Almond - Verba - Cap 1 An Approach

307
atterns.
337
'ceptions, ~ct. Con1d stable
CHAPTER I
An Approach to Political Culture
ure. The
of the political culture of democracy and of the social structures and processes that sustain it. The faith of the Enlightenment in the inevitable triumph of human reason and liberty has been twice shaken in recent decades. The development of Fascism and Communism after World War I raised serious doubts about the inevitability of democracy in the West; and we still cannot be certain that the continental European nations will discover a stable form of democratic process suitable to their particular cultures and social institutions; nor can we more than hope that together they will discover a European democracy. Without having first resolved these doubts, the events since World War II have raised questions of the future of democracy on a world scale. The "national explosions" in Asia and Africa and the almost universal pressure by previously subjected and isolated peopIes for admission into the modem world put this more special political question into the broader Context of the future character of the world's culture. Culture change has acquired a new significance in world history. The groping toward enlightenment and control aver nature that acquired momentum three or four centuries aga in the "Vest has became a world-wide process, and its tempo has shifted from centuries to decades.
HIS IS A STUDY
The central question af public palicy in the next dec-
ades is what content this emerging world culture will have. We already have a partial answer to this question and could have predicted it from our knowledge of the processes ofcul1 tural diffusion. Physical goods and their mode of production seem to presem the least difficulties in diffusion. It is apparent that these aspects of Western culture are diffusing rapidly, along with the technology Upon which they dependo Since economic modernization and national unification require a large social overhead investment in transportation, communication, and education, and since these in turn call for taxation, regulation, and administration, the model of a rational bureaucracy also diffuses relatively easily. The idea of an efficient bureaucracy has much in common with the idea of a rational technology. Lucian Pye refers to modern social organization as being based on an organizational technology.2 It has in common with engineering and technology a mixture of rationality and authority. Engineering is the application of rationality and authorty to material things; modern social organization is their application to human beings and social groups. Though the non-Western world is far from having successfuIIy developed an industrial technology and an efficient bureaucracy, there can be little q'llestion that it wams these institutions and has some uncIerstanding of them. What is problematical about the coment of the emerging world culture is ts political character. AIthough the movement toward technology and rationality of organization appears with great uniformity throughout the world, the direction of poltical change is less clear. But one aspect of this new world political culture is discernible: it wiU be a poltical culture of participation. If there is a poltical revolution going on throughout the world, t is what might be called the participation explosion. In all the new nations of the world the belief that the ordinary man is political1y relevam - that he ought to be an involved participam in. the political system - is widespread. Large groups of people who
1 Ralph Linton, The Study of Man: An Introduction, pp.324-46.
An Approach to Political
have been outside of pOliti4 political system. And the I profess commitmem to this : Though this coming wo dominated by the partici) of participation will be is are presented with two di ticipatory state, the deml democratic state offers the take part in the political ( ential citizen; the totalitar: ticipant subject." S Both 11 tions, and which wiU win the two does not emerge If the democratic model velop in these new natio formal institutions of dem litical party, the elective part of the totalitarian p. not functional sense. A d( litical system requires as with it. But the transfer o ern democratic states to f rious difficulties. There an these concerns the natun The great ideas of demol of the individual, the priJ the governed - are eleva ti imaginations of many of t the modernizing older one demoeratic polity and its political elites make decis wellas the norms and at relation to government aI der cultural components.
8 See Frederick C. Barghoon pared for the Summer Institu Committee on Compara tive Pol mer 1962.
New York, 1936,
2 Committee on Compara tive Politics, Social Science Research Council, Memorand'lm on the Concept of Modernization, November 1961.
to Political Culture cuIture will h ave. question and could the processes ofcul. mode of production usion. It is apparent 'e diffusing rapidly, they dependo Since nification require a Jortation, communiIrn call for taxation, :1 of a rational bue idea of an efficient te idea of a rational leial organization as Jgy.2 It has in comixture of rationality ltion of rationality acial organization is ial groups. Though ccessfullydeveloped bureaucracy, there nstitutions and has
j
An Approach to Political Culture have been outside of politics are demanding entrance into the political system. And the political elites are rare who do not profess commitment to this goaI. Though this coming world politi~al culture appears to be dominated by the participation explosion, what the mode of participati0l! will be is uncertain. The emerging nations are presented with two different mode!s of the modern participatory state, the democratic and the totalitarian. The democratic state offers the ordinary man the opportunity to take part in the political decision-making process as an influential citizen; the totalitarian offers him the role of the "participant subject:' 8 Both modes have appeal to the new nations, and which will win out - if indeed some amalgam of the two does not emerge - cannot be foretold. 1 the democratic mode! of the participatory state is to develop in these new nations, it will require more than the formal institutions of democracy - universal suffrage, the political party, the elective legislature. These in fact are also part of the totaltarian participation pattern, in a f<;>,rmal if not functional sense. A democratic form of participatory poltical system requires as well a poltical culture consistent with it. But the transfer of the political culture of the Western democratic states to the emerging nations encounters serious difficulties. There are two principal reasons. The first of these concerns the nature of the demoeratic culture itself. The great ideas of democraey - the freedoms and dignities of the individual, the principIe of government by consent of the governed - are elevating and inspiring. They capture the imaginations of many of the leaders of the new states and of the modernizing older ones. But the working principIes of the democratic polity and its civic culture - the ways in which poltical elites make decisions, their norms and attitudes, as. well as the norms and attitudes of the ordinary citizen, his relation to government and to his fellow citizens - are subtIer cultural components. They have the more diffuse proper8 See Frederick C. Barghoom, "Soviet Political CuIture," a paper prepared for the Summer Institute on Political Culture. sponsored by the Committee on Compara tive Politics. Social Science Research Council. Sumo mer 1962.
')'
nt of the emerging Jthough the moveaf organization apie world, the direcone aspect of this :: it will be a poa political revoluis what might be the new nations of 1 is politicaIl y relertieipant in the poIPS of people who
ction, New York. 1936, :nce Research Council. Itmber 1961.
An Approach
to Po
ties of belief systems or of codes of personal relations, which the anthropologists teU us spread only with great difficulty, undergoing substantial change in the processo Actually, Western social sdence has onIy begun to codify the operating characteristics of the democratc pality itself. The doctrine an practice of a rational bureaucracy as an in. strument of the democratic political powers are less than a century old. Doubts about the possibility of a neutral bureaucracy were expressed in England as recently as the 1930's, and on the European continent such doubt is widespread today. The complex infrastructure of the democratic politypoliticaI parties, interest groups, and the media of communications - and the understanding of their inner workings,operating norms, and sociaI-psychologica! preconditions are only now being realized in the West. Thus the image of the democratic polity that s conveyed to the elites of the new natio05 is obscure and incomplete and heavi!y stresses ideology and legal norms. What must be learned abaut democracy is a matter af attitude and feeling, and this is harder to learn. The second principal reason why the diffusion af democracy encounters difficulties among the new nations concerns the objective problems confronting these natiom. They are entering"history wth archaic technologies and social systems, drawn toward the gleam and power of the technological and scientific revolutions. It is not difficult to see why they should be drawn toward a technocratic image of the polity: a polity in which authoritarian bureaucracy predominates and politica! organization becomes a device for human and social engineering. In almost every instance, however, though in differing measure, the leaders of the modernizing nations appreciate the distortions and the risks in adopting an authoritarian form of polity. Though they cannot fully understand the subtle balo ances of the democratic polity and the nuances of the civic cuIture, they tend to acknowledge their Iegitimacy as the expression of an impulsetoward the humane poly. In characterizing their situation, we have left out a significam elemento For. though it is true that they are fascinated by scence and technology and are drawn to ao impatient technocratic polity
as a means of attaini also the creatures would prefer to deal were available,
THE C!VIC CULTURlE
It is as an answer recommends tself. F ture, but one that co offers an example of velopment of the ci, as the product of a tion and traditional significant change bt as to acate disinteg her insular security, ficaton and of abso of aristocratic, local, tinental Europe, A separation rom the toleration af relgi01 gence of a thriving ; involvement of com lations of trade and ( Independem aris countryside, courag( dent merchants - tI tradi tion of the feu tion and enabled I lutism without destr the industri.al revol elites which made it changes in sodal sti centuries without Whigs found it po formst merchan ts a principIes of parE; The tradicional ari~ ~ough o this cvi
h to Political Culture
rsonal relations, which , with great difficu1ty, lcess. onIy begun to codify mocratic polity itself. bureaucraey as an inowers are Iess than a lity of a neutral burecentIy as the 1930's, JUht is widespread to~ democratic polity,e media of communiir inner workings,op>reconditions are only he image of the demelites of the new naavily stresses ideology about democraey is li harder to learn. ~ diffusion of democlew nations concerns ;e nations. They are ~s and social systems, he technological and , see why they should f the polity: a polity minates and political I and social engineerIgh in differing measappreciate the dislthoritarian form of ;tand the subtle balnuances of the civic legitimaey as the exne polity. In charac, significant elemento tated by science and t technocratic polity
1S
as a means of attaining the new things of this worId, they are also the creatures of their own traditional cultures and would prefer to deal gently with these cultures if this choice were available,
THE CIVIC CULTURE
It is as an answer to this ambivalence that the civic culture recommends itself. For the civic culture is not a modem culture, but one that combines modernity with tradition. Britain offers an example of how such a cllJture can develop. The development of the civic culture in Britain may be llnderstood as the product of a sedes of encounters between modernization and traditionalism - encounters sharp enough to effect significam change but Bar 50 sharp 01' 50 concentrated in time as to ereatedisintegraton ar polarizatian. Partly because of her insular security, Britain carne imo lhe era of national unificatian and af absolutism able to tolerate a greater measure of aristocratic, local, and corporate autollomy than could continental Europe. A first step toward secularization was the separation f TOm the Church of Rome and the beginnings of toleration of reIgious diversity. A second step was the emergence of a thriving and self-confident rrierchant dass, and the involvement of court and arstocracy in the risks andcalculations of trade and commerce. Independem aristocrats with secure local power in the countryside, courageous nonconformsts, rich and seU-confident merchants - these were the forces that transformed the tradition of the feudal estates into the parliamentary tradition and enabled Britain to pass through the era of absolutism without destroying her pluralismo Britan thus entered the industrial revolution with a poltical clllture among its elites which made it possible to assimilate the grss and rapid changes in social structure in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries without sharp discontinuities. The aristocratie Whigs found it possible to enter a caalition with nonconformist merchants and industrialists, to establsh securely the principIes of parliamentary supremacy and representation. The traditional aristocratic and monarchc forces assimilated enough af this dvic culture to compete wtn the secularist
An Approach to Poli
Though their pattern Britain and America, tries, and Switzerland version of a poltical and compromise. In ] ters between moderni; ers seem to have beel to permit the emerge commodation. The ci piration, and the deI being attained. The civic culture a great and problematI science of the West ha possession and every traditional societies a civic culture - man's way to handle social well? As we consider the culture - indeed, as their emergence is sti or both of two moodl a process whereby ma surface muddled tO\\ violence and groped structive instrument becomes a unique cu The second mood is replaced the mood ( fore World War I. ] tudes so fragile, so out of historical an subtleties and these ourselves in a world nology run wild, de: and possibly of life it: No one can provi But as social scientisl
tendencies for popular support and, indeed, to mitiga te their rationalism and mpart to them a love and respect for the sacredness of the nation and its ancient institutions. What emerged was a third culture, neither traditional nor modem but partaking of both; a pluralistic culture based on communication and persuasion, a cuIture of consensus and diversity, a culture that permitted change but moderated it. This was the civic culture. With this civic culture already consoldated, the working classes could enter into politics and, in a process of trial and error, find the language in which to couch their demands and the means to make them effective. It was in this culture of diversity and consensualism, rationalsm and traditionalism, that the structure of British democracy could develop: parliamentarism and representation, the aggregative political party and the responsible and neutral bureaucracy, the associational and bargaining interest groups, and the autonomous and neutral media of communication. English parliamentarism included the traditional and modem forces; the party system aggregated and combined them; the bureaucracy became responsible to the new political forces; and the poltical parties, interest groups, and neutral media of communication meshed continuously with the diffuse interest groupings of the community and with its primary communica-' tions networks. We have concentrated on British experience because the whole story of the emergence of the civic culture is told in British history, whereas developments in the United States and the countries of the "Old Commonwealth" began after some of the major battles had been won. ActualIy, in the course of the nineteenth century the development of the democratic culture and infrastructure was more rapid and more unequivocal in the United States than in Britain, since the United States was a new and rapidly expanding society and relatively unimpeded by traditional institutions. Though their basic pattems are similar, the civic cultures of Britain and the United States have somewhat different contents, reflecting these differences in national histories and social structures. On the European continent the record is more mixed.
~ to Political Culture
eed, to mtigate their and respect for the stitutions. ~ither tradtional nor :stic culture based on [re of consensus and ge but moderated it. : culture already con. into politics and, in mguage in which to make them effective. onsensualism, rationIre of British democi representation, the lonsible and neutral ning interest groups, l of communication. dtional and modern combined them; the tlew poltical forces; md neutral media of 1 the diffuse interest primary communica-
Though their patterns differ in many respects from those of Brtain and America, the Scandinavian countries, Low Couotries, and Switzerland appear to have worked out their own version of a political culture and practice of accommodaton and compromise. In France, Germany, and ltaly the encounters between modernizing tendencies and the traditional powers seem to have been too massive and too uncompromising to permit the emergence of a shared culture of poltical accommodation. The civic culture is present in the form of aspiration, and the demoeratic inrastructure is still ar rom being attained. The civic culture and the open polity, then, represent the great and problematic gifts of the West. The technology and science of the West have now already passed out of her unique possession and everywhere are destroying and transforming traditional societies and cultures. Can the open polity, and the civic culture - man's discovery of a humane and conservative way to handle social change and participation - spread as well? As we consider the origin of the open polity and the civic culture - indeed, as we consider the areas in the West where their emergence is still in doubt - we may faIl victim to one or both of two moods. The first is one of mystery or awe over a process whereby mankind on only a smalI part of the earth's surface muddled toward a humane and reasoned taming of violence and groped toward its transformation into a constructive instrument available to alI i.l1terests. As mystery, it becomes a unique cultural heritage unavailable to foreigners. The second mood is one of pessimism, which seems to have replaced the mood of democratic optimism that existed before World War L How can a set of arrangements and attitudes so fragile, so intricate, and so subtle be transplanted out of historical and cultural context? Or, how can these subtleties and these humane etiquettes survive even among ourselves in a world caught in the grip of a science and technology run wild, destructive of tradition and of communty and possibly of lHe tself? No one can provide defini tive answers to these questions. But as social scientists we can put the questions in such a way
,erience beca use the c culture is told in 1 the United States wealth" began after ,n. ActuaIly, in the opment of the dem)re rapid and more tl Brtain, since the Janding society and :tions. Though their s of Brtain and the contents, reflecting Icial structures. rd is more mixed.
An Approach
to Political
Culture
An Approach
to Politl
as to get useful answers. Though we may share the mood of wonde. and awe at the intricacy of the democratic mechanisrns and the unique historical experience out of which they e~~rged, we are confronted with a contemporary historicaI chailenge for which mood by itself is an inadequate response. ,1. we. are to come doser to understanding the problems of the cllfuslOn of democratic culture, we have to be able to specify the contem of what has to be diffused, to develop appropnate measures for it, to disco ver its quantitative inddence and demographic distribution in countries with a wide range af experience with democracy. With such knowledge we can speculate intelligently about "how much of what" must be presem in a country before democratic insti .. tutions take root in congruent attitudes and expectations. E~orts to. deal with this problem have usually beeo based on ImpresslOns and inferences from history, on inferences frem democratic ideology, on certain kinds of socioloQ"ical analysis, ar 011 psychologica! insights. Thus in our effor;s to estimate the prospeets of democracy in countries such as German)' and Italy, or in the developin.g areas of the non-'iVestern world, we freguem!y try to draw "lessons" from British and ~meriean. hi~tory. It has been argued, for example, that the Iong cont!nUlty of British and American political experience and the gradual process of change have both contributed to effective democratization. Similar1y, the growth of a vigorous and numerous middle c1ass, the developrnent of Protestantism, and in particular the nonconformist sects, have been considered vital to the development of stable dernocratic institutions in Britain, the Old Commonwealth, and the Unted States. There have been efforts to derive fram these experiences some standards as to what attitudes and behavior must be present in other countries if they are to become democratic. Even more common than drawing inferences from history has becn our tendency to derive criteria of what has to be diffused rom the institutional and ideological norms of democracy itself. XL 1S argued that if a democratic svstem is based on tbe sharing of influence among the adu1t p;pulation as a wbole, then, if the system is not to be subverted, the individuaI musi use his power .intelligently for the good of the
polity. Theorists of d~ stressed that democraClt ticipation in civic affail public affairs, and by , ity. These doctrines teI be like if he is to bel the system. Stil! a third type of the development of st: nomic and social cone tems. Both Lipset and tween indices of moa main problem present and psychoIogieal co and processes are left t in comparison to othe literate and educated and wealth are higher tions the amenities oj analysis not only omit tion, it also cannot ex Germany and France, ernization, are classif Cuba and Venezuela, development in Latin ship and instability. potheses but does nol attitudes is associated . Another type af ap democracy is based o LasswelI has gone fu; acteristics of the "deI acter qualities he in, means a warm an in
4 Seymour M. Lipset, F A. Almond and James ( Princeton, N.}., 1960, pp. I) The Political Writinl 495ft; LassweIl, Power an
Political Culture
hare the mood of lemocratic mecha. ou of whch they nporary historical n inadequate reding the problems lave to be able to ed, to deve10p apquantitative inccountries with a With such knowlt "how much of : democratic insti .. expectations. sually been based Iry, on inferences ds of socioIogical j in our efforts to ltries such as Ger,f the non-\Vestem rom British and example, that the oIiticaI experience ,th contributed to ,wth of a vigorous t of Protestantism, have been considxratc nstitutions the United States. these experiences behavior must be ecome democratic. :nces from history II ""hat has to be ~icaI norms of deltic system is based lt popuIation as a !bverted, the indir the good of the
polity. Theorists af democracy from Aristotle to Bryce have stressed that democraces are maintained by active citizen participation in civic affairs, by a high level of information about public aftairs, and- by a widespread sense of civic responsibility. These doctrines teU us what a demo era ti c dtizen ought to be like if he is to behave according to the requirements Df the system. Stil! a third type o investigation of the conditions favoring the deveIopment of stable democracy are studies of the economic and sodal conditions associated with democratic syatems. Both Lipset and CoIeman find a strong correlation between indices of modernizatiol1 and democratization.4 The main problem presented by these studies is that the cultural and psychologieal consequences of "modem" technologies and processes are left to inference. We know that democraces, in comparison to other political systems, tend to have more !iterate and educated peopIe, that their per capita income and wealth are higher, and that they enjoy in greater proportions the amenities of modem civilization. Rut this type of analysis not only omits the psychological basis of democratization, it also cannot explain the significant deviam cases. Thu.s Germany and France, which rank high ou the indices of modernization, are classified by Lipset as unstable democracies. Cuba and Venezuela, both of Wh1Ch rank high in economic development in Latin America, have long histories of dictatorship and instability. This kind of study is suggestive of hypotheses but does not teU us directIy what kind of duster of attitudes is assocated with democracy. Another type o approach to the eulture and psyehology of democracy is based on the insights of psychoanaIysis. Harold LasswelI has gone furthest in specifying the personality charaeteristics of the "democrat." 5 In his list of demoeratic ebaracter quaIities he includes (1) an "open ego," by which he means a warm and inclusive attitude toward other human be4 Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man, New York, 1960, pp. 4511.;Gabriel A. Almond and James Coleman, Thc Politics of the Developing Areas, Princeton, N.J., 1960, pp. 538ff. li The Poltical Writings of Harold D. l.asswell, Glencoe, m., 1951, pp. 495ff.; Lasswell, Power and Personality, New York, 1946, pp. 148ff.
HJ
ings; (2) a capacity for sharing values with others; (3) a multivalued rather than a single-valued orientation; (4) trust and confidence in the human environmem, and (5) relative freedom trom anxiety. Though the relationship between these characteristics and democratie behavior seems to be c1ear, Lasswell's democratie qualities are not specifically political attitudes and feelings, and they may actually be encountered in great frequency in societies that are not democratie in structure. Our study grows out of this body of theory about the characteristics and preconditions of the culture of democracy. What we have done amounts to a series of experiments intended to test some of these hypotheses. Rather than inferring the properties of democratic culture fram political institutions or social conditions, we have attempted to specify its COntent by examining attitudes in a number of operating democratic systems. And rather than deriving the socialpsychological preconditions of democracy from psychologieal theory, we have sought to determine whether and to what ex. tent these, relations actually exist in functioning democratic: systems. We do not argue that our study wilI shut off specula. tion and provide the precise and tested propositions of a complete theory of democracy, but, rather, that some of these propositions wilI survive the test of empirical-quantitative analysis"and some will not. This stage of experiment should focus and direct inquiry by providing some answers to old questions and suggesting some new questions. In stilI another respect we hope to contribute to the de. velopment of a scientific theory of democracy. By far the greatest amount of empirical research on democratic attitudes has been done in the Unted States. In our study we have included, in addition to our own Country, Britain, Germany, Italy, and Mexico. Why we selected these particular countries is discussed below. Our five-country study offers us the opportunity to escape from this Amercan parochialism and to discover whether or not relations found in the American data are also encountered in democratic countries whose. historieal experiences and poltical and social structures differ from ooe another.
An Approach
to P
TYPES OF POLITICA
In our com parisc porary democraci.es c1assifications Whld We speak of the ": the "national chara litical socialization" rearing in general logical and anthroI tudes to other com 1 those theories whic velopment in gen.e into his adult pola coulcl not have bel historians, social I ps)'chologists, and I the relationshi ps characteristics of n greatly influenced 1 tural appro<;lch" te approach has dev~ graphic literature 11
6 General
theoretical
alia in RUlh Benedict,

anti Daniel Lcvinson. ality and Socio-Cultun Social Psychology, Cal
Studving Personality ( ner . The Psychologica The Indillidual and R,

Murray. and David Sei New York, 1955; Harol
ical Writings, op. cit.; ~

Iitical Acts," in U"orld Character Cha' re
Bachground of Person,
of National
Policy Sciences, Stanfo

Inkeles, "National lhe most important
Hsu (ed.). Psychologic.
h to Political Culturt:
es with others; (3) a l orientatian; (4) trust nent, and (5) relative :ionship between these Ir seems to be clear, t specifically political tually be encountered :e not democratic in heory about the charClIture of democracy. es of experiments inR.ather than inferring 'om political institu:mpted to specify its lUmber of operating deriving the socialy from psychological 'ther and to what exlctioning democratir. wiH shut olI specularopositions of a comthat some of these m pirical-q uantita tive f experiment should orne answers to old ns. mtribute to the delOcracy. By far the democratic attitud~s Ir study we have inBritain, Germany, particular contries offers us the oppor:hialism and to dis~Ameriean data are whose historical exres dilIer from one

TYPES OF POLITICAL CULTURE
11
In our comparison o the political cultures o five contemporary demotracies, we employ a number of concepts and classifications which it will be useul to specify and define. We speak of the "political culture" o a nation rather than the "national character" or "modal personality," and o "political socialization" rather than of child development or child rearing in general terms, not beca use we reject the psychological anel anthropological theories that relate political altitudes to other components o personality, or because we reject those theories which stress the relationship between child development in general terms and the induction a the child inta his adult political roles and altitudes. lndeed, this study coulcl not have been made without the prior work a those historians, social philosophers, an thropologists, sociologists, ps)'chologists, and psychiatrists who have been concerned with the relationships between the psychological and political characteristics of nations. In particular, this study has been greatly influenced by the "culture-personality" or "psychocultural approach" to the study of political phenomena. This approach has developed a substantial theoretical anel monographic literature in the past twenty-five years.G
6 General theoretical statements of lhis approach are lO be fOllnd inter alia in RUlh Benedict, Pallt'l'IlS of Culture, New York, 1934; Alex lnkcles and Daniel Lcvinson, "National Character: The Stuuy of Modal Person. ality and Socio-Cultural Systems," in Garuner Lindze)' (eu.), Hal1dbook of Social Psychology, Cambriuge, l\fass., 1954, VoI. Il; Bert Kaplan (ed.), Studyil1g Persollality Cmss.Cullurall)'. Evanston, m., 1961; Abram Kardi. ner. The Psychological Frol1tiers of Society, New York, 1939; Kardiner, The Individual and His Societ)', New York, 1945; Clyde Klllckhohn, Henry Murra)', and David Schneider, Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture, New York. 1955; Harold D. LassweIl, Psychopathology and Politics in Polit. ical Writings, op. cit.; Nathan Leites, "Psychocultural Hypotheses About Po. litical Acts," in J-florld Polilics, Vol. I, 1948; Ralph Linton, The Cultural Backgroul1d of Persollllli/y,. New York. 1945; l\l:u'garet l\l~au, "The Study of National Character," in Daniel Lemer anu Harold D. Lasswell, The Policy Sciellces, Stan(ord, 1951. Particularly relevam lo our work is Alex lnkeles, "National Character and Modem Political Systems," in Francis L. K. Hsu (ed.), Psychological Atltilroj)ology, Homewood, m., 1961. And one of the most importam recent contributions to the theory of national charac.
12
An Appmach
to Political Culture
We employ the terro "politicaI cuIture" for two reasons. First, if we are to ascertain the ~eJationships between poltical and nonpoltical attitudes and developmental patterns, we have to separa te the former .rom lhe Iatter even though the boundary between them .is flOr. as sharp as Qur terminoIogy would mggest. The term "poltica! culture" thus refers to the specifically poltical orientations - attudes toward the poltical system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the seH in Lhe system. We speak o a po!itical culture just as we can speak of an economic cu!ture or a religious cu 1lure. Ir. is a set of orientations toward a speciaI set of sodal objects and processes. But we also choose poIitcaI culiuye, rather than some other spedaI concept, beca use ir. enables tiS to utilize lhe couceptual frameworks 2nd approaches a anthropology, sociology, and psychology. Our thi.nking !s enriched when we employ, for example, sucn categories of anthropology an psyler and po!itical CUlture is Ludan W. Pye's Politics, Personality, and Na. tiO?!Building, New Haven, 1962, which both evelops a general theory Df personality and political altitudes and applies this to a study of Burmese patterns. Stuies Df Germany incJ.ude: R. Brickner, Is Germany lncurable? Phila. delphia, 1943; H. V. Dieks, "Personality Traits and National Socialist Ideology," Human Relations, VoI. UI, 1950; David Rodniek, PostUlar Germans, New Haven, 1948, and .Ber<ram Sehaffner, Fatherland. A Study of Authoritarinnism in the German Family, Neli' York. 1948. Studies Df the United States include: Geofl'rey Gorer, The American People, New YOi"k,1948; Marga.ret Mead, And Kcep YOur PaUlde:"Dry, New Yorl:, 1942, and David Riesrnan, The Lonely CroUld, New Haven,
1950.
.4ppmnch A n ...
.4 <A<
to Polti
Studies Df Russia inc!ude: H. V. Dicks, "Obsen'alions on Contemporary Russian Behavior:' Human Relations. Vol. V, 1952; Geoffrey Gorer and John Rickman, The People of Great Russia, JLondon, 1949; Nathan Leites, .I.iI Study of Bolshevism, Glencoe, m., i953; Marga".::t Mead, Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority, New York, 1951, and .Dinko Tomasic, The lmpact of Russian Culture on Soviet Communism, Glencoe,. 1953. For England, see Geoffrey Corer, Exploring ElIglish Character, New York, 1955. For France, see Nathan Leites, On the Game af Politics in Fro.nce, Stanford, 1959; Rhodu Metrau~ and Margaret Mead, Themes in French Culture, Stanford, 195,t, an lLawrence Wylie, P'illage in The Vaucluse, Cambridge, Mass., 195'7. And for ]apaI1, see Ruth ]F. Benedict, The ChrJ'sa.nthemv.m an The Swonf, Basto,], 1945.
chology as sociaEzati~) ;;;'milarly, Qur capaClt ui. . transformation of poht the body of theory a~( eral phenomena of SOCI;; We appreciate lhe f eulture in a variety of conceptual vocabu:ar~ importing ts ambIgmt cal~ only stress that we one of its many mean toward social objects. "' of a society, we refer t( the cognitions, feeling People are inducted i nonpolitical roles ana ture~ have much i.n COl poltical acculturative we view them in the 1 and incorpora tive te na, Thus the concept { from the diffuseness of cultural ethos and m the concept implies. : about relationships ar ture and to test these cept of poli.tic~l soci~ simple assumptlOns or lationships between g' adu1t poltical attit~d( attitudes and behaVIOj tem political socializat The Dolitical cuI:ur tion of Lpattems ar ori the members af the fi tributions, we need tI ping individual orient words, we need to cid tation and classes of
e" for two reasons. ps between political lental patterns, we er even though the as Qur terminology :" thus refers to the :1es toward the pottitudes toward the f a political culture e or a religious cul,pedal set of sodal rather than some , to utilize the conHhropology, sociolenriched when we :hropology and psys, Personality, and Na.
lPS
An Appmach
13
a general theory of to a study of Burmese
nallY Incurablel Phila. md National Socialist Rodnick, Postwar Ger'atherland. A Study o/

1948.
Gorer, The Arneriean 'cp Your Powder Dry, I Crowd, New Haven, ions on Contemporary ~; Geoffrey Gorer and 1, 1949; Nathan Leites, Mead, Soviet Attitudes ,masic, The lmpaet 01
3.
Iglish Charaeter, New ~ Garne of Polities in tret Mead, Themes in iylie, V illage in T he see Ruth F. Benedict,
chology as social!zation, culture conJlict, and acculturation. Similarly, our capacity to understancl the emergence anel transformation of political systems grows when we draw upon the body of theory anel speculation concerned with the general phenomena of social structure and processo We appreciate the fact that anthropologists use the term cuIture in a vo.riety of ways, anel that by bringing it into the conceptual vocabulary of political science we are in clanger of importing its ambiguities as weIl as its advantages. Here we cao onIy stress that we employ the concept of culture in only one of its many meanings: that of psychological orientation toward social objects. When we speak of the political culture oi a society, we refer to the political system as internalizeel in the cognitions, feelings, anel evaluations of its population. People are inducteel into it just as they are socializeel into nonpolitical roles anel social systems. Confiicts of political cultures have much in common with other culture conflits, anel political acculturative processes are more understandable if we view them in the light of the resistances and the fusional and incorpora tive tendencies of cultural change in general. Thus the concept of political culture helps us to escape rom the diffuseness of such general anthropological terms as cultural ethos and ram the assumption af homogeneity that the concept implies. lt enables us to formula te hypotheses about relationships among the different components of culture and to test these hypotheses empirically. With the concept of political socialization we can go beyond the rather sim pIe assumpticns of the psychocultural school regarding relationships between general child development patterns and adult poltical attitudes. 'iN'e can relate specific adult political attitudes and behavioral propensities to the manifest and latent political socialization experiences of childhood. The politica! culture of a nation is the particular distribution of patterns oi orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation. Before we can arrive at such distributions, we need to have some way of systematically tapping individual orientatio13 toward poltical objects. In other words, we need to define and specify modes of poltical orientation and classes of political objects. Qur definition and
14
An Approach
to Political
Culture
classification of types of poltical orientation foIlow Parsons and Shils, as has been suggested elsewhere.7 "Orientation" re. fers to the internalized aspects of objects and relationships. 1t incIudes (1) "cognitive oriemation," that is, knowledge of and belief about the poltical system, ts roles and the in. cumbems of these roles, ts inputs, and its OUtputs; (2) "af. fective oriemation," 01' feelings about the political system, ts roles, personnel, and performance, and (3) "evaluational oriemation," the judgments and opinions about poltical ob. jects that typicaIly invoIve the combination of value standards and cri teria with information and feelings. In classifying objects of poltical orientation, we start with the "general" poltical system. We deal here wth the system as a whole and incIude such feelings as patriotism 01' aliena. tion, such cogntions and evaluations of the nation as "large" 01' "smalI," "strong" or "weak," and of the poliry as "democratic," "consttutional," or "socialistic." At the other extreme we distinguish orientations toward the "self" as poltica 1 actor; the contem and quality of norms of personal poltical obligation, and the content and quality of the sense of personal competence vis-.vis the poltical system. In treating the component parts of the poltical system we distingllish, first, three broad classes of objects: (1) specific roles 01' sI ructures, such as legislative bodies, executives, 01' bureaucracies; (2) incumbl:nts of roles, such as particular monarchs, legisIators, and administrators, and (3) particular public po1ies, decisions, 01' enforcements of decisions. These structllres, in. cumbems, and decisions may in turn be cIassified broadly by whether they are involved ether in the political 01' "input" process 01' in the administrative 01' "output" processo Ry "poltical" ar "input" process we refer to the flow of demands from the society imo the polty and the conversion of these demands imo authortative policies. Some structures that are predominamly involved in the input process are political parties, interest groups, and the media of coInmunicatioll. By the administra tive or output process we refer to that process
Gabriel A, Almond, "Compara tive POlitical Systcllls," }oumal o/ Pol1956; Talcott Parsons and Edward A: Shils, Toward a General Theory o{ Action, Cambridge, Mass" 1951, pp. 53ff.
7
An Approach
to Po
by which authoritati'
tures predominantly bureaucracies and cal We realize tha t a actuaI continuity of functionality of pol ma de in bureaucraci Iabel as input, such are often concerned
TABLE I.! Dimensions. Syst. ger
ob
Cognition Affect Evaluation
"fies, Vol. XVIII,
forcement. What w( sis, and one that is of polticaI culture: ticipant and subjec presence or absencc structures. For our of great importam are also invoIved i tions and that the s in the performance for our classifica tio oriented to, how 1 these objects are I flow of policy mak enforcement. We 1 when we define the We can consoIid: viduaI orientations TabIe 1.1 teUs us t1J can be tapped systeJ
ation follow Parsons ~e.7"Orientation" reand relationships. 1t lat is, knowledge of ts roles and the ints outputs; (2) "af. e political system, its ld (3) "evaluational IS about political obm of value standards tation, we start with here with the system patriotism 01' alienalhe nation as "large" the polit)' as "demoAt the other ex treme 'seU" as poli tical acaf personal political of the sense of perstem. In treating the we distingllish. first, : roles or stl'uctllres, r bureaucracies; (2) nonarchs, legisla tors, public policies, de~hese structllres, in. classified broacl1y by political 01' "input" ut" processo By "pohe ftow of demands conversion o[ these e structures that are )rocess are poli tiral communration. By reter to that process
ystcll1s,"
15
by which authoritative policies are applied or enforced. Structures predominantly involved in trns process would incIude bureaucracies and courts. We realize that any such distinction does violence to the actual continuity of the poltical process and to the multiunctionality o political structures. Much broad policy is made in bureaucracies and by courts; and structures that we label as input, such as interest groups and political parties, are often concerned with the details of administration and cnT ABLE I.1 Dimensions of political orientation
1. 2.
System as general object Cognition

Affect Evaluation
J. OutjJut objects
4. SeI! as object
lnput objects
Jallmal af 1'01'aru A. Shils, TaU'flrd a pp.53ff.
forcement. What we are referring to is a difference in emphasis, and one that is of great importance in the classification of poltical cultures. The distinction we draw between participant and subject political cultures turns in part on the presence or absence of orientation toward specialized input structures. For our classification of politicaI cultures it is not of great importance that these specialized input structures are also involved in the performance of enforcement functions and that the specialized administra tive ones are involved in the performance of input functions. The important thing for our cIassification is what political objects individuaIs are oriented to, how they are oriented to them, and whether these objects are predominantly involved in the "upward" fiow of policy making or in the "downward" fiow of policy enforcement. We shalI treat this probIem in greater detail when we define the major classes of politicaI culture. We can consolida te what we have thus far said about individual orientations toward the polity in a simple 3 x 4 matrix .. Table 1.1 teUs us that the political orientation of an individual can be tapped systematically if we explore the following:
16
1. What knowledge does he have of his nation and of his politicaI system in general terms, its history, size, location, power, "constitutional" characteristics, and the like? What are his feelings toward these systemic charaeteristics? What are his more or less considered opinions and judgments of them? 2. What knowledge does he have of the structures and roles, the various political elites, and the palicy proposaIs that are involved in the upward ftow of poliey making? What are his feelings and opinions about these structures, leaders .. and poIicy proposaIs? 3. What knowIedge does he have of the downward flow of policy enforcement, the structures, individuaIs, and decisions invoIved in these processes? ""Vhat are his feelings and opinions of them?
TABLE
An Approach
to Paii;
1.2
Types of political culture System as general object SeI! as acti'ue participant O

O I
In/'ut objects O
O I
Parochial Subject Participant
Output objects O
I 1
O
1 I
4. Ho",,, does he perceive of himself as a member of his poltical system? What knowledge does he have oi his rights, powers, obIigations, and of strategies of access to influence? How does he EeeI about his capabilities? What norms of partieipation or of performance does he acknowledge and employ in formulating poltical judgments, or in arriving at opinions? Characterizing the polticaI culture of a nation means, in effect, filling in such a matrix for a valid sample of its population. The politieal culture becomes the frequency of differem kinds of cognitive, aifective, and evaluative orientations toward the poltical system in general, ts input and output aspects, and the seH as poltica! actor. Pamchial Political Culture. When this frequency of orientations to specialized poltical objects of the four kinds specified in Table 1.2 approaches zero, we can speak of the po-
liticaI culture as a p African tribal societies ferree! to by CoIemanF soceties tItere are no ~ chietainship, "shama religious roles, and f, litical orientations to their religious and se tion also implies the ' change initiated by t pects nothing from. th tralized African ch1ef( refers. the poltical c chiaI, although the d ized roles in these se more differentiated F and more differentiate nantly parochial cultu likcly to oceur in sim specialization is ~in.in political systems 15lIk than cognitive. That geria or Ghana may b istence of a central p' it are uncertain ar ne norms to regulate his r The Subject Polit( DoliticaI culture liste' Here there is a high ferentiated political s~ the system, but orient and toward the seIf The subject is aware he is affecti.vely orient haps disliking it; and as noto Rut the relat eral leveI, and towarc ward flow" side of the
8 Almond
and Coleman,
Political Culture
An Approach io Political Culture
17
naton anel of his :ory, size, location, the li.ke? What are ~teristics? What are udgmems of them? tructures anel roles, propasals that are
dng? What are his

:5, leaders,
and poI-
dOVvllward fJ.ow of uals, and declsions feelings and opin-
SeIf as
utput bjects
active participant O O
I
o
I
I
member of his pohave of his rights, l.ccess to influence? Vhat norros of parwledge and employ rriving at opinions? nation means, in ,ample of its popufrequency of differ.uative orientations input and output
i
, frequency of oriof the four kinds :an speak of the po-
ltica1 culture as a parochial oue. The po1iticaI cultures of African tribal societies anel autonomo'us local communities refeneci to by ColemanR would fall into this category. In these societies the.,.c are no specialized political roles: headmanship, chieftainship, "shamanship" are diffuse politica1-economicreligious roles, anel for members of these societies the poltical orientations to these roles are not separatecl rom thei" religious and social orientations. A parochial orientation also implies the compara tive absence of expectations of change initiated by the political system. The paro chiaI expects nothing from the political system. Similarly, in the centralized African chiefdoms and kingdoms to which. Coleman refers, the political cultures would be predominantly parochiaI, although the development of somewhat more speciaIized roles in these societies might mean the beginnings of more differentiated politicaJ orientations. Even larger-scale and more di.fferentiate polities, however, may have predominantly parochial cultures. But relatively pure parochi:lism is likely to occur in simpler traditional systems where political specialization is minima!. Parochialism in more differentiated political systems i.>likely to be affective and normative rather than. cognitive. That is to say, the remate tribesmen in Nigeria 01' Ghana mal' be aware in a dim sort of way of the existence of a central political regime. But his feelings toward it are uncertain or nega tive, and he has not interna1ized any norms to regulate his relations to it. The Subject Political Culture. The second major type of political culture listed in Table 1.2 i5 the subject culture. Here there i5 a high frequency of orientations toward a differentiated political system and toward the output aspects of the system, but orientations toward specifically input objects, and toward the sel as an active participant, approach zero. The subject is aware of specialized governmental authority; he is affectively oriented to it, perhaps taking pride in it, perhaps disliking it; and he evaluates it either as legitimate or as nol. But the relationship is toward the system on the general leveI, and toward the output, administrative, ar "downward flow" side of the poltica! system; ir is essentially a pas8 Almond
and Coleman, Politics of lhe Developing Arcas, p. 254.
18
An Approach to Politica,
picture, just as both .raroe when participant onentat the l1lost significant differ five uemocraces included the way in which paroch tions have combined, fu: individuaIs of the polity.9 Another cauton is neo ply homogeneity.or unife litical systems wlth pred even in the limiting caSE aIs. The imperfections o tion, personal preferencf in opportunities to leal' and parochials, even in cies. Simi!arly, parochi; "high" subject cultures. Thus there are two as' tura! "mix." The "citize subject, and parochia! o particular mix of ctize ctizen we need concept: gruence to handle the ~ ticipant, subject, and p tive performance. For t in detai! be!ow, we nel thresholds, and congrw "mix" of citizens, subjel fective performance of ( the poltica! cultures o occasion to discuss these Our threefold c1assifi rochial is only the begJ tures. Each one of the~ our classification has I litica! deve10pment ane latter question first, sin lem of subc1assification
9
sive relationship, although there is, as we shall show below, a limited form of competence that is appropriate in a subject culture. Again we are speaking of the pure subject orientation that is likely to exist in a society in which there is no differentiated input structure. The subject orientation in poltical systems that have developed democratic institutions is likely to be affective and norma tive rather than cognitive. Thus a French royalist is aware of democratic institutions; he simply does not accord legtimacy to them.
The Participant Political Culture. The third major type of poltical culture, the participant culture, is one in which the members of the society tend to be explicitly oriented to the system as a whole and to both the poltical and adminstrative structures and processes: in other words, to both the input and output aspects of the political system. Individual mem. bers of the participant polity may be favorably ar unfavorably oriented to the various classes of poltical objects. They tend to be oriented toward an "activist" role of the self in the polity, though their feelings and evaluations of such a role may vary rom acceptance to rejection, as we shaIl show below. This threefold classification of poltical cultures does not assume that one orientation replaces the others. The subject culture does not eliminate diffuse orientations to the primary and intima te structures of community. To the diffuse orienta. tions to lineage groups, religious communty, and village it adds a specialized subject orientation to the governmental institutions. Similarly, the participant culture does not supplant the subject and parochiaI patterns of orientation. The par. ticipant culture is an additional stratum that may be added to and combined wth the subject and parochial cultures. Thus the ctizen of a participant polty is not only oriented toward active participation in politics, but is also subject to law and authorty and is a member of more diffuse primary groups.
To be sure, adding participant orientations to subject and parochial orientations does not leave these "earlier" orientations unchanged. The parochial orientations must adapt when new and more specialized orientations enter into the
See below, chaps. VIII
aI
sha11 show below, a )priate in a subject ect orientation that : is no differentiated in political systems ans is likeIy to be jve. Thus a French ; he simply does not third major type of is one in which the itly oriented to the I and adminstrative to both the input 1. Individual mem. rorably or unfavoritical objects. They ,Ie of the self in the :ons of such a role Te sha11show below. [ cultures does not athers. The subject ions to the primary the diffuse orienta. nity, and village it le governmental in~ does not supplant entation. The parthat may be added parochial cultures. ; not onIy oriented 5 also subject to Iaw re diffuse primary ions to subject and e "earlier" orienta. ltions must adapt ons enter into the
19
picture, just as both parochial and subject orientations change when participant orientations are acquired. Actua11y, some of the 11l0stsignificant differences in the political cultures of the five democracies included in our study turn on the extent and the way in which parochial, subject, and participant orientations have combined, fused, ar meshed together within the individuais of the polity.9 Another caution is necessary. Our classification does not imply homogeneity or uniformity of poltical cultures. Thus politicaI systems with predominantly participant cultures will, even in the limiting case, include both subjects and parochiaIs. The imperfections of the processes of political socialization, personal preferences, and limitations in intelligence or in opportunities to learn will continue to produce subjects and parochials, even in we11-establshed and stable democracies. Similarly, parochials will continue to exist e~en in "high" subject cultures. Thus there are two aspects of cultural heterogeneity or cultural "mix." The "citizen" is a particular mix of participant, subject, and parochial orientations, and the civic culture is a particular mix of citizens, subjects, and parochials. For the citizen we need concepts of proportions, threshoIds, and con. gruence to handle the ways in which his conste11ation of participant, subject, and parochial attitudes is related to effective performance. For the civic culture, which we sha11 treat in detail below, we need the same concepts of proportions, thresholds, and congruence to handle the problem of what "mix" of citizens, subjects, and parochials is related to the ef. fective performance of democratic systems. When we compare the political cultures of our five countries we sha11 have the occasion to discuss these questions again. Our threefold classification of participant, subject, and parochial is onIy the beginning of a classification of poltical cultures. Each one of these major classes has its subclasses, and our classification !:las left out entirely the dimension of political development and cultural change. Let us look into this latter question first, since it will enable us to handle the problem of subclassification with a better set of conceptual tools.
9 See
below, chaps. VIU and IX.
20
An Appmach
to Poltical Cuhure
Political cultures may 01' may Dot be congruent wth lhe structures of the political system. iA congruent poltical structure woulel be one appropriate for the culture: in other words, where poltical cognition in the population would tend to be accurate anel where affect and evaluatio1 wou1d tenel to be favorableo In general, a parochiaI, subject, or participant cuI. ture wou1eI be most congruent wth, respectvely, a traditional poltical structure, a centralized authortarian structure, anel a democratic polticaI structure. A parochial political culture that was congruent wirh ts structure would have a high rate of cogntive orientations and high rates af positive affective and evaluative orientations to the diffuse structures of the tribal or village communityo A subject poltical culture congruent with its system wauId have a high rate af cognition anel high positve rates of the other two types of orientation to the specialized poltical system as a whole, anel to ts administra tive oroutput aspects; whereas the congruent participant culture wouJd be characterized by high and positive rates of orientation to alI four classes af political objectso Political systems change, that culture and structure other. ParticularIy in these the most numerous political failed to attain congruence, polit)' to' another. and we are justified in assuming are often incongruent with each decades of rapid cultural change, systems may be those that have or are moving from one form of
An Approach to Pol
congruence s strong entations approach 1J the political structur tive -feeling anel eva] Incongruence betwee when the indiffereno
TABU 1.3
Congruence{i and strv.cture
Cognitive orienta~ion Affe::tiveorientat!on Evaluative orientation

., A (+) sign means a li or of evaluation toward f of negative evaluations o ference,
To represent schematical1y these relatons of congruencej incongruence between poltical structure and cuIture, we present Table 1.3. Any one of the three major types of poltical cultures may be located on the matrix in Table 1..3. Thus we may speak of "allegiant" 10 parochiaI,. subject, and participam cultures when cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations to the appropriate objects of the polity approach uniry, or perfect congruence between cuture and structure. But congruence between culture and structure may be best represented in the forro of a scaleo The Iimits of congruence betvveen cuIture and structure are established in columns I and 2 of the table. The
10
book, Polilical
We have borrowe lhe concept "Allegiant" fwm Robert E. Lane's Ideology, New York, 1962, pp, 17011'.
evaluation grow in this scale as one of the first column in legiant stuation: c match; as we move toward alienation: , stitutions or structm But this scale s ' may take the form l role incumbents (eo racy); 01' it may be shift from a simph complex one. We h: tures (with the exc mxed. Thus a par are oriented as sub] will contain some mixed" poltical cu signii1cant proporti plex patterns of or: systemically mixed,
--_._-------'-....-
__
...:
__
..
---._-
) PoliticalCuh-ure ongruent with the lent political strucmo: in othef words, 1 would tend to be 'would i:end to be or participant cultivelv. ;;. traditional lan s~~'ucture, anel a ai political culture ld have a high rate )f posi ti ve affective e si:ructures of the )litical culture conlte of cognition and f orientation to the to its a(lministrative participant culture ~rates of orientation lstified in assuming )ngruent with each )id cultural change, be those that have g from one forro of tons of congruencej anel cul ture, we preJlitical cultures may lUS we may speak of participam cultures orienta dons to the ch unit)!, ar perfect Ire. But congruence 3t represented in the betv,reen culture and :1 2 of the table. 'lhe
fwm Robert E,Lane's
An Approach to Political Culture .

congTuence
21
15 strong when the frequendes of pOSltlve ori. emations apprpach unity (+); the congruence is weak when the po!itical structure i.s cognized but the frequency of positive feeIing and evaluati.on approaches indifference or zero.
Incongruence between political cuhure and structure begins when the inelifference paim 1Spassed and nega tive affect anel
TABLE
1.3
Congruence/incongruence und structure'"
between politieal c'ulture Apathy
Allegiance Cogllitive orientation Affective orientation Evaluative orientation
Alienation
+ + +
+
O O
'" A (+) sign rneans a high reqw~ncy or awareness, OI' of positive feeling or of evaluation toward poltical objects. A (-) sign means a high 'frequency of negative evaluations OI' feelings. A (O) means a high frequency of indifference.
evaluatiol1 grow in frequency (-). We may also think of this scale as one of stability jinstability. As we move toward the first colunm in the figure. we are moving toward an aIlegiant situation: one in which attitudes and institutions match; as we move toward the third. column, we are moving toward a1ienation: where attitudes tenel to reject poltical in. sttutions ar structures. Rut this scale s only a beginning, since lhe incongruence may take the form. oi a simple rejection of a particular set of role incumbents (e.g., a particular dynasty anel its bureaucfacy); ar it ma)' be an aspect of a systemic change, that is, a shift from a simpler pattern of poltical culture to a more complex ane. We have already suggested that alI poltical cul. tures (with the exception of the simple parochial ones) are mixed. Thus a participam culture contains individuaIs who are oriented as subjects and parochials; anel a subject cu1ture will contain some parochills. "iNe use the term "systemically mixed" politcal cultures to rder to those in which there are significam proponions of both Lhe simpler and more complex patterns of orientatons. 'When we say these cultures are systemically mixed, we do Dot inten.d to suggest that there 13
22
An Approach
to Political
CultuTe
An Approach
to Polit;
an inevitable tendency for the development to complete itself. The process of politieal cuIture change may stabilize at a point that faIls short of congruence with a centraIized authoritarian structure or a democratic one; or the development may take a course such as in Britain, where a sIow, continuous 'pattern of cultural change was accompanied by correspondingly continuous changes in structure. Political cultures may remain systemicaIly mixed for a very long time indeed, as witnessed by the experience of France, Germany, and Italy in the nineteenth and present centuries. When they do remain mixed, however, there are inevitable strains between culture and structure, and a characteristic tendency toward structural instability. If the three types of poltical cuIture represented in Table
1.2 are the pure forms of poltical cuIture, we may distinguish three types of systemicaIly mixed political cuItures: (1) the
parochiaI-subject culture, (2) the subject-participant and (3) the parochiaI-participant cuIture. cuIture,
The PaTochial-Subject Culture. This is a type of poItical cuIture in which a substantial portion of the popuIation has rejected the excIusive cIaims of diffuse tribal, vilIage, or feudal authority and has developed aIlegiance toward a more compIex poIitical system with specialized central governmental structures. This is the cIassic case of kingdom building out of reIatively undifferentiated units. The chronicIes and histories of most nations incIude this early stage of shift from local parochialism to centralized authority. But the shift may stabilize at a point that faIls short of a fuIIy deveIoped subject culture. The loosely articulated African kingdoms, and even the Ottoman Empire, are exampIes of stabIe, mixed subject-parochial cuItures where the latter predominates and central authority takes the form of a primarily extractive, dimly cognized set of political objects. The probIem of cul. tural change from paro chiaI to subject patterns is a difficuIt one, and unstable moves back and forth are common in the early history of nations.11
11 The classic case is that of lhe succession to King Solomon in lhe king. dom of Israel. When Solomon died, the parochial (tribal and lineage) leaders of Israel came to his son Rehoboam, saying, "Thy father made our
What we are sugge: cIass may be viewed as At one extreme we m Prussian absolutism, w rochial orientations; aI Ottoman Empire, whi, tive externaI reIationsl rochial units. The con soIutism is an interest have aIready made th, tures are mixes, and tl ing them are also mix, case, we may assume t. tion was much strongc Britain we suggest th more, the parochial ai These psychological n the eighteenth century the first, of kadavergel if deferentiaI, countq IarIy, the cultural mix poIarization between empIified in the extn German estates - an groups most affected the bureaucracy dOWJ
yoke hard; but do thou n and his heavy }'okewhich boam's older counselors a respect to the autonomy groups. His younger men brated advice to tell the tl is thicker than my father's a heavy yoke, I will add te whips, then will I chasti: The consequences of Reh. modernizers, as told in ti tack 011 parochialism may decline to apathy and ali and national destruction.
Political
Culture
An Approach
to Political
Culture
23
: to complete itnay stabilize at a :ntralzed authorthe development a slow, continu>anied by corresPoltical cultures ong time indeed, ~rmany, and Italy :n they do remain i between culture toward structural resented in Table e may distinguish cultures: (I) the lrticipant culture, type of political 1e population has aI, village, or feu:e toward a more 1 central govern)f kingdom build:s. The chronicles ~arly stage of shift )rity. But the shift a fully developed A.frican kingdoms, es of stable, mixed predominates and imarily extractive, le problem of cul. tterns is a difficult .re common in the
L
What we are suggesting is that the COmpoSltlOn of this class may be viewed as subvarieties alTanged on a continuum. At one extreme we might place the political culture under Prussian absolutism, whieh went rather far in suppressing parochial orientations; at the other, the poltical culture in the Ottoman Empire, which never went further than an extractive externaI relationship to its constituent, more or less parochial units. The contrast between Prussian and British absOlutism is an interesting one rom this point of view. We have already made the point that even "high" political cultures are mixes, and that the individual orientations comprising them are also mixes. In Prussia, in the typical individual case, we may assume that the intensity of the subject orientation was much stronger than that of the parochial, while in Britain we suggest there was greater balance, and, furthermore, the parochial and subject strata were more congruent. These psychological mixes may explain the contrast between the eighteenth century Prussian and British authority images: the first, of kadavergehorsam; the second, of the self-confident, if deferential, country squire, merchant, and yeoman. Similarly, the cultural mix in Prussia probably involved more of a polarization between a persisting parochial sub-culture - exemplified in the extreme case by the pcasantry on the East German estates - and a subject subculture among those groups most affected by the impact of Prussian absolutism: the bureaucraey down to the lowest leveIs and the increasyoke hard; but do thou now make lightcr the hard service of thy father, and his heavy yoke which he put upon us and we will serve thee." Rehoboam's older counselors advised him to lighten the yoke and pay more respect to the autonomy of the persisting paroehial tribal and lineage groups. His younger men - fanatical modernizers - offered him the ceie. brated advice to teU the traditional leaclers of the people, UMy little finger is thicker than my father's loins .... If roy father hath burdened you with a heavy yoke, 1 will add to your }'oke; if my falher hath chastised you with whips, then will 1 chastise you with scorpion thorns" (I Kiugs 12:4-11). The consequences of Rehoboam's acceptancc of the advice of the young modernizers, as toId in the rest of K ings, suggest that too violem an attack 011 parochialism may cause both parochial and subject oricntations to decline to apathy and alienation. The results are political fragmentation and national destruction.
Solomon in the king~l (tribal and lineage) UThy father made our
24
An Approach to Political Cu.lture

the
An Approach
to Pai
ingly large proportion of Prussian rnanpower undergoing Prussian army experience.
Thus change from a parochial to a subject political culture may stahilize at a number of points on the (ontinuum and produce different poli ti cal, psychoIogicaI, and cultural mixes. We also suggest that the kind of mix that results has ~eat signifieance for the stability and performance of the pohtlcal system.
The Subject-Parteipant Culture. The way in .which the shift from a parochial to a subject culture is solved greatly affects the way in which . he shift from a subject to a participant cuIture tak~s place. As Pye points out, the inculcation of a sense of national loyaIty and identification, and of a propemity to obey the regulations of central authority, i.s the first priority problem in the emerging nations.l2 In the Shlft fram a subject to a participant euIture, lhe parochial and local autonomies, if lhey survive, may contribute to the development of a democratic infrastructure. Certainly this is what happened in the British case. Local authorities, municip~l cor?o:rations, religious communities, and merchant groups m WhlCh the tradition of guild freedoms sti11 persisted became the first interest groups in the deveIoping British democraey. The lesson is a significant ane. PreciseIy beca use the development Df a subject culture in England stopped short of destroying local and parochial structures and cuItures, these could become available at a later time and in modified form as an innuence network that cou!d relate Britons as competent ctizens to their government. The more massive impact of the Prussian state authority drove parochial insttutions into privacy, or assimilated t.hem to stat~ authority. Thus lhe era of democratization in. Germany began with a great gap between the privale and pubIle spheres, and the infrastructure that emerg~d failed to are across from individual, family, and commumty to the insttutons of governmental authority. In the mixed subject-partkipant culture a substantial part of. the population has acquired specialized input orientations ano an activisl set of seH-orientations, while most of the Te.
12 Pye,
Politics, Pes~nality, and Nation Building, pp. 3ff.
mainder of the popu authoritarian goverI1 passive set of self-ori amples of this ty~e and !taly in the mm a characteristic patt( nation or authorita more than structura tural mixo The eultl the struetural insta!: participant orientat! population, a~d be( persisting sub]ect 51 tarian interludes, population cann~t. 1 enced body of CltlZ pirants. That is, th ture, but their sens( or on a confident SI tural instabilities t ject-participant cu] democratic infrastr tend to produce a ically oriented ele] this kind of a pc syndrome with C~I tion rom the POlIl parties, interest g~'~ The mixed sub) long period of t~m subculture. Dunnl ian-oriented grouf within a formally must develop a de Although this doe: democratic one, il degree. It is not arise in poltical
--
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, ",,~~~~
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,",s.;
~~,
;.
i' ~
" lI.
Political Culture
,f undergoing
25
the
t poltical cuIture e continu'llm and ld cultural mixes. results nas great :e o the poltical Tay in '\vhich the solved greatly afct to a participant : inculcation of a n, and o a prothority, is the first [n the shift from a lal and local auI the development this is what hapmunicipal corpol groups in which d became the first :mocracy. The les: development of a lf destroying local ese could become :m as an influence petent citizens to ct of the Prussian sinto privacy, 01' le era of democraQ between the prirUfe that ernerged y, and community a substantal part input orientations le most of the Te.
'p,3ff.
mainder of Lhe population continue to be oriented toward an aut~oritarian governmental structure and have a relativeIy passlve set of. self-orientations. In the Westem European examp~es of. thls ty~e of political culture - France, Germany, and ltaly In the mneteenth and present centuries _ there was a c~aracteristic pattem of structural instability with an alternatlOn o authoritarian and democratic governments. Rut more than structural instabilty results rom this kind of cul. tural mixo The cultural patterns themselves are influenced by the structural instabilty and the cultural stalemate. Because parti:ip~nt orientations have spreael among on1)' a part o the populatlOn, and beca use their legitimacy is chalIenged by the persisting subject subculture anel suspended durinO' authori t:> tanan mterludes, the participant-oriented stratum of the population cannot become a competent, sel-confident" experienced body of citizens. They tend to remain democratic aspirants. That is, they accept the nOTms of a participant cu!ture, but their sense of competence is not based on experience 01' on a confident sense of legitimacy. Furthermore, the structural instabilities that frequently accompany the mixed subject-participant culture, the frequent ineffectiveness of the democratic infrastructure and of the governmental system, tend to produce aliena tive tendencies amonO' the democratical1y oriented elements of the population. Taken together, this kind o~ a political cultural stalemate may produce a syndrome WIth components of idealist-aspiration and alienat!On from the poltical system, induding the infrastructure o parties, interest groups, and press. The mixed subject-participant culture, if it persists over a long period of time, also changes the character of the subject subculture. During the democratic interludes the authoritarian-oriented groups must compete with the democratic ones within a formally democratic framework. In other words, they must develop a defensive poltical infrastructure of their own. A1though this does nor transform lhe subject subculture into a democratic one, it certainly changes it, often to a significant de!5ree. li is not accidental that authoritarian regimes that anse in po1itical systems witb. mixed subject-partidpant cul.
26
tures tend lo have populistic overtones, and in the more recent period of totalitarianism these regimes have even adopted the democratic infrastructure in a grossly distorted formo . !he Parochial.Participant CultU1'e. In the parochial-par_ tIclpant culture we have the contemporary problem of cul. tural development in many of the emerging nations. In most of t~ese countries the political culture is predominamly parochIa~. The structural norms that have been introduced are usua.U!, participam; for congruence. therefore. they require a partlcIpant cuIture. Thus the problem is to develop speciaIIzed output and input orientations simultaneously. It is not surprising that most of these political systems. aIways threatened by parochial fragmentation, teeter like acrobats on tightropes. leaning precariously at one time toward authoritarianism, at another toward democracy. There is no structure on either side to lean on, neither a bureauc:racy resting upon loyal subjects, nor an infrastructure arising from responsible and competent citizens. The problem of development from parochial to participant culture seems. on first Iook. to be.a hopeJess one; but if we remem bel' that most parochial autonomies anel loyalties survive. we may at Ieast say that the deveIopment of participant cultures in some of the emerging nations has not yet been preeluded. The problems are to penetrate the parochiaI systems without destroying them on the output side, and to transform them into interest groups on the input side.
POLITICAL SUBCUL Tl;RE
An Approach to Pc
to population strata toward policy inpu! ented toward the I States the left wing c of the Republican p American politics ; from each other on policy issues. We reff But the kind of ( which occurs in syst, parochial-subject cul oriented toward dif toward the specializ system. A mixed p; characterized by a Thus if the polity ponents, then there ject subculture, the mally merged traditi The mixed subje, and even more contl fuI shift from a sub diffusion of positiv frastructure, the acCo the development of stan tial proportion ( combine with subje( conflict. England iJ moved toward and , these orientations. I the first 'part of the Labour left-wing gr' monarchy and the ] sulted in the transfo stitutions. Poltical ! examples of our firs sistent policy differe ferem orientations t( France is the ela:
"Ve have already made the point that most political cu 1t~~es are heterogeneous. Even the most fuHy deveIoped particIpam cultures wiII contain surviving strata of subjects and parochials. And even within that part of the cuIture that is oriemed toward participation the~e wiII be persistent and significam differences in politicaI orientation. Adapting the terminology of Ralph Linton to our purposes, we use the term "subcuIture" to reIer to these component parts of poI3 litical cultures. But we have to distinguish at least two types of subcultural cIeavage. First. the term may be used to refer
13 Ralph
Linton. The CultUral Background of Personality."
Political Culture
i in the more re. lave even adopted )rted formo .he parochial-par. problem of cul. : nations. In most lredominantly pam introduced are re, they require a ) develop specialneously. It is not TIS, always threatlike acrobats on e toward authoriere is no structure :racy resting upon rom responsible [evelopment from nrst look, to be a t parochial autont say that the deof the emerging lblems are to penying them on the nterest groups on
27
to population strata that are persistently oriented in one way toward policy inputs and outputs, but are "allegiantly" ori. enled toward the political structure. Thus in the United States the left wing of the Democratic party and the right wing of the Republican party accept as legitimate the structures of American politics and government, but differ persistently rom each other on a whole range of domes tic and foreign policy issues. We refer to these as policy subcultures. But the kind af cIeavage we are most interested in is that which occurs in systemically mixed systems. Thus in a mixed parochial-subject culture one part of the population would be oriented toward diffuse traditional authorities, and another toward the specialized structure of the central authoritarian system. A mixed parochial-subject culture may actually be characterized by a "vertical" as weU as a horizontal cIeavage. Thus if the polity incIudes two or more traditional components, then there wiII be, in addition to the emergi~g subject subculture, the persisting separa te cultures of the formally merged traditional units. The mixed subject-participant culture is a more familiar and even more contemporary problem in the West. .A successfuI shift from a subject to a participant culture involves the diffusion of positive orientations toward a democratic infrastructure, the acceptance of norms of civic obligation, and the development of a sense of civie competence among a substantial proportion of the population. These orientations may combine with subject and parochial orientations, or they may conflict. England in the nineteenth and present centuries moved toward and attained a political culture that combined these orientations. It is true, of course, that the RadicaIs in the first part of the nineteenth century and the Socialist and Labour left-wing groups at a later time were opposed to the monarchy and the House of Lords. But these tendencies resulted in the transformation, not the elimination, of these institutions. Political subcultures in England, consequently, are examples of our first type of cIeavage, the one based on persistent policy differences rather than upon fundamentaUy dif. ferent orientations toward poltica! structure. France is the dassic case of the second type of poltical-
nost political cu I. ly developed parta of subjects and he culture that is be persis ten t and on. Adapting the )oses, we use the nent parts of poat least two types f be used to refer
mality.
28
Ar/. Approach to Political Culture
An Approach
to Po
cultural heterogeneity. The French Revo!ution did not result in a homogeneous orientation toward a republican policaI structure; instead, it polarized the French population imo two subcultures, ane of participant aspiration and one domi. nated by subject and pawchiaI orientations. The structure of the French political system nas been at issue ever since [hat time, and wIlat was at first a bipolarization of political culture ~vas folIowed by urther fragmentations, as the Sodalists followed the Jacobins, and the Communists the Socialists, and as the right wing divided imo a "rallied" and an "umallied" part. In many other Europe:m countries the failure of the dominant elites to respoi1d to the moderate demands for structuraI and policy changes put forward by the left in the fixst naU af lhe nneteenth centm:y led to lhe deve10pment of lhe structurally alienated, :revolutionary socialist, syndicalist, and anarchist left of the seeond half Df the nineteenth century. In England, the Old Commonwealtl.1, the United States, and the Scandinavian countries, the ssues of political structure were resolved in the course of the nineteenth and eadv tweutieth centl1.ries: wb.at emerged were homogeneol1.s ;oIitic;1 cultures, in the sense of struetl1.ral orientation. The subcuIturaI phenornena in these countries tum on persistent poliey differences. Left and right both tend to accept the existing politieaI structure and difer onIy on the substance af policy and poltical personneI. What is most interesting is that in this group of countries in the last decades, the policy differenees nave tended to become less sharp, and there is a larger common body of agreement. In other woros, subcultural deavage has attenuated and cultural homogeneity has extended fmm strueturaI orientation imo policy orientation. This brief discussion cf politicaI subculture serves onIy to introduce the concept. Some af its implications and consequences will be considered at later points in the book. But we would mislead the reader if we we~e to suggest that our study treat.s p:roponionaHy each :ispeet of polticaI culture. Our study stresses orientation to poltical strueture. and process, not orientatioD. to the substance oI politicaI dernands and out.
puts. Vve need not point out how .t~~s( mensions oi pQlltlca tween general psyd politics ana pubIic r blic policy would as the present one. types o{ public poli, and cultural values, with which they are of pubIie policy ori< socialization pattem to discover the real among these phenon
pu
THE
CIVIC CULTUR
At an earEer poir vie eulture and th o social (hange. 1\11 deseription of the maintenance of a d( thereore to spell OI teristics. The cvic culture described in c!vics v"hich citizens ougJ citizen behavior o aspects of politica: pected to be dctiv more, he is suppasl tica, guided by reas well informed and dsion on how to ' as to the interests furthered. Tuis cu: tion within t.he inl "rationa ty-activist ture shares mueh " fael, slicn a cultun:
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;litical Culture did fiat result blican political opulation imo and one dami'he structure of ever since that Jolitical culture e Socialists folSocialists, and an "unrallied" failure cf the e demands for the left in the development of list, syndicalist, nineteenth cenlited States, and litical structure arid early twen~neous poltical m. The subcul. )ersistent poliey ~pt the existing stance of paliey ,sti.ng is that in he poliey differthere is a larger rds, subcultural 'geneity has ex)rientation. e serves anIy to ons and consehe book. But we lt that our study aI cul ture. Oul' ue and process, emands and out.
An Approach
to Political
Culture
29
puts. 'fiJe need not apologize for thi~ emphasis, but must paim out haw this choice may tend to obscure significant dimensions of political culture, and significant relationships between general psychoculturaI patterns and the substance of politics and public policy. A study that stressed orientation to public policy would requlre at least as much of a major effort as the present one. It would have to relate systematically types af public poiicy orientations to types af social structure and cultural values, as well as to the socializatiol1 processes with which they are related. A similarly rigorous separation of public poIicy orientation, general culture orientation, and socialization pattems would also be necessary, in order for us to discover the real character anel direction of re1ationships among these phenomena.
THE CIVIC CULTURlE: li. MIXD POUTICAL CULTURE
Ai an earEeI' point we diseussed the historical origins of the civic cultuI'e and the functions of that culture in the process a social change. Much of this book will offer an analysis and deseription of the culture and of the role it plays in the maintenanee of a demoeratic poltical system. It will be usefuI thereore to spell OUl, iI only briefty, some of its main characteristics. The civic cultuI'e 1S not the poltica! culture that one finds described in civics textbooks, which prescribe the way in which dtizens ought to act in a emocracy. The norms of citizen behavior faund in these texts stress the participant aspects of political culture. The democratic citizen 1S expected to be detive in politics and to be invoIved. Furthermore, he is supposed to be rational in his approach to politics, guided by reason, not by emotion. He is supposed to be weIl informed and to make decisions - for instance, his decision 00 how to vote - on the basis of careful calcuIation as to the inteI'ests and the principIes he would like to see furthered. This culture, with its stress on ratianaI participation within the input structures of politics, we can label the "rationality-activist" model of poltical culture. The civic culture shares much with this rationality-activist mode!; it is, in fact, such a culture plus something else. It does stress the par-
30
ticipation of individuaIs in the political input processo In the civic cultures described in this volume we shall find high frequencies of poltical activity, of exposure to poltical communications, of poltical discussion, of concern with poltical affairs. But there is something else. In the first place, the civic culture is an alIegiam participam culture. IndividuaIs are not only oriemed to political input, they also are oriented positively to the input structures and the input processo In other words, to use the terms imro. duced earler, the civic culture is a participant political culture in which the political culture and political structure are congruem. More importam, in the civic culture participam poltical orientations combine with and do not replace subject and parochial poltical orientations. IndividuaIs become participants in the poltical process, but they do not give up their orientations as subjects or as parochials. Furthermore, not only are these earlier oriemations maintained, alongside the participant political orientations, but the subject and parochial orientations are also congruent with the participant polticaI orientations. The nonparticipant, more traditionaI political orientations tend to limit the individual's commtment to politics and to make that commitment milder. In a sense, the subject and parochial orientations "manage" or keep in place the participant political orientations. Thus attitudes favorable to participation within the political system play a major role in the civic culture, but so do such nonpoltical attitudes as trust in other people and social participation in general. The maintenance of these more traditional attitudes and their fusion with the participant orientations lead to a balanced political culture in which poltical activity, nvolvement, and ratonalty exist but are balanced by passvity, traditonalty, and commitment to parochial values.
MICRO- AND MACROPOLITICS: POLITICAL CULTURE AS THE CONNECTING LINK
An Approach ta
viduals and group: which includes Sti analyses of the reI icy tendencies am istics, psychopoliti of political attitu( like. Rokkan and vidual, his politie< dividual or as a n as "micropolitics,' from "macropoliti student of politic~ icaI system.s, instil public policy.14 Although the re chology and the b is clear in princip content to assert I plication is given individuaIs, it ma chological tenden, are important fOI their outputs. TI searcher is concen ing the behavior bents, such as a extreme, or an el much of this liter the psychological poltical structure poltical psycholo made exchangeabl ance.15
14 Stein Rokkan aIl of America," in Interl pp.69lf. 15 For a valuable <I opinion and govemr American Demoeracy,
Developments in social science methods in- recem decades !lave enabled us to penetrate more deeply into the motivational basis of the political attitudes and behavior of indi-
olitical Culture
. processo In the 11 find high freI political comn with political lllegiant partido i to poli tical ininput structures the terms intront poltical cu 1:al structure are icipant political ace subject and become partidot give up their urthermore, DOt d, alongside the ~ct and parochial licipant political litional political lmitment to polIn a sense, the ~e" or keep in Thus attitudes aI system play a 1 nonpolitical atparticipation in :litional attitudes lations lead to a activity, involveby passivity, traleso JLTUllE
31
viduals and groups. A substantial lterature has accumulated, which includes studies of electoral attitudes and behavior, analyses of the relations between ideological and public policy tendencies and deeper attitude or personality characteristics, psychopolitical biographies of political leaders, studies of poltical attitudes in particular social groupings, and the like. Rokkan and Campbell refer to this focus on the individual, his political attitudes and motivations, whether as individual or as a member of a sample of a larger population, as "mieropolitics," distinguishing it as a research approach from "macropolitics," or the more traditional concem of the student of politics with the structure and function of political systems, institutions, and agencies, and their effects on public policy.14 Although the relationship between individual political psy. chology and the behavior of political systems and subsystems is clear in principIe, much of the micropolitical literature is content to assert this relationship in general terms. The implication is given that since political systems are made up of individuaIs, it may be taken for granted that particular psychological tendencies in individuaIs or among social groups are important for the functioning of political systems and their outputs. This may indeed be the case when the researcher is concerned with the psychological conditions affecting the behavior of a particular role incumbent or incumbents, such as a particular political decision-maker at one extreme, or an electorate at the other. On the other hand, much of this literature fails to make the connection between the psychological tendencies of individuaIs and groups, and political structure and processo In other words, the currency of poltical psychology, though it has undoubted value, is not made exchangeable in terms of political process and performance.15
14 Stein Rokkan and Angus CampbelI, "Norway and the United States of America," in lnternational Social Science ]ournal, VoI. XII, No. I, 1960, pp.69f. 15 For a va1uab1e ana1ysis of the prob1em of "linkage" between public opinion and governmenta1 action, see V. O. Key, Publie Opinion and A.meriean Demoeracy, New York, 1961,chaps. XVI fI.
recent decades in to the motivabehavior of indifi
32
An Approach
io Political
Culture
We would like to suggest that this relationship between the atttudes and motivations of the discrete individuaIs who make up poltical systems and the character and performance of political systems may be discovered systematically through the concepts of poiitical culture that we have sketehed out above. In other words, lhe connecting link between microand macropoltics is poltical culture. At an earlier point we stressed that individual poltical orientations must be separated analytically from other kinds of psychologieal orientations, in order for us to test hypotheses about the relationship between political anel other atttudes. vVe also defined the political culture as the particular incidence of patterns af poltical orientation in the population of a poltical system. Now, through the concepts of poltical subculture and role culture, we can loca te special attitudes and propensities for poltical behavior among parts of the population, or in particular roles, structures, or subsystems af the politica! system. These concepts of poltical culture allow us to establish what propensities for polticaI behavior exist in Lhe poltical system as a whole, anel in ts varieus parts, among special orientation groupings (i.e., subcu1tures), or at key points of intiative ar decision in the poltical structure (i.e., role cultures). In other words, we can relate poltical psychoJogy to political system performance by locating atttudinal and behavioral propensities in the political structure of the system. Thus an)' polity mal' be described and compared witIl other polities in terms of (1) ts structural-functional characteristi .s, and (2) ts cultural, subcuItural, and role-cultural characteristics. Our analysis of types of poltical culture is a first eIfort at treating Lhe phenomena of individual poltical orientation in such a way as to relate them systematically to the phenomena of poltical structure. It enables us to escape from the oversimplifications of the psychocultura! lterature in two significant ways. By separating political orientation from general psychological orientation, we can avoid the assumption of the homogeneity of orientation, ,and ook at this instead as a researchable relationship. And by examining the relationship between poltical cultural tendencies aneI political structuraI patterns, .\fo:ecan avoid the assumption of COil-
An Approach
to .
gruence between F relationship betwf becomes one oI t. the problem of po suming congruenc ter of the congrue litical cultural am "fit" between CU1tl We suggest tha realize the fuH cr' the psychocuIturaJ ena. It is our OW that the importan itics and oi experi ously underemph;; character, but al1 and evaluations tI rather than from rion of basic need: hood soeia1ization In still another serve to make lhe evant to the stud) types of political tween culture an' gruence is a relati between culture ; tianal, authoritar ture that is cong; the orientaton l types of political formulate hypotb eies and soeializ; congruent politic case of the eivic I ization which ena dissonances amor and actvist inpu then look at soei;

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Political Culture
,hip between the individuaIs wha anel performance latically through lve sketehed out between microearlier point we IS must be sepalological orienta. the relationship o denned the po: patterns of poical system. N ow, and role cuIture, :ties for political or in particular ai system. These abiish what prooliticaI system as 'ecial orientation S of initiative or >le cultures). In }' to poltical sysl behavioral prol.
n Approach to Poliiical Culture
33
gruence between.political culture anel political structure. The relationship between poltical cuIture anel politica! structure becomes one of the most significant researchable aspects of the problem o political stabi1ity anel change. Rather than assurning congruence, we must ascertain the extent and charac. ter of the congruence ar incongrucnce, anel the trenels in political cultural and structural development that may affect the "fit" between culture and structure. We suggest that this research strategy will enable us to realize the fuH creative potentialities of the great insights of the psychowItural approach to the study of poltical phenom. ena. It is our own hypothesis that such research will show that the importance of specilic learning of orientations to poZitics and 01' experience with the political system has been seria ously underemphasized. Such learning is not onIy cognitive in character, but aIso involves politica! feelings, expectations, and evaluations that result largely from poIitical experiences rather than from the simple projection into political orientation of basic needs and attitudes that are the product of childhood socialization. In stilI another respect Qur theory of poltical culture may serve to make the psychocuItural approach more directIy relevam to the study of the political system. In our discussion of types of poltical culture and the problem of congruence between cuIture and structure, we have pointed ut that congruence is a relationship of affective and evaluative allegiance between culture and structure. Each kind of polity - traditional, authoritarian, an~ democratic - has one form of cu!ture that is congruent with its own structul'e. Starting from the orientation and psychoIogieal requirements of different types of political structure, we are in a better position to formula te hypotheses about the kinds of personality tendencies and socialization practices that are likely to produce congruent polticaI cuItures and stable polities. Thus in the case of the civic culture, we may say that a partem of social. ization which enables the individual to manage the inevitable dissonances among his diffuse primary, his obedient output, and activist input roles supports a democratic polity. We can then Iook at socialization patterns and personality tendencies
,.
compared with lllctional characmel role-cultural tical culture is a lividuaI political systematically to bles us to escape Jltural lterature tical orientation :an avoid the asanel look at this )y examining the encies anel politmmption of con-
084
An Approach to Pc
and for the charactel litica! system.16
THE COUNTRIES IN
and ask just which of these qualities are crucial, to what extent they must be present, and what kinds of experience are most like!y to produce this capacity for dissonant poltical role management. Qur findings will show that the civic orientation is widespread in Britain and the United States and rela. tively infrequent in the other three countries, but we would be most hesitant to attribute these gross differences in political culture to the relatively slight difIerences in childhood socializadon brought to light in our findings. They seem more clearly to be related to characteristics of the social envronment and patterns of social interaction, to specifically political memories, and to difIerences in experience with political structure and performance. The most productive research on political psychology in the future will treat childhood socialization .. modal persona!ity tendencies, political orientation, and political structure and process as separa te variables in a complex, muItidirectional system of causality. In one c1ass of political contexts, however, the relations between political structure and culture, on the one hand, and character and personality, on the other, are relatively clea.r and dramatic. This is in our category of mixed political cul. tures. Here, in the parochial-subject, the subject-participant, and the parochial-participant cultures, we are dealing with societies' that are either undergoing rapid systemic culturalstructural change or else have stabilized in a condition of subcultural fragmentation and structural instability. Fragmentation of political culture is also associated with general cultural fragmentation(e.g., the sharp division between the modernizing urban society and the traditional countryside; between the industrial economy and the traditional agrarian economy). We may assume that in these rapidly changing and fragmented societies, cultural heterogeneity and the high incidence of discontinuity in socialization produce a high incidence of psychological confusion and instability. Nowhere would this be more marked than in the parochial-participant cultures of the emerging nations of Asia and Africa. Lucian Pye, in Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building, has provided ns with a dramatic study of this kind of discontinuity in culture and socialization, its consequences for personality development
c
Our compara tive democracies - the !tal)', anel Mexicorange of political-h selected the United tivel)' successful eXI analysis of these tW( are associated with : quantitative incider tion among differenl At the same time States might be US( about the difference tries. Two recent w persistence of tradi country. Brogan p( ment of Britain the emphasis on initia' with an older politic rights of the subject litica! culture com' lively sense of the ri! In the United St; ernment began wit] rejected the majest) and without a priv government tended authority was the ( ideology rejected t ta tive governmenta) obedient subject. 1
16
op cit., pp.
17 D. W. Brogan, 18 Harry
52-53 a Citi: Eckstein, ..
Uiam, The Major Politl
. ~f
)olitical Culture :ial, to what exE experience are mt political role le civic orientaStates and relai, but we would erences in polites in childhood They seem more : social environcifical1y political h political strucresearch on poIdhood socializa. orientation, and :iables in a com. the relations be: one hand, and ~ re1atively clear ced political cul. bject-participant, Ire dealing with ystemic culturalcondition of subility. Fragmenta: general cultural een the modernttryside; between I agrarian econIy changing and and the high inluce a high indlbility. Nowhere )chial-partici pant d Africa. Lucan ing, has provided tinuity in culture tlity development
An Approach
to Political
Culture and performance
35
of the Burmese pc-
and for the characteristics litical system.16

THE COUNTRIES.INCLUDED
IN THE STUDY
Our compara tive study of political culture includes five democracies - the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Ital}', and Mexico - selected beca use they represent a wide range of political-historical experience. At one extreme we selected the United States anel Britain, both representing relatively successful experiments in democratic government. An analysis of these two cases will telI us what kinels of attitueles are associateel with stably functioning democratic systems, the quantitative incidence of these attitudes, and their distribution among different groups in the population. At the same time, a comparison of Britain anel the United States might be useful as a test of some of the speculation about the differences between these two often-compareel'countries. Two recent writers on British politics comment on the persistence of traditional attitudes toward authority in that country. Brogan points out that in the historical development of Britain the culture of democratic citizenship, with its emphasis on initiative and participation, was amalgamated with an 01der political culture that stressed the obligations and rights of the subject,17 Eckstein points out that the British potitical culture combines deference towanl authority with a lively scnse of the rights of citizen initiative.18 In the Uni teel States, on the other hand, independent government began with republican institutions, in a mood that rejected the ma jesty and sacredness of traditional institutions, and without a privileged aristocratic class. The functions of government tended to be relatively limited, and bureaucratic authority was the object of distrust. The American populist ideology rejected the conception of a professional, authoritative governmental service and the corresponding role of the obedient subject. The spoils system anel political conuption
16 18
op cit., pp. 52-53 and 287ff.
W. Brogan, CitizetlShip Today, Chape1 HiIl, N.C., 1960, pp. 9ff. Harry Eckstein, "The British Political System," in S. Beer and A. U1am, The Major Political Systems of Eu.rope, New York, 1958, pp. 59ff.
17 D.
36
An Approach
to Political
Culture
A 11 A pproach
to P
further undermined the prestige of governmental authority. In an even broader sense, and for reasons we cannoi deal with !lere the general pattem of authority in American social systems: inc1uding the famiIy, tended to stress political competence and participation rather than obedience to Iegiti.mate authority. In our comparison of the .British and American political cultures, then, can we establish that Englishmen are more likely than Americans to have in~orporated allegiant subject orientations as well as participant ones? And are thev better able than Ame!cans to manage the dissonances betwe~n democratic activism and "subject obedience"? Several considerations led us to select Germany in ouI' comparative study. Prussia, like Britain, had a relatively long period of effective, legitimate government before the introduction of democratic institutions. During the German uni.fication in the nineteenth century, the Prussian bureaucratic authoritarian pattem was imposed more 01' less successfully on the other German states induded in the nadon. It nas been argued that while Germany developed both a Reehtsstaat and a subject political culture, the experiments with democratic participation in the late nineteenth century and in the Weimar period never developed a participant political culture necessary to sustain these democratic institutions and give them force and legitimacy. Much of the speculaton about the stability of contem.porary democratic instlutions in Gennany turns on the question of the extent to which a sem e of the responsibilities and opportunities of citizenship and mutual trust among political groupings have actl1ally taken root among the Gerrnan peopIe. Qne rnight condude from an examinati.on of their histories that Britain and Germany have in common deferential attitudes toward authority, growing out of their long predemocratic experiences with authoritarian control. Eut examination of history brings Qut oue most significam diference. British government controI in its predemocratic period never became as complete or as exhaustive of inwative as did the German. Brogan points Qut that even in the centuries when Englishmen were "subjects" there was a broad. area o auton-
omy, freedom to f, government.19 In o British authoritaria pant component iJ amalgamation of c centuries-old proce suffrage refonns o teenth centuries. 1 and unyielding sut a long-existent CUlt1 As Krieger point velopment of Ger German conceptiOl of the princes aga ment of nationhoc fied with. lhe free( rather than wth t als.20 However, de been, and are, pre in the nineteenth be observed today. element.s of a part population and wh We have inclue amples of less we lrical systems. Itai a premodern soei Italian political h never really deveI in modem times. VIl ar I period was of non expedit r legi timacy to lhe esses,2l During tli
Brogan, op. cit., i Leonard Krieger and pp. 458ff. 21 D. A. Binchy, Gil
III
20
,i
-,~..
",..c"_""''''''"~~~~
"''''''-~ ,.,..*-_
rJolitical Culture
[tal authority. In )t deal with here, fi social systems, competence and late authority. nerican political ih:men are more allegiant subject I are they better :es between dem-
An Approaeh
to Political
Culture
37
lany in OUI' comI relativeIy long ore the introducGerman unificabureaueratic auiS successfully on :ion. Ir. has been : Reehtsstaat and with demoeratic anel in the W ciDolitical culture ~~tions anel give l1ation about the ions in Germany :h a sense of the ship anel mutuaI lally taken root o their histories '- deferential aniir long predemo::>1.But examinaificam dilerence. atic period :never tia tive as did the '.e centuries when ad area auton-
omy, freedam to formo societies and engage in limited seHgovernment.19 In other words, even 'in the long centuries of British authoritarian government there 'was a limited partici. pant component in the British political culture. Thu$ the amalgamation f citizen attitudes with subject attitudes is a centuries-old process, long predating the parliamentary and suffrage reforms of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteemh centuries. These reforms did not founder on a hard and unyielding subject culture, but could root themselves ou a long-existem culture of plmalism and initiative. As Krieger points om in his penetrating analysis of the developmem of German poltical ideas and movements, the German conception of liberty - from the clays of the struggle of the princes against the imperial authority to the attainmem of nationhood in the nineteemh century - was identified with the freedam of the state from externaI limtations .rather than with the initiative and participation of individu20 a1s. However, democratic po1iticaI culture tendens have been, and are, presem in G~rman society. They were presem in the nineteenth century, in the Weimar period, and are to be observed today. Qur study will enable us to establish which elements of a participant culture are presem In the German population and which are lacking. We have included Italy and Mexico in our study as examples of less well-develope societies with transitional political systems. Italy, at least in the South and the islands, has a premodern social and political structure. 1 we consider Italian poltica! history for a moment, it is evident that Italy never really developed an aIlegiant national political culture in modem times. The Italian monarchy of the pre-"'World War I period was denied Iegitimacy by the Church. The mIe of non expedit required that the faithful refuse to accord legitimacy to the new state, refuse to participa te in its prac21 esses. During the Fascist interlude an effective state appaBrogan, op. cit., pp. 14ft Krieger, The Ge~'man Idea of Freedom, Bostom, 1957, passim and pp. 458ff.
19 20 J"eonard 21 D. A. Binchy,
or
Church and State in Fascist Italy, London,
1941.
38
An Approach to
In contrast to : tion tends to vie, tive force, many ~ instrument of uI social modernizat eratic infrastructl organization is me spread throughol tions may expIai political culture: and skill, yet the with these wide: however, are cyni infrastructure an least "modern" o relatively large t high illiteracy ra useful leads abot non-Western COl modernization an In this brief c ence of our five ( eses about the dil to find among th ture drawn fron: how much of a c memories, feelin what form it cal population are tl with what intem bine with the me living history in will translate ti inferred from hi tions, and regula fliet between the ioral sciences; tl supportive.
ratus developed, but it was more the externaI control of a society by a coercive authority than a relatively free according oI legitimacy to an established political system. In this respect Italy is unlike Britain and Germany, both oI which had integrated and legitima te authoritarian systems before the introduction of democratic institutions. In his study of a village in the southern Italian province of Lucania, Banfield characterizes the political culture of this area as "amoral familism," according legitimacy neither to the bureaucratic authortarian organs of the state, nor to the civic-political organs of party, interest group, or local community.22 It would be incorrect to view alI of Italy in these terms, but our own data will tend to support Banfield's cIaim that the Italian political culture contains unusually strong parochial, alienative subject, and aliena tive participant components. Democratie aspirational tendencies are also present, primarily concentrated on the left, but these are relatively weak in comparison with the widespread mood of rejection that affects the attitudes of the great majority of Italians toward their political system in alI its aspects. We selected Mexico as our fifth country in order to have at least one "non-Atlantic community" democracy. Mexico can hardly be viewed as representing the emerging nations of Asia and Africa, yet no single country could possibly represent the variety of socio-political structures and historical experiences of the emerging nations. It has in common with many of these nations a high rate of industrialization, urbanization, and increased literacy and education. Before the revolution, Mexiean government and polities were essentialIy alien, extractive, and exploitative structures resting uneasily on a society made up essentialIy of kinsmen, villagers, and ethnic and status groups. In the last thirty or forty years, however, the Mexican Revolution has deeply affected the social and political structure and has stimulated modern and demoeratic aspirations and expectations.23
m,
22 Edward 23 Robert
C. BanfieId, 1958, pp. 7ff.
The Moral Basis of a Backward Society, Glencoe, in Transition, Urbana,

lU.,
1959,
pp. 56fl:.
E. ScoU, Mexican Govemment
olitical Culture
aI control of a ely free accordtem. In this reh of whieh had :ms before the ian province of culture of this laey neither to ta te, nor to the . or local comf Italy in these Banfield's claim nusually strong articipant comre also presen t, ~ are relatively od of rejection , of Italians toIrder to have at cy. Mexico can ;ing nations of possibly repre.d historical excommon with lization, urbanBefore the revvere essentially :esting uneasily , villagers, and orty years, how~cted the social lern and demod Society, Glencoe, tion, Urbana,
39
In contrast to Italy, where a large portion of the population tends to view the poltical system as an alien, explota:tive force, many Mexicans temI to view their revolution as an instrument of ultima te democratization and economie and social modernization. At the same time, the Mexiean democratie infrastrueture is relatively new. Freedom of political organization is more formal than real, and corruption is widespread throughout the whole poltical system. These conditions may explain the interesting ambivalence in Mexican poltical culture: many Mexicans lack poltical experience and skill, yet their hope and confidence are high; combined with these widespread participant aspirational tenclencies, however, are cynieism about and alienation from the political infrastructure and bureaucraey. In addtion, Mexico is the least "modern" of our five countries; that is, there is still a relatively large tradtion-oriented village population and a high illteracy rate. Perhaps the Mexican case will provi de useful leads about the characteristies of poltical cultl;!re in non-Western countries undergoing similar experiences in modernization and democratization. In this brief comparison of the political-historical experience of our five countries, we have been formulating hypotheses about the differences in poltical culture we might expect to find among them. However, inferences about poltical culture drawn from history leave unanswered the question of how much of a country's historical experience lives on in the memories, feelings, and expectations of its population, in what forro t can be said to live on, whieh elements of the population are the bearers of which historical memories, and with what intensty. Here newer scientific methods can combine wth the more traditional approaches, in our search for living history in the politieal cultures of peoples. Qur survey will translate the rather simple and massive expectations inferred from history into quantities, demographicdistribu_ tions, and regularties or relations. There is no necessary conHict between the methods of history and those of the behavioral sciences; they are actually supplemental and mutually supportive.
m.,
40
THE lFITE-NATlfON SURVlEY
An Approach to Poltical Culture
An Approach to Po
July of 1959 in alI the interviews in lhe 1960. In most cases I six months to a year ,
StJRVEY DATA AND J
The presem work attempts to apply some of the methods developed in the fi.eld of systematic survey research to the study of compara tive politics. Unlike most other studies of political attitudes, ours is cross-national. Most survey studies of voting behavior or af othe. political attitudes have taken pIace within a single nadon, the bulk of them in the United States.24 Qur study is multicontextuala study of five nations. Throughout this book we shall concentra te on those nations - OH their similarities and their differences. Beeause of our compara tive approach, we fiust regretfully bypass interesting problems within the individual countries. The presem book 1S based upon about one thousand interviews earried OH in eaeh of five nations (about five thousand interviews in a11). In each case an attempt was made to obtain a national cross-seetion sample.25 The interviews ranged in length from about forty minutes to somewhat over an hour, though in some cases the)' lasted much longer. The interviews were largely structured, with about ten per cent Df the questions open-ended in form. .In each nation a small pro .. partion of the respondents interviewed as part of the national cross-section were reinterviewed with a l.onger and Iess structured interview, which attempted to elicit more material Df the sort dealt vth in the cross-seetion interview; as well as to obtain a description of what we call an individual's "poltical life history." 2lJ The cross-section nterviews were carried on in June and
24 Some exceptions are: William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril. :iow Nations See Each Other, Urbana, UI., 1953; The International Te2.cher's Study, reported in Eugene Jacobson and Stanley Schachter (eds.). "CrassNational Research: A Case Study," Journal Df Social Issues, X (1954). Sce also St.cin Rokkan, "Compara tive Cross National Resea.rch: II Bibliog' raphy," intemational Social Science Bulletin, VII (1955),pp. 622-41. 25 In Mexico the s:Jmpleis of cities of 10,000or more population. 26 The original plan was to obtain 125 such i.nterviews in each country. For a variety of reawns it was impossible to reinterview that many. The number Dfreinterviews actually completcd were: Uuited States, 49; United Kingdom, 114; Germany, 135; Italy, 121, and Mexico, 120.
The present work "micropolitics." It ( behavior of a crossrespondents in each as individuaIs. They respondent !las no no interaction with Qur study. Yet we ; individuaIs, but as wish to make stater about the general s wish to make staten attitudes and the w In particular, we ai poltical systems; a than the individuai They consist as we: litical parties, struel patterm of policy, The major probler sponses rom one t to answer questiom tem. It is as if that darkened room, ar by one thousand S{ light (our intervie' they touch. But th
27 ",\Te cannot go int design and analysis of ferred to the unabridg University Press. See version.
<"""J
<
~,;
.-:~~t>fi.",. \;;~i\
~..
,litical Culture
4]
)f lhe methods esearch to the ther studies of lrvey studies af. ies have taken l in the United ldy of five naItrate on those rences. Because fully bypass inies. thousand intert five thousand as made to obterviews ranged lt over an hour, gero The interDer cent of the )fi a small pro .. of the national ~ and less struclore material of ~w, as well as to dual's "politica!
l.
July of 1959 in all of the nations except the Unted States; the interviews in the United States wer.e carried on in March. 1960. In most cases the follow-up interviews took place about six months to a year after the first interviews.27
SURVEY DATA. AND POLlTICAI. SYSTEMS
m in ]une
and
ldley Cantril. HoU' rnational Teacher's chter (eds.). "Crossssues, X (1954). Sce :search: II Bibliog-
The present work is partIy a study in what has been ealled "micropolitics." It deals with the political orientations and behavior of a cross-section sample. The ane thousand or so respondents in each country are viewed in lhe first instance as individuais. They have no relationship to one another; one respondem has no knowledge of the other respondents and no interaction with them - certainly nane that is explored in our study. Yet we are interested in the respondents, not as individuaIs, but as members a complex social systems. We wish to make statements, based on those separate interviews, about the general state of attitudes in these natians. And we wish to make statements about the relationship between these attitudes and the way in which the poltical systems opera te. In parti.cular, we are interested in understanding democratC political systems; and these systems consist of much more than the individual ar collective attitudes of their members. They consist as well of formal structures of government, political parties, structures of power and infiuence, shared norms, patterns of policy, communication, interaction, and 50 forth. The major problem of analysis is, therefore, how to use responses from one thousand individuaIs who have neveI' met to answer questions about the characteristics of a political system. It is as if that system were a large map 011 the wall of a darkened room, and alI we know of it is what is revealed by one thousand separa te pinpoints of light. These points of light (our interviews) illuminate the spots on the map that they touch. But they light up onIy a small part of the map
27 'Ve cannot go into the many techl1ical problems associated with the design and analysis of the research. For a fuller account, the reader is referred to the unabridged version of this book published by the Princeton University Press. See in particular Chapte:r 2 and Appendix A of that version.
,pp.622.41.
Jopulation. ws in each countrt. ew that many. The :d States, 49; United
O.
42
An Approach to Pc
tion - we have a la] But if we want to t attitudes in a nati< system - say, the rf alienation and th{ have few cases in w in political analysis as most studies of tl five nations as exa more or less stable or less participator) dimension can be < of our study (a br( are more stable, or low a classification our study (one mi: political activity te they are characteri 1 one can then sI democracies there tudes that could 1 democracy; or tha most frequent thel terpersonal attitud participation, ther strating the prob tudinal patterns ; connections betwe of the political sy terna I analysis of one finds that a p tions exists most ticipation of a p, finds that it is pn tude who are mOI can then support is connected wi By moving consta tem to frequencil
and leave the areas between the dots completely dark. We want to. say something, not merely about the points that are illuminated, but about the entire map itself. There are a number of ways in which one may use the individuai pinpoints of light to illuminate the territory between them. In the first place, one assumes that the results of interviews with one thousand individuais can be generalized to the entire population -- with, of course, the usual allowances made for errors. Second, though we onIy talk to individuaIs and do not observe them interacting with others or engaged in political activity, we do ask them about their attitudes toward others, their re1ations with others, their social activities, their organizational memberships, and their political activities. 1 we can generalize about the respondents' answers, we can make statements about the number of people in each nation who hold to certain attitudes and engage in certain behavior; we can also describe the network of relations among people: the frequencies of such behavior as organizational membership, informal social contact, and political activity, and the frequencies of such attitudes as interpersonal trust and cooperativeness that refer, not mere1y to single individuaIs, but to the relations among individuais. The third and crucial point is that one must assume that the attitudes we report have some significant relationship to the way the political system operates - to its stability, effectiveness, and so forth. The distribution in a society of such attitudes as the belief that the political system is legitimate, that it operates effectively, that it is amenable to the ordinary man's influence; or the frequeney of such activities as oro ganizational membership or political participation - clearly all these have important effects on the way the political system operates. It is somewhat more difficult to pin down the precise re1ationship between these attitudes and behaviors of ordinary citizens and the ways in whieh politicaLdemocracies operate. The major problem is that, though we have about five thousand individual respondents, we have only five nations. Thus if we want to test statistically the relationship between two attributes of the individuais in our sample - say, the relationship between social class and political participa-
Political Culture
,letely dark. We ~ points that are may use the in:erritory between : results of inter. e generalized to usual allowances lk to individuaIs thers or engaged heir attitudes to: social activities, . political activi~nts' answers, we ~ople in each nage in certain berelations among lS organizational political activity, terpersonal trust ) single individuo nust assume that It relationship to ts stability, effeca society of such :em is legitimate, .e to the ordinary activities as or:ipation - c1early te political system in down the premd behaviors of itical democracies h we have about ave only tive nae relationship bemr sample - say, olitical participa
0
43
tion -'- we have a large number of cases with which to do this. But if we want to test the relatio~ship between a pattern of attitudes in a nation and some characteristic of a political system - say,the relationship between frequency of political alienation and the stability of the political system - we have few cases in which to test this. This is no new problem in political analysis, and we are in fact five times as well off as most studies of this sort. What we can do is to consider our five nations as examples of types of political democracymore or less stable democracies, more or less effective, more or less participatory. Which of these nations is highest on any dimension can be assessed either on the basis of data outside of our study (a brief glance at history will teU which of these . are more stable, or an analysis of the party structures will allow a classification by type of party system), or on data within our study (one might use the frequency of various types of political activity to rank the nations by the extentcto which they are characterized by high or low rates of parti~ipation). I one can then show, for instance, that in the more stable democracies there does exist a particular set of political attitudes that could theoretically further the chances of stable democracy; or that in those nations where participation is most frequent there does in fact exist a particular set of interpersonal attitudes that could theoretically further political participation, then one has come a long way toward demonstrating lhe probability of some connection between atti. tudinal patterns and systemic qualities. Furthermore, these connections between sets of attitudes and the characteristics of the political system can be made more convincing by internaI analysis of the attitudes within the nations. Suppose one finds that a particular attitude toward interpersonal relations exists most frequently in a system where political participation of a particular sort is most frequent; if one also finds that it is precisely those individuaIs who hold that atti. tude who are more likely to be the political participants, one can then support the hypothesis that the particular attitude is connected with a particular kind of participatory system. By moving constantly from characteristics of the political system to frequencies of particular attitudes within the system
44
An Approach to Political Cultu're
to the pattern of attitudes within the individual members of the system, one (an hope to develop plausible, testable (and perhaps, in a preliminary way, tested) hypatheses about the relationship between what we have called political culture and lhe workings of political systems. We hope to have shown in the above discussion that the kind of data reported here make sense only if interpreted in terms of other types af material about the systems we study. Thus the information we have about the five polticaI systems is not limed to areas directly under the Iittle pinpoints of light. One must integrate into a study of this sort findings about the general shape of the system, lhe institutions, the history of their development, and so orth. Que advantage of a cross-national study, we have suggested, is that it forces one to look at systemic characteristics. Our findings are intended not to repIace, but to supplement other materiaIs used for the analysis of poltica! systems. It is only if material of lhe sort we have can be combined with other materiaIs that we wiU have made progresso
CHAPTER H
Patterns of ]
N OUR CLASSIFIC
referred to ihe assumed to be system in both subject tends to put side of go judiciary. The aware, af the F countries in OUi Even the Mexi, specialized gov housewife may the five demoeI entati.ons tend tive tendencies 01' involvemen Me may vew i and sense af o and structures, paro chiaI and When afect a auire informa may be preseni ][n the pres( dairn to p:rese
'
45
l
; ;'"""","jt"
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307

An Approach to Political Culture

The central question af public palicy in the next dec-

An Approach to Political Culture

New York, 1936,

An Approach to Political Culture

An Approach to Political Culture

An Approach to Political Culture

An Approach to Political Culture

An Approach to Political Culture

An Approach to Political Culture

alia in RUlh Benedict,

Studving Personality ( ner . The Psychologica The Indillidual and R,

ical Writings, op. cit.; ~

Policy Sciences, Stanfo

Hsu (ed.). Psychologic.

An Approach to Political Culture

a general theory of to a study of Burmese

nallY Incurablel Phila. md National Socialist Rodnick, Postwar Ger'atherland. A Study o/

Cognition Affect Evaluation

"fies, Vol. XVIII,

An Approach to Political Culture

System as general object Cognition

Jallmal af 1'01'aru A. Shils, TaU'flrd a pp.53ff.

An Approach to Political Culture

Types of political culture System as general object SeI! as acti'ue participant O

Parochial Subject Participant

An Approach io Political Culture

dng? What are his

dOVvllward fJ.ow of uals, and declsions feelings and opin-

, frequency of oriof the four kinds :an speak of the po-

and Coleman, Politics of lhe Developing Arcas, p. 254.

An Approach to Political Culture

See below, chaps. VIII

An Approach to Political Culture

below, chaps. VIU and IX.

Congruence{i and strv.cture

Cognitive orienta~ion Affe::tiveorientat!on Evaluative orientation

An Approach to Political Culture .

Congruence/incongruence und structure'"

between politieal c'ulture Apathy

Allegiance Cogllitive orientation Affective orientation Evaluative orientation

An Approach to Political Cu.lture

ingly large proportion of Prussian rnanpower undergoing Prussian army experience.

Politics, Pes~nality, and Nation Building, pp. 3ff.

An Approach to Political Culture

An Approach to Political Culture

Linton. The CultUral Background of Personality."

An Approach to Political Culture

Ar/. Approach to Political Culture

An Approach to Political Culture

An Approach to Political Culture

recent decades in to the motivabehavior of indifi

n Approach to Poliiical Culture

An Approach to Political Culture

52-53 a Citi: Eckstein, ..

Uiam, The Major Politl

Culture and performance

and for the characteristics litical system.16

op cit., pp. 52-53 and 287ff.

Church and State in Fascist Italy, London,

An Approach to Political Culture