1.0 INTRODUCTION Power Transformer is one of the most important equipment in a power transmission and distribution system.

Being static equipment, the design and construction is relatively simple, which makes the transformer a highly reliable piece of equipment. Providing adequate protections, besides proper maintenance can further enhance the reliability while in service. The choice of protection is influenced by several factors, the important ones being. i) Size and rating of the transformer ii) Vector configuration iii) Source and Neutral Earthing iv) Type of transformer (2 winding / 3 winding Auto Transformer, Rectifier Transformer etc.) v) Infeed conditions (radial, parallel, interconnecting ). vi) OL TC Range 2.0 NATURE AND EFFECT OF TRANSFORMER FAULTS The nature of faults against which the transformer is to be protected, can be broadly classified as : 2.1 External Faults : There are short circuits or earth faults on the supply net work outside the transformer. The infeeds through the transformer may be high, if the faults are electrically close and the leakage reactance of the transformer is low, the excessive fault current may cause enormous electromechanical forces causing displacement, damage to the winding and overheating / hot spot generation inside the transformer. 2.2 Internal Faults : Primary protection of transformers is intended to protect the transformer against internal faults associated with the windings and connections. Internal faults can be classified as: a. Short circuits, Inter turn faults, earth faults duo to Insulation deterioration

b. Incipient faults c. Regulation faults a. Short Circuits, Inter turn faults, earth faults : These faults are of serious nature causing immediate damage, but are generally detectable due to unbalance /over shooting of current at the transformer terminals. b. Incipient Faults : These are initially minor faults causing slowly developing damage. These are not TRANSFORMER PROTECTION 411 detectable at winding terminals in the absence of any unbalance in current or voltage. Incipient faults Include i) Limited arcing in the oil, say due to failure of interlamination or core bolt insulation or accidental damage or poor electrical connection causing hot spots in windings / connections. ii) Cooling system failure: This may be due to low oil content clogged oil flow due to sludge formation, failure of oil pump or fans or blocking of radiator valves c. Regulator faults : These include faults associated with the tap changer / tap change controls. Operation on unequal taps for parallel transformers may cause overheating due to circulating currents. 2.3 Abnormal Operating Conditions : The abnormal operating conditions include overloads and over excitation of transformers. 3.0 ROTECTION AGAINST EXTERNAL FAULTS : Fuses often protect small distribution transformers with no control breakers. The fuse ratings are chosen well above the maximum loads and should be adequate to over ride any transient over current conditions such as magnetizing in rush or DOL starting of a motor feeder.

While a fuse can provide adequate protection against short circuits, it cannot provide effective protection against earth faults, in view of possible low infeeds. For larger transformers, controlled by circuit breakers, IDMT overcurrent relays are more commonly used as phase and earth fault backups. The overcurrent relay provides a twofold advantage. i) It avoids delay at lower amplitudes of fault currents as would happen in case of fuses. ii) It provides a sensitive earth fault protection largely independent of the full load rating of the transformer. The IDMT overcurrent relays are often supplemented by highest instantaneous overcurrent elements on the primary side of the transformers. The highest elements are set over and above the maximum through fault current and are primarily intended to ensure high-speed clearance of terminal short circuits on the primary side. The choice of over current / earth fault backup is greatly influenced by the vector configuration, type of earthing and infeed conditions. Some of the typical applications are discussed below. 3.1 Delta /Star Transformers (Delta winding connected to Grounded Source) The delta winding provides zero sequence isolation between the star winding and the source. Consequently, a residually connected earthfault relay on the delta side will not respond to earthfaults on the star side and hence its operation remains restricted to earth faults in the delta winding. A sensitive instantaneous earth fault relay (in high impedance mode) can therefore be provided on the delta side without requiring any time co-ordination with the star side backup protection. This will be evident from the current distribution shown in fig. 3.1 a. 412 3.2 Star / Star Transformers : Star / Star transformers with grounded neutrals exchange zero sequence current between primary and secondary. The earthfault backup is therefore usually IDMT type, time

co-ordinated with the downstream protections. Star/Star transformers with grounded neutrals have a comparatively low zero sequence impedance, particularly when these are provided with a delta connected tertiary. Even without a delta tertiary winding the zero sequence impedance of the primary winding is significantly low due to the tank effect. Consequently, the primary winding serves as a zero sequence shunt-bypassing substantial zero sequence current, in the event of an upstream earth faults causing non-selective tripping. It is therefore, preferable to provide a directional earth fault protection looking into the transformer on the primary side, to circumvent the above problem. In case the transformer is having infeeds on both sides (say grid supply on the primary and captive generation on the secondary), It would be desirable to have directional earth fault relays on both primary and secondary side, Fig. 3.1 c) below shows the zero sequence shunting effect of a star/star/delta transformer. In case of a delta / star transformer, a phase to phase faults on the star side produces 2:1:1 current distribution on the delta side. It is therefore, advantageous to provide 3-0/C elements on delta side (as against 2 elements) to enable faster clearance, through the phase element sensing highest current in backup mode. Fig. 3.1 b) below shows the current distribution for phase to phase fault on star side to illustrate the above. Fig. 3.1 (b) 413 Fig. 3.1 (a) Since an upstream earth fault causes a current outflow from the transformer, a directional earthfault relay (67N) looking into the transformer would not respond for such faults and enable better co-ordination. The overcurrent relays (phase CT connected - not shown in the figure) will also face a similar situation. However, since they have a comparatively high setting

(above full load) and see only 1/3rd current compared to earth fault relay, the problem is less pronounced. Over current relays need not therefore, be directional. In case of interconnecting transformers with infeeds on both sides, it is advantageous to go for directional overcurrent and earth fault relays on either side, to minimize grading problems. 3.3 The IDMT over current relays are often supplemented by highset instantaneous over current elements on the primary side, mainly to provide high speed clearance of severe terminals short circuits, overriding the IDMT elements. The highset elements should be set over and above the through fault current on secondary side and should preferably have low transient overreach to enable closer setting, in the presence of offset fault current. 4.0 PROTECTIONS AGAINST INTERNAL FAULTS : A high-speed unit type of protection such as differential /restricted earth fault protection is applied as a primary protection against internal faults. 4.1 Differential Protection : This is a complete phase and earth fault protection operating on Merz Price circulating currant principle. The differential relay compares the currents on the primary and secondary side of the transformer using C,Ts of matched ratio, such that the secondary currents are balanced in magnitude and phase for an external fault or load. While magnitude balance is achieved by a proper selection of CT ratio on primary and secondary side or by using interposing current transformers (ICTs). phase balance is achieved by appropriate vector connections of the associated CT / ICTs (for example star side CTs are connected in delta and vice versa ), Though theoretically it looks easier to achieve an amplitude and phasor balance, there are certain practical problems. These are discussed below as also the measures adopted to circumvent these problems in a practical differential scheme, 414

Fig. 3.1 (c) A practical biased differential scheme showing C.T. connections is illustrated in fig. 4.1.1 b) below for a delta / star (Dy 11) transformer. Following work out illustrates the choice of matching CTs/lCTs for a delta / star transformer, Transformers rating - 10 MVA, 66/33 KV, Dy11 Transtormer F. L. current : 66KV side : IFL = (10x 10 6 )/(3 1/2 x66x10 3) = 87.5A 33 KV side : IFL = (10x 10 6 )/(3 1/2 x33x10 3) = 175A 4.1.1 Mismatch produced by On Load Tap Changer (OL TC) : On load tap changer, where provided, introduces a mismatch since it changes the turns ratio and consequently the current ratios of transformer. The CT ratio are normally matched for the mean ratio, corresponding to center tap of the transformer. Any deviation from the mid tap, therefore, produces an unbalance proportional to the ratio change and hence a differential current on load. The differential current will, however, be more pronounced

on through fault and will not permit a sensitive selling to be adopted on the differential relay. In practical differential protection for transformers, this problem is over come by providing through current bias (or restraint). The bias, modifies the differential pickup and pegs It above the maximum expected differential current in the face of ratio mismatch produced by the tap changer and C. T. errors, thereby ensuring stability on through faults. A typical bias characteristic is shown in fig. 4.1.1 a below : Fig 4 1.1 a Typical Bias Characteristic 415 Equivalent secondary FL current, considering a matching CT ratio of 100/1A for 66 KV CTs and 200/1A for 33 KV CTs : IFL ( Sec ) = 87.5/100 = 0.875 A ( 66 KV side) IF L ( Sec ) = 175 I 200 = 0.875 A ( 33 KV side) Since the transformer is of Dy11 vector configuration, the 33 KV line current will be leading the 66KV side line currents by 30. To achieve phasor balance, the 33KV side C.T. secondary current will have to be phase retarded by 30 by connecting the interposing current transformers in star / delta ( Yd1 ) configuration as shown. The ICT ratio can be worked out as follows. ICT primary current (corresponding of F.L. condition) = 0.875A Line current on ICT secondary side to match in amplitude with the 66KV side CT secondary current of 0.875A. The ICT secondary current corresponding to the above line current :: 0.875 I ../3 A Hence, ICT ratio = 0.875 = 1.0 /1.0 3 1/2A 0.875/3 1/2

= 1.0/0.58 Amps Alternatively, a CT ratio of 200/0.58 Amps can be selected on 33 side and the 33 KV CTs can he directly connected in delta to achieve both amplitude and phase without necessitating ICTs. 4.1.2 Magnatising Inrush Current : When the primary side of a transformer is switched on the supply with its secondary unloaded, it acts as a simple inductive reactor. The value of the voltage at the instant of switching can be any where between zero and the peak value. Fig. 4.1.1 (b) Typical C.T. Connections for Blased Differential Protection 416 Initial value of the flux in the core is zero as against the steady state value of m corresponding to voltage zero. Since the total steady state flux change during voltage half cycle is 2 m (i.e.- m to + m) the flux rises from zero to 2m. This is known as the doubling effect. Modern transformers operate at very low saturation level (around 1.1times the working flux level). The flux doubling, therefore, causes extreme saturation of the core and the transformer consequently draws heavy magnetising current from the supply source. While the normal steady state magnetising current may be less than 5% of full load current, the (a) Switching at Peak voltage with core initially damagnetized At voltage maximum, the steady state value of the flux and hence the magnetizing current is zero. Hence the flux wave immediately assumes the normal shape for an inductive circuit with both the core flux and magnetising current rising from zero.

(b) Switching at Zero voltage with core initially damagnetized 417 transient core saturation may raise it to several times the normal load current. The situation is even worse if there is remnant flux in the core, which happens to be in the direction in which the first peak occurs. Since the inrush current flows only in the primary winding it appears as an operating current to the differential relay, producing instability. The immunity to inrush current can be obtained either by delaying the protection or by providing a harmonic restraint. a) Time delay : Since the magnetising inrush is a transient phenomenon, a small time delay can be provided in the differential relay to override the same and ensure stability. Induction disc relays with an adjustable delay provided by the disc movement, is one of the earlier designs of biased differential protection. b) Harmonic Restraint : Time delay associated with the differential relay as explained before, would make the protection slower in operation and increase the fault damage. Modern high-speed differential relay, therefore employ a different approach to this problem. The inrush current is highly distorted and contains a fairly high proportion of 2nd harmonic component. Typical analysis of an Inrush current wave shows following harmonic contents. Harmonic Component % of Fundamental Fundamental 100 2 nd 63

3rd 27 4th 5 5 th 4 The proportion of 2 nd harmonic generally varies between 30-60 % of the fundamental and is unique to the inrush current. This component is filtered from the operating circuit and is used to restrain the protection the same way as through current bias. The harmonic restraint is so proportioned that 15% of 2 nd harmonic current will just balance the operating current of 100% of fundamental frequency denomination. While through current bias and 2nd harmonic bias ( restraint) is an essential feature of a modern high speed differential protection, following additional features are incorporated to enhance stability and maintain operating speed. i) 5 th Harmonic bypass or restraint : This feature is provided to immunize the protection against over excited operation of the transformer, The magnetising current of an over excited transformer contains substantial proportion of 5th harmonic component. This component is filtered from the operating (differential) current and either bypassed or used to restrain the protection the same way as

2nd harmonic restraint. 418 There are alternative designs, which do not use harmonic bias (restraint) to achieve immunity against magnetising inrush or over excited operation of the transformer. One such design distinguishes between the above conditions and an internal fault by verifying the zero periods in the differential current waveform over a cycle. The magnetizing current waveform during switching inrush or over excited condition has substantial zero periods (in excess of cycle over one cycle period), unlike in the case of an internal fault. This method enables high speed of operation for internal fault in the absence of any harmonic restraint. Numerical versions of differential protections are also now available which use suitable algorithm for measurement. The ratio and phase angle correction is a software function in these relays which eliminate the need for matched CTs/lCTs. The numerical versions are usually multifunction and provide additional protection elements (such as REF / overfluxing etc.). Besides, several diagnostic non -protection functions such as event logging, fault recording, instrumentation & continuous self monitoring are provided. 4.2 Restricted Earth Fault (REF) Protection : This is a circulating current earth fault differential system, usually applied to the star windinng of a transformer, by balancing the residual current of the three line current ii) Unrestrained Differential Highset : The harmonic restraint may slow down the protection, on severe internal fault, if the associated CTs suffer transient saturation and produce a high degree of harmonic distortion. To ensure high speed operation under the above condition an unrestrained differential highest with high pick up threshold (usually 8-10 times) is incorporated in the differential relay. A typical circuit of a high speed, harmonic restraint biased differential relay is shown in fig. 4.1.2. a) below :

Fig. 4.1.2 (a) Typical Harmonic Restrained Biased Differential Relay 419 Through current bias Diode bridge comparator For an external earth fault, the associated phase and neutral C. T, see same fault current (IF) but of different polarity. While the phase C, T. sees an outflow of current, the neutral C.T, sees an inflow with respect to the transformer. The phase and neutral C. T., therefore, form a series connection between them with no differential current through the relay, if the C.Ts are assumed to be ideal with no errors. For an internal fault, either the neutral C.T. alone sees the fault current (for radial feeding transformer) or both the neutral and phase C.T see an inflow because of infeed reversal through the latter (in case of parallel transformers). This produces a differential current through the relay corresponding to the summated infeeds at the fault point, there by causing operation. In practice, however, the associated C.T.s may experience unequal saturation say due to the remnant flux in the core or dissimilarities in their magnetizing characteristics, particularly when the through fault current has large D.C offsets with slow decay rate. The worst condition would occur when one C. T. completely saturates while the other remains fully active during a severe external fault. The REF protection is invariably high impedance and is calibrated either in terms of voltage or current. In case of voltage relay, a setting voltage above to Vs can be set. In case of current operated relay, a series stabilizing resistance is added to make the relay branch high impedance such that the current through the relay will not exceed its current setting (Is). The external stabilizing resistor value can be worked out. Protection against Incipient Faults : One or the commonly used protection against incipient (developing) faults is Buchholz

relay. The relay has two floats actuating mercury switches and is placed in the pipe connecting the transformer tank to the conservator. A slow generation of gas due to a minor fault causes a stream of bubbles which pass towards the conservator and in the process get trapped into the Buchholz chamber lowering its oil level. Consequently the Alarm float lowers down actuating the mercury switch giving an alarm. transformers with the output current of a CT in the neutral earth connection. The protetlion arrangement is shown in fig. 4.2 a) below. Fig. 4.2 (a) Typical REF C. T. Connections 420 Source Transformer 64 - REF Relay RST- Stabilizing Resistor A heavy internal fault gives rise to an explosive generation of gas causing a surge travelling towards the conservator. The surge impinges on the lower (trip) float, tilting the mercury switch and closing the trip contact. While mounting the relay, care should be taken to ensure that the arrow on its case should point to the conservator and the connecting pipe should have an upward slant of about 5. Besides Buchholz relay, temperatures monitoring devices such as oil and winding temperature indicators are provided for transformers. These can also give fairly good indication of an incipient failure such as generation of hot spot. failure of cooling system etc. The winding temperature is measured by thermal image technique. In this technique a temperature sensing device (usually a silistor - silicon resister) is placed in the transformer

oil at the top of the transformer tank. The Silistor is encapsulated with a heater element in a thermal molded material.the latter being fed from the load current, through a bushing C.T. The combination thus forms a thermal replica of the transformer winding. The silistor is used as an arm of a resistance bridge supplied from stabilized d.c. supply. An indicating instrument calibrated in terms of temperature is energized from the out of balance voltage of the bridge. 5.0 PROTECTION AGAINST ABNORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS 5.1 Overload Protection : The winding temperature indicator described under 4.0 above can effectively detect over loading. Thermal image overcurrent relays with exponential or i 2 t time / current characteristics are also used for protection against overload. This protection detects overload but does not detect failure of cooling system unlike the temperature indicating devices. Definite time over current relays are also used to provide pretrip alarm, if the overload exceeds permissible limit. Such relays are required to have high reset ratio and continuously adjustable current setting to match permissible overload rating of the transformer. 5.2 Overfluxlng Protections : Increase in input voltage causes increase in working flux levels, thereby increasing the iron losses and magnetising current. The core and core bolt get heated and the inter-lamination insulation and core bolt insulation is weakened. The reduction in supply frequency also increases the core flux and has similar effect as that due to over voltage. The generator transformers are more prone for overfluxing as these may be subjected to an uncomfortable combination of over voltage and under frequency during start up or coasting down due to AVR / Governor malfunctioning.

The expression for induced voltage in a transformer is given by V *f*T Where is core flux f is frequency T is number of turns (constant) Thus V/f 421 Max. through fault current ( IF) Source impedance ( 66KV base) Zs = 662 /1000 = 4.356 Ohms. Transformer leakage impedance Z T= ZT% /100 X KV2/ MVA = 8 / 100 X 662 /10 = 34.85 Ohms. Total Impedance ( Zs + Z T ) = 4.356 + 34.85 = 39.20 Ohms. ( 66KV Base) = 39.2 x (33/66) 2 = 9.8 Ohms. (33 KV Base) Max. Through fault current (33KV side) = 33000 / 3 x 9.8 = 1944 A (66 KV side) = 972A The ratio of V/f is therefore an index of overfluxing and is used as a measure of overfluxing level. V/f relays are therefore, used to detect overfluxing in a transformer. Typical setting range for the relay is 1.0-1.30 on 110 V/50Hz basis. The overfluxing condition does not

warrant immediate isolation of transformer and hence the relay is provided with adjustable time delays, which also helps to prevent transient operation due to momentary disturbances. The practical overfluxing relays are either definite time of inverse time versions with a pretrip alarm. ANNEXTURE 1 Typical setting workout for REF / Highset Instantaneous o /c protection. DATA: Transformer rating 66/33KV, 10MVA, Dy11, Z 1 = 8%, CT Ratio HV side 100/1A, 5 P10/15VA LV side 200/1 A , VK = 60 volts, RCT = 2 Ohms. Im = 30mA at VK/2 66 KV side S.C. Level - 1000 MVA HV side Highset o/c relay (50) -5 -20A LV side REF Relay(64) -0.1 - 0.4 A . Burden 1 VA at setting current. Lead Resistance between C.T. & Relay (2RL) = 1.0.ohm (to & fro) 1.0 REF PROTECTION ON LV SIDE 422 Setting Voltage for REF protection (Vs) = IF /n ( RCT + 2RL ) = 1944 / 200 (2 + 1) = 29.0 volts. say 30 volts REF Relay setting adopted (Is) = 0.1A REF Relay Ohmic burden ( Pr) = (VA)R

/ (Is) 2 = 1.0/(0.1)2 = 100 Ohms. Stabilising Resistor ( RST ) = Vs/Is - Rr = [ 30.0/0.10] - 100 = 200 Ohms. Primary operating current (POC)= n ( Is + N x Im ) Where n = CT Ratio ( 200/1 A ) N = No. of CTs for REF protection ( 4 ) Im = 30 mA at 30 volts ( i.e. at setting voltages) POC =200/1 ( 0.1 + 4 x 0.03)= 44 Amps HIGH SET O/C ELEMENT ON HV SIDE Max. through fault current referred to HV side I f = 972 A (Primary) = 972/100 = 9.72 A (Secondary) H. S. Setting = 1.3 x If = 1.3 x 9.72 = 12.60A = 13 Amps (Instantaneous) 423 ANNEXURE - 2 Need for connecting C.T.s in Delta for Star / Star Transformers. A) Star Connected C.T.s Star C.T.s permit Zero Sequence Current to flow through Differential Element causing instability on Up Stream Earth Faults

B) Delta Connected C.T.s Delta C.T.s Filter the Zero Sequence Current and Ensure Stability on Upstream Earth Faults 424 ANNEXURE - 3 Typical C.T. Circuits for Combined Differential / REF Protection of a Star / Delta Transformer having Zigzag Earthing Transfor Delta Side within Diff. / REF Zone Current Distribution for External s / f shows balance 425 426 There are three distinct systems for the Operation and Control of Boiler in 210 MW and 500 MW Boilers. These are 1. Measurement and process control system for the control of Boiler Processes. This system is provided mainly for measurement and of mechanical properties such as Pressure, temperature, Flow and level of water and steam. Fuel and Air flow control, Furnace Draft control, Drum level control, coordinated master pressure control etc are some of the controls and measurements included in this system, 2. Boiler Interlock system is mainly used for the sequential and interlocking Control of ID fans, FD Fans and PA Fans and some other equipment of the Boiler. 3. Furnace Safeguard and Supervisory System, popularly called FSSS, continuously monitors the operations related to fuel admission and some other vital parameters to ensure safety of the Boiler. Generally furnace oil or any kind of fuel is susceptible to explosion hazards. Majority of explosions occurs during start up, shout down and low load operations. There are many steps that must be followed by the operator to admit fuel in to the furnace

safely and properly. If left to the judgement of the operators, there is a high probability of error. Adequacy of ignition energy is an important factor which should not be left for to operator interpretation. In high capacity boilers, where fuel input rate is very high, major furnace explosions can result from the ignition of unburnt fuel accumulated in first 1 or 2 seconds. Human reaction time to such situations is inadequate. Considering these facts a proper Burner Management System, called FSSS is installed in the Boilers. Every operation related to fuel admission is accomplished through FSSS. System Logic allows fuel admission only if it is safe. The system logic also senses any likelihood of dangerous situation and preempts fuel admission is such situations. Through FSSS, startup operations, routine operation and withdrawal of the Boiler are initiated and supervised. Following table shows the Boiler tripping initiated through FSSS. BOILER PROTECTIONS AND FURNACE SAFEGUARD AND SUPERVISORY SYSTEM Situation leading to Tripping Reason for tripping Drum Level Very high To prevent entry of wet steam in to Turbine Drum Level Very Low To avoid boiler starvation Furnace Draft very high To safeguard furnace from excessive stresses Furnace Draft very low To safeguard furnace from excessive stresses Total Air flow less than 30% To ensure air rich furnace at startup. Flame failure trip To avoid admission of coal when sufficient ignition energy is not available. Loss of fuel trip To ensure readmission of fuel only after furnace is purged. Loss of all I.D Fans To prevent boiler continuation if there are no means for driving out the flue gas Loss of all FD Fans To prevent boiler continuation if there are no means for

supply of combustion air. Loss of Power supply to FSSS To prevent operation of boiler if safeguard system Cabinet is not functioning Manual Trip Push Button pressed For manual tripping for the reasons other than defined tripping situations. Loss of Rehaeter protection To prevent boiler operation if there is no steam flow through (Only for 500 MW Units) Reheater tubes. 427 Purpose of Boiler interlocking circuit is to monitor and control the starting and stopping operation of ID Fans, FD Fans and PA Fans. These fans should be operated as per the requirements of process and safety of the fan itself. For ensuring uninterrupted service of the plant, some of the operational requirements are automated to avoid human errors. These fans and its dampers / gates are required to be operated by following certain sequences, and interlocking circuits carry out the sequential operations automatically. Basic logical requirements for operation of these fans are : 1) When all the Fans are Off, furnace should be put on natural ventilation, 2) A fan should be in service only when process is ready for it, 3) When any one of the ID, FD or PA fan is operating, all other fans of the group should be isolated from the process, 4) Fans should be started on no load, 5) While starting the fan, its other parameters such as Bearing temperature, Lubricating oil system etc. is healthy, 6) Fan should be tripped when it is unsafe to operate it. Considering these requirements, interlock circuits are designed. Accordingly, interlocks are of

two types : 1) Starting Interlocks :These are designed in such a way that an auxiliary can be started only if it is healthy and also the process is ready for operation of the auxiliary. 2) Tripping Interlocks :These are designed to supervise the vital parameters of the auxiliary and the process. If the parameters tend to violate the set limits, tripping of auxiliary or process is automatically executed. The interlocks are so arranged that only the faulty auxiliary or process trips and subsequent sequential operations isolate the faulty auxiliary, and healthy part of the plant continue to remain in operation. Detailed explanation of Boiler interlock circuits is as follows : 1.0 I.D. FAN INTERLOCKS : 1.1 Conditions existing when the unit is shut down and prior to starting of ID fans. I.D. Fan A and ID Fan B off. Regulating dampers of fans A&B open. Inlet gates of Fans A & B open. Outlet gates of fans A & B open. The regulating dampers will be on manual control during shut down and impulse from furnace draft control to regulating dampers of ID fans disconnected. 1.2 Starting ID Fan A (ID Fan B Off) a. ID Fan A shall be prohibited from starting till the following conditions are satisfied. i. Regulating damper of Fan-A in minimum position. PROTECTIONS AND INTERLOCKS OF ID/FD/PA FANS 428 ii. Outlet gate of Fan-A closed. iii. Inlet gate of Fan-A closed.

iv. Fan/fan motor bearing temperature not very high. v. One of the air preheaters running. b. When ID fan A is started (ID Fan B is off), impulses shall be give for. i. Opening the inlet gate and outlet gate of Fan A after the motor reaches the rated speed. ii. Connecting the regulating damper of Fan A to the auto control. iii. Closing the inlet gate and the outlet gate of ID Fan B and bringing the regulating damper to minimum position. iv. Permissive is issued to start either FD Fan A or FD Fan B. 1.3 Starting ID Fan B ( ID Fan A is off) Interlocks similar to those at clause 1.2 shall hold good of this condition. 1.4 Tripping of ID Fan A (ID fan B is off). a. ID Fan A shall trip automatically under following conditions. i. ID Fan A bearing temperature too high (prior to this, ID Fan A bearing temperature high shall be annunciated in UCB). ii. ID Fan A motor bearing temperature too high (prior to this, ID Fan a motor bearing temperature high shall be annunciated in UCB). iii. Post purge fan trip (contact from FSSS) iv. Vibration level of FAN/MOTOR very high. b. when ID Fan A trips (ID Fan B is off) impulses shall be given for: i. Opening the outlet gate of ID Fan B. ii. Opening the inlet gate of ID Fan B. iii. Opening the regulating damper of ID Fan B to wide-open position. iv. Disconnecting the regulating impulse from acting on regulating damper of ID Fan A. v. Opening the regulating damper of ID Fan A to wide-open position.

vi. Tripping the working FD Fans. vii. Boiler tripping. viii. To keep the inlet gate and outlet gate of ID Fan A open. 1.5 Starting of ID Fan B (ID Fan A is off) : Interlocks similar to those at clause 1.4 shall hold good for this condition. 1.6 Starting of ID Fan B (ID Fan A is on) : a. ID Fan B shall be prohibited from starting unless the following conditions are satisfied. i. Outlet gate of Fan B is closed. ii. Inlet gate of Fan B is closed. iii. Regulating damper of Fan B is at minimum position. iv. Fan/fan motor bearing temperature not very high. 429 b. When ID Fan B is started, impulses shall be given for. i. Opening the inlet gate and outlet gate of Fan B after the motor reaches rated speed. ii. Connecting the regulating damper of Fan B to auto control. iii. Permission to start other FD Fan. 1.7 Starting of ID Fan A (ID fan B is on) Interlocks similar to the clause 1.6 shall hold good for this condition. 1.8 TRIPPING OF ID FAN B (ID Fan A is on) a. ID Fan B shall trip automatically under the following conditions. i. Fan bearing temperature too high (prior to this fan bearing temperature high shall be annunciated in UCB) ii. Fan motor bearing temperature too high (Prior to this fan motor bearing temperature high shall be annunciated in UCB)

iii. Vibration level of Fan/motor very bush. iv. Post purge fan trip (Contact from FSSS0 b. When ID Fan B trips (ID Fan A is on) impulses shall be given for: i. Disconnecting the regulator from acting on the regulating damper of Fan B. ii. Bringing the regulating damper of Fan B to the minimum position. iii. Closing the inlet gate of Fan B. iv. Closing the outlet gate of Fan B. v. Tripping the FD Fan B, provided FD Fan A is on. vi. Energisation of partial load relay. 1.9 Tripping ID Fan a (ID fan B is on) Interlocks similar to those at clause 1.8 shall hold good for this condition. 2.0 FD FAN INTERLOCKS : 2.1 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO STARTING FD FANS : FD Fan A and FD Fan B off. Fan impellers tilted to maximum opening. Outlet dampers are fully open. Fan impeller regulator disconnected. Lube oil pumps of FD Fans off. 2.2 STARTING FD FAN A (FD FAN B IS OFF) a. FD Fan A shall be prohibited from starting untill the following conditions are satisfied. i. ID Fan A or ID Fan B is on. ii. Control oil pressure adequate (8 kg/cm2g) (Control oil pressure adequate lamp indication shall be provided on the control desk.) iii. Fan A IGV in the minimum position. iv. Outlet damper of Fan A is closed position.

v. Fan/Motor bearing temperature not very high. 430 b. When FD Fan A is started (FD Fan B off) impulse shall be given for: i. Outlet damper of Fan A to open after the motor reaches the rated speed. ii. The outlet damper of FD Fan B to close & impeller blades of Fan B to be driven to minimum position. iii. Connecting the impeller of Fan A control drive to auto control. 2.3 STARTING FD FAN B (FD FAN A IS OFF) Interlocks similar to those at 2.2 shall hold good for this condition. 2.4 TRIPPING OF FD FAN A (FD FAN B IS OFF) a. FD Fan A shall trip under the following conditions: i. FD Fan a bearing temperature too high (Prior to this, FD Fan A bearing temperature high will be annunciated in UCB) ii. FD Fan A motor bearing temperature too high (prior to this, FD Fan A motor bearing temperature high will be annunciated in UCB) iii. Both ID Fans trip. iv. Post purge fan trip (Contact from FSSS) NOTE : Oil pressure low shall be annunciated in UCB. b. When FD Fan A trip (FD Fan B is off) impulses shall be given for: i. Disconnecting the impeller control drive from the regulator of Fan A. ii. Bringing the impeller of Fan A to the maximum position. iii. Bringing the impeller of FD Fan B to the maximum position. iv. Opening the outlet damper of FD Fan B. v. To open the emergency scanner air damper. vi. Boiler tripping.

vii. The outlet damper of FD fan A shall remain open. 2.5 TRIPPING FD FAN B (FD FAN A IS OFF) Interlocks similar to those of 2.4 shall hold good for this condition. 2.6 STARTING FD FAN B (FD FAN A IS ON) a. FD Fan B (FD Fan A is on) shall be prohibited from starting untill the following conditions are satisfied. i. Both ID Fans are on. ii. Control oil pressure adequate (8 kg/cm2g) (control oil pressure adequate lamp indication shall be provided on the control desk). iii. Impeller of Fan B in the minimum position. iv. Outlet damper of Fan B in the closed position. v. Fan/Fan motor bearing temperature not very high. b. When FD Fan B is started (FD Fan A is on), impulses shall be given for: i. Opening the outlet damper of Fan B after the fan reaches the rated speed. ii. Connecting the impeller control drive of Fan B to auto control. 431 2.7 STARTING FD FAN A (FD FAN B IS ON) Interlocks similar to those at 2.6 shall hold good for this condition. 2.8 TRIPPING OF FD FAN B (FD FAN A IS ON) a. FD Fan B shall trip when FD Fan A is on under the following conditions. i. ID Fan B trips. ii. FD Fan B motor bearing temperature too high (prior to this, FD fan B motor bearing temperature high shall be annunciated in UCB. iii. FD Fan B motor bearing temperature too high (Prior to this, FD Fan B bearing temperature high shall be annunciated in UCB).

iv. Vibration level of Fan/Motor very high. NOTE : Oil pressure low shall be annunciated at UCB. b. When FD Fan B trips (FD Fan A is on), impulses shall be given for: i. Disconnecting regulator impulse from acting on impeller control drive of Fan B. ii. Bringing impeller of Fan B to the minimum position. iii. Closing the outlet damper of Fan B. iv. Energisation of partial load relay. v. Tripping mills working more than three through FSSS. 2.9 TRIPPING OF FD FAN A (FD FAN B IS ON) Interlocks similar to those at 2.8 shall hold good for this condition. 3.0 P.A. FANS INTERLOCKS : 3.1 Conditions prior to start : FA Fan A and PS Fan B off. Outlet dampers of Fan A and Fan B close. Regulating damper of Fan A and Fan B is closed position. Regulating damper regulator disconnected. 3.2 STARTING PA FAN A (PA FAN B OFF) : a. PA Fan A shall be prohibited from starting until the following conditions are satisfied. i. Regulating damper of Fan A in the minimum position. ii. Outlet damper of Fan A in closed position. iii. Any one FD Fan is on. iv. Purge complete. v. PA Fan/fan motor bearing temperature not very high. vi. PA Fan lub oil pressure adequate. NOTE : Signal from PA Fan A start PB shall simultaneously go to start PA Fan A and seal

air fan. b. When PA Fan A is started (PA Fan B is off), impulses shall be given for : i. Opening the outlet damper of Fan A after the motor vehicles the rated speed. ii. Connecting the regulating damper of PA Fan B to the minimum position. 432 iii. Bringing the regulating damper of PA Fan B to the minimum position. iv. Closing the outlet damper of PA Fan B. v. Permission to start any three mills through FSSS. 3.3 STARTING PA FAN B (PA FAN A IS OFF) Interlocks similar to those 3.2 shall hold good for this condition. 3.4 TRIPPING OF PA FAN A (PA FAN B IS OFF) a. PA Fan A shall trip (PA Fan B is off) under the following condition: i. PA Fan A bearing temperature too high (prior to this bearing temperature high shall be annunciated in UCB) ii. PA Fan A motor bearing temperature too high. (Prior to this motor bearing temperature high shall be annunciated in UCB) iii. Boiler trips. iv. Vibrator level of Fan/Motor very high. b. When PA Fan A trips (PA Fan B is off), impulses shall be given for: i. Disconnecting the regulating damper of Fan A from the auto control. ii. Bringing the regulating damper of Fan A to minimum position. iii. Closing the outlet damper of PA Fan A. iv. Bringing the regulating damper PA Fan B to minimum position. v. Closing the outlet damper of PA Fan B. vi. Tripping all the operating mills (done through FSSS)

3.5 TRIPPING OF PA FAN B (PA FAN A IS OFF) : Interlocks similar to those at 3.4 shall hold good for this condition. 3.6 STARTING PA FAN B (PA FAN A IS ON) : a. PA Fan B shall be prohibited from starting unless the following conditions are satisfied. i. Any one FD Fan is ON. ii. Regulating damper of Fan B in the minimum position. iii. Outlet damper of Fan B in closed position. iv. PA Fan B /Fan motor bearing temperature not very high. b. When PA Fan B is started (PA Fan A is ON) impulses shall be given for : i. Opening the outlet damper of PA Fan B after the motor reaches the rated speed. ii. Connecting the regulating damper of Fan B to the auto controls. iii. Permission to start three more mills through FSSS. 3.7 STARTING OF PA FAN A (PA FAN A IS ON) Interlocks similar to those at clause 3.6 shall hold good for this condition. 3.8 TRIPPING OF PA FAN A (PA FAN B IS ON) a. P.A. Fan B shall trip (PA Fan A is on) under the following conditions 433 i. PA Fan B bearing temperature too high (prior to this, fan bearing temperature high shall be annunciated in UCB) ii. PA Fan B motor bearing temperature too high (Prior to this, fan motor bearing temperature high shall be annunciated in UCB) iii. Boiler trip. iv. Vibration level of Fan / Motor very high. b. When PA Fan B trips (PA Fan A is ON) impulse shall be given for: i. Disconnecting the regulating damper of Fan B from the auto control.

ii. Bringing the regulation damper of Fan B to the minimum position. iii. Closing the outlet damper of fan B. iv. Energisation of partial load relay. v. Bringing the regulating damper of PA Fan A to max. safe position. 3.9 TRIPPING OF PA FAN A (PA FAN B IS ON) Interlocks similar to those at clause 3.8 shall hold good for this condition. 3.10 Both the PA Fans shall trip simultaneously when any boiler trip condition is present (impulse from FSSS) 4.0 AH INTERLOCKS : 4.1 Conditions before start up of AHS : a. Both AHS are off (both AC motors and DC motors are off) b. The inlet dampers and the outlet dampers in the gas path, secondary air path, primary air paths are in full open conditions. 4.2 STARTING AH A (AH B IS OFF) a. AH A AC motor is started. If the temperature of the bearings is less than 70 Deg.C b. Whenever AH A AC motor trips impulse shall be given for starting AH A DC motor provided the temperature of support/guide bearing of AH A is less than 70 Deg. C. c. Impulse shall be given for closing of the inlet and outlet dampers of AH B which is off. 4.3 TRIPPING OF AH A (AH B IS OFF) a. AH A AC motor/DC motor shall trip manually when the temperature of support/guide bearing of AHA is very high (i.e. greater than 70 Deg. C). under this condition AH A DC motor shall be prohibit from starting. b. DC motor shall trip automatically when AH A AC motor starts. NOTE : Trip signal of AH is to be taken from both AC & DC motors trip. 4.4 STARTING OF AH B (AH A IS OFF):

a. The interlocks said above for AH A starting (AH B off0 is applicable here. 434 4.5 TRIPPING OF AH B (AH A IS OFF) a. The interlocks as above for tripping of AH A (AH B is off) is applicable here. 4.6 BOTH AHS ARE WORKING AND AH A TRIPS AND AH B CONTINUES TO RUN : The gas inlet damper the secondary air inlet damper and primary air inlet damper of the tripped AH shall automatically closed. The gas outlet damper, the secondary air outlet damper and PA outlet damper of the tripped AH need not be closed. However, if the operator wants to manually close these outlet dampers they can be closed. 4.7 BOTH AHS ARE WORKING WHEN AH B TRIPS & AH A CONTINUES TO RUN : a. The interlocking conditions said above under 4.6 is applicable here. 4.8 ONE AH IS WORKING AND THE OTHER AH IS OFF : a. If the working Airheater trips, the operator shall try for restarting the AH. If the restarting is not within 5 minutes, the boiler shall be tripped. 4.9 BOTH AHS ARE TRIPPING : a. If both AHS A and B trip the operator may try for restart the Airheaters. If any one of the AH is not started within 5 minutes the operator shall manually trip the boiler within 5 minutes. 4.10 INTERLOCKS FOR LUBE OIL PUMPS OF SUPPORT BEARING : (Applicable for Air Heater A and Air Heater B) 2 x 100% lube oil pump have been provided for the support bearing. Any of the two lub oil pumps can be preselected as main pump and the other as standby. Following interlocks shall be provided for lub oil pumps. i. Whenever the temperature of support bearing of air heater A is high (35

0 C), impulse shall be given to start the main oil pump. ii. The standby oil pump shall start when the main oil pump fails to start or trips. iii. The main oil pump / stand by oil pump shall trip when the temperature of the support bearing falls below a present value (30 0 C) 4.11 INTERLOCKS FOR LUB OIL PUMPS OF GUIDE BEARING : 2X100% lube oil pumps have been provided for guide bearing. Any of the two lub oil pumps can e preselected as main pumps and other as standby. The interlocks for these pumps shall be similar to these for support bearing as envisaged in clause 41.0 NOTE : Guide / Support bearing lub oil pumps can be started/stopped manually by push button provided selector switch is in manual position. 5.0 BLOW DOWN VALVES : i. When drum water level rises to 120 mm above normal water level, an annunciation, Drum Level High shall be given in UCB. 435 ii. When drum level rises to 25 mm above normal water level, below down valves BD-8 and BD-9 shall open and this condition shall be annunciated. iii. Blow down valves shall close automatically when the water level falls down to NWL. One deinterlock switch, shall be provided for both the valves for manual operation. iv. Pump A or Pump B can be started/tripped by preassigning the respective push button on provide on LCB (Local Panel) only when A/M switch is in manual position. v. FD Fan A shall be prohibited from starting until the control oil pressure is adequate.

6.0 INTERLOCKS FOR FD FAN LUBRICATING/CONTROL OIL SYSTEM : 6.1 FD Fan A lube oil/Control oil system : a. i. Pump A will start automatically if pump B trips provided A/M switch is in auto Position. ii. Pump A will start automatically with a time delay of 0-60 seconds if oil pressure falls below a set value & the pump B is working provided A/M switch is in auto position. b. i. Pump B will start automatically if pump A trips/ has not started, provided A/M switch is in auto position. ii. Pump B will start automatically with a time delay of 0-60 seconds if lube oil pressure falls below a set value and the pump A is working provided A/M switch is in auto position. 6.2 FD FAN B LUBRICATING OIL SYSTEM : Interlocks similar to those at (a0 (b) and (c) above shall hold good for FD Fan B lubricating oil system. 7.0 FURNACE TEMPERATURE PROBE : i. Furnace temperature probe can be advanced/retracted using the push buttons provided in UCB as well as at site (local). ii. Furnace temperature probe shall be prohibited from being advance further into the furnace if furnace temperature sensed by it is more than 540 0 C. iii. If furnace temperature probe is inside the furnace and the temperature exceeds 545 0 C it will be retracted back automatically.

8.0 INTERLOCKS FOR P.A. FAN LUBRICATING OIL SYSTEM : 8.1 P.A. Fan A lube oil system : a. i. Pump A will start automatically if pump B trips provided A/M switch is in auto Position. ii. Pump A will start automatically with a time delay of 0-60 seconds if lub oil pressure falls below a set valve and the pump B is working provided automanual switch is in auto position. b. i. Pump B will start automatically if pump A trips/has not started provided A/M Switch is in auto position. ii. Pump B will start automatically with a time delay of 0-60 second if lube oil pressure falls below set value and the pump A is working provided A/M is in auto position. 436 c. Pump A or pump B can be started/tripped by pressing the respective push button provided on LCB only when A/M switch is in a manual position. d. P.A. Fan A shall be prohibited from starting until the lub oil pressure of P.A. Fan A bearing is adequate. 8.2 P.A. FAN-B LUBRICATING OIL SYSTEM : Interlocks similar to those at 8.1 (a) (b) and (c) above shall hold good for FD Fan B lubricating oil system. 9.0 MISCELLANEOUS INTERLOCK : 9.1 Interlock and protection for DDI gate with motor operated blowers : Guillotine Gate with motor operated blower & manual isolation valve for Blower. i. Gate will close and open according to BHA interlock and protection. ii. Blower shall be continuously working irrespective of whether the gate is in close or open position. iii. The manual isolation valve in the blower line shall always be open.

iv. If the blower trips due to overload, it shall be annunciated. NOTE : ID Fan outlet gate blower shall be started when any one of the ID Fan is started. 9.1.1 Interlocks for guillotine Gate without blowers but with manual isolation valve are as per BHA interlock and protection requirement. Note : 1. The blower motor for I.D. Fan outlet gate shall be started simultaneously with I.D. Fan. 2. The blower motor for Hot Air shut off gate shall be started simultaneously with P.A. Fan. 9.2 Interlocks for motor operated valves with Bypass valves : i. First open the bypass valve fully. ii. After bypass valve is fully opened, open the main valve. iii. After main valve is fully opened, by pass valve may or may not be closed. iv. Main valve can be closed whenever required. The bypass valve, if not already closed, can also be closed. 437 438 The modern generators are associated with generator transformer, unit auxiliaries transformer, excitation system and diverse type of faults and for immediate isolation of faulty equipment protective relays are provided. Hence the protection of generators involves the consideration of more possible abnormal operating conditions than the protection of any other system element. Followings are the protections provided to 210 MW generator and its associated auxiliaries. A) Generator protection

1. Generator differential protection C.T. 2. Gen. Stator earth fault protection bus duct C.T. 3. Gen. Intertern protection CB CT neutralaguide. 4. Gen. Negative phase sequence protection C.T. bus duct. 5. Gen. Overload protection C.T. in bus duct. 6. Gen. Over voltage protection voltage P.T. 7. Gen. Field failure protection (CT and PT bus duct) 8. Gen. Minimum inpedance back-up protection (CT&PT) bus duct. 9. Gen. Reverse power protection C.T. & PT (LV side) 10. Gen. Low forward power protection CT&PT (LV side) 11. Local breaker back-up protection - HV side CT 12. Gen. Rotor earth fault protection 13. Gen under frequency protection voltage relay. 14. Gen. Over frequency protection - voltage relay. B) Generator transformer protection 1. G.T. overall differential protection. 2. G.T. overfluxing protection V/f = voltage relay bus duct LV & GT 3. G.T. restricted earth fault protection HV side CT 4. G.T. back-up over current protection HV side. C) Unit auxiliary transformer protection 1. UAT differential protection. 2. UAT back-up overcurrent protection. 3. UAT earth fault only annunciation. The problem of generator protection may be divided into a number of parts, each of which is discussed under its own heading.

1) Faults involving stator Winding (Protection of Stator) A) Phase to phase short circuit. B) Phase to Ground short circuit. C) Short circuits between turns. D) Open circuits in stator winding. E) Overheating of the stator. GENERTOR PROTOCTION AND COMMISSIONING TEST 2) Faults involving Gen. Rotors (Protection of rotor) A) Short circuit in rotor Windings. B) Open circuit in Rotor winding. C) Grounds on the Filed circuit. D) Over-heating. 3) Others A) Motoring B) Loss of Field or Weak filed. C) Out of Step operating. D) Over voltage. E) Over speed. F) Single phase operation. G) Vibration. H) Failure of the cooling system. I) Failure of the Bearing Insulation. J) Fire. 4) Back-up protections : I. PROTECTION OF STATOR : (a) FAULTS IN STATOR WINDINGS :

Faults involving stator winding may be classified as phase to Phase short circuits, phase to ground short circuits, short circuits between turns, and open circuits in windings. Over-voltage, Reduced dielectric strength, or a combination of both may cause stator winding insulation failure. Switching transients, lighting may cause over-voltage, or a combination of over-speed and sudden loss of load . Reduced dielectric strength results: from aging, backing of the insulation, accumulation of dirt, corona, moisture, rough treatment, or foreign material boring into the insulation. If a failure of the winding insulation can be cleared before the laminations are damaged, repairs can be confined to the replacement of the damaged coils, but if iron is seriously burned, partial or complete restacking of the lamination is required. Winding faults should be cleared before there is in opportunity for general fire to develop in the stator assembly. In general differential protection is recommended for a.c. generator. A) Phase to phase short circuits : Differentially connected current relays are used to protect individually each phase winding of a generator Current Differentia Relays may be plain over current relays with or without time delay Or they may be of the % type with either linear or Variable restraint. To permit maximum sensitivity for differential relays, identical current transformer should be used at both ends of each phase, but even when this is done, the sensitivity of plain over-current relay is limited in order to prevent false tripping on heavy through faults. For a number of years percentage differential relays with liner restrain have been used generally. Most of these relays pickup when the differential current in the secondary circuit exceeds 0.1 amp. without restrain and operate. on a 10% slope. The time delay for appreciable amounts of fault current is on the order of from three to five c/s on a 50 Hz Basis . Where identical CTs cannot be used, or where several sets of current transformers must be paralleled to give the total output of the generator, % differential relays working on a variable slop utilizing either summation or product restraint may be required high speed differential relays of the

439 latter types, capable of operating in one cycle have been developed in recent years and because of their decreased sensitivity on severe external faults there is no danger of incorrect operation. It is advantageous to use these relays even when current transformers of the same type are involved. It is desirable to have no other burden except the differential relays on the CTs supplying them, if it becomes necessary to include some additional burden in these circuits, the burden should be kept to a minimum. However, if the CTs have other devices besides protective relays as a burden, the use of variable percentage relays is preferred, since the latter are less susceptible to mis-operation due to burden than fixed percentage relays. It is recommended that ground relays be used in addition to differential relays when a generator neutral is grounded through impedance that limits the fault current to a value below that to which differential relays can respond . B) Phase to Ground short circuits : High voltage generator usually are Y connected and may have their neutrals solidly grounded, grounded through a low impedance, a high impedance or may be isolated from ground . As a rule, some impedance is required in the generator neutral connection to ground so that the magnitude of a single phase to ground fault will not exceed the 3 phase short circuit current. Present standards do not require the generator windings to withstand fault currents greater than the 3 phase value. The effectiveness of differential relays in recognizing ground faults depends upon the available ground current. When the latter is high, as is the case when low impedance grounding is used, differential relay will respond to ground faults on all but a small percentage of the windings near the neutral. As the impedance in the neutral circuit is increased, differential relays protect a progressively smaller percentage of the windings untill they are of no further use for recognizing ground faults. It full advantage of

differential protection is to obtained, it may be desirable to ground the neutral of the generator in question to operate it in parallel with another machine whose neutral is grounded, or to establish the neutral by means of a separate grounding transformer so that ground current on the order of full load current will be available . In unit type installations the generator neutral may be grounded through high resistance or the equivalent consisting of a distribution transformer with a Resistor connected across its secondary terminals. As differential relays are not effective when the generator neutral is grounded through high impedance, an additional rely is needed to detect ground faults by responding to current flow through the neutral circuit. Star connected generators which have only a single neutral connection brought out can be protected against ground faults by comparing the residual in the phase leads with the current in the grounded connection. C) Short Circuits between Turns : Although differential relays will recognize to phase to phase faults almost any place where they may occur, they will not recognize faults between turns of the same phase . Various schemes have been used or proposed in the past for protecting against this type of fault, but they usually have required bringing out additional terminals from the machine. Because of physical restriction and the general use of hydrogen cooling on modern large high voltage steam driven generators, it is not practical to bring out additional terminals from the windings for purpose on interlaying current balance schemes to detect faults between turns. Furthermore. Generator of this type usually have single turn coils so that Faults between turns cannot occur without involving 440 ground, and on this basis protection against faults between turns generally is not provided. Split phase protection however, has been used extensively for large generators. D) Open Circuit in Windings : Open circuit in the windings of a modern generator is not likely because of the physical size of the conductors, and special protection against it is

not provided as a rule on high-speed machines. Differential protection usually is installed on generators rated in excess of 5000KVA and operating at 2300 volts or above, but also may be used on machines as small as 1000 KVA. It is recommended that the zone protected differential relays include the generator leads extend to far side of the main circuit breaker. Including within the zone of the differential relays the conductors which extend from the main terminals of the generator to the far side of the main C.B. furnishes a simple method of providing sensitive and fast protection for the generator leads without the need for providing additional relay equipment. It is recommended that the generator differential and ground relay trip simultaneously the GCB and the FCB, and the neutral C.B. provided. When a fault occurs in the windings of a generator, the circuit breaker which connect it to the system, the main field C.B. and the C.B.in the natural (if an adequate neutral circuit breaker is installed, should be tripped immediately. In the past, the foiled circuit Breaker frequently was interlocked with the main C.B. so that field C.B. did not open until the main C.B. first had opened. This practice seems to have developed when adequate hand reset auxiliary relays were not available, and the intention was to avoid the possibility of the field C.B. tripping and the main GCB remaining closed. Present day practice, trips the main circuit breakers and the foiled C.B. simultaneously. To minimize burning of the stator iron in case of a ground faults, the neutral C.B. should be tripped in order to interrupt the fault current that would otherwise flow while the flux in the main filed is decaying. E) over heating of the stator :Overheating of the stator may be caused by i) over current, ii) short circuited laminations, iii) failure in the cooling system.

Temperature indicators or recorders are arranged to operate an alarm and are used to recognize overheating of the stator. i) Over current : Re-heating of the stator caused by the cumulative effects over-current cannot be rocognised by ordinary short time any over-current relays. Temperature indicators or recorders rated from embedded resistance detector or thermocouples often used to check stator temperatures, temperature recorders quietly are equipped to operate an alarm when the temperature seeds a safe value . No automatic tripping is initiated for large generators by temperature devices. A sufficient number of embedded temperature detectors are installed at respective points in the windings to obtain adequate information of temperature conditions in the stator. 441 ii) Short circuited laminations : Heating of the stator may be caused by failure of core bolt insulation, where core bolts are used to assist in holding the laminations together, or by local heating in the core caused by uneven enameling of some of the punching. Such localized heacting may not cause sufficient rise in temperature in the area where the embedded temperature detectors are located as to be recognised , and consequently these detectors cannot be depending on for an indication of this condition . If the lamination enamel should fail in the teeth near the detectors , considerably higher temperatures undoubtedly would be observed. There have been number of cases where failure of insulation between lamination caused the generator iron to be melted away and resulted in complete failure of the generators. iii) failure in the cooling system : Over- heating of a machine may result from some failure in the cooling system caused by accumulation of dirt or other obstructions in the ventilating passages, blocked screens, or ice formation or by failure of the cooling water supply in closed air or hydrogen systems. Any failure in the cooling system can be

recognised by comparing the temperature of air or hydrogen leaving the machine with the temperature which has been established as the maximum safe value. Thermometers or temperatures detecting devices should be located in both the intake and exhaust air (or hydrogen) streames. In some cases, these temperatures are recorded on the same chart with the temperatures indicated by the detectors embedded in the stator. II. PROTECTION OF ROTOR (FIELD) Troubles in generator rorotors may be classified as a) Short circuits in rotor windings, b) Open circuits in rotor windings, c) Ground on the filed circuits, d) Over-heating. In general, tripping protection for the rotor is not recommended. a) Short circuits in rotor windings : Short circuits in rotor windings cannot be recognised by over-current relays in the field circuit if only a few turns are involved or if one pole one of a slow-speed generator is short-circuited. Furthermore, it is highly desirable for field circuit not to be opened during system disturbances when high currents be induced in the field circuit. For this reason, over-current protection usually is not considered for field circuits. If the windings on one pole of a generator should become short circuits the resulting unbalanced magnetic conditions would produce mechanical stresses and vibration .If the vibration is sufficient, the condition can be recognised by vibration detecting equipment arranged to operate an alarm. The effects of short-circuited winding are more evident for generators with small number of poles. b) Open circuits in rotor windings : Open circuits in rotor winding may occur on any type of Generators, but experience has shown that they are more likely to occur the slower speed salient pole alternators. Beside from the possibility of high potential and

burning at the point of fault, an open circuited field causes loss of excitation, which is discussed in more details under this heading. c) Grounds on the field circuit : A grounds on the field circuit is not serious in itself, but 442 it Indicates the presence of weakened insulation or mechanical fail and serious damage may result if a second ground should occur. A single form of ground indication consists of two lamps in series connected across the rotor winding. With their mid point grounded the scheme of ground detection gives a positive indication only for faults near terminal of the filed winding . More sensitive ground indication can be obtained by replacing the Lamps with resistors and connection the mid point to ground through a sensitive relay . Complete coverage can be obtained in all cases by the use of a separate A.C. supply with a low voltage Transformer. One terminal of the transformer secondary winding is connected to the field winding the other terminal is connected to ground through a sensitive relay. a) Overheating : Overheating of the rotor may be caused by excess rotor current, failure in the ventilating system and single phase or unbalanced current operation. Although overheating of the rotor may be caused by excess filed current such as might result from failure of rheostat or voltage regulators, opinion favours the omission of over-current protection in the field circuits in order to avoid any misoperation during system disturbances when high transient currents may be induced in the field . Although a slight rise in temperature might be detected in the ventilating medium, it is doubtful if this rise can be depended upon to call attention to overheating of the rotor. Single phase or unbalanced current option will cause local heating in the pole faces the roter and severe vibration will be imparted to the machine foundation . Protection against unbalanced current operation normally is not provided for attended machines dependence

being placed upon the indications of the phase ammeter and the pressure of vibration to disclose this condition. III. MISCLLANEOUS PROTECTION a) Motoring : Generators driven by steam turbines which do not have other provision against being operated from the electrical end with insufficient steam to prevent overheating the turbine may be equipped with sensitive power directional relays. These may be arranged to give an alarm immediately when power flows from the bus-back towards the generator and to trip if the power reversal persists long enough to cause damage to the turbine from over-heating. Very sensitive power directional releys developing maximum torque at unit power factor have been used for this application a minimum time delay of one minute will be permissible between the time when the power reversal will be permissible between the time when the power reversal starts and tripping should occur. b) Loss of field excitation : When the field excitation on a loaded generator is lost, the magnetic coupling between the rotor and the stator may be so weakened that the rotor advances and after a short period pulls out of synchronism with the system. Continued operation without excitation, has harmful effects on both the generator and the system. An alternator running as an induction generation will have heavy current circulation in the face of the rotor, particularly toward the ends, and these may cause injurious heating 443 in local areas and arcing at metal wedges in the slots. Induced voltage or current will appear in the field winding, depending upon whether it is open circuited or short-circuited. For complete loss of field on a large generator on most systems not quipped with automatic generator voltage regulators, seriously low system voltages may be roached in not more than 10 to 15 seconds and in some cases in as short a time as one second when the generator represents a relatively large part of the total system generation. Loss of field

protection has been developed for protecting generators against partial as well complete loss of field. Time delay should be provided either inherently or by means of auxiliary time delay relay to prevent false tripping as momental surges. If the loss of field protection is intended primarily to protect the system rather then the generator, an under-voltage rely may be incorporated in the scheme to supervise tripping, but it may be difficult to select a setting that will safeguard against damage. The need for loss of field portion applies to those systems where one or more of the following conditions exist : 1. Most of the generators are not equipped with AVRs. 2. One generator represents a fairly large portion of the total generation, and 3. The generators are loosely linked electrically. Every effort should be made to prevent loss of fiold by accidental opening of the field circuit breaker such as providing a control switch interlocks to prevent the field circuit breaker from being opened while the main circuit breaker is closed. If an alert operator is in attendance at all times, loss of field protection may not be considered necessary. c) Out of step Operation : A Generator when running out of step is subject to a succession of severe impacts whose cumulative effect may cause damage to the shaft, coupling or stator mounting. Relays have been developed to recognise out of step conditions. d) Over Voltage : Over-voltage protection is recommended for hydroelectric generators which are subject to over-speed and accompanying over-voltage upon loss of load . Over-voltage also result from trouble on AVRs Ovoltage Relays may be arranged to insert resistance in the exciter or Generator field circuit depending upon local requirements. e) Over speed : Generators driven by prime movers which can reach dangerous overspeed under abnormal operating conditions should be equipped with over speed protection . This mey be in corporate in the governing system of the prime mover, or centrifugal devices may be used in the absence of mechanical over speed devices frequency relays may be used. Lager stem turbines have their safety over-speed governors adjusted to

trip throttle valve when the speed increases to 10% above normal. f) Vibration : Vibration may be caused by single phase or unbalanced current operation, magnetic unbalance in the rotor, and mechanical unbalance in the to rotor. Excessive vibration can be recognized by any one of several different types of vibration detecting equipment, which may be associated with the generator assembly or may be incorporated in the prime mover. g) Failure of the Cooling system : Heat losses in the generator stator and rotor are 444 carried off by the circulation of cooling air or hydrogen through the machine which in closed system is cooled in turn by passing through a suitable heat exchanger provision may be made to detect the present of water in such a cooling system. Where air is taken from the outside it may be desirable or necessary under certain conditions to avoid changes in load that may result in condensation in the machine when humidity is high. Any failure of the cooling system will be reflected by a rise in stator temperature. Methods for detecting this are described under the heading Protection of stator. Heat developed in the bearings of large machines is carried from the bearings by the lubricating oil, which in turn is cooled by a suitable heat exchanger. In attended installations bearing temp is indicated by thermometers, but in un-attached installations bearing temperature relays should installed to shut down the machine if overheating should develop in any of the bearings. h) Back up protection : In principle, back-up protection is recommended. Back-up relays may be considered as any relays, which will clear a faulty piece of equipment in the event that the protective equipment that would normally clear the fault fails to operate. Back-up protection associated with generators may operate and clear the various sources that would feed

back into a generator fault if the primary generator protection is in operative for any reason or it may operate to trip the generator in case the first line of fens on an outgoing line, transformers, or bus fails to clear the faulty equipment. As a general principle, back-up protection will be less sensitive, will take more time to operate, and may operate to disconnect more equipment than is involved in the original failure. Because of the big investment in large, modern generators such thought has been given to the problem of providing back-up protection. Generators have been included within the back-up protection of the buses to which they are connected or within the differential protection of associated transformers in unit design. Time relay over-current relays on transformers and tie lines also may be depended upon to act in a back-up capacity for clearing severe faults. What is considered to be suitable back-up protection is largely a matter of opinion, and the scheme that is used for a particular installation will be influenced by past experience, individual preferences, and what expenditures can be made. For these reasons no attempt can be made to make any specific recommendations on the use of back-up protection for generators. IV COMMISSIONING TEST OF TG SET BEFORE SYNCHRONISING THE UNIT 1. All generator protective relays are tested by secondery injection. Master relay operation on protection and subsequently tripping of generator circuit breaker and turbine on interlock should be ensured. 2. All protection trials of turbine are conducted. Also successful operation of SOP and auto and manual operation of AC/DC lub oil pumps ensured. Barring gear and jacking oil pump operations are also observed. 3. Turbovisory instruments are put into service and it is ensured that turbine temperature recorder, vibration recorder and differential expansion indicators start rendering the correct pickup signals by turbovisory instrument mounted on TG set.

445 4. Generator drying out: a) Generator is isolated from bus duct. Generator I. R. values are recorded on barring speed. If PI (polerisation index megger value for 600 seconds divided by megger value for 60 seconds.) is not two or less than two then dry out the generator by hot air blowing through stator winding. If desired PI value is obtained then give clearance for filling of carbondioxide and hydrogen. Air leak test should have been carried out well in advance. If PI value is not achieved even by hot air blowing through stator windings then roll the machine at 1200 RPM with air pressure of 1.5 Kg/Cm2 in generator casing. We go on recording hourly reading of megger values by motorised megger (1 kv or 2.5 kv) till the IR values are improved and PI value recorded is two or more than two. Once required PI value is obtained, clearance is given for bus duct connection normalisation. ii) Simultaniously give clearance for CO 2,H 2 filling and restoration of stator water system. iii) Ensure that H 2 is filled in the generator casing to a pressure of 3.5 Kg/Cm 2 and purity not less than 97 %. iv) Take final IR value of generator including bus duct, UAT and GTR. This value normally comes in the range of 100 to 200 Kilo Ohms. Normalise generator neutral transformer and ground connections.

v) Ensure readiness of the static excitation system for slow buildup of generator voltage for conducting electrical tests. vi) Rotor impedance measurement can be carried out at 1200 RPM and 3000 RPM. Dynamic testing of generator : Dynamic testing after every annual overhaul of T. G. set is carried out. Prior to testing of the generator, the G. T. and UAT are tested and kept ready for live testing before synchronising of the unit. The T. G. set is rolled for the dynamic testing, voltage is buildup and by certain mechanism fault conditions are developed and operation of the protecting circuitry is checked and recorded. After checking of the dynamic testing the T. G. set is synchronised with the grid. 446 The following protections are provided for 210 MW turbine set. 1) Tripping on Axial shift High .......................................................... 102 to 107 mm. 2) Tripping on Very Low Vacuum in condenser ...................................... 540 mm of Hg. 3) Tripping on Low Lub oil Pressure ..................................................... < 0.3 Kg/cm2. 4) Tripping on Low main steam temperature ................................................... 450 0 C. 5) Tripping on HPT Exhaust Temp. High ........................................................... 450 0 C. 6) Tripping on HP Heaters level very very high ................................ 4250 mm of water. 7) Tripping on Boiler drum level very high ........................................... + 275 mm. 8) Tripping on Boiler Tripping.

9) Tripping on Generator Tripping. 10) Tripping on Damper tank very low (Emergency) 11) Tripping on Stator Water conductivity High ................................... 18 micro ohm/cc. 12) Tripping on Stator water flow low (Emergency) ................................. < = 13 m3/hr. 13) Emergency tripping from Local/Mechanical. 14) Tripping from control desk. 15) Elecro-Hydaulic Transducer protection 16) Overspeed Protection ................................................................................ 16 %. For all above protections except no 13, the power supply to the system is provided from two independent sections with fast automatic changeover facility. This changeover facility of supply system (AC & DC both) is provided to overcome the non -availability of protections due to supply failure. The failed supply may be restored during the running of set. All faults are annunciated independently. Necessary annunciation provisions are made to indicate non-availability of protection action. Provisions of manual switching ON and switching OFF of the protections are provided with their annunciation. In addition to this, all protection relays except hand reset type, have been provided with self hold down, where the relays are auto reset type. 1) Axial Shift Protection : This protection acts in the event of High Axial Shift of rotor caused by the unacceptable wear of the axial bearing pads which results in inadmissible displacement of the rotor with respect to the thrust bearings. This condition is very dangerous which results in rubbing of rotating parts against stationary parts of the turbine. The trip points correspond to 1.2 mm thrust--bearing wear from either side. The trip signal is initiated from axial shift measuring unit. 2) Very Low Vacuum in Condenser : This protection acts in the event of vacuum fall in

the condenser to low set point no. 2 (540 mm Hgc). There is a pretrip alarm at vacuum fall to set point no. 1 (650 mm Hgc). Both trip and pretrip signals are initiated from a metallic below type vacuum switch. Very low vacuum in the condenser (does not allow full steam from turbine to enter the condenser when turbine trips). Also this cause temp rise in the steam at the end of expansion stages and this may cause misalignment and PROTECTION OF TURBINE 447 damage at the exhaust end of the turbine and also possibly buckling of condenser tubes. Loss of vacuum is usually caused due to failure in the supply of condenser cooling water or malfunctioning of condenser air ejector system. Main reasons are inefficient cooling tower, air ingress through glands, scaling on condenser tubes from inside and outside. 3) Lub Oil Pressure Very Low : This protection acts in case the lub oil pressure fall to low set point no. 3 (0.3 Kg/cm2). There is a pretrip alarm at pressure fall to low set point no. 1 (0.6 Kg/cm2). Both trip and pretrip signals initiated from two metallic bellow type pressure switches connected in parallel. Low pressure of the lub. oil results in damaging the rotating parts in the turbine as well as outside the turbine like pedestal bearing at slip ring end of the generator. Lubrication with sufficient pressure and purity of oil is the initial requirement of the turbo generator set. The DC motor driven emergency pump is used as a final back up to supply oil. 4) Main steam temp. Low Protection : This protection acts in case the main steam temp. in any of the emergency stop valves decreases to low set point no. 2 (450 0C) from set point no. 1 (520 0 C) suddenly. The sudden drop of temp. causes mismatch between

turbine casing and rotor temp. resulting in high eccentricity and diff. expansion. The high diff. expansion of the turbine rotor relative to the turbine cylinder can damage the turbine seals due to rubbing. 5) HPT Exhaust Temp. High protection : This protection acts in case the exhaust steam temp. reaches to 425 0 C. Sensing of the temp. is taken through the temp. indicator in case of failure of NRV in CRH line the HP turbine temp. may shoot up beyond permissible working limit because of reverse steam flow. 6) Hp Heaters Level Very Very High Protection : For initiating alarm and protection actions in the event of abnormal levels in any of the hp heaters, level switches are provided for high set point no. 2 and no. 3. The instrument alarm contact and level switch contact for high set point no 3 is used in OR logic for initiating high level signal. This protection acts in case the level goes to high set point no. 2 , which isolates HP heaters and further goes to isolate the HP heaters from service, in addition to tripping of the turbine. Heater tube leakage causes HP heater level high, results in admission of water into turbine through bleed side from where the steam tapping are taken to HP heaters. High set point 2 - 750 mm of water col., very high set point - 4250 of water column. 7) Boiler Drum Level Very High Protection : This protection acts in case the level of water in boiler drum reaches high. In absence of this protection, water may enter into the turbine with steam, while it in rolling condition. The provision of boiler drum level indication is made in control room itself to maintain the level. 8) Turbine Tripping on Boiler Tripping : This protection acts in case the boiler trips out. 10 sec. delayed tripping is achieved through timer. It is well understood that tripping of the boiler means stopping steam production and steam supply to the turbine.

9) Reverse Power Protection : A steam turbine requires protection against overheating when its steam supply is cut off and generator runs as motor. Such overheating occurs 448 because insufficient steam is passing through the turbine to carry away the heat that is produced by windage loss. When a generator operating in parallel with other machines looses its driving force, it remains in synchronism with the system and continues to run as a synchronous motor drawing sufficient power to drive the prime mover and system and not for generator. 10) Damper Tank Level Low Protection : This protection acts (with 10 sec.-delayed action) in case the oil level in damper tank decreases below low set point. The oil from this tank serves for sealing, low level of which is not permitted. Sealing with low pressure of oil results in leakage of hydrogen from seals. 11) Stator Water Conductivity High Protection : This protection acts in case the conductivity of stator water required for its cooling goes high. In this case the stator windings may be earthed through water due to low resistance. 12) Stator Water Flow Low Protection : This protection acts in case the flow of stator water used for cooling of the stator goes low. The insufficient flow of water does not serve the purpose of cooling water of stator winding (13 M 3 /h wdg.) insulation gets damaged. 13) Emergency Tripping from Local : This protection acts in case the push button of local for tripping is pressed by hand. This is the emergency mechanical protection provided at local only. In abnormal condition ,irrespective of electrical protections ,turbine may be tripped without delay.

14) Emergency Tripping from Remote : This facility is provided on control desk itself. By pressing this push button in emergency the Turbine Trip Solenoidgets energized and turbine trips with ESV & IV closing. 15) Electro Hydraulic Transducers : Electro hydraulic transducer is intended for anticipatory closing of control valves in case the total loss of external load and thus reduces the transit overspeed peak. GCB may get open due to its own fault, results in overspeeding of the turbine. The transducer is energised by a 200 mA DC pulse for a duration of 2 sec., in the event of generator breaker opening. This interlock is automatically introduced when ESV & IV are open and GCB is closed. 16) Overspeed Protection : This totally mechanical protection provided at 10 % & 16%. Overspeed of the turbine with corresponding striker is ON. The inadmissible overspeed can result in rapture of the rotor as a result of stress due to centrifugal force. Trip initiation takes place at set value of overspeed with the assistance of mechanical overspeed governors. This is a built in feature in governing system. Turbine protection means isolation of steam supply to the turbine. On each and every elect. protection command goes to energies turbine trip solenoid,which after energisation gives command to close ESV,EV and control valves. Also the Turbine Lock Out Relay (TLR) which picks upon tripping gives command to close main steam stop valves, short time opening and again closing of turbine evacuation valves and closing of a temp. valves etc. 449 The system is either a Electro-mechanical relay based (as in most of the 210 MW old units) or Programmable Logic Controllers based in the new units. The system hardware consists of : 1. Pushbutton switches for initiating operations related to Fuel Oil and Coal admission,

2. Alarm windows on desk and panels for indicating current status of coal mills, oil elevations and flame scanner at every corner. 3. Relay Panels in the Relay room 4. Oil admission valves ( pneumatic or hydraulic) at every corner 5. Oil trip valves and re-circulation valves controlling the oil to headers at Boiler firing floor 6. Limit switches sensing status of the valves in oil admission 7. Flame scanners 8. Pressure and Temperature switches 9. Electro- pneumatic Solenoid valves 10. Relay panels consisting of Relays, Timers and Memory Units. Startup, withdrawal and tripping of Oil Elevations, Coal Elevations and Boiler are implemented through sequential logic built with the help of relays or PLCs. Many parameters from measurement and process control systems are also used as input to FSSS system for implementation of the required logic. Fuel admission is safe only if Unburnt fuel is not present in the furnace when Boiler is to be lighted up. Sufficient ignition energy is available for Fuel being admitted. Stopping the fuel admission if it is not burning completely. All other parameters mentioned in the table above are proper. The FSSS system is designed to offer maximum safety, minimum nuisance trips, minimum power consumption and maximum life for the components used. The logic is functionally divided in to Unit Logic, elevation logic and corner logic. Unit Logic :It supervises the overall furnace conditions by monitoring all critical parameters of fuel firing system and also supervises furnace purge. If there is a likelihood of dangerous condition, it trips the boiler.

Elevation Logic : Startup and stopping actions for the elevation are carried out through the elevation logic. Input to this logic is from operators for start and stop commands of the elevation and also trip commands from Unit logic. It also provides essential trip commands for corner logic. FURNACE SAFEGUARD SUPERVISORY SYSTEM (FSSS) 450 Corner Logic :It controls and supervises the corner valves i.e. Oil Valves. Atomosing Valves and Scavenge valves. However, trip signals from unit logic or elevation logic overrides the commands from corner logic. Power supply :There are two types of power supplies to FSSS panes, alternating current as well as direct current. DC is obtained from station batteries and there are two sources for ac power to FSSS with a fast and automatic change over arrangement. In case of loss of AC power, Dc power is used for tripping of the fuel trip valve or a coal feeder. In case of loss of DC power, boiler tripping is initiated using AC Power. Delay of 2 seconds is provided for Loss of power trip. FSSS Logic :Functions of FSSS are devided in following logic diagrams : 1. Furnace Purge Supervision 2. Igniter Control 3. Warm up fuel control 4. Pulveriser Control 5. Secondary Air damper Control 6. Flame scanner intelligence 7. Boiler Tripping Following Fig 1explains the meanings of the symbols used in the ensuing drawings. Furnace Purge Control :Purpose of this control is to ensure that furnace is always purged

prior to Boiler Light up. When boiler trips on protection or otherwise, there is a possibility of accumulation of unburnt fuel in the furnace. This unburnt fuel need to be driven out prior to readmission of oil for lighting up the boiler. Purging is achieved by establishing a sufficient airflow by running one air cycle for predetermined time (5 minutes for 210 MW and 9 minutes for 500 MW Boilers). This is the first operation that has to be carried out for lighting up the boiler. Attached Logic diagram at Fig 2 explains the furnace purge control. To initiate a Furnace purge following conditions need to be satisfied. 451 SN Condition to be satisfied 1 All igniters retraced in case of HEA igniters/All igniter valve closed in case of HSD Igniters 2 All heavy oil valves closed (Hydromotor valves or pneumatic valves) 3 All Light oil valves closed (Hydromotor valves or pneumatic valves) 4 All pulverisers off 5 All Coal feeders Off 6 All flame scanners sense no flame 7 All hot air gates closed and cold air dampers open 5%. 8 All auxiliary air dampers modulating 9 Igniters trip valves closed 10 Heavy oil trip valves closed 11 Light Oil Trip valves are closed 12 No Boiler trip These 12 signals are the input to AND Gate, output of which is fed to the second AND Gate and is also used to drive a Green Colored lamp indicating Purge Ready. Another input to the second AND Gate is from a Push Button switch for starting the Purging. The OR gate works as a latch. Output of the second AND gate goes to a timer set for a delay of 5 minutes.

When all the 12 input signals are true, first AND gates out put is true and Purge Ready lamp glow. Operator then starts Purging by pressing the Push Button switch. This causes Purging lamp to glow and simultaneously timer starts counting the purging time. Timer output goes to third AND gate. No Boiler trip signal is the second input to this gate. After completion of 5 minutes time, timer output becomes True. If No boiler trip signal is true then both the inputs to third AND gate remain true and its output goes True and resets Master Fuel Trip relay and also Purge Ready and No Boiler Trip lamp glows. Only when this lamp is glowing, any Oil Elevation can be started for lighting up the boiler. LOTV Open / Close Control :Figure 2 shows logic diagram for Warm up oil trip valve control. Before Boiler light up with Light Diesel oil, LOTV must be opened by giving open command from push button switch on the desk. Output from OPEN push button switch goes to an AND gate. Other inputs to this gate are 1. No Boiler Trip 2. All Corner Valves closed 3. LDO Pressure adequate 4. LOTV Close command not persisting When all these inputs are TRUE, OPEN command causes AND gate to give a TRUE output causing LOTV to Open. LOTV closes when 1. Close command through push button switch is initiated OR 2. Boiler trips. OR 452 3. After a delay of 3 seconds when any warm up oil elevations Corner valve is NOT CLOSED AND

a. If LDO Pressure drops to LOW value OR b. If P between atomizing air and LDO is low ANDNo LDO pair is in START or STOP State. Pulveriser Ready Permissive: Fig. 4 shows the logic diagram for Pulveriser Permissive. If this permissive is available then only the Pulveriser can be started. Requirements are: 1. Pulveriser outlet temperature NOT HIGH 2. Tramp Iron Hopper Valve Open 3. Feeder Inlet gate Open 4. No Primary Air Fan Trip 5. Pulveriser Discharge Valve open 6. No Pulveriser trip 7. No Pulveriser stop command existing from Local or control desk 8. Seal air valve open 9. Cold air gate open 10. No Boiler trip AND a. Any Feeder is ON OR b. Burner tilt horizontal ANDAir Flow less than 40%. Pulveriser Ignition Permissive : Fig. 5 shows Logic Diagram for Ignition Permissive for pulverisers A and B. Similar requirements are applicable for other pulverisers : 1. Pulveriser B is running with 50% loading AND Boiler Load is More than 30% OR a. Elevation AB in service with 3 out of 4 Guns established. 2. Pulveriser B Ignition Permissive is available if a. Pulveriser A or C running at 50% loading AND Boiler Load is more than 30% OR b. Oil Elevation AB in service with 3 out of 4 guns established. There are many more such logic diagrams are available, the scope of which is out side this lecture and hence can not be discussed here. Relevant drawings available in Power Stations

can be referred for further study. 453 Fig. 2 : Furnace Purge Control 454 Fig. 3 : LOTV ON / OF Control 455 LOW NO WARM-UP PAIR IN START OR STOP Fig. 4 : Pulveriser Ready Permissive 456 Fig. 5 : Pulveriser Ignition Permissive 457