G.R. No. 137268 March 26, 2001 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

EUTIQUIA CARMEN @ Mother Perpetuala, CELEDONIA FABIE @ Isabel Fabie, DELIA SIBONGA @ Deding Sibonga, ALEXANDER SIBONGA @ Nonoy Sibonga, and REYNARIO NUEZ @ Rey Nuez, accused-appellants. MENDOZA, J.: This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Ceb u City, finding accusedappellants Eutiquia Carmen @ Mother Perpetuala, Celedonia Fabie @ Isabel Fabie, Delia Sibonga @ Deding Sibonga, Alexander Sibonga @ Nonoy Sibonga, and Reynario Nuez @ Rey Nuez gu ilty of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pa y the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity as well as the costs. The information2 against accused-appellants alleged: That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997 at about 2:00 o'clock p.m., in th e City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, w ith treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there inflict fatal physical injuries on one Randy L untayao which injuries caused the death of the said Randy Luntayao. Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge, whereupon they were tried. The prosecution presented evidence showing the following: At around 2 o'clock in the afternoon of January 27, 1997, Honey Fe Abella, 10, and her friend Frances Claire Rivera, 7, were pla ying takyan in front of the house of one Bebing Lastimoso in Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City, when suddenly they hea rd a child shout, "Tabang ma!" ("Help mother!"). The cry came from the direction of the house of a ccused-appellant Carmen, who is also known in their neighborhood as Mother Perpetuala. The two ch ildren ran towards Mother Perpetuala's house.3 What Honey Fe saw on which she testified in court, i s summarized in the decision of the trial court, to wit: While there[,] she saw a boy, whose name . . . she [later] came to know as one R andy Luntayao, . . . being immersed head first in a drum of water. Accused Alexander Sibonga was holding th e waist of the body while accused Reynario Nuez held the hands of the boy at the back. Accused Eutiqu ia Carmen, Delia Sibonga, and Celedonia Fabie were pushing down the boy's head into the water. Sh e heard the boy shouting "Ma, help" for two times. Later, she saw accused Reynario or Rey Nuez tie the boy on the bench with a green rope as big as her little finger. . . . After that Eutiquia Carmen poured [water from] a plastic container

(galon) . . . into the mouth of the boy. Each time the boy struggled to raise hi s head, accused Alexander Sibonga banged the boy's head against the bench [to] which the boy was tied down . She even heard the banging sound everytime the boy's head hit the bench. For about five times she h eard it. According to this witness after forcing the boy to drink water, Eutiquia Carmen and accused Celedo nia Fabie alias Isabel Fabie took turns in pounding the boy's chest with their clenched fists. All the time Rey Nuez held down the boy's feet to the bench. She also witnessed . . . Celedonia Fabie dropped he r weight, buttocks first, on the body of the boy. Later on, Eutiquia Carmen ordered Delia or Deding Sibonga t o get a knife from the kitchen. Eutiquia Carmen then slowly plunged the stainless knife on the left sid e of the boy's body and with the use of a plastic gallon container, the top portion of which was cut out, Eut iquia Carmen [caught] the blood dripping from the left side of the boy's body. Honey Fe heard the moaning coming from the tortured boy. Much later she saw Nonoy or Alexander Sibonga, Reynario Nuez, Delia Sibonga, Celedonia Fabie, and Eutiquia Carmen carry the boy into the house.4 Eddie Luntayao, father of the victim, testified that he has five children, the e ldest of whom, Randy, was 13 years old at the time of the incident. On November 20, 1996, Randy had a "nervou s breakdown" which Eddie thought was due to Randy having to skip meals whenever he took the boy wit h him to the farm. According to Eddie, his son started talking to himself and laughing. On January 26, 1997, upon the

suggestion of accused-appellant Reynario Nuez, Eddie and his wife Perlita and the ir three children (Randy, Jesrel, 7, and Lesyl, 1) went with accused-appellant Nuez to Cebu. They a rrived in Cebu at around 1 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day and spent the night in Nuez's h ouse in Tangke, Talisay. The following day, they went to the house of accused-appellant Carmen in Quiot, Pardo,5 where all of the accused-appellants were present. Eddie talked to accused-appellant Carmen regard ing his son's condition. He was told that the boy was possessed by a "bad spirit," which accused-appellan t Carmen said she could exorcise. She warned, however, that as the spirit might transfer to Eddie, it wa s best to conduct the healing prayer without him. Accused-appellants then led Randy out of the house, while Ed die and his wife and two daughters were locked inside a room in the house.6 After a while, Eddie heard his son twice shout "Ma, tabang!" ("Mother, help!"). Eddie tried to go out of the room to find out what was happening to his son, but the door was locked. After a bout an hour, the Luntayaos were transferred to the prayer room which was located near the main do or of the house.7 A few hours later, at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellants carr ied Randy into the prayer room and placed him on the altar. Eddie was shocked by what he saw. Randy's face was bluish and contused, while his tongue was sticking out of his mouth. It was clear to Eddie that his son was already dead. He wanted to see his son's body, but he was stopped from doing so by accus ed-appellant Eutiquia Carmen who told him not to go near his son because the latter would be resurrect ed at 7 o'clock that evening.8 After 7 o'clock that evening, accused-appellant Carmen asked a member of her gro up to call the funeral parlor and bring a coffin as the child was already dead. It was arranged that th e body would be transferred to the house of accused-appellant Nuez. Thus, that night, the Luntayao family, ac companied by accusedappellant Nuez, took Randy's body to Nunez's house in Tangke, Talisay. The follow ing day, January 28, 1997, accused-appellant Nuez told Eddie to go with him to the Talisay Municipal H ealth Office to report Randy's death and told him to keep quiet or they might not be able to get the ne cessary papers for his son's burial. Nuez took care of securing the death certificate which Eddie signed.9 At around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of January 28, 1997, accused-appellant Carm en went to Tangke, Talisay to ensure that the body was buried. Eddie and his wife told her that the y preferred to bring their son's body with them to Sikatuna, Isabela, Negros Occidental but they were told by accused-appellant Carmen that this was not possible as she and the other accused-appellants might

be arrested. That same afternoon, Randy Luntayao was buried in Tangke, Talisay.10 After Eddie and his family had returned home to Negros Occidental, Eddie sought assistance from the Bombo Radyo station in Bacolod City which referred him to the regional office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in the city. On February 3, 1997, Eddie filed a complaint fo r murder against accusedappellant Nuez and the other members of his group.11 He also asked for the exhuma tion and autopsy of the remains of his son.12 As the incident took place in Cebu, his complaint was referred to the NBI office in Cebu City. Modesto Cajita, head of NBI, Region VII (Cebu), took over the investigation of t he case. He testified that he met with Eddie Luntayao and supervised the exhumation and autopsy of the body of Randy Luntayao.13 Cajita testified that he also met with accused-appellant Carmen and after admitt ing that she and the other accused-appellants conducted a "pray-over healing" session on the victim on Janu ary 27, 1997, accusedappellant Carmen refused to give any further statement. Cajita noticed a wooden bench in the kitchen of Carmen's house, which, with Carmen's permission, he took with him to the NBI off ice for examination. Cajita admitted he did not know the results of the examination.14 Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, the NBI medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy on Randy Luntayao, testified that he, the victim's father, and some NBI agents, exhumed the victim' s body on February 20, 1997 at Tangke Catholic Cemetery in the Tangke, Talisay, Cebu. He conducted the autop sy on the same day and later submitted the following report (Exhs. E and F):15

FINDINGS Body in advanced stage of decomposition wearing a white shirt and shorts wrapped in printed blanket (white and orange) placed in white wooden coffin and buried underground about 4 feet deep. Contusion, 3.0 x 4.0 cms. chest, anterior, left side. Fracture, 3rd rib, left, mid-clavicular line. Fracture, linear, occipital bone right side extending to the bases of middle cra nial fossae right to left down to the occipital bone, left side. Fracture, diastatic, lamboidal suture, bilateral. Internal organs in advanced stage of decomposition. Cranial vault almost empty. CAUSE OF DEATH: [The victim] could have died due to the internal effects of a tr aumatic head injury and/or traumatic chest injury. Dr. Mendez testified that the contusion on the victim's chest was caused by cont act with a hard blunt instrument. He added that the fracture on the rib was complete while that found on the base of the skull followed a serrated or uneven pattern. He said that the latter injury could have been caused by the forcible contact of that part of the body with a blunt object such as a wooden bench.16 On cross-examination, Dr. Mendez admitted that he did not find any stab wound on the victim's body but explained that this could be due to the fact that at the time the body was exhum ed and examined, it was already in an advanced state of decomposition rendering such wound, if present, unrecognizable.17 Accused-appellants did not testify. Instead, the defense presented: (a) Ritsel B lase, an alleged eyewitness to the incident; (b) Maria Lilina Jimenez, Visitacion Seniega, and Josefina Abing, alleged former "patients" of accused-appellant Carmen; (c) Dr. Milagros Carloto, the municipal health officer of Talisay, Cebu and; (d) Atty. Salvador Solima of the Cebu City Prosecutor's Office. Ritsel Blase, 21, testified that since 1987 she had been with the group of accus ed-appellant Carmen, whom she calls Mother Perpetuala. She recounted that at around 2 o'clock in the after noon of January 27, 1997, while she was in the house of accused-appellant Carmen, she saw Eddie Luntayao t alking with the latter regarding the treatment of his son. The boy was later led to the kitchen and giv en a bath prior to "treatment." After water was poured on the boy, he became unruly prompting accus ed-appellant Carmen to decide not to continue with the "treatment," but the boy's parents allegedly pre

vailed upon her to continue. As the boy continued to resist, accused-appellant Carmen told accused-appellants Delia Sibonga and Celedonia Fabie to help her (Carmen) lay the boy on a bench. As the child resist ed all the more, Eddie Luntayao allegedly told the group to tie the boy to the bench. Accused-appellant Delia Sibonga got hold of a nylon rope which was used to tie the child to the bench. Then Carmen, Delia Si bonga, and Fabie prayed over the child, but as the latter started hitting his head against the bench, Ca rmen asked Nuez to place his hands under the boy's head to cushion the impact of the blow everytime the child brought down his head. To stop the boy from struggling, accused-appellant Fabie held the boy's legs, wh ile accused-appellant Nuez held his shoulders. After praying over the boy, the latter was released and carried inside the house. Accused-appellant Alexander Sibonga, who had arrived, helped carry the boy insid e. After this, Blase said she no longer knew what happened inside the house as she stayed outside to finis h the laundry.18 Blase testified that the parents of Randy Luntayao witnessed the "pray-over" of their son from beginning to end. She denied that accused-appellants Fabie and Delia Sibonga struck the victi m on his chest with their fists. According to her, neither did accused-appellant Carmen stab the boy. She claimed that Randy was still alive when he was taken inside the house.19

The defense presented Maria Lilia Jimenez, 20, Visitacion Seniega, 39, and Josef ina Abing, 39, who testified that accused-appellant Carmen had cured them of their illnesses by mer ely praying over them and without applying any form of physical violence on them.20 Milagros Carloto, Municipal Health Officer of Talisay, Cebu, was also presented by the defense to testify on the death certificate she issued in which she indicated that Randy Luntayao d ied of pneumonia. According to her, Eddie Luntayao came to her office on January 28, 1997 to ask f or the issuance of a death certificate for his son Randy Luntayao who had allegedly suffered from cough and fever.21 On cross-examination, Dr. Carloto admitted that she never saw the body of the vi ctim as she merely relied on what she had been told by Eddie Luntayao. She said that it was a midwife, Mrs . Revina Laviosa, who examined the victim's body.22 The last witness for the defense, Assistant City Prosecutor Salvador Solima, was presented to identify the resolution he had prepared (Exh. 8)23 on the re-investigation of the case in whi ch he recommended the dismissal of the charge against accused-appellants. His testimony was dispensed with, however, as the prosecution stipulated on the matters Solima was going to testify with the quali fication that Solima's recommendation was disapproved by City Prosecutor Primo Miro.24 The prosecution recalled Eddie Luntayao to the stand to rebut the testimonies of Ritsel Blase and Dr. Milagros Carloto. Eddie denied having witnessed what accused-appellants did to h is son. He reiterated his earlier claim that after accused-appellants had taken Randy, he and his wife and two daughters were locked inside a room. He disputed Blase's statement that his son was still alive when h e was brought into the prayer room. He said he saw that his son's head slumped while being carried by a ccused-appellants.25 As for the testimony of Dr. Carloto, Eddie admitted having talked with her when he and accused-appellant Nuez went to her office on January 28, 1997. However, he denied having told her t hat his son was suffering from fever and cough as he told her that Randy had a nervous breakdown . He took exception to Dr. Carloto's statement that he was alone when he went to her office because it was Nuez who insisted that he (Eddie) accompany him in order to secure the death certificate.26 On November 18, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive porti on of which states: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, [the] accused are a ll found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are hereby [sentenced] to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION

PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify jointly and seve rally the heirs of the deceased Randy Luntayao in the sum of P50,000.00; and to pay the costs. The accu sed, are, however, credited in full during the whole period of their detention provided they will s ignify in writing that they will abide by all the rules and regulations of the penitentiary.27 In finding accused-appellants guilty of murder, the trial court stated: Killing a person with treachery is murder even if there is no intent to kill. Wh en death occurs, it is presumed to be the natural consequence of physical injuries inflicted. Since the defendant did commit the crime with treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the voluntary presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery (P v. Cagoco, 58 Phil. 530). All the accused in the ca se at bar had contributed different acts in mercilessly inflicting injuries to the victim. For having imme rsed the head of the victim into the barrel of water, all the herein accused should be held responsible for all the consequences even if the result be different from that which was intended (Art. 4, par. 1, RPC). It i s pointed out that in P. v. Cagoco, 58 Phil. 524, even if there was no intent to kill[,] in inflicting physi cal injuries with treachery, the accused in that case was convicted of murder. In murder qualified by treachery, it is required only that there is treachery in the attack, and this is true even if the offender has no intent to kill the person assaulted. Under the guise of a ritual or treatment, the accused should not have intentiona lly immersed upside down the head of Randy Luntayao into a barrel of water; banged his head against the b ench; pounded his chest with fists, or plunged a kitchen knife to his side so that blood would come out for these acts would surely

cause death to the victim. . . . One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences wh ich may naturally and logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. Ordinarily, whe n a person commits a felony with malice, he intends the consequences of his felonious act. In view of paragr aph 1 of Art. 4, a person committing a felony is criminally liable although the consequences of his feloni ous acts are not intended by him. . . . . . . . Intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act. The presumption of cr iminal intent may arise from the proof of the criminal act and it is for the accused to rebut this presu mption. In the case at bar, there is enough evidence that the accused confederated with one another in inflicting physical harm to the victim (an illegal act). These acts were intentional, and the wrong done resulted in th e death of their victim. Hence, they are liable for all the direct and natural consequences of their unlawful ac t, even if the ultimate result had not been intended.28 Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellants allege that the trial court erred in conv icting them of murder.29 First. It would appear that accused-appellants are members of a cult and that th e bizarre ritual performed over the victim was consented to by the victim's parents. With the permission of the victim's parents, accused-appellant Carmen, together with the other accused-appellants, proceeded to subject the boy to a "treatment" calculated to drive the "bad spirit" from the boy's body. Unfortunat ely, the strange procedure resulted in the death of the boy. Thus, accused-appellants had no criminal inten t to kill the boy. Their liability arises from their reckless imprudence because they ought that to know their actions would not bring about the cure. They are, therefore, guilty of reckless imprudence resulti ng in homicide and not of murder. Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing such act. Compared to in tentional felonies, such as homicide or murder, what takes the place of the element of malice or intention t o commit a wrong or evil is the failure of the offender to take precautions due to lack of skill taking into account his employment, or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.

The elements of reckless imprudence are apparent in the acts done by accused-app ellants which, because of their lack of medical skill in treating the victim of his alleged ailment, resul ted in the latter's death. As already stated, accused-appellants, none of whom is a medical practitioner, belo ng to a religious group, known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima, which is engaged in faith heali ng. In United States v. Divino,30 the accused, who was not a licensed physician, in an attempt to cure the victim of ulcers in her feet, wrapped a piece of clothing which had been soaked in petroleum around the victim's feet and then lighted the clothing, thereby causing injuries to the vic tim. The Court held the accused liable for reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries. It was no ted that the accused had no intention to cause an evil but rather to remedy the victim's ailment. In another case, People v. Vda. de Golez,31 the Court ruled that the proper char ge to file against a nonmedical practitioner, who had treated the victim despite the fact that she did not posse ss the necessary technical knowledge or skill to do so and caused the latter's death, was homicid e through reckless imprudence. The trial court's reliance on the rule that criminal intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act is untenable because such presumption only holds in the absence of proof to the contrary.32 The facts of the case indubitably show the absence of intent to kill on the part of the accus ed-appellants. Indeed, the trial court's findings can be sustained only if the circumstances of the case are igno red and the Court limits itself

to the time when accused-appellants undertook their unauthorized "treatment" of the victim. Obviously, such an evaluation of the case cannot be allowed. Consequently, treachery cannot be appreciated for in the absence of intent to ki ll, there is no treachery or the deliberate employment of means, methods, and manner of execution to ensure t he safety of the accused from the defensive or retaliatory attacks coming from the victim.33 Viewed in th is light, the acts which the trial court saw as manifestations of treachery in fact relate to efforts by accu sed-appellants to restrain Randy Luntayao so that they can effect the cure on him. On the other hand, there is no merit in accused-appellants' contention that the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Honey Fe Abella is not credible. The Court is more than convinced of Honey Fe's credibility. Her testimony is clear, straightforward, and is far from having been coached or contrived. She was only a few meters away from the kitchen where accused-appellants conducted their "prayover" healing session not to mention that she had a good vantage point as the kitchen had no roof nor walls but only a pantry. Her testimony was corroborated by the autopsy findings of Dr. Mendez who, consistent with Honey Fe's testimony, noted fractures on the third left rib and on the base of the victim's skull. With regard to Dr. Mendez's failure to find any stab wound in the victim's body, he himself had exp lained that such could be due to the fact that at the time the autopsy was conducted, the cadaver was alre ady in an advanced state of decomposition. Randy Luntayao's cadaver was exhumed 24 days after it had been bu ried. Considering the length of time which had elapsed and the fact that the cadaver had not been emba lmed, it was very likely that the soft tissues had so decomposed that, as Dr. Mendez said, it was no long er possible to determine whether there was a stab wound. As for the other points raised by accused-appell ants to detract the credibility of Honey Fe's testimony, the same appear to be only minor and trivia l at best. Accused-appellants contend that the failure of the prosecution to present the te stimony of Frances Claire Rivera as well as the knife used in stabbing Randy Luntayao puts in doubt the pr osecution's evidence. We do not think so. The presentation of the knife in evidence is not indispensable. 34 Finally, accused-appellants make much of the fact that although the case was tri ed under Judge Renato C. Dacudao, the decision was rendered by Judge Galicano Arriesgado who took over th e case after the prosecution and the defense had rested their cases.35 However, the fact that the judge who wrote the decision did not hear the testimonies of the witnesses does not make him less co mpetent to render a decision, since his ruling is based on the records of the case and the transcrip

t of stenographic notes of the testimonies of the witnesses.36 Second. The question now is whether accused-appellants can be held liable for re ckless imprudence resulting in homicide, considering that the information charges them with murder . We hold that they can. Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent parts: SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of th e offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged n ecessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is neces sarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. In Samson v. Court of Appeals,37 the accused were charged with, and convicted of , estafa through falsification of public document. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment and held one of the accused liable for estafa through falsification by negligence. On appeal, it was contend ed that the appeals court erred in holding the accused liable for estafa through negligence because the in formation charged him with having wilfully committed estafa. In overruling this contention, the Court held:

While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as w e held in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1955, but a distinct crime in it self, designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the form er can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the t heory that the greater includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present c ase. Appellant was charged with willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of the checks in que stion, appellant did not act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assu re himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the info rmation alleges acts which charge willful falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligen t. This is a case covered by the rule when there is a variance between the allegation and proof. . . . The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committ ed with imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence submitted by ap pellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly, having alleged that the falsific ation has been willful, it would be incongruous to allege at the same time that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is incompatible with the concept of negligence. In People v. Fernando,38 the accused was charged with, and convicted of, murder by the trial court. On appeal, this Court modified the judgment and held the accused liable for reckles s imprudence resulting in homicide after finding that he did not act with criminal intent. Third. Coming now to the imposable penalty, under Art. 365, reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. In this case, taking into account the pertinent provisions of Indeterminate Sentence Law , the accused-appellants should suffer the penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to fo ur (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. As to their civil liability, accused-appellants should pay the heirs of Randy Lu ntayao an indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages also in the amount of P50,000.00.39 In ad dition, they should pay exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 in view of accused-appellants' gro ss negligence in attempting to "cure" the victim without a license to practice medicine and to gi ve an example or correction for the public good.40 WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City, is AF

FIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellants are hereby declared guilty of reckless impr udence resulting in homicide and are each sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four ( 4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused-appellants are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Randy L untayao indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and exempla ry damages in the amount of P30,000.00. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998 ISABELITA REODICA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. DAVIDE, JR., J.: On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a va n along Doa Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of h er recklessness, her

van hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustain ed physical injuries, while the damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00. Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an A ffidavit of Complaint 1 against petitioner with the Fiscal's Office. On 13 January 1988, an information 2 was filed before the Regional Trial Court ( RTC) of Makati (docketed as Criminal Case No. 33919) charging petitioner with "Reckless Imprudence Result ing in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury." The information read: The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the crime of Reckl ess Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury as follows: That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the Municipality of Paraaque, M etro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovementio ned accused, Isabelita Velasco Reodica, being then the driver and/or person in charge of a Tamaraw bear ing plate no. NJU-306, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and opera te the same in a reckless, careless, negligent and imprudent manner, without regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid damage to property and injurie s to person, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said vehicle to bump/collide wi th a Toyota Corolla bearing plate no. NIM-919 driven and owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby causing d amage amounting to P8,542.00, to the damage and prejudice of its owner, in the aforementioned amoun t of P8,542.00. That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said Norberto Bonsol suffe red bodily injuries which required medical attendance for a period of less that nine (9) days and incapaci tated him from performing his customary labor for the same period of time. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued . On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decision 3 convict ing petitioner of the "quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with sligh t physical injuries," and sentencing her: [t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the comp lainant, Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542), Philippi ne Currency, without subsidiary impairment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. 4 The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise:

As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant suffered slig ht physical injuries (Exhs. D, H and I). In view of the resulting physical injuries, the penalty to be impos ed is not fine, but imprisonment (Gregorio, Fundamental of Criminal Law Review, Eight Edition 1988, p. 711). Slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence is now punished with penalty of arres to mayor in its maximum period (People v. Aguiles, L-11302, October 28, 1960, cited in Gregorio's book, p. 718). 5 As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car repairs (P8,54 2.00) and medical expenses (P5,000.00). Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed th e case as CA-G.R. CR No. 14660. After her motions for extension of time to file her brief were granted, s he filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal for Probation Purposes, and to Suspend, Ex Abundanti Cautela, Pe riod for Filing Appellant's Brief. However, respondent Court of Appeals denied this motion and d irected petitioner to file her brief. 6 After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the trial court, responde nt Court of Appeals rendered a decision 7 on 31 January 1996 affirming the appealed decision.

Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration 8 raising new issues, thus: NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT THE PENALTY AND MOVE THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND SET ASIDE SINCE IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO BE ERROR TO COMPLEX DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS BOTH ARE LIGHT OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION AND EVEN ASSUMING SUCH JURISDICTION, IT CANNOT IMPOSE A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. 9 xxx xxx xxx REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OF PRESCRIPTION OR LACK OF JURISDICTION. 10 In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motio n for reconsideration for lack of merit, as well as her supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, th e present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court premised on the following grou nds: RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, 1996 AND MORE SO ITS RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996, ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND GROSSLY ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY IMPOSED A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, ON THE BASIS OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A SECONDARY SOURCE. A. IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR, 11 THE SAME CASE WHERE THE COURT A QUO BASED ITS FINDING OF A PENALTY WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, WHAT WAS STATED IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF SAID CASE IS THAT THE PENALTY FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE IS ARRESTO MENOR AND NOT ARRESTO MAYOR. IT IS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE RESPONDENT COURT TO PUNISH PETITIONER MORE THAN SHE SHOULD OR COULD BE PUNISHED BECAUSE OF A CLERICAL ERROR COPIED FROM A SECONDARY SOURCE. B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT COMPLEXED THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES IMPOSING A SINGLE EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN ITS ELLIPTICAL RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996. C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACK OF JURISDICTION. Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below misquoted not on ly the title, but likewise the ruling of the case cited as authority regarding the penalty for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Concretely, the title of the case was not People v. Aguiles, but Peo ple v. Aguilar; while the ruling was that the penalty for such quasi offense was arresto menor not arresto mayor. As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the courts below sho uld have pronounced that there were two separate light felonies involved, namely: (1) reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries; and (2) reckless imprudence with damage to property, instead of consid ering them a complex crime. Two light felonies, she insists, "do not . . . rate a single penalty of a rresto mayor or imprisonment of

six months," citing Lontok v. Gorgonio, 12 thus: Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical inju ries, damage to property amounting to P10,000.00 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the lesione s menos graves and damage

to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365). The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is di fferent from the instant case because in that case the negligent act resulted in the offenses of lesiones meno s graves and damage to property which were both less grave felonies and which, therefore, constituted a complex crime. In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesi ones leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate information. She then suggests that "at worst, the penalties of two light offenses, both impo sable in their maximum period and computed or added together, only sum up to 60 days imprisonment and n ot six months as imposed by the lower courts." On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight physi cal injuries through reckless imprudence, being punishable only by arresto menor, is a light offense; as such, it prescribes in two months. Here, since the information was filed only on 13 January 1988, or almost three m onths from the date the vehicular collision occurred, the offense had already prescribed, again citing L ontok, thus: In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesi ones leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate information. And since, as a l ight offense, it prescribes in two months, Lontok's criminal liability therefor was already extinguished (Ar ts. 89[5], 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f], Rule 117, Rules of Court). The trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontok's motion to quash that part o f the information charging him with that light offense. Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the wrong court, s ince Regional Trial Courts do not deal with arresto menor cases. She submits that damage to property and sligh t physical injuries are light felonies and thus covered by the rules on summary procedure; therefore, only the filing with the proper Metropolitan Trial Court could have tolled the statute of limitations, this time invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes. 13 In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the Solicito r General (OSG) agrees with petitioner that the penalty should have been arresto menor in its maximum period , instead of arresto mayor, pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably with Buerano v. Court of Appeals, 14 which frowns upon splitting of crimes and prosecution, it was proper for the tri

al court to "complex" reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries and damage to property because what the law seeks to penalize is the single act of reckless imprudence, not the results thereof; henc e, there was no need for two separate informations. To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that although the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction to impose arresto menor for slight physical injuries, the Regional Trial Court p roperly took cognizance of this case because it had the jurisdiction to impose the higher penalty for the d amage to property, which was a fine equal to thrice the value of P8,542.00. On this score, the OSG cites Cuyo s v. Garcia. 15 The OSG then debunks petitioner's defense of prescription of the crime, arguing that the prescriptive period here was tolled by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three da ys after the incident, pursuant to People v. Cuaresma 16 and Chico v. Isidro. 17 In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner expressed gratitude and appre ciation to the OSG in joining cause with her as to the first assigned error. However, she considers th e OSG's reliance on Buerano v. Court of Appeals 18 as misplaced, for nothing there validates the "complexing " of the crime of reckless imprudence with physical injuries and damage to property; besides, in that case, two separate informations were filed one for slight and serious physical injuries through reckless imprude nce and the other for damage to property through reckless imprudence. She then insists that in this ca se, following Arcaya v.

Teleron 19 and Lontok v. Gorgonio, 20 two informations should have been filed. S he likewise submits that Cuyos v. Garcia 21 would only apply here on the assumption that it was proper to "complex" damage to property through reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries through reckl ess imprudence. Chico v. Isidro 22 is likewise "inapposite," for it deals with attempted homicide, which is not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma 23 should not be given retroact ive effect; otherwise, it would either unfairly prejudice her or render nugatory the en banc ruling in Zal divia 24 favorable to her. The pleadings thus raise the following issues: I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct. II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to pro perty in the amount of P8,542.00 and reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries are ligh t felonies. III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Co de applies to the quasi offenses in question. IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first tim e on appeal. V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offenses in questi on. VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already prescribed. I. The Proper Penalty We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six months of arre sto mayor imposed by the trial court and affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals is incorrect. However, w e cannot subscribe to their submission that the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period is the proper penalty. Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Any person who, by reckless imprudence, sha Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. ll commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer th e penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would hav e constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period s hall be imposed. Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which wo uld otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medi um and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in it s minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted i n damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal t o the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pe sos. A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have con stituted a light felony. In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound disc retion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64. The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those pro vided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts shall impose the penalty ne xt lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply. According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for rec kless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its maximum period , with a duration of 21 to 30 days. If the offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed delibera tely or with malice, it is penalized with arresto menor under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may be either lower than or eq ual to the penalty prescribed under the first paragraph of Article 365. This being the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies. Hence, the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slig ht physical injuries is public censure, this being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor. 25 As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,54 2.00, the third paragraph of Article 365, which provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since the reckless imprudence in this case did not result in damage to property only. What applies is the first paragr aph of Article 365, which provides for arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods (1 month and 1 day to 4 months) for an act committed through reckless imprudence which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony. Note that if the damage to the extent of P8,542.00 were caused deliberat ely, the crime would have been malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, and the pen alty would then be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months which is higher than that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365). If the penalty under Art icle 329 were equal to or lower than that provided for in the first paragraph, then the sixth paragraph of Artic le 365 would apply, i.e., the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in its maximum period to ar resto mayor in its minimum period or imprisonment from 21 days to 2 months. Accordingly, the imposa ble penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 w ould be arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1 mont h and 1 day to a maximum of 4 months, at the discretion of the court, since the fifth paragraph o f Article 365 provides that in the imposition of the penalties therein provided "the courts shall exercise t heir sound discretion without regard to the rules prescribed in article 64." II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question. Felonies committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the wrongful act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is f

ault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. 26 As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable by public censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies a s infractions of law carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since pub lic censure is classified under Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty, and is considered under the gra duated scale provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a penalty lower than arresto menor, it follows th at the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is a light felony. On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlier discussed, penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since arresto ma yor is a correctional penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in questio n is a less grave felony not a light felony as claimed by petitioner. III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes. Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony, should A rticle 48 of the Revised Code on complex crimes be applied? Article 48 provides as follows: Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more g rave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious

crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio, 27 this Court declar ed that where one of the resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there is n o complex crime, thus: Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no comple x crime. The resulting offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony may be absorbed by the grave felo ny. Thus, the light felonies of damage to property and slight physical injuries, both resulting from a single act of imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one information. They are separate offenses subject to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; See People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513). Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical inju ries, damage to property amounting to P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menor gr aves and damage to property [Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365]. Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the less grave felony of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.0 0 and the light felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries. IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information. Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries should have been charged in a separate inf ormation because it is not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no long er question, at this stage, the duplicitous character of the information, i.e., charging two separate offens es in one information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property; and (2) reckless imprud ence resulting in slight physical injuries. This defect was deemed waived by her failure to raise it in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the information. 28 Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each of them. 29 V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the Quasi Offenses in Question. The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in forc e at the time of the institution

of the action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the eff ect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. 30 At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980." Section 32(2) 31 thereof provided that except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Region al Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTC s), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive original jurisdiction over "all offen ses punishable with imprisonment of got exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more t han four thousand pesos, or both fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective o f kind, nature, value or amount thereof." The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the duratio n of the imprisonment and the amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged. The question thus arises as to which court has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by censure, such as reckless imprudence re sulting in slight physical injuries.

In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, 32 this Court found that a lacuna existed in the la w as to which court had jurisdiction over offenses penalized with destierro, the duration of which was f rom 6 months and 1 day to 6 years, which was co-extensive with prision correccional. We then interpreted the law in this wise: Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto mayor under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts, and since by Article 71 of the Revised Penal Cod e, as amended by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has placed destierro below arresto mayor as a lower penalty than the latter, in the absence of any express provision of law to the contrary it is log ical and reasonable to infer from said provisions that its intention was to place offenses penalized with des tierro also under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts and not under that of courts of first instance. Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years an d 2 months were within the jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those pen alized with censure, which is a penalty lower than arresto menor under the graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall within the jurisdicti on of said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries was cognizable by said courts. As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P 8,542.00, the same was also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable penalt y therefor was arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods the duration of which was from 1 month a nd 1 day to 4 months. Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC of Makati. VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question. Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand, reckless impr udence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, prescribes in five years. To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it is necessary to determine whether the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after th e incident in question tolled the running of the prescriptive period. Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription sha ll commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint of information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are u njustifiably stopped by any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis supplied) Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period "sha ll be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information," does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed for preliminary examination or investigation only or for an action on the merits. 33 Thus, in Fr ancisco v. Court of Appeals 34 and People v. Cuaresma, 35 this Court held that the filing of the complaint e ven with the fiscal's office suspends the running of the statute of limitations. We cannot apply Section 9 36 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides th at in cases covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, "the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by information." However, thi s Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information

directly with said courts. It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substanti ve law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rulemaking power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. 37 Hence, in case of conflict b etween the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latt er prevails. Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what wa s involved therein was a violation of a municipal ordinance; thus, the applicable law was not Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, but Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescrip tion for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescript ion Shall Begin to Run." Under Section 2 thereof, the period of prescription is suspended only when judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty party. Accordingly, this Court held that the presc riptive period was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Pro secutor, as such did not constitute a judicial proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive period there was only the filing of the information in the proper court. In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal C ode, Article 91 thereof and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for t he quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, ther efore, uphold petitioner's defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the information in this case. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenge decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the Regional Trial Court, whose decision was affirmed therein, had no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919. Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.