Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No.

164584 June 22, 2009

PHILIP MATTHEWS, Petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN A. TAYLOR and JOSELYN C. TAYLOR, Respondents. DECISION NACHURA, J.: Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Court of Appeals (CA) December 19, 2003 Decision1 and July 14, 2004 Resolution2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 59573. The assailed decision affirmed and upheld the June 30, 1997 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 4632 for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages. On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina.4 On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of P129,000.00.5 The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin.6 Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn.7 All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyns sister.8 However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property.9 On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease10 (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his (Benjamins) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages11 against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were

used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyns husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent. No Answer was filed, hence, the RTC declared Joselyn and the petitioner in defeault. On March 14, 1994, the RTC rendered judgment by default declaring the Agreement null and void.12 The decision was, however, set aside by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 34054.13 The CA also ordered the RTC to allow the petitioner to file his Answer, and to conduct further proceedings. In his Answer,14 petitioner claimed good faith in transacting with Joselyn. Since Joselyn appeared to be the owner of the Boracay property, he found it unnecessary to obtain the consent of Benjamin. Moreover, as appearing in the Agreement, Benjamin signed as a witness to the contract, indicating his knowledge of the transaction and, impliedly, his conformity to the agreement entered into by his wife. Benjamin was, therefore, estopped from questioning the validity of the Agreement. There being no amicable settlement during the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. On June 30, 1997, the RTC disposed of the case in this manner: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants as follows: 1. The Agreement of Lease dated July 20, 1992 consisting of eight (8) pages (Exhibits "T", "T-1", "T-2", "T-3", "T-4", "T-5", "T-6" and "T-7") entered into by and between Joselyn C. Taylor and Philip Matthews before Notary Public Lenito T. Serrano under Doc. No. 390, Page 79, Book I, Series of 1992 is hereby declared NULL and VOID; 2. Defendants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of SIXTEEN THOUSAND (P16,000.00) PESOS as damages representing unrealized income for the residential building and cottages computed monthly from July 1992 up to the time the property in question is restored to plaintiff; and 3. Defendants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, for attorneys fees and other incidental expenses. SO ORDERED.15 The RTC considered the Boracay property as community property of Benjamin and Joselyn; thus, the consent of the spouses was necessary to validate any contract involving the property. Benjamins right over the Boracay property was bolstered by the courts findings that the property was purchased and improved through funds provided by Benjamin. Although the Agreement was evidenced by a public document, the trial court refused to consider the alleged participation of Benjamin in the questioned transaction primarily because his signature appeared only on the last page of the document and not on every page thereof.

On appeal to the CA, petitioner still failed to obtain a favorable decision. In its December 19, 2003 Decision,16 the CA affirmed the conclusions made by the RTC. The appellate court was of the view that if, indeed, Benjamin was a willing participant in the questioned transaction, the parties to the Agreement should have used the phrase "with my consent" instead of "signed in the presence of." The CA noted that Joselyn already prepared an SPA in favor of Benjamin involving the Boracay property; it was therefore unnecessary for Joselyn to participate in the execution of the Agreement. Taken together, these circumstances yielded the inevitable conclusion that the contract was null and void having been entered into by Joselyn without the consent of Benjamin. Aggrieved, petitioner now comes before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari based on the following grounds: 4.1. THE MARITAL CONSENT OF RESPONDENT BENJAMIN TAYLOR IS NOT REQUIRED IN THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE DATED 20 JULY 1992. GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT HIS CONSENT IS REQUIRED, BENJAMIN TAYLOR IS DEEMED TO HAVE GIVEN HIS CONSENT WHEN HE AFFIXED HIS SIGNATURE IN THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE AS WITNESS IN THE LIGHT OF THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF SPOUSES PELAYO VS. MELKI PEREZ, G.R. NO. 141323, JUNE 8, 2005. 4.2. THE PARCEL OF LAND SUBJECT OF THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE IS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF JOCELYN C. TAYLOR, A FILIPINO CITIZEN, IN THE LIGHT OF CHEESMAN VS. IAC, G.R. NO. 74833, JANUARY 21, 1991. 4.3. THE COURTS A QUO ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED ARTICLE 96 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES WHICH IS A PROVISION REFERRING TO THE ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY. THE PROPERTY REGIME GOVERNING THE PROPERTY RELATIONS OF BENJAMIN TAYLOR AND JOSELYN TAYLOR IS THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS BECAUSE THEY WERE MARRIED ON 30 JUNE 1988 WHICH IS PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE. ARTICLE 96 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES FINDS NO APPLICATION IN THIS CASE. 4.4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE EXECUTION OF NOTARIAL DOCUMENTS. 4.5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO PASS UPON THE COUNTERCLAIM OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS NOT CONTESTED AND DESPITE THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING SAID CLAIM.17 The petition is impressed with merit. In fine, we are called upon to determine the validity of an Agreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino wife without the consent of her British husband. In addressing the

matter before us, we are confronted not only with civil law or conflicts of law issues, but more importantly, with a constitutional question. It is undisputed that Joselyn acquired the Boracay property in 1989. Said acquisition was evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Joselyn as the vendee. The property was also declared for taxation purposes under her name. When Joselyn leased the property to petitioner, Benjamin sought the nullification of the contract on two grounds: first, that he was the actual owner of the property since he provided the funds used in purchasing the same; and second, that Joselyn could not enter into a valid contract involving the subject property without his consent. The trial and appellate courts both focused on the property relations of petitioner and respondent in light of the Civil Code and Family Code provisions. They, however, failed to observe the applicable constitutional principles, which, in fact, are the more decisive. Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:18 Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands.19 The primary purpose of this constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.20 Our fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of the public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.21 In Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,22 cited in Muller v. Muller,23 we had the occasion to explain the constitutional prohibition: Under Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that Section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows: "Section 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. x x x

xxxx If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellants words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor Generals Brief, p. 6) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.24 The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions.25 There is no rule more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through another. In a long line of cases, we have settled issues that directly or indirectly involve the above constitutional provision. We had cases where aliens wanted that a particular property be declared as part of their fathers estate;26 that they be reimbursed the funds used in purchasing a property titled in the name of another;27 that an implied trust be declared in their (aliens) favor;28 and that a contract of sale be nullified for their lack of consent.29 In Ting Ho, Jr. v. Teng Gui,30 Felix Ting Ho, a Chinese citizen, acquired a parcel of land, together with the improvements thereon. Upon his death, his heirs (the petitioners therein) claimed the properties as part of the estate of their deceased father, and sought the partition of said properties among themselves. We, however, excluded the land and improvements thereon from the estate of Felix Ting Ho, precisely because he never became the owner thereof in light of the above-mentioned constitutional prohibition. In Muller v. Muller,31 petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Germany. During the subsistence of their marriage, respondent purchased a parcel of land in Antipolo City and constructed a house thereon. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of the petitioner. They eventually separated, prompting the respondent to file a petition for separation of property. Specifically, respondent prayed for reimbursement of the funds he paid for the acquisition of said property. In deciding the case in favor of the petitioner, the Court held that respondent was aware that as an alien, he was prohibited from owning a parcel of land situated in the Philippines. He had, in fact, declared that when the spouses acquired the Antipolo property, he had it titled in the name of the petitioner because of said prohibition. Hence, we denied his attempt at subsequently asserting a right to the said property in the form of a claim for reimbursement. Neither did the Court declare that an implied trust was created by operation of law in view of petitioners marriage to respondent. We said that to rule otherwise would permit circumvention of the constitutional prohibition. In Frenzel v. Catito,32 petitioner, an Australian citizen, was married to Teresita Santos; while respondent, a Filipina, was married to Klaus Muller. Petitioner and respondent met and later cohabited in a common-law relationship, during which petitioner acquired real properties; and since he was disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines, respondents name appeared as

the vendee in the deeds of sale. When their relationship turned sour, petitioner filed an action for the recovery of the real properties registered in the name of respondent, claiming that he was the real owner. Again, as in the other cases, the Court refused to declare petitioner as the owner mainly because of the constitutional prohibition. The Court added that being a party to an illegal contract, he could not come to court and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or property by knowingly engaging in an illegal contract may not maintain an action for his losses. Finally, in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court,33 petitioner (an American citizen) and Criselda Cheesman acquired a parcel of land that was later registered in the latters name. Criselda subsequently sold the land to a third person without the knowledge of the petitioner. The petitioner then sought the nullification of the sale as he did not give his consent thereto. The Court held that assuming that it was his (petitioners) intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; thus, the sale as to him was null and void. In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we find and so hold that Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.34 In fine, the Agreement of Lease entered into between Joselyn and petitioner cannot be nullified on the grounds advanced by Benjamin. Thus, we uphold its validity. With the foregoing disquisition, we find it unnecessary to address the other issues raised by the petitioner. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the December 19, 2003 Decision and July 14, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59573, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered DISMISSING the complaint against petitioner Philip Matthews. SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Matthews vs Taylor GR 164584, June 22, 2009 Facts: On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property). The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn entered into an Agreement of Lease (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered without his (Benjamins) consent, he instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner, Philip Matthews. Issue: Whether or not an alien husband (Benjamin) is capacitated to nullify a lease contract entered into by his Filipina wife (Joselyn) over a land bought during their marriage? Ruling: Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated vendee in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if Benjamins claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition is sustained. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 173138 December 1, 2010

NOEL B. BACCAY, Petitioner, vs. MARIBEL C. BACCAY and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. DECISION VILLARAMA, JR., J.: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assails the Decision1 dated August 26, 2005 and Resolution2 dated June 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74581. The CA reversed the February 5, 2002 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 38, which declared the marriage of petitioner Noel B. Baccay (Noel) and Maribel Calderon-Baccay (Maribel) void on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 364 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The undisputed factual antecedents of the case are as follows: Noel and Maribel were schoolmates at the Mapua Institute of Technology where both took up Electronics and Communications Engineering. Sometime in 1990, they were introduced by a mutual friend and became close to one another. Noel courted Maribel, but it was only after years of continuous pursuit that Maribel accepted Noels proposal and the two became sweethearts. Noel considered Maribel as the snobbish and hard-to-get type, which traits he found attractive.5 Noels family was aware of their relationship for he used to bring Maribel to their house. Noel observed that Maribel was inordinately shy when around his family so to bring her closer to them, he always invited Maribel to attend family gatherings and other festive occasions like birthdays, Christmas, and fiesta celebrations. Maribel, however, would try to avoid Noels invitations and whenever she attended those occasions with Noels family, he observed that Maribel was invariably aloof or snobbish. Not once did she try to get close to any of his family members. Noel would talk to Maribel about her attitude towards his family and she would promise to change, but she never did. Around 1997, Noel decided to break up with Maribel because he was already involved with another woman. He tried to break up with Maribel, but Maribel refused and offered to accept Noels relationship with the other woman so long as they would not sever their ties. To give Maribel some time to get over their relationship, they still continued to see each other albeit on a friendly basis.

Despite their efforts to keep their meetings strictly friendly, however, Noel and Maribel had several romantic moments together. Noel took these episodes of sexual contact casually since Maribel never demanded anything from him except his company. Then, sometime in November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. Upon advice of his mother, Noel grudgingly agreed to marry Maribel. Noel and Maribel were immediately wed on November 23, 1998 before Judge Gregorio Dayrit, the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. After the marriage ceremony, Noel and Maribel agreed to live with Noels family in their house at Rosal, Pag-asa, Quezon City. During all the time she lived with Noels family, Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of her way to endear herself to them. She would just come and go from the house as she pleased. Maribel never contributed to the familys coffer leaving Noel to shoulder all expenses for their support. Also, she refused to have any sexual contact with Noel. Surprisingly, despite Maribels claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed any symptoms of pregnancy in her. He asked Maribels office mates whether she manifested any signs of pregnancy and they confirmed that she showed no such signs. Then, sometime in January 1999, Maribel did not go home for a day, and when she came home she announced to Noel and his family that she had a miscarriage and was confined at the Chinese General Hospital where her sister worked as a nurse. Noel confronted her about her alleged miscarriage sometime in February 1999. The discussion escalated into an intense quarrel which woke up the whole household. Noels mother tried to intervene but Maribel shouted "Putang ina nyo, wag kayo makialam" at her. Because of this, Noels mother asked them to leave her house. Around 2:30 a.m., Maribel called her parents and asked them to pick her up. Maribel left Noels house and did not come back anymore. Noel tried to communicate with Maribel but when he went to see her at her house nobody wanted to talk to him and she rejected his phone calls.6 On September 11, 2000 or after less than two years of marriage, Noel filed a petition7 for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of Manila. Despite summons, Maribel did not participate in the proceedings. The trial proceeded after the public prosecutor manifested that no collusion existed between the parties. Despite a directive from the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also did not submit a certification manifesting its agreement or opposition to the case.8 On February 5, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Noel. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of the parties hereto celebrated on November 23, 1998 at the sala of Judge Gregorio Dayrit of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Quezon City as NULL and VOID.

The Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Chief of the National Statistics Office are hereby directed to record and enter this decree into the marriage records of the parties in their respective marriage registers. The absolute community property of the parties is hereby dissolved and, henceforth, they shall be governed by the property regime of complete separation of property. With costs against respondent. SO ORDERED.9 The RTC found that Maribel failed to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage, and such failure was due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic Personality Disorder characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability as determined by a clinical psychologist. The RTC cited the findings of Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist presented as witness by Noel, that Maribel was a very insecure person. She entered into the marriage not because of emotional desire for marriage but to prove something, and her attitude was exploitative particularly in terms of financial rewards. She was emotionally immature, and viewed marriage as a piece of paper and that she can easily get rid of her husband without any provocation.10 On appeal by the OSG, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC, thus: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 38 declaring as null and void the marriage between petitioner-appellee and respondent is hereby REVERSED. Accordingly, the instant Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 The appellate court held that Noel failed to establish that Maribels supposed Narcissistic Personality Disorder was the psychological incapacity contemplated by law and that it was permanent and incurable. Maribels attitudes were merely mild peculiarities in character or signs of ill-will and refusal or neglect to perform marital obligations which did not amount to psychological incapacity, said the appellate court. The CA noted that Maribel may have failed or refused to perform her marital obligations but such did not indicate incapacity. The CA stressed that the law requires nothing short of mental illness sufficient to render a person incapable of knowing the essential marital obligations.12 The CA further held that Maribels refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel did not constitute a ground to find her psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code. As Noel admitted, he had numerous sexual relations with Maribel before their marriage. Maribel therefore cannot be said to be incapacitated to perform this particular obligation and that such incapacity existed at the time of marriage.13

Incidentally, the CA held that the OSG erred in saying that what Noel should have filed was an action to annul the marriage under Article 45 (3)14 of the Family Code. According to the CA, Article 45 (3) involving consent to marriage vitiated by fraud is limited to the instances enumerated under Article 4615 of the Family Code. Maribels misrepresentation that she was pregnant to induce Noel to marry her was not the fraud contemplated under Article 45 (3) as it was not among the instances enumerated under Article 46.16 On June 13, 2006, the CA denied Noels motion for reconsideration. It held that Maribels personality disorder is not the psychological incapacity contemplated by law. Her refusal to perform the essential marital obligations may be attributed merely to her stubborn refusal to do so. Also, the manifestations of the Narcissistic Personality Disorder had no connection with Maribels failure to perform her marital obligations. Noel having failed to prove Maribels alleged psychological incapacity, any doubts should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.17 Hence, the present petition raising the following assignment of errors: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE CASE OF CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE. II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS NOT SUFFERING FROM NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER; AND THAT HER FAILURE TO PERFORM HER ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.18 The issue to be resolved is whether the marriage between the parties is null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner Noel contends that the CA failed to consider Maribels refusal to procreate as psychological incapacity. Insofar as he was concerned, the last time he had sexual intercourse with Maribel was before the marriage when she was drunk. They never had any sexual intimacy during their marriage. Noel claims that if a spouse senselessly and constantly refuses to perform his or her marital obligations, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity rather than to stubborn refusal. He insists that the CA should not have considered the pre-marital sexual encounters between him and Maribel in finding that the latter was not psychologically incapacitated to procreate through marital sexual cooperation. He argues that making love for procreation and consummation of the marriage for the start of family life is different from "plain, simple and casual sex." He further stresses that Maribel railroaded him into marrying her by seducing him and later claiming that she was pregnant with his child. But after their marriage, Maribel refused to consummate their marriage as she would not be sexually intimate with him.19 Noel further claims that there were other indicia of Maribels psychological incapacity and that she consistently exhibited several traits typical of a person suffering from Narcissistic

Personality Disorder before and during their marriage. He points out that Maribel would only mingle with a few individuals and never with Noels family even if they lived under one (1) roof. Maribel was also arrogant and haughty. She was rude and disrespectful to his mother and was also "interpersonally exploitative" as shown by her misrepresentation of pregnancy to force Noel to marry her. After marriage, Maribel never showed respect and love to Noel and his family. She displayed indifference to his emotional and sexual needs, but before the marriage she would display unfounded jealousy when Noel was visited by his friends. This same jealousy motivated her to deceive him into marrying her. Lastly, he points out that Maribels psychological incapacity was proven to be permanent and incurable with the root cause existing before the marriage. The psychologist testified that persons suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder were unmotivated to participate in therapy session and would reject any form of psychological help rendering their condition long lasting if not incurable. Such persons would not admit that their behavioral manifestations connote pathology or abnormality. The psychologist added that Maribels psychological incapacity was deeply rooted within her adaptive system since early childhood and manifested during adult life. Maribel was closely attached to her parents and mingled with only a few close individuals. Her close attachment to her parents and their over-protection of her turned her into a self-centered, self-absorbed individual who was insensitive to the needs of others. She developed the tendency not to accept rejection or failure.20 On the other hand, the OSG maintains that Maribels refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel did not constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code as her traits were merely mild peculiarities in her character or signs of ill-will and refusal or neglect to perform her marital obligations. The psychologist even admitted that Maribel was capable of entering into marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one. Also, it was established that Noel and Maribel had sexual relations prior to their marriage. The OSG further pointed out that the psychologist was vague as to how Maribels refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel constituted Narcissistic Personality Disorder. The petition lacks merit. Article 36 of the Family Code provides: ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. The Court held in Santos v. Court of Appeals21 that the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 6822 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

In Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,23 the Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.1avvphi1 Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.1avvphi1 (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,

much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x. xxxx (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. (Emphasis ours.) In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated. Noels evidence merely established that Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. As correctly observed by the CA, the report of the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the same psychologist even testified that Maribel was capable of entering into a marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one.24 Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated by law. The Court emphasizes that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that private respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder renders her "truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."25 Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:26

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x x x. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74581 is AFFIRMED and UPHELD. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice WE CONCUR: CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Chairperson ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice