In the Supreme Court of the State of California

ERNEST J. DRONENBURG, JR., in his official capacity as County Clerk of San Diego County, Petitioner, v. EDMUND G. BROWN JR., in his official capacity as Governor of the State of California, et al., Respondents.

Case No. S212172

INFORMAL OPPOSITION TO REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE TEMPORARY STAY

KAMALA D. HARRIS Attorney General of California DOUGLAS J. WOODS Senior Assistant Attorney General DANIEL J. POWELL Deputy Attorney General P. PATTY LI Deputy Attorney General TAMAR PACHTER Supervising Deputy Attorney General State Bar No. 146083 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 Telephone: (415) 703-5970 Fax: (415) 703-1234 Email: Tamar.Pachter@doj.ca.gov Attorneys for Respondents

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Introduction .................................................................................................. 1 Additional Material Facts Not Included in the Petition ............................... 2 Argument ...................................................................................................... 4 I. Petitioner is unlikely to prevail on the merits ........................ 5 A. B. C. Article III, section 3.5 does not apply to the ACLS........................................................................... 5 The petition is an impermissible collateral attack ........................................................................... 5 The district court properly entered a statewide injunction after finding Proposition 8 facially invalid .......................................................................... 7

II.

Petitioners have not established that a stay is needed to prevent irreparable injury ..................................................... 11

Conclusion .................................................................................................. 14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES Bresgal v. Brock (9th Cir. 1988) 843 F.2d 1163 .............................................................7 Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668 ............................................................................4 Doe v. Gallinot (9th Cir. 1981) 657 F.2d 1017 .....................................................7, 8, 9 Doe v. Reed (2010) 130 S.Ct. 2811 ..........................................................................8 Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan (9th Cir. 1996) 92 F.3d 1486 ...............................................................7 Estate of Buck (1994) 29 Cal. App. 4th 1846 ..............................................................6 Fenske v. Board of Administration (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 590 .................................................................5 Hollingsworth v. Perry (2013) 133 S.Ct. 2652 ................................................................ passim Isaacson v. Horne (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 1213 .........................................................7, 8 James v. Ball (9th Cir. 1979) 613 F.2d 180 ...............................................................9 Lewis v. Casey (1996) 518 U.S. 343 ...........................................................................10 Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1005 ..................................................................5, 13 Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 582 ...........................................................................4

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Los Angeles Haven Hospice, Inc. v. Sebelius (9th Cir. 2011) 638 F.3d 644 ...............................................................7 LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh (9th Cir. 2000) 205 F.3d 1146 .............................................................6 Madej v. Briley (7th Cir. 2004) 370 F.3d 665 .......................................................12, 13 Meinhold v. United States Dept. of Defense (9th Cir. 1994) 34 F.3d 1469 ...............................................................7 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McConnell (1955) 44 Cal.2d 715 ...........................................................................6 Perry v. Schwarzenegger (9th Cir. 2011) 630 F.3d 898 .................................................1, 5, 6, 12 Tahoe Keys Property Owners Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1459 ................................................................4 STATUTES Proposition 8 ............................................................................................10 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS United States Constitution Article VI, 2 ......................................................................................5 California Constitution Article III, 3.5 .......................................................................1, 2, 5, 6

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INTRODUCTION Respondents Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General Kamala D. Harris, Director of the California Department of Public Health Dr. Ron Chapman, and State Registrar of Vital Statistics Tony Agurto submit this informal opposition pursuant to this Courts order filed July 19, 2013. The request for temporary stay filed by San Diego County Clerk Ernest J. Dronenburg, Jr. is the second such request filed in seven days.1 The Court denied the stay sought in Hollingsworth v. OConnell this past Monday and should also deny this requestwhich is substantively identical. Respondents oppose petitioners request for a temporary stay prohibiting him from obeying the federal injunction issued in Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Petition, Ex. B) and prohibiting respondents from taking legal action to enforce that injunction. Like the Hollingsworth petition, this second petition for a writ of mandate and request for a stay is an attempt to circumvent the federal district courts judgment in Perry. This time, petitioner Dronenburg focuses his attack on the notices he received from the State Registrar, and he mistakenly asserts that these notices, informing him of his legal obligations under that judgment, violate article III, section 3.5 of the California Constitution. (Exhs. 1, 2.2) This subtle shift in focus does not

Petitioners in a related case, Hollingsworth v. OConnell, Case No. S211990, filed an original writ and request for immediate stay or injunction precisely a week before petitioner Dronenburg filed this case. Later today respondents herein will file their preliminary opposition as real parties in interest in the Hollingsworth case. The arguments made there bear equally in this matter. 2 The State Registrar sent two notices, which are appended hereto as Exhibits 1 and 2. Exhibit 1, dated June 26, 2013, was conspicuously (continued)

distinguish this petition from the petition in Hollingsworth v. OConnell and much of this petition repeats verbatim from the Hollingsworth petition. The Court should deny the stay because petitioner has no likelihood of success on the merits. The petition is an impermissible collateral attack on the district courts final judgment. This Court is not the proper forum to litigate the scope or validity of the district courts injunction, as that question is properly presented to the federal district court. The federal injunction applies statewide, and the State Registrars notices to the petitioner of his legal obligations under the terms of a federal injunction do not violate article III, section 3.5 of the California Constitution. Even if successful, the requested stay would not shield petitioner from proceedings to compel his compliance with the federal injunction. Finally, the public interest weighs sharply against issuing a stay in this case. After years of litigation, there is now a final determination that Proposition 8 is unconstitutional. If successful, petitioners effort to revive a ban on same-sex marriage in San Diego County will compel new violations of gay and lesbian Californians federal constitutional rights, precipitate a wholly avoidable conflict with the federal court, and block the uniform application of marriage laws in California. The instant request for a temporary stay should be denied, and the petition dismissed. ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PETITION 1. On June 26, 2013, respondent State Registrar of Vital Statistics (State Registrar) issued All County Letter (ACL) number 13-15 to all county clerks and county recorders. (Exh. 1) The June 26 ACL stated that the a decision of the United States Supreme Court had dismissed the appeal (continued) omitted from the petition. Exhibit 2, dated June 28, 2013, is referenced in the petition as Exhibit E, but appears as blank pages in the service copy.

of the judgment issued in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Case No. 09-2292, leaving intact the injunction against enforcement of Proposition 8; that the Attorney General had advised that the injunction applies statewide to all 58 county clerks and recorders; that same-sex marriages could not begin until the Ninth Circuit dissolved the stay of the injunction that had been in effect during the pendency of the appeal process; instructed county clerks and recorders (in boldface type) not to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples until the Ninth Circuit issued its order; and stated that the State Registrar would issue further instructions when additional information became available. It also attached copies of the injunction and the Attorney Generals June 3, 2013 advice to the Governor. 2. After the Ninth Circuit dissolved its stay on June 28, 2013, the State Registrar issued ACL 13-16 to all county clerks and county recorders. (Exh. 2.) The June 28 ACL stated that the Ninth Circuit had dissolved its stay of the order enjoining enforcement of Proposition 8; stated that the injunction applies to all 58 county clerks and county recorders; and instructed county clerks and recorders (also in boldface type) that effective immediately, they shall issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples in California. The ACL also provided information about the eligibility of couples currently in Registered Domestic Partnerships or married in another jurisdiction. 3. On information and belief, since July 1, 2013, petitioner has been issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples in conformance with the Perry injunction. (Exh. 3.) 4. On information and belief, petitioner has not asked the United States District Court for the Northern District of California for relief from his obligations under the terms of that injunction.

5. On information and belief, petitioner or those subject to his supervision and control routinely seek and receive directives from the State Registrar in connection with his duty to carry out state marriage laws. 6. On information and belief, petitioner or those subject to his supervision and control publicly stated it was his intention to comply with the Perry injunction and also sought direction from the State Registrar to determine when his obligation began to comply with the Perry injunction. (Exhs. 4, 5, 6, 8, 9.) 7. On information and belief, petitioner has publicly demonstrated that he understands his obligation to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples arises from the Perry injunction, rather than from any order of the State Registrar. (Exhs. 7 & 9.) ARGUMENT A stay should only be granted in cases in which the petitioner establishes (1) that irreparable injury will result if the status quo is not preserved, and (2) that petitioners are likely to succeed on the merits. These standards are similar to those governing a preliminary injunction issued by a trial court. In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a court must weigh two interrelated factors: (1) the likelihood that the moving party will ultimately prevail on the merits and (2) the relative interim harm to the parties from issuance or nonissuance of the injunction. (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 677-678.) The general rule is that where an injunction is sought against state officials, public policy considerations also come into play. Where, as here, the plaintiff seeks to enjoin public officers and agencies in the performance of their duties the public interest must be considered. (Tahoe Keys Property Owners Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1472-1473, citing Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc.

(1964) 61 Cal.2d 582, 588.) Each of these factors counsels in favor of denying the request for a temporary stay. I. PETITIONER IS UNLIKELY TO PREVAIL ON THE MERITS The petition for writ of mandate and accompanying request for a stay invoke article III, section 3.5 of the California Constitution. But as set forth in the June 3, 2013 letter from the Attorney General to the Governor (Petition, Exh. C) as well as ACLs 13-15 and 13-16 (Exhs. 1 & 2), the injunction the Northern District of California issued in Perry v. Schwarzenegger operates directly against state and county officials. (See Petition, Exh. B.) Because article III, section 3.5 does not apply, the scope of the injunction is not subject to collateral review in this Court, but even if it were, it would survive such review. A. Article III, Section 3.5 Does Not Apply to the ACLs

Article III, section 3.5 has no application where officials are acting under a court order.3 (Fenske v. Board of Administration (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 590, 595-596 [concluding that article III, 3.5 does not excuse an administrative agency from complying with the direct order of a superior court].) Accordingly, the State Registrar properly directed county officials to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples because they were so enjoined by a federal district court, not based on his own determination (or that of any of the respondents) that Proposition 8 is invalid. (Exhs. 1 & 2.) B. The Petition Is an Impermissible Collateral Attack The issue presented by the petition is controlled by the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. (U.S. Const., art. VI, 2.) All parties to the Perry case acknowledged before the United States Supreme Indeed, whether article III, section 3.5 even applies to county officials was a question this Court expressly left undecided in Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1055, 1085-1086.
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Court that the federal courts injunction applies statewide. (Hollingsworth v. Perry, United States Supreme Court Case No. 12-144, Brief of Petitioners at pp. 17-18 [proponents referencing the statewide injunction], Brief of Respondent City and County of San Francisco at p. 19, fn. 4, and Brief of Respondents at p. 19 [The district court therefore was within its power to enjoin enforcement of the amendment statewide].) The United States Supreme Court shared this view. (Hollingsworth v. Perry (2013) 133 S.Ct. 2652, 2674 (dis. opn. of Kennedy, J.) [referencing the District Courts judgment, and its accompanying statewide injunction, emphasis added].) After the Attorney Generals analysis was publicly released, the Ninth Circuit took the extraordinary step of dissolving the stay that would typically have remained in place until the mandate issued. (Compare Perry v. Schwarzenegger (9th Cir. 2011) 630 F.3d 898, 906 with Petition, Ex. D.) State and county officials have acted in accordance with their legal duty to comply with the federal courts injunction. Under the Supremacy Clause, the federal injunction overrides state law, including article III, section 3.5 of the California Constitution. (LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh (9th Cir. 2000) 205 F.3d 1146, 1160 [noting that article III, section 3.5 does not excuse state officials from complying with federal law under the Supremacy Clause].) By requesting a stay or injunction that would relieve him of his obligation to comply with the injunction, petitioner is in effect asking this Court to modify the scope of the district courts injunction. California law is clear that a judgment is not subject to collateral attack unless the issuing court lacked fundamental jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter, which is not the case here. (See, e.g., Estate of Buck (1994) 29 Cal. App. 4th 1846, 1854; see also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McConnell (1955) 44 Cal.2d 715, 725 [stating the general rule that a final judgment or order is not subject to collateral attack even though contrary

to statute where the court has jurisdiction in the fundamental sense, i.e., of the subject matter and the parties].) Petitioners arguments fail because he cannot successfully challenge the federal injunction on these grounds. Instead, he argues that the district court lacks the authority to bind respondents or, indeed, to award relief beyond an injunction that benefits the four named Perry plaintiffs. (Petition at pp. 34-37.) To be sure, there are numerous federal cases evaluating whether a federal district court abused its discretion in issuing relief that went beyond the parties to the case, with differing results. (Compare, e.g., Los Angeles Haven Hospice, Inc. v. Sebelius (9th Cir. 2011) 638 F.3d 644, 664 and Meinhold v. United States Dept. of Defense (9th Cir. 1994) 34 F.3d 1469, 1480 with Isaacson v. Horne (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 1213, 1230; Bresgal v. Brock (9th Cir. 1988) 843 F.2d 1163, 1169, 1171; Doe v. Gallinot (9th Cir. 1981) 657 F.2d 1017, 1024; Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan (9th Cir. 1996) 92 F.3d 1486, 1501.) But such disputes involve an examination of whether a district court properly exercised its discretion, not whether the district court had the authority to enter a judgment benefiting third parties in the first instance. C. The District Court Properly Entered a Statewide Injunction After Finding Proposition 8 Facially Invalid

Even if this Court could entertain a collateral attack on the district courts judgment, the petition would fail on the merits of its claims. The district court both had the authority to issue statewide relief, and did not abuse its discretion in doing so. Where, as in Perry, a court concludes that a law is unconstitutional in all possible applications, it may enjoin all applications of that law even if the case is not certified as a class action. (Isaacson v. Horne (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 1213, 1230.) For instance, in discussing the distinction between a facial challenge and an as applied challenge, the Supreme Court recently concluded that what mattered was

that the plaintiffswho did not represent a classwere seeking relief that would reach beyond the particular circumstances of these plaintiffs. (Doe v. Reed (2010) 130 S.Ct. 2811, 2817.) The Supreme Court did not suggest that plaintiffs had to represent a class (which again, they did not), but rather held that plaintiffs must meet the strict standards for proving a facial challenge in order to obtain relief enjoining enforcement of the state law at issue. (Ibid.) Similarly, in Perry, the plaintiffs satisfied the strict standard for a facial challenge, the district court concluded that Proposition 8 was facially unconstitutional, and it properly entered relief that extended beyond the plaintiffs to the case. The Ninth Circuit recently confirmed this rule in Isaacson v. Horne, supra, 716 F.3d 1213. There, the Court of Appeals concluded that three physicians were entitled to an injunction generally prohibiting state and local officials from enforcing an Arizona law that largely forbade physicians from performing an abortion where the fetus was twenty weeks old. (Id. at p. 1217.) Because the court determined that the law was unconstitutional in every practical application, this determination was sufficient to require declaring the statute entirely invalid. (Id. at p. 1230.) The Ninth Circuit expressly held that because the statute was facially invalid, the usual concern with invalidating an abortion statute on its facethat the injunctive relief goes beyond the circumstances in which the statute is invalid to include situations in which it may not bedoes not arise. (Id. at p. 1231.) The Ninth Circuit previously addressed this distinction in Doe v. Gallinot (9th Cir. 1981) 657 F.2d 1017, in which a district court enjoined enforcement of certain provisions of California law governing involuntary commitment of mentally ill persons. The district court concluded that it violated the federal due process clause to commit persons judged to be gravely disabled due to mental disease to a mental institution for 72 hours

on an emergency basis, and up to 14 more days for involuntary treatment, with no requirement that the state initiate a hearing before an independent tribunal to determine whether adequate cause for commitment exists. (Id. at p. 1019.) Although the case was brought by a single individual who had been involuntarily committed under this statute on six different occasions (id. at p. 1020), the district court enjoined all certifications under the act (id. at p. 1024). Like petitioners in this case, state officials in Doe argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to order relief that would benefit persons other than the individual plaintiff. (Id. at p. 1024.) According to those officials, plaintiff was granted no standing to assert the constitutional rights of third persons and accordingly, the district court should not have granted relief beyond an injunction prohibiting future certifications of John Doe, the plaintiff, without a probable cause hearing. (Ibid.) The Ninth Circuit, however, was at a loss to understand this argument. (Ibid.) [H]aving declared the statutory scheme unconstitutional on its face, the district court was empowered under 28 U.S.C. 2202 to grant (f)urther necessary or proper relief to effectuate the judgment. The challenged provisions were not unconstitutional as to Doe alone, but as to any to whom they might be applied. Under the circumstances, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to enjoin the defendants from applying them. (Ibid.) None of these cases were styled or certified as a class action, and each of them involved an injunction that afforded relief that reached beyond the plaintiffs to the action.4 There is thus no support for the argument that a

Indeed, courts have denied class action certification on the grounds that the injunctive relief sought by individual plaintiffs would, as a practical matter, produce the same result as class-wide relief, making class certification unnecessary. (See, e.g., James v. Ball, (9th Cir. 1979) 613 (continued)

federal court abuses its discretion when it issues a statewide injunction prohibiting the enforcement of a statute found to be unconstitutional in all of its applications. Even if the authority of the district court could be adjudicated by this Court, the cases cited in the petition for the proposition that the district court lacked such authority are readily distinguishable. Perry was a facial challenge to a provision of the California Constitution, and the injunction entered barred all enforcement of Proposition 8. Therefore, this case is unlike Lewis v. Casey (1996) 518 U.S. 343 (cited in Petition at p. 36), in which prison inmates alleged violations of their civil rights to access to the courts, and the Supreme Court ruled that there was insufficient evidence of actual injury to merit system-wide relief. (Id. at pp. 356-357.) In sharp contrast to the facts of Lewis v. Casey, there is no question that all lesbians and gay men who wish to marry are harmed by a constitutional provision that prevents the state from solemnizing or recognizing their marriages.5 If petitioner wants to challenge the scope of the district courts injunction or seek modification of it, he must do so before that court. He cannot ask this Court to enjoin him from complying with the district courts injunction. Because this Court is not the proper forum for seeking modification of the injunction, and because the injunction properly applies to all 58 county clerks and recorders, petitioner is unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claims, and this Court should deny the stay.

(continued) F.2d 180, 186 [citing cases], reversed on other grounds, (1981) 451 U.S. 355.) 5 Further, the argument that petitioner is not supervised and controlled by the State Registrar is belied by the public statements he and his office have made, all of which evidence his insistence on and adherence to the supervision and direction of the State Registrar. (Exhs. 4, 5, 6, 8, 9.)

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II.

PETITIONERS HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED THAT A STAY IS NEEDED TO PREVENT IRREPARABLE INJURY The balance of harm to the parties also weighs against issuance of a

preliminary stay or injunction. The petition articulates no harm that will befall the petitioner in the absence of a stay that would not be of his own making. Moreover, the petitioner cannot show that if granted, the stay will prevent the harm he seeks to avoid. Although petitioner suggests that he has not yet complied with the injunction (see Petition at p. 19 [If Petitioner submits to the State Registrars directive . . .]), in fact, like every other county clerk in the state, petitioner has obeyed the federal injunction and, since July 1, 2013, has been issuing marriage licenses to gay and lesbian couples. (Exhs. 3, 6, 7.) The potential harm that he identifies would only result if petitioner stopped issuing licenses in violation of the injunction: he would then be subject to enforcement proceedings in federal court, including sanctions for contempt of court. In any event, judicial enforcement of a valid court order is not injury or irreparable harm that would support a stay. Petitioner also contends, without legal or evidentiary support, that if he complies with the injunction, he will face mandamus proceedings. (Petition at p. 19.) But inchoate fear of regular legal proceedings, or incurring administrative costs (Petition at p. 21) also will not support issuance of a stay. Given that petitioner is unafraid to bring this petition, he would similarly have nothing to fear from mandamus proceedings should they indeed ever be filed. Every lawsuit presents an issue of law for the court to determine, and this ordinary legal uncertainty is not grounds for a stay. If it were, a stay would be entered in every action. Moreover, there is no landmine of uncertainty for petitioner to navigate here. (See Petition at p. 21.) A similar argument was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in one of the many appeals arising from Perry. In that case, the deputy county

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clerk of Imperial County appealed the decision of the district court denying her motion to intervene, arguing that she had a significant protectable interest in avoiding legal uncertainty and confusion as to the applicability of Proposition 8 if the district court order were not reviewed on the merits. (Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2011).) The Ninth Circuit disagreed, noting that: there could, in any event, be no confusion in light of the Supremacy Clause. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. If a federal district court were to enjoin a County Clerk from enforcing state law, no provision of state law could shield her against the force of that injunction. Cf. LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 11591160 (9th Cir.2000) (criticizing an expansive interpretation of Cal. Const. art. III, 3.5, and explaining, It is a long-standing principle that a state may not immunize its officials from the requirements of federal law). (Ibid.) In any event, a stay enjoining respondents cannot shield petitioner from proceedings that seek to compel compliance with the federal injunction. If petitioner stops obeying the federal injunction and stops issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, it is almost assured that the Perry plaintiffs will commence proceedings in federal court to protect the integrity of their judgment. If such proceedings are filed, a stay issued by this Court will not bind the federal court or prevent it from imposing sanctions. (See, e.g., Madej v. Briley (7th Cir. 2004) 370 F.3d 665, 666667 [No state court can countermand an order, issued by a federal court, implementing the Constitution of the United States.].) The balance of harm to the public interest also weighs against issuance of a stay. Petitioners only contention that a stay would be in the public interest is his unsupported assertion that ambiguity concerning county clerks legal duties threatens marriage-related uncertainty and lack of uniformity throughout the State. (Petition at p. 18.) But the only

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uncertainty and ambiguity has been raised in the yet to be adjudicated lawsuits before this Court that challenge the statewide marriage uniformity that has in fact been achieved by county officials uniform compliance with the district courts injunction. Petitioner fails even to address the harm to the public interest that would arise from a stay or injunction. First, the stay itself would create the very kind of uncertainty about the same-sex marriages solemnized since June 28 that petitioner professes to avoid. (Petition at pp. 18-21.) Today, those marriages are valid; if a stay issues, they will be rendered uncertain. Second, a stay in this case would likely precipitate a conflict of constitutional dimension between this Court and the federal court. (See, e.g., Madej v. Briley, supra, 370 F.3d 665, 666-667.) To the extent that there is any substance to petitioners claims about the scope of the injunction (and there is not), that uncertainty should be resolved in the first instance by the federal court that issued it, to avoid any potential conflict that might otherwise result between state and federal courts. Third, petitioner does not address the harm that would result from the lack of statewide uniformity in application of the marriage laws that was of concern to this court in Lockyer. (Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 33 Cal.4th 1005, 1078-1079.) The stay requested would purport to relieve only petitioner of his obligation to obey the federal injunction; other counties, meanwhile, would continue to issue marriage licenses to gay and lesbian couples. Petitioners application for a stay or injunctive relief fails to consider or address any of these legitimate and practical public interest concerns.

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CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, petitioners request for a temporary stay should be denied, and the Court should summarily deny the petition in its entirety. Dated: July 22, 2013 Respectfully submitted, KAMALA D. HARRIS Attorney General of California DOUGLAS J. WOODS Senior Assistant Attorney General TAMAR PACHTER Supervising Deputy Attorney General DANIEL J. POWELL Deputy Attorney General P. PATTY LI Deputy Attorney General Attorneys for Respondents
SA2013112094 20712997

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that the attached PRELIMINARY OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE uses a 13 point Times New Roman font and contains 4,089 words. Dated: July 22, 2013 KAMALA D. HARRIS Attorney General of California

TAMAR PACHTER Supervising Deputy Attorney General Attorneys for Respondents

TABLE OF EXHIBITS Exhibit No. Exhibit 1 Description All County Letter 13-15 Attachment: Letter from Attorney General to Governor dated June 3, 2013 Attachment: Permanent Injunction All County Letter 13-16 San Diego Union-Tribune, July 19, 2013 NBC San Diego, June 26, 2013 CBS8, June 26, 2013 San Diego 6, July 2, 2013 KPBS, July 1, 2013 10 News, June 26, 2013 News Release, Ernest J. Dronenburg, Jr., June 26, 2013 Page 2 3 10 13 15 19 22 24 27 29 32

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