Vda de Jacob vs Court of Appeals

FACTS: This is a case of settlement of estate where the legally adopted son questions the validity of marriage of Tomasa to Alfredo Jacob. The marriage certificate was lost so secondary evidence of reconstructed marriage contract was issued.

ISSUE: Whether the secondary evidence is enough to prove the existence of marriage

HELD: The rules provide that execution and loss must be proven before secondary evidence may be admissible.

The due execution can be proven by: parties themselves, swearing officers, witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties, and those to whom the parties narrated the execution thereof. While loss can be proven by: those who knows the fact of its loss, those who has made in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document are usually kept by the person in custody of the document lost and unable to find it, and those who has made the investigation to convince the court that the document was lost.

In the case at bar, the due execution was proven by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil and Tomasa Jacob who are present in the marriage ceremony and the loss was proven by the testimonies of the officiating priest and Tomasa Jacob. Hence, the secondary evidence is admissible.

CITIBANK vs TEODORO

FACTS: Teodoro was issued a credit card by CITIBANK. because it does not corresponds to his actual obligations.

He refused to pay the bill

ISSUE: Whether the invoices or charge slips are photocopies are they admissible.

HELD: Before secondary evidence can be shown to prove the contents the original the following must be proven: the execution of the original, the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court, and the offeror must not be in bad faith to which the unavailability of document can be attributed to.

In the case at bar, the secondary evidence is not admissible because the original was not produced by the equitable bank and since the sales invoices are prepared in triplicate copies. All of them must be proven to be lost before secondary evidence like photocopies and testimonies can be admitted.

De Vera vs Aguilar

FACTS: Petitioners and respondents are children and heirs of Marcosa Bernabe. The disputed land was mortgaged and redeemed by the respondent, in return was sold to them. Consequently, the respondent had registered the sale and had been paying taxes since then. However, the respondent claimed that they were co-owner of the property and that the property was resold to Bernabe. The RTC favored the petitioner after admitting the Xeroxed copy of sales as evidence of resale to Bernabe while CA reversed the decision after finding that the loss of the original sale has not been proven. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner had proven the loss of the original deed of sale.

HELD: No. The introduction of secondary evidence can be allowed only after the existence, execution, loss, contents has been proven, although this order may be changed upon the discretion of the court.

In case at bar, the existence and execution was properly proven. However, the destruction of the duplicate was not accounted. Hence, secondary evidence cannot be admitted. Wherefore, the decision of CA is affirmed.

The certified true copy and Xerox copy was submitted to the Registry of Deeds of Malolos for registration. The petitioners should have asked the office to produce it in court or its representative to explain why they failed to do so.

CALON vs ENRIQUEZ

FACTS: The case involves recovery of land. The plaintiff alleged that he has acquired the land by composicion con el estado and the defendant alleged they are entitled to the possession of the land because of 30 years and more possession of such property. The RTC favored the plaintiff. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo committed error in not ordering an ocular inspection.

HELD: No. Ocular inspection would depend on sound judgment and discretion of the court. Also, it is the duty of parties litigant to present proof which will accurately and definitely describe the property in question and its relation to adjoining property.

The complainant describes accurately the land and the document presented by the plaintiffs had identified the land. Hence, ocular inspection is unnecessary.

LAZATIN vs CAMPOS

FACTS: The petitioner claims to be an adopted child of the deceased Mariano Lazatin to enable him to intervene in the probate proceeding by mere certification, which tends to prove the status of a recognized natural child, of the deceaseds brother instead of

competent and documentary proof of a judicial proceedings for his legal adoption. Three months after the death of Mariano, his wife, Margarita , died leaving a holographic will which provides among others a legacy of education among others for Ramon Sta. Maria, son of the petitioner Renato Lazatin.

ISSUE: Whether or not secondary evidence may be admitted despite the rule that adoption should be proven by judicial decree of adoption and cannot be substituted by parol evidence.

HELD: Yes, when the records of adoption proceedings was lost or destroyed but prior to that existence must be first proved. The correct order of proof is existence, execution, loss, contents, although may be changed at the discretion of the court. However, the petitioner failed to establish existence and subsequent loss or destruction. Mere fact that the deceased spouses treated the petitioner as their child does not justify the conclusion that petitioner had been judicially adopted or constitute a proof of adoption.

BONILLAS, RODELAS vs ARANZA

FACTS: This is a case for probate of Ricardo Bonillas will wherein the will in question was not produced by petitioner in its original because the same has been lost. Respondents contested the probate of the will contending the holographic will itself and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce to effect as in held in Gan vs Yap (104 PhIL. 509). The petition for probate of the will was dismissed. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proven by means of photostatic copy or xerox copy.

HELD: If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or Xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gan vs Yap (104 PhIL. 509) a

footnote of said decision says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

MAGDAYAO vs PEOPLE

FACTS: This is a case involving a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 wherein the petitioner issued a check against his account at PNB in favor of Ricky Olvis as a payment for an obligation. The latter deposited the check in his account with the BPI Family Bank but the drawee bank dishonored the check for the reason Drawn Again Insufficient Funds stamped on the dorsal portion of the check. The petitioner requested the check to be replaced with two other checks: one for P400,000 and another for P200,000 while the original 600,000 check was returned to the petitioner.

During the trial, the prosecution marked a photocopy of the PNB check and the dorsal portion thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the photocopy can be admitted in evidence.

HELD: The photocopy can be admitted. Rule 130 Sec. 3 (b) of the Rules of Court provides that secondary evidence of a writing may be admitted when the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice. Under Sec. 6 of Rule 130, the mere fact that the original is in the custody of the adverse party does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offerror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the other party to produce the document. The notice may be in the form of a motion for production of the original or made in open court in the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum. When such party does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to, secondary evidence may be admitted.

In this case, there is evidence that the check was returned to accused in exchange for two checks which he issued to cover the amount therein. Accused himself admitted that he received the original. Accused however never offered to produce the original. He deliberately withheld the original of the check as a bargaining chip for the court to grant him an opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense.

GAN vs YAP

FACTS: The case is a probate proceeding on a holographic will being opposed by the husband of the testator asserting that his wife did not left any will. The proceeding did not prosper in the trial court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether a holographic will can be probated upon testimony of witnesses.

HELD: No. Rule 77 of Rules of Court approved in 1940, allows proof of a lost or destroyed will by secondary evidence the testimony of witnesses, in lieu of the original document. However, the Rules could not have contemplated to include the holographic will.

The Civil Code requires wills to be protocoled and presented to the judge who shall prescribe it and require its identity to e established by 3 (three) witnesses who depose that they have no reasonable doubt that the will was written by the testator. This procedure requires presentation of the will.

Article 692 of Civil Code requires that the relatives think that the face of the document itself was written by the testator not mere knowledge of the will. If this will be

allowed, the oppositor of the will is disadvantaged by not knowing the existence of the will or be able to prove its invalidity.

EDSA vs BF CORP.

FACTS: This is a case for collection of money arising out of a construction contract between Edsa Shangri-la and BF Corporation. In a memorandum-letter to BF, ESHRI laid out the collection procedure BF was to follow to wit: submission of the Progress Payment Certificate ESHRIs Engineering Department, following-up of the preparation of the Progress Payment Certificate with the Head of the Quantity Surveying Department, abd following-up of the release of the payment with one Evelyn San Pascual. BF submitted a total of 19 progress billings following the procedure agreed upon. Based on Progress Billing Nos. 1-13, BF was paid. However, for Progress Biolling Nos. 14-19, did not re-measure the work done, did not prepare the Progress Payment Certificates, let alone remit payment of the inclusive periods covered. In this regard, BF claimed having been misled into working continuously on the project by ESHRI which gave the assurance about the Progress Payment Certificates already being processed. After several futile attempts to collect by BF for the unpaid billings they filed for sum of money and damages. The RTC favored BF and was confirmed by the CA. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not a photocopy of a billing is admissible as evidence of billing and non-payment.

HELD: Rule 130 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court provides that a party may present secondary evidence of the contents of a writing not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party. In either instance, however, certain explanations must be given before a party can resort to secondary evidence. Complemented by Sec. 6 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides that if the document is in the custody or under control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of loss.

Petitioners were able to prove through the stenographic notes of exchanges between the counsel for BF and ESHRI that: the existence of the original documents which ESHRI had possession of; a request was made on ESHRI to produce the

documents; ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to produce them; and ESHRI was not inclined to produce them. Therefore, presentation of secondary evidence is justified.

SAAD AGRO vs REPUBLIC FACTS: The petitioner bought the disputed land from Orcullo who was issued a free patent for the said lot by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Sometime in 1995, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a complaint for annulment of title and reversion of the lot following the discovery that the lot is allegedly part of the timberland and forest reserve of Sibonga, Cebu.

Petitioner points out that P.D. No. 705 took effect on May 19, 1975 or long after the issuance of the free patent and title in question. It adds that if the subject lot was encompassed by the term public forest, the same should have been designated as a Timberland Block not as Cadastral Lot which was the designation made by the Republic prior to 1972.

The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that respondent failed to show that the subject lot is part of the timberland or forest reserve or that it has been classified as such before the issuance of the free patent and the original title. On appeal, the Court of Appeals in its decision reversed and set aside the trial courts judgment. It also Question the CAs reliance on the land classification map presented by respondent. The trial court had previously declared L.C. Map as inadmissible because it is neither a certified true copy nor attested to be true copy by DENR official having legal custody of the original thereof and thus should not have been made the basis of the cancellation of the free patent and title. Finally, it claims that the respondent failed to overcome the presumption of regularity of the issuance of the free patent and title in favor of Orcullo.

ISSUE: Whether or not photocopy of LC Map is admissible to determine that subject lot is part of timberland of forest reserve.

HELD: The photocopy of LC Map is not admissible. Indeed a photocopy is admissible when the original is in custody of a public officer or is recorded in the public office. However, to prove its contents, there is a need to present a certified copy issued by the

public officer in custody thereof. In addition, the LC Map may be considered a public document and prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, the map, to be admissible for any purpose, must be evidence by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record.

The rules of admissibility must be applied uniformly even when the Government is one of the parties.

Some officers from the CENRO office in Cebu testified that they personally saw the subject lot and that it falls within the timberland or forest reserve. Ultimately, however, the basis of their declaration is the LC MAP which the respondent failed to present in accordance with the rules on admissibility. Even assuming that the LC Map is admissible, still the land in question can hardly be considered part of the timberland or forest reserve. LC Map which purports to be the correct map of the areas demarcated as permanent forest pursuant of the provisions of P.D. No. 705 as amended was made only in 1980. Thus, the delineation of the areas was made nine years after Orcullo was awarded the free patent over the subject lot.

The Court has always upheld the Regalian doctrine as the basic foundation of the States property regime. Nevertheless, the fact that in every claim or right by the Government against one of its citizens, the paramount considerations of fairness and due process must be observed. Respondent failed to show that the subject lot is part of timberland or forest reserve it adverted to. In the face of the uncontroverted status of free patent as valid and regular issuances, respondents insistence on the classification of the lot as part of the forest reserve must be rejected.

SANTOS vs COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: This is an ejectment case and collection for unpaid rentals wherein the private respondent presented an unsigned copy of the lease agreement to prove the contents of the contract and the existence and due execution by affidavits of witnesses. This establishes their cause of action after claiming the original contract was lost.

Petitioner stresses that no lease contract had been executed between her and PGFI. She points out that the contents of the copy of the alleged contract must correspond exactly with the contents of the original. However, without the parties signature, the copy presented by PGFI cannot be legally considered as a copy of the original contract. Even the affidavits of PGFIs witnesses are insufficient, according to petitioner, since none of those witnesses had the opportunity to compare the copy with the original.

Petitioner Santos has been continuously occupying said premises even after the expiration of the lease agreement and without paying for the rents.

ISSUE: Whether or not an unsigned copy of an original is admissible as evidence to prove the existence of a lease agreement or not.

HELD: Before the contents of an original document may be proved by secondary evidence, there must first be satisfactory proof of its execution or existence of the original. Secondary evidence, then, may be admitted to prove the contents of the contract. The contents of the original document may be proved by a copy, by recital of its contents in some authentic document or by the recollection of witnesses.

The existence and due execution of the lease contract had been established by the affidavits of the trustees of plaintiff who were signatories thereto. There is also a testimonial evidence on record to prove the contents of the lost lease contract. The affidavits of the witnesses for PGFI contain a recital of the offer of petitioner to occupy the subject premises for a specified amount payable every month. Thus, the unsigned copy that was presented at the trial of this case, there is still evidence of the contents of the contract in the form of testimonial evidence. The contents of the lost original copy may not only be proved by a copy thereof but also by the testimony of witnesses. At best, the original copy of the contract that was later found merely affirms what had already been established by secondary evidence.

DIOSO vs CARDENO

FACTS: This is a complaint for performance and/or easement of right of way. Petitioners presented a photocopy of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay to prove the agreement to grant the right of way.

The respondents specifically denied the genuineness and due execution of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay, alleging that it was falsified. According to the respondents, respondent Leonora Cardeno and Encarnacion Javel could not have claimed coownership over Lor 248-A to the exclusion of their other siblings as early as 1977 when the Pinanumpaang Salaysay was supposedly executed, because it was only on August 27, 1992 that the other siblings waived their shares over the said property in favor of respondents.

The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the respondents. The CA rendered it decision substantially affirming that of the trial courts.

ISSUE: Whether or not a photocopy of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay is admissible under the best evidence rule.

HELD: The admission of secondary evidence in case of loss or unavailability of the original document is thus warranted upon satisfactory proof of the following: execution or existence of the original; loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence.

Petitioners were able to prove the due execution of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay, the photocopy and testimonial evidence to prove its due execution and loss of the original document, and that, despite earnest efforts on their part, could not produce the original. The presentation of secondary evidence to prove the contents of the said document was therefore justified.

The rule on the admission of secondary evidence provides that the contents of the original document may be proved: by a copy; by a recital of its contents in some authentic document; or by the recollection of the witnesses, in the order stated. The trial

court and the CA, erred in denying the admission of a photocopy of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay, when it can prove the contents thereof.

Having established the existence and due execution of Pinanumpaang Salaysay, the respondents are obliged to grant the petitioners a right of way in accordance with the terms thereof.

PACASUM vs PEOPLE

FACTS: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the Decision of the Sandiganbayan in finding the petitioner guilty of falsification.

The accused, Normallah A. Pacasum, a high ranking public official being the Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourim in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City, while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation thereto, taking advantage of her official position in falsifying her employee clearance by imitating the signature of Laura Y. Pangilan, Supply Officer 1, for purpose of claiming her salary for the months of August and September.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandigan Bayan erred in admitting photocopy of employees clearance to prove the contents of the original.

HELD: No. Rule 130 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. The rule, however, admits several exceptions: under Sec 3(b) of the same rule secondary evidence may be admitted when the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice and to warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing in the custody or control of the adverse party and under Sec. 6 of the same rule provides that when the original is in adverse partys custody and control, after reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of loss.

In the case, the prosecution thru COA two telegram subpoenas addressed to accused and her secretary to submit the original copy of the said employees clearance but was not followed. Hence, the presentation and admission of the photocopy of the original copy of the questioned employees clearance as secondary evidence to prove the contents thereof was justified.

GABATAN vs CA

FACTS: This is an action for Recovery of property and ownership and possession.

The respondent alleged that she is the sole owner of the disputed land, having inherited the same form her deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan Evero. It was claimed that prior to her death, Hermogena, demanded for the return of the land but to no avail. After Hermogenas death, the respondent demanded the same but the petitioners did not surrender.

The petitioner denied that the respondents mother, Hermogena, was the daughter of Juan Gabatan because he died single. Consequently, his brother and two sisters became his rightful heir and have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than 50 years and enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the whole world including respondent.

RTC granted the petition and was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this case.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the respondent had proved her filiation to Juan Gabatan.

Whether an authenticated photocopy of Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the respondent can be admitted as evidence.

HELD: No. The original typewritten birth certificate, uses a form of 1950s vintage, was presented by the respondent. No actual signature appears thereon except that of certain Maximo P. Noriaga, Deputy Local Civil Registrar, who purportedly certified on July 6, 1977 that it was a true copy of petitioners birth certificate. Also, Noriaga was not presented to identify the document. The respondent was the one who identified the document and the signature whose self-serving testimony cannot be deemed sufficient authentication of the birth certificate. While the certified copy of the handwritten birth certificate of the respondent presented by the petitioner were duly authenticated two competent witnesses: Assistant Registration Officer of the Office of the City Civil Registrar and the Achivist of the National Statistics Office.

Assuming that the birth certificate presented by respondent is a reliable document, the same on its face is insufficient to prove respondents filiation to her alleged grandfather, Juan Gabatan. It would only had proven the Hermogena was the respondents mother not to the establish that Hermogena was a daughter of Gabatan.

HELD: No. Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. It admits exception but basis for the presentation of secondary evidence must still be established. In this case, the use of the transcript of the testimony of Pacana who identified the photocopy of the Deed of Sale plainly shows that she gave no testimony regarding the whereabouts of the original, whether it was lost or whether it was recorded in any public office. Furthermore the certification of Velez is insufficient authentication of Deed of Absolute Sale since it did not indicate that it is a true copy of original. It is even highly doubtful that Velez could have made the attestation since the assessors office is

not the official repository of original notarized deeds of sale and could not have been the legal custodian contemplated in the rules.

Even if the authentication of Deed of Absolute Sale is to be considered admissible, it still nonetheless would have only provided proof that a certain Hermogena was the heir of Juan Gabatan and does not show the filiation of the respondent to either Hermogena or Juan Gabatan.

REPUBLIC vs VERZOSA

FACTS: Versoza filed a petition for reconstitution of the original copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). She alleged that she and Garcia are the registered owner of the land, that the original copy of their title was lost as shown by the Affidavit of Loss executed by her co-owner, and that the said title was in full force and effect and that no deed or other instrument involving the said property has been presented or pending registration with the Office of the Register of Deeds, at the time the title was destroyed.

The RTC granted the petition and was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not a photocopy of the owners duplicate of transfer certificate of title is enough to grant the petition for reconstitution.

HELD: Yes. The owners duplicate of the transfer certificate of title is given primacy in allowing reconstitution not a mere photocopy thereof. Versozas presentation of the photocopy of owners duplicate of the TCT requires her to comply with the conditions for its admissibility under Rule 130 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court. In the case, Versoza had submitted the affidavit of loss to establish that the duplicate of the TCT was lost and other documents to sufficiently reconstitute the title even without the photocopy of the title. It is correct the court must exercise the greatest caution in entertaining petitions for reconstitution of destroyed or lost certificates of title. However, the law does not give the

court discretion to deny the reconstitution if all the basic requirements have been complied with.

REPUBLIC vs MATEO

FACTS: Spouses Lorenzo and Feliciana Mateo filed before the RTC for reconstitution of the original copy and owners duplicate copy of transfer certificate of title.

The land covered by the title to be reconstituted was acquired by the spouses from Jose Tan. The original title could not be located despite of efforts to do so at the Registry of Deeds and Lorenzo lost the owners duplicate copy of transfer certificate of title because of frequent reassignement being a military officer.

The RTC denied the petition and was reversed by CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in giving weight to the alleged photocopy of the title.

HELD: Yes. Rule 130 Sec 5 of the rules of court directs that the order of presentation of secondary evidence is: existence, execution, loss, and contents. The order may, however, be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an allegedly lost document lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case.

Assuming that existence and execution of the original TCT has been satisfactorily shown and that it was taken by the Dept of justice and NBI in connection with the investigation of the judge on whose order the OCT from which the TCT was transferred, there is no satisfactory showing that TCT has been lost. The agent who received the TCT at the NBI office could have been presented to shed light on the whereabouts of the TCT

Even assuming that the original TCT was proved to be lost, the photocopy of the alleged owners duplicate copy was not shown to be kept under what circumstances, when and where taken that it was spared from being lost.

DECS vs Del Rosario

FACTS: Respondents filed before RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession against DECS by alleging that they own the parcel of land and it was registered in their name.

DECS countered that Kaypombo Primary School Annex (KPPS) occupation of a portion of the property was with the express consent and approval of respondents father, and donated by him to the Municipality for school site purposes. Atty. Natividad prepared the deed of donation and acceptance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner failed to prove the lost of the Deed of Doantion.

HELD: Yes. Prior to the introduction of secondary evidence, a party must establish the existence and due execution of the instrument. Then, he must prove that the document was lost or destroyed.

In the case, DECS alleged that the Deed of Donation was lost because their office transferred to a new site. However, they failed to account for the notarized Deed of Donation which the law requires Atty. Natividad to record and furnish to the designated government office. Also, DECS could have presented Atty. Natividad to explain why he did not retain the copy of Deed of Donation. This instances proves that DECS have not made diligent search to obtain a copy of the Deed of Donation.

PEOPLE vs DIMAANO

FACTS: This is a crime of rape by a daughter against his father. Complainant was 10 year old when she was first sexually abused and it was followed by two other incidents. The defendant claimed that it was impossible for him to rape his daughter because there were other people in the house, the complainant would not have accompanied him to the Police Station when he applied to police clearance.

The Trial Court convicted the accused. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the voluntary and due execution of the affidavit of desistance by the complainant shed doubts on the criminal charge.

HELD: The affidavit of desistance deserves scant consideration. Jurisprudence reveals that the court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought. Also, the complainant repudiated the affidavit of desistance in open court by stating that no lawyer assisted her when she affixed her signature and had shown her resolve to continue with the prosecution. Besides, RTC is not bound to dismiss the case when affidavit of desistance were executed. Moreover, a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign State and the power to prosecute and to punish crimes belongs to the State. In addition, the desistance did not retract her allegation that she was raped by her father. All that is stated in the affidavit was that she had decided to withdraw the complaints after the appellant agreed not to disturb the complainant, to consent to annul his marriage, allow his wife to solely manage the conjugal properties, and entrust the custody of his children to his wife.

Rule 130 Sections 26-33

VIACRUCIS vs CA

FACTS: Orais, private respondents bought an action to establish their title to a land. Mr. and Mrs. Viacrucis averred that they are the owners of the disputed land that the deed of sale exhibited in favor of Orais is a simulated transaction and is barred by the statute of limitations. RTC favored private respondent. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification.

In their petition to the Supreme Court, the petitioner maintains that the failure of Orais to bring the present action was an omission that may be given in evidence against him as provided in section 22 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and that when he tried to obtain a loan, offering the disputed land as collateral security, the bank did not accept said offer upon the ground that the land in question is not his property, in reply to which Orais said nothing, which is an admission by silence, pursuant to section 23 of Rule 130. Moreover, the petitioner contends that the admission of Mrs. Costelo, that he and his husband recognized Oraiz, as owner of the said lot despite their possession, is a violation of section 25 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of Mrs. Costelo be admitted.

HELD: Yes. The admission, which was confirmed by the public document, of Mrs. Costelo should be admitted because it constitute a declaration against their interest

pursuant to section 32 of Rule 130. Also, the admission was made five years before the petitioners predecessor in interest had entered into the picture, when Orais and Costelo were the only parties who had any interest in the obhect of said admission. Pursuant to said legal provision, such admission may be received in evidence, not only against the party who made it or his successors in interest, btsut also against third persons.

EDWARD A. KELLER & CO., LTD. Vs COB GROUP MARKETING INC.

FACTS: This case is about the liability of a marketing distributor under its sales agreements with the owner of the products. Edward A. Keller & Co., Ltd. Appointed COB Group Marketing, Inc. as exclusive distributor of its household products. The board of directors of COB Group Marketing were apprised by Jose A. Bax, the firms president and general manager, that the firm owed Keller and that he is also authorized to negotiate with Keller for the settlement of his firms liability as evidenced by minutes of meeting. COB Group Marketing through Bax, issued second chattle mortgages and a letter proposal of payment of the mortgaged obligation. These pieces of documentary evidence are sufficient to prove the liability of COB Group Marketing and to justify the foreclosure of the two previous mortgages. The RTC favored the respondent and was affirmed by the CA with modification. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in nullifying the admission of liability of COB.

HELD: Yes. Bax admitted that Keller Co. sent him statement of account supported by documentary evidence such as invoices and delivery receipt were presented of evidence. Also, Kellers finance managet submitted statement of account showing that COB Group Marketing owed Keller and that the amount is reflected in the customers ledger.

PEOPLE vs ALEGRE Y CERDONCILLO

FACTS: This is an automatic review of a decision of the RTC finding all the accused guilty of Robbery with Homicide.

Victims body was found in the bathroom and the bedroom was ransacked. Later Cudillan was apprehended in the act of pawning a bracelet taken from the victim. In the explanation on how he got the bracelet he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery. He made an extrajudicial confession implicating four other persons and one John Doe.

The accused alleged that the recital of facts based on the sworn statements was a product of compulsion leaving the testimony of the Sergeant, the companion remained silent during the identification of Cudillan, and the testimony of the prison mate, declaring the three appellant admitted to him the crime.

ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial confession can be admitted.

HELD: No. The extrajudicial confession is hearsay to other party and cannot be admitted under the principle of res acter inter alios Rule. The silence of the accused cannot be used against him because of the constitutional right to remain silent and right against self incrimination.

VERADERO DE MANILA vs INSULAR LUMBER CO.

FACTS: This is a case to set the amount for the repair of a lighter owned by Insular Lumber Co.. There is an implicit understanding that the amount to be paid would be lowe or as low as other company to have repaired it. The inspector of the vessel said that the repair would amount at a range of 7,000.00-8,000.00. The defendant admits that El Veradero de Nzavotas could have done it for about 8,000.00.

ISSUE: Whether or not the offer of compromise is admissible.

HELD: Yes, when the amount named in the offer to accept a certain sum in settlement appears to have been arrived at as a fair estimate of value making the said amount relevant.

PEOPLE vs GODOY

FACTS: This is an action for a crime of rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention against a teacher named Godoy. Sweetheart theory was alleged by the accused, corroborated by his co-teachers, and evidenced by letters.

ISSUE: Whether or not the compromise offered by the accused is an evidence of guilt.

HELD: Generally, compromise in criminal cases is an evidence of guilt. However, it can be shown that it is done to avoid legal consequences. During compromise the accused was not there so no admission of guilt can be implied.

PEOPLE vs DE GUZMAN

FACTS: This is an action against a crime of rape. The victim was going home riding the tricycle of the accused. When they are near an unfinished house in a subdivision, the accused stopped the tricycle saying that it is a bad condition. The victim get-off the tricycle and paid the fare, which the accused did not accept, then started to walk away. After a while the accused embraced her from behind, covered her mouth and held her neck. She was dragged to a vacant lot where she was raped.

ISSUE: Whether or not the begging of forgiveness by the parents, children, wife and sister-in-law is an implied admission of guilt.

HELD: Yes. A plea of forgiveness may be analogous to an attempt to compromise and in criminal cases, a compromise is allowed by law, a compromise is an implied admission of guilt. Also, his silence in his appellants brief on the said compromise establishes the knowledge and consent of the victim to the compromise

PEOPLE vs YPARRAGUIRRE

FACTS: This is an action for a crime of rape wherein the wife of the accused offered money after the crime has committed before the institution of the criminal action.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is required that a criminal action be first instituted before an offer to compromise can be admitted.

HELD: No. What is required are: that it should be after the crime is committed, the accused or his representative makes an offer, and such offer is proved.

PEOPLE vs SERRRANO, ET AL

FACTS: Eulogio Serrano told his five companions to kill Pablo Navarro because he had been inducing and prompting people to call on Senator David and testify on the Maliwalu massacre. The appellant stated the following alibis: they did not know about the crime, a gun was pointed at them so they cannot escape, and that the testimony of the conspirator may only be admitted when a proof of conspiracy was established beside the testimony of Reyes, one of the accused who was discharged.

ISSUE: Whether or not conspiracy should be established before the testimony of the conspirator may be admitted.

HELD: No. The requirement to establish the conspiracy before the testimony can be admitted is applicable only on extrajudicial declaration and does not apply in testimony given on trial because the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine.

PEOPLE vs GARCIA

FACTS: This is an action involving conspiracy in the commission of carnapping.

The police arrested three people as suspects in the crime of carnapping. While detained at the police station, the owner of the vehicle confronted the three about the crime. Two of them admitted having perpetrated the crime and implicated their third companion because they were in dire need of money. The third one, however, kept quiet.

ISSUE: Whether or not the silence of the third accuse is an implied admission.

HELD: Yes. The silence of the third accuse tantamount to failure to refute. This is in line with the provision of Rule 130 section 32 of the Rules of Court, an act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for his action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him.

PEOPLE vs YATCO, ETC., ET. AL

FACTS: This is a case of conspiracy in committing murder against Consuji, Panganiban, and one whose identity is unknown. During the trial, while the prosecution was questioning one of its witnesses in connection with a certain extrajudicial confession made by defendant Consuji to the witness, the counsel for Panganiban objected to any evidence on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent against Panganiban. The lower court ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to on the go. The lower court ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to on the ground that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confession of the defendants Consuji and Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in excluding the extrajudicial confessions of Consuji and Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.

HELD: Yes. The court erred in excluding the extrajudicial confessions. It may not be used against his co-accused but it could be used against the declarant. It is premature to exclude the testimony on the ground of conspiracy because the prosecution had not yet

offered confessions to prove conspiracy and the court cannot motu propio disregard the evidence.

Continuation of Rule 130 Sec. 3,5,6,7,8