Lacson vs Perez (GR No. 147780, May 10, 2001) Facts: On May 1, 2001, Pres.

Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) due to an angry and violent mob assaulting and attempting to break into Malacanang. She also issued General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected. Lacson et al. filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Issues: 1. WON the declaration of the state of rebellion has factual basis and constitutional a. On May 6, 2006, PGMA ordered the lifting of Proclamation No. 38, accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. 2. WON such declaration may be used to justify warrantless arrest a. Respondents have declared that the DOJ and police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. b. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a state of rebellion. c. Petitioners contention that they are under imminent danger of warrantless arrest does not justify resort to extraordinary remedies of mandamus and certiorari since there are other remedies in the ordinary recourse of the law: (a) Individual may ask for Preliminary Investigation (b) He may submit himself to inquest proceedings (c) If detention is without legal ground, charge arresting officer of arbitrary detention (d) Person must be delivered to proper authorities within periods prescribed by Art. 125, RPC (e) File action for damages against the arresting officer under Article 32 of CC. Other considerations for dismissal of petition: Lacson, Aquino and Mancao pray that appropriate court desist from proceeding with the trial of the case that may be filed against them. SC held that this is premature considering that, as of that moment, no complaint or charge was filed against them. Regarding the prayer to declare null and void hold departure orders against them, petitioners did not directly assail the subject hold departure orders and they have not expressed intention to leave the country in the near future. As to their application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, SC held that the writ is not called for since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint, a matter still speculative at that moment. Petition is dismissed. However, respondents are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners therein without the required judicial warrant for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang. Dissent of J. Kapunan: There is nothing in Article VII Section 18 which authorizes the President or any person acting under her direction to make unwarranted arrests. The existence of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion only authorizes the President to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

Navales vs Gen. Abaya (GR No. 162318, October 25, 2004) Facts:
Consolidated petitions for habeas corpus and prohibition Oakwood Incident: On July 27, 2003, more than three hundred junior officers and enlisted men, mostly from the elite units of
the AFP the Philippine Armys Scout Rangers and the Philippine Navys Special Warfare Group (SWAG) quietly entered the premises of the Ayala Center in Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and took over the Oakwood Premier Apartments (Oakwood). They planted explosives around the building and in its vicinity. Between 4:00 to 5:00 a.m., the soldiers were able to issue a public statement through the ABS-CBN News (ANC) network and claimed that they went to Oakwood to air their grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. (i.e.: the graft and corruption in the military, the sale of arms and ammunition to the enemies of the State, etc.) They declared their withdrawal of support from the chain of command and demanded the resignation of key civilian and military leaders of the Arroyo administration. PGMA gave them until 5p.m. to give up their positions and return to the barracks. At about 1:00 p.m., she declared the existence of a state of rebellion and issued an order to use reasonable force in putting down the rebellion. An agreement was forged between the two groups at 9:30 p.m. Shortly thereafter, Pres. Arroyo announced that the occupation of Oakwood was over. The soldiers agreed to return to barracks and were out of the Oakwood premises by 11:00 p.m.

August 1, 2003 - DOJ charged 321 of those soldiers who took part in the Oakwood Incident with violation of Article 134-A (coup detat) of the Revised Penal Code (filed w/ RTC) September 12, 2003 243 of accused filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the RTC assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before the military tribunal in accord w/ RA 7055 and, order the prosecution to present evidence to establish probable cause against 316 of 321 accused in which failure to do so should cause dismissal of case. October 20, 2003 - While the said motion was pending resolution, the DOJ issued the Resolution finding probable cause for coup detat against only 31 of the original 321 accused and dismissing the charges against the other 290 for insufficiency of evidence. November 14, 2003 RTC admitted Amended Information, charging only 31 of original accused with coup detat. It expressly stated that the case against the other 290 accused, including p etitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. and those who are subject of the petition for habeas corpus, Capt. Reaso, et al., was dismissed Meanwhile, Capt. Reaso, et al. and 1Lt. Navales, et al. were charged before the General Court-Martial with violations of the Articles of War 63, 64, 67, 96, 97. The 31 charged in the Amended Information were not included in the charge sheets. February 11, 2004 acting on the earlier Omnibus Motion filed by the 243 of the original accused under the Information dated August 1, 2003, the RTC (Branch 148) issued an Order rendering contents of OM moot and academic and all charges before court martial against the accused and former accused declared not service-connected but rather absorbed and in furtherance to alleged crime of coup det at. March 1, 2004 - General Court-Martial set on March 16, 2004 the arraignment/trial of petitioners for violations of the Articles of War

Issue: whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the writs of prohibition and habeas corpus. Held: NOOOOO. The sweeping declaration made by the RTC (Branch 148), that all charges before the court-martial against the accused were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup detat, was made without or in excess of jurisdiction and thus cannot be given effect. (null and void) o The Order dated February 11, 2004 was issued purportedly to resolve the Omnibus Motion, which prayed for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over all the charges filed before the military courts in accordance with Rep. Act No. 7055. o The said Omnibus Motion was filed on September 12, 2003 by 243 of the original accused under the Information dated August 1,2003. However, this information was subsequently superseded by the Amended Information dated October 20, 2003 under which only 31 were charged with the crime of coup d'etat. o In the November 14, 2003 Order of the RTC (Branch 61), the Amended Information was admitted and the case against the 290 accused, including 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., was dismissed. The said Order became final and executory since no motion for reconsideration thereof had been filed by any of the parties. o Therefore, when the RTC (Branch 148) eventually resolved the Omnibus Motion on February 11, 2004, the said motion had already been rendered moot by the November 14, 2003 Order of the

RTC (Branch 61) admitting the Amended Information under which only31 of the accused were charged and dismissing the case as against the other 290. It had become moot with respect to those whose charge against them was dismissed because they were no longer parties to the case. In view of this the case against aforesaid accused, the Court, therefore, can no longer assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before the military courts and this Court cannot undo nor reverse the Order of November 14, 2003 of Judge Barza, there being no motion filed by the prosecution to reconsider the order or by any of the accused. Such declaration was made by the RTC (Branch 148) in violation of Section 1, RA 7055 o RA 7055 did not divest the military courts of jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses." In fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the court-martial. o In view of the clear mandate of Rep. Act No. 7055, the RTC (Branch 148) cannot divest the General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction over those charged with violations of Articles 63 (Disrespect Toward the President etc.), 64 (Disrespect TowardSuperior Officer), 67 (Mutiny or Sedition), 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and 97 (General Article) ofthe Articles of War, as these are specifically included as "service-connected offenses or crimes" under Section 1 thereof. Military courts have jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. Once vested by law on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by any body other than by the legislature through the enactment of a law. Writ of Habeas Corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by the court (includes General Court-Martial) which has jurisdiction to do so. It should not be allowed after the party sought to be released has been charged before any court or quasi-judicial body. This rule applies to Capt. Raso, et al., as they are under detention pursuant to Commitment Order issued by Chief of Staff of the AFP pursuant to Article 70 of Articles of War. Writ of Prohibition is to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards or persons from usurping/exercising a jurisdiction/power with which they have not been vested by law. The General Court-Martial has jurisdiction has jurisdiction over the charges filed against 1Lt. Navales, et al. under RA 7055. A writ of prohibition cannot be issued to prevent it from exercising its jurisdiction.

Article VII , Sec. 21 No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: 1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. 2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. 3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned. 4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. 5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. 6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

Nicolas v. Romulo G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009

Facts: Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the United States Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, petitioner herein, sometime on November 1, 2005. Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) the United States, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the proceedings. During the trial at the RTC of Makati, the United States Government faithfully complied with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial court.Following the end of the trial, the RTC rendered its Decision, finding defendant Smith guilty and ordering that he be detained in the Makati jail. Defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail and be returned to US military custody at the US Embassy in Manila, as provided for under the new Romulo-Kenney Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. Matter was brought before the CA but was dismissed for being moot and academic. Hence this petition. Issues: 1. WON presence of USAF in Philippine territory, pursuant to the VFA is allowed under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State --- YES, IT IS a. Bayan v. Zamora: the VFA has been recognized as a treaty by the US as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the US government i. The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State, for this is a matter of internal United States law. b. The VFA is simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-US Military Defense Treaty. It was not necessary to submit the VFA to the US Senate for advice and consent, but merely to the US Congress, under the CaseZablocki Act, within 60 days of its ratification. Joint RP-US military exercises for the purpose of developing the capability to resist an armed attack fall squarely under the provisions of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. c. The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions. 2. WON the VFA violates Article VIII, Sec 5[5] of the Constitution a. The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other accused. b. The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter ones territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon.

The Status of Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary in terms and conditions, according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties. d. Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as against custody. It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during the trial and detention after conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention. It is clearly stated not only that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also that the detention shall be by Philippine authorities. e. Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not by Philippine authorities. 3. Whether the VFA is recognized as a treaty and part of the domestic law of the US, pursuant to Medellin v. Texas to the effect that treaties entered into by the United States are not automatically part of their domestic law unless these treaties are self-executing or there is an implementing legislation to make them enforceable. a. The VFA is a self-executing Agreement, as that term is defined in Medellin itself, because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the Agreement is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. b. the VFA is covered by implementing legislation, namely, the Case-Zablocki Act, USC Sec. 112(b). The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was advised and consented to by the US Senate. Petition partially granted. The VFA is upheld as unconstitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA.

c.

AKBAYAN v. Aquino G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008

Facts: Petitioners, as non-government organizations, congressmen, citizens and taxpayers, filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition seeking to compel respondents, Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino, et al., to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with another country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which includes trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business environment, and general and final provisions. Petitioners emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement violates their right to information on matters of public concern and of public interest. Also, that the non-disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to effective and reasonable participation in all levels of social, political and economic decision making. Respondent relied on the ground that the matter sought involves a diplomatic negotiation then in progress, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full disclosure of matters that are of public concern like the JPEPA. They contend that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege. Issues/Held: 1. WON the claim of the petitioners is covered by the right to information. a. Yes. To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold requirement that it be a matter of public concern. b. Legaspi v Civil Service Commision: In determining whether or not particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. c. From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. 2. WON the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege a. Yes. Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. b. Senate v. Ermita: recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status. c. PMPF v. Manglapus: i. wherein petitioners were seeking information from the Presidents representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. ii. "secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information. iii. Citing US v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.: President is the sole organ of the nation in its negotiations with foreign countries. 1. In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it d. While the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published.

3.

4.

Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations. e. Secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information WON the executive privilege claimed by the respondents applies only at certain stages of the negotiation process. a. No. b. Chavez v PCGG: Supreme Court stated that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. However, the information must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. c. The privilege for diplomatic negotiations fall under the recognized exceptions. WON there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claim of privilege. a. No. Petitioners failed to present a sufficient showing of need and have failed to convince the Court that they will not be able to meaningfully exercise their right to participate in decision-making unless the initial offers are also published. b. The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege and can be overcome by a sufficient showing of need. This need determination is to be made flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis. [E]ach time [the deliberative process privilege] is asserted the d istrict court must undertake a fresh balancing of the competing interests, taking into account factors such as the relevance of the evidence, the availability of other evidence, the seriousness of the litigation, the role of the government, and the possibility of future timidity by government employees. c. There are two kinds of public interest involved in this case: one in favor of keeping information confidential and one in favor of disclosure. d. The nature of diplomacy requires the centralization of authority and is inherently confidential in nature. The privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations followed as a logical consequence of the privileged character of the deliberative process. There was no showing that the public interest in disclosure overcame the interest in confidentiality.

Dissent, J. Puno: The reasons provided by respondents for invoking the diplomatic secrets privilege while the JPEPA negotiations were ongoing no longer hold now that the negotiations have been concluded. Did not claim the privilege after the conclusion of the negotiations. The initial offers (between Phil & Japan) are not in the nature of advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations which can be covered by the deliberative process privilege. It was not in the nature of internal deliberations since it is the handiwork of the Philippine and the Japanese negotiating panels working together. In using the balancing of interests test the scale must be tilted in favour of the peoples right to information for t he records are bereft of basis for finding a public interest to justify the withholding of the subject JPEPA documents after the negotiations have been concluded. Petition is dismissed.

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers G.R. No.180643,March 25, 2008
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the show cause Letter1 dated November 22, 2007 and contempt Order2 dated January 30, 2008 concurrently issued by respondent

Facts:

On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People's Republic of China. In connection with this, several resolutions regarding the investigation and implications on national security and government-to-government contracts regarding the NBN Project were introduced in Senate. Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among those invited. He was summoned to appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26 and October 25, 2007. However, he attended only the September 26 hearing, claiming he was "out of town" during the other dates. In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. It appeared that the Project was initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project but, on March 29, 2007, the NEDA acquiesced to convert it into a government-to-government project, to be financed through a loan from the Chinese Government. Sept. 26, 2007 petitioner testified before respondent Committees for 11 hours. He disclosed that COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the project, and he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt. When probed further on what they discussed, petitioner refused to answer 3 questions, invoking executive privilege: o WON President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project o WON she directed him to prioritize it o WON she directed him to approve Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007. However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested respondent Committees to dispense with petitioner's testimony on the ground of executive privilege On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees. Thus, on November 22, 2007, the latter issued the show cause Letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. Neri replied that it was not his intention to ignore the hearing and he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. He further requested to be furnished in advance as to what else he needs to clarify. In a letter by his counsel, it was stated that it was upon the order of the President that he did not appear, and that the conversation with the president dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal. Jan. 30, 2008 respondent committees found petitioners explanations unsatisfactory, and without responding to his reply, issued the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until he gives his testimony.

Issues: WON the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege o YES o An area where the presidential communications privilege is highly revered is in foreign relations. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp: The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on secrecy, and even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely impolitic, for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other powers. The necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the power of making treaties in the

President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the principle on which the body was formed confining it to a small number of members. To admit, then, a right in the House of Representatives to demand and to have as a matter of course all the papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign power would be to establish a dangerous precedent. Chavez v. PCGG: there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters." Chavez v. PEA: there is also a recognition of the confidentiality of Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. Senate v Ermita: concept of presidential communications privilege is fully discussed. Questions are covered by executive privilege. o US v Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and, Judicial Watch v DOJ, : provide the elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit: The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential power." The communication must be authored or "solicited and received" by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in "operational proximity" with the President. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought "likely contains important evidence" and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. o Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. the communications relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable power" of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. communications are "received" by a close advisor of the President. Under the "operational proximity" test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo's cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority o Maintaining the confidentiality of conversations of the President is necessary in the exercise of her executive and policy decision making process. o The information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People's Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, Neri cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. o Senate v Ermita: the Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department. WON respondent Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt Order o YES. For the ff. reasons: o There was a legitimate claim of executive privilege therefore the Order suffers from constitutional infirmity. o Committees did not comply with the requirement (Senate v. Ermita) that the invitations should contain the possible needed statute which prompted the inquiry, the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof. Compliance is imperative, both under Sec. 21 and 22 of Art. 6 of Constitution, to ensure rights of persons appearing and affected by the inquiry are respected. o It is revealed in the transcript that the proceeding on Jan. 30, 2008 had only a minority of the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee present during the deliberation (7 only). Sec. 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that a vote of majority of its members may punish any witness for contempt. Members who did not actually participate in the deliberation were made to sign the contempt Order, and its validity is doubted. Sen. Pimentel insisted that the quorum of the committee was only 2 and that the will of the lead committee prevails over all the other.

o o

The Court finds merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent violated Sec. 21, Art. 6 of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure, which the respondents failed to meet therefore its hearings were procedurally infirm. Respondents issuance of the contempt Order were arbitrary and precipitate because it did not pass upon the claim of executive privilege and inform the petitioner of their ruling, curtly dismissed his explanation as unsatisfactory and simultaneously issued the Order. Petitioner was not an unwilling witness and manifested his willingness to testify. Respondents denied him due process of law.

Petition granted. Contempt order is nullified. Neri v. Senate Sept 4, 2008 Resolution on Motion for Consideration Issues: Whether or not there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our legal system o Yes. o Almonte v. Vasquez: the Court affirmed that the presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. The Court articulated that there are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public, that there is governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters; and that the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. Whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited by the 3 questions are covered by executive privilege o Yes. o Committees contend that the power to secure a foreign loan does not relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power, because the Constitution does not vest it in the President alone, but also in the Monetary Board. Quintessential is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated essence of substance. Non-delegable means that a power or duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the obligor. The power to enter into an executive agreement is in essence an executive power and the final decision in the exercise of the said executive power is still lodged in the Office of the President even when it has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board because it is only a form of check and balance. o Committees contend that the application of the doctrine of operational proximity fo r the reason that it may be misconstrued to expand the scope of the presidential communications privilege to communications between those who are operationally proximate to the President by who may have no direct communications with her. In the case at bar, the danger is absent because the official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the term advisor of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of her official family. o Committees contend that the Court erred in upholding the Presidents invocation, through Exec. Sec., of executive privilege because: Between Committees specific and demonstrated need and the Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality, there is a need to strike the balance in favor of the former Presidents claim of executive privilege is not merely founded on her generalized interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated Nov. 15 of Exec. Sec. Ermita specified presidential communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic relation with another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim. The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction that information on inter -government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest. In the balancing of interest, the Court disregarded the provisions of the 1987 Constitution on government transparency, accountability, and disclosure of information

The constitutional provisions cited by Committees do not espouse an absolute right to information. It must be emphasized that the assailed Decision did not enjoin the Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. All that is expected from them is to respect matters that are covered by executive privilege. Whether or not Committees have shown that the communications elicited by the 3 questions are critical to the exercise of their functions o No. Committees contend the information elicited by the 3 questions are necessary in the discharge of their legislative function, among them: To consider the 3 pending Senate BillsThere is simply a generalized assertion that the information is pertinent to the exercise of the power to legislate and a broad and nonspecific reference to pending Senate Bills. And it is further expressed by the counsel of Committees that even without Neri answering the 3 questions, the Senate can still come up with legislations. To curb graft and corruptionThe potential culpability of high government officials in a given government transaction is not a task for the Senate to perform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to determine anyones guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. Whether or not Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order o Yes. An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked Executive, generates its own abuses. The requirements set forth in Senate v. Ermita are modest mechanisms that would not unduly limit Congress power. Witnesses should be adequately informed what matters are to be covered by the inquiry. It will allow them to prepare the pertinent information and documents.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS DENIED.

Vinuya vs Executive Secretary (GR No. 162230, April 28, 2010)

Petition for Certiorari with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ and, OSG

Facts: Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War. They claim that they were comfort women at the time and as a result of the actions of their Japanese tormentors, the petitioners have spent their lives in misery, having endured physical injuries, pain and disability, and mental and emotional suffering. Since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines. However, officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. Issue/Held: WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
a. No. The Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan. Whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari Justice Punos dissent in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion: It is also the President who possesses the most
comprehensive and the most confidential information about foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him on meaningful events all over the world. He has also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data. In fine, the presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a wider degree of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs.

b.

c.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. Even then, it is not the individuals rights that are being asserted, but rather, the states own rights. e. The State is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease. It retains, in this respect, a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case. f. Even the invocation of jus cogens (compelling law) norms and erga omnes (in relation to everyone) obligations will not alter this analysis. Even if we sidestep the question of whether jus cogens norms existed in 1951, petitioners have not deigned to show that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens. i. erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. ii. jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority Petition dismissed. Regrettably, it is not within our power to order the Executive Department to take up the petitioners cause. Ours is only the power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to take up petitioners cause.

d.

Pimentel vs. Office of the Executive Secretary 462 SCRA 622 Facts: This is a petition for mandamus to transmit the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court, from the Office of the Exec Sec and DFA to the Senate. The ICC has the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, covering genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, etc. It was opened for signatures in Rome in 1998 until 2000 in the UN NY Headquarters and whose provisions are subject to ratification by the signatories. Petitioners request such transmission because they believe that it is the duty of the Senate to ratify treaties under both domestic and international law, and the duty of the executive department to transmit such to the Senate. This is to fulfill the ministerial duty of the Philippines in line with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to do acts which do not defeat the objects and purposes of a treaty. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing - Only Sen. Pimentel has legal standing. Legislators
have the standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators

Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs have the duty to transmit to Senate a copy of Rome Statute signed by a member of Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without Presidents signature? o No. The President as the head of the state is the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the countrys sole representative to foreign nations. He is the mouthpiece of the country regarding foreign affairs and has the sole authority to negotiate with other states in the realm of treaty making. o The power to ratify belongs exclusively to the President as the head of state, the countrys sole representative with foreign nations and the chief architect of foreign policy. The role of Senate is limited to giving or withholding its consent or concurrence in ratification. o The steps in treaty-making are: o 1) Negotiation - undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually assigns this task to his authorized representatives o 2) Signature - symbol of good faith however, it does not indicate the final consent of the state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required o 3) Ratification - purpose of ratification is to enable the contracting states to examine the treaty more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they find it inimical to their interests. It is for this reason that most treaties are made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the government other than that which negotiated them. o 4) Exchange of instruments of ratification. - usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date has been agreed upon by the parties. Where ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the instrument is deemed effective upon its signature The power to participate in treaty-making lies solely with the executive branch. It is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties Petition dismissed

Abaya vs. Ebdane, 515 SCRA 720 Facts: On May 7, 2004 Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) issued a Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012 which recommended the award to China Road & Bridge Corporation of the contract for the implementation of civil works for Contract Package No. I (CP I). This consists of the improvement/rehabilitation of the San Andres-Virac-Jct. Bago-Viga road, with the lengt of 79.818 kilometers, in the island province of Catanduanes. Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 was executed by and between the JBIC and the Philippine Government pursuant to the Exchange of Notes executed by and between Mr. Yoshihisa Ara, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the Philippines, and then Foreign Affairs Secretary Siazon, in behalf of their respective governments. The Exchange of Notes expressed that the two governments have reached an understanding concerning Japanese loans to be extended to the Philippines and that these loans were aimed at promoting our countrys economic stabilization and development efforts. In accordance with the established prequalification criteria, eight contractors were evaluated or considered eligible to bid as concurred by the JBIC. Prior to the opening of the respective bid proposals, it was announced that the Approved Budget for the Contract (ABC) was in the amount of P738,710,563.67. Consequently, the bid goes to private respondent in the amount of P952,564,821.71 (with a variance of 25.98% from the ABC). Hence, this petition on the contention that it violates Sec. 31 of RA 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act) which provides that :
Sec. 31 Ceiling for Bid Prices. The ABC shall be the upper limit or ceiling for the bid prices. Bid prices that exceed this ceiling shall be disqualified outright from further participating in the proceeding. There shall be no lower limit to the amount of the award.

The petitioners further contend that the Loan Agreement between Japan and the Philippines is neither an international treaty nor an executive agreement that would bar the application of RA9184.
Based on Executive Order No. 459 dated November 25, 1997 where the three agreements are defined in this wise: a) International agreement shall refer to a contract or understanding, regardless of nomenclature, entered into between the Philippines and another government in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments. b) Treaties international agreements entered into by the Philippines which require legislative concurrence after executive ratification. This term may include compacts like conventions, declarations, covenants and acts. c) Executive agreements similar to treaties except that they do not require legislative concurrence

They pointed out that to be considered as such, the parties must be two (2) sovereigns or states whereas in this loan agreement, the parties were the Philippine government and the JBIC, a banking agency of Japan, which has a separate juridical personality from the Japanese government. Issue: WON the Loan agreement is an executive agreement/treaty? Held: Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 taken in conjunction with the Exchange of Notes dated December 27, 1999 between the Japanese Government and the Philippine Government is an executive agreement. Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 is indubitably an integral part of the Exchange of Notes. It forms part of the Exchange of Notes such that it cannot be properly taken independent thereof An "exchange of notes" is a record of a routine agreement that has many similarities with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval

treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols, declarations, memoranda of understanding, modus vivendi and exchange of notes" all refer to "international instruments binding at international law. Although these instruments differ from each other by title, they all have common features and international law has applied basically the same rules to all these instruments. These rules are the result of long practice among the States, which have accepted them as binding norms in their mutual relations. Therefore, they are regarded as international customary law. an exchange of notes is considered a form of an executive agreement, which becomes binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or Congress

Under the fundamental principle of international law of pacta sunt servanda, which is, in fact, embodied in Section 4 of RA 9184 as it provides that "[a]ny treaty or international or executive agreement affecting the subject matter of this Act to which the Philippine government is a signatory shall be observed," the DPWH, as the executing agency of the projects financed by Loan Agreement No. PH-P204, rightfully awarded the contract for the implementation of civil works for the CP I project to private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation. Petition dismissed.

Commissioner of Customs vs Eastern Sea Trading (3 SCRA 351, 1961) Facts: Eastern Sea Trading was the consignee of several shipments of onion and garlic which arrived at the port of Manila in 1954. Some shipments came from Japan while the others from Hongkong. Such did not have the certificate required by the Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 and thus, the goods were seized and subjected to forfeiture proceedings. With the orders of the CFI, the consignee was directed that the amounts of of the surety and principal bonds be paid to the Bureau of Customs. CTA, on appeal, reversed the decision of the Commissioner of Customs and ordered the bonds to be cancelled and withdrawn Hence, the present petition. Issues: (1) Whether the Central Bank has the authority to regulate transactions involving foreign exchange. The said shipments were said to be of "no-dollar" imports and as such, the forfeiture of the goods cannot be justified under EO 328. Moreover, the executive agreement, extending the effectivity of our Trades and Financial Agreements with Japan is believed to be of dubious quality. It should be noted that the Central Bank has been given broad powers under its charter to maintain the monetary stability and to preserve the international value of our currency and hence authorized to issue such rules and regulations as it may consider necessary to discharge its functions. (2) Whether the executive agreement sought to implemented by EO 328 is valid It is argued that the agreement is not valid due to absence of the concurrence of the Senate. However, treaties are distinct from executive agreement. Treaties are formal documents which require the ratification of the Senate. Executive agreements become binding even without the vote of the Senate. The executive then has the power to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of congressional approval. The Court also notes a finer distinction between treaties and agreements in so far as Treaties often involve political issues or changes of national policies which are of a permanent character. Agreements, on the other hand, embody adjustments of detail and those arrangements which are temporary in nature. (3) Whether it is unreasonable to require an import license when the Import Control Commission was no longer in existence and hence, no agency, there was no agency authorized to issue the aforementioned license. The authority is not solely vested to the Import Control Commission. Judgment reversed.

USAFFE Veterans Assocn vs Treasurer (105 Phil 1030) Facts: In 1954, the USAFFE Veterans Association Inc. prayed in its complaint before the CFI that the Romulo-Snyder Agreement be annulled, that the payments thereunder made be declared illegal and that the defendants be restrained from disbursing any funds in from the treasury pursuant to the said agreement. In 1941, foreseeing the War in the Pacific, Roosevelt called into service the Armed Forces of the US and organized the military forces of the Philippine Commonwealth. For the expenses to such incorporation, the Congress of the US provided funds in its Appropriation Act of December 17, 1941. After the war, of the millions transferred, there remained unexpended and uncommitted funds in possession of the Philippine Armed Forces. The Philippine Government, badly needing funds for its activities, proposed the retainment of the fund as loan and its subsequent repayment in ten annual installments. Hence, the agreement in question. Issues: (1) Whether the money delivered to the Armed Forces of the Philippine Islands were straight payments for military services and hence, ownership is vested to the Philippine Government upon delivery. The Congressional Act of December 17, 1941 expressly stated shall be available for the payment to the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines upon its written request, either in advance of or in reimbursement for all or any part of the estimated or actual cost. Regarding the funds as advanced means that it is to be subsequently accounted for which means submissions of expenditures and if approved, return of balance. Hence, there is the obligation to return of the unexpended funds. (2) Whether the Romula-Snyder Agreement is valid absent ratification of the Congress The agreement is not a "treaty" as the term used in the constitution. The agreement was never submitted to the Senate for concurrence. The distinction between "executive agreements" and "treaties" is purely a constitutional one and has no international legal significance. Executive agreement fall into two classes: (1) agreements made purely as executive acts affecting external relations and independent of or without legislative authorization, and (2) agreements entered into in pursuant of acts of Congress. The Romula-Snyder agreement fall under any of these two classes. Precisely, on September 18, 1946, the Congress specifically authorized the President to obtain such loans with the US. Assuming that there was no legislative authorization, the agreement was legally entered into to conform with the first category which does not need the ratification of the Senate. Resolution: Petition denied.