Marcos vs Sandiganbayan Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for a dubious

transaction done in 1984 while they were officers transacting business with the Light Railway Transit. The case was raffled to the 1st Division of the Sandiganbayan. The division was headed by Justice Garchitorena with J Balajadia and J Atienza as associate justices. No decision was reached by the division by reason of Atienzas dissent in favor of Imeldas innocence. Garchitorena then summoned a special division of the SB to include JJ Amores and Cipriano as additional members. Amores then asked Garchitorena to be given 15 days to send in his manifestation. On the date of Amores request, Garchitorena received manifestation from J Balajadia stating that he agrees with J Rosario who further agrees with J Atienza. Garchitorena then issued a special order to immediately dissolve the special division and have the issue be raised to the SB en banc for it would already be pointless to wait for Amores manifesta tion granted that a majority has already decided on Imeldas favor. The SB en banc ruled against Imelda.

ISSUE: Whether or not due process has been observed.

HELD: The SC ruled that the ruling of the SB is bereft of merit as there was no strong showing o f Imeldas guilt. The SC further emphasized that Imelda was deprived of due process by reason of Garchitorena not waiting for Amores manifestation. Such procedural flaws committed by respondent Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its decision convicting petitioner. Garchitorena had already created the Special Division of five (5) justices in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in the First Division. At that stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices, especially the new justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario who may have a different view of the cases against her. At that point, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice Balajadia may change their mind and agree with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but the turnaround cannot deprive petitioner of her vested right to the opinion of Justices Amores and del Rosario. It may be true that Justice del Rosario had already expressed his opinion during an informal, unscheduled meeting in the unnamed restaurant but as aforestated, that opinion is not the opinion contemplated by law. But what is more, petitioner was denied the opinion of Justice Amores for before it could be given, Presiding Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division. *********************************************************************** Rivera vs. CSC, Land Bank of the Philippines (January 4, 1995) Facts: Petitioner was the manager of Corporate Banking Unit of LBP and was charged with dishonesty, receiving for personal use of fee, gift or other valuable thing in the course of official duties, committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft Laws, and pursuit of private business vocation or profession without permission required by CSC. Rivera allegedly told Perez that he would facilitate the processing, approval and release of his loan if he would be given 10% commission. Rivera was further charged having served and acted, without prior authority required by CSC, as the personal consultant of Lao and consultant in various companies where Lao had investments. LBP held Rivers guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service in accepting employment from a client of the bank. The penalty of forced resignation, without separation benefits and gratuities, was thereupon imposed on Rivera. Issue: Whether the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in composing the capital penalty of dismissal on the basis of unsubstantiated finding and conclusions Ruling: Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation in resolving Riveras appeal to CSC to give full meaning and consequence to a fundamental aspect of due process. CSC resolution is SET ASIDE and the case is remanded to CSC for the resolution, sans the participation of CSC Commissioner Gaminde, as she was the Board Chairman of MSPB whose ruling is thus appealed.

***********************************************************************

El Banco Espaol-Filipino vs Vicente Palanca

Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he owe. Due to the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracios property. Engracio however left for China and he never returned til he died. Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court further orderdd the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that itd be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition to execute Engracios property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio never received the summons.

ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed.

HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process had been met. The requisites are; There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the matter before it. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.

*********************************************************************** NON VS. DAMES Facts: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester.The subject of the protests is not, however, made clear in thepleadings. Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition. They now petition the court to reverse its ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which was also applied in the case. The court said that petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form forthe first semester of school year 1988-89, which states that: TheMabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college. Students, therefore, are required to behave in accord with the Mabini College code of conduct and discipline. Not the students right to freedom

Issue: Whether

or

of

speech and

assembly

infringed.

Held: Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution is similarly available tostudents is well-settled in our jurisdiction. However there are limitations. The permissible limitation on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights within the school presupposes that conduct bythe student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior should not materially disrupt classwork or must not involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. ***********************************************************************

Goldberg v. Kelly Facts. This case was brought by residents of New York City who received financial aid under the federally assisted program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or under New York States Home Relief Program. Their complaint alleged that City officials administering these programs terminated such aid without prior notice and

hearing, denying them due process of law. After the suit was filed, the City adopted procedures for notice and hearing, which the plaintiff-appellees then challenged as constitutionally inadequate. The procedure allowed the recipient to challenge the proposed termination of benefits within seven days and submit a written statement for the reviewing official to make a final determination. Appellees challenged the procedures lack of an opportunity to personally appear before the reviewing officer for oral testimony and cross-examination of adverse witnesses. The procedure did allow for a post-termination fair hearing, however. The District Court held that only a pre -termination hearing would satisfy the constitutional due process requirement.

Issue. Does a State that terminates public assistance benefits to a particular recipient without affording him an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to termination deny the recipient due process of law? Held. Yes. Affirmed. Where welfare is concerned, only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with procedural due process. For qualified recipients, welfare provides the only means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing and medical care. The crucial factor is that the termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy might deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits. Dissent. No provision in the Constitution should paralyze the governments efforts to protect itself against making payments to people who are not entitled to them. There are large numbers of undeserving welfare recipients, and States should be able to fight back against them. Concurrence. None. Discussion. The interest of the eligible recipient in uninterrupted receipt of public assistance, coupled with the States interest that payments not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweigh the States competing interest to prevent administrative and fiscal burdens. The pre-termination hearing need not take the form of a judicial or quasijudicial trial, as the fair hearing will afford full adminis trative review later on. It need only produce an initial determination that the welfares grounds for termination of benefits are valid. *********************************************************************** Bell v. Burson Facts. The Act provided that the registration and license of an uninsured motorist involved in an accident should be suspended unless he posted a security to cover the damages claimed in the accident reports. The administrative hearing to be conducted prior to the suspension excluded any evidence of fault or liability for the accident. Petitioner was a clergyman who was involved in an accident when a five-year-old child rode her bike into the side of his car. In the administrative hearing, Petitioner was not permitted to present any evidence that he was not at fault for the accident, or that his ministry would be severely handicapped if he lost his license. Petitioner appealed to Superior Court, which found him free from fault for the accident and ordered that his license not be suspended. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting Petitioners contention that the States statutory scheme denied him due process of law.

Issue. Did the revocation of Petitioners license without affording him an opportunity to contest liability violate due process?

Held. Yes. Reversed. Once issued, licenses may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood, as in the Petitioners case. Suspension of issued licenses involves state action that adjudicates important interests of licensees, and due process is required. The procedure set forth by the Act violated due process. Dissent. None. Concurrence. None.

Discussion. It is fundamental that, except for in emergency situations, States afford notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of a case before terminating an interest. This case did not involve an emergency situation, and due process was violated.

RE: IMPARTIAL COURT: The inquiry into fault or liability requisite to afford the licensee due process need not take the form of a full adjudication of the question of liability. That adjudication can only be made in litigation between the parties involved in the accident. Since the only purpose of the provision before us is to obtain security from which to pay any judgments against the licensee resulting from the accident, we hold that procedural due process will be satisfied by an inquiry

limited to the determination whether there is a reasonable possibility of judgments in the amounts claimed being rendered against the licensee. We hold, then, that under Georgia's present statutory scheme, before the State may deprive petitioner of his driver's license and vehicle registration, it must provide a forum for the determination of the question whether there is a reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against him as a result of the accident. We deem it inappropriate in this case to do more than lay down this requirement. The alternative methods of compliance are several. Georgia may decide merely to include consideration of the question at the administrative hearing now provided, or it may elect to postpone such a consideration to the de novojudicial proceedings in the Superior Court. Georgia may decide to withhold suspension until adjudication of an action for damages brought by the injured party. Indeed, Georgia may elect to abandon its present scheme completely and pursue one of the various alternatives in force in other States. Finally, Georgia may reject all of the above and devise an entirely new regulatory scheme. The area of choice is wide: we hold only that the failure of the present Georgia scheme to afford the petitioner a prior hearing on liability of the nature we have defined denied him procedural due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

*********************************************************************** U.P. vs Ligot Telan (227 SCRA 342) Facts: In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.) truly the University of the People, U.P. administration conceptualized and implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP), popularly known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program. After broad consultations with the various university constituencies, U.P. President Jose V. Abueva, the U.P. Board of Regents issued on April 28, 1988 a Resolution establishing the STFAP. A year later, it was granted official recognition when the Congress of the Philippines allocated a portion of the National Budget for the implementation of the program. In the interest of democratizing admission to the State University, all students are entitled to apply for STFAP benefits which include reduction in fees, living and book subsidies and student assistantships which give undergraduate students the opportunity to earn P12.00 per hour by working for the University. Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire where, among others, they state the amount and source of the annual income of the family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances from which the University may evaluate their financial status and need on the basis of which they are categorized into brackets. To further insure the integrity of the program, a random sampling scheme of verification of data indicated in a student's application form is undertaken. Among those who applied for STFAP benefits for School Year 1989-90 was Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law. A team composed of Arsenio L. Dona and Jose Carlo Manalo conducted a home investigation at the residence of Nadal. Ms. Cristeta Packing, Nadal's aunt, was interviewed and the team submitted a home visit report. Consolacion Urbino, Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between the report and Nadal's application form. Forthwith, she and Bella M. Villanueva, head of the Office of Scholarships and Student Services, presented the matter to the Diliman Committee on Scholarships and Financial Assistance. In compliance with the said Committee's directive, Bella Villanueva wrote Nadal informing him that the investigation showed that he had failed to declare, not only the fact that he had been maintaining a 1977 Corolla car which was owned by his brother but also the income of his mother who was supporting his brothers Antonio and Federico. Nadal was likewise informed that the Diliman Committee had reclassified him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to June 1989, unless he could submit "proofs to the contrary." Nadal was required "to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees" with "interest based on current commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation. commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation. Nadal issued a certification stating, among other things, that his mother migrated to the United States in 1981 but because her residency status had not yet been legalized, she had not been able to find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment." U.P. charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) that he committed acts which find him guilty of willfully and deliberately withholding information about the income of his mother, who is living abroad and that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car. As such, the SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the University and required him to reimburse all STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not voluntarily make reimbursement, it shall be "effected by the University thru outside legal action.

The SDT decision was thereafter automatically elevated to the Executive Committee of U.P. Diliman for review pursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P. Rules on Student Conduct and Discipline. Board of regents modified the penalty from Expulsion to One Year- Suspension, effective immediately, plus reimbursement of all benefits received from the STFAP, with legal interest. However the BOR also decided against giving Nadal, a certification of good moral character. Nadal forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of the BOR decision, in the next BOR meeting Regent Antonio T. Carpio raised the "material importance" of verifying the truth of Nadal's claim that earlier, he was a beneficiary of a scholarship and financial aid from the Ateneo de Manila University (AdeMU). Learning that the "certification issued by the AdeMU that it had not given Nadal financial aid while he was a student there was made through a telephone call," Regent Carpio declared that there was as yet "no direct evidence in the records to substantiate the charge." According to Carpio, if it should be disclosed that Nadal falsely stated that he received such financial aid, it would be a clear case of gross and material misrepresentation that would even warrant the penalty of expulsion. Hence, he cast a conditional vote that would depend on the verification of Nadal's claim on the matter. U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V. Abueva countered by stating that "a decision should not be anchored solely on one piece of information which he considered irrelevant, and which would ignore the whole pattern of the respondent's dishonesty and deception from 1989 which had been established in the investigation and the reviews."In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a certification to the effect that Nadal was indeed a recipient of a scholarship grant from 1979 to 1983. That evening, the BOR met again at a special meeting, according to Regent Carpio, in executive session, the BOR found Nadal "guilty." However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order against President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili. Issue: Whether or not the Board of Regent violated Nadal's right to due process when it rendered a decision finding Nadal guilty of the charges against him" during the March 29, 1993 meeting. Held: With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent considers the same as "unquestionably void for lack of due process" inasmuch as he was not sent a notice of said meeting, that imposition of sanctions on students requires "observance of procedural due process," the phrase obviously referring to the sending of notice of the meeting. However BOR ruled that in any event it is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with the sending of notice of the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting to respondent. University rules do not require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of students whose disciplinary cases have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the final review body. At no time did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation. Counsel for Nadal charged before the lower court that Nadal was not given due process in the March 29 meeting because the ground upon which he was again convicted was not the same as the original charge. Obviously, he was referring to the basis of the conditional votes on March 28. Whether or not Nadal was telling the truth when he claimed that he received a scholarship grant from the AdeMU. However, Regent Carpio himself testified that the charge considered was "exactly the same charge" of withholding information on the income of Nadal's mother. It should be stressed that the reason why Regent Carpio requested a verification of Nadal's claim that he was a scholar at the AdeMU was that Regent Carpio was not "morally convinced" yet as to the guilt of Nadal. In other words, he sought additional insights into the character of Nadal through the information that would be obtained from the AdeMU. The Court in this regard find such information to be irrelevant and a mere superfluity. In his July, 12, 1991 certification aforementioned, Nadal admitted, although inconsistently, that his mother was a "TNT" who could not find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment" but that she was supporting the education of his brothers with the help of another son. The court constitutes this as a sufficient admission that Nadal withheld information on the income, however measly and irregular, of his mother. The court also sighted that respondent aspires to join the ranks of the professionals who would uphold truth at all costs so that justice may prevail. In those who exhibit duplicity in their student days, one spots the shady character who is bound to sow the seeds of chicanery in the practice of his profession. With this the court ruled that it sufficiently shown that respondent has committed an act of dishonesty in withholding vital information in connection with his application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of petitioner University, the latter's inherent power and authority to impose disciplinary sanction may be invoked and rightfully exercised. Therefore deciding that the BOR did not violate Nadals right of due process. The lower court is hereby ordered to DISMISS the petition for mandamus.

*********************************************************************** ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN Case Digest ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001 Facts: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial challenge. Ruling: On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real. The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.

Issues: 1. WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague

No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed. We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms combination and series in the key phrase a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These o missions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them.

A statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of other may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. 2. WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The reasonable doubt standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof of reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged the element of the offense. Relative to petitioners contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that pattern is a very important element of the crime of plunder; and that Sec. 4 is two -pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime, such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder We do not subscribe to petitioners stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operated in furtherance of a remedy. What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it. No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally. It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner. In support of his contention In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No.733 Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown. The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being. There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit *********************************************************************** YNOT vs IAC Case Digest FACTS: The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of Executive Order No. 626-A which provides that the carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUES: Whether or not executive order no. 626-A is unconstitutional due misapplication of police power, violation of due process, and undue delegation of legislative power? HELD: The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In the light of the tests mentioned, we hold with the Toribio Case that there is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.

We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat. Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government. This measure deprives the individual due process as granted by the Constitution. The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require. Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused. To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional. *********************************************************************** EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP (DYRE) V. DANS JR Facts: A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was summarily closed on grounds of national security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE contends that they were

denied due process. There was no hearing to establish factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of the radio station violates freedom of expression. Before the court could even promulgate a decision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the petition. The rights of the station were sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Despite the case becoming moot and academic, (because there are no longer interested parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the Supreme Court still finds that there is need to pass a RESOLUTION for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals in matters as this case.

Issues: (1) Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE.

(2) Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of Freedom of Expression.

Held: The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void. The absence of a hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights. The primary requirements in administrative proceedings are laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relation (69 Phil.635). The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed before any broadcast station may be closed. The Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the following requirements: (1) The right to hearing, includes the right to present ones case and submit evidence presented. (2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented (3) The decision must have something to support itself. (4) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to support conclusion) (5) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing (6) The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and facts and not simply accept subordinates views (7) Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know the various issued involved and reasons for decisions rendered. The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due Process, it gives an unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty and property is valid. The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and expression. The court stresses that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast are entitled to this constitutional right. Although the government still has the right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation of freedom of expression is the clear and present danger rule. If in the circumstances that the media is used in such nature as to create this danger that will bring in such evils, then the law has the right to prevent it. However, Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or signal a start of widespread uprising. The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. The people continues to have the right to be informed on public affairs and broadcast media continues to have the pervasive influence to the people being the most accessible form of media. Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.

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TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" inthe office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices

against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavitswere in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of AmityTrading Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the prosecutiondeprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedydisposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

Held: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy dispositionof trial were violated. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavitsand counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a tenday period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. ***********************************************************************