Final Exam Study Guide Final Exam: August 6, 2013 Review Session: August 1, 2013 Bring a large Blue

book on the day of the exam. Jackson 1. Reconstruct Jackons Knowledge Argument, being sure to make explicit each premise on which the argument relies. 2. What considerations does Jackson give in favor of thinking that qualia might be epiphenomenal? Carruthers 1. In what sense does Carruthers think that mental events cause physical events? How does he use this claim to argue in favor of the identity thesis? 2. Explain Carruthers point in bringing up the examples of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, and Oedipus and Jocasta. 3. Why does Carruthers think that a mental experience cannot be green in the same way that an object can be green? Churchland 1. Define functionalism. Explain how it differs from behaviorism. 2. Explain what it means for a mental state to be functionally isomorphic to another mental state. Next, explain how that concept features prominently in Churchlands assertion that mental states are multiply realizable, and how the multiple realization of mental states poses a problem for identity theorists.

Searle 1. For Searle, what distinguishes weak artificial intelligence from strong artificial intelligence? 2. Explain Searles case of the Chinese Room. How is it supposed to demonstrate that machines, even if they are capable of passing very sophisticated Turing tests, are not thereby capable of understanding? Sider 1. Explain the story of the prince and the cobbler. In your view, does it support or undermine the spatiotemporal continuity view of personal identity? 2. What is the difference between a reliable way of identifying something and an account of what something really is?

3. Someone who accepts the spatiotemporal continuity account of personal identity might try to solve the duplication problem by asserting that, if you are split into two distinct persons (each of whom is spatiotemporally continuous with you), then you cease to exist. Explain why Sider does not think that this is a plausible response to the duplication problem.

Locke 1. How does Locke argue that the physical components of my body can be altered without an alteration in my personal identity? 2. Why does Locke posit the possibility that a person (i.e., someones consciousness) might appear in a different body? What problem is Locke trying to solve? Reid 1. Reid maintains that it is a consequence of Lockes theory of personal identity that a man be, and at the same time not be, the person that did a particular action. Explain Reids argument that Lockes account yields this contradiction. 2. How does Reid think that consciousness is to be distinguished from memory? Why does he feel the need to make this distinction? Hume 1. What does Hume seem to think the relationship between perception and personal identity is? Are we capable of perceiving our identities, according to Hume? 2. What is Hume attempting to demonstrate in comparing the mind to a theatre? 3. What confusion does Hume say we are guilty of that explains why we believe in a persisting unchanging identity? Parfit 1. Parfit says that there are two views concerning the nature of persons. Explain both of these views. 2. In his discussion of Ego Theory and the split-brain problem, Parfit states that it is easy to believe that subjects of experience exist, when we understand subject of experience as just meaning person. Split-brain cases, though, make it hard to believe that there really are such things, according to Parfit. Explain his argument.