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Global Research
Australias economy needs to rebalance from mining to non-mining led growth The process is being made more urgent by the slowdown in China and the fall in commodity prices But we think Australia will avoid a significant downturn or a recession, helped by a weakening AUD
10 July 2013
Paul Bloxham Chief Economist, Australia & New Zealand HSBC Bank Australia Limited +61 2 9255 2635 paulbloxham@hsbc.com.au Adam Richardson Economist HSBC Bank Australia Limited +61 2 9006 5848 adamrichardson@hsbc.com.au
We remain optimistic that Australia will pull off its rebalancing, although growth is likely to be below trend this year (2.5%), before heading towards trend next year (2.8%). The RBA may cut rates further to support this rebalancing. Our optimism reflects that: Australias main trading partners are still the worlds fastest-growing economies; there are few imbalances in the local economy; the bulk of the local economy is outside of mining; policymakers still have room to move on the monetary and fiscal policy fronts; and the AUD could fall further if necessary. Key risks are a sharp fall in commodity prices, due to slower Asian growth, or a ramp-up in global commodity supply. However, we remain confident that local policymakers have room to loosen policy and the flexible AUD could provide support in the face of a negative global surprise. While a recession can never be completely ruled out, we think Australias R-word is more likely to be rebalancing.
Disclaimer & Disclosures This report must be read with the disclosures and the analyst certifications in the Disclosure appendix, and with the Disclaimer, which forms part of it
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be less than it has been in recent years, when it had been an extraordinarily large share of Australias GDP growth story
Source: RBA
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At the peak, in mid-2011, the average price of the basket of commodities that Australia exports was 370% higher than it was in 2000 in USD terms. Commodity prices have fallen by 27% since then, though they remain historically high, at around 240% above the level they were at in 2000 in USD terms. A significant AUD appreciation between Q1 2009 and Q2 2011 helped Australia to absorb the positive shock to local incomes from the rise in commodity prices, particularly the jump in prices after the global financial crisis. As a result, commodity prices rose by less in AUD terms over recent years than they had prior to the global financial crisis, dampening the impact on local incomes. The first stage boosted Australias income growth most significantly in the mid-2000s. Nominal GDP grew by 8.0% a year from 2004 to 2007 (Chart 2). It slowed to 6.4% between 2008 and 2011, and we expect nominal GDP growth will track below its long-run average in the coming four years, at closer to 5%, as global growth is more constrained and Australias terms of trade are expected to gradually decline. The first stage of the mining boom is over.
2. Nominal GDP is slowing as the commodity price boom is over
This stage of the mining story is now slowing. We believe this should not be a surprise, given the extraordinary pace of growth in mining investment over the past couple of years. For
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investment to continue to grow would have required more and more new (and larger) projects to enter the pipeline. This would have been unrealistic, in our view. Indeed, because Australia has been doing so much investment, the cost of new investment has risen substantially as companies have been competing for labour and capital, which has also discouraged new investment proposals. Mining investment is set to peak as a share of the Australian economy this year. The precise timing is difficult to determine due to the lumpy nature of these large projects. A guide to the likely timing of the peak is the Australian capital expenditure survey, which aggregates responses from firms about investment spending plans. The RBA has also provided its own forecasts, based on publicly available information, as well as its own confidential liaison. Both, the last set of available RBA forecasts and the numbers from the last capital expenditure survey suggest that mining investment will plateau over the coming year, rather than peak and fall sharply (Chart 4).
4. Investment should plateau, but not plummet
Beyond this period, we expect mining investment will fall and be a drag on economic growth. However, this does not imply that mining is necessarily an overall drag on the economy. After all, this capacity has been built for a reason to boost Australias resources exports.
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exports are a much larger share of GDP than mining investment: so while mining investment is set to decline in coming years, we expect this to be more than offset by a rise in resources exports (Chart 6).
6. Mining sector should contribute positively in real terms
but to edge downwards over the next couple of years (Chart 7). Clearly, this is an important assumption and we discuss the risks in the final chapter, below.
7. Commodity prices to cycle around a new higher mean
But this is not the full story. A large part of the boost to the economy from the mining run-up in recent years came from rising commodity prices (stage one of the mining boom). If there was a large fall in commodity prices, this would be a drag on the nominal economy. That is, the run-up in commodity prices boosts incomes, but a fall in prices would work in the other direction. Much depends on the commodity price outlook. We remain of the view that commodity prices will not fall back to the low levels of the 1980s and 1990s. We discuss this view in detail: Commodities and the global economy: Are current high prices the new normal?, 8 August 2012. In short, we expect the shifting composition of global growth towards the emerging world means global growth is now more commodity intensive as these economies have substantial infrastructure requirements. However, we do expect commodity prices have passed their peaks, which means that they are now a modest drag on income growth. Our working assumption for Australias terms of trade is that they remain structurally high. We expect them to cycle around a new higher mean than in the past,
With this working assumption for the terms of trade, we believe that the mining sectors nominal share of the Australian economy is likely to edge downwards in the next few years, although it is expected to remain significantly higher than it was in the 1990s and early 2000s (Chart 8). In broad terms, this shift in Australias economy matches the shift in the composition of global growth to being more driven by emerging economies. For Australia, the investment share is forecast to fall, but this is expected to be largely offset by a rise in export values.
8. In nominal terms, mining is expected to edge downwards
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Overall, our central view remains that mining is slowing, not collapsing, with the forthcoming fall in mining investment expected to be more than offset (in real terms) by a rise in exports, as new capacity comes online.
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Source: ABS
Given the slowdown in the mining sector this year, other sectors of the economy need to pick up and take over as drivers of local growth. Importantly, over 80% of Australias economy is not directly exposed to the mining boom. The bulk of the Australian economy is services, as is the case in most developed nations (Chart 10). Many of these sectors are interest rate and exchange rate sensitive and there are already signs that conditions are gradually improving in these sectors, given the low RBA cash rate. The recent
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fall in the AUD is expected to provide further support for exchange rate-sensitive sectors.
10. The bulk of the economy is services, not mining
Australias powerful policy tools, 13 January 2012), in contrast to many other developed economies where conventional policy options are no longer available. Estimates suggest that a 100bps cut in the cash rate boosts GDP by +0.9%, chiefly through higher household consumption and dwelling investment (Chart 12).
12. Australias cash rate setting is powerful
2 0
0.9
GDP (expenditure)
Source: HSBC estimates
In addition to the role of interest rates, the currency is also likely to support a rebalancing of the Australian economy. The AUD has fallen significantly in recent months. During the mining investment boom, the exchange rate appreciation played a buffering role, dampening the positive shock to local incomes and spreading the benefits of high commodity prices by boosting the purchasing power of households over internationally produced goods, services and assets, effectively pushing local demand offshore. As mining investment cools, the exchange rate will likely again play its traditional buffering role. A lower exchange rate should help to rebalance production towards the domestic economy. A lower currency improves the competitiveness of Australias exporters and relative price shifts encourage greater consumption spending within Australia, while the tourism and education sectors will also get a boost from a lower exchange rate.
Source: RBA
Our empirical modelling suggests that cash rate changes typically have a significant impact of growth in Australia (see Downunder digest:
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This mechanism was somewhat stymied in late 2012 and early 2013 as the AUD remained around 30-year highs (Chart 13), despite commodity prices having fallen through 2012.
13. Australias great shock absorber is working again
Source: RP-Data-Rismark
Source: RBA
To some degree, the AUD was being artificially held up by capital flowing to Australia in search of an alternative safe haven to the US bond market. Since mid-April the AUD has depreciated and has moved back towards commodity price levels. Australias shock absorber is once again working to support the rebalancing of growth in the economy.
Evidence of rebalancing
Housing market is lifting
A key channel through which low interest rates are expected to lift the economy is the impact on new household borrowing. A recent solid rise in housing loan approvals provides evidence that monetary policy is getting some traction. The rise in housing lending is reflected in a lift in activity in the established housing market. National housing prices have risen by 5% since their trough in May 2012 (Chart 14).
Source: ABS
Dwelling investment has the potential to be a key contributor to growth over the next few years as a number of factors lend support to the sector (see Downunder digest: Australias housing pick-up, 19 March 2013). Mortgage rates are at low levels and the recent rise in house prices will likely encourage further investment in housing construction, as development returns rise. In
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addition, we have been through a period of underinvestment in housing, as construction has slowed in recent years. Coupled with continued population growth, demand for new housing is likely to remain robust (Chart 16).
16. Strong growth in dwelling investment is expected
A rise in dwelling investment will, however, not be enough. Household consumption also needs to lift if Australias growth is to rebalance and head back towards its trend pace.
However, we have yet to see a significant rise in household spending. Despite the 200 basis points in cuts that the RBA has provided, the saving rate has remained elevated (Chart 18) and consumption has yet to rise substantially. We still expect a pick-up in household consumption in coming quarters, and we have been somewhat surprised that this has not already occurred.
18. Household saving has remained stubbornly high
Source: ABS
A number of factors may have weighed on household spending activity. In particular, conditions in the labour market remain loose, constraining household sector confidence. Continued weakness in global activity has also likely added to household cautiousness (Chart 19). Households appear to be continuing to repay debts ahead of required rates, constraining their
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Businesses have also held back on hiring recently. The unemployment rate is currently around 5.5%, while jobs growth has only averaged around 24,000 a month since the beginning of 2013, which is not quite enough to match the increase in the labour force. This has seen the unemployment rate gradually drift higher since the middle of 2012 (Chart 21). With the unemployment rate above the full employment level, wage growth has been subdued, and an elevated unemployment rate is a factor holding back household confidence.
21. Labour market remains loose, subduing confidence
Source: ABS
Looking forward, policy settings are expected to be effective in boosting employment. A lower AUD coupled with lower borrowing costs should see business confidence begin to improve which should see firms committing to greater levels of hiring. After tracking broadly sideways in recent years, there are already some signs of improvement in employment in the more exchange rate-sensitive industries of the Australian economy (Chart 22). A lower exchange rate should see increased activity and employment in industries such as tourism, retail and manufacturing.
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Source: ABS
Source: ABS
Source: ABS
The number of Australias departing for international trips is also expected to level out in coming months as the lower AUD discourages international travel (Chart 24).
While some commentators argue that there are imbalances, we disagree with many of these arguments. First, in our view, Australia does not have a housing bubble. Second, while household debt levels are fairly high, they have been broadly stable for the past seven years and household debt is fairly well allocated to households that can afford to service it. Third, the mining investment that has been
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undertaken is, in our view, an appropriate allocation of capital, given our outlook for resources demand as emerging economies continue to drive global growth. Finally, inflation has been low across the economy, which is another sign that there have been limited excesses as a result of the mining boom.
No housing bubble
We have long held the view that Australia does not have a housing price bubble (see Downunder digest: Australian housing outlook positive, 12 July 2012, and Australias place in the world, 15 March 2011). While Australian house prices are fairly high, they are high for structural reasons that reflect underlying economic fundamentals. These include that supply is low relative to demand for housing, partly reflecting urban structure and zoning restrictions. These constraints limit the quantity of well located housing in Australian cities and these supply impediments are only resolved slowly. Solid population growth and low housing construction suggest that there is an undersupply of housing in Australia. A sharp fall in housing prices would be necessary to establish that Australia has a housing bubble, and we see a sharp fall as highly unlikely. It is worth keeping in mind that while Australian housing prices are fairly high, they are at comparable levels to a range of similar economies. The Australian house price-to-income ratio is similar to Belgium, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Canada, and only a slightly above the level in Italy and Germany (Chart 25).
Source: RBA
50 40 30 20 10 0 Lowest
Source: RBA
Highest
Micro survey data show that Australia also only has a small proportion of mortgages with very high loan-to-valuation ratios, high servicing burdens and low incomes. In 2011, only around 15% of indebted owner-occupiers had a housing
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gearing ratio greater than 80%. The subset of households that also had high debt servicing ratios of greater than 50% of their incomes was low, at 3.5% of all mortgages. Even within this group, almost half report in surveys that they have built up some buffer by being ahead on their mortgage repayments. Australia also never had sub-prime loans and has a full recourse mortgage system, which encourages households to only take on debts they can afford. Australians have taken the opportunity to consolidate their balance sheets somewhat in recent years, with debt-to-income ratios stabilising and household saving rising (Chart 27). This implies that the quantity of new and inherently more risky lending growth has been modest, with households holding more mature loans and many of them well ahead on their debt repayments.
27. Household debt has been steady since 2006
A run-up in the prices of Australias natural resources saw firms build up productive capacity in Australia with mining capital allocated based on the medium-term outlook for resources demand. As such, rather than an irrational bubble, the mining investment boom provides both an initial boost to growth and improves the medium-term prospects for Australian activity, through providing a sustained increase in Australian resources production. While there have been substantial cost overruns in many of Australias mining construction projects, much of this has reflected that Australia has been trying to do an extraordinary amount of work in a relatively short period of time. This has meant demand for skilled labour and capital in the mining industry has risen well ahead of available supply and driven up costs. Likewise, as mining investment is now slowing down, there are already early signs that many of those costs are falling. The bottom line remains that Australia is a low-cost producer of a range of commodities, even if it has been a high-cost investment destination in recent years. As we move into the production phase, Australia is expected to continue to have an absolute advantage in the production of most commodities. We discuss this topic further in the risks chapter, below.
Inflation is low
Source: ABS, RBA
Despite a mining boom, Australias inflation and wages growth has been subdued. Overall inflation is currently at the bottom end of the target band (Chart 28). Most mining booms in Australias history saw inflation rise rapidly, leaving policymakers with less flexibility to respond after the boom had ended. This time around, inflation is low, which is also a sign that there have been few excesses in the broader economy as a result of this mining boom.
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Source: ABS
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a significant downturn, given our outlook for Asia and because policymakers have room to move to support growth if needed
The challenge for policymakers is managing the economy in the
wake of the mining boom, which would have been easier if more had been saved or productivity-enhancing reforms occurred earlier
Commodity demand
A sharper downturn in Asia, which sees a fall in commodity demand, is a key downside risk to Australias outlook. For further discussion of the risks to the Asian growth outlook see: Asias bitter medicine, 9 July 2013.
Chinas current slowdown presents some risk in this regard. In the short run, there is some risk that Chinas current focus on faster reforms sees less fixed asset investment than we currently forecast (see Hongbin Qu, China: Faster reform, slower growth, 19 June 2013). However, our mediumterm view remains positive. In our view, China has significant infrastructure yet to build in the medium term, which should support medium-term demand for commodities (see Hongbin Qu, China Inside Out: Yes, China still needs infrastructure, 5 October 2012). The infrastructure story also extends beyond China to across the Asian region. Countries where there is significant infrastructure yet to be built include India, Indonesia and the Philippines (see Ronald Man, Bridging the gap, 20 May 2013). While China is approaching similar levels of per capita steel consumption as the West, India, for example, has barely started (Chart 29).
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The LNG outlook is also more stable as all seven LNG projects currently under construction have forward sold LNG on long-term contracts to various Asian nations.
Commodity supply
Another risk for Australia is that the significant global investment in the resources sector in recent years leads to a glut of supply, which puts downward pressure on commodity prices. Our central view remains that there is only enough supply of commodities due to come online to meet demand at prices that are well above their 1980s and 1990s levels (see Commodities and the global economy: Are current high prices the new normal?, 8 August 2012). But there is a risk that more supply comes online and suppresses prices. While this is a credible risk, it is important to keep in mind that Australia is a low-cost producer of a broad range of commodities. As such, in many cases Australia would continue to export rising quantities of commodities, even if the prices were lower than expected. For iron ore, which is Australias largest commodity export, the large producers are very low on the global cost curve (Chart 31). The same applies for many of the large coal producers, although not all.
31. Australian iron ore at the low end of the cost curve
R e a l (2 0 1 0 ) C a s h C o s t s (U S D /t ) 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 0 600 1,200 1,800 Vale Rio BHP Chinese producers
Source: RBA
Importantly, much of Australias recent investment has been in capacity to produce LNG, and thus energy. Over three-quarters of the resources investment boom in Australia has been in capacity to produce LNG. Australia is therefore set to become a large global energy producer. The prospects for energy demand are promising, with a number of Asian developing economies still at very low levels of per capita energy consumption. Chinas energy consumption is still at low levels relative to developed economies and India is at very low levels (Chart 30). Japan is also in the process of substituting nuclear power generation, having shut down 48 of its 50 nuclear power plants following the March 2011 nuclear disaster at Fukushima.
30. Energy consumption is still low in China and India
Source: RBA
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US shale gas
For LNG, a significant possible threat to supply is from US shale gas. However, as we noted above, the LNG story should be more stable than other commodities as the product is forward sold on long-term contracts. Australias domestic economy is also somewhat protected by the high foreign involvement in the mining industry. Australias mining sector is 80% foreign-owned and the concentration of foreign involvement in the LNG sector is even more highly concentrated. Australias seven major LNG projects are being built by consortia of global multinationals, including Chevron, Exxon, Mobil, Shell and Conoco-Phillips. When the resources boom was ramping up, the leakage of demand offshore was a source of local angst, as it meant less support for local demand. Likewise, as the mining story slows, foreign involvement should be a source of some comfort, as it has a risk-sharing effect.
probability of a recession in any one year is around 20% of course this means that there is an 80% chance of no recession in any year.
32. Australia has had six technical recessions in 52 years
Importantly, we dont see the chances of a recession as significantly higher than normal. To see a much greater chance than normal means arguing that there are significant imbalances that need to correct which, as we have argued above, we do not see. Or, that there are reasons to think that policymakers would be unable to respond effectively to a downturn which also seems unlikely in Australias case. As we have noted above, the RBA has room to move on interest rates if required and the exchange rate could depreciate further to act as a shock absorber against negative foreign shocks. The governments relatively strong balance sheet also offers a line of defence for the economy. Net public debt is low, particularly in comparison to other advanced economies around the world (Chart 33). At the same time, the government remains on a path of consolidation and the fiscal deficit is relatively small (-1.3% of GDP). The government could provide support for growth with fiscal stimulus if necessary.
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33. Public debt is very low, so fiscal policy has room to move
Source: IMF
Of course, a recession can never be completely ruled out. A recession can occur if there is a significant downside surprise, which happens quickly and catches policymakers off guard. The speed of adjustment matters a great deal. This is one of the reasons why we do not expect the end of the mining investment boom to cause a recession because it is widely forecast to occur, which means markets and policymakers have time to respond. The likely driver of a recession would be a negative surprise from abroad probably a sharper-than-expected downturn in Asia. Of course, a downside surprise from abroad would also motivate a response from overseas policymakers. In Chinas case, our Chief China economist remains of the view that China is highly unlikely to have a hard landing because Chinese authorities still have plenty of ammunition to shore up the countrys economy if needed. In particular, he notes that China has a fiscal surplus that has totalled RMB960bn in the first five months, leaving Chinas fiscal accounts in a healthy position. He sees the risk that GDP growth falls below 7% as remote (Hongbin Qu, China Inside Out: Will the cash crunch lead to a hard landing?, 26 June 2013).
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Given low levels of government debt and a fairly flexible economy, these issues are not expected to be too detrimental to Australias growth prospects though it is fair to say Australias does face some structural issues that should have been dealt with when incomes were growing strongly. In the short run, we believe Australias major economic challenge is a lack of confidence. Australias great rebalancing relies on businesses outside of the mining sector and households being confident enough to make investments and spend, and non-mining businesses confident enough to hire. Despite already low interest rates, confidence has remained surprisingly subdued in the first half of 2013. There have been a number of reasons for this, including the mining slowdown, worries about growth in China, the high level the AUD maintained until recently, and local political issues leading to policy uncertainty. With limited help from other policymakers, the central bank is left with the bulk of the burden of managing the transition from mining investment-led growth to growth supported by the non-mining sectors. To manage this, the RBA has already cut its cash rate to its lowest level in 53 years to support rebalancing, but until recently the high AUD was keeping financial conditions tight, despite the rate cuts. The recent fall in the AUD will help support Australias great rebalancing. The falling AUD is also an upside risk to inflation, though at this stage it is largely offset by a loose labour market, which is continuing to put downward pressure on local wages growth. The next move in interest rates is highly dependent on where the AUD settles. Current market pricing suggests another cut is likely in coming months.
For other arms of policy, we believe the focus ought to be on lifting Australias productivity growth, which has been weak recently. Tax and regulatory reform ought to be high on the policymakers agenda and be a key part of the discussion in the lead-up to this years election. Infrastructure is also a key issue as congestion is acting as a key constraint on Australias productivity growth.
Australias R-word
In our view, Australias R-word is rebalancing, not recession. Given our outlook for the global economy and Asia in particular, and Australias current policy settings, a rebalancing of Australias growth is far more likely than a recession. Asias infrastructure build-out has many years to run yet and its energy demand is still low and set to rise rapidly. We remain cautiously optimistic about our outlook for the Australian economy for three key reasons. First, despite a slowdown in Asia, Asian economies are still expected to be the fastest-growing economies in the world and Australias strongest ties are to Asia. Second, Australias mining story is slowing down, not collapsing, with the ramp-up in resources exports yet to come. Finally, Australias interest rates and currency are both now supportive of a rebalancing of Australias growth; and, in our view, Australias economy does not have obvious structural imbalances that constrain its ability for growth to rebalance. We expect a period of below-trend growth in 2013, but for growth to head towards trend in 2014. We believe the RBA may need to deliver further stimulus to support growth, but it is also possible that the AUD depreciates sufficiently to obviate the need for further rate cuts.
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Forecast table
HSBCs forecasts for Australia _______ Year-average _______ 2012 2013 2014 %* AUSTRALIA GDP Consumption Govt consumption Investment - Dwelling - Business - Public Final domestic demand Domestic demand Exports Imports GDP (% quarter sa) CPI** Trimmed mean** Unemployment rate Labour price index Current A/C (%GDP) Terms of trade Budget balance (%GDP) Capital city house prices Private sector credit USD/AUD (end period) 90 day bank bill rate Cash rate (end period) __________________________Year-ended___________________________ Q113 Q213e Q313e Q413e Q114e Q214e Q314e
3.6 3.3 3.1 8.7 -3.8 16.5 0.7 4.7 4.7 6.0 6.4 -1.8 2.3 5.2 3.6 -3.9 -10.4 -3.0 -0.7 3.8 1.04 3.19 3.00
2.5 2.2 0.6 -0.3 5.0 -0.2 -4.3 1.2 0.7 7.6 -0.3 -2.4 2.3 5.5 3.2 -2.4 -2.9 -1.5 4.9 3.8 0.90 2.80 2.50
2.8 2.9 2.1 3.0 9.4 -0.6 9.8 2.8 2.8 6.6 7.0 -3.0 2.8 5.4 3.5 -2.5 -0.9 -1.0 5.9 6.6 0.86 3.30 3.00
2.5 2.0 0.5 0.9 2.7 2.3 -5.8 1.1 0.3 8.1 -3.2 0.6 2.5 2.2 5.5 3.2 -2.2 -6.2 -2.6 3.2 1.04 3.30 3.00
2.6 1.9 -0.5 1.5 5.6 1.4 -2.0 0.6 0.4 8.0 -1.3 0.7 2.7 2.2 5.5 3.0 -2.4 -6.1 -4.2 3.2 0.96 3.05 2.75
2.5 2.3 0.8 0.6 5.6 -1.6 4.2 1.3 0.6 8.4 1.0 0.7 1.9 2.3 5.5 3.1 -2.5 -0.8 -6.7 3.9 0.94 2.80 2.50
2.7 2.6 1.8 -2.9 6.1 -2.5 -11.9 1.9 1.6 6.1 2.2 0.7 2.6 2.3 5.5 3.2 -2.4 2.1 -6.2 4.9 0.90 2.80 2.50
2.9 2.8 1.8 3.8 8.7 1.6 7.2 2.9 3.0 6.5 7.4 0.8 2.9 2.6 5.4 3.3 -2.4 -0.4 -7.3 6.1 0.89 2.80 2.50
2.9 2.9 2.1 3.7 10.2 0.1 10.4 3.0 3.0 6.1 7.0 0.7 2.9 2.8 5.4 3.4 -2.4 0.0 6.2 6.8 0.88 2.80 2.50
2.8 3.0 2.2 2.6 10.3 -1.8 11.5 2.7 2.7 6.7 6.8 0.6 3.1 2.8 5.3 3.5 -2.6 -1.0 5.2 6.8 0.87 3.05 2.75
Source: ABS, RBA, HSBC forecasts *unless otherwise specified **includes the effect of the carbon tax from Q312
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Disclosure appendix
Analyst Certification
The following analyst(s), economist(s), and/or strategist(s) who is(are) primarily responsible for this report, certifies(y) that the opinion(s) on the subject security(ies) or issuer(s) and/or any other views or forecasts expressed herein accurately reflect their personal view(s) and that no part of their compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendation(s) or views contained in this research report: Paul Bloxham and Adam Richardson
Important Disclosures
This document has been prepared and is being distributed by the Research Department of HSBC and is intended solely for the clients of HSBC and is not for publication to other persons, whether through the press or by other means. This document is for information purposes only and it should not be regarded as an offer to sell or as a solicitation of an offer to buy the securities or other investment products mentioned in it and/or to participate in any trading strategy. Advice in this document is general and should not be construed as personal advice, given it has been prepared without taking account of the objectives, financial situation or needs of any particular investor. Accordingly, investors should, before acting on the advice, consider the appropriateness of the advice, having regard to their objectives, financial situation and needs. If necessary, seek professional investment and tax advice. Certain investment products mentioned in this document may not be eligible for sale in some states or countries, and they may not be suitable for all types of investors. Investors should consult with their HSBC representative regarding the suitability of the investment products mentioned in this document and take into account their specific investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs before making a commitment to purchase investment products. The value of and the income produced by the investment products mentioned in this document may fluctuate, so that an investor may get back less than originally invested. Certain high-volatility investments can be subject to sudden and large falls in value that could equal or exceed the amount invested. Value and income from investment products may be adversely affected by exchange rates, interest rates, or other factors. Past performance of a particular investment product is not indicative of future results. HSBC and its affiliates will from time to time sell to and buy from customers the securities/instruments (including derivatives) of companies covered in HSBC Research on a principal or agency basis. Analysts, economists, and strategists are paid in part by reference to the profitability of HSBC which includes investment banking revenues. For disclosures in respect of any company mentioned in this report, please see the most recently published report on that company available at www.hsbcnet.com/research. * HSBC Legal Entities are listed in the Disclaimer below.
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abc
bertrand.j.delgado@us.hsbc.com
stefan.schilbe@hsbc.de
agata.urbanska@hsbcib.com
mathilde.lemoine@hsbc.fr
North America
Kevin Logan Chief US Economist +1 212 525 3195 kevin.r.logan@us.hsbc.com Ryan Wang +1 212 525 3181 David G Watt +1 416 868 8130 ryan.wang@us.hsbc.com david.g.watt@hsbc.ca
melismetiner@hsbc.com.tr
simon.williams@hsbc.com
liz.martins@hsbc.com
Asia Pacific
Qu Hongbin Managing Director, Co-head Asian Economics Research and Chief Economist Greater China +852 2822 2025 hongbinqu@hsbc.com.hk Frederic Neumann Managing Director, Co-head Asian Economics Research +852 2822 4556 fredericneumann@hsbc.com.hk Leif Eskesen Chief Economist, India & ASEAN +65 6658 8962 leifeskesen@hsbc.com.sg Paul Bloxham Chief Economist, Australia and New Zealand +612 9255 2635 paulbloxham@hsbc.com.au Adam Richardson +612 9006 5848 Donna Kwok +852 2996 6621 Trinh Nguyen +852 2996 6975 Ronald Man +852 2996 6743 Sun Junwei +86 10 5999 8234 Sophia Ma +86 10 5999 8232 Su Sian Lim +65 6658 8963 adamrichardson@hsbc.com.au donnahjkwok@hsbc.com.hk trinhdnguyen@hsbc.com.hk ronaldman@hsbc.com.hk junweisun@hsbc.com.cn xiaopingma@hsbc.com.cn susianlim@hsbc.com.sg
Latin America
Andre Loes Chief Economist, Latin America +55 11 3371 8184 andre.a.loes@hsbc.com.br Argentina Javier Finkman Chief Economist, South America ex-Brazil +54 11 4344 8144 javier.finkman@hsbc.com.ar Ramiro D Blazquez Senior Economist +54 11 4348 2616 Jorge Morgenstern Senior Economist +54 11 4130 9229 Brazil Constantin Jancso Senior Economist +55 11 3371 8183 Mexico Sergio Martin Chief Economist +52 55 5721 2164 Claudia Navarrete Economist +52 55 5721 2422 Central America Lorena Dominguez Economist +52 55 5721 2172
ramiro.blazquez@hsbc.com.ar
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constantin.c.jancso@hsbc.com.br
sergio.martinm@hsbc.com.mx
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