CRIMPRO Digest For June 10, 2013 Sets A To E (Inc.)

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013
A. VENUE IN CRIMINAL CASES IS JURISDICTIONAL 1. MANUEL ISIP V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Petitioner here was charged with Estafa before the RTC of Cavite City under the information that he received a seven carat diamond ring for the purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or return of the jewelry if not sold. Petitioner's wife was also indicted before the same court for 7 counts of Violation of BP 22 (for issuing a check which upon presentation was dishonored for insufficiency of funds notwithstanding the repeated demands made). o o 6 other informations were filed except when the offense was committed and the number and amount of the check. They were also charged with 5 counts of estafa for rings and earrings misappropriated.
The prosecutions version of the facts were that at the complainant's residence (Cavite City), they received the objects of the complaint and if not able to sell them, they have to return the thing on or before a specific date. They did not return the ring and instead, the wife issued checks as payment which were later dishonored for insufficiency of funds. According to prosecution, they repeatedly went to the said residence of the complainant to claim jewelry, not paying for them and thereafter issuing personal checks which bounced. The version of the defense was that she started obtaining jewelry from financially strapped players and repledged such as security for financing which she obtained from Nemesio Jose. When Nemesio Jose lost capital, he referred them to his son, one Leonardo Jose. At their condominium in Manile, they started having transactions with complainant extending various amounts to her for which she pledged jewelry. In the course of the transactions she issued several checks as guarantee for the payment of the subject jewelry which have either been paid or redeemed. They aver that the transactions happened in Manila and that her husband participated only as a witness. The RTC ruled that the transactions were sufficiently shown to have taken place in Cavite when the latter was on leave of absence from the Bureau of Customs. CA upheld the finding of the lower court that the venue was properly laid and that the checks were delivered by the accused in Cavite City. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the essential ingredients of the offenses charged therein was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Cavite City. RULING: (1) The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike civil cases is jurisdictional. The place where the crime is committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. o The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. But if the evidence adduced during trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
In this case, the petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the transaction happened in Manila. o o Convenience alone, that they live in Manila, cannot hold in this case. Distance will not prevent any person from going to a distant place where he can procure goods that he can sell so that he can earn a living. The fact that the checks were drawn against accounts with banks in Manila or Makati likewise cannot lead to the conclusion that the transactions were not entered into in Cavite.
By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta
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OTHER ISSUES (Not procedural, but just in case) (1) The receipt of the ring: the acknowledgement receipt executed by petitioner is very clear evidence that he received the ring. As a businessman, he must know the consequences that may arise by signing such receipt. (2) There is no novation here since the obligations they incurred herein were not yet settled when the criminal case was filed. Also, not all elements of novation in this case were present. 2. LANDBANK V. BELISATA FACTS: Belisata is the owner of 8 parcels of land placed by the Dept of Agrarian Reform under the CARP program. Belisata disagreed with the DAR as to the amount of just compensation he deserved, which caused him to file a Petition for Valuation and Payment of Just Compensation before the Regional Adjudicator for Region V. Favor was then granted to him. Aggrieved, the DAR filed an original Petition for Determination of Just Compensation at the RTC sitting as SAC. It was dismissed on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. ISSUE: Whether it is necessary that in cases involving claims for just compensation under RA 6657 that the decision of the adjudicator must first be appealed to the DARAB before the party can resort to the RTC sitting as SAC RULING: Sec 50 and 57 of RA 6657 provide that DAR shall have primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, with an exception that DAR doesnt have original or exclusive jurisdiction over matters of just compensation. This is a judicial function. All criminal offenses under RA6657 are within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a special agrarian court. 3. PEOPLE V. TAROY FACTS: Taroy was charged with two counts of Rape before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet. On two separate dates, he allegedly raped his stepdaughter (DES). DES complained to her mother MILA and they subsequently accompanied the victim to the National Bureau of Investigation. The RTC found Taroy guilty of two counts of rape and sentenced him to Reclusion Perpetua. Taroy challenged the Benguet RTCs jurisdiction over the crimes charged, he having testified that their residence when the alleged offenses took place was in Baguio City. The RTC however held that their residence was in Baguio City did not strip the court of its jurisdiction since he waived the jurisdictional requirement. CA affirmed the decision ISSUE: (1) W/N the RTC of La Trinidad Benguet has jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases of rape against Taroy RULING: (1) Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases. It can neither be waived or subjected to stipulation. It must exist as a matter of law. Thus for territorial jurisdiction to attach, the criminal action must be instituted and tried in the proper court for the municipality, city, or province where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients took place. In the case at bar, the Informations filed with The RTC of La Trinidad state that the crimes were committed in the offenders house in La Trinidad Benguet. Taroys assertion that it happened in Baguio is UNCORROBORATED!
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4. BONIFACIO, ET AL. VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI FACTS: Upon the complaint filed by Jessie John P. Gimenez (Gimenez) on behalf of the Yuchengco Family (particularly, former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee) and the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan), 13 Informations for libel were filed with the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC) against officers, trustees and a member of the Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), and a certain John Doe, the administrator of the website www.pepcoalition.com, which provides a forum for planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. a wholly owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies to seek redress for being unable to collect under their pre-need educational plans after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments. The Informations alleged that the accused, holding legal title to the said website, maliciously published therein the following defamatory article against the Yuchengco Family and Malayan: Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x xxx xxx For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they had successfully lull us and the next time they will try to kill us na. x x x However, on appeal, the Secretary of Justice directed the withdrawal of the Informations for lack of probable cause, opining that the crime of internet libel was non-existent. On motion of the accused, the RTC, albeit finding probable cause, quashed the Informations for failure to allege that the offended parties were actually residing in Makati at the time the offense was committed as in fact they listed their address in Manila, or to allege that the article was printed and first published in Makati. The prosecution moved for reconsideration, arguing that even assuming the Information was deficient it merely needed a formal amendment. The RTC granted the motion and ordered the prosecution to amend the Information to cure the defect of improper venue. The prosecution amended the Information to show that the website was accessible in Makati City and the defamatory article was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City. After the RTC admitted the Amended Information, several of the accused (petitioners) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court faulting the RTC. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not petitioners, in filing the petition directly to the Supreme Court, violated the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus render the petition dismissible; and (2) whether or not the RTC gravely abuse its discretion when it admitted the Amended Information. RULING: (1) Strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. Thus, petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTC should be filed in the Court of Appeals. The rule, however, admits of certain exceptions as when the case involves purely legal questions. In this case, petitioners raised a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363. (2) The Amended Information was insufficient to vest jurisdiction in Makati.Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. Venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: (a) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or (b) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. The prosecution chose the second. Before Article 360 of the RPC was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed. Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue. Article 360 was amended by RA 4363 to state that such action should be brought where the article was printed and first published. The evil sought to
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be prevented by the amendment was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than to harass or intimidate an accused, especially when the offended party is a person of sufficient means or possesses influence, and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge. If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass. The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To equate first access to the defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with printing and first publication would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed. Contrary to petitioners claim, the venue requirements, under Article 360 of the RPC, for libel actions filed by private persons cannot be considered unduly oppressive as they still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in which situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter was printed and first published. RTC was directed to quash the Amended Information and to dismiss the case. B. JURISDICTION TO ISSUE HOLD DEPARTURE ORDERS (REGULAR COURTS DISTINGUISHED WITH THE SANDIGANBAYAN 1. MONDEJAR V. BUBAN FACTS: Bernadetted Mondejar charged Judge Buban of the Tacloban City MTCC with gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct relative to the Criminial Case entitled People v. Bernadette Mondejar. Buban allegedly issued a hold-departure order against her in violation of SC circular 39-97 which provides that hold departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. Buban for his part alleged that he was not familiar with the said SC Circular and he only became familiar with its contents when he recently ordered his clerk to secure a copy from the RTC of their area. ISSUE: W/N Buban can validly issue a hold departure order RULING: No. Paragraph 1 of the said circular specifically provides that hold-departure orders shall be issued only only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. Clearly then, criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall within the ambit of the circular and it was an error on the part of the respondent judge to have issued on in the instant case. Buban was reprimanded and given a stern warning by the courts. 2. MUPAS V. ESPANOL FACTS: In a letter-complaint dated October 29, 2001 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator, Judge Lorinda T. Mupas of the Municipal Trial Court of Dasmarias, Cavite, charges Judge Dolores L. Espaol, Regional Trial Court (Branch 90) of Dasmarias, Cavite, in her capacity as Executive Judge, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Usurpation of Authority. Three separate criminal complaints for syndicated estafa were filed before the MTC. Complainant judge conducted a preliminary investigation and on the same day, she issued a warrant of arrest against the accused. No bail was recommended.
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Invoking that the Executive Judge has the authority to supervise all detainees in the municipal jail of Dasmarinas, Cavite under Section 25 of Rule 114 of the Revised Criminal Procedure, the private complainants sent copies of the motion to transfer and supplemental pleading to respondent. On the same day, respondent issued two orders: (1) directing the transfer of the accused Eva Malihan from Municipal Jail to Provincial Jail; (2) directing the Commissioner on Immigration and Deportation to hold and prevent the departure from the Philippines of the accused while the cases are pending. Respondent retired from service. ISSUE: RATIO: In a memorandum, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) opines that respondents order to transfer the accused from the municipal jail to the provincial jail cannot be justified under Section 25 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. As an executive judge, respondent exercises supervision over all persons in custody for the purpose of eliminating unnecessary detention but the rule does not give her the authority to arrogate upon herself a power vested upon a presiding judge of the court where the case is pending. The OCA concludes that respondent encroached upon the power of the complaining judge when respondent took cognizance of the motions not pending in her court. The hold-departure order cannot be sustained since it is contrary to the mandates of SC No. 3937 inasmuch as the time of its issuance, no case has yet been filed in the RTC. The OCA recommends to the that: a) Respondent be admonished for issuing an order transferring the accused from the municipal jail to the provincial jail; b) Respondent be reprimanded for issuing a hold-departure order considering that it is not within her authority to issue it in cases pending preliminary investigation in the MTC; c) Supplemental complaint be incorporated The Court agrees with the OCA, except to the recommended penalty. The respondent judge was guilty of Gros Ignorance of the Law and was fined Php5,000 to be deducted from whatever retirement benefit due her. Whether or not the respondents act of issuing the two assailed orders, despite the fact that the cases are pending with the MTC, constitutes gross ignorance of the law and usurpation of authority.
C. JURISDICTION DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT 1. VICENTE FOZ AND DANNY FAJARDO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. FACTS: An information was charged against petitioners herein in the RTC of Iloilo City for the crime of libel. In the information, a certain article entitled "Meet Dr. Portigo, Company Physician" was included portraying a certain physician as wanting in high sense of professional integrity, trust and responsibility expected of him as a physician. It also alleged that the article was published in Panay News (daily newspaper with considerable circulation in Iloilo). o The accused was convicted and motions for reconsideration, as well as appeals were decided against him. Hence, this petition. For the first time in the case, petitioners claim that the information charging them of libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo.
ISSUE: RATIO:
Whether or not the RTC of Iloilo has jurisdiction over the case
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The RTC has no jurisdiction over the case. Although this issue was raised for the first time in court, the ground that the lower court lacks jurisdiction may be raised by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused by express waiver or otherwise since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which organized the court and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law. Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional and this is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information filed against the accused in criminal cases. As such, the information must show that the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. o In libel, rules for venue has been stated by the court (citing a cae Agbayani v. Sayo). The information must be filed depending on the personality of the offended party. if private person or public official CFI of province or city where the article is printed and first published. if private person CFI of province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense if public officer whose office is in Manila CFI of Manila if public officer whose office is outside Manila CFI of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense. o In this case, since the offended party is a private individual, it must be filed in the province or city where the article was printed and first published or where he resided at the time of the commission of the offense. Such fact was not included in the information. It only stated that Panay News was in considerable circulation but it did not establish that the said publication was printed and first published in said City. Neither did the information allege that the private individual resides in the said venue at the time of the commission of the offense. It failed to allege the residence.
D. CREATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN 1. SECTION 4, ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law. 2. P.D. 1486 DATED JUNE 11, 1978 CREATING A SPECIAL COURT TO BE KNOWN AS "SANDIGANBAYAN" AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES WHEREAS, the New Constitution declares that a public office is a public trust and ordains that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people; WHEREAS, to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, Section 5, Article XIII of the New Constitution provides for the creation of a special court to be known as Sandiganbayan; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, do hereby order and decree as follows: Section 1. Sandiganbayan; Composition; Qualifications; tenure; removal and compensation. A special court, possessing all the inherent powers of a court of justice, to be known as the Sandiganbayan is hereby created composed of a Presiding Judge and eight (8) Associate Judges who shall be appointed by the President and shall be subject to the same inhibitions and/or disqualifications as judges of courts of first instance. No person shall be appointed Presiding Judge or Associate Judge of the Sandiganbayan, unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least 40 years of age and for at least ten (10) years or more had been a judge of a court of record or been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held office requiring admission to the bar as a prerequisite for a like period.
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The Presiding Judge shall be so designated in his commission and the other judges shall have precedence according to the dates of their respective commissions, or when the commissions of two (2) or more of them shall hear the same date, according to the order in which their commissions have been issued by the President. The Presiding Judge and the Associate Judges shall not be removed from office except on impeachment upon the grounds and in the manner provided for in Sections 2 and 3 of Article III of the 1973 Constitution. The Presiding Judge shall receive an annual compensation of P60,000.00 and each Associate Judge P50,000.00 which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. They shall hold office until they reach the age of 65 years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. Section 2. Official Station; Place of Holding Sessions. The Sandiganbayan shall have its principal office in the Metro Manila Area; Provided, however, that the Presiding Judge may authorize any division or divisions of the court to hold sessions at any time and place outside Metro Manila to hear and decide cases emanating from any of the existing judicial districts. Whenever necessary, the Sandiganbayan may require the services of the personnel and the use of the facilities of any agency of the Government, national or local, including the courts of first instance of the province where any of the divisions is holding session and those personnel of such agencies or courts shall be subject to the order of the Sandiganbayan. Section 3. Quorum. Five judges shall constitute a quorum for sessions en banc, and two judges for sessions in division; Provided, that when a quorum and/or the majority required for a decision of the Sandiganbayan either en banc or in division, or the trial or hearing of cases cannot be had due to the legal disqualification or temporary disability of a judge or of a vacancy occurring therein, the President shall, upon recommendation of the Presiding Judge, designate any judge of the court of first instance or of the circuit criminal court of the judicial district concerned to sit temporarily therein. The Sandiganbayan shall, as a body, sit en banc but it may sit in three (3) divisions of three (3) judges each. The three (3) divisions may sit at the same time. If the Presiding Judge is present in any session of the court, whether en banc or in division, he shall preside. In his absence the Associate Judge attending who is first in precedence shall preside. Section 4. Jurisdiction. Except as herein provided, the Sandiganbayan shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide: (a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Republic Act No. 1379; (b) Crimes committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in government- owned or controlled corporations, embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; (c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees including those employed in governmentowned or controlled corporations in relation to their office; Provided, that, in case private individuals are accused as principals, accomplices or accessories in the commission of the crimes hereinabove mentioned, they shall be tried jointly with the public officers or employees concerned. Where the accused is charged of an offense in relation to his office and the evidence is insufficient to establish the offense so charged, he may nevertheless be convicted and sentenced for the offense included in that which is charged. (d) Civil suits brought in connection with the aforementioned crimes for restitution or reparation of damages, recovery of the instruments and effects of the crimes, or forfeiture proceedings provided for under Republic Act No. 1379;
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(e) Civil actions brought under Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil Code. Exception from the foregoing provisions during the period of material law are criminal cases against officers and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and all others who fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the military tribunals. Section 5. Proceedings against constitutional officers; votes required. All cases involving constitutional officers shall be heard and decided by the Sandiganbayan en banc; Provided, that when a non-constitutional officer or employee or private individual is charged or sued jointly with a constitutional officer under Section 4 hereof, they shall all be tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan en banc. All other cases may be tried and decided by a division. The affirmative vote of five (5) judges is necessary for a decision of the Sandiganbayan en banc. The affirmative vote of two judges in a division shall be necessary for the promulgation of a judgment. Section 6. Maximum period for termination of cases. As far as practicable, the trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan en banc or in division once commenced shall be continuous until terminated and the judgment en banc or in division shall be rendered within three (3) months from the date the case was submitted for decision. Section 7. Form, finality and enforcement of decisions; petitions for reconsideration. Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it. Decisions and final orders en banc shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; and those of a division shall be appealable under Rule 42 thereof. The Supreme Court shall hear and decide any case on appeal promptly and without the necessity of placing it upon the regular calendar. Whenever, in any case decided by the Sandiganbayan en banc or by a division thereof, the death penalty of life imprisonment shall have been imposed, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court whether the accused shall have appealed or not, for review and judgment, as law and justice shall dictate. Any party may file a petition for reconsideration of any order or decision of the Sandiganbayan en banc or in division within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a certified copy of such order or decision and such petition for reconsideration shall be decided by the Sandiganbayan en banc or in division, as the case may be, within thirty (30) days from submission thereof. Final judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan en banc or in division shall be executed and enforced in the manner provided for in the Rules of Court. Section 8. Transfer of cases. All cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan as herein provided, the trial of which had not yet commenced in the trial courts as of the date of its organization shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan, except those cases filed in the military tribunals and those cases against military personnel which shall remain in the military tribunals. Section 9. Authority over internal affairs. The Sandiganbayan shall administer its own internal affairs and may adopt such rules governing the constitution of its divisions, the allocation of cases among them, the rotation of judges and other matters relating to its business. Section 10. Proceedings free of charge; premature publicity prohibited. All proceedings in the Sandiganbayan en banc or in division shall be conducted at no cost to the complainant and/or his witnesses. No criminal complaint shall be given due course by the Sandiganbayan except upon a certification by the Chief Special Prosecutor of the existence of probable cause to be determined after a preliminary investigation conducted in accordance with existing laws. No publicity shall be allowed during the pendency of such preliminary investigation and the name of the complainant and the accused shall not be made public until after an information is field with the Sandiganbayan. Section 11. Administrative Personnel. Upon recommendation of the Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court may designate, from among the officers and employees under it, or appoint the personnel necessary for the Sandiganbayan, including a Clerk of Court and three (3) Deputy Clerks of Court; Provided, however, that those
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designated shall not receive additional compensation, except per diems, traveling and necessary expenses in accordance with existing laws and rules. The Clerk of Court shall have an annual compensation of P23,000.00, and the deputy clerks of court, P18,000.00. The Clerk of Court and deputy clerks of court shall at least be members of the bar. All subordinate employees of the Sandiganbayan shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law; Provided, that the Sandiganbayan may, by resolution en banc, remove any of them for cause. Section 12. Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor. The provisions of any law or rule to the contrary notwithstanding, the direction and control of the prosecution of cases mentioned in Section 4 hereof, shall be exercised by a Chief Special Prosecutor who shall be assisted by one (1) Assistant Chief Special Prosecutor and nine (9) Special Prosecutors who shall be appointed by the President. The Chief Special Prosecutor shall have annual compensation of P30,000.00, the Assistant Chief Special Prosecutor of P28,000.00 and the Special Prosecutors of P24,000.00 which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. The Chief Special Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief and the Special Prosecutors shall have exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigations of all complaints filed with the Sandiganbayan, to file information and conduct the prosecution of all cases; Provided, that the Secretary of Justice may designate any lawyer in the government service as special prosecutor or special counsel to assist the Chief Special Prosecutor in conducting preliminary investigations and prosecuting cases before the Sandiganbayan. The Chief Special Prosecutor, Assistant Chief Special Prosecutor and Special Prosecutors mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall have the authority to administer oaths, to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, summon and compel witnesses to appear and testify under oath before them and to bring books, documents or other things under their control and to secure the attendance or presence of any absent or recalcitrant witness through application before the Sandiganbayan en banc or in division or before any inferior or superior court having jurisdiction of the place where the witness or evidence may be found. The Chief Special Prosecutor and his assistants shall be under the control of the Secretary of Justice. Section 13. Office of Special Investigators. To assist the Chief Special Prosecutor in the performance of his duties, the Secretary of Justice may, upon the recommendation of the Chief Special Prosecutor, appoint such number of Special Investigators and subordinate personnel as may be deemed necessary therefor and/or detail to the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor any officer or employee of the Department of Justice or any Bureau or Office under the executive supervision thereof; Provided, that those designated shall not receive additional compensation except per diems, traveling and necessary expenses in accordance with existing law and rules. The Office of Special Investigators shall be under the Chief Special Prosecutor. The appointment of Special Investigators and subordinate personnel therein shall be subject to Civil Service Law and Rules. "The Sandiganbayan may, upon proper, request of the Chief Special Prosecutor, require the assistance and services of any Department, Agency, or Bureau of the government. Section 14. Report to the President. The Sandiganbayan shall submit an annual report to the President including all disbursements of funds entrusted to it within two months from the end of the Fiscal Year. Section 15. Funding. There is hereby immediately appropriated out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Decree and thereafter to be included in the general appropriation act. The appropriations for the Sandiganbayan shall be automatically released in accordance with a schedule submitted by the Sandiganbayan. Section 16. Repealing Clause. Any provision of law, order, rule or regulation inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree is hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Section 17. Effectivity. This Decree shall be part of the laws of the land and shall take effect immediately. Done in the City of Manila, this 11th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-eight.
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3.
P.D. 1606 DATED DECEMBER 10, 1978 REVISING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1486 CREATING A SPECIAL COURT TO BE KNOWN AS "SANDIGANBAYAN" AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES WHEREAS, the new Constitution declares that a public office is a public trust and ordains that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people; WHEREAS, to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, Section 5, Article XIII of the New Constitution provides for the creation of a special court to be known as Sandiganbayan; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree as follows: Section 1. Sandiganbayan; composition; qualifications; tenure; removal and composition. A special court, of the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court of justice, to be known as the Sandiganbayan is hereby created composed of a Presiding Justice and eight Associate Justices who shall be appointed by the President. No person shall be appointed Presiding Justice or Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan; unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, at least 40 years of age and for at least ten years has been a judge of a court of record or been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held office requiring admission to the bar as a prerequisite for a like period. The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his commission and the other Justices shall have precedence according to the dates of their respective commissions, or, when the commissions of two or more of them shall bear the same date, according to the order in which their commissions have been issued by the President. The Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices shall not be removed from office except on impeachment upon the grounds and in the manner provided for in Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution. The Presiding Justice shall receive an annual compensation of P60,000.00 and each Associate Justice P55,000.00 which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. They shall have the same rank, privileges and other emoluments, be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those provided for under existing laws of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals. Whenever the salaries of the Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals are increased, such increases in salaries shall be correspondingly extended to and enjoyed by the Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan. They shall hold office until they reach the age of 65 years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. Section 2. Official Station; Place of Holding Sessions. The Sandiganbayan shall have its principal office in the Metro Manila area and shall hold sessions thereat for the trial and determination of all cases filed with it irrespective of the place where they may have arisen; Provided, however, that the Presiding Justice may authorize any division or divisions of court to hold sessions at any time and place outside Metro Manila to hear and decide cases emanating from any of the existing judicial districts. Whenever necessary, the Sandiganbayan may require the services of the personnel and the use of the facilities of any agency of the Government, national or local, including the courts of first instance of the province where any of the divisions is holding session, and those personnel of such agencies or courts shall be subject to the orders of the Sandiganbayan.
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Section 3. Divisions of the Courts; Quorum. The Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions of three Justices each. The three divisions may sit at the same time. Three Justices shall constitute a quorum for session in division; Provided, that when the required quorum cannot be had due to the legal disqualification or temporary disability of a Justice or of a vacancy occurring therein, the President shall, upon recommendation of the Presiding Justice, designate any Justice of the Court of Appeals or Judge of the Court of First Instance or of the Circuit Criminal Court of the judicial district concerned to sit temporarily therein. Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over: (a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379; (b) Crimes committed by public officers and employees including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and (c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in governmentowned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office. The jurisdiction herein conferred shall be original and exclusive if the offense charged is punishable by a penalty higher than prision correccional, or its equivalent, except as herein provided; in other offenses, it shall be concurrent with the regular courts. In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees. Where an accused is tried for any of the above offenses and the evidence is insufficient to establish the offense charged, he may nevertheless be convicted and sentenced for the offense proved, included in that which is charged. Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by, the Sandiganbayan, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such action shall be recognized; Provided, however, that, in cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, where the civil action had therefore been filed separately with a regular court but judgment therein has not yet been rendered and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise, the criminal action may no longer be filed with the Sandiganbayan, its exclusive jurisdiction over the same notwithstanding, but may be filed and prosecuted only in the regular courts of competent jurisdiction; Provided, further, that, in cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts, where either the criminal or civil action is first filed with the regular courts, the corresponding civil or criminal action, as the case may be, shall only be filed with the regular courts of competent jurisdiction. Excepted from the foregoing provisions, during martial law, are criminal cases against officers and members of the armed forces in the active service. Section 5. Proceedings, how conducted; votes required. The unanimous vote of the three justices in a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment. In the event that the three justices do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Judge shall designate two other justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment. Section 6. Maximum period for termination of cases. As far as practicable, the trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan once commenced shall be continuos until terminated and the judgment shall be rendered within three (3) months from the date the case was submitted for decision.
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Section 7. Form, finality and enforcement of decisions. Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall contain complete findings of facts on all issues properly raised before it. A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision maybe filed within (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order or judgment, and such petition for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30) days from submission thereon. Decisions and final orders shall be subject to review on certiorari by the Supreme Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court shall decide any case on appeal promptly and without the necessity of placing it upon the regular calendar. Whenever, in any case decided, the death penalty shall have been imposed, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court, whether the accused shall have appealed or not, for review and judgment, as law and justice shall dictate. Final judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be executed and enforced in the manner provided by law. Section 8. Transfer of cases. As of the date of the effectivity of this decree, any case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan within its exclusive jurisdiction where none of the accused has been arraigned shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan. Section 9. Rule-making Power. The Sandiganbayan shall have the power to promulgate its own rules of procedure and, pending such promulgation, the Rules of Court shall govern its proceedings. Section 10. Authority over internal affairs. The Sandiganbayan shall administer its own internal affairs and may adopt such rules governing the constitution of its divisions, the allocation of cases among them, the rotation of justices and other matters relating to its business. Section 11. Proceeding free of charge. All proceedings in the Sandiganbayan shall be conducted at no cost to the complainant and/or his witnesses. No criminal information or complaint shall be entertained by the Sandiganbayan except upon a certification by the Investigating Prosecutor of the existence of a prima facie case to be determined after a preliminary investigation conducted in accordance with applicable laws and approved by the Chief Special Prosecutor. Section 12. Administrative personnel. The Sandiganbayan shall reelect and appoint such personnel as it may deem necessary to discharge its functions under this Decree including a Clerk of Court and three (3) Deputy Clerks of Court who shall be members of the Bar. The Clerk of Court shall have an annual compensation of P36,000.00 and the Deputy Clerks of Court, P30,000.00. All other subordinate employees of the Sandiganbayan shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law; Provided, that the Sandiganbayan may, by resolution en banc, remove any of them for cause. Section 13. Report to the President. The Sandiganbayan shall submit an annual report to the President, including all disbursements of funds entrusted to it, within two months from the end of the Fiscal Year. Section 14. Funding. There is hereby immediately appropriated the sum of Five Million Pesos (P5,000.00) out of any funds in the National Treasury to carry out the provisions of this Decree and thereafter to be included in the general appropriations act. The appropriations for the Sandiganbayan shall be automatically released in accordance with a schedule submitted by the Sandiganbayan. Section 15. Separability of Provisions. If for any reason, any section or provision of this Decree is declared to be unconstitutional or invalid, other sections or provisions thereof which are not affected thereby, shall continue in full force and effect. Section 16. Repealing Clause. This Decree hereby repeals Presidential Decree No. 1486 and all other provisions of law, General Orders, Presidential Decrees, Letters of Instructions, rules or regulations inconsistent herewith.
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Section 17. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect immediately. Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of December, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-eight.
RULES OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN Pursuant to the provisions of Section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the Philippines, as implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan hereby adopts and promulgates the following rules to govern the conduct of its business. RULE I TITLE AND CONSTRUCTION Section 1. Title of the Rules. These Rules shall be known and cited as the Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2. Construction. These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objectives and to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding before the Sandiganbayan. RULE II CONTROL OF FUNCTIONS AND SUCCESSION Section 1. Exclusive Control. Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution and Presidential Decree No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive control, direction and supervision of all matters pertaining to its internal affairs and the operation of its business. Section 2. Succession in the Office of the Presiding Justice. In case of vacancy in the position of Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan or his temporary incapacity to exercise the powers and perform the duties of his office, the same shall devolve upon the qualified most senior Associate Justices until such incapacity is removed or another Presiding Justice is appointed and has duly qualified. RULE III COMPOSITION OF DIVISIONS Section 1. How Divisions Constituted. The Sandiganbayan shall consist of three divisions which shall be known as the First Division, Second Division, and Third Division, and shall each be composed of Presiding Justice and the first two Associate Justices in the order of precedence as the respective Chairmen; the next three Associate Justices in the order of precedence as the respective senior members; and the last three Associate Justices in the order of precedence as the respective junior members. However, until the entire complement of the Sandiganbayan shall have been appointed and qualified, the Presiding justice and the two Associate Justices first appointed and qualified shall constitute the First Division. Section 2. Vacancy; How Filled. In case of any vacancy in the composition of a division, whether permanent or temporary, the Presiding Justice may designate an Associate Justice of the Court, to be determined by strict rotation on the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said division with all the rights and prerogatives of a regular member of said division in the trial and determination of cases assigned thereto, unless the operation of the other divisions of the Court will be prejudiced thereby, in which case, the procedure provided in Section 3, Rule VIII of these Rules shall apply. RULE IV FILING OF CASES
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Section 1. Proceedings Free of Charge. All proceedings in the Sandiganbayan be conducted at no cost to the complainant and/or his witnesses. Section 2. Preliminary Investigation Necessary. No criminal information or complaint shall be entertained by the Sandiganbayan except upon a certification by the investigating Prosecutor of the existence of a prima facie case to be determined after a preliminary investigation conducted in accordance with applicable laws and approved by the Chief Special Prosecutor. Section 3. Where Cases Filed. All cases to be filed with the Sandiganbayan shall be filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Sandiganbayan which shall be open for the purpose of receiving complaints, information, motions and the like from eight to twelve o'clock in the morning and twelve thirty to four-thirty o'clock in the afternoon, on Mondays to Fridays, except on public or special holidays. RULE V DISTRIBUTION AND CONSOLIDATION OF CASES Section 1. Distribution of Cases. All cases filed with the Sandiganbayan shall be allotted among the three divisions for hearing and decision by raffle to be conducted by a Raffle Committee composed of the Presiding Justice and the two most senior Associate Justices available, on such days as may hereafter be fixed by the Presiding Justice depending upon the need for such raffle to be made in view of the number of cases filed, with notice to the interested parties who may, if they so desire, be present therein by themselves or through counsel. Section 2. Consolidation of Cases. Cases arising from the same incident on series of incidents, or involving common questions of fact and law, may, in the discretion of Sandiganbayan, be consolidated in only one division. Should the propriety of such consolidation appear upon the filing of the cases concerned and before they are raffled, all such cases shall be considered as one case for purposes of the raffle; but, should the propriety of such consolidation may be affected upon motion of an interested party filed with the division taking cognizance of the case to be consolidated and, if granted, consolidation shall be made in the division before which the case with the lowest number is pending. In either case, the division in which consolidation is effected shall be entitled to be credited in the distribution of cases with the same number of cases transferred to it to the end that all divisions shall, as much as possible, receive more or less the same number of cases filed with the Sandiganbayan. Section 3. Assignment of Cases Permanent. Cases assigned to a division of the Sandiganbayan in accordance with these Rules shall remain with said division notwithstanding changes in the composition thereof and all matters raised therein shall be deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are members of the division aforesaid at the time said matters are taken up, irrespective of whether they were or were not members of the division at the time the case was first assigned thereto: Provided, however, That only Justices who are members of the division at the time a case is submitted for decision shall take part in the consideration and adjudication of said case, unless any such member thereafter ceases to be a member of the Sandiganbayan for any reason whatsoever in which case any Justice chosen to fill the vacancy in accordance with the manner provided in Section 2, Rule III, of these Rules shall participate in the consideration and adjudication of said case; Provided, lastly, that the Sandiganbayan en banc may, for special or compelling reasons, transfer cases from one division thereof to another. RULE VI PROCESSES Processes and writs of the Sandiganbayan which by their nature or by provision of existing laws or the Rules of Court are to be issued under the signature of a Judge or a Justice shall be signed by the Chairman of the division concerned: Provided, That if there is an urgent necessity for the issuance thereof before the case is raffled to a division, the same shall be signed by the Presiding Justice. In the absence of the Presiding Justice or the Chairman aforesaid, the process or writ shall be signed by the senior Associate Justice in the Sandiganbayan or in the divisions concerned, respectively. All other processes or writs issued upon authority of the Sandiganbayan or a division thereof shall be signed by the Clerk of Court or, in his absence, by the Deputy Clerk of Court of the division concerned. RULE VII BAIL
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Section 1. How Amount Fixed; Approval. The amount of bail to be posted in cases in the Sandiganbayan shall be fixed by the Chairman of the division thereof to which they are assigned; and such bail may be approved by any Justice of the Sandiganbayan, but preferably by a Justice of the division concerned: Provided, however, That where the accused is arrested, detained or otherwise placed in custody outside the Metropolitan Manila area, any judge of the Court of First Instance or Circuit Criminal Court may accept and approve the bail for his appearance before the division to which his case is assigned and release him, and shall inform the division issuing the order of arrest of his action, forwarding thereto the papers in this case. Section 2. Condition of the Bail. The condition of the bail is that the accused shall appear and answer the complaint or information in the division of the Sandiganbayan to which it is assigned or transferred for trial and submit himself to the orders and processes thereof and, after conviction, if the case is appealed to the Supreme Court, that he will surrender himself for the execution of such judgment as the Supreme Court may render; or, that, in case the cause is to be tried anew or remanded for a new trial, he will appear in the division to which it may be remanded and submit himself to the orders and processes thereof. RULE VIII SESSIONS AND TRIAL Section 1. How Sessions Held. The Sandiganbayan shall for administrative purposes, sit en banc; and, for the trial and determination of cases, sit in three divisions of three Justices each. The three divisions may sit at the same time. Section 2. Presiding Officer. Sessions of the Sandiganbayan en banc shall be presided by the Presiding Justice; whereas sessions in division shall be presided by the respective Chairman of each division. In the absence of the Presiding Justice or the Chairman of a division, as the case may be, the Associate Justice attending the session en banc or in division who is first in the order of precedence and able to preside, shall do so. Section 3. Quorum. Five Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions en banc, and three Justices for sessions in division: Provided, That when a quorum and/or the votes required for a resolution or decision of the Sandiganbayan, either en banc or in division, or the trial or hearing of cases cannot be had due to the legal disqualification or temporary disability of a Justice or of a vacancy occurring therein, the President shall, upon recommendation of the Presiding Justice, designate any Justice of the Court of Appeals, Judge of the Court of First Instance or of the Circuit Criminal Court to sit temporarily therein. Section 4. Place of Holding Sessions. Sessions of the Sandiganbayan, whether en banc or in division, shall be held in the place of its principal office in the Metropolitan Manila area where it shall try and determine all cases filed with it irrespective of the place where they may have arisen: Provided, however, That the Presiding Justice may authorize any division or divisions of the Court to hold sessions at any time and place outside Metropolitan Manila to hear and decide cases emanating therefrom. For this purpose and whenever necessary, the Sandiganbayan may require the services of the personnel and the use of the facilities of any agency of the Government, national or local, including the Courts of First Instance or Circuit Criminal Court of the province or city where any of the divisions is holding session, and those personnel of such agencies or courts shall be subject to the orders of the Sandiganbayan. Section 5. Time of Holding Sessions. Sessions of the Sandiganbayan en banc may be called at any time by the Presiding Justice or at the instance at least five Associate Justices. Sessions for the trial of cases cognizable by it shall be held on such days and at such times as the divisions thereof may, by order and upon notice to the parties concerned, fix. Section 6. Pre-trial Inquest. After the arraignment of an accused who pleads not guilty, the division concerned shall, without prejudice to the invocation by the accused of his constitutional rights, direct the prosecutor and the accused and his counsel to appear before any of the Justices thereof for a conference to consider; (a) Admissions of facts about which there can be no dispute; (b) Marking for identification of documentary or real evidence of the parties; (c) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
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(d) Procedure on objections where there are multiple counsel; (e) Order of presentation of evidence and arguments where there are multiple accused; (f) Order of cross-examination where there are multiple accused; and (g) Such other matter as will promote a fair and expeditious termination of the trial. After the pre-trial inquest, a pre-trial order shall be issued by the Associate Justice presiding the conference reciting the actions and/or proceedings taken thereat, the admissions of facts made, the documents and real evidence marked, and the agreement entered into by the parties as to any of the matters taken up therein. Such order shall limit the issues for trial to those not disposed of by the admissions or agreements of the parties and when entered shall blind the parties and control the course of the action during the trial, on appeal, and in post-conviction proceedings, unless modified by the division concerned before trial to prevent manifest injustice. RULE IX MOTIONS Section 1. Motion Day. The first hours of the morning session of the divisions every Friday shall be devoted to the hearing of motions, unless, upon motion of an interested party and for special reasons, the division concerned shall fix another day for the hearing of any particular motion. Section 2. Resolution on Interlocutory or Incidental Motions. Rulings on all written motions submitted to the Sandiganbayan or any division thereof for resolution shall be reached in consultation among the Justices participating in the consideration thereof: Provided, however, That rulings on oral motions or on objections made in the course of the trial or hearing shall be handed down by the Chairman of the division concerned. RULE X JUDGMENT Section 1. Votes Necessary to Decide. The unanimous vote of three Justices in a division shall be necessary for the rendition of a judgment or order. In the event that the three Justices do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall designated by raffle two Justices from among the other members of the Sandiganbayan to sit temporarily with them forming a special division of five Justices, and the vote of a majority of such special division shall be necessary for the rendition of a judgment or order. Section 2. Procedure in Deciding Cases. The conclusions of a division of the Sandiganbayan in any case submitted to it for decision shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Justice for the writing of the opinion of the division. Any Justice dissenting from a judgment shall state the reasons for his dissent. Section 3. Maximum Period to Decide Cases. The judgment or final order of a division of the Sandiganbayan shall be rendered within three (3) months from the date the case was submitted for decision. Section 4. Form of judgment and final order of a division of the Sandiganbayan shall contain complete findings of fact and a statement of the law on all issues properly raised before it. RULE XI PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT A judgment of a division of the Sandiganbayan shall be promulgated by reading the judgment or sentence in the presence of the accused and any Justice of the division which rendered the same: Provided, That, if the accused is confined or detained in a place outside Metropolitan Manila or of the city or province in which any division of the Sandiganbayan is sitting at the time of such promulgation, the judgment may, upon delegation by the division concerned be promulgated by any judge of the Court of First Instance or Circuit Criminal Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention, in which event the Court so promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept and approve the appeal bond.
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RULE XII PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION Within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of a judgment or final order of a division of the Sandiganbayan, unless said judgment or order had in the meantime otherwise attained finality, a petition for the reconsideration thereof may be filed upon the grounds, in the form and subject to the requirements, for motions for new trial in criminal cases under Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, and such petition for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30 days from submission thereof. RULE XIII REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS Section 1. Method of Review. A party may appeal from a judgment or final order of a division of the Sandiganbayan by filing with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of Rules of Court and by serving a copy thereof to the Sandiganbayan. Whenever, in any case decided, the death penalty shall have been imposed, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court, whether the accused shall have appealed or not, for review and judgment, as law and justice shall dictate. Section 2. Bail Pending Appeal. An accused who has been released on bail shall not committed to jail upon conviction pending the expiration of the period for appeal or pending an appeal seasonably taken, except when the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or death, in which case, the accused may forthwith be committed to jail after promulgation of the sentence. The division of the Sandiganbayan concerned, however, may, for good cause, cancel the bond or increase the amount of bail and commit the accused into custody pending appeal, unless he gives bail in the increased amount. The surely shall also be responsible for the surrender or the accused after judgment shall have become final. RULE XIV PUBLICATION OF DECISIONS With the consent of the respective writers thereof, the decisions of the Sandiganbayan may be published in the Official Gazette in the language in which they have been originally written. The syllabi for the decisions shall be prepared by the Clerk of Court in consultation with writers thereof. RULE XV APPLICABILITY OF THE RULES OF COURT Except as otherwise herein provided or as may hereafter be modified from time to time by the Sandiganbayan and insofar as practicable, the Rules of Court shall govern proceedings in the Sandiganbayan. RULE XVI SEAL OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN The seal of the Sandiganbayan shall be of standard size, circular in form, consisting of two concentric circles as its margin, with the inscription, running from left to right, on the upper margin of the word "Sandiganbayan" and on the lower margin of the words "Republika ng Pilipinas"; with 16 stars, representing the existing 16 judicial districts, immediately along the outer edge of the inner circle; and with a design at the center of a triangle, with a trisected area composed of the national colors of white on its upper part, blue on the left and red on the right, with the words "KATAPATAN" on the right side, "KAPANAGUTAN" on the left side, and "KARANGALAN" on the base; a star in each corner of the triangle representing Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao; and a bolo inside the triangle on which is superimposed a balance. RULE XVII SEPARABILITY CLAUSE
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If, for any reason, any section or provision of these Rules shall be held to be unconstitutional or invalid, no other section or provision thereof shall be effected thereby. RULE XVIII EFFECTIVITY The Rules shall take effect upon approval. Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-nine.
4.
P.D. 1861 PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1861 - AMENDING THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606 AND BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129 RELATIVE TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 has simplified the rules on jurisdiction by, among others, abolishing the concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts; WHEREAS, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses enumerated in Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, to embrace all such offenses irrespective of the imposable penalty; WHEREAS, there has been a proliferation and marked increase in the filing of cases before the Sandiganbayan where the offense charged is punishable by a penalty not higher than prision correccional or its equivalent; and WHEREAS, to insure that the prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be as inexpensive and as expeditious as possible, and in keeping with the constitutional mandate constituting the Sandiganbayan as a special court to try cases involving graft and corruption, and other offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, it is necessary and desirable that certain cases shall be triable by the appropriate courts, with appellate jurisdiction over these cases to be vested in the Sandiganbayan. NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree as follows: Section 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: "(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: (1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; (2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. "(b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction: (1) On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in cases originally decided by them in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
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(2) By petition for review, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction. "The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereinafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Intermediate Appellate Court shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan, the Office of the Tanodbayan shall represent the People of the Philippines. "In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees. "Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be considered abandoned." Section 2. All cases pending in the Sandiganbayan or in the appropriate courts as of the date of the effectivity of this Decree shall remain with and be disposed of by the courts where they are pending. Section 3. The provisions of this Decree notwithstanding, the Office of the Tanodbayan shall continue to have the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation, file the necessary information, and direct and control the prosecution of all cases enumerated in Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, whether such cases be within the exclusive original/appellate jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1630. Section 4. All other laws, orders, promulgations, rules and regulations or parts thereof, which are inconsistent herewith are hereby amended, repealed or modified accordingly. Section 5. This Decree shall take effect immediately. Done in the City of Manila, this 23rd day of March, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-three.
5. R.A. 7995 APPROVED MARCH 10, 1995

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE CONVERSION OF THE BAROTAC NUEVO NATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE HIGH SCHOOL IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF BAROTAC NUEVO, PROVINCE OF ILOILO, INTO A POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE, TO BE KNOWN AS THE BAROTAC NUEVO POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFORE Section 1. The Barotac Nuevo National Comprehensive High School in the Municipality of Barotac Nuevo, Province of Iloilo, is hereby converted into a polytechnic institute to be known as the Barotac Nuevo Polytechnic Institute. Section 2. The Institute, in addition to its present secondary offerings, is hereby authorized to offer post-secondary programs in agriculture, technology and engineering and teacher education, which are priority programs of the government schools as well as short-term technical and vocational courses, subject to the policies of the Commission on Higher Education. Section 3. The title to the assets and properties now under the name of the Barotac Nuevo National Comprehensive High School shall be changed and transferred to the Barotac Nuevo Polytechnic Institute, in accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations.
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Section 4. The faculty and employees of the Barotac Nuevo National Comprehensive High School shall remain as such faculty and employees of the Institute: provided, however, that those who may opt to retire shall be granted such benefits and privileges as may be provided by existing laws. Section 5. The chairperson of the Commission on Higher Education, in coordination with the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, is hereby authorized to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement the conversion and operation of the Institute subject to existing rules and regulations. Section 6. The amount necessary for the implementation of this Act shall be charged against the current years appropriations of the Barotac Nuevo National Comprehensive High School. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for its operation and maintenance shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act. Fees and charges, including government subsidies and other income generated by the Institute shall constitute special trust funds and shall be deposited in any authorized government depository bank, and all interest that shall accrue therefrom shall form part of the same funds for the use of the Institute. The income generated by the Institute may, at their discretion, be disbursed for the professional growth and development, health, welfare and other similar benefits of the faculty members and personnel, for extension and student welfare expenses so that the flexibility on use of income shall be focused on faculty, personnel improvement and student welfare activities, and for expenses necessary for the attainment of its purposes under this Act. Section 7. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Lapsed into law on April 22, 1995 without the signature of the President in accordance with Article VI, Section 27 (1) of the Constitution.
6.
R.A. 8249 APPROVED FEBRUARY 5, 1997 Tenth Congress Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-third day of July, two thousand seven. Republic Act No. 8249 February 5, 1997
AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:: Section 1. The first paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: "SECTION 1. Sandiganbayan; Composition, Qualifications; Tenure; Removal and Compensation. - A special court, of the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court ofjustice, to be known as the Sandiganbayan is hereby created composed of a presiding justice and fourteen associate justices who shall be appointed by the President." Section 2. Section 2 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
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"SECTION 2. Official Station; Place of Holding Sessions. - The Sandiganbayan shall have its principal office in the Metro Manila area and shall hold sessions thereat for the trial and determination of cases filed with it: Provided, however, That cases originating from the principal geographical regions of the country, that is, from Luzon, Visayas or Mindanao, shall be heard in their respective regions of origin except only when the greater convenience of the accused and of the witnesses, or other compelling considerations require the contrary, in which instance a case originating from one geographical region may be heard in another geographical region: Provided, further, That for this purpose the presiding justice shall authorize any divisions of the court to hold sessions at any time and place outside Metro Manila and, where the interest of justice so requires, outside the territorial boundaries of the Philippines. The Sandiganbayan may require the services of the personnel and the use of facilities of the courts or other government offices where any of the divisions is holding sessions and the personnel of such courts or offices shall be subject to the orders of the Sandiganbayan." Section 3. The second paragraph of Section 3 of the same decree is hereby deleted. Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows: "a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: "(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: "(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads; "(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department heads; "(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; "(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; "(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher; "(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; "(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; "(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade'27'and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; "(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; "(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and "(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade'27'and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
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"b. Other offenses orfelonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office. "c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. "In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court ' as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. "The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders or regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction orof their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. "The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1,2,14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court. The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. "In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in govemment-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. "Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had therefore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned." Section 5. Section 7 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows: 'SECTION 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. - All decisions and final orders determining the merits of a case or finally disposing of the action or proceedings of the Sandijanbayan shall contain complete findings of the facts and the law on which they are based, on all issues properly raised before it and necessary in deciding the case. "A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order on judgment, and such motion for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30) days from submission thereon.
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"Decisions and final orders ofthe Sandiganbyan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Whenever, in any case decided by the Sandiganbayan, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death is imposed, the decision shall be appealable to the Supreme Court in the manner prescribed in the Rules of Court. "Judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be executed and enforced in the manner provided by law. "Decisions and final orders of other courts in cases cognizable by said courts under this decree as well as those rendered by them in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction shall be appealable to, or be reviewable by, the Sandiganbayan in the manner provided by Rule 122 of the Rules of the Court. "In case, however, the imposed penalty by the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial court in the proper exercise of their respective jurisdictions, is death, review by the Supreme Court shall be automatic, whether or not accused files an appeal." Section 6. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against the current fiscal year appropriations of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, such sums as may be needed for its continued implementation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act. Section 7. Transitory Provision. - This Act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof Section 8. Separability of Provisions. - If for any reason any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts or portions not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect. Section 9. Repealing Clause. - All acts, decrees, general orders and circulars, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Section 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation. Approved: (Sgd.) ERNESTO M. MACEDA President of the Senate (Sgd.) JOSE DE VENECIA, JR. Speaker of the House of Representatives
This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 5323 and Senate Bill No. 844 was finally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on January 28,1997 and January 29, 1997, respectively. (Sgd.) LORENZO E. LEYNES, JR. Secretary of Senate (Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO Secretary General House of Represenatives
Approved: February 5, 1997 (Sgd.) FIDEL V. RAMOS President of the Philippines
E. JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN
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1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SANDIGANBAYAN AND VICTORIA AMANTE FACTS: Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the Province of Cebu and she allegedly obtained a certain cash advance for which no liquidation (which was mandated) was made under disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and Environment protection. The COA submitted an investigation report to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas which recommended that she be further investigated to ascertain her proper charges under the Auditing Code of the Philippines. The Office of the Ombudsman recommended that an Information for Malversation of Public Funds be filed against Amate. The OSP filed an information with the Sandiganbayan against Amante for violation of PD 1445 and such case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. In her answer, the respondent claims that she already liquidated and refunded the balance of her cash advance and that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over her since then, she was a local official who was occupying a position of SG 26 and the law conferring jurisdictionto the Sandiganbayan states that it shall have original jurisdiction only in cases where the accused holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher.
ISSUE: RATIO: The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The exception provided in Section 4 of the law which states at the time of the commission of the offense is confined only to cases where the law violated is one of those enumerated in 4(a). It is not applicable in the present case since the offense involved here is a violation of the Auditing Code of the Philippines. This present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved. Under the said provision, there is no exception contained. Thus the jurisdiction is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action and not at the time of the commission of the offense. Under 4(A) of the law, offenses are specifically enumerated. And in order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses,it must be committed by the officials or employees with SG27 or higher. But, those under SG27 may also be included provided, they are one of those expressly enumerated. Under 4(b) of the law, other offenses or felonies committed by public officials or employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Hence, Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod (which is an office expressly enumerated) falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner was correct in disputing the decision of the Sandiganbayan which cited the case of Inding v. Sandiganbayan. In that case, the court held that the public officer (Sangguniang Panglungsod) with SG25 charged in violation of RA3019 (graft law) was within its jurisdiction. The respondents in this case anchor their arguments on that fact and stated that if the intention of the law had been to extend the application of the exceptions to other cases, then there would have been no need to distinguish between violations of the expressly enumerated laws and the other offenses under 4(b). But the court does not agree with this since public office is an essential element in the expressly enumerated offenses while those in 4(b), it is enough that the offenses were committed in relation to the public officials office. 4(b) does not mention any qualification as to the officials involved. It refers to those officials with SG27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. Whether or not a member of the Sangguiniang Panglungsod under SG26 who was charged with violation of the Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
2. SERRANA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
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FACTS: Serrana (a student regent of UP) is being implicated by petitioner herein and her brother for estafa. Upon investigation, the SB found that there is probable cause for such case. She moved to quash the information and claims that the SB does not have jurisdiction over the offense charged (estafa) and over her person (because she was just a regent student of UP and as such, she was not a public officer). She further states that it was not alleged in the information that t was among her functions as a student regent to receive funds or that the crime was committed in relation to her official functions.
ISSUE: RATIO: Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. Petitioner in this case isolated the crimes enumerated in 4(a) and failed to take into consideration "other crimes and felonies" under 4(b). Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office. It only requires that it be committed by the officials in (a-g) And that the offense be committed in relation to their office. The contention that she is not a public officer was considered by the courts and says that a "public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is vested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government" It is not the SG27 that determined the jurisdiction of the SB since it also has jurisdiction over officers with SGs lower than 27 as long as they are enumerated in 4(a). They are covered by express provision by law. The law vests tin the SB the jurisdiction over Presidents, directors, trustees, or managers of GOCCs, state universities or educational institutions or foundations to which petitioner belongs to. Compensation is not an essential element of public office. Assuming arguendo that she is not of SG27, she still committed the offense in relation to her office contrary to what she avers. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Serrana
3. ANTONINO ESQUIVEL V. THE HON. OMBUDSMAN FACTS: Offended parties herein are police officers charging the municipal mayor (Esquivel) of Pampanga along with his brother, the barangay captain with alleged illegal arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder and grave threats. The parties herein were forced to board a vehicle and was there mauled with the use of a firearm and was threatened to be killed. Before they were released from detention, they were made to sign a statement in the police blotter that he was in good physical conditon. However, in support of his charge against Esquivel, he (Eduardo) presented a medical certificate showing his injuries. After the charges were filed, separate informations for less serious physical injuries against Esquivel and his brother and for grave threats against mayor were formally filed with the SB. According to the petitioners, they hold positions excluded in RA 7975 which means they are not covered by the SB.
ISSUE: RATIO:
Whether or not the SB has jurisdiction over the offenses filed against petitioners
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The ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and thereafter to file a corresponding information with the appropriate courts. The court has consistently held that the SB has original and exclusive jurisdiction over municipal mayors. As Barangay Captain he cannot claim that he is also outside the jurisdiction since the law provides that only in cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG27 or higher that the jurisdiction is vested with the RTC, MTC as the case may be. Under the LGC, the Mayor has a Salary grade of 27 as such, he falls under the jurisdiction of SB.
F. DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE OF INORDINATE DELAY 1. TATAD V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 159 SCRA 70 FACTS: De los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of RA 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3 (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of Section 3 (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the complaint must be dismissed because of inordinate delay. RULING: There was an inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information, which is violative of the constitutionality guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and speedy disposition of the cases against him. The informations in the five criminal cases should be dismissed. RATIO: Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report.
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The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it cannot be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. The Court is not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. 2. CERVANTES V. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 108595; May 18, 1999; First Division--- Pardo, J.]
FACTS:On March 6, 1986, one Pedro Almendras filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan (predecessor of the Ombudsman) a sworn complaint against Alejandro Tapang for falsification of complainant's "salaysay" alleging that Tapang made complainant sign a piece of paper in blank on which paper a "salaysay" was later inscribed stating that complainant had been paid his claim, which was not true. Pedro Almendras mentioned that he sought the help of petitioner Elpidio Cervantes who worked as analyst in the office of labor arbiter Teodorico Ruiz. More than six years after the filing of the initiatory complaint with the Tanodbayan, Special Prosecutor Officer Luz Quinones-Marcos filed with the Sandiganbayan, an information charging Tapang, together with Teodorico Ruiz and petitioner Cervantes with violation of sec. 3(e), R.A. 3019. Thereafter, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to defer arraignment due to pendency of reinvestigation or motion to quash on the ground that the filing of the information against petitioner over six years after the initial complaint with the Tanodbayan violated his right to speedy disposition of the case. The Ombudsman denied petitioner's motion, hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to quash for violation of his right to speedy disposition of the case. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It took the Special Prosecutor six years from the filing of the initiatory complaint before he decided to file an information for the offense with the Sandiganbayan. It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not object tot he delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly attributable to him.
G. ANTI-GRAFT CASES IN SANDIGANBAYAN 1. VENUS V. DESIERTO, 298 SCRA 219 FACTS: Sometime during the period from September to October 1988, in the Municipality of New Washington, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused ERIBERTO L. VENUS, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of New Washington, Aklan, while in the performance of his official functions, taking advantage of his position, and committing the offense in relation to his office, through evident bad faith, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to the government, particularly to the Municipality of New Washington, Aklan and to public interest, as follows:
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o that accused Mayor Venus after having been previously authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan of New Washington, Aklan to negotiate and/or enter into a contract in behalf of said Municipality with the Board of Liquidators of the Office of the President for the purchase/acquisition of the latters Garcia-Diapo Lot No. 2, situated in front of the New Washington Town Hall, and which was scheduled for public bidding on September 19, 1988, o Said accused after having withdrawn money from the Municipality Treasury the amount of P1,401.00 as travelling expense in going to Manila to negotiate said transaction, did then and there maneuver said sales deal and enter into a Contract of Sale with the said Board of Liquidators in his own name instead, and purchased the aforementioned lot for and in his own behalf despite the fact that he knew that said lot is badly needed by the Municipality which is proposed to be the site of the Fire Fighting Station of the Municipality; to the damage and prejudice of the Municipality of New Washington, Aklan and public interest. In 1993, after due proceedings, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas recommended the dismissal of the complaint o After a meticulous examination of the pleadings of both parties, giving due consideration to documentary evidences [sic] respectively submitted in support of their contending [sic] allegations, the undersigned investigator determines to be of no sufficient basis the present charge [for] violation of Section 3, paragraph (h), of R.A. 3019, the pertinent provision of which reads as follows: h. Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest. . The representation made by the respondent former mayor Eriberto L. Venus before the Board of Liquidators pursuant to the authority given him by the Sangguniang Bayan of New Washington, Aklan, per Resolution No. 19, s. 1988, to negotiate and/or enter into a contract with the Board for the purchase by the municipality of New Washington of the subject lot, did not constitute actual intervention as contemplated in the aforecited provision of the anti-graft law. What the same respondent did was merely to make arrangement [sic] or bargain with the Board regarding the offer of the Sangguniang Bayan of New Washington. He was not a member of the Board of Liquidators, and his being the authorized representative of the municipality of New Washington to deal with the Board or his capacity as mayor of New Washington, Aklan, were not reasons for him to intervene in the transaction of the Board. The respondent was not in the position to intercede in whatever official capacity in the Boards deliberation/meeting to decide on whether to accept or reject the offer made. The decision was purely the exclusive prerogative of the Board, which in fact rejected the offer per its Resolution No. 420, s. 1988. And there was absolutely no evidence that the respondent had, in his capacity as then Mayor, used his influence, power, and authority in the rejection of the offer of the municipality of New Washington, Aklan, and in the award to him of the contract for the sale of [the] subject lot when he subsequently tendered his own personal bid. Hence, no legal prohibition exists against the respondents acquisition of the property in question.
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Then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez, however, disapproved the resolution, with a marginal note to [c]onsider the possible liability of [petitioner] for a violation of Section 3(e), R.A. 3019 [since] [t]here is a pervading showing of bad faith on the part of [petitioner] in maneuvering to acquire for himself a piece of property which he himself knew to be badly needed by the municipality. The case was re-raffled to Graft Investigation Officer I Carla N. Tanco of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. In her Resolution i[11] dated 5 December 1994, she found prima facie evidence to proceed against [petitioner] for violation of Sec. 3(e), of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, and recommended the filing of the corresponding information. The Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas recommended approval thereof. The resolution was thereafter referred for review to Special Prosecutor Officer III Orlando I. Ines of the Office of the Special Prosecutor. On April 26, 1996 Ombudsman Desierto likewise approved the Information ii[13] charging petitioner with having violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan; a motion for reconsideration was granted. On March 20, 1997 petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration with the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The motion was referred to Pascual, Prosecution Officer III, the Prosecuting Officer of the case. Pascual dismissed the case. He further recommended that, the proper Manifestation be prepared and filed with the Honorable Sandiganbayan informing the latter of the result of the Motion for Reconsideration in this case for its consideration. Sandiganbayan noted the Manifestation and set petitioners arraignment on October 20, 1997. Arraignment was set to January 30,1998. On January 12, 1998, the Court issued a TRO. By allowing petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration and directing Special Prosecution Officer Victor Pascual to resolve the same, public respondent Sandiganbayan agreed that the Ombudsman reinvestigate the case or, at the very least, further re-assess or re-examine the facts. In the language of Marcelo v. Court of Appeals,iii[26] the Sandiganbayan here deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm to resolve, once and for all, the issue of whether or not sufficient ground existed to file the information. Respondent court must have been guided by the general statement in Crespo v. Moguliv[27] that courts cannot interfere with the prosecutors discretion as to and control over criminal prosecutions. Conformably with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained either through a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition, this Court ordinarily does not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. v[28] There are, however, settled exceptions to this rule, such as those enumerated in Brocka v. Enrile,vi[29] to wit:
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a.
To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al., L-19272,
January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95); b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions
(Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607); c. d. e. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202); When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62); Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu
Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389); f. g. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Alvendia, 109 Phil. 1140); Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795. October 29, 1966, 18
SCRA 616); h. 1960); i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25,
(1953), cited in Raoa vs. Alvendia, CA G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf. Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, L60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577); j. Where there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has
been denied (Salonga vs. Pao, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438); and k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of
petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1953) (cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)vii[30]
Ocampoviii[31] provided the basis for the general rule insofar as the Ombudsman is concerned, thus: The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. ISSUE: 1. Whether petitioner may validly invoke any of the exceptions because the facts fo not make out a prima facie case for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended.
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2. Whether public respondent Sandiganbayan can be directed to dismiss Criminal Case No. 23332. RULING: 1. Yes. As shown by the procedural antecedents, the Office of the Ombudsman has not been at all certain in its position. Initially, no less than the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, Hon.. Mojica, found no ground to believe that petitioner had violated Sec. 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. However, then Ombudsman Vasquez disagreed, in view of the possibility of a violation of Section 3(e) thereof, because of the pervading showing of bad faith on the part of the [petitioner] in maneuvering to acquire for himself a piece of property which he himself knew to be badly needed by the Municipality. Subsequently, and conformably with this observation of Ombudsman Vasquez, the case was remanded to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas and re-assigned to Graft Investigation Officer Tanco who thereafter found a prima facie case for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. This time, the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas concurred with such finding. Upon review thereof, Special Prosecution Officer III Orlando Ines agreed with this finding and recommended the filing of the corresponding information. The Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman, in turn, agreed with Ines and the information was forthwith filed. Upon a subsequent re-assessment of the evidence as a consequence of petitioners motion for reconsideration, another Special Prosecution Officer, Victor Pascual, found that petitioner had not violated Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. He thus recommended dismissal of the case for want of probable cause and the filing of the corresponding manifestation to inform the Sandiganbayan of the result of the motion for reconsideration. In this instance, the Special Prosecutor himself concurred with the finding. However, the Ombudsman disapproved the recommendation as he found that probable cause existed, but opted to allow the court to find absence of bad faith. This marginal note of the Ombudsman simply meant that he believed that petitioner was in bad faith. However, good faith is always presumed. It must likewise be underscored that bad faith alone on the part of petitioner is not enough to make him liable for a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. Said Section provides: SEC. 3. (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence
Where bad faith is involved, it is obvious that for one to be liable therefor, the bad faith must be evident. It necessarily follows that since petitioner was not guilty of bad faith in the first place, the issue then of whether such was evident fails to emerge. Indisputably, Special Prosecution Officer Victor Pascual was correct that there existed no reasonable ground to believe that petitioner violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. 2. Yes. We stated earlier that by allowing petitioner to file a motion to reconsider the adverse resolution of Special Prosecution Officer Ines, approved by the Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman, and directing Special Prosecution Officer III Pascual to resolve the motion within thirty days from receipt thereof, the Sandiganbayan thus deferred to the authority of the Ombudsman to reinvestigate the case or further re-assess or re-examine the facts. In short, the Sandiganbayan was willing to accept and adopt the final resolution of the Office of the Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman on the issue of whether or not the offense charged was in fact committed by petitioner. Of course, applying by analogy Crespo v. Mogul,ix[36] Marcelo v. Court of Appeals,x[37] Roberts v. Court of Appealsxi[38] and Martinez v. Court of Appeals,xii[39] the Sandiganbayan was not bound by such quasi-judicial findings. In fact, under the principles governing criminal procedure, the Sandiganbayan, or any trial court for that matter, is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case,xiii[40] and may either agree or disagree with the
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recommendation of the prosecutor. Hence, the logical thing for us to do would be to remand this case to the Sandiganbayan. Nevertheless, where the innocence of an accused is manifest from the evidence, as here, we find neither reason nor logic to merely remand the case. In Fernando v. Sandiganbayan,xiv[41] we directly ordered the dropping of petitioners from the information of a case before the Sandiganbayan for want of probable cause, justifying such action in this wise: We emphasize at this point that the Court has a policy of non-interference in the Ombudsmans exercise of his constitutionally mandated powers. The overwhelming number of petitions brought to us questioning the filing by the Ombudsman of charges against them are invariably denied due course. Occasionally, however, there are rare cases when, for various reasons there has been a misapprehension of facts, we step in with our review power. This is one such case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. For want of reasonable ground to believe that petitioner violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, or for absence of probable cause therefor, the Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to forthwith DISMISS Criminal Case No. 23332, entitled People of the Philippines versus Eriberto L. Venus, and to SUBMIT to this Court a report of its compliance within ten (10) days from such dismissal. The temporary restraining order issued on 12 January 1998 is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs. 2. FONACIER V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 238 SCRA 687 VITUG, J.: FACTS: These consolidated cases were spawned by the reported "ghost project" in 1978 by the Benguet Highway Engineering District under the then Ministry of Public Highways. Herein petitioners were among those originally charged before the then Court of First Instance of Baguio for violation of Section 3, paragraph (e), of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and for estafa thru falsification of public documents in, respectively, Criminal Case No. 707 and Criminal Case No. 708. Before petitioners' arraignment, the Sandiganbayan and the Tanodbayan were created. Pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1486, the two cases were transferred to the Sandiganbayan. The amended information in Criminal Case No. 010 for violation of the Anti-Graft Law, filed on 04 April 1978, read: That in or about and during the period from April 17, 1978 up to and including May 26, 1978, in the Municipality of Atok, Province of Benguet, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Sandiganbayan, the accused Santiago G. Paragas, District Engineer of the Benguet Highway Engineering District, Ministry of Public Highways, with the indispensable cooperation and assistance of accused Eusebio V. Fonacier, Supervising Civil Engineer, Rogelio R. Ramos, Materials Testing Engineer, Joseph U. Gonzales, Field Materials Man, Francisco M. Villanueva, Jr., Acting Property Custodian III, Hubert Nabus, Cashier I, all of the office of Benguet Highway Engineering District, Ministry of Public Highways; Apolinario T. Padilla, Resident Auditor, Arnulfo B. Sarmiento, Audit Clerk, and Remedios B. Almoite, Auditing Examiner, all of the Commission on Audit, and assigned in the office of the Benguet Highway Engineering District, then being public officers, all taking advantage of their official positions, for personal gain, financial and pecuniary interest, with deliberate intent to cause damage and undue injury to the Government, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence in the discharge of their official duties and functions, giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to a particular contractor, conspiring, conniving, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously directly become interested in entering into a fixed and prearranged contract requiring their participation and approval with Francisco T. del Moral, a private contractor, for the delivery of Five Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty (5,550) cubic meters of
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aggregate subbase (Item 108) at Km. 271.470 to Km. 275.700 of the Baguio-Bontoc road otherwise known as Halsema Highway within the jurisdiction of the Benguet Highway Engineering District, and after a fixed and pre-arranged public bidding, an award was made to Francisco T. del Moral as the lowest bidder, and through a purchase order, Francisco T. del Moral allegedly delivered to the jobsite aforementioned the aggregate subbase (Item 108) called for in the requisition and issue voucher, when in truth and in fact, no delivery was ever made, after which payment was demanded by and paid to Francisco T. del Moral through falsified vouchers supported by falsified, spurious, irregularly prepared and questionable documents and without the requisite delivery receipts and tally sheets in the total amount of Ninety Six Thousand Six Hundred and Three Pesos (P96,603.00), Philippine Currency, hurriedly signed, processed and pre-audited by the accused public officers to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the sum of P96,603.00. CONTRARY TO LAW. 1 On 26 April 1979, the ten (10) accused, nine (9) of them public officials, pleaded not guilty to the charge. 2 The accused public officials were thereupon suspended from office pursuant to the Sandiganbayan's Resolution of 21 June 1979. 3 Later, upon motion of the prosecution, and with the conformity of the accused given in open court, Criminal Case No. 011 was dismissed without prejudice. 4 Trial thus proceeded in respect only to Criminal Case No. 010. 5 Findings of the Sandiganbayan In sum, it concluded: 1. There was no "regular or legitimate program of work" in accordance with standard operating procedures for Item 108. The Sandiganbayan said: What actually appears from the evidence on record is that, after the discarding of the first program of work and while the revised program of work was still pending approval by the MPH (in fact it was approved only in January, 1979 according to Regional Director Manalo), the accused district officials took it upon themselves to "resurrect" the discarded program of work by lifting that portion of the revised program of work referring to Phase II and implementing it separately without waiting for the approval of the entire program. Such a machination is clearly apparent by comparing the Phase II portions of the revised program of work and the Detailed Estimates for Phase II signed by Buccat and Fonacier which is attached to the RSE And assuming, arguendo, that the Detailed Estimate and Time Spot Schedules originally prepared by Buccat and Fonacier, yet there is no showing that the same constitute or form part of an approved program of work, involving as they do an estimated amount of P270,500.00 obligated by Acting Accountant Remedios Gacad, hence, such program, if it can be called that, must be approved by the regional office. Moreover, Regional Director Manalo could not legally approve such a program involving Phase II as he himself admitted that a revised program of work for the entire project covering Phases I to IV and involving P10,000,000.00 had been forwarded already to the MPH for approval, so that such a piece-meal program of work must have to be discarded. 40 2. Director Manalo could not have approved a requisition for Item 108, Phase II, between 20 April 1978 (Exhs. C-10 and D-2) and 22 May 1978 (Exh. D-2-a) for being in violation of the COA circular (Exh. I) against "splitting" and of his own revised program of work. Furthermore, it would have entailed the implementation of Phase II much ahead of Phase I which was not yet completed at the time. 3. Buccat did not witness the deliveries of the supposed 5,550 cu. m. of road materials covered by Item 108 in May 1978, nor did he prepare the corresponding DRs and the TSs he was directed to accomplish. Buccat was, in fact, busy at the time supervising elsewhere the asphalting project of Kms. 257-262. 4. There could not have been deliveries of 5,550 cu. m. of Item 108. Del Moral's testimony that he started the deliveries at 3:00 in the afternoon of 28 April 1978, the date of the bidding, and that he alerted and mobilized his truck drivers two days earlier, strained credulity. Even Fonacier, Sarmiento and Gonzales could not testify with certainty
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that, between 28 April and 23 May 1978, BHED representatives were at the site to witness and record all such alleged deliveries. 5. The supposed 28 April 1978 bidding was not merely irregular but it was "fixed or pre-arranged." The bidding originally scheduled for 31 March 1978 was a "general" bidding aimed primarily at securing a price index or quotations for future requisitions. The defense failed to explain satisfactorily "why the advertised bidding for 31 March 1978 was cancelled or why the notices of postponement thereof were received by some contractors-suppliers on 26 April 1978 (Exh. 1-Del Moral) when all the supposed 'sealed' proposals were dated 17 April 1978" (Exhs. D-7-a, D-8 to D-13, inclusive). The Sandiganbayan added: Apparently, the bidding previously scheduled on March 31, 1978 was for the purpose of filling up the expected requisitions for the first program of work prepared by Buccat and which was not approved by the regional office. Thereafter, the district officials, in their inordinate haste to defraud the government, decided to revive a portion of said discarded program of work referring to kms. 271-276 and seized upon the quotations given as early as April 17, 1978 to commence the procurement process, as shown by the preparation of an RSE on April 20, 1978, holding a supposed bidding on April 28, 1978, preparing a GV on May 15, 1978 and having the RSE approved by the regional office only on May 22, 1978 and, thereafter splitting the RSE and PO into two, after which was processing and pre-auditing was railroaded with clock-like precision within the district office. 41 6. While Paragas claimed that Del Moral, a winning bidder, was allowed to deliver Item 108, he, however, admitted in the same vein that Anitos Construction, winning bidder for Items 200, 300, 306-1 and 405, did not deliver said items since the implementation of the project was stopped. 7. On Almoite's testimony that no certificate of test was attached to the GV when it was presented to her, the Sandiganbayan said: . . . . If such was the case, then Villanueva, Fonacier, Paragas, Gacad and Carantes, should have noticed this deficiency as they signed or initialed the GVs ahead of Almoite and Padilla, and therefore, their claims that they passed the GVs because the supporting papers were complete miserably fail of their own accord. Del Moral also admitted this particular facet of the processing by Almoite and was also corroborated by Ramos and Gonzales when the latter two admitted that Del Moral came to them only on May 25, 1978 to get the certificate of test because Almoite was asking for it, hence, Gonzales prepared the certificate of test that same date (Exhs. C-4 and D-5) and had it signed by Ramos who gave it to Del Moral for delivery to Almoite. Under these circumstances, then the Court must also reject outright the testimonies of Gonzales and Ramos to the effect that samples were taken by the former at the job site on April 30, 1978 and five more times in May, 1978, that he made the necessary laboratory tests on said samples and made written reports to Ramos on each occasion and that Ramos also submitted written reports to Fonacier, which testimonies the Court finds to be patently fabricated and perjured. If such taking of samples, performance of laboratory tests, and making of reports were actually made, then these reports would have been attached to the GVs or in the possession of Fonacier, Paragas or Villanueva, and the certificate of test would not have to be hastily prepared on May 25, 1978. As Mr. Justice Fernandez himself observed during the trial, the certificate of test showed only one laboratory test conducted (BBR-15a-78) although Gonzales claimed that he took samples and tested them on six occasions in the month of May, 1978. 42 8. The Item 108 transaction was in violation of the provision of COA Circular No. 76-41, dated 30 July 1976, 43 against "splitting" of the RSE, POs and GVs. At P18.00 per cu. m., the 5,550 cu. m. of Item 108 would have been purchased at P99,900.00. Thus, the check(s) in payment of the item delivered would have been in excess of P50,000.00 and therefore would have required the voucher to be processed, pre-audited and approved by the regional highway auditor, instead of by merely the BHED auditor, in accordance with COA Circular No. 76-16 of 10 February 1976. Evidently, in order to avoid action, review or approval by the regional highway auditor on a check of P99,900.00, the RSE, PO and GV were split into two. It was feared that the regional auditor would "discover that there (were) (1) no regular biddings, (2) no deliveries of materials, (3) no actual inspection at the job site, and (4) no actual tests conducted."
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9. Relative to the alleged selfish motives of Jose Dominguez, the Sandiganbayan said, "the very evidence of the defense strongly tends to show that desperate measures were even resorted to by Paragas and Padilla to seek an amicable settlement with Dominguez, in the process utilizing Governor Ben Palispis and Assemblyman Antonio Villar to intercede for them. Gov. Palispis' testimony, in fact, boomeranged against the defense since by the very nature thereof it is clear and patent that his intercession was not intended to promote the ends of justice but to subvert them, even going to the extent of trying to persuade Dominguez to delay, if not interfere with, the preliminary investigation then pending in the Benguet Provincial Fiscal's Office." 44 All considered, the Sandiganbayan held that Section 3, paragraph (e), of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act had, indeed, been violated by nine (9) of the accused who acted in conspiracy to defraud the Government "in the amount of P96,903.00, which excludes . . . the 3% BIR contractor's tax on the amount of P99,999,00, through the utilization of fictitious and/or fraudulent public documents which certified to the alleged requisition of supplies or materials intended for a non-existing project, resulting in the payment of public funds for non-existent deliveries." 45 The Sandiganbayan acquitted accused Nabus since his participation was in merely issuing the checks in payment of the GVs, and that it was not shown that he had the "legal duty to process the said GVs and supporting papers or to verify the correctness of each and every document prior to his causing the preparation and issuance of said checks."
46
ISSUE: 1. Whether PD 1487 (creating the Office of the Ombudsman or Tanodbayan) and PD 1606 (amending PD 1486, creating the Sandiganbayan) were unconstitutional. 2. Whether Fonacier violated RA No. 3019 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. RULING: 1. Denied for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 50691, petitioners would assail the constitutionality of the decrees creating the Sandiganbayan and the Tanodbayan, this time, upon the thesis that it was the National Assembly that could have, under Sections 5 and 6, Article XIII of the (1973) Constitution, created both the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan. 54 Although this question was not specifically raised in the Nuez case, this Court, nonetheless, declared categorically that: . . . While such competence under the 1973 Constitution contemplated that such an act should come from the National Assembly, the 1976 Amendments made clear that he as incumbent President "shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted." Thus, there is an affirmation of the ruling of this Court in Aquino Jr. v. Commission on Elections (L40004, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275) decided in 1975. In the language of the ponente, Justice Makasiar, it dissipated "all doubts as to the legality of such law-making authority by the President during the period of Martial Law, ***." As the opinion went on to state: "It is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a recognition of such power as already existing in favor of the incumbent President during the period of Martial Law." 55 P.D. No. 1606, furthermore, has since undergone several amendments in P.D. No. 1629, B.P. Blg. 129, P.D. No. 1861 and Executive Orders Nos. 101 and 184. Article XI, Section 4, of the 1987 Constitution now provides that "(t)he present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law." As regards the Tanodbayan, Article XI, of the 1987 Constitution states that the Ombudsman created therein shall henceforth be "known as Tanodbayan" (Sec. 5) and that "(t)he existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor" which "shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution" (Sec. 7). Pursuant to the 1987 Constitution, President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated, on 24 July 1987, Executive Order No. 243 and Executive Order No. 244 declaring the effectivity, respectively, of the Office of the Ombudsman and the creation of the Office of the Special Prosecutor. Section 2 of the latter executive order expresses that the Office of the Special Prosecutor "shall exercise powers presently exercised by the Tanodbayan except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman under the Constitution." On 17 November 1989, President Aquino approved into law
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Republic Act No. 6770, which provides for the "functional and structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman." Section 13 thereof states: Sec. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people. With the ratification of the Constitution and the enactment of subsequent laws, any further doubt on the constitutionality of the Sandiganbayan and the Tanodbayan must now be dispelled. The so-called "jurisdictional issue" being raised by petitioner Ramos in G.R. No. 52821, i.e., that since, the crime charged is said to have been committed before the creation of the Sandiganbayan and that, therefore, the ordinary courts should not be divested of their jurisdiction thereover, 56 deserves scant consideration. Suffice it to state that in Manuel vs. De Guzman 57 and subsequent cases, this Court has sanctioned the transfer to the Sandiganbayan, pursuant to Section 8 of P.D. 1606, of criminal cases falling under its jurisdiction but still pending with the regular courts at the time of the decree's enactment. 2. Yes. The particular provision of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) with which violation petitioners have been charged states: Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx xxx xxx e. Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. The elements of the offense defined in this provision are that: (1) The accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action has caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or has given any party unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. 65 In this case at bench, it is undisputed that herein remaining petitioners are public officers with whom private contractor Del Moral, now deceased, has been charged also as a co-principal. 66 The first element required for the commission of the offense charged is thus clearly extant. The second element enumerates the different modes by which means the offense penalized in Section 3(e) may be committed. "Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" 67 which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are." 68 "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." 69 "Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property." 70 These definitions prove all too well that the three modes are distinct and different from each other.
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Proof of the existence of any of these modes in connection with the prohibited acts under Section 3(e) should suffice to warrant conviction. The use of the three phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and "gross inexcusable negligence" in the same information does not mean that the indictment charges three distinct offenses 71 but only implies that the offense charged may have been committed through any of the modes provided by the law. In Criminal Case No. 010, all three modes of committing the offense under Section 3(e) are alleged in the information. The third element of the offense is satisfied when the questioned conduct causes undue injury to any party, including the government, or gives any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. Proof of the extent or quantum of damage is not thus essential; it should be sufficient that the injury suffered or benefit received can be perceived to be substantial enough and not merely negligible. We have examined the voluminous records of the cases at bench, and we cannot decry the findings and conclusions of the Sandiganbayan to the bereft of factual bases. Petitioners, except for Del Moral who was charged a co-principal, were all public officials and alleged to have acted as such in the commission of the offense. From all that appear on record, we cannot disregard the Sandiganbayan in finding guilt on 1. Paragas, in knowingly ordering the implementation of an unapproved program of work, instructing the holding of the starkly irregular bidding, and in signing the pertinent documents leading to the issuance of checks in favor of Del Moral; 2. Fonacier, in knowingly going along with the irregular directives of Paragas in so misperceived a role as the "trusted" project engineer of Paragas; 96 3. Villanueva, for preparing the documents or ordering their preparation notwithstanding the non-observance of the applicable procedures therefor; Padilla, for negligently agreeing to the splitting of payments in gross violation of COA circulars and closing his eyes to irregularities glaringly indicated on the documents supporting the two vouchers; and 4. Ramos for the grossly lackadaisical performance of his duty to see to it that the materials allegedly delivered were in accordance with government standards. Proof of the extent of damage sustained by the government with respect to the supposed deliveries of Item 108 is not indispensable for conviction. It is enough that Del Moral has obtained large payments through, using the language of the Sandiganbayan, "the utilization of fictitious and/or fraudulent public documents . . . for a non-existing project . . . and non-existing deliveries." We, however, find lack of moral certainty in the conviction of petitioners Remedios Almoite, Joseph Gonzales and Arnulfo Sarmiento, whose guilt, considering their respective insignificant roles in the questioned anomalies, may only be justified on the basis of conspiracy with the other accused petitioners. There is no clear evidence of their knowledge of a conspiracy among their co-accused or of their intentional and active participation therein. 97 Conspiracy requires no less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. 98 As regards the imposable penalty, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act then prescribed an "imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years. 99 The Sandiganbayan therefore correctly applied Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, i.e., that in offenses punishable by a law, other than the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the penalty should "not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum (should) not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." 3. MAGCUSI V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 240 SCRA 13 FACTS:
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Some time in January 1980, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources ("BFAR") and Dexter Construction ("DEXTER"), represented by its Ancla, entered into a "Contract of Service" for the construction by the latter of a 40-ton ice making plant, including a 150-ton ice storage and 350-ton cold storage facility, in Surigao City. In October 1982, while the construction was still on-going, BFAR and Ancla executed a supplemental "Memorandum of Agreement," under which Ancla additionally undertook "the purchase and installation of three distribution transformers and construction of circular steel elevated tank" for P910,500.00. On 10 March 1983, BFAR Central Office Engineer David T. Enriquez, 2 charged with the duty to render accomplishment reports on the progress of the construction and to certify on the work accomplishments of DEXTER, prepared and signed an "Accomplishment Report," as well as a "Certification," attesting to the progress and extent of completion of the additional work. The report also bore the signature of Ancla. On the following day, or on 11 March 1983, Hermenegildo M. Magsuci, the newly designated 3 BFAR Regional Director for Region X, Cagayan de Oro City, read the Accomplishment Report and Certification, affixed his signature thereon, and directed the Chief of the Fisheries Extension Division in Cagayan de Oro City, David F. Ernacio, to cause the issuance of the corresponding voucher. Disbursement Voucher No. 3-0061, to which the Accomplishment Report and Certification were attached, was thereupon prepared for the payment of 45.32% (P412,729.24) of the contract price of P910,700.00, or P357,217.16 after deducting the contractor's tax, withholding tax, and the required retention. Magcusi signed the disbursement voucher, carrying the standard printed certification that the expenses were necessary, lawful, and incurred under his supervision. Forthwith, Magcusi likewise signed four checks, payable to the order of DEXTER, in the total amount of P357,217.16. The disbursement Voucher, along with its attachments, and the corresponding checks were then transmitted from the regional office to the BFAR Central Office in Manila. Director Felix R. Gonzales approved the voucher and co-signed the checks. Later, the checks were released to DEXTER. As it turned out, however, the additional work so represented to have been accomplished in the field report and certifications had yet to be undertaken. Although somewhat hazy, it would appear that the work was ultimately completed in December, 1983. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment, finding Magsuci guilty of the complex estafa through falsification of public documents. WHEREFORE, the Court finds Hermenegildo M. Magsuci guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as principal of the complex crime of estafa defined in Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, through falsification of public documents penalized under Article 171 of the same Code. ISSUE: Whether criminal responsibility may be incurred by a head of office who, in the discharge of his official duties, has relied on an act of his subordinate. RULING: No.The Sandiganbayan predicated its conviction of petitioner on its finding of conspiracy among Magsuci, Ancla and now deceased Enriquez. There is conspiracy "when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." 5 Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all taken together, however, the evidence therefor must reasonably be strong enough to show a community of criminal design. 6 In concluding petitioner's involvement in the conspiracy, the Sandiganbayan could only point to Magsuci's having 91) noted the Accomplishment Report and Certification submitted by Enriquez,
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92) signed the disbursement voucher with the usual certification on the lawful incurrence of the expenses to be paid, and 93) co-signed four checks for the payment of P352,217.16 to Ancla. the Sandiganbayan concluded that petitioner would not have thusly acted had he not been a party to the conspiracy.
Fairly evident, however, is the fact that the actions taken by Magsuci involved the very functions he had to discharge in the performance of his official duties. There has been no intimation at all that he had foreknowledge of any irregularity committed by either or both Engr. Enriquez and Ancla. Petitioner might have indeed been lax and administratively remiss in placing too much reliance on the official reports submitted by his subordinate (engineer Enriquez), but for conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is not the product of negligence but of intentionally on the part of cohorts. In Arias vs. Sandiganbayan, 7 this court, aware of the dire consequences that a different rule could bring, has aptly concluded: We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final approving authority. xxx xxx xxx . . . . All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. . . . There has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers that routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or departments is even more appalling. 4. SISTOZA V. DESIERTO, (2002) [G.R. No. 144784. September 3, 2002] Bellosillo, J.: FACTS: This petition for certiorari and prohibition stemmed from a routine purchase of tomato paste to be used as ingredient in the austere diet of the inmates of the New Bilibid Prison. On 10 August 1999 the Pre-Qualification, Bid and Awards Committee (PBAC) of the Bureau of Corrections (BuCor) offered for public bidding the supply of tomato paste in addition to other food items for consumption in the month of September. Among the bidders were RBJJ, PMS Trading Enterprises, Filcrafts Industries, Inc. (Filcrafts), and Elias General Merchandising (Elias). The specification for tomato paste appearing in the bid announcement and the bid tender form where it appeared as item 55 was 48/170 tins-grams to one (1) case Though the bid of Filcrafts Industries, Inc. constitutes the lowest bid, PBAC rejected the companys offer for offering a non-registered brand of tomato paste in the Philippines and its failure to specify in the bid tender form the country of origin of the tomato paste it would supply. Being the second lowest bidder, Elias won with its offer of P1,350.00 for 100/170 tins-grams to one (1) case. The Supply Division of the BuCor then prepared the purchase order for the one (1)-month supply of tomato paste in favor of Elias. It reflected the supplier's winning offer of P1,350.00 for 100/170 tins-grams to one (1) case and no longer the initial specification of 48/170 tins-grams. The Management Division of the BuCor passed upon the purchase order and confirmed the regularity of the procedures previously undertaken, while the Accounting Division authorized the funding of the purchase order. Petitioner Sistoza received the purchase order and its supporting documents, cursorily read them and thereafter affixed his signature on the purchase order. On 2 September 1999 PBAC issued a resolution noting that Elias "in
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all angles x x x greatly complied with the specifications provided" thereby confirming its winning bid for the month-long supply of tomato paste. Petitioner Sistoza endorsed the winning bid of Elias to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for three times. The first two endorsements were disapproved since Elias General Merchandising is the only the second lowest bidder. The winning bidder then provided for a counter-offer to meet the price "meet the price of the lowest bidder for item No. 55, tomato paste which is more or less P1,120.00/box for 100 cans/170 grams, which is still higher than Filcrafts offer. For the third endorsement, Sistoza noted that though Filcraft is the lowest bidder, its offer does not conform to the specifications and that Elias made a counter-offer (but still higher than that of Filcraft). He also emphasized that he tomato paste had been used for the subsistence of the inmates of the New Bilibid Prison for the month of September. Upon the third endorsement, Undersecretary Liwag finally approved the purchase order and a check was issued for its payment. Respondent Eliseo Co, a perennial bidder for supply of food items of the New Bilibid Prison, filed an affidavitcomplaint with the Office of the Ombudsman alleging criminal and administrative charges for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against petitioner Pedro G. Sistoza as Director of the Bureau of Corrections and officers and members of its Supply Division and PBAC. He claimed that Sistoza and his staff conspired with each other to cause undue injury to the government and the inmates of the New Bilibid Prison by giving undue advantage to Elias although its bid was higher in price and lower in quantity than that offered by Filcrafts.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner Sistoza is liable for violating Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act HELD: No. The Court found no probable cause to warrant the filing of charges against the petitioner. RATIO: Corrupt practices of public officers has the following elements: (a) The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (b) The public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public functions; (c) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party; (d) Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and, (e) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable neglect. In the instant case, there is no direct evidence that petitioner Sistoza acted in conspiracy with the officers and members of the PBAC and the other implicated public officials. He did not himself participate in the bidding procedures nor was he involved in the award of the supply of tomato paste to Elias General Merchandising. Plainly, the accusation against him rests upon his signature on the purchase order and his repeated endorsements thereof notwithstanding his knowledge that the winning bidder did not offer the least price. The Ombudsman concluded that these acts constituted manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or even gross inexcusable negligence resulting in undue injury to the government. We disagree with the conclusions of the Office of the Ombudsman. We have meticulously analyzed the arguments raised by the parties in the various pleadings and motions, together with their documentary evidence, which all formed the basis for the issuance of the questioned resolutions, and we are convinced that no probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges against petitioner Sistoza for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019. Since petitioner had no reason to doubt the validity of the bidding process and given the urgency of the situation since the tomato paste had by then been delivered and consumed by the inmates of the New Bilibid Prison, we certainly cannot infer malice, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence from his signing of the purchase order and endorsing the same to the Department of Justice. Considering that his duties as Director of the Bureau of Corrections entailed a lot of responsibility not only on the management side but also in the rehabilitation and execution of convicted prisoners, public relations and other court-imposed duties, it is unreasonable to require him to accomplish direct and personal examination of every single detail in the purchase of a month-long supply of tomato paste and to carry out an in-depth investigation of the motives of every public officer involved in the transaction before affixing his signature on the pro-forma documents as endorsing authority. OTHER ISSUE: W/N the SC can direct the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the Criminal case as against Sistoza:
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HELD/RATIO: Yes. This will not be the first time that we order the dismissal of a criminal case being heard by a trial court for want of probable cause, and there is no reason not to prescribe the same justified outcome in the instant petition. PRINCIPLES: Gen. Rule: It is settled that the preliminary investigation proper is the function of the prosecution. For criminal cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, it is the Office of the Special Prosecutor, as an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman, which exercises investigatory and prosecutory powers. Concomitantly, as a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman's determination of the existence or absence of probable cause. In the instant case, we see this principle at work when the Sandiganbayan deferred to the authority of the prosecution to exercise investigatory powers when it granted petitioner Sistoza's motion for reinvestigation EXCEPTION: Grave abuse of discretion. When the Ombudsman does not take essential facts into consideration in the determination of probable cause, it has been ruled that he gravely abuses his discretion. H. JURISDICTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN 1. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE V. LIWAG [G.R. NO. 149311. FEBRUARY 11, 2005] FACTS: Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Mary Ong filed a complaint-affidavit on before the Ombudsman against PNP General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino, other high-ranking officials of the PNP, and several private individuals. Her complaint-affidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different offenses imputed to respondents Lacson and Aquino. The Ombudsman found the complaint-affidavit of Mary Ong sufficient in form and substance and thus required the respondents therein to file their counter-affidavits on the charges. On February 28, 2001, said respondents submitted their counter-affidavits and prayed that the charges against them be dismissed. Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn statements before the NBI, alleging the same facts and circumstances revealed by Mary Ong in her complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman. NBI Director Wycoco, in a letter dated May 4, 2001 addressed to then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez, recommended the investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP officials, and private individuals for the following alleged crimes: kidnapping for ransom and murder of several individuals. On May 7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to Lacson, et al named in the witnesses sworn statements directing them to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence at the scheduled preliminary investigation on the complaint filed by the NBI. However, Lacson and Aquino manifested in a letter dated May 18, 2001 that the DOJ panel of prosecutors should dismiss the complaint filed therewith by Mary Ong since there are complaints pending before the Ombudsman alleging a similar set of facts against the same respondents, and claimed that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, he may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases involving public officials, including police and military officials such as private respondent. DOJ, which construed the letter as a motion to dismiss, denied the motion. Lacson, et al. filed before the RTC a petition for prohibition, which the RTC granted, saying that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case, and directing the DOJ to desist from conducting preliminary investigation. Thus, the DOJ filed a Petition for certiorari and prohibition in the SC. ISSUE: W/N the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation despite the pendency before the Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same accused, facts, and circumstances. RULING: No. RATIO:
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The question is whether or not the Ombudsman has in effect taken over the investigation of the case or cases in question to the exclusion of other investigatory agencies, including the DOJ. Since the Ombudsman has taken hold of the situation of the parties in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the matter, respondents cannot insist on conducting a preliminary investigation on the same matter under the pretext of a shared and concurrent authority. In the final analysis, the resolution on the matter by the Ombudsman is final. In the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman itself, the other investigative agencies of the Government have no power and right to add an input into the Ombudsmans investigation. Only in matters where the other investigative agencies are expressly allowed by the Ombudsman to make preliminary investigation may such agencies conduct the investigation, subject to the final decision of the Ombudsman. The public respondents cannot find comfort in that provision of the law that the Ombudsman may take over, at any stage, from any investigative agency of the Government, the investigation of cases involving public officials, including police and military officials such as the petitioners. That situation presupposes the conduct by other Government agencies of preliminary investigations involving public officials in cases not theretofore being taken cognizance of by the Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman, as in the case, has already taken hold of the situation of the parties, it cannot take over, at any stage of the proceedings, the investigation being conducted by another agency. It has the case before it. Rudimentary common sense and becoming respect for power and authority would thus require the respondents to desist from interfering with the case already handled by the Ombudsman. Indeed, as conceded by the respondents, they are deputized prosecutors by the Ombudsman. If that is so, and that is the truth, the exercise by the principal of the powers negates absolutely the exercise by the agents of a particular power and authority. The hierarchy of powers must be remembered. Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction. While the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter, the settled rule is that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. Thus, assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom to file the same case before both bodies or be viewed as a contest between these bodies as to which will first complete the investigation. In the present case, it is the Ombudsman before whom the complaint was initially filed. Hence, it has the authority to proceed with the preliminary investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ. The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation over the cases filed against the respondents would not promote an orderly administration of justice. Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial, it is not a casual affair either. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. To allow the same complaint to be filed successively before two or more investigative bodies would promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would also cause undue difficulties to the respondent who would have to appear and defend his position before every agency or body where the same complaint was filed. This would leave hapless litigants at a loss as to where to appear and plead their cause or defense. There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the distinct possibility that the two bodies exercising jurisdiction at the same time would come up with conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of the respondents. 2. LAZATIN V. DESIERTO[G.R. NO. 147097 DATED JUNE 5, 2009] FACTS: The Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Complaint-affidavit, charging petitioners Lazatin et al. with Illegal Use of Public Funds as defined and penalized under Article 220 of the RPC and violation of Section 3 (a) and (e) of RA 3019. The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use of Congressman Lazatin of his Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) for 1996 (he was both proponent and implementer of the projects funded from his CDF; he signed vouchers and supporting papers pertinent to the disbursement as Disbursing Officer; and he received, as claimant, eighteen (18) checks amounting to P4,868,277.08). Thus, Lazatin, with the help of Morales, Pelayo, David, was allegedly able to convert his CDF into cash. A preliminary investigation was conducted and the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) thereafter issued a resolution recommending the filing against petitioners of 14 counts each of Malversation of Public Funds and
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violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. This resolution was approved by Ombudsman Desierto. Hence, 28 informations were filed against petitioners in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners Lazatin et al. filed their respective Motions for reconsideration/reinvestigation which were granted. The Office of Special Prosecutors (OSP) recommended the dismissal of the cases for lack or insufficiency of evidence. However, Desierto ordered the Office of the Legal Affiars (OLP) to review the OSP resolution. In a memorandum, the OLA recommended that the OSP resolution be disapproved and the OSP be directed to proceed with the trial. Desierto adopted the OLA memorandum. The cases were then returned to the Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal proceedings. Hence, petitioners Lazatin et al. filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. They contend that the Ombudsman had no authority to overturn the OSP's Resolution because, under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman is clothed only with the power to watch, investigate and recommend the filing of proper cases against erring officials, but it was not granted the power to prosecute. They point out that under the Constitution, the power to prosecute belongs to the OSP, which was intended by the framers to be a separate and distinct entity from the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioners conclude that, as provided by the Constitution, the OSP being a separate and distinct entity, the Ombudsman should have no power and authority over the OSP. Thus, petitioners maintain that R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the OSP an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman, should be struck down for being unconstitutional. ISSUE: W/N Ombudsman Desierto acted with GADLEJ RULING: No. RATIO: Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is stale. It has long been settled that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting the Office of the Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP under said office have no constitutional infirmity. The Court cited the case of Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman. In that case, the Court held that giving prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in accordance with the Constitution as paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI provides that the Ombudsman shall exercise such other functions or duties as may be provided by law. The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman, was likewise upheld by the Court in Acop. More recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera, the Court declared that the OSP is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman. The Court's ruling in Acop that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the Constitution was also made the foundation for the decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan, where it was held that the power to prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the filing of informations, which power had not been delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that under the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from legislating the grant of additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman. 3. PRESIDENTAIL AD-HOC FACT FINDING COMMITTEE V. DESIERTO [G.R. NO. 135482 DATED AUGUST 14, 2001] Pardo, J.: FACTS: President Fidel Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans. Orlando S. Salvador, in his capacity as PCGG consultant, executed three separate Sworn Statements stating that among the loan accounts referred by the Assets Privatization Trust to the Committee for investigation, report and recommendation are those of the following corporations: P.R. Garcia and Sons Development and Investment Corporation (PRGS), Golden River Mining Corporation (Golden River), and Filipinas Carbon and Mining Corporation (Filcarbon).
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On different occasions, these three companies obtained loans from the Development Bank of the Philippines (PRGS and Golden River), and the National Investment Development Corporation (Filcarbon), amounting to tens of millions of pesos for various purposes in a period spanning from 1967 to 1982. Filcarbons loan in particular was favorably recommended by the President of the Philippine National Bank. Salvador alleged that, based on the evidence submitted to the Committee, these three corporations did not have sufficient collaterals for the loans they obtained, except with respect to the loans obtained by Golden River in 1975 and 1977. Salvador also alleged that the abovementioned corporations did not have adequate capital to ensure not only the viability of their operations but also their ability to repay all their loans. Accordingly, the Committee found the loan accounts of the above-mentioned three corporations as behest loans. The Committee submitted its report to President Ramos who instructed then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo, sitting as the Committee's ex-officio Chairman, to file the necessary charges against the DBP Chairman and members of the Board of Directors, the former PNB President and former NIDC General Manager, together with the respective stockholders/officers of the three corporations. Salvadors Sworn Statements were used by the Committee as its bases in filing separate complaints with the Office of the Ombudsman against herein private respondents for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Complaints were filed against the aforementioned parties in the Office of the Ombudsman but upon the recommendation of the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau, complaints against the respondents were dismissed. The Ombudsman ruled that, except with respect to the two loan transactions entered into by Golden River in 1982, all the offenses alleged by the Committee as having been committed by herein respondents had already prescribed under the provisions of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019. As to the two 1982 transactions of Golden River, the Ombudsman found that, contrary to the claims of the Commission, the loan accounts obtained by the said corporation have sufficient collaterals. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied. ISSUE: W/N the Ombudsman was empowered to dismiss the complaint motu propio, without requiring the respondents to file their counter-affidavit or conducting preliminary investigation? (REM TOPIC) RULING: Yes. RATIO: The Court has consistently held that the Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his call. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith should he find it to be insufficient in form and substance or, should he find it otherwise, to continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation if, in his view, the complaint is in due and proper form and substance. Quite relevant is the Court's ruling in Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman and reiterated in the case of The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Hon. Desierto, to wit: The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the Ombudsman. To insulate the Office from outside pressure and improper influence, the Constitution as well as R.A. 6770 has endowed it with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. This court consistently refrains from interfering with the exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service. As a rule, the Court shall not unduly interfere in the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers, as provided in the Constitution, without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. The basis for this rule was provided in the case of Ocampo IV v. Ombudsman where the Court held as follows: The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
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It is quite clear under Section 2(a), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, that it may dismiss a complaint outright for want of palpable merit. At that point, the Ombudsman does not have to conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a complaint. Should the investigating officer find the complaint devoid of merit, then he may recommend its outright dismissal. The Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a preliminary investigation is proper. It is only when the Ombudsman opts not to dismiss the complaint outright for lack of palpable merit would the Ombudsman be expected to require the respondents to file their counter-affidavit and petitioner, its reply. 4. CASTRO V. DELORIA [G.R. No. 163586 dated January 27, 2009] Austria-Martinez, J.: FACTS: Castro was charged by the Ombudsman before the RTC with Malversation of public funds. The information alleged that Castro was a revenue officer of the BIR who misappropriated 556K+ of collections. Castro pleaded NOT GUILTY on arraignment. On Aug 31, 2001, Castro filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation and file the Information since it failed t to allege her salary grade -- a material fact upon which depends the jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner further argued that as she was a public employee with salary grade 27, the case filed against her was cognizable by the RTC and may be investigated and prosecuted only by the public prosecutor, and not by the Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was limited to cases cognizable by theSandiganbayan. The RTC denied & held that the (1) jurisdiction of the RTC over the case did not depend on the salary grade, but on the penalty imposable upon the latter for the offense charged. It also (2) sustained the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman since in the cited case the court later overturned their decision in a clarificatory resolution. Finally, it said that the (3) Motion to Quash was contrary to Sec. 1, Rule 117, for it was filed after Castro pleaded not guilty under the Information. Castro contends that the prevailing jurisprudence from Aug 9, 1999 til May 20, 2001 was that the Ombudsman had no prosecutorial powers over cases cognizable by the RT and since the investigation and prosecution against Castro was conducted by the Ombudsman beginning April 26, 2000, then the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy was applicable, notwithstanding that the decision was set aside in the March 20, 2001 Resolution. So, the Information that was filed against petitioner was void for at that time the Ombudsman had no investigatory and prosecutorial powers over the case. Castro filed an MR which was denied so filed a petition for certiorari w/ CA also dismissed. Filed 65 with SC. ISSUES: 1. W/N the Ombudsman had the authority to file the information in light of the ruling in the First "Uy vs. Sandiganbayan" case, which declared that the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. 2. W/N the clarificatory Resolution in the Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case can be made applicable to the Castro, without violating the constitutional provision on ex-post facto laws and denial of the accused to due process. RULING: YES to BOTH. RATIO: In the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc, similar grounds were raised and the SC held that the Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the regular courts. It RULING: The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and
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those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee. The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA 6770. In the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon. Breva, court held that the March 20, 2001 Resolution, that the Ombudsman has prosecutorial powers in cases cognizable by the RTC, extends even to criminal information filed or pending at the time when its August 9, 1999 Decision was the operative ruling on the issue. 5. ANGELES V. GUTIERREZ G.R. 18161 & 189173. March 21, 2012
FACTS: Judge Angeles(Petitioner) filed a criminal complaint against Senior State Prosecutor Velasco(respondent) on 3 grounds: (1) Giving preference to accused for failing to present a material witness; (2) Engaging in private practice by re-opening child abuse cases against Angeles; (3) Falsifying a public document to make it appear that clarificatory hearing on child abuse complaint was conducted. First, Velasco failed to present gemmologist in smuggled jewelry case, a violation Anti-Graft Act on unwarranted benefits to any private party. Second, Velasco, not being the trial prosecutor in the case, re-opened child abuse cases to exact vengeance from Angeles, a violation of the Code of Conduct since it is unlawful for public officials to engage in private practice unless authorized by law. Third, the witness of Velasco in the child abuse case was seriously sick and could not have appeared but the Minutes of the hearing affirms that a clarificatory hearing was conducted, this being a violation of Art. 171 of the RPC. The Ombudsman dismissed all charges against Velasco. First, Velasco acted based on his discretion, Ombudsman has no authority to investigate unless act is tainted with malice and bad faith. Second, Angeles failed to exhaust all administrative remedies and Velasco was actually the investigating prosecutor of the child abuse cases. Third, falsification should have been raised earlier, and mere presentation of falsified document does not establish falsification.
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ISSUES: 1. W/N the court may interfere with the plenary powers of the Ombudsman. 2. W/N the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in the evaluation of evidence.
HELD: 1. NO. The general rule is that SC will not interfere with Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. This is based on respect and practicality, and to insulate it from outside pressure and improper influence. - The determination of probable cause is usually done after preliminary investigation. Sec 2 Rule II of Ombudsman RoP states the power to (a) dismiss outright for want of palpable merit or (d) determine whether or not preliminary investigation should be conducted. Thus, the Ombudsman acted within its powers when it dismissed the case of Velasco without conducting a preliminary investigation. 2. NO. The determination of grave abuse of discretion is the exception to the general rule of non-interference. However, the burden of proof is with the petitioner. - First, the CA's factual findings with the dismissal of the first charge since the witness was eventually presented. But, the Ombudman may choose not to conduct preliminary investigation in administrative cases, this does not apply to criminal cases. Second, Velasco's act of filing a pleading does not constitute private practice which is interpreted as habitually holding one's self out to public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. Third, the issue of falsification is dismissed not because it was raised belatedly rather, because it was raised in a different proceeding.
H. JURISDICTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN 1. ANTONINO V. DESIERTO G.R. 144492. December 18, 2008
FACTS: President Macapagal issues PD168, which withdraws from sale and reserves for recreation, a 52,678sqm lot in General Santos, to be called Magsaysay Park. Said lot was divided into 3 lots. President Marcos issues PD2273 amending PD168, declaring the land open to disposition except for one portion(Lot X, 15,000sqm). As a result, heirs of Kusop were able to acquire title to lot X. City government of GenSan institutes a case against heirs but end up with a compromise agreement wherein the latter would donate lot X. However, heirs of Kusop enjoined to donate such and sales patents over portions of lot X were issued. Former Congresswoman Antonino files a case against the mayor and her alleged co-conspirators for failure to interpose any objection to the application of 19 miscellaneous sales patents. The Ombudsman dismissed the case, pending before the Sandiganbayan, due to lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
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1. W/N the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing charges against respondents despite clear and convincing evidence of the conspiracy to cheat and defraud the city.
HELD: 1. NO. Petitioner gave no explanation for late filing of her motion for reconsideration, even only on this basis, the petition ought to be dismissed. Sec 27 states that all orders of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory, a motion for reconsideration must be filed within 5 days from receipt of written notice only on the following grounds: (1) New evidence; (2)Errors of law. Such will be resolved within 3 days from filing, provided that only one motion shall be entertained. - on the substantive issue, the SC will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's plenary powers due to respect and practicality. An exception would be grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction(ie. violation of constitutional rights of an accused, prejudicial question, invalid law, no jurisdiction, no prima facie case).
2. ENEMECIO V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN G.R. 146731. January 13, 2004.
FACTS: Enemecio(petitioner) is a utility worker in Cebu State College while Bernante(respondent) is an assistant professor. Petitioner files an administrative complaint for falsification of public documents, malversation, dishonesty, and defamation against respondent. The administrative complaint together with a criminal complaint for falsification was filed with the Ombudsman. Petitioner claims respondent spray painted obscene words against her on school walls, shouted defamatory words against her in school premises, and falsified her leave application by not informing the school of her forced leave due to a 20 day prison term for slight physical injuries. The Ombudsman dismisses the administrative complaint on the grounds that: (1) No regulation restricting the purpose of leave credits as long as it is duly approved by the appropriate official; (2) No eyewitnesses to spray paint accusation; (3) buricat(whore), putangina(motherfucker), and maot(snob) were not uttered in relation to respondents official functions; (4) As for the criminal case, conviction by final judgment is necessary before administrative action(suspension). Petitioner files petition for review with the CA on criminal charge of falsification. CA dismisses petition for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUES: 1. W/N a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed before the CA is the proper remedy of a criminal complaint filed with the Ombudsman.
HELD: 1. NO. Petitioner availed of the wrong remedy in the wrong forum: (1) Appeals from Ombudsman in administrative cases must be brought to CA under Rule 43; (2) Appeals from Ombudsman in criminal cases must be brought to SC under Rule 65.
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- Petitioner failed to prove requisites of falsification under the RPC, Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given the facts and circumstances, should be filed or not.
3. BAVIERA V. ZOLETA G.R. 169098. October 12, 2006.
FACTS: Baviera filed several complaints against officers or directors of the bank(SCB), SEC, BSP, AMLC, NLRC, and DOJ. Baviera claims he was a former employee of the bank and an investor who was defrauded due to the solicitation of funds in unregistered and unauthorized foreign stocks and securities. Secretary of Justice Datumanong issues a Hold Departure Order(HDO) against directors, including a certain Raman. Datumanong had to attend a conference in Austria so Gutierrez was designated as Acting Secretary. Raman was initially apprehended by agents in NAIA but was able to leave the next day as he was verbally allowed by Gutierrez to do so. Baviera accuses Gutierrez of illegal conduct since she went out of her way to issue a verbal order on a weekend(Sunday). Gutierrez argues that the constitutional right to travel extends to all residents regardless of nationality. Datumanong then orders the lifting of the HDO. Graft Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Zoleta recommends the dismissal of the criminal complaint against Gutierrez due to lack of proof that she received consideration in exchange for her decision to allow Raman to travel(based on senate deliberations). The deputy Ombudsman approved the recommendation. CA dismisses the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUES: 1.W/N petition in the CA was the proper remedy. 2. W/N Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion.
HELD: 1. NO. As stated in Enemecio: (1) Appeals from Ombudsman in administrative cases must be brought to CA under Rule 43; (2) Appeals from Ombudsman in criminal cases must be brought to SC under Rule 65. 2. NO. Petitioner failed to establish probable cause. The SC will not interfere with the exercise of the Ombudsman's discretion.
J. PROCEDURE BEFORE THE OMBUDSMAN 1. SESBRENO V. AGLUGUB A.M. MTJ-05-1581. February 28, 2005.
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FACTS: Sesbreno files complaint against Marcelino, Nunez, and Tabazon(officers of Traffic Management Unit of Laguna) for falsification, grave threats, and usurpation of authority. Judge Aglugub dismissed cases for the first two but issued warrant of arrest for Marcelino who failed to appear during arraignment of the usurpation charge. Sesbreno then files an urgent manifestation alleging that all of the accused were also charged with violation of RA 10 thus, warrants of arrest be issued to all 3 accused. Judge admitted oversight but stated that she still found no probable cause for the charges. Judge ordered records to be forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office(PPO) for review. Sesbreno files administrative complaint against for her refusal to issue warrants and failure to transmit records to the Ombudsman within 10 days. Judge counters that the issuance of warrants is discretionary and that the PPO has been designated as the Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor.
ISSUES: 1. W/N the judge erred in not issuing warrants of arrest against the accused. 2. W/N the transmittal of records to the PPO was proper.
HELD: 1. NO. In cases not requiring preliminary investigation(less than 4yrs 2months and 1 day) such as usurpation of authority, if the judge does not find probable cause, the judge in his discretion may: dismiss the case, issue warrant of arrest, or a commitment order. It is not obligatory but merely discretionary upon the judge to issue a warrant of arrest. 2. YES. AO 8 provides that all prosecutors are now deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. The Deputy Ombudsman shall take the appropriate final action: (1) Approval or dismissal of complaint if crime charged is punishable by prision correcional or lower or fine not more than 6,000, or both); (2)Resolutions involving offenses falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan shall be forwarded by Deputy Ombudsman to Office of the Ombudsman. Respondent judge acted in accordance with the law.
The judge is not required to transmit the case the records of the case to the prosecutor for review.
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JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

5. R.A. 7995 APPROVED MARCH 10, 1995

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

Approved: February 5, 1997 (Sgd.) FIDEL V. RAMOS President of the Philippines

E. JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta

JUSTINS ALLIANCE 2A-2013 June 10, 2013

By: Fugaban, Geraldez, Larcia, Ong, Palmares, Peralta