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Understanding Character Motivation: A Process-Oriented Approach to Realism The reality produced by the cinema at will and which it organizes is the reality of the world of which we are a part and of which the film receives a mold at once spatial and temporal. --Andr Bazin (1971, p. 14) As Joseph Anderson and others have pointed out, cinematic realism was pronounced clinically dead by the 1990s. Between issues of ideology and the technical belief that digital imaging rendered the issue moot, the above quote by Andr Bazin seemed downright naive (Anderson & Anderson, 2005). Yet during the same period, the rise of cognitive film theory meant something quite different for realism. Though cognitive film theory embraces a wide range of theoretical approaches, any approach built on an evolutionary or ecological theory must embrace realism in almost the exact form of Bazins quote. There are two basic assumptions at the heart of evolutionary models of film viewing. The first is that the process of evolution guarantees that we generally perceive the world the way it is, because if we did not, we could not have survived. The second is that motion pictures take advantage of this fact by presenting images that are perceived with the same mechanisms we use to perceive the world. That is: ...The perception and comprehension of motion pictures is regarded as a subset of perception and comprehension in general, and the workings of the perceptual systems and the mind of the spectator are viewed in the context of their evolutionary development. (Anderson, 1996, p. 10)

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Despite this assumption of realism, we have yet to fully wrestle with all of its implications. One of the main problems is that we have yet to fully define realism. This problem can be traced back to Andr Bazin who similarly struggled with what he meant when invoking the term realism. It is a testament to Bazin and perhaps an indictment of us that 50 years later his views and struggles with realism continue to shape and define how we approach realism today. Realism has many components. Bazin defines the most basic aspect in his essay, The Ontology of the Photographic Image: The photographic image is the object itself, the object freed from the conditions of time and space that govern it. No matter how fuzzy, distorted, or discolored, no matter how lacking in documentary value the image may be, it shares, by virtue of the very process of its becoming, the model of which it is the reproduction; it is the model. (1967, p. 14) The very nature of reproducing a view of the real world through a photochemical process creates what we might call photographic realism. Throughout his writing Bazin attempts to deal with at least two additional aspects of realism: content realism and perceptual realism. Though Bazin did not label them as such and often seems to mix them together, he recognized that in different films realism can take different forms. In discussing content realism, Bazin points to the films of the neorealist movement. In An Aesthetic of Reality, originally published in Esprit in 1948, Bazin takes a somewhat circuitous route in describing the realism of neorealist films, specifically Roberto Rossellinis Paisan. In discussing realism through the narrative

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technique of Paisan, Bazin notes that the film is similar to a documentary. While he mentions the lack of expressive lighting and the grey tonal values of the film, his comparison to documentary is most rooted in Paisans similarity to quasi-literary journalism. That is, the film is like a documentary in the kind of story it tells and how it is told. The six stories of Paisan have a social, historical, and human foundation and are not told in a highly structured narrative, but instead, maintain[s] an intelligible succession of events, [that] do not mesh like a chain with the sprockets of a wheel (1971, p. 35). For Bazin, the basic structural unit of Paisan is not the shot, but the fact. As with the real world, the movie does not connect the dots for us. Rather, we gather up all the facts, we look for relationships between them, and only then does any sort of meaning emerge (1971). In The Evolution of the Language of Cinema Bazin seems to have realized the core of the issue and his description of content-oriented realism is to the point: ...The real revolution took place more on the level of subject matter than of style. Bazin continues, Is not neorealism primarily a kind of humanism and only secondarily a style of film-making? (1967, p. 29). Just as Bazin relates this type of realism to Italian neorealism, today we might consider the content of the independent or art film mini-plot to be more realistic than the content of the classical Hollywood archplot. The second form of realism, perceptual realism, is equally important to Bazin. The main focus of Bazins discussion of this form of realism centers on depth of field, particularly in Orson Welles Citizen Kane. Bazin famously argues that depth of field in

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combination with deep staging creates a more naturally ambiguous way to perceive a scene than the forced meaning created by montage. He writes: ...Depth of focus brings the spectator into a relation with the image closer to that which he enjoys with reality. Therefore it is correct to say that, independently of the contents of the image, its structure is more realistic. (1967, p. 34) The validity of this belief has been discussed elsewhere, but the more important issue is that Bazin recognized the existence of a form of realism tied to the perception of the image, rather than its content. Bazin also recognized that films could lack perceptual realism. Soviet montage was the usual example that Bazin discussed, but he also noted that the Italian neorealists sacrificed the perceptual realism of sound synchronization in order to increase the mobility of the camera (1971). Bazins bifurcated view of realism continues to influence theorists today. Discussions of realism in contemporary cognitive theory tend to either focus on content realism or perceptual realism. Today, content realism informs discussions of documentary and reality-based television. More importantly, perceptual realism has been at the very center of cognitive theory. From the very act of perceiving motion in film, to how we handle the shifting view points of continuity editing, theorists have been concerned with ways perceiving motion pictures parallels perceiving the real world. Most recently, researchers have begun to analyze visual effects in terms of perceptual realism; as Anderson and Anderson point out, most filmmakers want digitally generated

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or composited images to look as real as possible (2005). Furthermore, as mentioned in the introduction, any ecological approach to film theory assumes the validity of realism. While Bazin clearly understood there to be two type of realism, he hinted at another type of realism in his comparison of Paisan and Citizen Kane. At the conclusion of An Aesthetic of Reality Bazin writes: By diametrically opposite technical routes each arrives at a scenario with roughly the same approach to reality--the depth of focus of Welles and the predisposition toward reality of Rossellini...In short, although they use independent techniques, without the least possibility of a direct influence on one another and possessed of temperaments that could hardly be less compatible, Rossellini and Welles have, to all intents and purposes, the same basic aesthetic objective, the same aesthetic concept of realism. (1971, pp. 38-39) Though he doesnt name it, the basic aesthetic objective they both share is ambiguity. Bazin calls each moment of Paisan a fragment of concrete reality in itself multiple and full of ambiguity (1971, p. 37). Likewise, of Citizen Kane, he writes, depth of focus reintroduced ambiguity into the structure of the image (1967, p.36). Much of the importance of ambiguity stems from the contrast of realism with the use of montage, which for Bazin created an abstract event, through association, whose meaning is unambiguous. However, it is important to note that Bazin did not believe in ambiguity for ambiguitys sake or merely as a contrast to the predetermined meaning of montage.

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Rather, ambiguity for Bazin meant that the viewer becomes more engaged in the movie. He states: That it [depth of field] implies, consequently, both a more active mental attitude on the part of the spectator and a more positive contribution on his part to the action in progress...The uncertainty in which we find ourselves as to the spiritual key or interpretation we should put on the film is built into the very design of the image. (1967, p. 35-36). Though Bazin relates this active mental attitude to an aspect of perceptual realism, the ambiguity from which it stems is clearly not perceptual per se. Rather, the uncertainty and following mental activity result from having to both make choices as to what is important and decide the meaning of what we are perceiving. This is basically the same mental activity we must engage in with realistic content. As either form of realism grows increasingly ambiguous, the more we have to think and figure things out. Given Bazins believe that the role of cinema is to be a realistic art, it is clear he values this process of figuring things out because this parallels how we interact with the real world. The more a movie engages the same cognitive processes we use to make sense of the real world, the more realistic it is. I label this third, distinct form of realism, processoriented realism. One cognitive process that illustrates how process-oriented realism functions is a viewers understanding of character motivation. As we watch characters navigate the challenges of their world, we are often forced to figure out why they do the things they

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do. Often times we immediately understand a characters motivation, but this is not always the case. How often we must do this and how difficult a task this is depends on the type of film we are viewing. In general, for example, the motivation of a character in an action movie is immediately clear. Moreover, understanding complex characters is not a primary reason for watching an action film. However, in the mini-plot of an independent or European art film, it is often less clear why characters do what they do. In addition, attempting to understand complex characters is one of the reasons why viewers watch this type of film. Research on understanding motivation grows out of social psychology, and like many areas of psychology, cognitive psychology has played a large role. Initial theories concerned themselves with logical rules of attribution; however, they did not address the actual mental processes involved in applying these rules. This issue was not tackled until social cognitivists entered the picture and began exploring three categories of mental processing: identification, attribution, and integration. Identification involves how an observer perceives an action and identifies it as a meaningful act. Specifically, observers identify an action by understanding the intention of the act. Once an act is identified, the observer must attribute that act to either the persons disposition or to the specific situation in which the act occurs. Finally, over repeated encounters, an observer integrates what they perceive into an impression of the actor (Gilbert, 1998). While identification and attribution had traditionally been considered as separate stages, Yaacov Trope has developed an influential model that demonstrates how these stages interact. Observers make use of two factors to make sense of an action and use

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those same two factors in determining whether to attribute that action to the actors disposition. First, an observer has prior knowledge, including previous behaviors of the actor. Second, the observer has knowledge of the current situation in which the action takes place. At the identification stage, both prior and situational knowledge have additive effects in helping to identify the specific behavior or action. For example, a behavior that seems aggressive is more likely to be considered aggressive if the situation seems to call for aggression or the observer has previous knowledge of aggressive behavior by the actor. Furthermore, the behavior itself may have a contextual influence on how the observer considers the situation and prior knowledge. Clearly aggressive behavior may make the observer more likely to judge the situation as one that requires aggression and more likely to identify past aggressive behavior. While identification of an action can be perceptually direct, not all actions are unambiguous, and higher level knowledge may be required to identify the action (Trope, 1986). At the attribution stage, the observer may or may not infer a disposition based on the identified action. As with the identification stage, knowledge of prior information has an additive effect on disposition inference just as it does on action at the identification stage. Once an action is identified as aggressive, for example, prior knowledge of aggressive actions will have an additive effect leading the observer to attribute aggressiveness to the actors disposition. However, situational knowledge, while being additive in identification, is subtractive in attribution. If a behavior is identified as aggressive, but the situation is clearly one that calls for aggression, the observer will be less likely to attribute aggressiveness to the actors disposition (Trope, 1986) Like

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identification, attribution has the possibility of being experienced as perceptually immediate and direct. Quattrone argues for an anchoring-adjustment mechanism. Observers assume a correspondence between action and disposition. An aggressive action will lead to the immediate assumption of an aggressive disposition. Only then does the observer factor in situational and prior knowledge (Gilbert, 1998). From an evolutionary perspective this makes sense; if we identify an action as life threatening we must immediately assume the actor is dangerous. We cannot stop to ponder possible reasons why the actor might be acting in such a manner. Yet, having the ability to use information about past actions and the current situation is highly useful in both how we make attributions and how we react to the perceived action. Less work has been done on how, over time, we form an impression of a person. However, among the general features of how we integrate perceived actions over time into an overall impression one is worth noting. Observers create impressions of others that are coherent. That is, we dont think of others as simply a collection of dispositions. Instead, we attempt to construct unifying explanations of who people are. Furthermore, these explanations then allow us to infer new dispositions for which we have no direct evidence. This ability to construct a coherent, overall impression from a collection of dispositions, means that people have a great deal of practical knowledge about how dispositions relate to one another (Gilbert, 1998). In terms of film viewing ambiguity can come into play at all three stages of identification, attribution, and integration. At the identification and attribution stages ambiguity can come into play in the consideration of both the current situation of the

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scene and prior knowledge. At the situational level, ambiguity may arise from either a situation with many cues or a situation with too few. Situations with an overabundance of information seem to be the type of situation envisioned by Bazin when discussing the ambiguity of deep staging and large depth of field. However, situations with too much information turn out to also be problems of lack of information. There are two possibilities. First, a viewer many witness an action taking place in a very active, complex situation, in which they simply miss the relevant information because there is too much to focus on. The dense, overlapping soundtrack of Robert Altmans Nashville and the many layers of action staged in depth of Jean Renoirs La Rgle du jeu are examples. The second possibility occurs when the viewer perceives the relevant information but is unable to use it because she doesnt possess enough prior information to understand its relevance. This can occur with an abundance of information or very little information, and will be discussed shortly. A lack of situational information was experienced by anyone watching world feed television coverage of the World Cup Final. In the middle of the action, the camera cut to Italian defender Marco Materazzi writhing in pain on the ground. A replay showed French star Zinedine Zidane walk up to Materazzi and smash his head into the Italians chest. The observer saw a clearly unambiguous act and tried to identify it by figuring out Zidanes intention. The general situation of the game and Zidanes presumed goal to win did not seem to explain his action since Zidane knew he would be ejected from the game. The specific situation provided no cues whatsoever to help explain the action. The observer was left to search their memory for prior examples of Zidanes

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behavior. However, because of contextual influences, the unambiguity of the action influences the viewers understanding of the ambiguity of the situation, and leads the viewer to conclude there must be a situational component. Therefore, regardless of the observers prior knowledge, situational knowledge is required before an attribution can be made. In the case of the World Cup, further replays showed Materazzi talking to Zidane. Most observers assumed that Materazzi provoked Zidanes strong reaction. At this point, identification was resolved and it was relatively clear that Zidanes intention was to get back at Materazzi or perhaps to punish him for his remarks. Days later, however, it was still unclear what Materazzi had actually said to Zidane, making it difficult for many to make an attribution since they were unable to decide whether such a strong action was justified. While, this example actually happened, it was also experienced by viewers through a visual media that could just as easily have been an edited sequence in a narrative film. As such, it illustrates how this process works both in the real world and in visual media. Another common instance of a lack of situational information in films occurs when the observer is not sure of the actors goal in the scene. This is less likely to happen in a Hollywood arch-plot where goals are usually clear, and more likely to happen in a mini-plot film in which goals are often less clear. An example occurs in Citizen Kane when Kane finishes Lelands review of Susans performance at the opera. Though Leland believes Kane wrote a negative review to prove to Leland he was an honest man, the viewer may have a harder time assigning this intention to Kane. Perhaps Kane is actually honest; perhaps hes trying to convince himself hes honest; perhaps

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his intention involved Susan in some way. Prior knowledge helps narrow down the choice of possibilities, but not far enough. One of the reasons the intention of this act is unclear is because Kanes goal for the entire scene is unclear. Why did he show up at the Chicago office in the first place? Did he arrive specifically to talk to Leland? If we knew Kanes goal was to admit to Leland that Susans performance was terrible, we might conclude Kanes intention was simply to be honest and tell the truth. It is important to note, however, that even if we know Kanes goal, the combination of situational and prior knowledge may still not be enough resolve the issue. Ambiguity is also a possibility in terms of using prior knowledge to identify and attribute an action. As with situational ambiguity, prior knowledge ambiguity can result from either an abundance of information or not enough information. In situations of abundance, memory and relevance are the main challenges for the observer, as he attempts to sort through all of the prior information concerning the specific action perceived. While feature films can certainly create this situation, it is especially relevant when watching complex, multi-character, multi-plotline television shows such as 24, Alias, or Lost. A viewer attempting to make sense of an action that takes place in episode 20 of the show 24 has a huge amount of prior information that must be remembered and accessed. The viewer faces an additional challenge since many of these shows reference information from past seasons, as well as past episodes. More often, the viewer lacks the necessary prior knowledge. This is often the case at the start of a film, before we have gotten much information on the characters. For example, at the start of Heaven (2002) an unknown woman makes a bomb, enters a

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high-rise, goes to the office of an unknown man, and leaves a bomb in his wastebasket. She then leaves, calls the police, and tells them her name is Philippa Paccard. Shortly thereafter, the bomb explodes. The viewer has no idea who this woman is, why she detonates a bomb in the building, or why she told the police her identity. The result is ambiguity, which we can only hope to resolve by receiving future information. Besides simply lacking knowledge, observers may possess contradictory information and lack further information to resolve that ambiguity. An example occurs in the film Shopgirl (2005). Ray is a rich, older man dating Mirabelle, a younger woman who works at the glove counter of Saks 5th Avenue. About halfway into the movie, Ray calls a depressed Mirabelle and finally gets her to admit that she has stopped taking her anti-depressants. He responds by having her call her doctor, bringing her to the office, and taking her back to his house to care for her. The main question is why Ray has decided to take care of Mirabelle. Specifically, does Ray love Mirabelle? The action itself is relatively unambiguous; he does take good care of her. The situation is also unambiguous; Mirabelle is extremely depressed and needs help. In looking back on prior events, however, the viewer discovers contradictory information. In an earlier scene Ray tells Mirabelle they should keep their options open given their age difference and his frequent travels. He also admits to his therapist that their relationship is temporary and an purely a diversion. A couple of scenes later Ray is off by a day when he gives Mirabelle a birthday present. He promises to correct the situation and get it right next year. The obvious implication is that Ray believes they will still be together the following year. The viewer trying to identify and attribute Rays action of caring for

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Mirabelle during her depression will encounter contradictory prior cues, and have a difficult time deciding Rays intention. As with identification and attribution, ambiguity can also arise during the integration stage. As a viewer compiles a set of dispositions she begins to integrate them into an overall impression of a character. The more contradictory these dispositions are, the harder it becomes to integrate them. In the previous example from Shopgirl, the viewers attempt to form an impression of Ray is difficult because of the ambiguity created by the contradictory dispositions of Ray. Rays kindness to Mirabelle during her depression is contradicted a few scenes later when Ray sleeps with another woman. Over the course of the movie he is generous, kind, and caring. He is also lonely, shallow, callous, and a cheater. Eventually, the viewer will form an impression of Ray, but the contradictory set of dispositions certainly makes this a challenging task. Perhaps the most famous example of attempting to form an impression of a character occurs in Citizen Kane. The movies plot itself is built around attempting to create a coherent impression of a character who is highly complex and contradictory. In both Shopgirl and Citizen Kane the ending provides a final key piece of information that may help to resolve the contradictions. Yet, even with knowledge of Rosebud, it is not easy to form an impression of Charles Foster Kane. Understanding character motivation is just one possible cognitive process viewers engage during Bazins active mental attitude. There are situations that require thinking above and beyond what we perceive directly while watching the film. This

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need for thinking based on ambiguity was clearly what Bazin valued most about realism. More recently, Steve Johnson, in his book, Everything Bad is Good for You, argues for the value of visual media that engage higher level functioning. He also argues that contrary to those who believe that popular visual media have become less mentally engaging, todays television shows, films, and video games create a much higher level of active mental processing (2005). Research in play supports the need and value of process-oriented realism. As cognitive practice, play helps develop a wide range of abilities from problem solving to social skills. From an evolutionary perspective, practicing these skills would aid in survival. The more forms of play make use of cognitive processes in a fashion similar to their use in the real world, the more successful practicing these skills will be. Of course, while evolution may explain why play behavior exists, it should be remembered that people play because they enjoy it (Anderson, 1996). On a last note, process oriented realism most likely can be found in other areas of visual media such as video games. Understanding how we utilize cognitive processes across different forms of visual media and how they vary in paralleling real world processes can help us more fully understand peoples entertainment choices and the cognitive role they play in peoples lives. Bruce Hutchinson University of Central Arkansas

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References Anderson, Joseph and Barbara Anderson. (2005). Moving Image Theory: Ecological Considerations. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Anderson, Joseph. (1996). The Reality of Illusions: An Ecological Approach to Cognitive Film Theory. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Bazin, Andr. (1967). What Is Cinema? (Vol. I). Hugh Gray, Trans. Berkeley: University of California Press. Bazin, Andr. (1971). What Is Cinema? (Vol. II). Hugh Gray, Trans. Berkeley: University of California Press. Gilbert, Daniel. (1998). Ordinary Personology. In Daniel Gilbert, Susan Fiske and Gardner Lindzey (Eds.), The Handbook of Social Psychology (Vol. Two), Fourth Ed. (pp. 89-150). Boston: McGraw-Hill. Johnson, Steven (2005). Everything Bad Is Good For You. New York: Riverhead Books. Trope, Yaacov. (1986). Identification and Inferential Processes in Dispositional Attribution. Psychological Review, 93, 239-257.