1. G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990 FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner, vs.

THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents. Taada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner. Antonio E. Escober and Jurado Law Office for respondent Twin Peaks Development Corporation. COURTS, J.: Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation without public bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs found in the concession area [Annexes "6" and "7" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 54-63]. Petitioner made the following allegations: (a) That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license agreement designated as TLA No. 87 with the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya * from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990; (b) That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development [hereinafter referred to as "Bureau"], Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena [Annex "5" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 49]; (c) that on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram from the Bureau, the contents of which were as follows: PURSUANT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT YOU ARE REQUESTED TO STOP ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS TO CONSERVE REMAINING FORESTS PLEASE CONDUCT THE ORDERLY PULL-OUT OF LOGGING MACHINERIES AND EQUIPMENT AND COORDINATE WITH THE RESPECTIVE DISTRICT FORESTERS FOR THE INVENTORY OF LOGS CUT PRIOR TO THIS ORDER THE SUBMISSION OF A COMPLIANCE REPORT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS SHALL BE APPRECIATED [Annex "4" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 48]; (d) That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it immediately sent a letter addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its contributions to alleging that it was not given the forest conservation and opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging 531, but no operations (Annex "6" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 50 favorable action was taken on this letter; (e) That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000 hectares of the area formerly covered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Reality Corporation under TLA No. 356 which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license; and, (f) That the latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. Acting on petitioner's letter, the MNR through then Minister Ernesto Maceda issued an order dated July 22, 1986 denying petitioner's request. The Ministry ruled that a timber license was

not a contract within the due process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983. Moreover, emphasis was made of the total ban of logging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao imposed on April 2, 1986, thus: xxx xxx xxx It should be recalled that [petitioner's] earlier request for reinstatement has been denied in view of the total ban of all logging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao which was imposed for reasons of conservation and national security. The Ministry imposed the ban because it realizes the great responsibility it bear [sic] in respect to forest t considers itself the trustee thereof. This being the case, it has to ensure the availability of forest resources not only for the present, but also for the future generations of Filipinos. On the other hand, the activities of the insurgents in these parts of the country are well documented. Their financial demands on logging concessionaires are well known. The government, therefore, is well within its right to deprive its enemy of sources of funds in order to preserve itself, its established institutions and the liberty and democratic way of life of its people. xxx xxx xxx [Annex "9" of the Petition, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 65-67.] Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforestated order reiterating, among others. its request that TLA No. 356 issued to private respondent be declared null and void. The MNR however denied this motion in an order dated September 15, 1986. stating in part: xxx xxx xxx Regarding [petitioner's] request that the award of a 26,000 hectare portion of TLA No. 87 to Twin Peaks Realty Development Corporation under TLA No. 356 be declared null and void, suffice it to say that the Ministry is now in the process of reviewing all contracts, permits or other form of privileges for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of natural resources entered into, granted, issued or acquired before the issuance of Proclamation No. 3, otherwise known as the Freedom Constitution for the purpose of amending, modifying or revoking them when the national interest so requires. xxx xxx xxx The Ministry, through the Bureau of Forest Development, has jurisdiction and authority over all forest lands. On the basis of this authority, the Ministry issued the order banning all logging operations/activities in Quirino province, among others, where movant's former concession area is located. Therefore, the issuance of an order disallowing any person or entity from removing cut or uncut logs from the portion of TLA No. 87, now under TLA No. 356, would constitute an unnecessary or superfluous act on the part of the Ministry. xxx xxx xxx [Annex "11" of the Petition, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 77-78.] On November 26, 1986, petitioner's supplemental motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Meanwhile, per MNR Administrative Order No. 54, series of 1986, issued on November 26, 1986, the logging ban in the province of Quirino was lifted. Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the Office of the President. In a resolution dated July 6, 1987, the Office of the President, acting through then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. The Office of the President

ruled that the appeal of petitioner was prematurely filed, the matter not having been terminated in the MNR. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on August 14, 1987. Hence, petitioner filed directly with this Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, on August 27, 1987. On October 13, 1987, it filed a supplement to its petition for certiorari. Thereafter, public and private respondents submitted their respective comments, and petitioner filed its consolidated reply thereto. In a resolution dated May 22, 1989, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition. After a careful study of the circumstances in the case at bar, the Court finds several factors which militate against the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner. 1. Firstly, the refusal of public respondents herein to reverse final and executory administrative orders does not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction [See Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956); Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72; San Luis v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80160, June 26, 1989]. In the case at bar, petitioner's letters to the Office of the President and the MNR [now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dated March 17, 1986 and April 2, 1986, respectively, sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as well as the revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents in 1984. But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law, i.e. Section 8 of Pres. Dec. No. 705 as amended, for attacking the validity of these administrative actions until after 1986. By the time petitioner sent its letter dated April 2, 1986 to the newly appointed Minister of the MNR requesting reconsideration of the above Bureau actions, these were already settled matters as far as petitioner was concerned [See Rueda v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 106 Phil. 300 (1959); Danan v. Aspillera G.R. No. L-17305, November 28, 1962, 6 SCRA 609; Ocampo v. Arboleda G.R. No. L-48190, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 374]. No particular significance can be attached to petitioner's letter dated September 19, 1983 which petitioner claimed to have sent to then President Marcos [Annex "6" of Petition, Rollo, pp. 50-53], seeking the reconsideration of the 1983 order issued by Director Cortes of the Bureau. It must be pointed out that the averments in this letter are entirely different from the charges of fraud against officials under the previous regime made by petitioner in its letters to public respondents herein. In the letter to then President Marcos, petitioner simply contested its inclusion in the list of concessionaires, whose licenses were cancelled, by defending its record of selective logging and reforestation practices in the subject concession area. Yet, no other administrative steps appear to have been taken by petitioner until 1986, despite the fact that the alleged fraudulent scheme became apparent in 1984 as evidenced by the awarding of the subject timber concession area to other entities in that year. 2. The principal issue ostensibly presented for resolution in the instant petition is whether or not public respondents herein acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to overturn administrative orders issued by their predecessors in the past regime. Yet, what the petition ultimately seeks is the nullification of the Bureau orders cancelling TLA No. 87 and granting TLA No. 356 to private respondent, which were issued way back in 1983 and 1984, respectively. Once again, the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial recourse to have the earlier administrative actions reviewed by the courts through a petition for certiorari is prejudicial to its cause. For although no specific time frame is fixed for the institution of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the same must nevertheless be done within a "reasonable time". The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a petition for certiorari is the "reasonableness of the length of time that had expired from the commission of the acts complained of up to the institution of the proceeding to annul the same" [Toledo v. Pardo, G.R. No. 56761, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA

566, 571]. And failure to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period of time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of laches [Municipality of Carcar v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, G.R. No. L-31628, December 27, 1982, 119 SCRA 392). Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it or declined to assert it [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29; Seno v. Mangubat, G.R. No. L-44339, December 2, 1987, 156 SCRA 113]. The rule is that unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may, depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Verily, the laws aid those who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights (Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt) [See Buenaventura v. David, 37 Phil. 435 (1918)]. In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at the time, its delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie. 3. Finally, there is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and against public respondents herein. It is precisely this for which prevents the Court from departing from the general application of the rules enunciated above. A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent Minister Maceda of the MNR which were ed by the Office of the President, will disclose public policy consideration which effectively forestall judicial interference in the case at bar, Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to develop and conserve the country's natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under the previous dispensation. In fact, both the executive and legislative departments of the incumbent administration are presently taking stock of its environmental policies with regard to the utilization of timber lands and developing an agenda for future programs for their conservation and rehabilitation. The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and growing global concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed, most especially in this country. The Court takes judicial notice of the profligate waste of the country's forest resources which has not only resulted in the irreversible loss of flora and fauna peculiar to the region, but has produced even more disastrous and lasting economic and social effects. The delicate balance of nature having been upset, a vicious cycle of floods and droughts has been triggered and the supply of food and energy resources required by the people seriously depleted. While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet the country's immediate financial requirements, the more essential need to ensure future generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable environment demands effective and circumspect action from the government to check further denudation of whatever remains of the forest lands. Nothing less is expected of the government, in view of the clear constitutional command to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology. Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides: SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies [See Espinosa v. Makalintal, 79 Phil. 134 (1947); Coloso v. Board of Accountancy, 92 Phil. 938 (1953); Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. 905 (1960); Suarez v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-19828, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 461; Ganitano v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G. R. No. L-21167, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 543; Villegas v. Auditor General, G.R. No.

L-21352, November 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 877; Manuel v. Villena, G.R. No. L-28218, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 745; Lacuesta v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-33646, January 28, 1975, 62 SCRA 115; Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No. L-30637, July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA 80]. More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources [Director of Forestry v. Munoz, G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183; Lim, Sr. v. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-26990, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 751]. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3 (ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]. In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion more than suffice to justify the Court's refusal to interfere in the DENR evaluation of timber licenses and permits issued under the previous regime, or to pre-empt the adoption of appropriate corrective measures by the department. Nevertheless, the Court cannot help but express its concern regarding alleged irregularities in the issuance of timber license agreements to a number of logging concessionaires. The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country's timber resources, if done in contravention of the procedure outlined in the law, or as a result of fraud and undue influence exerted on department officials, is indicative of an arbitrary and whimsical exercise of the State's power to regulate the use and exploitation of forest resources. The alleged practice of bestowing "special favors" to preferred individuals, regardless of merit, would be an abuse of this power. And this Court will not be a party to a flagrant mockery of the avowed public policy of conservation enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, should the appropriate case be brought showing a clear grave abuse of discretion on the part of officials in the DENR and related bureaus with respect to the implementation of this public policy, the Court win not hesitate to step in and wield its authority, when invoked, in the exercise of judicial powers under the Constitution [Section 1, Article VIII]. However, petitioner having failed to make out a case showing grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents herein, the Court finds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari and to grant any of the affirmative reliefs sought. WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

2. G.R. No. 85502 February 24, 1992 SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. ALFONSO G. ABAD, as Judge RTC, Br. 22 of Pagadian City, COURT OF APPEALS, ISIDRO GILBOLINGO AND ROBUSTIANO BUGTAI, respondents. Manuel V. Trinida for petitioner. Adolf Leo P. Boncavil for private respondents.

CRUZ, J.: The Court will focus its attention only on one of the issues raised in this petition the correct application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove and utilize timber within the concession area covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur, for a period of ten years expiring on September 31, 1992. On July 31, 1987, the herein private respondents filed a petition with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for the cancellation of the TLA on the ground of serious violations of its conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations. The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a complaint for injunction with damages against the petitioner, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City. The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court had no jurisdiction over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction sought was expressly prohibited by section 1 of PD 605. Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss on December 11, 1987, 1 and the motion for reconsideration on February 15, 1988. 2 The petitioner then elevated the matter to the respondent Court of Appeals, which sustained the trial court in a decision dated July 4, 1988, 3 and in its resolution of September 27, 1988, denying the motion for reconsideration. 4 The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without exception and pointed to the several instances approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The respondent court found that in the case before it, the applicable exception was the urgent need for judicial intervention, which it explained thus: The lower court found out that sometime on July 1981, the City Council of Pagadian in its Resolution No. 111 requested the Bureau of Forest Development to reserve 1,000 hectares in Lison Valley. This request remained unacted upon. Instead in 1982, a TLA covering 29,500 hectares, including the area requested, was given to petitioner. Then the fear expressed by the City Council of Pagadian in its resolution became reality. "As averred in the complaint, the erosion caused by the logging operations of the defendant has caused heavy siltation not only in the Labangan River (as predicted by the City Council of Pagadian City in 1981) but also in the Tukuran River, Salug River, Sindangan River, and Sibuguey River. In other words, the adverse effects of the logging operations of the defendant have already covered a wider area than that feared to be adversely affected by the City Council of Pagadian City. Floods are unknown phenomena in heavily forested areas years back, particularly in the Island of Mindanao. When the grant of logging concessions started, so was the denudation of forests. . . . It is common knowledge that heavy floods have occurred in areas/places adjoining logging concessions. (Resolution dated December 11, 1987, p. 5). Thus, it is urgent that indiscriminate logging be stopped. Irreparable damage would ensue unless the court intervenes. Reliance on the DENR may not be enough, judging from its inaction on the council's request seven years back. The respondent court cited in support of this conclusion the case of De Lara v. Cloribel, 5 where "irreparable damage and injury" was allowed as an exceptional ground, and Arrow Transportation Corporation v. Board of Transportation, 6 where the doctrine was waived because of "the strong public interest in having the matter settled" as soon as possible.

The decision also declared invalid Section 1 of PD 605, which provides: Sec. 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving or growing out of the issuance, approval or disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the proper administrative official or body on concessions, licenses, permits, patents, or public grants of any kind in connection with the disposition, exploitation, utilization, exploration and/or development of the natural resources of the Philippines. This was held to be an encroachment on the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and the lower courts by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution. The respondent court cited Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 7where several presidential decrees were declared unconstitutional for divesting the courts of the judicial power to determine just compensation in expropriation cases. The petitioner is now before the Court, contending that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not correctly applied and that the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605 was improper. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, 8 which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it operates as a waiver of the objection as a ground for a motion to dismiss and the court may then proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been observed. One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. A no less important consideration is that administrative decisions are usually questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed only when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets. 9 As correctly suggested by he respondent court, however, there are a number of instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptional cases are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 10 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 11 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 12 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 13 5) when the claim involved is small; 14 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 15 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 16 8) when strong public interest is involved; 17 9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; 18 and 10) in quo warranto proceedings. 19 The private respondents now submit that their complaint comes under the exceptions because forestry laws do not require observance of the doctrine as a condition precedent to judicial action; the question they are raising is purely legal; application of the doctrine will cause great and irreparable damage; and public interest is involved. We rule for the petitioner. Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require prior resort to administrative remedies, the reasons for the doctrine above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still require its observance. Even if such reasons were disregarded, there would still be the explicit language of pertinent laws vesting in the DENR the power and function "to regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country's forests" and "to exercise exclusive jurisdiction" in the "management and disposition of all lands of the public domain," 20 and in the Forest Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Forest Development) the responsibility for the enforcement of the forestry laws aid regulations 21 here claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive conferment

clearly implies at the very least that the DENR should be allowed to rule in the first instance on any controversy coming under its express powers before the courts of justice may intervene. The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal is also not acceptable. The private respondents have charged, both in the administrative case before the DENR and in the civil case before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, that the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of the TLA and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations. The charge involves factual issues calling for the presentation of supporting evidence. Such evidence is best evaluated first by the administrative authorities, employing their specialized knowledge of the agreement and the rules allegedly violated, before the courts may step in to exercise their powers of review. As for the alleged urgent necessity for judicial action and the claimed adverse impact of the case on the national interest, the record does not show that the petitioners have satisfactorily established these extraordinary circumstances to justify deviation from the doctrine by exhaustion of administrative remedies and immediate resort to the courts of justice. In fact, this particular submission must fall flat against the petitioner's uncontested contention that it has since 1988 stopped its operations under the TLA in compliance with the order of the DENR. In the Petition for prohibition filed with the respondent court, the petitioner alleged that its logging operations had been suspended pursuant to a telegram 22 received on February 23, 1988, by the District Forester from the Regional Executive Director of the DENR, Zamboanga City; reading as follows: DISTRICT FORESTER PAGADIAN CITY QUOTED HEREUNDER IS RADIO MESSAGE DATED FEBRUARY 22, 1988 FROM SECRETARY FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR. QUOTE EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY CMA SUSPEND ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS OF SUNVILLE IN VIEW OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF FOREST PROTECTION AND REFORESTATION UNQUOTE SUBMIT REPORT ASAP. RED BATCAGAN The petition now before us contains the allegations that the "petition for cancellation of petitioner's TLA is still pending up to this date and that petitioner's logging operations (were) ordered suspended by the Secretary of the DENR pending further investigation." 23 In the memorandum filed by the petitioner with this Court, it is informed that "the Secretary of the DENR suspended petitioner's logging operations until further investigation. The suspension is still in force up to this date after the lapse of almost 3 years." 24 These statements have not been disputed by the private respondents in their pleadings before the respondent court and this Court and are therefore deemed admitted. There in no question that Civil Case No. 2732 comes within the jurisdiction of the respondent court. Nevertheless, as the wrong alleged in the complaint was supposedly committed as a result of the unlawful logging activities of the petitioner, it will be necessary first to determine whether or not the TLA and the forestry laws and regulations had indeed been violated. To repeat for emphasis, determination of this question is the primary responsibility of the Forest Management Bureau of the DENR. The application of the expertise of the administrative agency in the resolution of the issue raised is a condition precedent for the eventual examination, if still necessary, of the same question by a court of justice. In view of the above observations, we find that there was no need for the respondent court to declare the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605. The rule is that a question of constitutionality must be avoided where the case can be decided on some other available ground, 25 as we have done in the case before us. The resolution of this same question must await another case, where all the indispensable requisites of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question are satisfactorily established. In such an event, it will be time for the Court "to make the hammer fall, and heavily," in the words of Justice Laurel, if such action is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated July 4, 1988, and its resolution dated September 27, 1988, as well as the resolutions of the trial court dated December 11, 1987 and February 15, 1988, are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

3. Eduardo Brillantes vs. Leonardo Castro Gr. No. L-9223 June 30, 1956 Facts: On December 1, 1953, Brillantes filed a complaint against Castro before the Wage Administration Service (WAS) for the recovery of the alleged unpaid salary and overtime pay. On February 15, 1954 Brillantes and Castro entered into an Arbitration Agreement whereby they agreed 1. That they submit their case to the WAS for investigation; and 2. That they bind themselves to abide by whatever decision WAS may render over the case; and that they recognize said decision to be final and conclusive. WAS ruling: the claim for overtime and underpayment is hereby dismissed but the respondent is adjudged to pay the claimant P50.88 corresponding to his salary for services rendered in the month of November. No appeal was taken from this decision and on November 10, 1954, Brillantes filed a complaint against Castro with this Court over the same subject matter and cause of action litigated between them before and decided by the WAS. The counsel of Brillantes agreed that the decision rendered by the hearing officer of the WAS is an order issued pursuant to section 7 of Minimum Wage Law in relation section 12 which authorizes delegation by the Secretary of Labor of his powers in the administration or enforcement of the MWL to the Chief of the WAS, however he contends that the right to go to the Supreme Court for review of said order granted by section 7 of MWL is not exclusive because under said section the review by this Tribunal is limited to question of law and that the findings of fact contained in the appealed decision must be accepted. Trial Court ruling: dismissed the complaint on the ground that it is barred by prior judgment. Hence, this appeal. Issue: whether or not, the second complaint is barred by prior judgment. Held: affirmative; the SC fully agree with the decision of the trial court that the complaint is barred by prior judgment. There is no question that the complaint filed by Brillantes with the WAS may be regarded as a suit by one party as against another to enforce a right; that the WAS in entertaining said suit, hearing the parties and deciding the case acted as quasi-judicial body and the proceedings before it were quasi-judicial proceedings, and conducted in accordance with law, and so was the decision rendered. The failure of Brillantes to appeal from said decision to the SC as provided by the Minimum wage law rendered it final and conclusive and served as a bar to another action between the same parties involving the same subject matter and cause of action and the same issues. Besides, the parties signed an agreement whereby they submitted their case to the WAS, binding themselves to abide by whatever decision it would validly render. Note: the principle of res judicata is applicable to decisions of a quasi-judicial body like the WAS. In this connection, it has been declared that whatever a final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the SC, upon a writ of error or a certiorari; such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata. 3. [G.R. No. L-9223. June 30, 1956.] EDUARDO BRILLANTES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. LEONARDO CASTRO, doing business under the name and style of ALMACAS POLICE PROTECTIVE BUREAU, Defendant-Appellee. DECISION MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by Judge E. Soriano dated February 12, 1955, granting the motion to dismiss filed by the DefendantLeonardo Castro and dismissing the complaint of the Plaintiff Eduardo Brillantes. For a statement of the facts of the case we adopt that made by the trial court which we reproduce below:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary It appears that on December 1, 1953, the Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Defendantbefore the Wage Administration Service for the recovery of alleged unpaid salary and overtime pay, the said case bearing No. C-1046; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat on February 15, 1954; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythe Plaintiffand the Defendant entered into an ARBITRATION AGREEMENT whereby they agreed 1. That they submit their case to the Wage Adm inistration Service for investigation; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand 2. That they bind themselves to abide by whatever decision this Office may render on the case and that they recognize said decision to be final and conclusive; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat in accordance with the said agreement, the parties, assisted by their respective counsel, adduced evidence before the Wage Administrative Service; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat on May 31, 1954, the latter rendered a decision containing its findings and the following dispositive parts WHEREFORE, considering the evidence presented, the claim for overtime and underpayment is hereby dismissed but the Respondent is adjudged to pay to the claimant the amount of fifty pesos and eighty-eight centavos (P50.88) corresponding to his salary for services rendered in the month of November, 1953 and to deposit the same within five (5) days from receipt thereof; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat no appeal was taken from the said decision, and that on November 10, 1954, the Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Defendant with this Court over the same subject- matter and cause of action litigated between them before, and decided by, the Wage Administration Service. (pp. 22-23, Record on Appeal.) In support of its order of dismissal, the trial court made the following observations and conclusions which we quote with favor:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary It is evident that the aforesaid decision rendered by the Hearing Officer of the Wage Administration Service was pursuant to the authority granted to the Secretary of Labor to delegate any or all of his powers in the administration or enforcement of the Minimum Wage Law to the Chief of the WAS, who may act personally or through duly authorized representative Republic Act No. 602, The Minimum Wage Law, section 12(e). Section 7 of the same Act also pertinently provides that Any person aggrieved by an order of the Secretary of Labor issued under this Act may obtain a review of such order in the Supreme Court by filing in such court within fifteen (15) days after the entry and publication of such order a written petition praying that the order of the Secretary of Labor be modified or set aside in whole or in part cralaw The Jurisdiction of the Wage Administration Service to render the aforesaid decision, as well as the remedy of the aggrieved party against such a decision, is impliedly recognized by the Supreme Court in Gonzales vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor, et als., G.R. No. L- 6409, wherein it was said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The point raised by the Solicitor General on behalf of theRespondent. Secretary of Labor that Petitioners remedy is to appeal to the President of the Philippines is not well taken. Section 7 of the law creating the WAS (Rep. Act No. 602) expressly authorized any person aggrieved by an order of the Secretary of Labor to obtain a review of such order in the Supreme Court. In view of the failure of the herein Plaintiff to avail himself of the remedy marked out by said Section 7 of Republic Act No. 602 within the time therein specified, the aforesaid decision of the Wage Administration Service became final and conclusive, not only by clear implication but also by express agreement of the parties That they bind themselves to abide by whatever decision this Office (WAS) may render on the case, and that they recognize said decision to be final and conclusive. To permit the herein Plaintiff to institute the present case before this Court, after the same had been finally and conclusively decided by the Wage Administration Service, is therefore to allow him to go back on his own solemn agreement, to set at naught the provisions of Republic Act No. 602; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand to encourage duplication of work, if not conflicting judgments, by authorizing a party first to file his case with the Wage Administration Service and thereafter, in case of an adverse decision, to refile the same case with the Court of First Instance. This could not have been the legislators intention in the enactment of Republic Act No. 602. (pp. 23-24, Record on Appeal.) Attorney Manuel Y. Macias counsel for Appellant in his brief concedes that the decision rendered by the hearing officer of the WAS is an order issued pursuant to Section 7, above quoted, of the Minimum Wage Law in relation to Section 12 (a) which authorizes delegation by the Secretary of Labor of his powers in the administration or enforcement of the Minimum Wage Law to the Chief of the Wage Administrative Service. He, however, contends that the right to go to the Supreme Court for review of said order granted by Section 7 of the Minimum Wage Law is not exclusive, because according to him, under said Section 7 the review by this Tribunal is limited to questions of law and that the findings of fact contained in the appealed decision must be accepted. This is not entirely correct. The findings of fact made by the Secretary of Labor or his delegate are accepted and are

conclusive only if supported by substantial evidence. So that Plaintiff could well have appealed from the decision of the WAS to this Tribunal, even on question of fact, if he was prepared and in a position to show that the findings of fact of the WAS were not supported by substantial evidence. Then counsel forAppellant, referring to the hearing officer of the WAS and his decision, says the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Appellant cannot accept the findings of fact in the decision of the Hearing Officer of the Wage Administration Service because they are not merely contrary to the facts but a scandalous distortion of them with no other end in view but to favor Appellee, theRespondent employer. The Hearing Officer, to promote this end, callously ignored Appellants evidence. His so-called decision is a mockery of justice, and absolute nullity for which no fair minded citizen can have any respect. (p. 5, Appellants Brief.) And of Judge Soriano who dismissed Plaintiffs complaint, the same counsel comments thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The court a quo refused to perform the functions of a trial court and rendered the foregoing ruling without any evidence having been first presented pro or con. It decided an Issue in favor of one party and against the other upon the mere representations of the favored party and refused absolutely to hear the other. The court a quos act in so doing is a plain violation of the right to due process p. 8, Appellants Brief.) The above is couched in strong and disrespectful language unbecoming a lawyer who is an officer of the court, and highly improper in referring to an administrative official authorized to render decisions and especially to a Judge of the Court of First Instance. If Plaintiff-Appellant and his counsel were dissatisfied with the findings of the hearing officer of the WAS; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryif they believed that the findings were a distortion of the facts as contained in the evidence, they should have appealed from said decision to this Tribunal. And if they were really convinced that said hearing officer of the WAS deliberately distorted the facts to favor the employer, they should have prepared charges of partiality and malfeasance and lodged the same with the proper authorities for investigation. Now is neither the time nor the occasion to air said grievance, assuming for the moment that it is real and well founded. And as to the reference to the trial court, said court merely acted upon the motion to dismiss. It considered the complaint and the motion to dismiss. That was enough. There was no need for the presentation of any evidence. So, the action of the trial court was proper and warranted; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarywhich cannot be said of the comment and observations of counsel above reproduced. Said counsel is hereby admonished to use more temperate and respectful language and observe more proper conduct in the future. We fully agree with the trial court in its order dismissing the complaint on the ground that the action is barred by prior judgment. There is no question that the complaint filed by Plaintiff-Appellant with the WAS may be regarded as a suit by one party against another to enforce a right; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the WAS in entertaining said suit, hearing the parties and deciding the case acted as a quasi-judicial body and the proceedings before it were quasi-judicial proceedings, and conducted in accordance with law, and so was the decision rendered. Not only this, but the parties before the commencement of the proceedings signed an agreement whereby they submitted their case to the WAS, binding themselves by whatever decision the WAS may render on the same, and that they recognized the decision to be final and conclusive. After signing that agreement or pledge, Plaintiff- Appellant may not now be heard to say that the decision rendered by the WAS has no legal effect on him. Besides, even assuming that despite the agreement the decision did not automatically become final, still Plaintiffs failure to appeal therefrom to the Supreme Court as provided by the Minimum Wage Law (Rep. Act 602) rendered it final and conclusive and served as a bar to another action between the same parties involving the same subject matter and cause of action and the same issues. In the case of Pealosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303, 314, we held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary cralaw a judgment rendered cralaw by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits, is a bar to any future suit between the same parties or their privies upon the same cause of action so long as it remains unreserved; or in the language of Mr. Justice Field in the opi nion just cited:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose. And in the case of Tejedor held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary vs. Palet, 61 Phil. 494, 502-503, we equally

The rule is often stated in general terms that a judgment is conclusive not only upon the questions actually contested and determined, but upon all matters which might have been litigated and decided in that suit; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand this is undoubtedly true of all matters properly belonging to the subject of the controversy and within the scope of the issues cralaw . (citing 34C.J., pp. 909-911.) The authorities above cited on res adjudicata refer to decisions rendered by the courts. Are they applicable to decisions of a quasi-judicial body like the Wage Administration Service (WAS)? The answer is in the affirmative, as may be seen from the following authorities:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive, or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers. This rule has been recognized as applying to the decisions of road or highway commissioners, commissioners of motor transportation, boards of audit, county boards, tax commissioners, boards, or officers, the federal trade commission, school commissioners, police commissioners, sewers commissioners, land commissioners or officers, collector of customs, referees in bankruptcy court commissioners, boards or other tribunals administering workmens compensation acts, and other like officers and boards. However, a particular decision or determination may not be conclusive, as where it was not a judicial, as distinguished from a legislative, executive, or ministerial, determination, or the matter was not within the jurisdiction of the officer or board cralaw . (50 C.J. S., Judgments, Sec. 690, pp. 148-149). cralaw There are, however, cases in which the doctrine of res judicata has been held applicable to judicial acts of public, executive, or administrative officers and boards. In this connection, it has been declared that whenever a final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata. (30 Am. Jur., Judgments, Sec. 164, p. 910). (Italics Supplied). In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is affirmed. No costs. Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., concur. 5. G.R. No. L-56948 September 30, 1987 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Forest Development and the Director of Lands, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and MARTINA CARANTES for and in behalf of the Heirs of SALMING PIRASO, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Branch III, at La Trinidad in LRC Case No. N-287, Record No. 37205, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: It having been proven convincingly that this land was owned and possessed by the late Salming Piraso and later by his successors-in-interest, who are his children for a period of more than thirty years up to this date, they have shown to have a registerable title on the property which this Court therefore confirms and affirms in accordance with the law. Let the land so described in the technical description of the survey made of the same and in accordance with the corresponding plan be so registered. (p. 50, Rollo) On May 9, 1968, respondent Martina S. Carantes for and in behalf of the Heirs of Saying Piraso filed with the Court of Firing Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Land Registration No. N-287, covering the following describe property: A parcel of land (as shown on plan PSU-43639) situated in the Barrio of Ansagan Municipality of Tuba, Mountain Province. Bounded in the, NE., along line 1-2 by property of Sioco Carino (PSU-43643, Lot 1); on the SE., and SW., along lines 2-3-4-5 by public land, on the We, along lines 5-6-1 by property of Tunccalo. Containing an area of TWO

MILLION ONE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND SEVENTY NINE (2,197,879) SQUARE METERS. ... (p. 13, Rollo) On January 13, 1970, the Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, filed an opposition to the application for registration stating, among others: That neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to said parcel of land the same not having been acquired by them either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894; That neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the present application; That the aforementioned parcel of land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines. (pp. 13-14, Rollo) On April 7, 1970, the Director of Forestry also filed an opposition to the application for registration on the following grounds: That the whole area applied for registration is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve established under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929; That the area sought to be registered is neither release for disposition nor alienation; and that the herein applicant has no registerable title over the whole parcel of land either in fact or in law. (p. 14, Rollo) After trial, a decision was rendered by the land registration court, as earlier stated, adjudicating the parcel of land to the applicants. The motion for reconsideration filed by Government oppositor's having been denied, an appeal was made to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the land registration court. In this petition, the petitioner assigns the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals: A. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION IS NOT CAPABLE OF REGISTRATION BEING PART OF THE PUBLIC FORESTS WITHIN THE CENTRAL CORDILLERA FOREST RESERVE: B. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED POSSESSION OF THE LAND BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND THEIR PREDECESSORSINTEREST WAS NOT IN CONCEPT OF OWNER UNDER SECTION 48 of the PUBLIC LAND LAW, THE LAND BEING INALIENABLE; C. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LAND IS AGRICULTURAL BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO SUBMIT PROOF THAT THE LAND IS MORE VALUABLE FOR FOREST PURPOSES; D. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROPERTY BECAME SEGREGATED FROM THE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND ASSUMED THE CHARACTER OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP UPON APPROVAL OF ITS SURVEY PLAN BY THE DIRECTOR OF LAND IN 1925; E. ASSUMING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD POSSESSED AND CULTIVATED 10 TO 15 HECTARES OF THE LAND APPLIED FOR, RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THEY HAD ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP THRU CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OVER THE REST OF THE (219.7879) HECTARES APPLIED FOR. (p. 18, Rollo) The issues raised are: 1. Whether or not the land in question is part of the public forest within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve; and

2. Whether or not private respondents have established registerable title over the land in question. It is the stand of the petitioner that the land in question covered by the Plan-Psu-43639 is part of the public forests within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve established under Proclamation No. 217 of Governor General Henry Stimson dated February 16, 1929. On February 27, 1980, an ocular inspection of said property was made by Land Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., of the Bureau of Lands together with representatives of the Bureau of Forestry, the Land Registration Court, and the applicants for registration. During the ocular inspection, the land was found to be rolling and stony in nature. Bartolo, Jr., submitted a report on April 17, 1970 stating among others, that the land is covered with trees, bushes and grasses and being also stony is not suitable for agricultural purposes. The representative of the Bureau of Forestry, Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero, submitted to the Provincial Fiscal a separate report dated April 6, 1970 to the effect that the whole area falls within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and that the same has not been released for agricultural purposes by the Director of Forestry who had administrative jurisdiction over the same. The petitioner states that since the land in question is indubitably part of the public forest and has not been reclassified or released from the forest zone, the same can not be the subject of registration either under Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, or under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. The petitioner points out that lands within the forest zone or within a duly established reservation do not form part of the disposable portion of the public domain nor can the same be alienated as said lands are not capable of private appropriation or ownership and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert that same into private property. It is further argued by the petitioner that the private respondents or their predecessors-in-interest, Salming Piraso, had not acquired ownership over the land prior to its classification as part of the Cordillera Forest Reserve use there is no evidence on record that Salming Piraso had possessed the property for any appreciable period prior to 1929 when the land became part of the Cordillera Forest Reserve. On the other hand, the private respondents assert that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals show that the land subject of application is not within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and the same land applied for registration is disposable and alienable. The private respondents, as applicants, claim to have sufficiently shown by preponderance of evidence that the land being applied for registration had been possessed by Salming Piraso as far back as 1915 when he and his workers planted the arable portion of about 15 hectares to rice and other products and raised cows on the other portion suited for pasture. The late Salming Piraso had the land surveyed by private surveyor Jose Castro on April 3-9, 1924 as Plan Psu-43639 which was approved by the then Director of Lands, Jorge B. Vargas on March 6, 1925, while Proclamation No. 217 was promulgated only on February 16, 1929. They state that the approval of the said survey by the government thru the Director of Lands Jorge B. Vargas can only mean that said land was no longer included in the overall survey of the government as it was no longer part of the public land. As applicants, they contend that they have possessed the land applied for in concept of owner, openly and publicly, adverse against the whole world and continuously for more than thirty (30) years before they filed the application over the land which is agricultural and separate from the public domain. We find the petition to be meritorious. It is already a settled rule that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, of convert them into private property (Vano vs. Government of Philippine Islands, 41 Phil. 161; Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401; Director of Forestry vs. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183; Republic vs. De la Cruz 67 SCRA 221; Director of Lands vs. Reyes & Azurin vs. Director of Lands, 68 SCRA 177; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; and Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701) unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable by the Director of Forestry, but even then, possession of the land by the applicants prior to the reclassification of the land as disposable and alienable cannot be credited as part of the thirty-year requirement under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, supra). In this case, there is no showing of reclassification by the Director of Forestry that the land in question is disposable or alienable. This is a matter which cannot be assumed. It calls for proof. There is an erroneous assumption implicit in the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals which the government oppositors also appear to have overlooked. This is the reliance on Proclamation No. 217

of Governor General Henry L. Stimson as the operative act which converted the lands covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve into forest lands. This is wrong. The land was not non-forest or agricultural land prior to the 1929 proclamation. It did not ease a classification from non-forest into forest land because of the proclamation. The proclamation merely declared a special forest reserve out of already existing forest lands. The land was already forest or timber land even before the proclamation. The alleged entry in 1915 of Salming Piraso and the cultivation of 15 hectares out of a (219.7879) hectares claimed area has no legal significance. A person cannot enter into forest land and by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect title. The Government must first declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title. The records positively establish that the land in question is part of the public forest which the Executive formally proclaimed as the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve to further preserve its integrity and to give it a status which is more special for certain purposes than that of ordinary forest lands. One reason for the respondent court's decision finding a registerable title for the private respondents is its observation that the Government failed to show that the disputed land is more valuable for forest purposes. The court noted a failure to prove that trees are thriving in the land. The Court of Appeals finding is based on a wrong concept of what is forest land. There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a classification of lands of the public domain in the Constitution. (Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, as amended; and Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution). One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status a classification for legal purposes. The "forest land" started out as a "forest" or vast tracts of wooded land with dense growths of trees and underbush. However, the cutting down of trees and the disappearance of virgin forest and not automatically convert the lands of the public domain from forest or timber land to alienable agricultural land. As stated by this Court in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69, 75); A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classffied as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas,(56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void at initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. (at p. 75) On February 27, 1970, an ocular inspection of the questioned property was conducted by Land Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., of the Bureau of Lands, together with Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero of the Bureau of Forestry, Deputy Clerk of Court Roberto Gogoling as representative of the land registration court, Fiscal Navarro and Andres Carantes as representative of the applicant.

Land Inspector Crisogono Bartolo, Jr., submitted his report dated April 17, 1970, which states, among others, that the land is covered with trees, bushes and grasses and being stony is not suitable for agricultural purposes. This negates the claim of the private respondents that the land has been cultivated since 1915. More important, however, than the appearance of the land is its status, as stated in the separate report dated April 6, 1970 submitted to the Provincial Fiscal of Benguet Province by Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero which declares that the whole area applied for by the applicant fails within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and that the same has not been released for agricultural purposes by the Director of Forestry who has administrative jurisdiction over the same. This has not been successfully refuted. It has not been proved erroneous. Testifying in connection with the matters stated in his report, Forester Ricardo D. Zapatero stated that: Q Do you know the land in question here in this case? A I know, sir. Q In connection with your duty to inspect the lands that are subject matters of land registration cases, have you inspected this land in question also?. A Yes, I inspected it, sir. Q What is the purpose of your inspection? A The purpose of my inspection is to determine the status of the area if it falls within the reservation or within the alienable or disposable area. Q What is your finding, if any ? A My finding was that the area falls within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. Q Was that finding reduced into writing? A Yes, sir. Q I am showing to you a report found on Pages Sixty-Eight (68) of the records which for purposes of Identification, we pray that the same be marked as Exhibit "A" for the government oppositors, your Honor. COURT: As what? FISCAL BRAWNER: Rather as Exhibit "1" COURT: Have it marked. Q What is the relation of this report with that report that you made? A This is the original copy of the Report which I submitted to the Provincial Fiscal. Q There appears a signature above the typewritten name "Ricardo D. Zapatero", whose signature is that? A That is mine, sir.

Q You stated that in paragraph 3 of your report, Exhibit 1 that the land falls within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, how did you arrive at that conclusion? A Because of what I have even of the improvements of the applicant and because of the Bureau of Forestry map. Q Did you actually go to the land in question or the land applied for? A Yes, air. Q So, you actually saw this land applied for? A Yes, sir. Q What is the nature of this land applied for? A It is generally stony and the topography is level to rolling and there are certain enemies of plants inside the land, in some area. COURT: Q What are the species of plants? A There are species of Binayuyu. Q That is for lumber? A No, that is not. FISCAL BRAWNER: Q You stated in paragraph 2 of your report that the topography of the land applied for is generally stony, and because of the Binayuyu species, the condition of the land is not suited for agricultural purposes? A Yes, sir. Q What is the basis of that statement? A Because of the topography which is of solid inclination, we believe that is not good for agricultural purposes. The land applied for is more suited for pasture purposes. (pp. 203-206, tsn., September 6,1971; Emphasis supplied) The reports and testimonies of Land Inspector Bartolo and Forester Zapatero support the contention of the petitioner that the area applied for by the applicant is forest land within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. In the case of Ramos v. Director of Lands (39 Phil. 175) we have ousted: Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, Paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on Forestry matters. There is no factual basis for the conclusion of the appellate court that the property in question was no longer part of the public land when the Government through the Director of Lands approved on March 6, 1925, the survey plan (Plan Psu-43639) for Salming Piraso. The existence of a sketch plan of real property even if approved by the Bureau of Lands is no proof in itself of ownership of the land covered by the plan. (Gimeno v. Court of Appeals, 80 SCRA 623). The fact that a claimant or a possessor has a sketch plan or a survey map prepared for a parcel of land which forms part of the country's forest reserves does not convert such land into alienable land, much less private property. Assuming that a public officer erroneously approves the sketch plan, such approval is nun and void. There must first be a formal Government declaration that the forest land has been re-classified into alienable and

disposable agricultural land which may then be acquired by private persons in accordance with the various modes of acquiring public agricultural lands. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the land registration court which granted the private respondents' application for registration of the land in question is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for land registration is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. 6. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, G.R. No. 134209 Present: PUNO, J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CORONA, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ.

- versus -

Promulgated:

CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent.

January 24, 2006

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION GARCIA, J.:

Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 which affirmed an earlier decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69 inLand Registration Case No. N-25-1. The decision under review recites the factual backdrop, as follows: This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, more particularly described in the amended application filed by Celestina Naguiat on 29 December 1989 with the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, Branch 69. Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter alia, that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof. On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein petitioner]. . . filed an opposition to the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; that the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do

not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicants claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of . . .; and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation. On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued an order of general default as against the whole world, with the exception of the Office of the Solicitor General, and proceeded with the hearing of this registration case. After she had presented and formally offered her evidence . . . applicant rested her case. The Solicitor General, thru the Provincial Prosecutor, interposed no objection to the admission of the exhibits. Later . . . the Provincial Prosecutor manifest (sic) that the Government had no evidence to adduce. [3]

In a decision[4] dated September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment for herein respondent Celestina Naguiat, adjudicating unto her the parcels of land in question and decreeing the registration thereof in her name, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates the parcels of land situated in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, appearing on Plan AP-03-003447 containing an area of 3,131 square meters, appearing on Plan AP-03-003446 containing an area of 15,322 containing an area of 15,387 square meters to herein applicant Celestina T. Naguiat, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Rommel Naguiat and a resident of Angeles City, Pampanga together with all the improvements existing thereon and orders and decrees registration in her name in accordance with Act No. 496, Commonwealth Act No. 14, [should be 141] as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1529. This adjudication, however, is subject to the various easements/reservations provided for under pertinent laws, presidential decrees and/or presidential letters of instructions which should be annotated/ projected on the title to be issued. And once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be immediately issued. (Words in bracket added)

With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, petitioner Republic went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001. As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed decision of May 29, 1998, affirmed that of the trial court, to wit: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Hence, the Republics present recourse on its basic submission that the CAs decision is not in accordance with law, jurisprudence and the evidence, since respondent has not established with the required evidence her title in fee simple or imperfect title in respect of the subject lots which would warrant their registration under (P.D. 1529 or Public Land Act (C.A.) 141 . In particular, petitioner Republic faults the appellate court on its finding respecting the length of respondents occupation of the property subject of her application for registration and for not considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.

Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act of the Government so that they may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of private appropriation.[5] As to these assets, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.[6] Given this postulate, the principal issue to be addressed turns on the question of whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain. Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act[7] and the Constitution[8] classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks, do not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded land or an expanse covered by dense growth of trees and underbrush. As we stated in Heirs of Amunategui [9]A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. xxx. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. xxx Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,[10] which embodies the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. [11] All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to the State.[12] Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.[13] Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive Branch of the government and not the court.[14] Needless to stress, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant.[15] In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in question are already alienable and disposable. Wrote the appellate court: The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are lands of the public domain cannot be sustained as it is directly against the above doctrine. Said doctrine is a reaffirmation of the principle established in the earlier cases . . . that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property . (Word in bracket and underscoring added.) The principal reason for the appellate courts disposition, fin ding a registerable title for respondent, is her and her predecessor-in-interests open, continuous and exclusive occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years. Prescinding from its above assumption and finding, the appellate court went on to conclude, citing Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)[16] and Herico vs. DAR,[17] among other cases, that, upon the completion of the requisite period of possession, the lands in question cease to be public land and become private property. Director of Lands, Herico and the other cases cited by the CA are not, however, winning cards for the respondent, for the simple reason that, in said cases, the disposable and alienable nature of the

land sought to be registered was established, or, at least, not put in issue. And there lies the difference. Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for proof.[18] Aside from tax receipts, respondent submitted in evidence the survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which, needless to state, provided no information respecting the classification of the property. As the Court has held, however, these documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.[19] It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public lands has been a notorious practice resorted to in land registration cases.[20] For this reason, the Court has made it a point to stress, when appropriate, that declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the case may be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable lands need an express and positive act from the government.[21] The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessor-ininterest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is now of little moment. For, unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.[22] WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, respondents application for original registration of title in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED. 7. Amunategui vs Director of Forestry 126 SCRA 69 Facts: There were two petitions for review on certiorariquestioning the decision of the Court of Appealswhich declared the disputed property as forestl a n d , n o t s u b j e c t t o t i t l i n g i n f a v o r o f p r i v a t e persons, Borre and Amunategui. The Director of Forestry, through the ProvincialFiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming thatthe land was mangrove swamp which was stillclassified as forest land and part of the publicdomain.Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed hisopposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885c o n t a i n i n g 1 1 7 , 9 5 6 s q u a r e m e t e r s w a s concerned and prayed that title to said portionbe confirmed and registered in his name. Issue: W O N t h e l o t i n q u e s t i o n c a n b e s u b j e c t o f registration and confirmatio n o f t i t l e i n t h e name of the private person. HELD: The opposition of the Director of Forestry wasstrengthened by the appellate court's findingthat timber licenses had to be issued to certainl i c e n s e e s a n d e v e n J o s e A m u n a t e g u i h i m s e l f t o o k t h e t r o u b l e t o a s k f o r a l i c e n s e t o c u t timber within the area. It was only sometime in1 9 5 0 t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y w a s c o n v e r t e d i n t o fishpond but only after a previous warning fromthe District Forester that the same could not bed o n e b e c a u s e i t w a s c l a s s i f i e d a s " p u b l i c forest.A forested area

classified as forest land of thepublic domain does not lose such classificationsimply because loggers or settlers may havestripped it of its forest cover. "Forest lands" don o t h a v e t o b e o n mountains or in out of t h e w a y p l a c e s . S w a m p y a r e a s c o v e r e d b y mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other treesgrowing in brackish or sea water may also bec l a s s i f i e d a s f o r e s t l a n d . T h e p o s s e s s i o n o f forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripeni n t o p r i v a t e o w n e r s h i p . T h e r e f o r e , t h e l o t i n question never ceased to be classified as forestland of public domain.

8. [G.R. No. 135527. October 19, 2000]

Spouses GEMINIANO and AMPARO DE OCAMPO and Spouses PEDRO and CRISANTA SANTOS, petitioners, vs. FEDERICO ARLOS, MARY ARLOS, TEOFILO OJERIO and BELLA OJERIO, respondents. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Under the Public Land Act as amended, only titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain may be judicially confirmed. Unless a public land is reclassified and declared as such, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long ago, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. A suit for the reversion of such property to the State may be instituted only by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the August 28, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 52048, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:[2] ACCORDINGLY, for want of merit, the appeal is DENIED and the challenged Decision dated 26 November 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Balanga, Bataan, is AFFIRMED. No costs. The affirmed Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled on the following: (1) Land Registration Case No. N-340, filed in 1977 for confirmation of respondents title to three parcels of land; and (2) Civil Case No. 4739, filed in 1981 for cancellation of petitioners Sales Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title covering two of the said lots. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:[4] ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered: I. In Civil Case No. 4739 1. Ordering the cancellation of Sales Patent Nos. 5387 and 5388 as well as Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-43298 and T-44205 in the names of [herein petitioner-]spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo and x x x Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos. 2. Taking judicial cognizance of the decision in Civil Case No. 3769, which ordered the cancellation of Free Patent Nos. 522697 and 502977 as well as Original Certificate of Title Nos. 296 and 297, which decision has already become final and executory; 3. Ordering [Petitioners] Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo and x x x Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs attorneys fees in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and the costs of suit. II. In Land Registration Case No. N-340 -

1. Confirming [herein respondents] title [to] the land subject of registration and ordering the registration thereof in the names of [Respondent] Teofilo D. Ojerio, of legal age, Filipino, married to Bella V. Ojerio and a resident of Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan - share; and Cecilia P. Arlos, Jose P. Arlos, Gloria P. Arlos, Luisito P. Arlos, all of legal age, Filipinos, single and residents of 500-A, Fifth Avenue corner Baltazar Street, Grace Park, Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and Alberto U. Arlos, minor, Filipino, and a resident of 500-A, Fifth Avenue corner Baltazar Street, Grace Park, Caloocan City, Metro Manila - share; and 2. As soon as this decision becomes final and executory, let an order for the issuance of the corresponding decrees be issued. SO ORDERED.
The Facts

The undisputed facts are quoted by the CA from the RTC judgment, as follows:[5] On 14 April 1977, Federico S. Arlos and Teofilo D. Ojerio filed an application for registration, docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-340, wherein they seek judicial confirmation of their titles [to] three parcels of land, namely: (1) a parcel of land covered by SGS 4140 [PLAN] with an area of 226,105 square meters; (2) a parcel of land identified as Lot 1, SGS 41241 [PLAN] with an area of 111,333 square meters; and (3) a parcel of land identified as Lot 2, SGS 4141 [PLAN] with an area of 63,811 square meters, all located at Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan, and having a total area of 401,159 square meters or 40.1159 hectares. Spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo De Ocampo and spouses Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos opposed the application for registration, alleging that they are the co-owners of Lots 1 and 2 of Plan SGS 3062, situated at Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan, and their ownership is evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-43298 and T-44205, and that they became owners of said lots by purchase from the government through sales patents. The Republic of the Philippines also opposed the application, contending that neither t he applicants nor their predecessors-in-interests have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that the parcels of land applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation. Spouses Placido Manalo and Rufina Enriquez and spouses Armando Manalo and Jovita Baron also opposed the application for registration. Almost four years after the filing of the land registration case or, to be exact, on 20 February 1981, applicant Arlos and his spouse, Mary Alcantara Arlos, and applicant Ojerio and his spouse Bella V. Ojerio, filed Civil Case No. 4739, seeking to cancel; (1) the free patent title of defendants-spouses Placido Manalo and Rufina Enriquez, that is, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 296-Bataan, covering Lot, 1, Plan F-(III-4) 508-D with an area of 155,772 square meters, and Lot 2, same plan, containing an area of 43,089 square meters, or a total area of 198,861 square meters or 19.8861 hectares; (2) the free patent title of defendants Armando Manalo and Jovito Baron, that is, OCT No. 297-Bataan, covering Lot, 1, F-(III-4) 510-D with an area of 72,065 square meters or 7.2065 hectares; and (3) the sales patent title of defendants-spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo and defendants-spouses Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos, that is, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-44205-Bataan with an area of 225,011 square meters or 22.5011 hectares, and T-43298-Bataan with an area of 111,333 square meters or 11.1333 hectares. In the Order dated 31 July 1991 of the RTC, Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan, Civil Case No. 4739 which was then assigned to said Branch was ordered consolidated with the land registration cases assigned to Branch 2. Of relevance to this case on appeal is the Decision of the Supreme Court dated 26 April 1989 in G.R. 64753 involving Civil Case No. 3769 entitled Spouses de Ocampo et al. v. Manalo, et al. which annulled the free patent titles of the spouses Manalo and declared as valid the sales patent title issued

in favor of the spouses De Ocampo and spouses Santos involving the same properties subject of this appeal.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Affirming the factual findings of the trial court, the CA ruled that petitioners had failed to comply with the Public Land Act, which required sales patent applicants to be the actual occupants and cultivators of the land. It held that the testimonies of petitioners, which were incongruous with reality, bolstered the finding that [they had] never occupied, cultivated or made improvements on the property. It explained: On the basis of its own findings, the trial court, after evaluating the evidence presented, concluded that [herein respondents] and their predecessors-in-interest were in actual possession of the subject lands in 1947 and continuously up to the present. In contrast, the checkered testimonies of [petitioners] reveal that they have never been in possession of the lands. And because of the absence of the actual occupancy on their part, the sales patents and titles issued in their favor are null and void citing therein the ruling in Republic v. Mina (114 SCRA 946) that the alleged misrepresentation of the applicant that he had been occupying and cultivating the land are sufficient grounds to nullify the patent and title under Section 9 of the Public Land Laws. On this particular note, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. x x x.[6] Debunking petitioners reliance on Manalo v. IAC and de Ocampo,[7] the CA ratiocinated as follows: [Herein respondents] do not challenge the Decision of the High Court dated 26 April 1989 in GR No. 64753 which annulled the free patent titles of defendants-appellants Manalos and granted the issuance of sales patent titles of [Petitioners] De Ocampos and Santoses. What is being disputed is that the issuance of the sales patents of the subject property in favor of the Santoses and the De Ocampos was allegedly tainted by fraud and misrepresentation on their part by misrepresenting themselves to be actual occupants of the subject properties when in fact the subject properties were being actually occupied by the [respondents] since 1947 way back when the land still formed part of the military reservation and further on when it was declared to be public agricultural land. x x x.[8] Hence, this Petition.[9]
The Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:[10] I Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in disregarding the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 64753 entitled, Placido Manalo, et al. vs. Spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo, et al., wherein the validity and legality of petitioners TCT No. T -44205 and TCT No. T-43298 [pertaining to] the land in dispute were upheld. II Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ordering the cancellation o f petitioners Sales Patent as well as TCT Nos. T-43298 and T-44205 considering that private respondents are not the proper party to institute the action for annulment of petitioners titles [to] the lots. III Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ruling that petitioners committed an act of misrepresentation in their Application for Sales Patent. IV

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ordering petitioners to pay private respondents the amount of P50,000.00 representing attorneys fees. In short, petitioners ask this Court to determine the propriety of (1) the registration of respondents title under the Public Land Act and (2) the cancellation of petitioners Sales Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs).
The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:Registration of Respondents Title

Respondents application for registration of title to the three parcels of land that were once part of the public domain is governed by the Public Land Act,[11] the pertinent portion of which reads: SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxxxxxxxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under abona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. x x x x x x x x x Respondents claim that they purchased the subject lots in 1967 from Bernardo and Arsenio Obdin,[12] who in turn had been in possession of the property since 1947. Hence, when the former filed their application for registration in 1977, they and their predecessors-in-interest had been occupying and cultivating, in the concept of owners, the said parcels of land for at least 30 years, as required by the Public Land Act. We are not convinced. First, a title may be judicially confirmed under Section 48 of the Public Land Act only if it pertains to alienable lands of the public domain.[13] Unless such assets are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 1073[14] clarified Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by specifically declaring that the latter applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.[15] In the present case, the disputed land which was formerly a part of a US military reservation that had been turned over to the Philippine government in 1965, was declared disposable and alienable only in 1971. In Manalo v. IAC and de Ocampo,[16] a suit involving the same parcel of land and instituted by herein petitioners against other claimants, the Court held: As correctly pointed out by the appellate court in its questioned decision: x x x. It is not correct to say that when the U.S. Military Reservation in Bataan, of which the land in question forms part, was turned over to the Philippine government, the same automatically became a disposable land of the public domain. The ownership and control over said reservation was transferred to the Philippine government, but its nature as a military reservation remained unchanged. Said parcels of land became a disposable land of public domain only on May 19, 1971, per certification of the Bureau of Forestry (Project No. 4-A, C-C. Map No 26-40). Its disposition only by sale was duly authorized pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 274. If the land in question became immediately disposable upon its turn over to the Philippine government in 1965, then why, it may be

asked, was it certified disposable only in 1971. This Court is of the conclusion that this land above referred to continued to be a military reservation land while in the custody of the Philippine government until it was certified alienable in 1971. (Emphasis supplied.) Second, respondents and their predecessors-in-interest could not have occupied the subject property from 1947 until 1971 when the land was declared alienable and disposable, because it was a military reservation at the time. Hence, it was not subject to occupation, entry or settlement. This is clear from Sections 83 and 88 of the Public Land Act, which provide as follows: SEC. 83. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, the President may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, in accordance with regulations prescribed for this purpose, or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public interest requires it, including reservations for highways, rights of way for railroads, hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems, communal pastures or leguas comunales, public parks, public quarries, public fishponds, working-men's village and other improvements for the public benefit. SEC. 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of section eighty-three shall be nonalienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared under the provision of this Act or by proclamation of the President. (Emphasis supplied.) Verily, in Manalo, the Court debunked therein petitioners similar argument that they had been occupying the property since 1944. It ruled in this wise: The big tract of land in Mariveles, Bataan to which the parcels of land involved in the case belong was formerly a portion of the US Military Reservation in Mariveles, Bataan which was turned over to the Philippine Government only on December 22, 1965 (Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals et al., No. L-39473, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 648). Under the situation, the Court seriously doubts whether Placido Mapa and their predecessors-in-interest could have been in possession of the land since 1944 as they claimed: Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired (Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., No. 14912, September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 146). We reiterate that the land was declared alienable only in 1971; hence, respondents have not satisfied the thirty-year requirement under the Public Land Act. Moreover, they could not have occupied the property for thirty years, because it formed part of a military reservation. Clearly then, their application for the registration of their titles was erroneously granted by the appellate and the trial courts.
Second Issue: Cancellation of Petitioners Titles

Petitioners claim that their titles can no longer be challenged, because it is a rule that the Torrens Title issued on the basis of a free patent becomes indefeasible as one which was judicially secured upon registration upon expiration of one year from date of issuance of patent.[17] Petitioners further contend that the action for the cancellation of their Sales Patents and TCTs should have been initiated by the solicitor general, not by herein respondents, pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act, which we quote: SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondents argue, however, that the present proceedings are not for reversion, but for reconveyance. Hence, they have the personality to file the present suit. We are not persuaded by respondents argument. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. That is what reconveyance is all about.[18]

Reconveyance, however, is not available to respondents, because they have not shown a title better than that of petitioners. As earlier shown, the former have not proven any title that may be judicially confirmed. Moreover, respondents invocation of Heirs of Nagano v. CA[19] must be rejected. In that case, the Court noted that the allegations in the Complaint, which were deemed admitted for the purpose of resolving the Motion to Dismiss, were an assertion that the lot is private land, or that even assuming it was part of the public domain, private respondents had already acquired imperfect title thereto under Section 48 (b) of CA No. 141 x x x. Hence, the Court ruled that respondents, not the OSG, were the proper parties to file the suit. In the present case, we reiterate that respondents failed to show entitlement to the land. They have not established that they are the rightful owners of the property; or at least, that they, not petitioners, have a better right thereto. Respondents vigorously contend that the Sales Patents were fraudulently obtained by petitioners, who have allegedly failed to prove the requisite actual occupation of the land in question. The former cite several portions of the transcript of stenographic notes, showing that the latter have not actually occupied or cultivated the property. The Court, however, finds that a ruling on the veracity of these factual averments would be improper in this Decision. If petitioners Sales Patents and TCTs were in fact fraudulently obtained, the suit to recover the disputed property should be filed by the State through the Office of the Solicitor General. Since petitioners titles originated from a grant by the government, their cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.[20] At the risk of being repetitive, we stress that respondents have no personality to recover the property, because they have not shown that they are the rightful owners thereof. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court are REVERSED. No pronouncement as to costs. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General for a possible review, in its sound discretion, of the issuance of the Sales Patents and Certificates of Titles in the name of herein petitioners. SO ORDERED. 9. G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989 THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner vs. RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent. The Solicitor General for petitioner. Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pena & Marcos for respondents.

CRUZ, J.: The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares, as they are commonly known. If they are part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under the Constitution. If they are considered public agricultural lands, they may be acquired under private ownership. The private respondent's claim to the land in question must be judged by these criteria. The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First Instance. of Capiz. 1 The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 2 The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed.

It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the land is mangrove land. There is no dispute as to this. The bone of contention between the parties is the legal nature of mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner claims, it is forestal and therefore not disposable and the private respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The issue before us is legal, not factual. For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the earlier American organic acts in the country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and timber or forest lands. This classification was maintained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, promulgated in 1935, until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That new charter expanded the classification of public lands to include industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, and grazing lands and even permitted the legislature to provide for other categories. 3 This provision has been reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in the present Constitution. 4 Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force when this case arose, only agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated. 5 Their disposition was provided for under C.A. No. 141. Mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to private ownership unless they were first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation. In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government, 6 promulgated in 1909, mangrove swamps or manglareswere defined by the Court as: ... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grows various kindred plants which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate there. These constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exist naturally, but which are also, to some extent cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that they cannot be so regarded in the sense in which that term is used in the cases cited or in general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not available for purpose of navigation, and they may be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains. xxx Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law, the custom had grown of converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which became a common feature of settlement along the coast and at the same time of the change of sovereignty constituted one of the most productive industries of the Islands, the abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and prove a public disaster. Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so susceptible of private ownership. Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared, despite the above-cited case, that mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative Code of 1917, which became effective on October 1 of that year, thus: Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character. It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court maintained the doctrine in the Montano case when two years later it held in the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry: 7 ...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish translation of that Act (Act of Congress) as terrenos forestales. We think there is an error in this translation and that a better translation would be 'terrenos madereros.' Lumber land in English means land with trees growing on it. The mangler plant would never be called a tree in English but a bush, and land which has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it cannot be called 'timber land. xxx xxx xxx

The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa swamps does not change the general character of the land from manglare to timber land. More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section 1820, the Court declared: 'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this Court said that the phrase agricultural lands as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July 1st 1902, classifies the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands. The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment. These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court should have considered them agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands, then the rights of appellants are fully established by Act No. 926. The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera v. Obias, 8 promulgated on March 4, 1933, more than fifteen years after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917. Justice Ostrand declared for a unanimous Court: The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land covered by the application there are mangrove lands as shown in his opponent's Exh. 1, but we think this opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in the Act of Congress. No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on the cases of Montano and Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of Forestry, 9 with Justice Fernando declaring that the mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in nature. The decision even quoted with approval the statement of the trial court that: ... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees are small and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of commercial value as lumber do not convert the land into public land. Such lands are not forest in character. They do not form part of the public domain. Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10 the Court, citing Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 11 reiterated the ruling in the Mapa case that "all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands. But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a line of decisions holding the contrary view. In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 12 promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled "that the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest lands. Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, it held, again through Justice Gutierrez:
13

the Court was more positive when

The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.' Although conceding that 'mangrove swamp' is included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of the said Code as first, second and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove

swamp, is still subject to land registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private persons for many years, and therefore, said land was already 'private land' better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification. The petition is without merit. A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested lands' do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classsified as 'forest' is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply.' The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 14 where this Court agreed with the Solicitor General's submission that the land in dispute, which he described as "swamp mangrove or forestal land," were not private properties and so not registerable. This case was decided only twelve days after the De Porkan case. Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a need for a categorical pronouncement that should resolve once and for all the question of whether mangrove swamps are agricultural lands or forest lands. The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the legislature, which has the authority to implement the constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public domain (and is now even permitted to provide for more categories of public lands). The legislature having made such implementation, the executive officials may then, in the discharge of their own role, administer our public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed' and in accordance with the policy prescribed. For their part, the courts will step into the picture if the rules laid down by the legislature are challenged or, assuming they are valid, it is claimed that they are not being correctly observed by the executive. Thus do the three departments, coordinating with each other, pursue and achieve the objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and utilization of our natural resources. In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the Philippines the function of making periodic classifications of public lands, thus: Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into: (a) Alienable or disposable, (b) Lumber, and (c) Mineral lands, and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition. Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act. With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same law provides:

For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows: (a) Agricultural; (b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and (d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses. The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time make the classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another. As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as follows: Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of same. - Upon there commendation of the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the Department Head, the President of the Philippines may set apart forest reserves from the public lands and he shall by proclamation declare the establishment of such reserves and the boundaries thereof, and thereafter such forest reserves shall not be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall remain as such for forest uses, and shall be administered in the same manner as public forest. The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter or modify the boundaries of any forest reserve from time to time, or revoke any such proclamation, and upon such revocation such forest reserve shall be and become part of the public lands as though such proclamation had never been made. Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. - Lands in public forest, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands. With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion: Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive department. More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected. We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. That determination having been made and no cogent argument having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it. And so we shall. Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural lands should be understood as covering only those lands over which ownership had already vested before the Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively legislated as forest lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired property right protected by the due process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 15 where the possession of the land in dispute commenced as early as 1909, before it was much later classified as timberland. It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could therefore not be the subject of the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private respondent in support of his application

for registration. To be so, it had first to be released as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code. The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the Director of Lands, 16 to prove that the land is registerable. It should be plain, however, that the mere existence of such a plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly in officious. The Director of Lands was not authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who has the authority to determine whether forest land is more valuable for agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for private ownership. Thus we held in the Yngson case: It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of utilization. The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or timber land and not released for fishery or other purposes. The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus: It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registerable. The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence until after the forest land has been declared alienable and disposable. Possession of forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it into private property.' We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in nature, the proof the private respondent offers of prescriptive possession thereof is remarkably meager and of dubious persuasiveness. The record contains no convincing evidence of the existence of the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the original transferor of the property, let alone the fact that the conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it been shown that the informacion posesoria has been inscribed or registered in the registry of property and that the land has been under the actual and adverse possession of the private respondent for twenty years as required by the Spanish Mortgage Law. 17 These matters are not presumed but must be established with definite proof, which is lacking in this case. Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were practically the only basis used by the appellate court in sustaining his claim of possession over the land in question. Tax declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and much less vest ownership in favor of the declarant, as we have held in countless cases. 18 We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his right to the registration of the subject land in his name. Accordingly, the petition must be granted. It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now, mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for registration of title of private respondent is DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED. 10. G.R. No. L-46048 November 29, 1988

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, as represented by the DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY (now Director of Forest Development), petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MIGUEL MARCELO, CELIA ZURBITO, HEIRS OF JOSE ZURBITO, namely, SOLEDAD VDA. DE ZURBITO, GASPAR, GUADALUPE, ADELAIDA, FELIPE, JOSE and CECILIO, all surnamed ZURBITO, respondents. The Solicitor General for petitioner. Antonio P. Fortuno for respondents Miguel Marcelo and Celia Zurbito. Melquides Paredes for respondent Heirs of Jose Zurbito. Eduardo M. Marcaida, Jr. for respondent Soledad B. Vda. de Zurbito.

REGALADO, J.: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 49640R 2 which affirmed, with modifications, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Masbate in Land Registration Case No. N-9419, LRC Record No. N-9414, thereof. The proceedings in the court a quo started on February 8, 1955 when herein private respondent Miguel Marcelo filed an application for the registration of two (2) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 116.8441 hectares, situated in Sitio Calulod Barrio Pauwa Masbate, Masbate. 3 Oppositions were filed by the Government and private parties. The opposition of the Director of Forestry (now Forest Development), which is the one involved in the present recourse, was based on the ground that the 22 hectares of the aggregate area of the two parcels of land applied for form part of Timberland Block F, Land Classification Project No. 3, L.C. Map No. 452, Masbate, Masbate, certified on December 22, 1924. 4 The antecedent facts, as found by the trial court and quoted with approval by the respondent court, are as follows: The evidence of the herein applicant disclosed that from 1909 and during the conjugal union of the spouses Jose Zurbito and Soledad Zurbito, they commenced to purchase small parcels of land from various owners adjoining the 30 hectares of land located in Calulod Pauwa (sic), Masbate, which Jose Zurbito inherited from his parents. The land thus acquired by the spouses comprises the two parcels of land which (the spouses) described in Plan Psu-104631. The parcels of land which the spouses bought have (sic) fruit-bearing coconut trees at the time they were purchased, some of which are estimated to be one year old. Jose Zurbito, however, continued to plant more coconut trees and there are now no less than 10,000 trees on the land. A small area outside of the coconut plantations is devoted to pasture and the marshy portion not covered by nipa palms has been converted into a fishpond. The spouses occupied and cultivated these properties and their possession was peaceful, adverse, public, open, and in the concept of owners. Upon the death of Jose Zurbito on June 22, 1955 (sic), his wife Soledad Buencamino Zurbito and his children succeeded to his estate and continued his possession. The estate of Jose Zurbito was placed under administratix (sic) thereof. On April 13, 1943, Soledad vda. de Zurbito sold, under a deed of absolute sale, her rights, title, interest and participation in the parcels of land subject of this registration proceedings in favor of the herein applicant, Dr. Miguel Marcelo, who is also her son-inlaw, for and in consideration of the sum of P10,000.00 (Exhibit H). Then on October 24, 1944, Soledad vda. de Zurbito, as administratix of the estate of the deceased Jose Zurbito and in behalf of her children, Engracia, Gaspar and Felipe, co-signed with her other children, namely, Guadalupe, Adelaide, Jose and Celia, a deed of sale with a right to repurchase wherein they sold to Miguel Marcelo for and in consideration of the sum of P12,000.00 the remaining one-half undivided portion of the properties mentioned in the previous deed of sale. Under the provisions of the aforementioned deed, the vendors were given the option to repurchase the properties within five years from the date thereof

(October 24, 1944) extendible for another period of one year at the option of vendors. It is further stipulated that upon failure of the vendors to redeem the properties, within the alloted (sic) time, title shall automatically vest in the vendee, Dr. Miguel Marcelo. inasmuch as the properties were already covered by another pacto de retro sale in favor of one Adela Romero, part of the consideration of the sale was paid to the said Adela Romero in order to redeem the properties from her. When the vendors-a-retro failed to repurchase the properties within the period agreed upon, Dr. Marcelo consolidated ownership of the properties by executing and registering in 1954 an affidavit of consolidation dated December 2,1953 in the office of the Register of Deeds of Masbate (Exhibits M, M-1 and M-2).<re||an1w> The evidence of the applicant shows that after Dr. Marcelo consolidated ownership of the properties in 1954 and paid the delinquent taxes in the sum of P2,691.21, he allowed his mother-in-law, Soledad vda. de Zurbito, to continue managing the properties because he and his wife are living in Manila where he is engaged in the practice of medicine. Soledad vda. de Zurbito attended to the affairs of the hacienda, paid the taxes due thereon, deducted from the income whatever expenses she might have incurred including her subsistence and remitted to Dr. Marcelo in Manila the excess, if any. This arrangement was made in consideration of the personal relationship between the applicant and Soledad vda. de Zurbito. 5 With respect to the opposition of the Government, said decision states, inter alia: The Director of Lands did not adduce evidence to show that the land is part of the public domain and left to the applicant the burden of proving that in the absence of any form of grant from the state, he acquired an imperfect or incomplete title thereto, and has all the qualifications and perfumed (sic) all the conditions prescribed by law to justify the registration of the land in his name. The Opposition of the Director of Forestry is centered on the claim that approximately 22 hectares of the land is within the forest zone indicated in the sketch (Exhibit 22government) as Exh. 22-B. In his report, Forester Anacleto B. Espinas stated that the area is a portion of Block F, Timber Land, Land Classification project No. 3, Masbate, Masbate, certified on December 22, 1924, L.C. Map No. 452. Inside this portion is a fishpond containing an area of 15 hectares covered by fishpond lease agreement of Leocadio Guzon with the Bureau of Fisheries. After the expiration of the fishpond permit granted to Leocadio Guzon, the Director of Lands refused to approve the private land survey of the fishpond as a prerequisite to the renewal of the lease agreement with the Bureau of Fisheries on the ground that the land in question is under litigation. The authentic document evidencing the classification of the land applied for registration as a forest zone has (sic) been presented. Neither the order setting aside the said portion as timber land by the Director of Forestry nor the original plan nor a certified copy thereof showing the segregation from which the sketch (Exhibit 22-government) has been traced or copied, was introduced. Without these proofs, the testimony alone of a forester will not be considered sufficient and convincing for the Court to adjudge the area in question as timber land (Director of Lands vs. Abaldonado CA G.R. No. 177-R; 45 O.G. 2128). It has been held that this will not convert ipso facto the land into a forest land. (vigor vs. Director of Lands, CA-G.R. No. 24582- R, October 21, 196 ; 57 O.G. 5888). ... 6 After trial, the Court a quo promulgated its decision the decretal portion whereof provides: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: Confirming and ordering the registration of the title over the property described in Plan Psu-104631 (Exhibit A) and its technical descriptions (Exhibits B and C) in the name of Miguel Marcelo, married to Celia Zurbito, Filipino, of legal age and residing at 687 General Geronimo, Sampaloc, Manila. Once this decision becomes final and executory, let a decree of confirmation be issued in favor of the applicant. 7 The Director of Forestry (now Director of Forest Development) and the Heirs of Jose Zurbito, as oppositors, appealed the aforequoted decision to respondent Court of Appeals.

On January 26, 1977, respondent court rendered judgment declaring the applicant and the private oppositors, now the private respondents herein, as co-owners, in stated shares, of the entire property involved. A motion for reconsideration filed by oppositor-appellant Director of Forestry was denied. Hence, this petition. The decisive issue for resolution is whether the 22 hectares area which forms part of the land applied for registration by and decreed in favor of herein private respondents is disposable agricultural land. Petitioner relies mainly upon the testimony of District Forester Anacleto Espinas who submitted a report that the land in dispute is within a forestal zone and cannot, therefore, be awarded to private respondents in land registration proceedings. A careful perusal of his testimony, 8 however, reveals that, insofar as relevant to this issue, said witness merely Identified and described the condition of the area claimed by the Government and verified the location thereof as stated in Plan Psu-104631 which, as heretofore stated, is covered by Land Classification Project No. 3 under LC Map No. 452, Masbate, Masbate, certified on December 22, 1924. 9 As correctly observed by the trial court, supra, no authentic document evidencing the classification of the land applied for registration as a forest zone was ever presented by the oppositor Director of Forestry. Furthermore, said forester admitted that the subject area is planted with fruit-bearing coconut trees and nipa palms, and that it is only partly covered by mangroves. 10 Petitioner would, however, insist that since the contested area has manglares or mangrove swamps, then, pursuant to Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, such swamplands with nipa and mangrove growth are distinctly classified as forestal areas. It has, however, been held that said statutory provision does not warrant the conclusion sought to be drawn therefrom, thus: ... For instance, section 1820 of the administrative Code of 1917 provides: "For the purpose of this chapter, "public forest" includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character. This definition of public forest", it will be noted, is merely "for the purpose of this chapter". A little further on, section 1827 provides: "Lands in public forests, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands. ..." xxx xxx xxx Either way we look at this question we encounter difficulty. Indubitably, there should be conservation of the natural resources of the Philippines. x x x On the other hand, the presumption should be, in lieu of contrary proof, that land is agricultural in nature. One very apparent reason is that it is for the good of the Philippine Islands to have the large public domain come under private ownership. Such is the natural attitude of the sagacious citizen. If in this instance, we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it be noted that the Government, in the long run of cases, has its remedy. Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the Government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes. Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence, will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant. 11 Furthermore, in Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera vs. Obias, et. al., 12 in disposing of the opposition of the Director of Forestry to an application for land registration, it was explicity held that:

This opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that in the land covered by the application there are mangrove lands as shown in this opponent's Exhibit 1, but we think this opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in the Act of Congress (Montano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 572; and Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560). It is not disputed that the aforesaid Land Classification Project No. 3, classifying the 22-hectare area as timberland, was certified by the Director of Lands only on December 22, 1924, whereas the possession thereof by private respondents and their predecessor-in-interest commenced as early as 1909. While the Government has the right to classify portions of Public land, the primary right of a private individual who Possessed and cultivated the land in good faith much prior to such classification must be recognized and should not be prejudiced by after-events which could not have been anticipated. Thus, We have held that the Government, in the first instance may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. 13 On the matter of classification of the land into either agricultural or forestal area, petitioner's invocation of Section 1838 of the Revised Administrative Code is not in point since said provision is merely a general conferment of authority and administrative control on the Director of Forestry to lease or grant to qualified persons, under the conditions therein stated, permits for the use of forest lands or vacant non-agricultural public lands. However, as to whether the particular land in question is forestry or any other class of land is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. 14 Regarding the contention that the controverted lot has been the subject of a fishpond lease agreement between the Bureau of Fisheries and one of the private respondents and is, therefore, incapable of registration, even under considerations of only the res inter alios rule the act of that party cannot bind the applicant in the land registration proceeding. Furthermore, the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer or dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain until such lands have been released for fishery or other purposes. 15 WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento JJ., concur. 11. G.R. No. L-36847 July 20, 1983 SERAFIN B. YNGSON, plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES, ANITA V. DE GONZALES and JOSE M. LOPEZ, defendants-appellees.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental which upheld the orders of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the President regarding the disposition of swamplands for conversion into fishponds. Originally taken to the Court of Appeals, the case was elevated to this Court on a finding that only a pure question of law was involved in the appeal. There is no dispute over the facts. The Court of Appeals adopted the statement of facts in the Solicitor-General's brief. We do the same: The subject matter of the case at bar are the same mangrove swamps with an area of about 66 hectares, more or less, situated in sitio Urbaso, barrio Mabini, municipality of Escalante, province of the Negros Occidental. In view of the potentialities and possibilities of said area for fishpond purposes, several persons filed their applications with the Bureau of Fisheries, to utilize the same for said purposes. The first applicant was Teofila Longno de Ligasan who filed her application on January 14, 1946, followed

by Custodio Doromal who filed his on October 28, 1947. Both applications were rejected, however, because said area were then still considered as communal forest and therefore not yet available for fishpond purposes. On March 19, 1952, petitioner-appellant Serafin B. Yngson filed a similar application for fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries followed by those of the respondentsappellees, Anita de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez, who filed their respective applications with the same bureau on March 19 and April 24, 1953. When the applications were filed by the aforesaid parties in the instant case, said area was not yet available for fishpond purposes and the same was only released for said purpose on January 14, 1954. The conflicting claims of the aforesaid parties were brought to the attention of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries who issued an order on April 10, 1954 awarding the whole area in favor of the petitioner-appellant and rejecting the claims of the respondents-appellees (pp. 1-3, Rec. on Appeal). Appellants Anita V. de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez appealed the order of the Director of Fisheries to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources where their appeals were docketed as D.A.N.R. Cases Nos. 901 and 901-A (p. 3, Rec. on Appeal). In an order dated April 5, 1955, the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources set aside the order of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and caused the division of the area in question into three portions giving each party an area of one-third (1/3) of the whole area covered by their respective applications (pp. 4-5, Rec. on Appeal). Appellant filed a petition for review dated July 6, 1955 from the aforesaid order of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources but the same was dismissed by the Office of the President of the Philippines on December 20, 1955 (pp. 5-8, Rec. on Appeal). A motion for reconsideration filed by the appellant on February 15, 1956 was likewise denied on August 3, 1956. A second and third motion for reconsiderations filed by the appellant was also denied on August 5, 1958 and October 26, 1960, respectively (p. 18, Rec. on Appeal). Not satisfied with one-third of the 66 hectares, Mr. Yngson filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of First Instance against the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Anita V. Gonzales, and Jose M. Lopez. The petitioner-appellant asked that the orders of the public respondents be declared null and void and that the order of the Director of Fisheries awarding the entire area to him be reinstated. The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the petition on the ground that plaintiff had not established such "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment" on the part of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the President of the Philippines as to constitute grave abuse of discretion justifying review by the courts in a special civil action. The plaintiff-appellant made the following assignments of errors: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED SUCH 'CAPRICIOUS AND WHIMSICAL EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANTS- APPELLEES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AS TO CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, JUSTIFYING REVIEW THEREOF IN A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION BY THE COURT. II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RULE OF THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES IN EFFECT ITSELF HOLDING THAT THE 'PRIORITY RULE' ESTABLISHED IN PARAGRAPHS (a) AND (d), SECTION 14, FISHERY ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 14 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO FISHPOND APPLICATIONS FILED PRIOR TO THE CERTIFICATION OF THE BUREAU OF FORESTRY THAT THE AREA APPLIED FOR IS AVAILABLE FOR FISHPOND PURPOSES; IN TREATING THE APPLICATIONS OF THE APPELLANT AND THAT OF THE APPELLEES LOPEZ AND GONZALES ON EQUAL FOOTING

ONLY AND IN ORDERING THE DIVISION OF THE AREA INVOLVED IN THESE APPLICATIONS INTO THREE EQUAL PARTS AWARDING ONE-THIRD SHARE EACH TO THESE APPLICANTS. III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT. Did the administrative agencies having jurisdiction over leases of public lands for development into fishponds gravely abuse their discretion in interpreting and applying their own rules? This is the only issue in this case. The pertinent provisions of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 14 read: SEC. 14. Priority Right of Application-In determining the priority of application or right to a permit or lease the following rules shall be observed: (a) When two or more applications are filed for the same area, which is unoccupied and unimproved, the first applicant shall have the right of preference thereto. xxx xxx xxx (d) A holder of fishpond application which has been rejected or cancelled by the Director of Fisheries by reason of the fact that the area covered thereby has been certified by the Director of Forestry as not available for fishpond purposes, SHALL NOT LOSE his right as a PRIOR APPLICANT therefore, if LATER ON, the area applied for is certified by the Director of Forestry as available for fishpond purposes, provided that not more than one (1) year has expired since the rejection or cancellation of his application, in which case, his fishpond application which was rejected or cancelled before, shall be reinstated and given due course, and all other fishpond applications filed for the same area shall be rejected. The five applicants for the 66 hectares of swampland filed their applications on the following dates: 1. Teofila L. de Ligasan January 14, 1946. 2. Custodio Doromal October 28, 1947 3. Serafin B. Yngson March 19, 1952 4. Anita V. Gonzales March 19, 1953 5. Jose M. Lopez April 24, 1953 The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond purposes only on January 14, 1954. It is clear, therefore, that all five applications were filed prematurely. There was no land available for lease permits and c nversion into fishponds at the time all five applicants filed their applications. After the area was opened for development, the Director of Fisheries inexplicably gave due course to Yngzon's application and rejected those of Anita V. Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez. The reason given was Yngzon's priority of application. We see no error in the decision of the lower court. The administrative authorities committed no grave abuse of discretion. It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases, and other modes of utilization. (Mapa v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175; Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil. 10; Vda. de Alfafara v. Mapa, 95 Phil. 125; Director of Forestry v. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1184).

The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released for fishery or other purposes. All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can claim to have a preferential right over another. The priority given in paragraph "d" of Section 14 is only for those applications filed so close in time to the actual opening of the swampland for disposition and utilization, within a period of one year, as to be given some kind of administrative preferential treatment. Whether or not the administrative agencies could validly issue such an administrative order is not challenged in this case. The validity of paragraph "d" is not in issue because petitioner-appellant Yngson is clearly not covered by the provision. His application was filed almost two years before the release of the area for fishpond purposes. The private respondents, who filed their applications within the one-year period, do not object to sharing the area with the petitioner-appellant, in spite of the fact that the latter has apparently the least right to the fishpond leases. As a matter of fact, the respondent Secretary's order states that all three applications must be considered as having been filed at the same time on the day the area was released to the Bureau of Fisheries and to share the lease of the 66 hectares among the three of them equally. The private respondents accept this order. They pray that the decision of the lower court be affirmed in toto. The Office of the President holds the view that the only purpose of the provision in question is to redeem a rejected premature application and to consider it filed as of the date the area was released and not to grant a premature application a better right over another of the same category. We find such an interpretation as an exercise of sound discretion which should not be disturbed. In the case of Salaria v. Buenviaje (81 SCRA 722) we reiterated the rule that the construction of the officer charged with implementing and enforcing the provision of a statute should be given controlling weight. Similarly, in Pastor v. Echavez (79 SCRA 220) we held that in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, the discretion of the appropriate department head must be respected. The records show that the above rulings should also apply to the present case. During the pendency of this petition, petitioner Yngson filed a motion to have Patricio Bayoborda, Rene Amamio, and nine other respondents, declared in contempt of court. Petitioner charged that Bayoborda and Amamio entered the property in controversy and without petitioner's consent, laid stakes on the ground alleging that the same were boundaries of the areas they were claiming; that the other respondents likewise entered the property on different dates and destroyed petitioner's hut and the uppermost part of his fishpond and started to build houses and to occupy the same. In their comment, the respondents in the contempt motion denied petitioner's charges. Bayoborda and Amamio stated that they were bona-fide applicants for fishpond purposes of areas outside the 22 hectares alloted for the petitioner and that they were authorized to place placards in the areas they applied for. As evidence the respondents attached a copy of the resolution of the Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) showing that their applications have been duly received and acknowledged by the latter and in compliance with government regulations, they placed markers and signs in their respective boundaries. The resolution likewise stated that these markers and signs were subsequently destroyed and later on Mr. Yngson started development by building dikes in the area applied for, which he has no authority to do so due to the present conflict. The resolution further prohibited Yngson from constructing any improvements in any area outside his 22 hectares and also prohibited Bayoborda and Amamio from entering and making constructions in the applied for areas pending the issuance of their permits. The petitioner has failed to show that the acts committed by the respondents were a direct disturbance in the proper administration of justice and processes of the law which constitutes contempt of court. If there were any violations of petitioner's rights, he should resort to PACLAP which issued the resolution between him and respondents or file, as he alleged he did, a criminal complaint or other action before the courts. The motion also raises factual considerations including boundaries and geographical locations more proper for a trial court. We have held that contempt of court presupposes contumacious and arrogant defiance of the court. (De Midgely v. Ferandos, 64 SCRA 23; Matutina v. Judge Buslon, 109 Phil. 140,142) The petitioner has failed to show a contempt of court which we can take cognizance of and punish. If any of his property or other rights over his one-third's share of the disputed property are violated, he can pursue the correct action before the proper lower court.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. The motion for contempt is also DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner-appellant. SO ORDERED. 12. G.R. No. 81961 April 18, 1989 DIRECTOR OF LAND MANAGEMENT and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MINO HILARIO, respondents. The Solicitor General for petitioners. R.M. Molintas Law Office for private respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals' decision which affirmed the trial court's decision ordering the issuance of a certificate of title in the name of Mino Hilario over a parcel of land particularly described in survey plan PSU-221769. The facts of the case as stated in the Court of Appeals' decision are as follows: The land subject matter of the application for registration is situated in the sitio of Cosaran, Bo. Baloy, Itogon, Benguet, Philippines. It is within the "Central Cordillera Forest Reserve", established under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929, the Ambuklao-Binga Watershed covered by Executive Proclamation No. 548, dated April 19, 1969, and the Upper Agno River Basin Multiple Use of Forest Management District created under Forestry Administrative Order No. 518, dated March 9, 1971. In his application for land registration filed on March 10, 1975 with the Court of First Instance of Baguio-Benguet (now RTC), applicant-appellee Mino Hilario claimed ownership in fee simple over said land by purchase from his father Hilario Molang on April 17, 1972. The subject land, consisting of one (1) parcel, with an area of 5.3213 hectares, is situated, bounded and described as shown in plan PSU-221769, the technical description of which is attached to the application and made a part thereof. The applicant seeks to register the title to the subject land under the Land Registration Act (Act 496). However, as an alternative, the applicant invokes the benefits of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874 as superseded by Commonwealth Act 141, as well as the provisions of Republic Act 1942 and Republic Act 3872 because the applicant is a member of the cultural minorities. On December 3, 1975, the Director of Bureau of Lands filed his opposition dated July 14, 1975, alleging that neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee simple of the land applied for, the same not having been acquired by any of the various types of title issued by the Spanish Government, or have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the present application, and that the aforesaid property is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and is not subject to private appropriation. On March 8, 1976, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development filed his opposition dated March 1, 1976, to the registration of whatever title of the applicant on the ground that the area applied for is within the "Central Cordillera Forest Reserve" under LC Map No. 1435, aside from the fact that it is a part of the Ambuklao-Binga Watershed covered by Executive Proclamation No. 548 dated April 19, 1969 as evidenced by the letterreport of Forest Ranger Antonio Chagyo, and Engineer Carlito Banac; that the area sought to be registered is not in the entire possession of applicant Mino Hilario in the concept of an owner considering that there are several houses built by different

individuals within the area in question; that the applicant does not have any registrable title either in law or in fact over the property; and that the area is not classified as alienable or disposable land. After due trial, the lower court rendered its decision dated May 16, 1985, which decreed the confirmation and registration of the subject land in the name of applicant Mino Hilario, married to Sofina Hilario. The decision is based on the facts found by the trial court, to wit: The evidence for the applicant consists of his testimony and those of his witnesses, namely, Dionisio Capsula, 54 years old, farmer and a neighbor in the place; Hilario Molang, 55 years old, the applicant's father; and Eustaquio Cabson, 80 years old, and another neighbor; and documentary exhibits, Exhibits "A" to "U". Also, an ocular inspection was conducted on the premises. From these, the Court gathers that the applicant acquired the land subject hereof by purchase from his father, Hilario Molang on April 17, 1972; that his said father, in turn acquired the property from the latter's father, and the applicant's grandfather Shawidi; that the applicant and his predecessors successively, continuously, publicly and adversely occupied, possessed and worked on the land in the concept of absolute owners since before the First World War, building supporting walls, rice paddies where they planted rice, and planting fruit-bearing trees; that as seen during the ocular inspection there are about 100 mango trees, three of which are more than 100 years old, about 50 matured avocado trees, about 200 banana trees, about 30 maguey, about 40 cheza trees, about 30 coffee trees, about 8 jackfruit trees, cassava, two bamboo groves more than 100 years old, 70 orange trees, camote patches, three rice paddies for planting rice, about 50 pineapple plants, stone walls, fence of German cables, around 30 scattered Kaingins, 22 young coconut trees, and about two old coconut trees; that the land is suitable to agriculture; and that there are seven old houses made of galvanized iron inside the area being registered. The property had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of Hilario Molang, and land tax therefor had been paid by him since 1945. Since 1972 the property has been declared in the name of the applicant and land tax has been paid by him. The evidence for the Government oppositors consists of the testimonies of Antonio Chaggyo, a Forest Manager of the Bureau of Forest Development, and Alfredo A. Ramirez, a Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, and their respective reports (Exhibits "1" and "2") and the first indorsement of the District Land Office that the land in question "appears to be within the Central Cordillera Forest Reservation which is outside the jurisdiction of this office." (Exhibit "3"). The testimonies of these witnesses on their respective observations when they separately investigated the land in question and their respective reports do not refute the evidence of the applicant as to the length, nature and manner of possession of the land subject of this case by the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest. On the contrary, their testimonies, viewed in their entirety, would tend to corroborate the evidence adduced by the applicant. The report of the Land Investigator even states that the other houses found within the land at issue are "owned by his (applicant's) relatives ... who swore that they are not claiming any portion of the land they occupy. The preponderance of evidence clearly shows that the applicant, and his predecessorsin-interest before him, all of whom are members of the national cultural minorities, have been in actual, open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land subject hereof which is suitable to agriculture, under a bona fide claim of ownership since before the First World War up to the present or at least more than sixty (60) years. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. Hence, this present petition. The Director of Land Management and the Director of Forest Development raise the following assignments of errors in this petition, to wit:

1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the land in question, notwithstanding that it is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, is registrable on the basis of Republic Act No. 3872; which said court misconstrued and misapplied. 2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that private respondent Mino Hilario had acquired a private right to the land in question prior to the issuance of Proclamation No. 217 on February 17, 1929 establishing the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and Executive Proclamation No. 548 on April 19, 1969 establishing the Ambuklao-Binga Watershed, and therefore, said land is exempted from the force and effect of those executive issuances. 3. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the lower Court's Decision which granted the application for registration of the land in question of respondent Mino Hilario. (Rollo, pp. 12-13). The petition is impressed with merit. There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable. Declassification of forest land is an express and positive act of Government. It cannot be presumed. Neither should it be ignored nor deemed waived. As held in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, [154 SCRA 476 (1987)]: ... It is already a settled rule that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private property, (Vano v. Government of Philippine Islands, 41 Phil. 161; Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401; Director of Forestry v. Muoz 23 SCRA 1183; Republic v. De la Cruz, 67 SCRA 221; Director of Lands v. Reyes & Alinsunurin v. Director of Lands, 68 SCRA 177; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; and Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701) unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable by the Director of Forestry, but even then, possession of the land prior to the reclassification of the land as disposable and alienable cannot be credited as part of the thirty-year requirement under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, supra). In this case, there is no showing that the land in question is disposable or alienable. This is a matter which cannot be assumed. It calls for proof. In the instant case, the subject land is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. Private respondent Hilario submits that even assuming that this is so, still he may own the land situated within the forest reserve as he is a member of the cultural minorities. His basis for this is Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended (Public Land Act), sec. 48 (c) which provides: ... The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx xxx xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be

entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. (as amended by RA. No. 3872, section 1, approved June 18, 1964). Respondent Hilario contends that the phrase "whether disposable or not" should be construed to mean that a parcel of land situated in an inalienable land may be privately-owned by a member of the cultural minorities. We agree with the Solicitor General's observations, to wit: 1. Republic Act No. 3872 is only amendatory to Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. The Public Land Act applies to agricultural public lands and to no other type of land borne out by the explicit terms of Section 2, Chapter I and Section 2, Chapter II, both under Title I of the Public Land Act. Chapter I is subtitled "Short title of the Act, lands to which it applies, and officers charged with its execution." Section 2 clearly states that the "provisions of this Act apply to the lands of the public domain; but timber and mineral lands shall be governed by special laws ... Section 10 provides that the words "alienation", "disposition", or "concession" as used in this Act, shall mean any of the methods authorized by this Act for the acquisition, lease, use, or benefit of the lands of the public domain other than timber or mineral lands. (Emphasis supplied). 2. The new sub-section (c) of Section 48 of the Public Land Act should be read together with the provision of the preceding subsection (b) which expressly refers to "agricultural lands of the public domain." Perforce, the term "lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture" as used in the said new subsection of Sec. 48 should mean the same thing as the term "agricultural lands of public domain." It does not appear that two different classes of lands were intended to be the subject matter of one section of the same Public Land Act. And both terms manifestly do not refer to either timber or forest land including forest reserves. 3. The construction given by respondent Court of Appeals to the particular provision of law involved, as to include even forest reserves as susceptible to private appropriation, is to unconstitutionally apply such provision. For, both the 1973 and present Constitution petitions do not include timber or forest lands as alienable. Thus, Section 8, Article XIV of 1973 Constitution states that 'with the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated." The new Constitution, in its Article XII, Section 2, also expressly states that "with the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated." What the law contemplates are lands that are agricultural although not disposable, such as agricultural lands within a reservation for fruit experiments (as the one in Baguio City administered by the Bureau of Plant Industry, or agricultural lands reserved for the Camarines Sur Agricultural School in Pili, Camarines Sur), or those reserved for a specific purpose, but certainly not a forest reserve, a timber land, which the Constitution, the Public Land Act itself, and jurisprudence have excluded from alienation. (Rollo, pp. 16-18). As to the lower court's ruling that "applicant's predecessor, Shawidi, had been occupying and working on the land at the outbreak of the First World War in 1914" long before Proclamation No. 217 declaring the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve was issued, this Court has had the opportunity to rule on this issue earlier. As held in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra: There is an erroneous assumption implicit in the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals, which the government oppositors also appear to have overlooked. This is the reliance on Proclamation No. 217 of Governor General Henry L. Stimson as the operative act which converted the lands covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve into forest lands. This is wrong. The land was not non-forest or agricultural land prior to the 1929 proclamation. It did not earn a classification from non-forest into forest land because of the proclamation. The proclamation merely declared a special forest reserve out of already existing forest lands. The land was already forest or timber land

even before the proclamation. The alleged entry in 1915 of Salming Piraso and the cultivation of 15 hectares out of a 219.7879 hectares claimed area has no legal significance. A person cannot enter into forest land and by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect title. The Government must first declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court which granted the private respondent's application for registration of the land in question is reversed and set aside. The application for land registration is dismissed. SO ORDERED.

14. G.R. No. L-13663

March 25, 1960

ESPERIDION ADORABLE, ET AL., claimants-appellees, vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, movant-appellant. Santiago L. Damaso for appellees. Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Eriberto D. Ignacio for appellant. REYES, J.B.L., J.: In Cadastral Case No. 88 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Esperidion Adorable, in his own behalf and that of his brothers and sisters, presented a claim over Lot No. 3249 situated in barrio Madong, Janiuay, Iloilo. After hearing before the Justice of the Peace of Janiuay, who was duly authorized to hear the cadastral case in that municipality, judgment was rendered awarding the aforementioned lot to claimants Esperidion Adorable, et al. Copy of the decision was received by the Director of Forestry on January 14, 1956; and on January 31, before the finality of the decision, said Director, through the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo, filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial, claiming that he was not notified of the hearing, that his office had a claim over a portion of the lot in question for river bank protection or as permanent timberland, and that he was unduly denied the opportunity to appear and present evidence in behalf of his office. The motion was denied by the court upon the ground that it was not obliged to notify the Director of the hearing because the latter did not file any claim over the land in question; and that at any rate, said official should be deemed to have notice of the proceedings because an employee of his Bureau was present at the hearing and had with him a map of the cadastre. From the denial of his motion, the Director of Forestry appealed to the Court of Appeals, urging that the court below erred in holding that it was not necessary to serve him notice of the hearing and in denying his motion for reconsideration and new trial. These questions being purely of law, the Court of Appeals certified the appeal to this Court. The claim of the appellant Director of Forestry that he is entitled to a personal notice of the hearing in this case seems to have been based on the provisions of section 32, Act No. 496 (as amended by section 2, Republic Act 96), that: . . . If the land borders on a river, navigable stream, or shore, or an arm of the sea where a river or harbor line has been established, or on a lake, or if it otherwise appears from the application or the proceedings that the National Government may have a claim adverse to that of the applicant, notice shall be given in the same manner to the Solicitor General, the Director of Public Works, the Director of Lands, and the Director of Forestry. . . . Since the description of the land here in question does not show that it borders on a river, stream, sea, or lake, and considering the fact mentioned by the court that an employee of the Bureau of Forestry was present all throughout the hearing with a map of the cadastre but did not make any claim in behalf of said Bureau, the omission to send personal notice of the hearing to appellant can not be considered a violation of section 32 of Act 496. But while the lower court was not legally bound to send personal notice of the hearing to appellant, it does not mean, however, that it acted correctly and within legal bounds in summarily dismissing

appellant's motion for reconsideration and new trial without any inquiry as to the truth of the facts alleged therein. Appellant based his motion on the claim that a portion of the land in question either is needed for river bank protection or forms part of permanent timberland. If this claim that any portion of the land in question still forms part of the public forests is true, then possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it into private property (Vano vs. Government of the Philippines, 41 Phil., 161), and such portion would fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the torrens system (Nicolas vs. Jose, 5 Phil., 589; Vano vs. Government of the Philippines, supra). Hence, the lower court should have set appellant's motion for hearing to receive evidence on his allegations, in order that any portion or portions of the land in question that should form part of the forest or timber zone may be excluded and segregated from the decree of registration in favor of appellees. The order appealed from is, therefore, set aside, and the records are remanded to the court of origin for a hearing on the motion for reconsideration and new trial of the appellant Director of Forestry, after which a new judgment shall be rendered with respect to Lot No. 3249. No costs. 15. G.R. No. L-24796 June 28, 1968

DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, FOREST STATION WARDEN, DISTRICT 13, BUREAU OF FORESTRY, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE AUTHORITY 1 and CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. HON. EMMANUEL M. MUOZ, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I, the SHERIFF OF THE PROVINCE of BULACAN, and PINAGCAMALIGAN INDO-AGRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC.,respondents. ----------------------------G.R. No. L-25459 June 28, 1968

PINAGCAMALIGAN INDO-AGRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. MACARIO PERALTA, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of National Defense; HON. ENETERIO DE JESUS, in his capacity as Undersecretary of National Defense; GENERAL RIGOBERTO ATIENZA, in his capacity as the Chief of Staff; 2 Armed Forces of the Philippines, COLONEL MANUEL V. REYES, in his capacity as the Judge Advocate General, Armed Forces of the Philippines; and the TASK FORCES COMMANDER, Task Force Preserve (Tabak Division), 1st Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Nueva Ecija, respondents. Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner Director of Forestry, et al. Gualberto Cruz for respondent Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation. SANCHEZ, J.: Two original actions involving divers legal questions are now before this Court. In the first, L-24796, the corresponding government officials seek on certiorari and prohibition to annul the order and writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in its Civil Case 3035-M allowing Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. (Piadeco, for short) to haul its logs in the area hereinafter to be mentioned. In the second, L-25459, it was Piadeco's turn to ask on prohibition and injunction for a ruling that respondent government officials are "without authority and jurisdiction to stop logging operations, construction of the roads, cutting, gathering and removing of timber and other forest products" from said corporation's private woodland area. Because of their interrelation, the two case are here jointly considered. The following undisputed facts control:

Piadeco claims to be the owner of Some 72,000 hectares of land 3 located in the municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal. Piadeco's evidence of ownership consists of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136, dated April 25, 1894,4 and a deed of absolute sale of July 12, 1962, in its favor. Piadeco applied for registration as private woodland some 10,000 hectares of this land. The Bureau of Forestry, on December 4, 1963, issued in Piadeco's name Certificate of Private Woodland Registration No. PWR 2065-New, covering but a portion of the land an aggregate area of 4,400 hectares and an average stand of 87.20 cubic meters, situated in the municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray, and San Jose del Monte, all of the province of Bulacan, and Montalban, in Rizal. It was to expire on December 31, 1964. By virtue of the registration certificate, Piadeco conducted logging operations.. The controversy in the these cases began on April 11, 1964, when Acting Director of Forestry Apolonio F. Rivera issued an order cancelling PWR No. 2065-New. He required Piadeco to surrender the original certificate to him. Ground for this cancellation was that Piadeco had violated forestry rules and regulations for cutting trees within the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservations, expressly excluded from the said certificate.5 On April 14, 1964, Forest Station Warden Reinaldo B. Marquez, District 13, Bureau of Forestry, wrote Piadeco requesting the latter to desist, effective the same day, April 14, 1964, from conducting its logging operation inside or outside the area covered by PWR 2065-New, and to refrain from removing logs already cut unless they have been scaled and properly invoiced by forestry officers. Previously, on April 10, 1964, Nawasa's board of directors advised Piadeco, by letter, of the revocation of the 1964 grant to Piadeco, of a right of way from a barrio in Bosoboso, Antipolo, to Montalban, Rizal, as an access road to its logging concession under PWR 2061. Offshot of the foregoing is Piadeco's petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, lodged on April 17, 1964 with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.6 This petition was directed against the Director of Forestry, Forest Station Warden Marquez and Nawasa, essentially upon the averment that their acts heretofore narrated were "all precipitate, arbitrary, whimsical and capricious." On the same day, April 17, 1964, Judge Emmanuel M. Muoz of the Bulacan court directed the government authorities to show cause why preliminary injunction should not issue. On May 4, 1964, over the Director of Forestry's opposition, the judge ordered the issuance upon a P10,000-bond of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the Director of Forestry, the Forest Station Warden and Nawasa from carrying out and executing the April 10, 1964 revocation by Nawasa of Piadeco's right of way, the April 11, 1964 order of the Director of Forestry, and the April 14, 1964 directive of the Forest Station Warden, heretofore mentioned. On May 5, 1964, Piadeco moved to declare the forestry officials in default for failure to answer its petition on time. On May 6, 1964, unaware of Piadeco's May 5 motion, the forestry officials, upon a motion dated April 29, 1964, asked the Bulacan court to dismiss Piadeco's petition upon the averments that said court had no jurisdiction over their persons or the subject matter of the petition, and that administrative remedies have not yet been exhausted by Piadeco. On the same date, too, but in a separate motion, said forestry official asked for a reconsideration of the lower court's order granting preliminary injunction, bottomed upon their charge that the illegal cutting of trees by Piadeco inside the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservations which are the main source of water supply of the City of Manila and its surrounding towns and cities poses a grave danger of causing them to dry up to the prejudice and irreparable injury of the inhabitants thereof. Piadeco file written opposition on May 13, 1964. On May 14, 1964, acting on the aforesaid motion for reconsideration and opposition thereto, the judge below ruled that although Piadeco is entitled to injunction, the continuance thereof would cause great damage to the government, while Piadeco can be fully compensated for any damages Piadeco may suffer because of the dissolution thereof. That bond, however, was not filed by the forestry officials. On July 13, 1964, upon Piadeco's May 5 motion earlier adverted to, the forestry officials were declared in default.

On July 24, 1964, said forestry officials filed a verified motion to set aside the default order and to admit their answer thereto attached. They pleaded excusable neglect and/or oversight of the clerk of the records of the Records section of the Bureau of Forestry. On July 29, 1964, the court shunted aside the foregoing motion for the reason that their six days' delay was not excusable and their answer was prepared only after three days from their receipt of the order of default. A motion for reconsideration registered by the forestry officials on August 12, 1964 was unavailing. The court below struck down that motion on September 4, 1964. Thus it is, that Piadeco submitted evidence ex parte to the court below against the Director of Forestry and the Forest Station Warden. Piadeco had, in the meantime, entered into an amicable settlement with Nawasa whereby Piadeco's case against Nawasa was withdrawn, the right of way granted by Nawasa to Piadeco remaining revoked and cancelled; and Nawasa's counterclaim against Piadeco was also withdrawn in consideration of P1,651.59 paid by Piadeco to Nawasa, representing the former's liabilities to the latter. On December 29, 1964, the court below rendered judgment. It approved Piadeco's compromise agreement with Nawasa. It held that Piadeco was the owner of the land in question; that its operation was not in violation of forestry rules and regulations; that aside from its regulation certificate, Piadeco was permitted by Nawasa thru the latter's Resolution 1050, Section of 1963, to conduct selective logging within the Angat-Marikina Watershed upon payment of P2.00 for every cubic meter of timber classified in the first group and P1.75 belonging to the second group; that similar permits were issued to other individuals by the Director of Forestry with the acquiescence of Nawasa; that Piadeco's logging under Resolution 1050 aforesaid could not be contrary to forestry rules and regulations; and that, upon the doctrine laid down in Santiago vs. Basilan Lumber Co., L-15532, October 31, 1963, even if Piadeco's private woodland was unregistered, it still retains its inherent "rights of ownership, among which are (its) rights to the fruits of the land and to exclude any persons from the enjoyment and disposal thereof", its only liability being the payment of surcharges on the timber severed from the land. Thereupon, the court reinstated the writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued and made it permanent, with costs.. Meanwhile, on December 28, 1964, one day before the rendition of the judgment just mentioned, Piadeco applied for the renewal of its Certificate of Private Woodland Registration PWR 2065-New, which would expire on the last day of that month. On January 12, 1965, in reply thereto, Assistant Director of Forestry J. L. Utleg denied the renewal requested. He informed Piadeco that its Titulo de Propiedad 4136 was not registerable under Forestry Administrative Order No. 12-2 which took effect on January 1, 1963. The expiration of its registration certificate and the non-renewal thereof notwithstanding, Piadeco continued logging operations. It was about this time that illegal logging was denounced by some members of Congress thereby attracting national attention. This led to a directive by the President of the Philippines on March 8, 1965 to stop all illegal logging operations. Complying therewith, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources wrote the Secretary of National Defense with the request that units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines be detailed at the areas involved, deputizing them agents of the Bureau of Forestry to assist in the enforcement of forest laws, rules and regulations, and the protection of the forests. The Secretary of National Defense, in turn, direct the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to implement the request. And, the Chief of Staff dispatched at ask force of the army into the Angat area, which impounded and seized all logs cut by Piadeco and other loggers which were purportedly conducting illegal operations. On May 11, 1965, Piadeco sought from the Bulacan court an ex parte writ of execution of the December 29, 1964 decision. That decision had by then become final for failure of the forestry officials to appeal therefrom. Piadeco prayed that it be not molested in its logging operations including the hauling of about 600 pieces (unscaled) and 1,000 pieces of mixed (scaled and unscaled) timber from the log ponds. On May 12, 1965, the Bulacan court presided over temporarily by Judge Ricardo C. Puno set Piadeco's motion for execution for hearing on May 27, 1965. Before the day of the hearing arrived, however, Piadeco withdrew its ex parte motion for execution with the manifestation that it would look for a more expeditious way or a more appropriate remedy to enable it to haul the logs before the rains set in. But on May 27, 1965, Piadeco refiled its motion for execution with Judge Muoz, who had meanwhile resumed his duties.

On June 1, 1965, Judge Muoz granted Piadeco's motion. In line therewith, on June 3, 1965, the corresponding writ of execution was issued, directing a special sheriff to make effective and execute the aforesaid lower court's decision of December 29, 1964. Execution notwithstanding, the forestry officials still refused to permit Piadeco to haul its logs. Because of this, on June 11, 1965, Piadeco asked the court below to declare the forestry officials and those acting under them in contempt. On June 30, 1965, the forestry officials opposed. They averred that Piadeco's registration certificate already expired on December 31, 1964; that despite this expiration, Piadeco continued illegal logging operations, which resulted in the seizure of its logs: that after December 31, 1964, the December 29, 1964 decision of the court below became functus officio and could no longer be executed. Piadeco's rejoinder of July 1, 1965 was that its registration certificate is not expirable and that it is not a license. On July 8, 1965, the judge came out with an order declaring that notwithstanding "the expiration of petitioner's [Piadeco's] license (?) on December 31, 1964, their said property remains registered with the Bureau of Forestry subject only to renewal, in which case it can still pursue its logging operations, conditioned upon the payment by it of forest charges." The judge took into consideration a certificate issued on May 4, 1965 by Assistant Director of Forestry J. L. Utleg, as officer-in-charge, that "all the timber cut ... during the lifetime" of the registration certificate "may be transported by" Piadeco "provided they are properly documented." Finding that Piadeco "complied with all the requirements of the Bureau of Forestry and the Bureau of Internal Revenue as regards the proper documentation of the logs in question," the judge thereupon directed the forestry officials "and all members of the Armed Forces stationed along the way" to allow Piadeco "to haul its logs which have already been properly documented." This precipitated the filing on July 28, 1965 by the Director of Forestry, the Forest Station Warden, the Armed Forces Chief of Staff 7 of an original petition with this Court (L-24796, now at bar) for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the June 1,1965 order of execution, the June 3, 1965 writ of execution and the July 8, 1965 order allowing Piadeco to haul its logs. Named respondents were Piacedo, Judge Emmanuel M. Muoz of the Bulacan court, and the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan.. On July 30, 1965, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, as prayed for by the aforenamed government officials. On August 3, 1965, Piadeco sought the dissolution thereof for the reason, amongst others, that Mr. J. L. Utleg, Assistant Director of Forestry and Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Forestry, was already agreeable mentioned, as per his letter of June 7, 1965 to Piadeco informing the latter that the writ of execution was being referred to the Forest Station Warden for compliance. On August 9, 1965, the Solicitor General blocked Piadeco's motion to dissolve, with an allegation, amongst others, that the June 7, 1965 letter just mentioned was deemed recalled when the Director Forestry realizing that the said writ would allow Piadeco to continue logging after the expiration and non-renewal of its certificate in a public forest area or in an area excluded from the expired permit did not give effect to the said letter. On August 18, 1965, manifestation was made by the Solicitor General to this Court thru a motion dated August 17, 1965, that the logs seized and imposed by the armed forces were being exposed to the elements; that the rainy season having set in, there was grave danger that the said logs might deteriorate and become useless. He thus prayed that the forestry officials be authorized to turn the logs over to the engineer corps of the Armed Forces for the construction of prefabricated schoolhouses pursuant to General Circular V-337, series of 1961, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. On August 31, 1965, Piadeco objected upon the ground that the said logs are still its private property; and that there is no law empowering the State to seize, confiscate and turn over the cut logs to the Armed Forces. On September 29, 1965, Piadeco, in turn, petitioned for preliminary injunction and moved again to dissolve this Court's writ of preliminary injunction of July 30, 1965. It called attention to the fact that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the court below on May 4, 1964 in Civil Case 3035-M is still enforceable and has not yet been dissolved because the forestry officials have not filed their P10,000.00-bond as required by the trial court in its order of May 14, 1964. On October 8, 1965, this Court denied the two motions of Piadeco, declared that the writ of preliminary injunction it issued stands enforced and is effective until otherwise lifted, and authorized the Solicitor General to effect the removal of all the logs subject of his motion of August 17, 1965 from the log

ponds but only for the purpose of turning them over to the Armed Forces for safekeeping and custody pending final resolution of the case. On October 14, 1965, Piadeco traversed the averments of the forestry officials' petition before this Court, thru an answer dated October 12, admission of which was however denied for being late. The case was submitted without further memoranda. Meanwhile, a companion case (L-25459, also at bar)emerged from subsequent events hereunder related. On October 20, 1965, pending this Court's resolution of the foregoing petition of the forestry officials (L-24796), Piadeco wrote the Director of Forestry with a request to grant it " AUTHORITY to cut, gather and remove timber" from its alleged private woodland. At the same time, it advised the Director of Forestry that "in the absence of such authority or permit", it "shall cut, gather and remove timber from the said area subject to the payment of regular forest charge and 300% surcharge for unlawful cutting in accordance with the penal provisions" of Section 266 of the Tax Code. On November 4, 1965, Acting Director J. L. Utleg replied. He told Piadeco that "pending meticulous study" of its application for renewal of PWR 2065-New, his "[o]ffice is not now in a position to grant" the desired authority and "will consider any cutting, gathering and removal of timber" from the land "to be illegal, hence, subject to the provisions of Section 266 of the National Internal Revenue Code." Obviously taking the foregoing letter as a case, Piadeco, on December 6, 1965, advised the Director that immediately upon receipt of said letter, it (Piadeco) resumed logging operations within its private woodland area in the municipality of Montalban, Rizal, "thereby subjecting all timber cut therefrom to the payment of 300% penalty, plus regular forest charges." Piadeco also requested the Director to inform the Task Force Commander that it "can be allowed to continue its logging operation within their private woodland" subject to Section 266 of the Tax Code. So, on December 7, 1965, Acting Director J. L. Utleg notified the Task Force Commander, through the Undersecretary of National Defense, that Piadeco "can conduct logging operations within its private woodland, as it is a constitutional right on its part to use and enjoy its own property and the fruits thereof" but that whatever timber cut therefrom "should be subject to the payment not only of the regular charges but also of the surcharges imposed by Section 166" of the Tax Code. This notwithstanding, the army authorities refused to heed Utleg's December 7, 1965 letter and stood pat on its posture not to allow Piadeco to conduct logging operations. Hence, it was Piadeco's turn to come to this Court on December 22, 1965 on an original petition for injunction and prohibition (L-25459 aforesaid) against respondents Secretary of National Defense, the Undersecretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, the Judge Advocate General and the Task Force Commander (Task Force Preserve, Tabak Division). Specifically, Piadeco charges as follows: On December 17, 1965, army men [Capt. Zamuco, Lt. Oresque, Sgts. Albino, Gutierrez, Ramirez, and Sawada, and Cpl. Manlapus], boisterously, unlawfully, wilfully, and feloniously entered upon orders of a certain Major Elfano Piadeco's land at Barrio Anginan, Montalban, Rizal, outside the watershed reservations. They made a portion of the land their private quarters. They prevented Piadeco's officers (a) from continuing its logging operations, especially the construction of the road inside the land; (b) from cutting, gathering and removing timber and other forest products therefrom; and (c)from living and moving in freedom and engaging in the pursuit of happiness on said land. Piadeco asks principally that respondent officials be declared "without authority and jurisdiction to stop logging operations, construction of the roads, cutting, gathering and removing of timber and other forest products from the Private Woodland area" of the former. There was a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which this Court, however, denied on December 31, 1965, and upon reconsideration, on February 1, 1966. After respondents' answer, and hearing on oral arguments, the case was submitted for decision. 1. Basic to an intelligent appraisal of the rights of Piadeco, who comes to us as an alleged private wood landowner, is the all-important question: Is Piadeco's title registrable with the Bureau of Forestry? The pertinent statutory provision is Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code, viz:

SEC. 1829. Registration of title to private forest land. Every private owner of land containing timber, firewood and other minor forest products shall register his title to the same with the Director of Forestry. A list of such owners, with a statement of the boundaries of their property, shall be furnished by said Director to the Collector of Internal Revenue, and the same shall be supplemented from time to time as occasion may require. Upon application of the Director of Forestry the fiscal of the province in which any such land lies shall render assistance in the examination of the title thereof with a view to its registration in the Bureau of Forestry. Ampliatory thereof is Section 7, Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 of July 1, 1941, as amended by Forestry Administrative Order 12-2, which took effect on January 1, 1963. It reads: 7. Titles that may be registered. Only the following titles covering lands containing timber, firewood and other minor forest products may be registered under and pursuant to Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code; (a) Administrative titles granted by the present Government, such as homestead patent, free patent, and sales patent; and (b) Judicial titles, such as Torrens Title obtained under the Land Registration Act (Act 496, as amended) or under the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as amended). The amendment of Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 by Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 consisted in theomission of one paragraph, paragraph (c), which particularized as one of the titles registrable pursuant to Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code, "[t]itles granted by the Spanish sovereignty in the islands and duly recognized as valid titles under the existing laws." Piadeco's position is that such amendment contravenes said Section 1829, which does not specify the titles that are registrable thereunder; and that it is diametrically opposed to the Opinion of the Attorney General of October 15, 1919, which ruled that a royal title "issued in September, 1896, and inscribed in the Registry of Property within a year after its issuance is valid, and therefore its owner is entitled to the benefits" of Section 1829 aforesaid. Also cited are the Opinion of the Secretary of the Interior of November 7, 1916, stating that registration under Section 1829 is not subject to change and revocation unless title is established in a different person by judicial declaration; the Opinion of the Director of Forestry of January 8, 1925, which recognized as registrable, titles "such an informacion posesoria ..., composicion con el estado and purchase under the Spanish sovereignty" amongst others; and the Opinion of the Collector of Internal Revenue of February 6, 1926, declaring imperfect titles within the purview of Section 45(a) of Act 2874, as also registrable. True it is that the law, Section 1829, does not describe with particularity titles that may be registered with the Bureau of Forestry. Concededly, too, administrative authorities in the past considered as registrable, titles issued during the Spanish regime. In fact, as late as 1962, Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 was still in force, authorizing registration of such Spanish titles. But when Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 came into effect on January 1, 1963, that order should be deemed to have repealed all such previous administrative determinations. There should be no question now that Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 has the force and effect of law. It was promulgated pursuant to law. Section 1817, Revised Administrative Code, empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the approval of the department head, to issue regulations "deemed expedient or necessary to secure the protection and conservation of the public forests in such manner as to insure a continued supply of valuable timber and other forest products for the future, and regulating the use and occupancy of the forests and forest reserves, to the same end." Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 was recommended by the Director of Forestry, and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It is no less a valid law. It is an administrative regulation germane to the objects and purposes of the law. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorized the promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to implement a given legislation, "[a]ll that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes."8 In Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712, we pronounced that the necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power to make rules and regulations for various and varying details of management has been recognized and upheld by the courts.

And we are certainly totally unprepared to jettison Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 as illegal and unreasonable. Spanish titles are quite dissimilar to administrative and judicial titles under the present system. Although evidences of ownership, these Spanish titles may be lost thru prescription. They are, therefore, neither indefeasible nor imprescriptible. The law in this jurisdiction, both under the present sovereignty and the previous Spanish regime is that ordinary prescription of ten years may take place against a title recorded in the Registry of Property "in virtue of another title also recorded,"9 and extraordinary prescription of thirty years will run, even "without need of title or of good faith." 10 For possession for along period fixed by law, the "unquestionable foundation of the prescription of ownership ... weakens and destroys the force and value of the best possible title to the thing possessed by one who is not the owner thereof." 11 The exception, of course, is the Torrens title, expressly recognized to be indefeasible and impresciptible.12 And more. If a Spanish title covering forest land is found to be invalid, that land is public forest land, is part of the public domain, and cannot be appropriated.13 Before private interests have intervened, the government may decide for itself what portions of the public domain shall be set aside and reserved as forest land.14 Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. 15 In this case, it is undisputed that Picadeco's title which it sought to register was issued by the Spanish sovereignty Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136, dated April 25 or 29, 1894. It is unmistakably not one of those enumerated in Section 7 aforesaid. It should not have been allowed registration in the first place. Obviously, registration thereof can never be renewed. 2. Piadeco is nonetheless insistent in its plea that it can still cut, gather, and remove timber from its alleged private woodland, upon payment of forest charges and surcharges. The purposes of registration, as succinctly stated in Section 6, Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 dated July 1, 1941, are: 6. Objects of registration (a) to exempt the owners of private woodlands from the payment of forest products gathered therefrom for commercial or industrial purposes. (b) To regulate the transportation of forest products gathered or collected therefrom and to avoid fraud which may be committed in connection with utilization of such forest products with respect to their origin. (c) To determine the legality of private claims for the protection of the interest of the owners as well as of the Government, and to exclude all land claimed under valid titles from the mass of the public forest in order to facilitate the protection, administration, and supervision of the latter. The foregoing has in part gained judicial approval in Santiago vs. Basilan Lumber Company, L-15532, October 31, 1963, where we pronounced: "Obviously, the purpose of the registration required in Section 1829 of the Administrative Code is to exempt the titled owner of the land from the payment of forestry charges as provided for under Section 266 of the National Internal Revenue Code." 16 And Section 266 of the Tax Code, therein mentioned, provides in full: SEC. 266. Charges collectible on forest products cut, gathered and removed from unregistered private lands. The charges above prescribed shall be collected on all forest products cut, gathered and removedfrom any private land the title to which is not registered with the Director of Forestry as required by the Forest Law: Provided, however, That in the absence of such registration, the owner who desires to cut, gather and remove timber and other forest products from such land shall secure a license from the Director of Forestry in accordance with the Forest Law and regulations. The cutting, and the removing of timber and other forest products from said private lands without license shall be considered as unlawful cutting, gathering and removing of forest products from public forest and shall be subject to the charges prescribed in such cases in this Chapter. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 173, approved June 20, 1947.)17 Following this provision in the Tax Code is Section 267, which in part provides: SEC. 267. Surcharges for illegal cutting and removal of forest products or for delinquency. Where forest products are unlawfully cut or gathered in any public forest without license or, if

under license, in violation of the terms thereof, the charges on such products shall be increased by three hundred per centum.... To recapitulate, registration of titles by the owners of private woodlands with the Bureau of Forestry results in an exemption "from the payment of forest products gathered therefrom for commercial or industrial purposes." If an owner fails to so register, he is obliged to pay forest charges, as prescribed in Sections 264 and 265 of the Tax Code, because "he still retain(s) his rights of ownership, among which are his rights to the fruits of the land and to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof (Art. 429, New Civil Code)."18 However, as provided in Section 266 above-quoted, if an owner does not register his title, but he desires to cut, gather and remove timber and other forest products from his land, he may "secure a license from the Director of Forestry in accordance with the Forest Law and regulations." If he does not, under the same Section 266, his cutting, gathering and removing of timber and other forest products "shall be considered as unlawful cutting, gathering and removing of forest products from public forests and shall be subject to the charges prescribed in such cases." And this would bring into play Section 267, where, as heretofore quoted, the charges on forest products "unlawfully cut and gathered in any public forest without license, or, if under license, in violation of the terms thereof ... shall be increased by three hundred per centum." But it should be stressed that all of the situations herein mentioned refer specifically to owners of private woodlands. The position Piadeco has taken is a jump ahead of where it should be. We are not ready to grant the assumption that Piadeco owns the forest land it seeks to register. Such unwillingness can come from even a superficial assessment of Piadeco's pretensions of ownership based on the Titulo de Propiedad in question. Neither said Titulo, nor a copy thereof, was presented in the two proceedings before us. What we have is merely a description thereof, viz: TITULO DE PROPIEDAD NUMERO 4136 DATED APRIL 25, 1894, ISSUED BY GOBIERNO CIVIL DE LA PROVINCIA DE BULACAN Titulo de Propiedad Numero 4136, in the name of Dn. Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, dated April 25, 1894, being a gratuitous composicion title, grated to Dn. Mariano San Pedroy Esteban, by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, pursuant to Resolution dated April 14, 1894, of the Board of Land Adjustment of the (Spanish) Administration Civil de Filipinas, as authorized under Royal Decree of May 14, 1867 and August 31, 1888, and signed by Dn. Alejandro Garcia, El Jefede la Provincia de Bulacan and Dn. Mariano Lopez Delgado El Secretario de la Junta, with the Seal of the Spanish Government in the Philippines attached thereto and to said Titulo de Propiedad Numero 4136, is affixed a "Sello 10aA*s 1894 y 95 de Peso" documentary stamp bearing Serial Number NO. 292-404 inscribed in the Office of the Registry of Property of Bulacan, on pages 127 and 129 of Book I, for Norzagaray, as Tax Declaration (Fincas) Nos. 57 and 58, Inscripcion No. 1, on July 16, 1894 (or within one (1) year from April 25, 1894, pursuant to Royal Decree of January 12, 1863), the inscription of the said TITULO DE PROPIEDAD NUMERO 4136 of Dn. Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, having been accomplished by the Office of the Land Registry of Bulacan, on the said date of July 16, 1894, by the then Registrar of Bulacan, Dn. Miguel de Lizan, as follows: Ynscrito el titulo que precede, a los folios ciento veinti-sietey ciento veintinueve del Tomo primero de Norzagaray, fincas numeros cincuenta y siete y cincuenta y ocho inscripcion numero uno, Bulacan, diez y seis de julio de mil ocho cientos noventa y cuatro (Fdo.) MIGUEL DE LIZAN. Two (2) vast parcels of land (agricultural and mountainous lands), together with the improvements thereon, including all the trees in the mountains, all mineral deposits or resources ( pertenecia minera), including lime, gravel and lumber for ship building, located in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon and Quezon City, and bounded, on the North, by Sierra Madre Mountains and Rio Grande (Laog to Kinabayunan); on the East, by Maputi, Umiray and Caliwatcanan (Ibona Estate and Public Land); on the South by Susong Dalaga and Cupang (Hegmatangan to Pinugay) and on the West, by Pugad-Lawin and Sapang-Alat (Pinugay, Public Land, Bignay, Lauan to Laog).

The various types of titles granted by the Spanish crown, it will be remembered, were: (1) the "titulo real" or royal grant; (2) the "concession especial" or special grant; (3) the "composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title; (4) the "titulo de compra" or title by purchase; and (5) the "informacion posesoria" or possessory information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title. 19 Piadeco's Titulo appears to be an adjustment title. Piadeco asserts in its answer in L-2479620 that it is a "titulo de composicion con el estado"21 or a "composicion" with the State.22 The given description of Titulo de PropiedadNo. 4136 above-quoted calls it a "gratuitous composition title." Title by "composicion con el estado" was granted by the Direccion General de Administracion Civil, pursuant to the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, or by the Chief of the Province by delegation, pursuant to the Royal Decree of August 31, 1888, or under the Royal Decree of February 13,1894, otherwise known as the Maura Law. The theory behind this title is that all lands belong to the State. Applicants to be entitled to adjustment must possess the lands sought to be acquired for a number of years.23 These titles, as the "titulo real", altho evidences of ownership, may be lost by prescription.24 Piadeco's Titulo de Propiedad 4136, as heretofore described, was signed, pursuant to the Royal Decrees of May 14, 1867 and August 31, 1888, by Dn. Alejandro Garcia, el Jefe de la Provincial de Bulacan, and Dn. Mariano Lopez Delgado, el Secretario de la Junta, purportedly with the Seal of the Spanish Government in the Philippines. The main difficulty here lies with the requirements, then obtaining, for the issuance of Spanish adjustment titles. The Royal Decree of August 31, 1888 under which Piadeco's title was issued classified public lands subject to adjustment into two groups: First. Those bounded at any point thereof by other lands belonging to the State, and those which, though entirely encircled by private lands, had a total area of more than 30 hectares. Second. Those with an area of less than 30 hectares and entirely bounded by private lands. By this royal decree, adjustment of the lands of the first group just mentioned continued to be heard and determined by the general directorate of civil administration with the intervention of the Inspector General of Forests; adjustment of lands of the second group were heard and determined by "a provincial board for the adjustment of lands "headed by a Civil or Military-Civil Governor as president. When the provincial board approves the adjustment, "the chief of the province, in his capacity as deputy of the General Directorate of Civil Administration, shall issue the corresponding title." 25 The property here involved unquestionably belongs to the first group. That is because the area thereof is more than 30 hectares (72,000 or 74,000 hectares); and, going by the descripcion of its boundaries, the property is bounded by public land. In particular, the description is that it is "bounded, on the North, by Sierra Madre Mountains and Rio Grande (Laog to Kinabayunan); on the East, by Maputi, Umiray and Caliwatcanan (Ibona Estate and Public Land); on the South by Susong Dalaga and Cupang (Hegmatangan to Pinugay) and on the West, by Pugad-Lawin and Sapang-Alat (Pinugay, Public Land, Bignay, Lauanto Laog)."26 As stated, the title were was "signed by Dn. Alejandro Garcia, El Jefe de la Provincia de Bulacan, and by Dn. Mariano Lopez Delgado, El Secretario de la Junta, with the Seal of the Spanish Government in the Philippines attached thereto." Piadeco now claims before this Court that its title "appears to be issued by (on its face) the DIRECTOR GENERAL DE ADMINISTRACION DE FILIPINAS"; that the title is in printed form, with the dry seal in the form of a mountain, bearing the inscription, "Office of the Inspector General of Forests in the Philippine Islands Adjustment of Lands" and the rubric of the said Inspector General of Forests and is serially numbered, pursuant to the Circular dated February 14, 1894 of the General Directorate of Civil Administration. In the same breath, however, Piadeco avers that the title was approved by the Chief of the Province of Bulacan as Deputy of the General Directorate of Civil Administration and the said Chief issued Titulo 4136 pursuant to the Royal Decree of August 31, 1888.27These averments, we must say, merely emphasize the necessity of adducing evidence to prove the validity of Piadeco's title, which should be done in appropriate land registration proceedings. Ramirez vs. Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 114, 123, struck down a similar title covering land

which it thereupon declared public forest land, upon grounds, amongst others, that the title was not issued by the proper authority. On this ground, this Court there specifically declared Judging from the area of the land28 in question and that of the two-third portions from which it has been segregated, upon the supposition that the three-third portions above-mentioned constitute the whole tract of land which had originally passed from Tomas Ilao, it is obvious that the same belonged to the first group, as defined in the aforesaid Royal Decree, on the ground that the area thereof greatly exceeded thirty hectares and was not entirely bounded by private lands. Notwithstanding such facts, the title Exhibit D-2 was not issued by the General Directorate of Civil Administration with the intervention of the Inspector General of Forests, but merely by the provincial board, in open violation of the laws and regulations relative thereto.29 But an important moiety here is the deeply disturbing intertwine of two undisputed facts. First. The title embraces land "located in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, and Quezon City." Second. The title was signed only by the provincial officials of Bulacan, and inscribed only in the Land Registry of Bulacan. Why? The situation, indeed, cries desperately for a plausible answer. To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded principle that private ownership of land must be proved not only through the genuineness of title but also with a clear identity of the land claimed.30 This Court ruled in a case involving a Spanish title acquired by purchase that the land must be concretely measured per hectare or perquion, not in mass (cuerpos ciertos),31 That fact that the Royal Decree of August 31, 1888 used 30 hectares as a basis for classifying lands strongly suggests that the land applied for must be measured per hectare. Here, no definite are seems to have been mentioned in the title. In Piadeco's "Rejoinder to Opposition" dated April 28, 1964 filed in Civil Case 3035-M, it specified the area covered by its Titulo de Propiedad as 74,000 hectares.32In its "Opposition" of May 13, 1964 in the same case, it described the land as containing 72,000 hectares.33 Which is which? This but accentuates the nebulous identity of Piadeco's land. Piadeco's ownership thereof then equally suffers from vagueness, fatal at least in these proceedings. Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the original owner appearing on the title, acquired his rights over the property by prescription under Articles 4 and 5 of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880,34 the basic decree that authorized adjustment of lands. By this decree, applications for adjustment showing the location, boundaries and area of land applied for were to be filed with the Direccion General de Administracion Civil, which then ordered the classification and survey of the land with the assistance of the interested party or his legal representative.35 The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for filing applications for adjustment at one year from the date of the publication of the decree in the Gaceta de Manila on September 10, 1880, extended for another year by the Royal Order of July 15, 1881.36 If Don Mariano sought adjustment within the time prescribed, as he should have, then, seriously to be considered here are the Royal Orders of November 25, 1880 and of October 26, 1881, which limited adjustment to 1,000 hectares of arid lands, 500 hectares of land with trees and 100 hectares of irrigable lands. 37 And, at the risk of repetition, it should be stated again that Piadeco's Titulo is held out to embrace 72,000 or 74,000 hectares of lands. But if more were needed, we have the Maura Law (Royal Decree of February 13, 1894), published in the Gaceta de Manila on April 17, 1894.38 That decree required a second petition for adjustment within six months from publication, for those who had not yet secured their titles at the time of the publication of the law.39 Said law also abolished the provincial boards for the adjustment of lands established by Royal Decree of December 26, 1884, and confirmed by Royal Decree of August 31, 1888, which boards were directed to deliver to their successors, the provincial boards established by Decree on Municipal Organization issued on May 19, 1893, all records and documents which they may hold in their possession.40 Doubt on Piadeco's title here supervenes when we come to consider that that title was either dated April 29 or April 25, 1894, twelve or eight days after the publication of the Maura Law . Let us now take a look, as near as the record allows, at how Piadeco exactly acquired its rights under the Titulo. The original owner appearing thereon was Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. From Piadeco's explanation not its evidence 41 we cull the following: On December 3,1894, Don Mariano mortgaged the land under pacto de retro, redeemable within 10 years, for P8,000.00 to one

Don Ignacio Conrado. This transaction was said to have been registered or inscribed on December 4, 1894. Don Mariano failed to redeem within the stipulated period. When Don Ignacio died, his daughter, Maria Socorro Conrado, his only her, adjudicated the land to herself. At about the same time, Piadeco was organized. Its certificate of registration was issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission on June 27, 1932. Later, Maria Socorro, heir of Don Ignacio, became a shareholder of Piadeco when she conveyed the land to Piadeco's treasurer and an incorporator, Trinidad B. Estrada, in consideration of a certain amount of Piadeco shares. Thereafter, Trinidad B. Estrada assigned the land to Piadeco. Then came to the scene a certain Fabian Castillo, appearing as sole heir of Don Mariano, the original owner of the land. Castillo also executed an affidavit of adjudication to himself over the same land, and then sold the same to Piadeco. Consideration therefor was paid partially by Piadeco, pending the registration of the land under Act 496. The question may well be asked: Why was full payment of the consideration to Fabian Castillo made to depend on the registration of the land under the Torrens system, if Piadeco was sure of the validity of Titulo de Propiedad4136? This, and other factors herein pointed out, cast great clouds of doubt that hang most conspicuously over Piadeco's title. The standing presumption, we must not forget, is that land pertains to the State, and any person seeking to establish ownership over land must conclusively show that he is the owner. 42 And his presumption clings with greater force here where "a portion" of the land Piadeco claims is, as Piadeco itself admits, directly affected by Proclamation No. 71 dated March 10, 1927 of the then GovernorGeneral Leonard Wood of the Philippines, which reserved for watershed purposes an area of 62,309.0952 hectares of land located in Montalban, Province of Rizal, in San Jose del Monte, Norzagaray, Angat, San Rafael, and San Miguel, Province of Bulacan, in Pearanda, Province of Nueva Ecija, and in Infanta, Province of Tayabas (now Quezon),subject to "private rights if any there be." Private rights must then have to be proved. It will be remembered that, by Article VIII of the Treaty of Paris of December 10,1898, property of the public domain was relinquished and ceded by the Kingdom of Spain to the United States of America, which, of course, transferred the same to the present Republic. Assertion has likewise been made that Piadeco's title has already been judicially recognized in the judgment rendered in Civil Case 3035-M, the case below, at least insofar as the portion of the land that lies in Bulacan is concerned. This is less than persuasive. Piadeco's title was not directly in issue in the court below. A reading of the decision thereof suggests that said title was not submitted therein. The judge did not even examine that title. According to the decision, Piadeco's ownership was gleaned merely from the registration certificate which stated that a copy of Piadeco's land title, including the corresponding plan, was submitted to the Director of Forestry. A mere statement by the judge below that Piadeco appears to be the owner of the land cannot wipe out the objectionable features of its title. From all the foregoing, our conclusion is that we cannot give prima facie value to Piadeco's title. We cannot thus truly state that Piadeco is a private woodland owner for purpose of these proceedings. This all the more strengthens our view that Piadeco needs to acquire an indefeasible title to be entitled to registration under Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code. 3. Even on the assumption that Piadeco's alleged title is registrable, said corporation cannot complain against the cancellation thereof by the Director of Forestry on April 11, 1964. Why? When the Director of Forestry cancelled Piadeco's registration certificate, he only performed his duty as he saw fit. By Forestry Administrative Order 12-2, "[t]he Director of Forestry may cancel a certificate of registration for any violation of the provision of this Order or of the forest and internal revenue laws and regulations or of the terms and conditions embodied in the certificate, or when found that the area is no longer covered with forest, or upon failure of the landowner thereof, or of his representatives, to obey, follow or implement instructions of the said Director of Forestry." 43 To him, a condition expressly written into the registration certificate was being violated. Piadeco was found to be cutting trees within the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservations in direct contravention of a specific prohibition in the certificate. And this, upon the basis of positive and actual findings of qualified and competent forestry officers. Quite revealing is Piadeco's admission44 before the court below that "it made cuttings on that portion of its own private land within the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservation where it was constructing its access road to the area covered by P.W.P. No. 2065 to the construction of which no objection was interposed by ... Nawasa as per its resolution No. 126, Series of 1964." 45 Deducible from the foregoing

is that Piadeco was cutting within the watershed reservations outside the area covered by its registration certificate, altho within the land it claims in private ownership, which is now disputed. Piadeco's registration certificate should remain cancelled. It could be stricken down anytime. It is a nullity. And, notwithstanding the fact that said registration certificate had expired and was not renewed, Piadeco had the temerity to continue operations. Correctly, there was necessity for freezing forthwith Piadeco's illegal acts.46 4. True it is that the judgment below virtually reinstated Piadeco's registration certificate. However, as shall be discussed later on in this opinion, that judgment has now no legal effect. For, said certificate, by its very terms, expired on December 31, 1964. Piadeco cannot be heard to protest further. But Piadeco still insists that it objected to the expiry date of the registration certificate, when it was issued that certificate. Granting the truth of this averment, Piadeco nonetheless accepted the certificate, did not follow up its objection to its logical conclusion, sat supinely until the certificate was cancelled; only then did it renew the bid that its registration certificate is non-expirable. At all events, Piadeco's submission is inaccurate. Forestry Administrative Order 12-2, promulgated pursuant to law, amended Section 11 of Forestry Administrative Order 12-1, the pertinent part of which reads: (b) Duration of the certificate. The certificate of registration issued under this Order shall be made to expire on the last day of the 12th month from the date of its issuance. This regulation is not without rational basis. This Court had occasion to say once47 that: "Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, land classified as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow." Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 verily declares that certificates "are renewable for as long as there are substantial amounts of forestry in the area, upon filing of the necessary application therefor" and that those "cancelled for causes may be renewed upon submission of application for registration by the owner and if the cause of cancellation is explained satisfactorily."48 If only for purposes of effective regulation, annual registration of private woodlands cannot be successfully assailed. 5. We cannot place our stamp of approval on Piadeco's claim that it should be permitted to remove from the premises those logs that have already been cut before December 31, 1964, the expiry date of its registration certificate. We have already said that its registration certificate is a nullity. Even if it is not, the facts and the law will not support its plea. It is not altogether clear whether the 600 pieces of unscaled and the 1,000 pieces of mixed (scaled and unscaled)timber sought to be hauled by Piadeco, were cut before December 31, 1964. Piadeco could present only one auxiliary invoice thereon, which but covers 256 logs and that very invoice stated that those logs were "cut or ordered cut" in the area covered by P.W.R. No. 2065-New, "after its expiration on Dec. 31, 1964."49 Worse, a factual assumption that the logs were cut before that date, is meaningless in law. A contrary view would easily lend itself to misuse and mischief. For, loopholes could then be bored through which an unscrupulous logger may crawl. Such that a holder of a registration certificate could be at complete liberty to just cut and cut during the lifetime of that certificate and leave the hauling for later, as he pleases, even long after expiry thereof. This, we must say, should not be allowed to pass. 6. Absent a valid registration certificate under Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code, or a license to cut, gather and remove timber, and more important, credible evidence of private ownership over the forestry land in question, Piadeco's logging operations logically descend to the level of unlawful cutting from public forests. Seizure made by the government authorities here of logs illegally cut cannot be branded as illegal. It was but in obedience to Bureau of Internal Revenue General Circular No. V-337 of May 24, 1961, which prescribed rules on the disposition of illegally cut logs, pursuant to a directive from the Office of the President to the Secretary of Finance on March 22, 1961. Section 3 of Circular V-337 declares as follows:

3. Logs illegally cut from public forests, such as timberlands, forest reserves other than national parks, 50communal forests and communal pastures shall be subject to seizure and delivered to the nearest Bureau of Internal Revenue Officer who in turn shall deliver them to the duly authorized representative of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for use in the manufacture of prefabricated school houses. The illegal cutter shall not be allowed to pay the forest charges and surcharges and other fees on the logs cut. However, if such forest charges and fees have already been paid, the same shall be retained by the Bureau of Internal Revenue Officer concerned as part of the collection for forest charges, but shall not be the basis for the release of such logs. On the other hand, such payment shall be used as evidence should the illegal cutter be prosecuted in court for the violation of the corresponding forest laws.51 Could this Court then justifiably order the delivery to Piadeco of the logs impounded right there on the land? The answer must certainly have to be in the negative; a contrary posture is tantamount to abetting a wrong. The logs belong to the State. They are not Piadeco's. Piadeco cannot later on come back to claim them by curing defects in the proof of its ownership over the land. It has submitted the controversy over the logs for decision to this Court. Any ruling thereon should bind Piadeco. It cannot be overturned by fresh convincing proof of ownership, which it should have offered in the first place. We hold that government seizure of Piadeco's logs here complained of is valid. 7. The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds try up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops, livestock, houses and highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a lumberman's decalogue. Because of the importance of forests to the nation, the State's police power has been wielded to regulate the use and occupancy of forests and forest reserves. To be sure, the validity of the exercise of police power in the name of the general welfare cannot be seriously attacked. Our Government has definite instructions from the Constitution's preamble to "promote the general welfare." Jurisprudence has time and again upheld the police power over individual rights, because of the general welfare. Five decades ago, Mr. Justice Malcolm made it clear that the "right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good" and that the "liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power." 52 Mr. Justice Laurel, about twenty years later, affirmed the precept when he declared that "the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations" and that"[p]ersons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state."53 Recently, we quoted from a leading American case,54 which pronounced that "neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellow, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm," and that, therefore, "[e]qually fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate in the common interest. 55 These precepts more than suffice to sustain the validity of the government's action with respect to Piadeco's logging operations. 8. We come to consider the effects of the judgment in Civil Case 3035-M, where the Court of First Instance of Bulacan adjudged Piadeco's operation not to be in violation of forestry rules and regulations and made permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued against the defaulting forestry authorities, upon Piadeco's ex-parteevidence. That judgment, it should be remembered, is sought to be executed by Piadeco and the execution proceedings in that case are not before this Court on review.

Said judgment enjoined the forestry officials from carrying out and executing the order of April 11, 1964 and the implementing letter of April 14, 1964, cancelling Piadeco's registration certificate, PWR 2065-New. But when execution was ordered on June 1, 1965, and the writ of execution issued on June 3, 1965, and when the court ordered on July 8, 1965 that Piadeco be allowed to haul its logs, the registration certificate had already expired on December 31, 1964. It is, therefore, not inappropriate for us to say that judgment had already become functus officio56 and can no longer be executed. The over-all position we have here taken should dispose of all other issues raised by the parties; hence, unnecessary is a discussion thereof. For the reasons given The petition for certiorari and prohibition in L-24796 is hereby granted; the June 1, 1965 order of execution, the June 3, 1965 writ of execution issued pursuant thereto, and the July 8, 1965 order, allowing respondent Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. to haul its logs, all of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case 3035-M, are hereby declared null and void; the writ of preliminary injunction issued herein is hereby made permanent; and the Chief of the Engineer Corps, Armed Forces of the Philippines, who was permitted by this Court on October 8, 1965 to retain for safekeeping and custody the logs previously seized by the State from the log ponds of respondent Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc., is now given authority to use the same for the manufacture of prefabricated school houses; and The petition of Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. for injunction and prohibition in L-25459 is hereby denied. 17. Director of lands vs. Court of AppealsFacts:The land in question is situated in Obando, Bulacan. It adjoins the Kailogan River andprivate respondent Valeriano have converted it into a fishpond.In their application in 1976, private respondents claimed that they are the co-owners infee simple of the land partly through inheritance and partly by purchase and that; it is notwithin any forest or military reservation.The Republic of the Phil., represented by the Dir of the Bureau of Forest Development,opposed the application on the principal ground that the land applied for is WITHIN THEUNCLASSIFIED REGION of Obando, Bulacan and that such area are denominated as FORESTLANDS-do not form part of the disposable and alienable portion of the public domain.The Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land in favor of the Valerianos. Thiswas affirmed by the CA which said in part that since the subject property is entirely devoted tofishpond purposes, it cannot be categorized as part of forest lands.Issue:WON the courts can reclassify the subject public land.Held:Courts cannot reclassify... its beyond their competence and jurisdiction.The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the ExecutiveDepartment of the Government (Bureau of Forest Development) and not of the Courts. In theabsence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefromand rendered open to disposition.Since the subj property is still unclassified, whatever possession Applicants (Valeriano)may have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.The conversion of the subj property into a fishpond by Applicants does notautomatically render the property as alienable and disposable.The recommendation of the District Forester for release of subj property fromunclassified region is not the ultimate word on the matter. 18. G.R. Nos. L-31666, L-31667 and L-31668 April 30, 1979 LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. MANUEL DUMYUNG, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY, and the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. FORTUNATO DUMYUNG, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY , and the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. DUMYUNG BONAYAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY, and the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents. Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo & Feliciano, Jesus B. Santos and Hill & Associates for petitioner. Floro B. Bugnosen for private respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.: This is a petition to review the order of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, Branch I, dismissing the three complaints for annulment of titles in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 entitled "Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Manuel Dumyung, et al., Defendants, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, Intervenor" for being without merit. 1 The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, commenced in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 for annulment of Free Patents Nos. V152242, V-155050 and V-152243, and of the corresponding Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-208, P-210 and P-209, on the ground of misrepresentation and false data and informations furnished by the defendants, Manuel Dumyung, Fortunate Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan, respectively. the land embraced in the patents and titles are Identified as Lots 1, 2 and 3 of survey plan Psu-181763 containing a total area of 58.4169 hectares, more or less, and situated in the Municipal District of Mankayan, Sub-province of Benguet, Mountain Province. The Register of Deeds of Baguio City was made a formal party defendant. The complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 are all dated September 22, 196 l. The defendants filed their respective answers. 3 The Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, petitioner herein, filed motions for intervention dated February 5, 1962 in the three (3) civil cases 4 which were granted. 5 The complaints in intervention alleged that a portion of the titled lands in question-.ion is within the intervenor's ordinary timber license No. 140-'62 dated July 7, 1961 expiring and up for renewal on June 30, 1962 and another portion of said lands is embraced in its mineral claims. 6 The defendants in the three (3) civil cases filed an amended joint answer with counterclaim to the complaint in intervention. 7 The said amended joint answer was admitted in an order dated September 10, 1972. 8 Before the hearing on the merits of the three (3) civil cases, the plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City three (3) criminal cases for falsification of public document. 9, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2358, 2359 and 2360, against the defendants Manuel Dumyung, Fortunato Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan, private respondents herein, for allegedly making untrue statements in their applications for free patents over the lands in question. The proceedings on the three (3) civil cases were suspended pending the outcome of the criminal cases. After the presentation of evidence by the prosecution in the three (3) criminal cases, the defense filed a motion to dismiss the same on the ground that the accused had complied with all the legal requirements in the acquisition of their patents which were duly issued by the Director of Lands and that they are not guilty of the alleged falsification of public documents. In an order dated December 6, 1967, the trial court sustained the theory of the defense and dismissed the three (3) criminal cases, with costs de officio, for insufficiency of evidence to sustain the conviction of the three (3) accused. 9 Thereupon, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss dated October 12, 1968 in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 on the following grounds: (1) extinction of the penal action carries with it the extinction of the civil action when the extinction proceeds from a declaration that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist; (2) the decision of the trial court acquitting the defendants of the crime charged renders these civil cases moot and academic, (3) the trial court has no jurisdiction to order cancellation of the patents issued by the Director of Lands; (4) the certificates of title in question can no longer be assailed; and (5) the intervenor Lepanto has no legal interest in the subject matter in litigation. 10 The Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch I, dismissed the three (3) civil cases because:
2

After a careful examination and deliberation of the MOTION TO DISMISS, these civil cases filed by the defendants as well as the two OPPOSITIONS TO MOTION TO DISMISS filed by both plaintiff and intervenor Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company and the of all the three civil cases, it clearly shows that upon the issuance of said Free Patents on November 26, 1960, the same were duly registered with the office of the Register of Deeds of Baguio and Benguet, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 122 of Act 496, as amended, and consequently, these properties became the private properties of the defendants, under the operation of Sec. 38 of said Act; hence, these titles enjoy the same privileges and safeguards as Torrens titles (Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carle, G. R. No. L-12485, July 31, 1964). It is therefore clear that OCT Nos. P-208, P209 and P-210 belonging to the defendants are now indefeasible and this Court has no power to disturb such indefeasibility of said titles, let alone cancel the same. The records of this case further disclose that the defendants are ignorant natives of Benguet Province and are members of the so-called Cultural Minorities of Mountain Province, who are the same persons accused in the dismissed criminal cases, based on the same grounds. It should be noted that these cases fall squarely under Sec. 3 of Rule III of the New Rules of Court. 11 They plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, and the intervenor, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company,, filed separate motions for reconsideration of the order dismissing Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070. 12 Both motion for reconsideration were denied by the trial court. 13 Thereupon the intervenor, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, filed the instant petition. The petitioner assigns the following errors: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE 'INDEFEASIBLE' SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY WERE ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE REGISTRATION OF THE FREE PATENTS OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3872. III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACQUITTAL OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE CRIMINAL CASES FOR FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS BARRED THE CIVIL ACTIONS FOR ANNULMENT OF THE FREE PATENTS AND CANCELLATION OF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. 14 Timber and mineral lands are not alienable or disposable. The pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provide: Sec. 2. The provisions of this Act shall apply to the lands of the public domain; but timber and mineral lands shag be governed by special laws and nothing in this Act provided shall be understood or construed to change or modify the administration and disposition of the lands commonly called 'friar lands' and those which being privately owned, have reverted to or become the property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, which administration and disposition shall be governed by the laws at present in force or which may hereafter be enacted. Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into (a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Timber, and (c) Mineral lands, and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition. The principal factual issue raised by the plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, and the intervenor, petitioner herein, is that the lands covered by the patents and certificates of title are timber lands and mineral lands and, therefore, not alienable. Without receiving evidence, the trial court dismissed the three (3) cases on the ground that upon the issuance of the free patents on November 26, 1960, said patents were duly registered in the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Baguio pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496, as amended, and said properties became the private properties of the defendants under the operation of Section 38 of the Land Registration Act. The trial court concluded that these titles enjoy the same privileges and safeguards as the torrens title, and Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-208, P-209 and P-210 of the defendants are now indefeasible. In its order denying the motion for reconsideration the trial court said, On the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Director of Lands to dispose of the properties since they are within the forest zone, the court finds Republic Act No. 3872, to clear this point. Section 1, amending Section 44 of the Land Act in its second paragraph states: A member of the national cultural, minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-ininterest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: PROVIDED, that at the time he files his free patent application, he is not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under this provision of the Public Land Law. The 'preceding paragraph' refers to the right of a person to have a free patent issued to him, provided he is qualified, which in this case the Director of Lands has the jurisdiction to dispose, whether the land be disposable or not. This provision of law, certainly, applies to herein defendants. The reason for this law is explicit and could very well be seen from its EXPLANATORY NOTE, which reads: 'Because of the aggresiveness of our more enterprising Christian brothers in Mindanao, Mountain Province, and other places inhabited by members of the National Cultural Minorities, there has be-en an exodus of the poor and less fortunate non-christians from their ancestral homes during the t ten years to the fastnesses of the wilderness where they have settled in peace on portions of agricultural lands, unfortunately, in most cases, within the forest zones. But this is not the end of the tragedy of the national cultural minorities. Because of the grant of pasture leases or permits to the more agressive Christians, these National Cultural Minorities who have settled in the forest zones for the last ten years have been harassed and jailed or threatened with harassment and imprisonment. The thesis behind the additional paragraph to Section 44 of the Public Land Act is to give the national culture, minorities a fair chance to acquire lands of the public domain' ... It is for this reason that is, to give these national cultural minorities who were driven from their ancestral abodes, a fair chance to acquire lands of the public domain that Republic Act 3872 was passed. This is the new government policy on liberation of the free patent provisions of the Public Land Act emphasizing more consideration to and sympathy on the members of the national cultural minorities, which our courts of justice must uphold. 15 The trial court assumed without any factual basis that the private respondents are entitled to the benefits of Republic Act 3872. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No, 3872 reads:

SECTION 1. A new paragraph is hereby added 1--o Section 44 of Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred-d forty-one, to read as follows: SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, ninth hundred and twenty-six or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by, himself' or through his predecessors-in-interest. a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition- or who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has, not been occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provision of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares. A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in- interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time he files his free patent application he is not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under this provision of the Public Land Law. There is no evidence that the private respondents are members of the National Cultural Minorities; that they have continously occupied and cultivated either by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest the lands in question since July 4, 1955; and that they are not the owner of any land secured or disposable under the Public Land Act at the time they filed the free patent applications. These qualifications must be established by evidence. Precisely, the intervenor, petitioner herein, claims that it was in possession of the lands in question when the private respondents applied for free patents thereon. It was premature for the trial court to rule on whether or not the titles based on the patents awarded to the private respondents have become indefeasible. It is well settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. 16 In Director of lands vs. Abanzado 17 this Court said: 4. To complete the picture, reference may be made to the learned and scholarly opinion of Justice Sanchez in Director of Forestry v. Muoz, a 1968 decision. After a review of Spanish legislation, he summarized the present state of the law thus: 'If a Spanish title covering forest land is found to be invalid, that land is public forest land, is part of the public domain, and cannot be appropriated. Before private interests have intervened, the government may decide for i what Portions of the public domain shall be set aside and reserved as forest land. Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.' Nor is this all He reiterated the basic state objective on the matter in clear and penetrating language: 'The view this Court takes of the cages at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, above the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation. protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number Of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappears. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops, livestock, houses and highways not to mention precious human lives, ...' The acquittal of the private respondents in the criminal cases for falsification is not a bar to the civil cases to cancel their titles. The only issue in the criminal cases for falsification was whether there was evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the private respondents had committed the acts of falsification alleged in the informations. The factual issues of whether or not the lands in question are timber or mineral lands and whether or not the private respondents are entitled to the benefits of Republic Act No. 3872 were not in issue in the criminal case.

There is need to remand these cases to the trial court for the reception of evidence on (1) whether or not the lands in question are timber and mineral lands; and (2) whether the private respondents belong to the cultural minorities and are qualified under Republic Act 3872 to be issued free patents on said lands. WHEREFORE, the order dismissing Civil Cases Nos. 1968, 1969 and 1970 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City is hereby set aside and said cases are remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. 19. G.R. No. L- 24548 October 27, 1983 WENCESLAO VlNZONS TAN, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO, respondents-appelllees, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO RIVERA, THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND N ATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO, respon dents-appellees,RAVAGO COMMERCIAL CO., JORGE LAO HAPPICK and ATANACIO MALLARI, intervenors, Camito V Pelianco Jr. for petitioner-appellant. Solicitor General for respondent Director. Estelito P. Mendoza for respondent Ravago Comm'l Co. Anacleto Badoy for respondent Atanacio Mallari. Mariano de Joya, Jr. for respondent Jorge Lao Happick, Jr.

MAKASIAR, J: This is an appeal from the order dated January 20, 1965 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, in Civil Case No. 56813, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary prohibitory injunction (p. 2. rec.), which dismissed the petition of petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan on the ground that it does not state a sufficient cause of action, and upon the respondents-appellees' (Secretary of Agriculture and Natural resources and the Director of Forestry) motion to dismiss (p. 28, rec.). Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for public bidding a certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales, provided tenders were received on or before May 22, 1961 (p. 15, CFI rec.). This public forest land, consisting of 6,420 hectares, is located within the former U.S. Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over by the United States Government to the Philippine Government (P. 99, CFI rec.). On May 5, 1961, petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan submitted his application in due form after paying the necessary fees and posting tile required bond therefor. Nine other applicants submitted their offers before the deadline (p. 29, rec.). Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having the area declared as a forest reserve or allow the same to be awarded to the most qualified bidder. On June 7, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive to the Director of the Bureau of Forestry, which read as follows: It is desired that the area formerly covered by the Naval Reservation be made a forest reserve for watershed purposes. Prepare and submit immediately a draft of a proclamation establishing the said area as a watershed forest reserve for Olongapo, Zambales. It is also desired that the bids received by the Bureau of Forestry for the issuance of the timber license in the area during the public bidding conducted last May 22, 1961 be rejected in order that the area may be reserved as above stated. ...

(SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA (pp. 98, CFI rec.). On August 3, 1961, Secretary Cesar M. Fortich of Agriculture and Natural Resources sustained the findings and re comendations of the Director of Forestry who concluded that "it would be beneficial to the public interest if the area is made available for exploitation under certain conditions," and We quote: Respectfully forwarded to the honorable, the Executive Secretary Malacanang. Manila inviting particular attention to the comment and recommendation of the Director of Forestry in the proceeding in indorsement in which this Of fice fully concurs. The observations of responsible forest officials are most revealing of their zeal to promote forest conservation and watershed protection especially in Olongapo, Zambales area. In convincing fashion, they have demonstrated that to declare the forest area involved as a forest reserve ratify than open it for timber exploitation under license and regulation would do more harm than of to the public interest. To convert the area into a forest reserve without an adequate forest protection force, would make of it a 'Free Zone and Logging Paradise,' to the ever 'Problem Loggers' of Dinalupihan, Bataan . . . an open target of timber smugglers, kaingineros and other forms of forest vandals and despoilers. On the other hand, to award the area, as planned, to a reputable and responsible licensee who shall conduct logging operations therein under the selective logging method and who shall be obliged to employ a sufficient number of forest guards to patrol and protect the forest consecration and watershed protection. Worthy of mention is the fact that the Bureau of Forestry had already conducted a public bidding to determine the most qualified bidder to whom the area advertised should be awarded. Needless to stress, the decision of the Director of Forestry to dispose of the area thusly was arrived at after much thought and deliberation and after having been convinced that to do so would not adversely affect the watershed in that sector. The result of the bidding only have to be announced. To be sure, some of the participating bidders like Mr. Edgardo Pascual, went to much expense in the hope of winning a virgin forest concession. To suddenly make a turn about of this decision without strong justifiable grounds, would cause the Bureau of Forestry and this Office no end of embarrassment. In view of the foregoing, it is earnestly urged that the Director of Forestry be allowed to proceed with the announcement of the results of the bidding for the subject forest area (p. 13, CFI rec.). The Office of the President in its 4th Indorsement dated February 2, 1962, signed by Atty. Juan Cancio, Acting Legal Officer, "respectfully returned to the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources for appropriate action," the papers subject of Forestry Notice No. 2087 which was referred to the Bureau of Forestry for decision (p. 14, CFI rec.). Finally, of the ten persons who submitted proposed the area was awarded to herein petitionerappellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, on April 15, 1963 by the Bureau of Forestry (p. 17, CFI rec.). Against this award, bidders Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions for reconsideration which were denied by the Director of Forestry on December 6, 1963. On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon who succeeded Secretary Cesar M. Fortich in office issued General Memorandum Order No. 46, series of 1963, pertinent portions of which state: xxx xxx xxx SUBJECT: ... ... ... (D)elegation of authority to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary timber licenses.

1. ... ... ... 2. The Director of Forestry is hereby authorized to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (be the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 5,000 hectares each; 3. This Order shall take effect immediately (p. 267, CFI rec.). Thereafter, Jose Y. Feliciano was appointed as Acting secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, replacing secretary Benjamin M. Gozon. Upon assumption of office he Immediately promulgate on December 19, 19b3 General memorandum Order No. 60, revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry, under General Memorandum order No. 46, to grant ordinary timber licenses, which order took effect on the same day, December 19, 1963. Pertinent portions of the said Order read as follows: xxx xxx xxx SUBJECT: Revocation of General Memorandum Order No 46 dated May 30, 1963 1. In order to acquaint the undersigned with the volume and Nature of the work of the Department, the authority delegated to the Director of forestry under General Memorandum Order No. 46, dated May 30, 1963, to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 3,000 hectares each is hereby revoked. Until further notice, the issuance of' new licenses , including amendments thereto, shall be signed by the secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. 2. This Order shall take effect immediately and all other previous orders, directives, circulars, memoranda, rules and regulations inconsistent with this Order are hereby revoked (p. 268, CFl rec.; Emphasis supplied). On the same date that the above-quoted memorandum took effect, December 19, 1963, Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW) dated April 22, 1963, in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry Estanislao R. Bernal without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the license was released by the Office of the Director of Forestry (p. 30, CFI rec.; p. 77, rec.). It was not signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as required by Order No. 60 aforequoted. On February 12, 1964, Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be considered by tile Natural Resources praying that, pending resolution of the appeal filed by Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick from the order of the Director of Forestry denying their motion for reconsideration, OTI No. 20-'64 in the name of Wenceslao V. Tan be cancelled or revoked on the ground that the grant thereof was irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws, rules and regulations. On March 9, 1964, acting on the said representation made by Ravago Commercial Company, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources promulgated an order declaring Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 issued in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, as having been issued by the Director of Forestry without authority, and is therefore void ab initio. The dispositive portion of said order reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office is of the opinion and so holds that O.T. License No. 20-'64 in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan should be, as hereby it is, REVOKED AND DECLARED without force and effect whatsoever from the issuance thereof. The Director of Forestry is hereby directed to stop the logging operations of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, if there be any, in the area in question and shall see to it that the appellee shall not introduce any further improvements thereon pending the disposition of the appeals filed by Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge lao Happick in this case" (pp. 30-31, CFI rec.).

Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied the motion in an Order dated March 25, 1964, wherein this paragraph appears: In this connection, it has been observed by the Acting Director of Forestry in his 2nd indorsement of February 12, 1964, that the area in question composes of water basin overlooking Olongapo, including the proposed Olongapo watershed Reservation; and that the United States as well as the Bureau of Forestry has earmarked this entire watershed for a watershed pilot forest for experiment treatment Concerning erosion and water conservation and flood control in relation to wise utilization of the forest, denudation, shifting cultivation, increase or decrease of crop harvest of agricultural areas influenced by the watershed, etc. .... (pp. 3839, CFI rec.; p. 78, rec.). On April 11, 1964, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, acting on the separate appeals filed by Jorge Lao Happick and Ravago Commercial Company, from the order of the Director of Forestry dated April 15, 1963, awarding to Wenceslao Vinzons Tan the area under Notive No. 2087, and rejecting the proposals of the other applicants covering the same area, promulgated an order commenting that in view of the observations of the Director of Forestry just quoted, "to grant the area in question to any of the parties herein, would undoubtedly adversely affect public interest which is paramount to private interests," and concluding that, "for this reason, this Office is of the opinion and so holds, that without the necessity of discussing the appeals of the herein appellants, the said appeals should be, as hereby they are, dismissed and this case is considered a closed matter insofar as this Office is concerned" (p. 78, rec.). On April 18, 1964, on the basis of the denial of his motion for reconsideration by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, petitioner-appellant filed the instant case before tile court a quo (Court of First Instance, Manila), Special Civil Action No. 56813, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary prohibitory injunction (pp. 1-12, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant claims that the respondents-appellees "unlawfully, illegally whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a valid and existing timber license without just cause, by denying petitioner-appellant of the equal protection of the laws, by depriving him of his constitutional right to property without due process of law, and in effect, by impairing the obligation of contracts" (P. 6, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant prayed for judgment making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents- appellees; declaring the orders of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated March 9, March 25, and April 11, 1964, as well as all his acts and those of the Director of Forestry implementing said orders, and all the proceedings in connection therewith, null and void, unlawful and of no force and effect; ordering the Director of Forestry to renew OTI No. 20-'64 upon expiration, and sentencing the respondents, jointly and severally, to pay the petitioner-appellant the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.000) by way of pecuniary damage, One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) by way of moral and exemplary damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000-00) as attorney's fees and costs. The respondents-appellees separately filed oppositions to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, Ravago Commercial Company, Jorge Lao, Happick and Atanacio Mallari, presented petitions for intervention which were granted, and they too opposed the writ. The Director of Forestry in his motion to dismiss dated April 24, 1964, alleges the following grounds: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction; (2) that the respondents may not be sued without their consent; (3) that the petitioner has not exhausted all available administrative remedies; (4) that the petition does not state a cause of action; and (5) that purely administrative and discretionary functions of administrative officials may not be interfered with by the courts. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources joined the motion to dismiss when in his answer of May 18, 1964, he avers the following special and affirmative defenses: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; (2) that the petitioner has no cause of action; (3) that venue is improperly laid; (4) that the State is immune from suit without its consent; (5) that the court has no power to interfere in purely administrative functions; and (6) that the cancellation of petitioner's license was dictated by public policy (pp. 172-177, rec.). Intervenors also filed their respective answers in intervention with special and affirmative defenses (pp. 78-79, rec.). A hearing was held on the petition for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction, wherein evidence was submitted by all the parties including the intervenors, and extensive discussion was held both orally and in writing. After the said hearing, on January 20, 1965, the court a quo, from the evidence received, resolved not only the question on the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction but also the motion to dismiss, declared that the petition did not state a sufficient cause of action, and dismissed the same

accordingly. To justify such action, the trial court, in its order dismissing the petition, stated that "the court feels that the evidence presented and the extensive discussion on the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction should also be taken into consideration in resolving not only this question but also the motion to dismiss, because there is no reason to believe that the parties will change their stand, arguments and evidence" (p. 478, CFI rec.). His motion for reconsideration having been denied (p. 488, CFI rec.), petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan appealed directly to this Court. I Petitioner-appellant now comes before this Court, claiming that the trial court erred in: (1) holding that the petition does not state a sufficient cause of action: and (2) dismissing the petition [p.27,rec. ]. He argues that the sole issue in the present case is, whether or not the facts in the petition constitute a sufficient cause of action (p. 31, rec.). Petitioner-appellant, in his brief, presented a lengthy discussion on the definition of the term cause of action wherein he contended that the three essential elements thereon, namely, the legal right of the plaintiff, the correlative obligation of the defendants and the act or omission of the defendant in violation of that right are satisfied in the averments of this petition (pp. 31-32, rec.). He invoked the rule that when the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, such fact can be determined only from the facts alleged in the complaint and from no other, and the court cannot consider other matters aliunde He further invoked the rule that in a motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of cause of action, the facts alleged in the complaint are deemed hypothetically admitted for the purpose of the motion (pp. 32-33, rec.). A perusal of the records of the case shows that petitioner-appellant's contentions are untenable. As already observed, this case was presented to the trial court upon a motion to dismiss for failure of the petition to state a claim upon which relief could be granted (Rule 16 [g], Revised Rules of Court), on the ground that the timber license relied upon by the petitioner- appellant in his petition was issued by the Director of Forestry without authority and is therefore void ab initio. This motion supplanted the general demurrer in an action at law and, as a rule admits, for the purpose of the motion, ail facts which are well pleaded however while the court must accept as true all well pleaded facts, the motion does not admit allegations of which the court will take judicial notice are not true, nor does the rule apply to legally impossible facts, nor to facts inadmissible in evidence, nor to facts which appear by record or document included in the pleadings to be unfounded (Vol. 1, Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p. 505, citing cases). It must be noted that there was a hearing held in the instant case wherein answers were interposed and evidence introduced. In the course of the hearing, petitioner-appellant had the opportunity to introduce evidence in support of tile allegations iii his petition, which he readily availed of. Consequently, he is estopped from invoking the rule that to determine the sufficiency of a cause of action on a motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. If there were no hearing held, as in the case of Cohen vs. U.S. CCA Minn 1942,129 F. 2d 733), "where the case was presented to District Court upon a motion to dismiss because of alleged failure of complaint to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and no answer was interposed and no evidence introduced, the only facts which the court could properly consider in passing upon the motion were those facts appearing in the complaint, supplemented be such facts as the court judicially knew. In Llanto vs. Ali Dimaporo, et al. (16 SCRA 601, March 31, 1966), this Court, thru Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, held that the trial court can properly dismiss a complaint on a motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action even without a hearing, by taking into consideration the discussion in said motion and the opposition thereto. Pertinent portion of said decision is hereby quoted: Respondents moved to dismiss. Ground therefor is lack of cause of action. The Court below granted the motion, dismissed the petition. The motion to reconsider failed. Offshoot is this appeal. 1. The threshold questions are these: Was the dismissal order issued without any hearing on the motion to dismiss? Is it void?

WE go to the record. The motion to dismiss was filed on February 1, 1961 and set for hearing on February 10 following. On February 8, 1961 petitioner's counsel telegraphed the court, (r)equest postponement motion dismissal till written opposition filed.' He did not appear at the scheduled hearing. But on March 4, 1961, he followed up his wire, with his written opposition to the motion to dismiss. Adverting to the 5-page motion to dismiss and the 6-page opposition thereto, We find that the arguments pro and con on the question of the board's power to abolish petitioner's position to discussed the problem said profusely cited authorities. The May 15, 1961 8-page court order recited at length the said arguments and concluded that petitioner made no case. One good reason for the statutory requirement of hearing on a motion as to enable the suitors to adduce evidence in support of their opposing claims. But here the motion to dismiss is grounded on lack of cause of action. Existence of a cause of action or lack of it is determined be a reference to the facts averred in the challenged pleading. The question raised in the motion is purely one of law. This legal issue was fully discussed in said motion and the opposition thereto. In this posture, oral arguments on the motion are reduced to an unnecessary ceremony and should be overlooked. And, correctly so, because the other intendment of the law in requiring hearing on a motion, i.e., 'to avoid surprises upon the opposite party and to give to the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion,' has been sufficiently met. And then, courts do not exalt form over substance (Emphasis supplied). Furthermore even if the complaint stated a valid cause of action, a motion to dismiss for- insufficiency of cause of action will be granted if documentary evidence admitted by stipulation disclosing facts sufficient to defeat the claim enabled the court to go beyond disclosure in the complaint (LOCALS No. 1470, No. 1469, and No. 1512 of the International Longshoremen's Association vs. Southern Pacific Co., 6 Fed. Rules Service, p. 107; U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Dec. 7, 1952; 131 F. 2d 605). Thus, although the evidence of the parties were presented on the question of granting or denying petitioner-appellant's application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court correctly applied said evidence in the resolution of the motion to dismiss. Moreover, in applying said evidence in the resolution of the motion to dismiss, the trial court, in its order dismissing the petition, pointed out that, "there is no reason to believe that the parties will change their stand, arguments and evidence" (p. 478, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant did not interpose any objection thereto, nor presented new arguments in his motion for reconsideration (pp. 482-484, CFI rec.). This omission means conformity to said observation, and a waiver of his right to object, estopping him from raising this question for the first time on appeal. " I question not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal" (Matienzo vs. Servidad, Sept. 10, 1981, 107 SCRA 276). Moreover, petitioner-appellant cannot invoke the rule that, when the ground for asking dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, its sufficiency must be determined only from the allegations in the complaint. "The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated. Where the rules are merely secondary in importance are made to override the ends of justice; the technical rules had been misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial right of a party, said rigid application cannot be countenanced" (Vol. 1, Francisco, Civil Procedure, 2 ed., 1973, p. 157, citing cases). What more can be of greater importance than the interest of the public at large, more particularly the welfare of the inhabitants of Olongapo City and Zambales province, whose lives and properties are directly and immediately imperilled by forest denudation. The area covered by petitioner-appellant's timber license practically comprises the entire Olongapo watershed (p. 265, CFI rec.). It is of public knowledge that watersheds serves as a defense against soil erosion and guarantees the steady supply of water. As a matter of general policy, the Philippine Constitution expressly mandated the conservation and proper utilization of natural resources, which includes the country's watershed. Watersheds in the Philippines had been subjected to rampant abusive treatment due to various unscientific and destructive land use practices. Once lush watersheds were wantonly deforested due to uncontrolled timber cutting by licensed concessionaries and illegal loggers. This is one reason why, in paragraph 27.of the rules and regulations included in the ordinary timber license it is stated:

The terms and conditions of this license are subject to change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license may be made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests so require (Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.). Considering the overriding public interest involved in the instant case, We therefore take judicial notice of the fact that, on April 30, 1964, the area covered by petitioner-appellant's timber license has been established as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve by virtue of Executive Proclamation No. 238 by then President Diosdado Macapagal which in parts read as follows: Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1824 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, 1, Diosdado Macapagal, President of the Philippines do hereby withdraw from entry, sale, or settlement and establish as Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve for watershed, soil protection, and timber production purposes, subject to private rights, if any there be, under the administration and control of the Director of Forestry, xx the following parcels of land of the public domain situated in the municipality of Olongapo, province of Zambales, described in the Bureau of Forestry map No. FR-132, to wit: ... ... (60 O.G. No. 23, 3198). Petitioner-appellant relies on Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW) for his alleged right over the timber concession in question. He argues thus: "The facts alleged in the petition show: (1) the legal right of the petitioner to log in the area covered by his timber license; (2) the legal or corresponding obligation on the part of the respondents to give effect, recognize and respect the very timber license they issued to the petitioner; and (3) the act of the respondents in arbitrarily revoking the timber license of the petitioner without giving him his day in court and in preventing him from using and enjoying the timber license issued to him in the regular course of official business" (p. 32, rec.). In the light of petitioner-appellant's arguments, it is readily seen that the whole controversy hinges on the validity or invalidity of his timber license. WE fully concur with the findings of the trial court that petitioner- appellant's timber license was signed and released without authority by then Acting Director Estanislao R. Bernal of Forestry, and is therefore void ab initio. WE hereby quote such findings: In the first place, in general memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized to grant a new ordinary timber license only where the area covered thereby was not more than 3,000 hectares; the tract of public forest awarded to the petitioner contained 6,420 hectares (Exhs. 2-A and 2-B Ravago, embodied in Annex B; Exh. B). The petitioner contends that only 1,756 hectares of the said area contain commercial and operable forest; the authority given to the Director of Forestry to grant a new ordinary timber license of not more than 3,000 hectares does not state that the whole area should be commercial and operable forest. It should be taken into consideration that the 1,756 hectares containing commercial and operable forest must have been distributed in the whole area of 6,420 hectares. Besides the license states, 'Please see attached sketch and technical description,' gives an area of 6,420 hectares and does not state what is the area covered of commmercial and operable forest (Exh. Ravago Also Annex B of the petition, which was marked as Exhibit B, states: Under Notice No. 2087, a tract of public forest containing 6,420 hectares located in Olongapo, Zambales was declared available for timber utilization and development. Pursuant to this Notice, there were received bid proposals from the following persons: ... Wherefore, confirming the findings of said Committee, the area described in Notice No. 2087 shall be awarded, as it is hereby awarded to Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, subject to the following conditions: ... ... In the second place, at the time it was released to the petitioner, the Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to grant any license. The license was signed by the Acting Director of Forestry on December 19, 1963, and released to the petitioner on January 6, 1964 (Exh. RavaGo The authority delegated to the Director of Forestry to grant a new ordinary timber license was contained in general memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963. This was revoked by general memorandum order No. 60, which was promulgated on December 19, 1963. In view thereof, the Director of Forestry had no

longer any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964, and said license is therefore voidab initio (pp. 479480, CFI rec.). The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the impression that it was ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on which date the authority of the Director of Forestry was revoked. But, what is of greatest importance is the date of the release or issuance, and not the date of the signing of the license. While petitioner-appellant's timber license might have been signed on December 19, 1963 it was released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release, no right is acquired by the licensee. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not acquired any legal right under such void license. This is evident on the face of his petition as supplemented by its annexes which includes Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW). Thus, in the case of World Wide Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. vs. Macrohon, et al. (105 Phil. 250, Feb. 28, 1959), this Court held that if from the face of the complaint, as supplemented by its annexes, plaintiff is not the owner, or entitled to the properties it claims to have been levied upon and sold at public auction by the defendants and for which it now seeks indemnity, the said complaint does not give plaintiff any right of action against the defendants. In the same case, this Court further held that, in acting on a motion to dismiss, the court cannot separate the complaint from its annexes where it clearly appears that the claim of the plaintiff to be the A owner of the properties in question is predicated on said annexes. Accordingly, petitioner-appellant's petition must be dismissed due to lack of cause of action. II Petitioner-appellant, in his petition, alleged that he has exhausted all his administrative remedies to no avail as respondents-appellees have failed, neglected, refused and continue to refuse to allow petitioner-appellant to continue operation in the area covered by his timber license. He further alleged that he has neither recourse by way of appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except thru this special civil action, as the last official act of the respondentappellee Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in declaring void the timber license referred to above after denying petitioner-appellant's motion for reconsideration, is the last administrative act. Petitioner-appellant relies on the case of Demaisip vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. (106 Phil. 237, Sept. 24, 1959), wherein it was held that the failure of the plaintiff to appeal from the adverse decision of the Secretary to the President cannot preclude the plaintiff from taking court action in view of the theory that the Secretary of a department is merely an alter-ego of the President. The presumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the President unless the same is disapproved by the latter (Villena vs. the Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451; p. 7, CFI rec.). To this We cannot agree. Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, who issued Executive Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the area from private exploitation, and establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies. Thus, this Court, in the case of Calo vs. Fuertes (5 SCRA 399, 400, June 29, 1962), held that: At any rate, the appellant's contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is the alter ego of the President and his acts or decisions are also those of the latter, he need not appeal from the decision or opinion of the former to the latter, and that, such being the case, after he had appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of the Director of Lands he had exhausted the administrative remedies, is untenable. The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is tantamount to not appealing all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal to the President is the last step he should take in an administrative case. In 1912, in the case of Lamb vs. Phipps (22 Phil. 491-92, July 22, 1912), this Court stressed the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, thus: When a plain, adequate and speedy remedy is afforded by and within the executive department of the government the courts will not interfere until at least that remedy has been exhausted. Jao Igco vs. Shuster, 10 Phil. Rep. 448; Ekiu vs. U.S., 142 U.S. 651; U.S. vs. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161; U.S. vs. Ju Toy 198 U.S. 253; Chill Yow vs. U.S., 28

Sup. Ct. Rep. 201). The administrative remedies afforded by law must first be exhausted before resort can be had to the courts, especially when the administrative remedies are by law exclusive and final. Some matters and some questions are by law delegated entirely and absolutely to the discretion of particular branches of the executive department of the government. When the law confers exclusive and final jurisdiction upon the executive department of the government to dispose of particular questions, their judgments or the judgments of that particular department are no more reviewable by the courts than the final judgment or decisions of the courts are subject to be reviewed and modified by them" (emphasis supplied). Moreover, this being a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must allege and prove that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy (Diego vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., 54 Off. Gaz., No. 4, 956). In the case at bar, petitioner- appellant's speedy and adequate remedy is an appeal to the President of the Philippines. Accordingly, "it is settled to the point of being elementary that the only question involved n certiorari is jurisdiction, either want of jurisdiction or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion shall warrant the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari when the same is so grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law" FS Divinagracia Agro-Commercial Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 191 [April .1, 1981]). The foregoing is on the assumption that there is any irregularity, albeit there is none in the acts or omissions of the respondents-appellees. certiorari is not a substitute for appeal as held time and again by this Court (People vs. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465), "it being a time honored and well known principle that before seeking judicial redress, a party must first exhaust the administrative remedies available" (Garcia vs. Teehankee, 27 SCRA 944, April 18, 1969). Moreover, from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources complained of, petitioners had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy by appealing therefrom to the Chief Executive. In other words, before filing the present action for certiorari in the court below, they should have availed of this administrative remedy and their failure to do so must be deemed fatal to their case [Calo vs. Fuertes, et al., G.R. No. L-16537, June 29,1962]. To place petitioners' case beyond the pale of this rule, they must show that their case falls which it does not within the cases where, in accordance with our decisions, the aggrieved party need not exhaust administrative remedies within his reach in the ordinary course of the law [Tapales vs. The President and the Board of Regents of the U.P., G.R. No. L-17532, March 30, 1963; Mangubat vs. Osmena, G.R. No. L- 12837, April 30, 1959; Baguio vs. Hon. Jose Rodriguez, G. R. No. L-11078, May 27, 1959; Pascual vs. Provincial Board, G.R. No. L-11959, Oct. 31, 1959; Marinduque Iron Mines, etc. vs. Secretary of Public Works, G.R. No. L-15982, May 31, 1963; Alzate vs. Aldaba, G.R. No. L-14407, Feb. 29, 1960 and Demaisip vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L- 13000, Sept. 25, 1959] (Ganob vs. Ramas, 27 SCRA 1178, April 28, 1969). III Petitioner-appellant not only failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, but also failed to note that his action is a suit against the State which, under the doctrine of State immunity from suit, cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to be sued Kawananakoa vs. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349; Siren vs. U.S., 7 Wall. 152; Sec. 16, Art. XV, 1973 Constitution). The respondents-appellees, in revoking the petitioner-appellant's timber license, were acting within the scope of their authority. Petitioner-appellant contends that "this case is not a suit against the State but an application of a sound principle of law whereby administrative decisions or actuations may be reviewed by the courts as a protection afforded the citizens against oppression" (p. 122, CFI rec.). But, piercing the shard of his contention, We find that petitioner-appellant's action is just an attempt to circumvent the rule establishing State exemption from suits. He cannot use that principle of law to profit at the expense and prejudice of the State and its citizens. The promotion of public welfare and the protection of the inhabitants near the public forest are property, rights and interest of the State. Accordingly, "the rule establishing State exeraiption from suits may not be circumvented by directing the action against the officers of the State instead of against the State itself. In such cases the State's immunity may be validly invoked against the action as long as it can be shown that the suit really affects the property, rights, or interests of the State and not merely those of the officer nominally made party defendant" (SINCO, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 35; Salgado vs. Ramos, 64 Phil. 724; see also Angat River Irrigation System vs. Angat River Workers' Union, G.R. No. L-10943-44, Dec. 28,

1957, 102 Phil. 789, 800-802; Mobil PhiL vs. Customs Arrastre Service, 18 SCRA 1120, 1121-1125; Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of Printing Employees' Association, 1 SCRA 340, 341, 343). Both the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Forestry acted in their capacity as officers of the State, representatives of the sovereign authority discharging governmental powers. A private individual cannot issue a timber license. Consequently, a favorable judgment for the petitioner-appellant would result in the government losing a substantial part of its timber resources. This being the case, petitioner-appellant's action cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to be sued. IV Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still respondents-appellees can validly revoke his timber license. As pointed out earlier, paragraph 27 of the rules and regulations included in the ordinary timber license states: "The terms and conditions of this license are subject to change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license may be made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests so require" (Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.). A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this ceise "A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation" (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin 54 O.G. 7576). In the case of Pedro vs. Provincial Board of Rizal (56 Phil. 123), it was held that: A license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may not be deprived without due process of law, but a mere privilege which may be revoked when public interests so require. The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the proper exercise of police power (Surigao Electric Co., Inc. vs. Municipality of Surigao, 24 SCRA 898, Aug. 30, 1968). The State has inherent power enabling it to prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety, and welfare of society (Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, Oct. 24,1970). V As provided in the aforecited provision, timber licenses are subject to the authority of the Director of Forestry. The utilization and disposition of forest resources is directly under the control and supervision of the Director of Forestry. However, "while Section 1831 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that forest products shall be cut, gathered and removed from any forest only upon license from the Director of Forestry, it is no less true that as a subordinate officer, the Director of Forestry is subject to the control of the Department Head or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (See. 79[c], Rev. Adm. Code), who, therefore, may impose reasonable regulations in the exercise of the powers of the subordinate officer" (Director of Forestry vs. Benedicto, 104 SCRA 309, May 5, 1981). The power of control of the Department Head over bureaus and offices includes the power to modify, reverse or set aside acts of subordinate officials (Province of Pangasinan vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 30 SCRA 134, Oct. 31, 1969; Montano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 144, 147-148). Accordingly, respondent-appellee Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has the authority to revoke, on valid grounds, timber licenses issued by the Director of Forestry. There being supporting evidence, the revocation of petitioner-appellant's timber license was a wise exercise of the power of the respondent- appellee (Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources) and therefore, valid. Thus, "this Court had rigorously adhered to the principle of conserving forest resources, as corollary to which the alleged right to them of private individuals or entities was meticulously inquired into and more often than not rejected. We do so again" (Director of Forestry vs. Benedicto, supra). WE reiterate Our fidelity to the basic policy of conserving the national patrimony as ordained by the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, THE ORDER APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY .AFFIRMED IN TOTO. COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLANT. SO ORDERED,