NGO Counterplan For Debate

ngo counterplan zag scholars
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NGO COUNTERPLAN and index

NGO COUNTERPLAN and index................... 1 NGO CP Shell...................................................... 5
***NGO Solvency............................................................................................................................ 7 NGOs Solve..................................................................................................................................... 8

Uganda proves, NGOs reach the poor far better than the government or private organizations...............8 NGOs are uniquely effective advocates for disempowered groups............................................................8 NGOs solve better than military forces NGOs build neutral relationships that better solve for peace..............................................................................................................................................................9 NGOs solvency..........................................................................................................................................10 NGOs create a broader system of peace and are the only actor that can do so.......................................11 NGOs solve better because of autonomy from the state..........................................................................12 NGOs solve from a bottom-up approach..................................................................................................13 Peacekeeping missions cant solve without NGOs..................................................................................14 NGOs need independent credibility to solve............................................................................................15 NGOs solve war and other stuff.................................................................................................................16 NGOs solve best .........................................................................................................................................17 Local people-level connections make NGO solvency superior................................................................17
NGOs solve the economy.............................................................................................................. 18

Economic instability can be ameliorated by NGO gap-filling..................................................................18
Activism solvency .......................................................................................................................... 19

NGOs empower individual activism..........................................................................................................19
Human rights solvency ................................................................................................................. 20

Human rights are an ideal organizing principle for NGOs .......................................................................20 Human rights are a primary NGO focus....................................................................................................20 NGOs inspired wide-scale human rights monitoring ................................................................................21 NGOs are critical to the human rights movement....................................................................................21
NGOs are key to civil society ....................................................................................................... 23

NGOs are key to civil society ....................................................................................................................23
Most NGOs are gap-fillers ........................................................................................................... 24

Most NGOs are gap-fillers .........................................................................................................................24
NGOs gap-filling solves ................................................................................................................ 25

NGOs are critical to fill gaps in government social service provision .....................................................25
NGOs solve fundability................................................................................................................. 26

Aid to governments will be misused, it should be given directly to NGOs .............................................26
NGOs decrease regime corruption.............................................................................................. 27

NGOs are effective political watchdogs ....................................................................................................27 IFIs use NGOs as tools for political pressure on regimes receiving aid...................................................27
*** Solve Specific Areas/Things.................................................................................................. 28 NGOs Solve Congo ...................................................................................................................... 29

Private military firms should be deployed to the Congo...........................................................................29
A.I.D.S. solvency............................................................................................................................ 30
NGOs are implementing successful programs to stop HIV ......................................................................30
NGO solve democratization ......................................................................................................... 31
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NGOs are a force for democratization and economic liberalization ........................................................31 NGOs are schools for democracy ..............................................................................................................31
Environment solvency .................................................................................................................. 32

NGOs in the Horn solve environmental issues better than the governments ...........................................32
NGOs solve feminism.................................................................................................................... 33

Womens NGOs are inclusive and more effective than government organizations ................................33
NGOs solve poverty ...................................................................................................................... 34

In poverty alleviation programs, NGOs are superior to government action ............................................34
***Private Corporations Solvency.............................................................................................. 35 Private Corporations Solve .......................................................................................................... 36

Private corporations solve empirically proven .......................................................................................36 Private corporations solve international support ....................................................................................36 Private corporations solve strategically unimportant conflicts.................................................................36 Private corporations solve better than UNPKOs......................................................................................37 Private corporations solve humanitarian aid..............................................................................................37 Private corporations solve rapid reaction force .........................................................................................38 Private corporations solve genocide ..........................................................................................................39 Private corporations solve genocide ..........................................................................................................39 Private forces solve the lack of commitment to solving genocide............................................................39 Private corporations solve failed states......................................................................................................40 Private forces solve conflict in Africa .......................................................................................................41 Private security companies are key to avoid over-extension of armies and executing optimized peacekeeping operations.............................................................................................................................42 Private peacekeeping avoids the downfalls of U.N. intervention and effective peacekeeping. ..............43
***Answers to UN solves.............................................................................................................. 44
UN forces further conflicts NGOs are neutral ......................................................................................45
***Answers to the Perm............................................................................................................... 46

Cooperation between states and NGOs lead to state control of the organization...................................46 NGOs can only work independently ........................................................................................................46 Cooperation leads to cooption....................................................................................................................47 Cooperation between states and NGOs lead to state control of the organization...................................48 UN and private corporations forces cant cooperate together .................................................................48 Private forces/NGOs avoid politics ..........................................................................................................49 Governments will attempt to intervene with NGO independence............................................................49
***NGOs better than the UN ..................................................................................................... 50

NGOs are oriented towards conflict resolution and not towards politics ...............................................50 NGOs have more legitimacy than traditional peacekeepers....................................................................50 NGOs mediate conflicts better than states ...............................................................................................51 Private forces have been training than UN forces .....................................................................................51 Private forces save money..........................................................................................................................52
*** UN Peacekeepers Bad............................................................................................................ 53

Government sponsored peacekeeping is based on a form of coercion and zero-sum interests ...............53 Formalized peacekeeping doesnt represent the interests of the people...................................................54 State actors (the UN) cant compromise with warring parties peacekeeping fails ...............................55
***Answers To............................................................................................................................... 56 Answers to: No accountability..................................................................................................... 57

Market forces keep the firms in line ..........................................................................................................57 Private forces will not comply with illegal operations..............................................................................57
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AT: Aid dependence bad.............................................................................................................. 58

Aid is key to keep NGOs independent from corrupting market forces ....................................................58 Market reliance decreases NGO community empowerment ....................................................................60
******AFF ANSWERS ................................................................................................................ 61 NGOs bad....................................................................................................................................... 61

1. NGOs cant solve: 9 reasons .................................................................................................................61 2. Giving development assistance to NGOs causes aid pathology; increased poverty and public rejection result.............................................................................................................................................61 3. Ending aid to NGOs will force the government to provide for social services, or face political and social upheaval............................................................................................................................................62 Aid Dependence DA.......................................... 63 Aid will continue to decrease in coming decades. NGOs must become independent. ...........................63 Aid Dependence DA.......................................... 64 Despite short-term problems, cutting aid now will improve the transition to aid independence ............64 Decreased aid good ........................................... 65 Decreasing aid to NGOs allows them to focus on political empowerment..............................................65 Decreasing aid is good. NGOs are structurally incapable of large-scale social programs .....................65 Decreased aid good ........................................... 66 Decreasing aid leads to NGO grassroots political empowerment ............................................................66 Aid => dependence ........................................... 67 Turn: Aid to NGOs causes dependence, not empowerment .....................................................................67 Aid dependency is caused by funneling through NGOs. They lose focus on their real agenda.............67 Aid => competition (kills cooperation) .......... 69 Foreign aid causes NGO competition for funds, preventing crucial cooperation....................................69 Competition for funds ruins NGO solvency..............................................................................................69 NGOs cant solve............................................... 70 NGOs are ineffective: four reasons............................................................................................................70 (not identifying the poorest groups, addressing povertys symptoms not causes, educational bias, sexism) ........................................................................................................................................................70 Voluntary and Grassroots NGOs (VOs and POs) cant solve, even with financial support....................70 There are intrinsic limits to NGO solvency...............................................................................................70 Decreasing aid to NGOs is good, six reasons............................................................................................72 NGOs cant solve crises .................................. 74 Failure of NGOs in the Rwanda demonstrate their inability to manage genocide...................................74 NGO gap-filling excuses government inaction75 NGO gap-filling is bad. Government should be responsible for poverty and social progams ...............75 NGOs should not be gap-fillers..................................................................................................................75 NGOs get co-opted by corrupt regimes ......... 76 Apolitical NGOs get co-opted by corrupt regimes....................................................................................76 NGOs hurt gov legitimacy and => instability77 Successful NGOs demonstrate the governments faults and undercut political stability ........................77 No solvency: bad communication ................... 78 Poor communication systems undermine African NGOs .........................................................................78 No solvency: bad coordination........................ 79 Lack of regulation makes NGOs a dangerous place to send money ........................................................79 Poor coordination prevents NGO success .................................................................................................79 No solvency: factionalism ................................ 80
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Aiding through NGOs only supports factionalism and indeterminacy in actual assistance ....................80 No solvency: internal corruption .................... 81 Financial corruption destroys NGO effectiveness.....................................................................................81 Desire for self-perpetuation corrupts NGOs..............................................................................................81 NGOs are populated by a professional elite. Their radical policies have faded .....................................81 No solvency: masks capitalism........................ 82 NGOs just put a smiley face on capitalism and neo-liberalism ................................................................82 No solvency: democratization ......................... 83 NGOs are structurally incapable of promoting democratzation ...............................................................83 Private Peacekeeping Bad................................ 84 Private peacekeeping is bad 12 reasons..................................................................................................84 Private peacekeeping fails several reasons.............................................................................................85 Taulbee, 2003, (Associate Prof. of Poly. Sci. @ Emory, Fall, Emory International Law Review, 17 Emory Intl L. Rev. 1109, p. l/n)................................................................................................................85 Private peacekeeping is unaccountable, prolongs wars, and causes neo-colonialism. ............................86 Private Pecaekeeping = no accountability ..... 87 Private peacekeeping is unaccountable......................................................................................................87 Private corporations have no accountability..............................................................................................87 Private peacekeepers violate international law..........................................................................................88 Private corporations fall outside rule of international law ........................................................................88 Private forces dont have any accountability/Private forces dont fall into the trap of statism...............89 Private forces dont have any accountability Balkans proves ...............................................................89 Private Peacekeeping -> Conflict.................... 90 Private peacekeeping causes corruption and promotes conflict. ..............................................................90 Peacekeeping cant solve long-term ............... 91 Private corporations dont solve the long-term causes of violence ..........................................................91 Private peacekeeping = no training................ 92 Private corporations are unable to handle the things UN peacekeepers are trained for...........................92 Peacekeeping = prone to market failure........ 93 Market failures -> peacekeeping failures...................................................................................................93 Private corporations are controlled by market forces not humanitarian need.......................................93 Private peacekeeping = same problems as standing army 94 Perm Solvency ................................................... 95 The perm solves the UN can use its own peacekeepers in coordination with private corporations ...95 NGOs have to collaborate with regional governments ............................................................................95 Answers to: NGOs solve human rights......... 96 NGOs are constrained by local governments...........................................................................................96
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NGO CP Shell
Observation 1: Text All relevant NGOs will <do plan> Observation 2: Competition the counterplan competes via the net benefits of better solvency, politics, and <other disads that link to US/UN action> Observation 3: Solvency First, NGOs can solve conflicts Collins, 1995 [U.N. CHAOS-FIXING FAILURE IS NGO CHALLENGE , Carole, National Catholic Reporter. 00278939, 3/24/95, Vol. 31, Issue 21]
NGOs and international groups such as the International Committee of the Red Cross seem tailormade for this purpose. While not new actors in humanitarian crises, they are more likely to work in war-torn areas even when the United Nations and its member governments evacuate their troops and diplomats, as they did yet again in early March in Somalia. NGOs have generally proved more effective in grassroots outreach and more sensitive to local cultural sensitivities and economic and political variations. They usually form the primary source for U.N., donor and media information on the scope and extent of needs in a humanitarian emergency as they are often the only outside presence in communities isolated by war. And many, though not all, deliver emergency relief more cheaply than governments do. Many also have significant expertise in tasks traditionally undertaken by governments. Groups such as Atlanta-based CARE have undertaken complex projects to lower excessively high food prices in war-torn areas via market-based mechanisms. Others have undertaken to demobilize soldiers and remove land mines from farmers' fields. Still others -- such as the Mennonites and Quakers have launched efforts in Somalia, southern Sudan and elsewhere to mediate ethnic or clan disputes, working to help build a peace process from below rather than coax or impose it from above, as is the case in more traditional diplomacy.
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Second, independent NGO action is key to maintaining legitimacy Oliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs. University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. Martin Institute, 2001-01-01.
Because of their unique access NGOs can support and stimulate an effective response, and contribute to a multi-level and multi-dimensional peacemaking and/ or building operation. NGOs have a vital role to play both in these operations and also in building up a consensus about why these operations are required, through their ability to network and lobby, filling the gap between civil society and global society, exploiting cross-cutting cleavages. This requires that NGOs have greater access to governments and regional and international organizations. However, NGOs need to increase their credibility at these levels, including in areas pertaining to their legitimacy, efficiency, effectiveness, and conduct. Much more work needs to be done on the practical choices, and the political and ethical choices that confront NGOs, relating to their roles and impartiality, and the possible knock-on effects of their activities. As with any activity that brings new resources into a conflict environment, there is the possibility that some of these resources may become part of the conflict itself. This danger is exacerbated by the fact that there is often a lack of international consensus amongst dominant state actors about what should be done and how far they are responsible to intervene to bring about a sustainable peace, particularly in conflict zones beyond of their own direct interests.
Third, NGOs solve area/action <insert specific card>
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***NGO Solvency
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NGOs Solve
Uganda proves, NGOs reach the poor far better than the government or private organizations Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 126-7
There is little dispute about the importance of NGOs from the perspective of service provision, poverty alleviation and emergency services in Uganda. In general NGOs have been praised for their ability to reach the poorest of the poor, and indeed, they have penetrated areas in Uganda that the state has not even been able to, and where private enterprise has been either incapable or uninterested in becoming involved. And they have played a crucial role in poverty-alleviation and service provision. The bankrupt and corruption-ridden public sector and the nascent private sector could never have achieved the same de gree of effectiveness or efficiency that NGOs have. As Brett (1993) argues, . . . NGO performance is usually though not always, excellent, with staff often being willing to work exceptional hours in environments involving high degrees of discomfort and risk. The expatriate personnel in these cases were all highly qualified people who would have no difficulty in obtaining well paid and less disruptive work in the West. . . Local staff were better paid than they would have been in most other jobs, but there was so much competition for NGO posts that they were for the most part highly qualified and motivated. It is difficult to imagine that an equivalent service could have been provided by either public or private agencies. (Brett, 1993, p. 297)
NGOs are uniquely effective advocates for disempowered groups Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 12-13
Linked to their educative role is the advocacy role of NGOs. NGOs may help to provide citizens with an alternative or supplement to political parties which may not fully represent their interests (Brown and Korten, 1991, p. 53; Diamond, 1994, p. 8). These organizations can then help to channel the interests and demands of their members to government. This is particularly the case with traditionally disadvantaged groups such as women, youth or other minorities. NGOs can bring together individuals of a similar ethnic group or community or different ethnicities together under the banner of common issues or concerns. This is especially important where political parties represent factional politics rather than competing ideologies, as is the case in Uganda. NGOs can serve the political role of '... supplementing] political parties as mechanisms through which citizens define and articulate a broad range of interests and make demands on government' (Brown and Korten, 1991, p. 53). NGOs thus become important sources of alternative policy ideas (Korten, 1991, p. 31). NGOs can also become advocates for social change, organize to create power centres outside of the state which can pressure for structural change, and provide leadership development of third world leaders who can leave the NGO sector and move to government. NGOs are capable of pluralizing the institutional environment and of thus providing '... alternative structures to the monopolies of the state' (van de Walle, 1990, p. 1 16).
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NGOs Solve
NGOs solve better than military forces NGOs build neutral relationships that better solve for peace Rufini 1995 [THE POTENTIAL OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PEACEKEEPING NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION Giovanni. Peacekeeping & International Relations, 11873485, May/Jun95, Vol. 24, Issue 3]
A good NGO, which has been able to perform well in the local community or has brought assistance to an affected population, enjoys respect and consideration. This may be the ideal position for solving controversies. "NGOs build relationships at many levels within a community where, as outsiders, they are often looked to as disinterested observers better able to fairly weigh a situation. These relationships that NGOs have, particularly in the midst of overt conflict, are seldom exploited for bridge-building potential. . . . [w]ithout betraying familiarity or trust, relationships can be used creatively by NGOs to raise new issues, recall old ones, suggest an unpopular option, or lend support to an uncertain iniative which reaches for peace."[5] In the scope of the New Peacekeeping Partnership". a better synergy between NGOs and the local populace is a necessary phase of peace building. When focusing on conciliation and conflict resolution, this synergy is instrumental to building a durable peace. Peacebuilding "may take the form of concrete cooperative projects which link two or more countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking that cannot only contribute to economic and social development but also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace
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NGOs Solve
NGOs solvency Oliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs. University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. Martin Institute, 2001-01-01.
What conflict resolution offers is a plethora of theoretical and practical approaches to developing peace in conflict environments, and which can be exploited at several levels in order to channel global and regional norms of interdependence, human security and democratization into unstable local environments. It is here that the contribution of NGOs to the process of conflict resolution in civil society may be critical. NGOs can play an important role in facilitating a linkage between a global and civil society and thus resolving one of the most serious problems of the conflict resolution genre related to the trickle-up (and down) effect; this can also contribute to the diplomatic process of peacemaking in the realms of official diplomacy. NGOs that conduct humanitarian, developmental, human rights, and conflict resolution activities contribute to the objectives that second generation approaches have delineated. Indeed, conflict resolution has always been undertaken by NGO-type, independent, actors. Conflict resolution approaches also provide a methodology for NGO activity; it identifies the post Westphalian space they fill and in which they operate.
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NGOs Solve
NGOs create a broader system of peace and are the only actor that can do so Oliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs. University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. Martin Institute, 2001-01-01.
This has partly been because NGOs alone tend to have access and the ability to address the social level of international social conflicts, but also because they have been perceived to provide a generally ethical perspective of politics and can, through undertaking low level, inexpensive, and unobtrusive peace-building efforts, contribute to a broader peace. It is clear that there currently exists a possibility in the current and changing environment of globalization and fragmentation for the involvement of IGOs, NGOs, non-state and state actors, to facilitate the development of 'ethical actors' and 'ethical regimes' in local stabilization projects (though agreement on what constitutes the ethical is still a major barrier). This may occur in the context of the shifts which are emerging vis-vis sovereignty, non- intervention and human rights. As some actors in the international community move to strengthen human rights regimes through the creation of institutions which deal with human and minority rights, sovereignty and its associated regime of non-intervention have slowly lost its pre-eminence. It is in this context that a new generation of peace-building activity can emerge to which NGOs can make contributions. This is in the context of the attempt to attain postWestphalian norms based on the dominance of human security and needs over, or in parallel with, state security, sovereignty, global and regional integration, reducing isolationism and particularism. Though this is a grand project, if it is to be undertaken at all, the role of NGOs is clearly vital as they are the only actors able to operate within societies torn by conflict on a broad range of social and economic issues that may be part of the overall conflict environment.
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NGOs Solve
NGOs solve better because of autonomy from the state Oliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs. University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. Martin Institute, 2001-01-01.
The emergence of numerous centres of power ranging from the civil to the global has in part prompted this turn,[29] particularly as NGOs have access to local civil societies and their authority structures. This has prompted the international community and the UN to try to develop the role of NGOs in preventing, managing and resolving conflict.[30] In some cases, NGOs may now substitute for local government, and encourage the development of civil society in a post Westphalian context, through conflict resolution techniques.[31] The increasing legitimization of NGOs at the local, state, regional and global level, means that their agendas are more widely propagated; it also means that civil society has a linkage with global civil society as NGOs are legitimized in international organizations like the UN. NGOs are relatively unencumbered by sovereign concerns and therefore are themselves relatively free of claims to sovereignty, enabling them to work in normative frameworks that may not be tainted by official and systemic interests. NGOs tend to have the advantage of familiarity with the local conflict environment and close contacts with grassroots movements and therefore have been ascribed with the ability to play a preventive role. They can also play an important role through the gathering of supplementary information in areas of tension pertaining to human rights and their abuses. This is part of their peace-building role of strengthening civil society and the social system through the ability for smallscale projects (the training of local leaders, etc.). This means that NGOs are able to aid in the creation of the general conditions that enhance peace-building, promoting peace constituencies, which include cross-cutting segments of different sectors of civil society involved in the development of sustainable peace.
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NGOs Solve
NGOs solve from a bottom-up approach Oliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs. University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. Martin Institute, 2001-01-01.
This perspective on conflict, and the methodology which is derived from it for solving conflict, is thought to remove the critical difficulties inherent in first generation peacemaking where the common argument is made that involvement is crippled by the intensity of the dispute, the resources or lack of that the third party has access to, and the type of issues at stake for the disputants.[15] It is in this context that the international system dictates that third parties must view their role as one of conflict management as opposed to resolution in order to bring about compromise through bilateral and trilateral negotiations. As the logic of the Westphalian international system is believed at this level to be zero sum, the relationships between disputants and third party are similarly based and as Mitchell has pointed out, intervention is crippled by its own logic.[16] This knot can, according to the conflict resolution perspective be untied by a bottom up approach in which individuals who have certain influential positions in the conflict environment are provided with an alternative and positive-sum understanding of their conflict, which through a trickle-up effect, will eventually play a role in the official peacemaking process. This brief analysis of the basis of the conflict resolution debate illustrates an important critique of first generation approaches to peacemaking which may replicate conflict, rather than manage it; the shift towards a post Westphalian world seems to be partly derived from this understanding.
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NGOs Solve
Peacekeeping missions cant solve without NGOs Oliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs. University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. Martin Institute, 2001-01-01.
Despite this, NGOs offer the flexibility, expertise, rapid responses, and commitment in local environments to respond rapidly to emerging signs of trouble. In such situations they provide essential services, aid, and have the capacity to inform the public both at the national and global level in order to mobilize opinion.[33] While the erosion of regional and local self-help capacities, and state sovereignty, and the possibility that NGOs may actually aid one of the disputants indirectly have been put forward as criticisms of NGO activity in complex emergencies,[34] the role of NGOs in conflict resolution and prevention is undeniably vital to the emerging practices of peacemaking in intractable conflict. NGOs can try to empower parties to deal with conflict constructively, monitor and lobby for human rights and the protection of minorities, and enact capacity-building and protective measurements for disadvantaged or endangered groups. NGOs, consequently, can play an important role in the creation of peace-constituencies.[35] Humanitarian NGOs may be open to manipulation in conflict environments by disputants, as Abiew and Keating have recently argued;[36] yet this is an indirect offshoot of their concern with normative issues like justice and human freedoms and rights. This, I would argue, is far less likely to be colored by interests which overlook such rights than state-centric activities and this is why NGOs carry extraordinary local and global levels of legitimacy particularly with citizen groups. While states may still dominate the legal sphere, this entails a certain amount of cynicism that NGOs are less susceptible to. The problem is to retain the advantages of their unofficial status without incurring the wrath of sovereign actors that fear interventionary practices becoming institutionalized upon their territory, while guarding against the corruption of NGOs themselves. Thus, linkages between transnational organizations (which are themselves torn between normative concerns and the statecentric interests of the international system) and NGOs are highly significant with respect to peacemaking in contemporary world politics. NGOs contribute to the process of conflict resolution by addressing aspects of conflict which official actors cannot reach; this is also supported by their role in humanitarian, developmental, media, and education issues in which NGOs contribute to the stabilization of civil society through identifying and acting upon the human needs frameworks, the communicational, and psychological, deep-rooted aspects of conflict. Citizen diplomacy can also become NGO diplomacy in which multi-dimensional efforts address the local, civil, regional and global aspects of the conflict, incorporating both an understanding of global norms and global civil society, the traditional international system of Westphalian states, and local identity, civil, and representational needs in the wider context of political and economic interdependence, regionalization and globalization.
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NGOs Solve
NGOs need independent credibility to solve Oliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs. University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. Martin Institute, 2001-01-01.
It is therefore important to consider the links between local and international actors and their relationship with NGOs, particularly as their work in the field of peacemaking and peace-building impinges upon the sphere of influence of states and international organizations. NGOs which are dedicated to monitoring specific laws or specific institutions, lobbying, peace-building and early warning, play a valuable role, which needs to be expanded in order to curtail the credibility gap of traditional tools and methods of peacemaking, and to increase the effectiveness of the international system and community in responding to conflict.
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NGOs Solve
NGOs solve war and other stuff. Cranston, author of A Return to Peace, 1999 (Alan, Boston Review) http://www.bostonreview.net/BR24.1/cranston.html
The other absolutely essential ingredient is the deep and total involvement of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). This, too, was demonstrated in the case of land mines in the historic collaboration between the Canadian government and the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. The most important contribution of Global Action, I believe, is the suggestion that the many different and diverse NGOs-movements and individuals concentrating today on one or another of the most obvious causes of war, most horrific characteristics of war, or most hopeful and promising preventatives of conflict-form a coalition to push a comprehensive approach to ridding us of war itself. Those working to banish trade in small arms, for example, would of course carry on their crusade, as would advocates of banning nuclear weapons and proponents of mediation and judicial processes. But they would also all be invited and urged to work together in a cooperative effort that should strengthen each cause as advances are achieved, as well as enhance prospects for progress toward the more general goal. As Jonathan Dean put it in a letter he wrote to me just over a year ago, "Despite remarkable progress on nuclear disarmament, without more movement towards ending conventional wars, it will be difficult to completely eliminate nuclear weapons. I also doubt that, unless it is imbedded in a broader program to stop wars, the . . . initiative on restricting arms sales can succeed." NGOs are fulfilling a rapidly increasing role in international affairs in and about the United Nations and just about everywhere else. Witness the impact of Amnesty International on human rights in the world. Witness the global focus on the issue of abolition of nuclear weapons that hundreds upon hundreds of NGOs are bringing about. Witness that in Bangladesh countless NGOs have actually achieved a form of power-sharing with the government. Witness the emergence even in China of a new force known as GONGOsGovernment Organized Non Government Organizations! Randall, Jonathan, and Saul have now proposed a new and historic mission for these ever more significant instruments of civil society.
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NGOs Solve
NGOs solve best Paula Hoy, Interfaith Hunger Appeal Associate Director, Players And Issues In International Aid, 1998, p. 99
NGOs' Strengths: The proliferation of NGOs and the growing support from governmental and multilateral sources are a testament to their excellent reputations as providers of assistance to the poor. It is broadly acknowledged that NGOs are in a better position than the larger, multilateral agencies to reach the poor and work at the grassroots level. Whereas NGOs used to promise to reach the poorest of the poor, they now admit that they fail to reach the poorest 5 to 10 percent, but this is still a significant accomplishment, given that, according to UNDP estimates, official and multilateral aid fails to reach the poorest 20 percent.' Additionally, NGOs' comparatively small size makes them less bureaucratic, cheaper, and more cost-effective. Because NGOs are not hampered by political motivations and constraints, as governments are, they have the ability to reach a broader recipient audience, including countries that are deemed hostile and from which official aid is withheld. Ironically, NGOs working in such blacklisted countries often report that those are the few countries where the local governments are not working against broadbased development.'' U.S. NGOs also escape the strategic and corporate interests that tend to guide much of U.S. foreign policy and aid, furthering their scope and independence.
Local people-level connections make NGO solvency superior Paula Hoy, Interfaith Hunger Appeal Associate Director, Players And Issues In International Aid, 1998, p. 101-2
NGOs also have the on-the-ground advantage-they typically have more staff people working permanently in the field (not just during emergencies), especially in rural areas, where the poorest populations live, than do the large multilateral agencies. Relationships with local communities are more easily fostered with staff people living and sharing daily routines, which provides NGOs with perhaps their greatest advantage of all: access to local knowledge. As it becomes increasingly clear that the key to sustainable development (which, for aid donors, equates to money well spent) is local participation in all stages, it is obvious that NGOs that know and listen to local populations are in the best position to help achieve it. They can collaborate with local organizations and assist with institution building, training, and staff development and in the process, be a part of development that far outlives their presence. Their in-country presence also strategically places them in a position to conduct preventive action and implement early warning systems in the increasingly common occurrence of natural and man-made emergencies
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NGOs solve the economy

Economic instability can be ameliorated by NGO gap-filling Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 14
NGOs play a key role in this new approach. This is reflected in the New Policy Agenda (NPA). Although the agenda is not monolithic, the marriage of neo-liberal economics and liberal democratic theory provide the ideological backdrop for aid policies and the role of non-state actors (Hulme and Edwards, 1997, p. 5). The NPA is donor-driven, with an emphasis on, '... the central importance of free markets, efficient use of limited government resources, a reduced role for the state and the need for good governance in low iNGOme countries' (Commins, 1997, p. 141). Within this agenda, NGOs are viewed as '...the preferred channel for service-provision in deliberate substitution for the state' (Hulme and Edwards, 1997, p. 6). But this is not the sole role of NGOs. NGOs and Grassroots Organisations (GROs) '... are seen as the vehicles for "democratisation" and essential components of a thriving "civil society", which in turn are seen as essential to the success of the Agenda's economic dimension' (Moore, 1993, quoted in Hulme and Edwards, 1997, p. 6). They thus help mitigate the '. . - social shock of economic adjustment programs by delivering services and promoting and supporting coping mechanisms' (Nelson, 1995, p. 45). In addition they also help to . . . increase diversity of opportunity in society, a prerequisite for the success of market-oriented policies which stress competition and freedom of choice and action. . . And generally, NGOs and POs broaden channels through which resources or benefits reach groups that may otherwise feel disenfranchised, with consequent discontent and instability which may threaten investment. (Fowler, 1991, p. 56)
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Activism solvency
NGOs empower individual activism Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 11-12
The greatest potential of NGOs lies in their capacity to generate selfhelp initiative. It is in this vein that NGOs are viewed as vehicles for development and democracy, and more specifically as vehicles for 'democratising development' (dark, 1991). indigenous NGOs have the potential of giving voice to popular demands which may subsequently empower likeminded members to '.., articulate a collective interest and take collective action' (Bratton, 1990b, p. 104). NGOs have the potential to be significant vehicles of empowerment because of their ability to reach the grassroots. Empowerment is thus ', . . a multifaceted process..., [which]. . . involves transforming the economic, social, psychological, political and legal circumstances of the currently powerless' (Sandbrook, 1993, p. 2). There are several levels at which an individual, community or society can be empowered. However, two key components of empowerment are the development of a sense of efficacy in the individual and a group's ability to influence political and personnel decisions of government or powerful institutions. Empowerment can be measured by such indicators as the amount of political clout (Bratton, 1990, p. 93) that the organization has acquired, by the ability of the collective to alter conditions (social, economic, political or cultural) that it Finds intolerable, by its success at an educative role (if applicable), and its ability to voice/address popular concerns/interests. Whether there is a general feeling of constructive change among the members can also be used as a measure (albeit an imprecise one) of whether the NGO has been able to empower its constituents. Certain indicators can be used to measure the degree to which individuals or communities are politically or economically empowered. Economic empowerment can be partially gauged by visible improvements in the standard of living directly related to the activities of the NGO as well as attempts to educate and therefore empower individuals to help themselves economically and politically to achieve greater self-sufficiency. On the political level, whether an NGO or association has helped to empower an individual or community can be gauged by determining whether the constituency has more political voice in affecting their destiny through actions (direct or indirect) of the NGO, and whether people have greater access to policy-makers and policy formulation and decision-making because of NGO activities. As Halfani intimates, '[T]o change power relations entails equipping communities not only to develop themselves but also to become effective participants in public policy formulation (which at present is a sole prerogative of the state)' (1993b, pp. 202-3). NGOs are thought to '. . . enhance the access of the poor to public services and augment their political power through organization' (Paul, 1991, p. 2). Even though NGOs might not have specific political agendas, they strengthen political pluralism in two ways: '... they can provide finance for village level public goods that are not controlled by the state and thus create the possibility of an alternative political project at the local level', and they can '. . . strengthen pluralism in the classic sense of enhancing the power of given groups of people vis-vis the state' (Van de Walle, 1990, p. 116). They may not be a panacea, but they are a '. . . First, imperfect step in the empowerment of the weakest political actors in . . . [the] political systems' (Van de Walle, 1990, p. 1 18)
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Human rights solvency

Human rights are an ideal organizing principle for NGOs Peter van Tuijl, Senior Policy Advisor with the Netherlands Organisation for International Cooperation and a member of Oxfam International, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 618
A first simple response to the question posed above is an observation that, while emerging global markets do not create a global social order, in a world with no aid there will still be human rights. The function of human rights as a normative instrument to shape and form the political and human quality of globalisation cannot he underestimated. Human rights offer the opportunity to undo the present inclination of NGO discourse to claim the moral high ground or to promise too much, precisely because human rights are concrete and hound to enforcement mechanismssome strong, others weak. Moreover, the claim on the universality of human rights is increasingly supported by a much clearer and stronger legal, political, social and cultural global rooting. NGOS deserve credit for having contributed to this global culture of human rights (Van Tuiji, 1999). However, it is necessary to expand upon these achievements, in particular by further turning human rights into a more applicable concept and rooting it deeper in new relationships and shared institutions. This next step will offer a solid foundation for NGOS to engage-with and give shared meaning to globalisation.
Human rights are a primary NGO focus Peter van Tuijl, Senior Policy Advisor with the Netherlands Organisation for International Cooperation and a member of Oxfam International, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 621-2
Some NGOS have a long-standing engagement with human rights. However, what often started out as a single-issue human rights agency has meanwhile taken on a much broader significance among the NGO community. A commitment to human rights is no longer limited to the 'human rights movement'. Generally, human rights language has become a centrepiece of NGO mission statements and global NGO relationships. Classic human rights organisations have gradually come to realise that they can only function as a part of larger transnational networks, including a variety of other NGOS. At the same time, and in line with the debate on the indivisibility of human rights, what used to be known as 'development NGOS', or NGDOS, ie those working on social service delivery, have come to appreciate the virtues of 'advocacy NGOS', in promoting human rights (Van Tuiji, 1999). By now there will be few (international) NGOS left without a human rights policy, or at least a reference to human rights in one of their principle statements.
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Human Rights Solvency

NGOs inspired wide-scale human rights monitoring Peter van Tuijl, Senior Policy Advisor with the Netherlands Organisation for International Cooperation and a member of Oxfam International, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 623
The function of NGOS in monitoring human rights violations is widely acclaimed. NGOS, and particularly transnational NC.O networks, have constructed large webs of relationships and information exchange on human rights, capable of reaching out and calling upon the responsibility of governments even in remote corners of the world. The capacity to collect and publicise credible information on human rights violations is among the most important contributions of NGOS to establishing a global culture of human rights. For the time being, this will remain a significant area of NGO activity. But with the greater acceptance of human rights and partly in response to the success of NOO human rights lobbies, new actors involved in monitoring and reporting on human rights abuses have appeared. Many countries with a poor human rights record have established a National Human Rights Commission. Although these Commissions differ in mandate, composition and political clout, they have generally entered a terrain of human rights monitoring which used to be covered by NGOS alone. Some National Human Rights Commissions have even been established with the clear purpose of breaking the monopoly of NGOS on credible human rights information. For example, before establishing the National Human Rights Commission of India, the Home Minister stated that the purpose of the commission would be to 'counter the false and politically motivated propaganda by foreign and Indian civil rights agencies'. (International Council on Human Rights Policy, 1999: 56). Interestingly, most of these Commissions often take on a life of their own and eventually do not hesitate to criticise the authorities that established them, as in Togo. Even if a Commission is ineffective, it may still help to open up space for NGOS to talk more openly about human rights, as has happened in Nigeria.
NGOs are critical to the human rights movement Schnabel and Horowitz 2002 [Albrecht and Shale. International Network. NGOs critical role in advancing human rights in transition societies. http://www.tolerance-net.org/news/podium/podium071.html]
Human rights NGOs and their individual and organizational supporters are key to a more effective functioning of the international human rights regime. NGOs are largely unconstrained by national interests. Although they have their own ideological biases, competition among them produces a large and relatively objective stream of information about human rights practices around the world. Just as importantly, NGOs are engaged in ongoing efforts to popularize and advance the whole panoply of human rights causes around the world. These informational and advocacy functions can potentially have significant impacts on elite and public opinion, fertilizing and organizing local human rights traditions and movements to the point where they become prominent and influential in domestic culture and politics. This slow, decentralized process of building human rights awareness through local contacts is probably the international human rights regimes most powerful and consistent force for positive change.
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Human Rights Solvency

NGOs solve all human rights abuse regimes Schnabel and Horowitz 2002 [Albrecht and Shale. International Network. NGOs critical role in advancing human rights in transition societies. http://www.tolerance-net.org/news/podium/podium071.html]
Careful analyses of the international human rights regime, and of country and regional case studies, show that the creation of international human rights norms and decentralized propagation of these norms by NGOs have a greater impact than actions taken by states whether individually through their own foreign policies or collectively through decisions of IGOs.1) This is because state policies reflect state interests and, even under the best of circumstances, are inconsistent and of limited scope. In large part thanks to the work of local and international NGOs, even for the most repressive regimes human rights norms have become difficult to ignore. It is a victory for the human rights cause that such regimes feel compelled to make up excuses for their abuses, thus implicitly admitting fault and accepting the need for remedial action.
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NGOs are key to civil society

NGOs are key to civil society Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 9-10
The dominant discourse of pluralism and neo-liberalism suggest that the existence of a plurality of autonomous associations is crucial to the development of civil society and democratization. Pluralist theory insists that there is a need for autonomous organizations to constitute independent centres of power to check abuses of central or local authority and thus procure greater accountability from the regime. The state is thought to mediate between sectoral interests, rather than to represent collective interests, consequently compromising between the demands of various associations and classes. NGOs play an important role in this model, in that NGOs are viewed as being capable of pluralizing the institutional environment and of thus providing '... alternative structures to the monopolies of the state' (Bratton, 1990a. p. 104). By building independent organizations at the community, regional, and national level. NGOs in Africa have already begun to populate and pluralize the institutional landscape. As such they are having an impact not only on economic growth and social welfare, but are also strengthening the civil society. (Baldwin, 1990, p. 97) Since state society relations in Africa are now at a crossroads, pluralist theory suggests that the retreat of the state will '. . .create enlarged political spaces within which associational life can occur' (Bratton, 19S9. p. 412). Under these conditions, '...groups within civil society will enjoy greater opportunities to attract a following, develop a bureaucratic form and formulate policy alternatives' (Bratton, 1989, p. 412)
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Most NGOs are gap-fillers

Most NGOs are gap-fillers Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 124-6
With economic liberalization, the state is retreating from its responsibilities to provide basic social services such as health care, education, sanitation and basic security, leaving this space open for other actors to occupy. Indigenous and international NGOs have been some of the other actors that have attempted to Fill these spaces. Over the past several years, the number of indigenous and international NGOs in Uganda has skyrocketed," and in fact some suggest that foreign and indigenous NGOs have invaded Uganda since the UPDF stormed into Kampala in 19136.4 This invasion has affected almost every sector of Ugandan life and every region of Uganda, although some districts such as Rakai (badly hit by the AIDS virus), Luwero and Kampala have higher concentrations of NGOs reflecting certain service provision needs as well as NGO preferences (Table 5.1). No complete record of all NGOs is available, but it is estimated that there are between 700 and 1000 registered NGOs operating in Uganda, both foreign and indigenous (Kwesiga and Ratter, 1993, p. 10; Gariyo, 1996, p. 165). Many NGOs are in fact unregistered, grassroots self-help organizations. A 1993 study commissioned by the Ugandan Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, and funded by the World Bank, found that out of 703 organizations that had applied for registration by December 1992, 15 had 'relief as their primary main activity, 430 had 'development', and 258 had some 'other' activity. Of the 258 'others', 248 had evangelism as the primary subsidiary activity (Kwesiga and Ratter, 1993, p. 10). This does not include the possible hundreds if not thousands of indigenous grassroots associations that have not registered with the NGO Registration Board" (see Appendices I and II). My own research based on a list of registered NGOs compiled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (NGO Registration Board) suggests a similar conclusion. There are several types of NGOs in Uganda including religious, development-oriented, charity, human rights, 'briefcase' NGOs, self-help, grassroots organizations," and women's organizations. These can more generally be classified into three main categories according to what they actually do and who they do it for: 'gap-fillers'. people's organizations and voluntary organizations. " These categories are not exclusive, however; a particular NGO may embody characteristics from any of the categories while belonging predominantly to one category. Of a total of 434 indigenous NGOs, religious organizations comprised 40.3 per cent; the gap-fillers (not including religious organizations) comprised 40.8 per cent; voluntary organizations, 14.1 per cent; people's organizations only 1.2 per cent, and the other category (including networking NGOs) comprised some 3.4 per cent of the total registered indigenous NGOs in Uganda. Since most religious NGOs engage not only in evangelism but also in service-provision, many can be classified in the gap-filler category. Even assuming that 15 per cent of these religious NGOs are involved in development work, almost 65 per cent of indigenous NGOs in Uganda focus mainly on reliefer service-provision work.'" Similarly, approximately 40 per cent of foreign NGOs fell within the category of gap-fillers or relief provision; 28 per cent could be considered VOs, 28 per cent were strictly religious organizations, and approximately 4 per cent represented the other category, including environmental and network organizations.
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NGOs gap-filling solves

NGOs are critical to fill gaps in government social service provision Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p.102-3
Because of state withdrawal from the provision of basic services, and the consequent economy of survival that has developed, many NGOs are being pressured into dealing with poverty alleviation and :he provision of basic social services like primary health care, education and sanitation instead of empowerment and advocacy. These are lot mutually exclusive pursuits, but they do serve to divert NGOs to a more apolitical focus. The willingness of the NRM regime to allow NGOs to multiply, especially NGOs that are engaged in poverty-alleviation and service provision, suggests that it is an indirect beneficiary of NGO activities as well. Although state-NGO relations can be conflictual or consensual, NGOs acting as alternative service providers operating in an environment of political and economic survival often serve to give the regime added legitimacy and help Fill in the gaps where state-initiated service provision has lapsed (if it even existed in the First place). This is particularly the case in Northern Uganda where the state is only minimally present and regional/ethnic animosities still exist. The state has thus come to rely on the service-provision and poverty alleviation offered by foreign and indigenous NGOs, and has increasingly attempted to integrate NGOs into its national development program- 13 Many NGOs, therefore, tend to have a complementary relationship with the LCs. This is perhaps due, as one observer suggests, to a situation where one-third of indigenous NGOs are within the LC system.'4444 In fact many NRM officials I interviewed were in some way involved with NGOs. 15 In addition, LCs often ask assistance of NGOs because of their resource constraints; the LC will identify a problem and suggest a policy, and the NGO will help to implement it.'"
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NGOs solve fundability

Aid to governments will be misused, it should be given directly to NGOs Brett D. Schaefer, Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs in the Center for
International Trade and Economics at The Heritage Foundation, The Keys to an African Economic Renaissance, May 10, 2000, http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/bg1369.html Aid is not necessary for development, but if policymakers insist on giving development assistance, they should require aid recipients to institute measures that prevent it from being misused or stolen. To avoid funding unintended projects or programs and reduce the possibility of funds being pilfered by corruption or used for political patronage, loans and grants should not be funneled through government agencies. They should be awarded to the non-governmental organizations (NGOs), agencies, or businesses involved in delivering the programs after having competitively bid on a project and won the contract. Third-party auditors should evaluate the loans and grants to provide impartial oversight and guard against corruption.
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NGOs decrease regime corruption

NGOs are effective political watchdogs Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 13-14
Closely linked to their advocacy role, NGOs also perform a watchdog role, usually in connection with other political actors such as political parties, lawyers' associations and the media. NGOs can help put checks on the '. .. powerful tendency of the state to centralize power and evade accountability and control' (Brown and Korten, 1991, p. 53). The proliferation of associations at all levels, rural and urban and in a variety of forms and types, is a powerful factor constraining abusive central government authorities and the predatory conduct of dominant elites. By empowering groups throughout society to both voice their concerns and take direct action to achieve their ends, the trend is strongly in favour of more participatory politics, greater public accountability, and hence basic democracy. (Landell-Mills, 1992, p. 563) The most powerful mechanism available to NGOs in this regard is to subject the government to public scrutiny, and disseminate information to the general public (Diamond, 1994, p. 10). Intermediary associations, such as political parties, and the media play a key role in linking indigenous NGOs and the wider civil society with the state. They help lo articulate, negotiate and foster the interests of civil society (Lewis, 1992, p. 39), and are thus vital to bringing societal interests and issues into the political arena.
IFIs use NGOs as tools for political pressure on regimes receiving aid Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 16
NGOs, both indigenous and international and the World Bank have a love-hate relationship. The World Bank espouses an apolitical, logical and rational approach to the problems of African development, whereas NGOs are often viewed as having a politicized nature and values-orientation which may '. . . threaten the apolitical expertise on which the World Bank's fundamental myths are based' (Nelson. 1995, p. 130), Thus. NGOs are useful as '. . .agents of project participation, private service delivery, and local "civic culture", not as agents for wider democratic change' (Schmitz, 1995. p. 74). The World Bank's view of the importance of NGOs in democratization is summed up by the following: NGOs [as] intermediaries have an important role to play; they can create links both upward and downward in society and voice local concerns - . . In doing this they can bring a broader spectrum of ideas and values to bear on policy making. They can also exert pressure on public officials for better performance and greater accountability. (World Bank, 1989, p. 61) NGOs play a very limited, and well-defined role in the World Bank and the IMF's vision of development and democracy: they are crucial in Filling in the gaps left by state withdrawal from the provision of social services, and they are central for democracy by acting as watch-dogs and providing for a more plural institutional setting.
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*** Solve Specific Areas/Things
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NGOs Solve Congo

Private military firms should be deployed to the Congo Singer, 2003 [Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]
More recently, a consortium of military firms, interestingly entitled the "International Peace Operations Association," has proposed that it be hired to work on behalf of the largely ineffectual monuc peacekeeping operations in the Eastern Congo. The private military firms, which range from aerial surveillance operators to a company of Gurkha veterans, have offered to create a "Security Curtain" (50 km demilitarized zone) in one of the most lawless areas on the African continent. The ipoa's charge would be between $100-200 million, dependent on the scale of the operation. So far, it has found no takers, but the level of violence in the area continues to escalate
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A.I.D.S. solvency
NGOs are implementing successful programs to stop HIV Kenya Broadcasting Corporation TV, Nairobi, BBC, August 15, 2000, p.ln
Reeling under years of condemnation as HIV/AIDS high risk areas, beach communities along the shores of Lake Victoria have now taken up awareness campaigns with unmatched vigour. They are gradually abandoning their old ways of pairing fishermen with women fish traders with the help of Plan International, a nongovernmental organization. Beach communities have formed guidance and counselling groups. Reporter This fireplace was last utilized when mourners attended the burial of Mzee honorific Vitalis' bogus son and daughter-in-law. The couple died of AIDS leaving behind six orphans. The home has since been declared closed, like many other homesteads along the shores of Lake Victoria. The beaches are considered high risk areas. Women who came to the beach in the past to work or trade were paired off with men to avoid jealousies among men - a sure recipe for the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS. Passage omitted: local women speak about how they began prostitution Gradually, however, the beach community is coming to terms with the reality and has enforced rather stringent regulations. (?Asat) Beach, for example, is a no-go zone for single women. If they have to visit they are restricted to two days. They are, however, silent over what measures apply to single men. Asat Beach has fishermen and fishmongers from Uganda, Tanzania and over 3,000 neighbouring community members who fish and return to their homes. In an effort to sensitize the locals on HIV/AIDS, Plan International has forged a working relation with the Asat beach community. Passage omitted: NGO worker speaks about cooperation .
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NGO solve democratization

NGOs are a force for democratization and economic liberalization Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 2-3
NGOs, civil society and the market have become the panacea for the failures of the African state in the post-cold war neo-liberal climate. NGOs have thus caused much hype and enthusiasm within the dominant neo-liberal paradigm (Bratton. 1989; Diamond, 1994). NGOs are certainly not new to the African continent, or to the Third World for that matter.2 But now, in addition to their previous importance as poverty alleviators. emergency and humanitarian aid providers, NGOs are being heralded as important vehicles for empowerment, democratization and economic development. Surely, a tall order for any actor to fulfill They allegedly play a key role in creating a civic culture. pluralizing the political, economic and social arena and bridging the gap between the masses and the state. NGOs and wider civil society thus act as intermediaries between the unorganized masses and the state (Macdonald. 1994, p. 271).
NGOs are schools for democracy Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 12
In addition to their empowering potential, NGOs are heralded for their ability to 'provide training grounds for democracy' (Brown and Korten, 1991, p. 53; Bratton, 1990b. p. 104; Korten, 1990, p. 99). More broadly, civil society can be characterized as a key arena for the development of democratic virtues such as '. . . tolerance, moderation, willingness to compromise and respect for opposing viewpoints' (Diamond. 1994, p. 8). Because many NGOs are formed along interest-based issues rather than vertical cleavages based on ethnicity, regionalism or ethnicity, they help to 'crosscut the principal polarities of political conflict' (Diamond, 1994. p. 9). Assuming that NGOs empower their constituency (or membership) and the wider community, the existence of a plurality of NGOs also helps to stimulate political participation, elevate the skills of democratic citizens, and promote an '. . . appreciation of the obligations as well as the rights of democratic citizenship' (Diamond, 1994, pp. 7-8). These organizations therefore act as 'schools of democracy' where leaders within the organization learn how to organize and motivate people, debate issues (Diamond, 1994. p. 9) and become accountable to their membership, while the membership in turn learns how to keep its leadership accountable and how, therefore, eventually to pressure the state for accountability and responsiveness.
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Environment solvency
NGOs in the Horn solve environmental issues better than the governments Emmanuel Koro, African Eye News Service (South Africa), Africa News, August 25, 2000, p.ln
Washington DC - African environmental groups have joined forces with a Washington- based organisation to force governments on the continent to curb what they call rampant "state-driven natural resource abuses". Led by east African non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the groups claim that many African governments come down hard on lobbies that demand environmental accountability. "Political space for environmental advocacy in Africa is very weak and the governments de-register NGOs," Peter Veit, World Resources Institute (WRI) senior associate and regional director for Africa, said. "Environmental information is stamped 'confidential' and court cases challenging the environmental performance of governments and politically connected private sector business operations are thrown out on technicalities," he added. WRI is a Washingtonbased independent center for research on global environmental and development issues. The organisation provides partners with methods, tools and analysis for alternative environmental governance. It will now work with African NGOs such as Kenya's African Center for Technology Studies (ACTS), Tanzania's Lawyers Environmental Action Team (LEAT) and Uganda's Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE) to push for environmental accountability on the continent. Veit cited a recent case in which the Tanzanian government tried to de-register an NGO called Bawata because it had become "too political" in its advocacy work. A court of law ruled in favour of the NGO in an ensuing legal action, but the government has appealed against the ruling. Veit said the Ugandan government initially tried to frustrate the registration of ACODE. However, ACODE is now operating smoothly. Godber Tumushabe, ACODE executive director, said the organisation recently succeeded in halting the tabling of a draft policy on fisheries, until public consultations were held. "A good example of state-driven natural resources abuses in Uganda is mismanagement in the forestry department, which is alleged to have given one of the biggest sugar companies in Uganda, Madhivani's, chunks of several reserves for sugar cane growing," he said. "Cases of political pressure on forestry department staff to allow this to happen have been cited and the issue is being investigated by parliament," he added.
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NGOs solve feminism

Womens NGOs are inclusive and more effective than government organizations Maria Nzomo, lecturer at the Institute for Diplomacy and International Studies at the University of Nairobi, 1999, African Foreign Policies, p. 194
The return to pluralism has at least created some political space for articulating gender interests and lobbying for gender-sensitive democratic development and foreign relations. Until the mid-1980s, Tanzanian women had only marginally participated in this kind of activism, despite the UN women's decade. The situation has changed significantly since 1992. With the reemergence and redynamization of civil society groups, new forms of women's organizations are emerging. They seek to transcend class, religious, racial, ethnic, and other social divides and focus on issues that unite, such as the impact of SAPs on women, gender violence, and women's marginalization in strategic decisionmaking positions. An example of these new forms of organization is the national women's NGO known as Baraza Ya Wanawake wa Tanzania (BAWATA), launched in May 1995 to coordinate and promote women's rights in the emerging democratic environment. Although it is still too early to predict its performance, it would seem that BAWATA has the potential to galvanize Tanzanian women to become influential actors in future development and foreign relations. Pluralism has also energized a number of longerestablished women's organizations, such as the Tanzania Media Women's Association (TAMWA), Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP), Tanzanian Women's Lawyers Association, and university women research groups. At a global level, Tanzanian women have already made an impact: For example, Gertrude Mongolia served as the Tanzanian secretary-general for the 1995 Women's Beijing conference. As international donors become disenchanted with the Tanzanian state, they are increasingly turning to women NGOs as more reliable actors for promoting development and democracy. This new partnership puts women among the most significant "new" actors in Tanzania's foreign relations.
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NGOs solve poverty

In poverty alleviation programs, NGOs are superior to government action Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p.123-4
NGOs and civil society have become increasingly important in Africa over the last two decades. How and why they are important is controversial, not whether they have become important. As discussed in previous chapters the dominant discourse of neo-liberalism views NGOs as significant harbingers of democratization and economic liberalization, but as Fowler (1993) argues, African NGOs tend to be '. . . organizational weak, seldom truly indigenous or rooted within the mass of the population'. In addition they are often used by the political and bureaucratic elite to '. . . sustain themselves by providing a needed diversification of patronage resources' (Fowler, 1993, p. 334). So, how influential and effective can they be in a transition to democracy? As the case study of Uganda illustrates, NGOs have a limited impact on the political arena, focusing more on gap-filling, serviceprovision roles. What impact have NGOs had on their target groups and the wider community in terms of political empowerment, given their own organizational constraints? There is little dispute about the importance of NGOs in helping to alleviate poverty and in helping to rebuild Uganda; however, to what degree do NGOs help to empower individuals and provide the foundation for a democratic society and polity? What hope do they offer for the democratization of Uganda, given their contextual limitations as outlined in Chapter 4 and their internal weaknesses? NGOs in general have been more-or-less efficient in addressing service-provision and poverty alleviation needs. A labour-intensive approach, a focus on community participation, a non-hierarchical decision-making structure, as well as a flexibility and adaptiveness to the locale they are operating in, often make NGOs more cost-effective and responsive to community needs than government (see Kwesiga and Ratter, 1992, p. 13). But according to the dominant discourse, NGOs have also been identified as one of the key vehicles of empowerment, the development of a vibrant democratic civil society and democratization. NGOs are thus viewed as being capable of providing independent centres of power to check abuses of central and local authority and therefore procure a greater accountability from the regime (Bratton, 1989; Korten, 1990); of pluralizing the institutional environment and giving voice to popular demands; and helping to promote a popular culture (Chazan, 1993, p. 282). In other words, NGOs have a significant empowerment, political, watchdog and educative role to play in pressing for democratization.
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***Private Corporations Solvency
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Private Corporations Solve

Private corporations solve empirically proven Singer, 2003 [Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]
At the same time, there is growing global trade in private military services for hire, better known as the privatized military industry. These companies range from small consulting firms, formed by retired generals, to transnational corporations that offer battalions of commandos for hire. Often operating out of public sight, such firms have been players in a number of conflicts over the past decade, ranging from Angola to what was Zaire. Even the U.S. military has become one of the prime clients of the industry, with private firms now providing the logistics of every major U.S. military deployment, maintaining such strategic weapons systems as the b-2 stealth bomber and Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle, and taking over the rotc programs in over 200 American universities. Indeed, from 1994 to 2002, the U.S. Defense Department entered into over 3,000 contracts with U.S.-based military firms, estimated at a value of more than $300 billion. Their role in supporting the Iraq war will only see these numbers grow.
Private corporations solve international support Singer, 2003 [Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]
As a result, over the past several years, many have begun to call for a twenty-first-century business solution to the worlds twenty-first-century security problems. If everything from prisons to welfare has been privatized, why not try turning peacekeeping over to the private market? Proponents of exploring this idea obviously include the companies who stand to profit from it. But they have also expanded well beyond, to include not only the British government, which just issued a Green Paper exploring the issue, but also many traditional supporters of U.N. peacekeeping, including even former U.N. Under Secretary Sir Brian Urquart, who is considered the founding father of peacekeeping. As a U.N. officer summed up his feelings on the firms in an interview with the Ottawa Citizen (April 6, 1998), In a perfect world we dont need them or want them. But the world isnt perfect. Privatized peacekeeping offers both promise and peril, and the time has come for the international community to face up to some hard choices before the next disaster forces an even worse dilemma.
Private corporations solve strategically unimportant conflicts Singer, 2003 [Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]
The industry began its boom roughly a decade ago. The opening of a market for private military services was the result of a synergy between three powerful forces. The immediate catalyst was a massive disruption in the supply and demand of capable military forces since the end of the Cold War. Not only did global military downsizing create a new labor pool of over 6 million recently retired soldiers, but at the same time there was an increase in violent, but less strategically significant, conflicts around the world. With the great powers less willing to intervene or prop up local allies, the outcome was a gap in the market of security, which private firms found themselves able to fill.
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Private corporations solve better than UNPKOs Singer, 2003 [Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]
The contrasting experiences in Sierra Leone between the military provider firm Executive Outcomes and the U.N.s peacekeeping operation are the most often cited example of privatizations promise. In 1995, the Sierra Leone government was near defeat from the ruf, a nefarious rebel group whose habit of chopping off the arms of civilians as a terror tactic made it one of the most truly evil groups of the late twentieth century. Supported by multinational mining interests, the government hired the private military firm, made up of veterans from the South African apartheid regimes elite forces, to help rescue it. Deploying a battalion-sized unit of assault infantry (numbering in the low hundreds), who were supported by firm-manned combat helicopters, light artillery, and a few armored vehicles, Executive Outcomes was able to defeat the ruf in a span of weeks. Its victory brought enough stability to allow Sierra Leone to hold its first election in over a decade. After its contract termination, however, the war restarted. In 1999 the U.N. was sent in. Despite having a budget and personnel size nearly 20 times that of the private firm, the U.N. force took several years of operations, and a rescue by the British military, to come close to the same results.
Private corporations solve humanitarian aid Singer, 2003 [Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]
There are three potential scenarios for the privatization of peacekeeping forces. The first is privatized protection. The problem of security for relief operations is widespread and pervasive. In fact, more Red Cross workers were killed in action in the 1990s than U.S. Army personnel. Thus, while the ability of humanitarian actors to create a consensual environment themselves is severely limited, military provider firms might be able to provide site and convoy protection to aid groups. This would allow much more effective aid actions in areas where the local government has collapsed. Besides the direct benefit to the workers on the ground, better protection might also prevent local insurgents from gaining control of supplies and lessen the pressure on outside governments to become involved in messy situations, including scenarios like the 1992 Somalia operation. Humanitarian organizations still operating in dangerous places such as Mogadishu already contract for protection with local warlords, so the more formal business alternative might be preferable. In fact, this scenario is not all that unlikely, given that several U.N. agencies already use such firms to provide security for their own offices
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Private corporations solve rapid reaction force Singer, 2003 [Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]
The second possibility is hired units constituted as a Rapid Reaction Force within an overall peacekeeping operation. Whenever recalcitrant local parties break peace agreements or threaten the operation, military firms would be hired to offer the muscle that blue helmets are unable or unwilling to provide. The quick insertion of a more combat-minded force, even a relatively small private one, could be critical in deterring local adversaries and stiffening the back of the overall peace operation. Paid firms might thus provide the short-term coercion necessary at critical junctures in the operation.
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Private corporations solve genocide Singer, 2003 [Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]
The final, and most contentious, scenario is the complete outsourcing of the operation. When a genocide or humanitarian crisis occurs and no state is willing to step forward to send its own troops, the intervention itself might be turned over to private firms. Upon their hire (by the U.N. or anyone else willing to pay), the firm would deploy to a new area, defeat any local opposition, set up infrastructures for protecting and supporting refugees, and then, once the situation was stabilized, potentially hand over control to regular troops. This idea may sound quite incredible but actually was an option considered by policymakers behind closed doors during the refugee crisis that took place in eastern Zaire in 1996. Both the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping and the U.S. National Security Council discussed the idea that, in lieu of U.N. peacekeepers, a private firm be hired to create a secure humanitarian corridor. The plan was dismissed when the question of who would actually foot the bill was raised.
Private corporations solve genocide Singer, 2003 [Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html] The second front is perhaps even more difficult than U.N. reform. The decision to watch genocide and do nothing not only is morally unacceptable, but also is likely untenable in a world of ever-present media attention. So, if the international community is unwilling to pay the costs of providing its own capable peacekeeping forces, then it is better that it now begin finding ways to mitigate the underlying concerns with contracting out humanitarian intervention. This is preferable to an ad hoc response at the point of crisis.
Private forces solve the lack of commitment to solving genocide Hukill 2004 [Traci Selling Mercenaries to the U.N. as privatized peacekeeping. The Progress Report. May 20 http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/8509.html]
Avoiding new genocides is frequently invoked as a reason to use mercenaries, who, for the right price, could be deployed quickly in a crisis. But mercenaries are talked about for less dire peacekeeping missions as well. Doug Brooks sees involving the better private firms -- those with proven records of good service and behavior -- in U.N. peacekeeping operations as an opportunity to do the right thing."The reality is, the West has pretty much abrogated its responsibility for supporting U.N. operations with boots on the ground in places they don't care about. So in Congo, Liberia, you're not going to see many Western troops getting involved, and that's a shame," he says. "If the biggest, richest, best-equipped militaries do not participate, it's really ridiculous to expect a mission to succeed."
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Private corporations solve failed states Singer, 2003 [Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]
The scenarios illustrate how the concept of the private sector taking over peace operations could radically transform the very nature of peacekeeping, opening up all sorts of new possibilities. For example, firm executives have proposed that they could be paid to take back cities such as Mogadishu, which have been lost to warlords and lawlessness. The firms would stabilize them and then turn the cities over to local or U.N. administration, thus perhaps allowing failed states to rejoin the international system. Similarly, the aforementioned Executive Outcomes performed a business exploration of whether it would have had the capacity to intervene in Rwanda in 1994. Internal plans claim that the company could have had armed troops on the ground within 14 days of its hire and been fully deployed with over 1,500 of its own soldiers, along with air and fire support (roughly the equivalent of the U.S. Marine force that first deployed into Afghanistan), within six weeks. The cost for a six-month operation to provide protected safe havens from the genocide was estimated at $150 million (around $600,000 a day). This private option compares quite favorably with the eventual U.N. relief operation, which deployed only after the killings. The U.N. operation ended up costing $3 million a day (and did nothing to save hundreds of thousands of lives).
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Private forces solve conflict in Africa Schulhofer-Wohl 2000 [Jonah, May 12, Washington Post]
With the United Nations' mission to Sierra Leone floundering, and Western nations even more reluctant to contribute troops, there is a need for some alternative way to undertake peacekeeping in Africa. One such solution may be found in the role that the South Africa-based private military company Executive Outcomes (EO) played in Sierra Leone from May 1995 to January 1997. The United Nations does not like to discuss companies such as EO, shunning them as mercenaries." But it would be wise to examine their activities in Africa more closely. Indeed, EO's operations in Sierra Leone stand in stark contrast to those of the United Nations. The status of the current mission, UNAMSIL, is being seriously questioned after the deaths of at least four U.N. peacekeepers and the capture of hundreds more. At an estimated cost of $260 million over six months, UNAMSIL is a very expensive mission gone wrong. EO's actions in Sierra Leone could not be more different from the United Nations'. In the 21 months that it was in Sierra Leone, EO's costs were just $35 million. In that same time period, EO was able to drive back Revolutionary United Front (RUF) troops from around the capital, Freetown, retake key mines from the RUF and destroy the RUF's headquarters. This final act brought Foday Sankoh to the negotiating table; he signed a peace agreement in November 1996 that enabled elections to take place. To be sure, the fundamental natures of EO and UNAMSIL are diametrically opposed, the latter being an international peacekeeping force, the former a military company hired to fight for the Sierra Leonean government. And EO, in fulfilling its contract with the government, no doubt had a good deal more leeway to do as it saw fit to subdue the RUF than U.N. troops do now. But its success may also be attributed to its general approach in Sierra Leone. Involvement in Angola in 1993 and 1994 gave EO experience in the kind of "low intensity" conflict that was going on in Sierra Leone. EO used the kamajors, local hunters, in gathering intelligence for its operations, and then used them to occupy captured RUF bases. EO also cooperated with the West African peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, in many of its operations. This coordination allowed EO's small force to overwhelm the far more numerous RUF.
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Private security companies are key to avoid over-extension of armies and executing optimized peacekeeping operations. Zarate, 1998 (Federal Law Clerk, Southern District of California, J.D. Harvard Law School, Stanford Journal of International Law, Winter, 34 Stan. J Intl L. 75, p. l/n)
There are many more SCs throughout the world, generated in the militarily advanced countries and employed by regimes in need of military expertise. Unlike rogue mercenaries, SCs provide military training and services in a quasi-official capacity, although their home states are likely to disavow their "private" activities. The modern notion of the mercenary is that of "an international blight in their perpetration of acts of violence which ruin human lives, create material losses, hamper economic activity and extend terrorist attacks that have touched off or aggravated conflicts, with often catastrophic results for those affected." 263 SCs, on the contrary, work with recognized states to professionalize militaries and restore a semblance of public order. Since they are registered companies, SCs are constrained not only by their employing states but by the legal obligations and reporting requirements of their home states, as well as by the desire to remain in the good graces of their home states. Market forces, in combination with the extensive media attention SCs receive, require that they maintain a professional reputation respectful of human rights and of their limited mandates. Furthermore, SCs are reluctant to enter arenas in which their governmental employers' legitimacy is unclear and where there is a likelihood of many casualties. In short, to the extent that SCs actually engage in offensive maneuvers, they do not represent the same threats that mercenaries do. Where SCs have entered conflicts, the ill-disciplined and vengeful national factions fighting for control of resources have been greater threats to the safety and economic well-being of the population. [*116] SCs fill a void by providing military aid in an age when governments do not have the resources or political will to enter internal skirmishes or civil wars on behalf of recognized regimes. At the same time, poor countries are susceptible to low-level guerrilla wars waged by bandits or disaffected members of society because of the countries' lack of military preparedness and public order. 264 These regimes cannot create well-trained standing militaries or modernize antiquated forces because of high costs and the potential for military coups by existing military institutions. In this geopolitical context, SCs supply military professionalism, modernization, and expertise to countries wracked by violence and plagued by social disorder. Given the international opprobrium facing foreigners who contribute directly to internal civil wars or unrest in other countries, SCs legitimate their activities and ensure the survival of their personnel by limiting their involvement to military training. In addition to geopolitical constraints, SCs are controlled by market forces which make it too costly in pecuniary terms to enter conflicts in which they might appear to destabilize governments or aggravate military conflicts. In general, the emergence of SCs represents a new form of state agency which will persist as long as governments need military aid.
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Private peacekeeping avoids the downfalls of U.N. intervention and effective peacekeeping. Zarate, 1998 (Federal Law Clerk, Southern District of California, J.D. Harvard Law School, Stanford Journal of International Law, Winter, 34 Stan. J Intl L. 75, p. l/n)
SCs fulfill an important role in international peace and security - a role which has been abdicated by states in many cases. SCs professionalize militaries and restructure officer corps, training them to function within democratic, civilian regimes and to fight under internationally accepted principles of engagement. Such training makes human rights abuses by native forces less likely. The training also diminishes the need for outside intervention in future conflicts since it makes the national forces self-sufficient. SCs allow small, struggling states to obtain quick and effective military expertise when other states are unwilling to devote their national forces or resources to aid besieged governments in their internal conflicts. Rather than being a threat to small states as mercenaries were in the past, SCs give small states a degree of independence from large state support or reliance on regional or international intervention. In part, this explains the attempt by the Papua New Guinea government to hire Sandline International to provide military training and guidance against the BRA. In addition, SCs give governments the military capability to bargain from a position of strength and bring an opposition movement to the negotiating table. 461 The expense of SCs' [*151] services forces rulers to make cost-benefit determinations as to the value of continuing to fight versus negotiating settlements. 462 Though SCs have economic stakes in the outcome of conflicts, they tend to be objective and apolitical since they are not personally entangled in the internal conflicts fueling the battles. Since most of the professional soldiers and trainers have other jobs and are paid well by SCs directly, they do not volunteer in order to maraud or plunder the countryside. In a situation of social chaos, as appeared in Sierra Leone, such dispassionate agents may be the only way of restoring order. Low-scale civil conflicts represent a mixture of banditry and civil war fought for control of economic resources. They easily disintegrate into social chaos and spill over into neighboring countries, as seen in the Great Lakes region, West Africa, and the SudanUganda border region. SCs provide the stabilizing, objective internal force that the United Nations and the OAU (among other regional organizations) cannot offer. 463 In addition, these companies protect humanitarian aid agencies and regional organizations, as seen with EO in Sierra Leone and with MPRI in the former Soviet Republics. EO's effectiveness in providing stability and security has prompted the OAU to consider contracting with EO for continent-wide peacekeeping. 464 In sum, the SC market has developed because there is a need for such services in the world. 465 SCs provide valuable services in restoring order and preventing internal conflicts from becoming international in scope in countries often ignored by the rest of the world. Yet, SCs have no role in countries with strong, consensual political and social institutions - one reason why EO's presence in PNG was rejected. 466 SCs professionalize militaries, promoting jus in bello principles and preserving the rights of noncombatants. For exporting states, SCs are a means of aiding a regime or ally without committing national forces or compromising neutrality. Also, the SC gives ex-military officers, who could be a threat to their home [*152] states, a professional outlet for their services. SCs are an efficient tool for smoothing trouble spots in the international community, and can be vanguards for peace and stability.
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***Answers to UN solves
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UN doesnt solve
UN forces further conflicts NGOs are neutral Collins, 1995 [U.N. CHAOS-FIXING FAILURE IS NGO CHALLENGE , Carole, National Catholic Reporter. 00278939, 3/24/95, Vol. 31, Issue 21]
Many critics overlook the fact that the United Nations has saved many lives in Bosnia and Somalia. But it has largely failed to develop effective strategies and tools for defusing the central conflicts there. These conflicts are still generating horrific anti-civilian violence and disrupting economic activities to the point of famine. In Somalia and Bosnia, cases can be made that U.N. presence has inadvertently served to fuel further conflict. Many Somalis and others believe that Egyptian U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the United States came to clearly favor Ali Mahdi's clan-based militia forces over those of Gen. Mohammed Aideed, eroding their credibility as honest brokers or disinterested mediators. By constantly attacking Aideed's I forces in mid-1993, the United States became -- as several observers noted at the time -- little more than another clan faction fighting for supremacy. Indeed, the military and financial massiveness of the U.S.-initiated and U.N.-sustained humanitarian intervention may have prolonged clan conflict. Clans intensified their competition for aid resources, the only significant source of income and wealth amid the shattered ruins of Somalia's economy.
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***Answers to the Perm

Cooperation between states and NGOs lead to state control of the organization Collins, 1995 [U.N. CHAOS-FIXING FAILURE IS NGO CHALLENGE , Carole, National Catholic Reporter. 00278939, 3/24/95, Vol. 31, Issue 21]
Significant government funding of NGO humanitarian intervention also carries unique moral dilemmas. Some NGOs that accept major government funding and coordinate extensively with military forces become virtual extensions of the state. Some lose credibility as NGOs when, as in Somalia, they become overly dependent on the often controversial presence of foreign troops for their safety.
NGOs can only work independently http://www.earthsummit2002.org/toolkits/women/un-doku/un-conf/ag21chap27.htm Rio Earth Summit 2002 Agenda 21 Chapter 27
Non-governmental organizations play a vital role in the shaping and implementation of participatory democracy. Their credibility lies in the responsible and constructive role they play in society. Formal and informal organizations, as well as grass-roots movements, should be recognized as partners in the implementation of Agenda 21. The nature of the independent role played by non-governmental organizations within a society calls for real participation; therefore, independence is a major attribute of non-governmental organizations and is the precondition of real participation.
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Answers to Perm
Cooperation leads to cooption Oliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs. University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. Martin Institute, 2001-01-01.
However, one difficulty lies in the fact that while NGOs can play a vital role in building civil and therefore global civil society, if their legitimacy and resources are enhanced by increased cooperation with states and international or regional organizations, they may either be forced to take on board the interests of states in the traditional diplomatic system or states may withdraw their support. An important question, therefore, relates to whether NGOs can help states and international organizations iron out difficulties in the peacemaking apparatus of the international system pertaining to intractable conflict, or whether states and NGOs are on a collision course with each other.
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Answers to Perm
Cooperation between states and NGOs lead to state control of the organization Collins, 1995 [U.N. CHAOS-FIXING FAILURE IS NGO CHALLENGE , Carole, National Catholic Reporter. 00278939, 3/24/95, Vol. 31, Issue 21]
Significant government funding of NGO humanitarian intervention also carries unique moral dilemmas. Some NGOs that accept major government funding and coordinate extensively with military forces become virtual extensions of the state. Some lose credibility as NGOs when, as in Somalia, they become overly dependent on the often controversial presence of foreign troops for their safety.
UN and private corporations forces cant cooperate together Singer, 2003 [Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]
Similar concerns also occur at the operational level. In the rapid reaction force scenario, for example, there will likely be difficulties of integrating a better-paid private force within a larger U.N. peacekeeping force. The probable resentment between the two forces could jeopardize operational cohesion. Likewise, it is difficult to determine who should be in operational command. Few military firms are willing to accept outside commanders of their units, particularly from the U.N., while clients would obviously prefer to have their own people at the top. In lieu of this, some firms have expressed a willingness to allow outside observers to be present during their operations. The exact powers of these observers, though, are also unsettled. For example, who will provide them and ensure their independence? Will they be like rapporteurs, just providing independent reporting on the operations, or like referees, with the ability to veto certain actions or suspend operations in mid-course?
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Answers to perm
Private forces/NGOs avoid politics Schulhofer-Wohl 2000 [Jonah, May 12, Washington Post]
Yet they could present a remedy to the recent refusals by France, Britain and the United States to send troops to bolster UNAMSIL's forces. These refusals stem in part from the experience in Somalia. No country wishes to embark on a peacekeeping mission and find its troop contribution being sent home in coffins. But the deaths of the soldiers of a private military company, to be blunt, would not cause the same political problem that the deaths of a country's nationals do.
Governments will attempt to intervene with NGO independence. Mayhew and Ambegaokar, Centre for Population Studies, 2002 (Susannah and Maia, Health NGOs and the State: Conflict, control or collaboration?) http://www.lshtm.ac.uk/cps/dfid/2002_88.htm
Over the past two decades a new policy agenda has emerged in the health and development sector, favouring donor support for non-government organisations over centralised government hegemony for implementing health services in developing countries. NGOs are deemed to have a number of comparative advantages over government sectors such as reaching the hardest-to-reach segments to providing services in areas of government weakness or apathy. The increasing attention being given, particularly to southern NGOs and notably in the field of reproductive health and rights, has sparked increased attention not necessarily benign from developing country governments. What emerge are diverse State legislative responses to NGOs reflecting fluctuating ideological boundaries between control and collaboration. Drawing on recent qualitative policy research in Asia, this paper details a spectrum of legislation and relationships which are influenced by prevailing power-bases and ideologies with governments typically perceiving NGOs as a threat to their hegemony and NGOs being wary of government intervention threatening their independence. Vietnam for example fiercely safeguards its ideological supremacy, controlling rather than regulating and enabling its NGO sector; Cambodia meanwhile has no formal policies on the NGO sector. Notably, in countries with long-established local NGO sectors (Bangladesh and Nepal), the NGOs themselves may call for quality regulations and clarity of GovernmentNGO relations. The paper calls for a spectrum of collaboration to be forged between NGOs and governments if a mutually acceptable balance is to be achieved between the hegemonies of public and NGO sectors and between control and regulation. Without this equilibrium the improvement of health and health services will be impaired.
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***NGOs better than the UN

NGOs are oriented towards conflict resolution and not towards politics Oliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs. University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. Martin Institute, 2001-01-01.
Increasingly, peacemaking, humanitarian and peace-building tasks are being delegated by states and intergovernmental organizations to NGOs that have humanitarian, developmental, human rights, educational, and conflict resolution orientations. These actors are forming a vital role in the development of new approaches to ending conflict, particularly in the context of their growing links with transnational organizations and their professed interests in human security issues. These interests appear to be constituted by their civic nature both at the local and international level; and though they may express partisan interests the amelioration of the root causes of conflict appears to be their over-riding objective.
NGOs have more legitimacy than traditional peacekeepers Oliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs. University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. Martin Institute, 2001-01-01.
This paper argues that it is in this late Westphalian context, via their focus on human security derived from a world view provided by conflict resolution approaches, that NGOs derive increasing levels of legitimacy, at both the local and global level. This legitimacy is also the basis on which they gain access to areas in conflict zones that would normally be marginalized or denied to formally constituted peacemaking actors. As the UN Secretary General has pointed out, NGOs promote and provide access to a global civil society. Understanding in particular the role of NGOs in constituting global civil society may enable peace-building approaches to tap into the relative success that NGOs have had in micro-political environments, and the macro-political changes which are also occurring.
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NGOs Better than UN

NGOs mediate conflicts better than states Oliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs. University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. Martin Institute, 2001-01-01.
Human rights abuses by states, the oppression of minorities, and the suppression of their claims for representation, democratization, education and development tend to be highly politicized in local environments and therefore need to be addressed at a level at which states are marginalized. This is particularly so if states themselves cannot find a consensus on what should be done and commit themselves to facilitate its achievement. Given that states control the majority of the world's resources this is extremely difficult, but it may well be easier to mediate the interests of those engaged in intractable conflict via NGOs (directly or indirectly) and regional and international organizations, with state actors and interests remaining indirectly involved. This would ultimately aid in the channelling of norms of an ethical nature for peace, representation, democratization and development into local environments.
Private forces have been training than UN forces Schulhofer-Wohl 2000 [Jonah, May 12, Washington Post]
Add to this the fact that military companies still in business (EO closed in 1998), such as the British-based Sandline International, have experience in Africa, and they become a more attractive option. The capabilities of military companies go beyond the provision of combat troops. Sandline is registered with the United Nations' Common Supply Database, and Military Professional Resources was used in the former Yugoslavia in 1994, furnishing 45 border monitors in a contract with the State Department.
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NGOs Better than UN

Private forces save money Hukill 2004 [Traci Selling Mercenaries to the U.N. as privatized peacekeeping. The Progress Report. May 20 http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/8509.html]
This most likely represents significant savings. Although the United Nations has issued no cost estimate for a Sudan mission, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has proposed spending $418 million on a 5,600-man mission to Burundi, a small Central African nation about the size of Maryland. "The practical reality is, the United Nations is probably going to try and do Sudan itself without using as much private support as we'd like to provide," Brooks says. But he is obliged to try. As president of the Arlington, Va.-based International Peace Operations Association, a consortium of 10 military mercenary firms available for hire, it's his job to drum up business. Lately, that means trying to persuade the United Nations to give mercenaries -- "privatized peacekeeping" -- a chance. The United Nations is facing a peacekeeping crisis. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations began emitting distress signals months ago about the number of blue berets and blue helmets it will be expected to muster this year -- up to 20,000 for missions in Ivory Coast, Haiti, and possibly Burundi and Sudan, and all at a time when troop-contributing countries are under pressure from Washington to send soldiers to Iraq. If the Burundi and Sudan missions become reality, the U.N. will have 45,000 peacekeepers deployed, the highest number since the mid-1990s
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*** UN Peacekeepers Bad

Government sponsored peacekeeping is based on a form of coercion and zero-sum interests Oliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs. University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. Martin Institute, 2001-01-01.
First generation approaches are based upon the tradition, norms, and culture of western diplomacy and operate at the level of the state in the context of an assumed Westphalian international system. As such, first generation peacekeeping operations (like UNFICYP, for example) are based on state interests while international mediation and negotiation represent stylized and formal communication between official and sovereign representatives, based upon zero-sum interests. Such interests can be manipulated and coordinated, but only through the use of coercion, in the presence of ripe moments, mainly engendered by hurting stalemates of the external provision of large incentives, of which the settlement of the Egypt Israel conflict at Camp David, or the more recent settlement at Dayton, are good examples.
Formalized peacekeeping ignores ethnic groups and unofficial actorrs Oliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs. University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. Martin Institute, 2001-01-01.
In this high level process there is little room for unofficial actors, whose separate legitimacy tends to be unrecognized and subsumed by officialdom. Thus, it is an inflexible process best suited to statecentric types of conflicts that seem to have declined. The very obvious weaknesses of first generation approaches have been highlighted by the emergence of ethnic actors, identity claims, humanitarian and development issues, all of which are now often components of conflict and complex emergencies. First generation traditional peacemaking activities therefore attempt to operate in the realms of traditional diplomacy in which the state holds [a somewhat contested] thrall.[4] International mediation therefore aims at outcomes based on the intricacies of potentially fragile status quos. Mandell has argued that mediation could influence the creation and internalization of new norms for conflict management,[5] but this is unlikely if such norms are limited to the local and are not derived from a global or regional dialogue.
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UN Peacekeepers bad
Formalized peacekeeping doesnt represent the interests of the people Oliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs. University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. Martin Institute, 2001-01-01
Power-based mediation, because of its mono-dimensional nature, can do little more that manage short-term strategic interactions, particularly given the fact that under the auspices of a state sponsor, or of the UN, it must observe the norms of international law and international society. Thus, it often falls victim to the tensions between the two. Because mediation is constructed as a mono-dimensional activity it lacks co-ordination with other peacemaking activities at other levels, and falls victim to the ethical void that traditional diplomacy depicts the Westphalian international system as being indicative of. It is merely assumed that citizen interests will trickle up to form the national interest, which will influence the formation of foreign policy. Clearly, such assumptions do not accurately mirror the issues and actors engaged in intractable conflict or complex emergencies, and therefore the whole process of diplomacy tends to become ensnared upon the need for official legitimacy, recognition, and the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. Often the role of the third party becomes one of mediating between two [partly ambiguously] legitimate sets of principles inherent in a flawed international system- for example, self-determination and sovereignty and the continuing controversies over the issue of legitimate intervention, which draw on different approaches to international law and ethics. First generation approaches to ending conflict tend to be overpowered by the tension between the relative interests and leverage of sponsor-states, third party states and actors and the disputants themselves, situating the practice firmly in the realm of traditional diplomacy and power politics. It is this stumbling block that the international community has attempted to address since the end of the Cold War.
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UN Peacekeepers bad
State actors (the UN) cant compromise with warring parties peacekeeping fails Oliver P. Richmond, Post Westphalian Peace-Building: The Role of NGOs. University of St. Andrews, UK: Department of International Relations. Martin Institute, 2001-01-01.
In response to the inadequacies of first generation approaches, it has been argued that settlements need to be based upon just political orders which promotes democracy and human rights, new norms, participatory governance structures, civil society, international tribunals, and truth commissions. Disarming, repatriating refugees, building a consensus for peace under the auspices of the UN, and moderate local political leadership play a role in this method.[21] This is based on conflict resolution perspectives of conflict, and requires deep access into local environments, something that requires grassroots processes rather than top down approaches. NGOs can often provide this because of their unofficial and human security oriented focus. State centric approaches cannot operate at this level. What this means is that first generation approaches fail in many conflicts because the structural asymmetry between state and non-state actors make compromise unlikely.
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***Answers To
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Answers to: No accountability

Market forces keep the firms in line Hukill 2004 [Traci Selling Mercenaries to the U.N. as privatized peacekeeping. The Progress Report. May 20 http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/8509.html]
The incident goes to the heart of the accountability issue. Brooks maintains that market forces keep firms in line, because no one wants to hire a company with black marks on its behavior or performance record. This is a reasonable argument and may prove right in the long run, but in the short term, DynCorp does not appear to have suffered much from the Bosnia scandal. The company dropped a court appeal against the whistle-blower only after it was awarded a $50 million contract last year for work in Iraq. In the meantime, Brooks is advocating for greater transparency among private mercenary firms. His association has a code of conduct for its members, and Brooks says that his firms would welcome impartial observers to monitor their employees' behavior.
Private forces will not comply with illegal operations Hukill 2004 [Traci Selling Mercenaries to the U.N. as privatized peacekeeping. The Progress Report. May 20 http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/8509.html]
In their place are private military companies (PMCs), staffed by former special forces and front-line soldiers who find no call for their services in the civilian world but dislike the term mercenaries."We are not mercenaries. Northbridge is a legitimate private military company that only works for democratically elected national governments or recognized agencies," said Andrew Williams of the Anglo-American company Northbridge Services Group. "Our people are contracted to us, not directly to any government or other organization. We have been approached for other work but rejected it because it was illegal," he said in an interview.
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AT: Aid dependence bad

Aid is key to keep NGOs independent from corrupting market forces Alan Fowler, co-founder of the International NGO Training and Research Centre based in Oxford, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 642-3
There arc a number of worrying issues associated with a trend from civic to public legitimacy. First is the vulnerability that official aid brings. While the proportion of taxderived aid to NGDOS is currently climbing, overall levels of aid are rapidly decreasing. It is apparent that, in the eyes of policy makers, aid is loosing its value for global development and as an instrument with which to pursue foreign interests. When growth in official Finance to NGDOS eventually collides with diminishing levels of aid, the situation for many of them will he perilous. Hence, one interpretation of the official concern with NGDO capacity building and of the emphasis on their sustainability is that, at its core, this is part of a long-term reduction and withdrawal strategy for international aid. Some aid will probably remain, channelled to the most impoverished countries, especially to those whose stability is fragile, posing a threat to regional and global security. But open trade and foreign direct investment are taking over as the preferred mode for allocating development capital and accelerating economic growth based on competition for individual gain. The negative impact of such a shift on equity, sustainability and justice are already to be seen. Second, and more importantly, because of a deeper association with official aid, a large proportion of NGDOS are being compromised in their motivation and ability to think about, let alone promote, alternative ideas, language and paths for developing sustainable societies. One example is the apparent uncritical acceptance of the convergence of all development endeavours around 'partnership'. Presently, with a few exceptions, NGDO evolution in thinking and practice is being strongly conditioned by a questionable paradigm of civic 'partnership' with states and markets. The original 1970s NGDO concept of partnership was premised on moral and political solidarity. The concept has subsequently been usurped by all and sundry within and beyond the aid system, such that the term is, in itself, empty without a complementary explanation by the user of what exactly is meant (Fowler, 1998). The attraction of 'partnership' as a framework for international development is that it provides an innocuous cover for a systematic push to reconfigure relations within all developing societies into the same mould. Partnership as articulated by donors corresponds to the 'social contracts' arrangements prevalent in Western Europe and Canada. Such an agenda is informed by the belief that this model is the best way to deal with dysfunction and limits to competitive growth in a market economy (Group of Lisbon, 1995). This 'one measure fits all' approach is patently wrong as a development framework because it downplays or discounts the individual historical trajectory, relative strength and interplay of forces in other societies. It flies in the face of past lessons of development experience, which clearly demonstrate the importance of local specificity in selecting policies and interventions (Adieman & Morris, 1997). It also ignores the fact that the conditions within which European social contracts evolved no longer apply in Europe itself, let alone elsewhere in the world." Simply put, it cannot be assumed, a priori, that a harmonic model with aligned interests between state, capital, labour and civic forces is appropriate or desirable at this moment in time for (ill societies. Such an assumption ignores the importance of contention in the evolution of Northern societies. Working through conflict and dissent in their own historical processes has resulted in different emphases in the socioeconomic configurations and conventions they have produced. Of critical importance, however, is that each configuration and set of conventions is institutionalised in an 'organic' way. In other words, they are not artificially supported or falsely legalised patterns of social and economic relations but enjoy broad public support because they are home-grown and home-owned. An organic process produces a basic stability and shapes the unique character of a nation and society. Partnership policy, on the other hand, opportunistically presupposes that, with judicious applications of foreign aid. any society
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can circumvent the internal struggles required to balance forces in ways that lead to an organic configuration of relations along social contract or other lines. There is no foundation for this assumption, but its uniformity is both convenient and politically correct. With a few noted exceptions, such as NGDO agitation at the 1998 and 1999 meetings of the World Trade Organization, the mainstream of NGDOS appears to be buying into this type of partnership agenda (Madeley, 1998; Jenkins, 1998). There are few examples of a reasoned rejection of partnership as the basis of NGDO relations with other actors in the aid system or for how development needs to proceed in a particular context. This further implies a shift of NGDO development frameworks and interpretations from civic to public. A growing association with and dependency on official aid brings with it the danger that NGDOS act as conspirators, rather than partners, in a questionable approach to development and to promoting the interests of (poor or excluded) civic groups. Retaining a civic stance is also being hampered because many NGDOS appear to find it difficult to articulate alternatives or to criticise the prevailing orthodoxy in terms of its fundamentals as opposed to its operations. One reason is that the necessary concepts and language are not there or a common currency. Consequently, today much NGDO discourse is framed in market terms. A few examples. The task of NGDOS is to generate value-added, not to create reform. NGDOS do not produce social benefits, but services. They are working for 'clients' with needs, not constituencies with interests. Generally speaking, the NGDO community has at worst not recognised, or at best lagged behind, the conscious long-term investment made by extreme pro-market forces to steer the thinking and language of debate about society and development. (And the terminology used in this paper reflects the problem.) In Moving a Public Agenda (Covington, 1997), Sally Covington shows how 12 right-wing think tanks worked over many years to fund NGOS to change the language of politics. Their (successful?) goal was based on making the world free for unfettered global capitalism, dismantling public services and welfare states and promoting the rights of individuals over that of community (Knight, 1988). Without a similar effort to construct a language of alternatives with other values and propositions, NGDOS will be less able to understand and express their identity in their own terms. They will also be ill-equipped to get a distinctive grip on the debate.
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AT: Aid dependence bad

Market reliance decreases NGO community empowerment Alan Fowler, co-founder of the International NGO Training and Research Centre based in Oxford, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 644-5
Overall, the past 80 years have seen an interesting evolution in motivation and legitimacy for NGDO action. In terms of inspirations, we now have a complex mix of spiritual calling, secular human compassion, political ideologies and their imperatives, and people's anger about particular issues. NGDO legitimacy has also become more complicated because of varying amalgamations between broadly and deeply civic, highly individual and status-based, and public-domain support.' However, it can be argued that past trends are an insecure guide to NGDOS in the future. Why? Because the global context signals a discontinuity or turning point in the world's structure and the management of its affairs. Aided by technology, the turning point has pivoted on the adoption of a single global economic model of free trade-based, market capitalism. Paradoxically, while the model may be the best we know so far for generating economic wealth, Asia has already seen that it can destroy wealth just as easily. Consequently, the scenario before us is one where NGDOS' past complex motivations and legitimacy are coming to an end in favour of a market discourse and its values. It would appear that NGDOS are about to succumb to the homogenising forces of economic globalisation in favour of a market-inspired model of NGDO identity and behaviour. Such a model gives highest merit to values of individualism, competition, extraction, accumulation, exploitation and rivalry as the normative mode for relations between people and between people and nature. The negative social effects are manifest and manifold: for example, destabilising social relations, eroding social capital and undermining virtuous values, such as trust, reciprocity, mutuality, co-operation and tolerance of difference. There are also unwelcome political effects in the accumulation of power within a few corporations whose practical accountability to and through shareholders to society at large is grossly overstated (Korten. 1995). An additional perspective is that there is nothing intrinsic to the dominant model that will produce or secure many of the basic rights that people, through their governments, have determined to be part and parcel of a reasonable human existence. To generate such rights, the model must be guided and bound by civic influence and choice. If, as seems likely, governments continue to adopt and apply this model for economy, society and development, a 'turning point' issue for NGDOS whose legitimacy comes from 'public association' is to fall into line or decline. Responding to this possibility contains both moral and practical dimensions. The moral dimension relates to the values on which NGDOS operate. Are they to be derived by allying with the public sector or with the civic groups and constituencies whose interests NODOS say they take to heart? In practical terms, this means strategising and organising for zero or minimum vulnerability to decisions about allocating public finance. The search, therefore, is for an alternative development framework or paradigm that delivers on two fronts. First, to ensure the propagation of civic values and legitimacy. Second to provide the freedom to explore and pursue alternatives to the prevailing development model and its Financing. To what extent does social entrepreneurship or civic innovation satisfy these requirements?
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******AFF ANSWERS NGOs bad

1. NGOs cant solve: 9 reasons Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p.159
In general, indigenous NGOs are hampered by several shortcomings. They are not well coordinated, they often vigorously compete for scarce resources, and for the most part they avoid conflicts with the regime by remaining apolitical. In fact many LC officials and bureaucrats head or are involved in NGOs. NGOs are mostly headquartered in Kampala, whereas the population is predominantly rural, with most decisions emanating from the top down. Because they are heavily reliant on foreign donors, NGOs are often more accountable to those donors then they are to their constituents, with the recipients of aid disenfranchised and limited in the contributions they can make to their own development. And NGOs are increasingly headed by bureaucrats and members of the middle class, reflecting an understanding by many Ugandans that the way to make money is to set up your own NGO. Consequently, indigenous NGOs in Uganda are often cynically viewed as being part of the 'pajero culture' which suggests that they are helping few besides themselves.
2. Giving development assistance to NGOs causes aid pathology; increased poverty and public rejection result. Alan Fowler, co-founder of the International NGO Training and Research Centre based in Oxford, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 591-2
These two examples of change in NGDO behaviour because of a greater reliance on official aid are, in fact, the tip of a more substantial iceberg of the danger of public mistrust by association. By tying themselves more closely to official aid and its excessive, dysfunctionally 'projectised' way of working (Fowler, 1997: 16-18), NGDOS embrace the risk of being tarred with the same brush of poor performance and of being smitten by the same pathologies. A recent estimate is that aid-funded interventions are only sustainable in some 15% of cases (Cox & Healy, 1998).'" Moreover, the number of poor people in the world has not diminished, but increased. After 30 years of effort, this result does not inspire public confidence. What, one might naturally ask, has caused this disappointing level of achievement? One answer is that the aid system has evolved to embody a number of deep-seated illnesses or pathological traits that create perverse incentives, debilitating and corrupt behaviours and a 'suspended' layer of southern NGDOS. These factors combine to work against best practice, a high level of achievement and gaining public trust. For example, in Russia
and countries newly independent of the Soviet Union, NGDOS are too often perceived as covers for organised crime (see, eg CAF, 1999). In Pakistan and Bangladesh some NGDOS are seen to serve as fronts for
externally funded fundamentalist causes, while in Central Asia they are utilised as platforms for failed politicians. Simply put, nowhere in the world can the growth of NGDOS be equated with pubic recognition or trust in who they are or what they do. However, the structural nature of aid pathology is actually more worrying for NGDOS than such 'transitional' problems of post-Soviet Europe and public scepticism elsewhere.
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NGOs bad
3. Ending aid to NGOs will force the government to provide for social services, or face political and social upheaval. Kamal Malhotra, Senior Adviser on Civil Society for the United Nations Development Programme, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 661
Equally if not more importantly, it should also force governments and international multilateral and financial institutions to take the fulfilment of their core obligations to citizens (eg poverty eradication, universal, free basic social service provision) more seriously and urgently than they currently do. This is because they know that in the current 'moral hazard' system they can remain relatively complacent because they are inevitably bailed out by willing but surrogate NGO social service deliverers. In a world with much reduced NGO aid, such service delivery substitution will obviously not be feasible for NGOS for purely financial reasons, either in terms of the overall need or even the scale that is currently implemented by them. Consequently, governments and the international civil service community will be under much more pressure to deliver on their core roles and responsibilities. If they do not do so. the risks of social and political upheaval and the systemic failure of the globalised laissez-faire market economy will be significantly higher than it is at present or is likely to remain in the prevailing system, notwithstanding the current crisis in key aspects of globalisation. This is because, even in the existing crisis, the ladles in the global soup kitchen' role of most NGOS has remained intact. In fact, it has been enhanced, once again cushioning what would otherwise have been a much more severe social impact than that currently being felt by the most affected population groups. Such cushioning will clearly be less possible in a world of greatly diminished aid! It can only be hoped that a future with greatly diminished aid will force many governments and NGOS to revert to what their main role should be. It should remind both sets of actors that there are core or 'universal' roles and duties of states and governments to their citizens that should not vary over time in different societies at the same stage of development (see van Tuiji in this issue). This should also be the fundamental and overarching premise and framework that guides the determination of the appropriate roles and responsibilities of NGOs.
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Aid Dependence DA
Aid will continue to decrease in coming decades. NGOs must become independent. Kamal Malhotra, Senior Adviser on Civil Society for the United Nations Development Programme, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 656-7
Against this scenario, a future without aid would clearly be a welcome development if this was a result of developing countries making the transition from their current condition of absolute or relative poverty to its total eradication. After all, conceptually, aid has always been viewed as a transitionary but necessary evil until poverty is removed. It is clearly not desirable as a permanent state of affairs! Unfortunately, though, the future without aid or, more accurately, the future with vastly diminished aid that we are contemplating in this issue is not happening because poverty has declined and there is no need for aid. Instead, a beyond-aid scenario is under discussion both because the richer industrialised countries of the world have chosen to diminish their flow of concessionary assistance to developing countries and because, intentionally, private capital flows to developing countries in this decade have all but eclipsed it. Indeed, the current dominant processes of globalisation are led by the forces of market economics and borderless international finance. These processes have had and continue to have an overarching, overwhelming and pre-eminent role in both stimulating and determining many of the dramatic trends described earlier. They have a particular impact on trade, investment and other financial and economic flows and arrangements that are predominant among current global and regional trends. As a direct result of the current dominant processes of economic globalisation under way, total private capital flows (eg foreign direct investment, portfolio equity) to developing countries increased more than six-fold from US$41.9 billion to US$256 billion in less than a decade, ie between 1990 and 1997.' Of this amount, portfolio equity capital, which is relatively footloose and volatile. reached close to $46 billion in 1996 (a 14fold increase over 1990) before falling to $32.5 billion in 1997 in the wake of the Asian-led global financial crisis. Such flows to Asia are now in the process of gradually recovering. Global official development finance or ODA, on the other hand, declined to $44.2 billion in 1997 from $56.4 billion in 1990. This amount represents just slightly more than private capital flows to one Asian country in 1996, namely the PRCY, which received a record $42.3 billion that year (World Bank, 1998). The astonishing increase in the magnitude of foreign private capital inflows (outside OF.CD countries) has resulted in a ratio of almost 6:1 in favour of private capital flows in 1997. This is a dramatic reversal from the ratio of less than 0.75:1 in favour of QUA less than a decade ago. Such a reversal has far-reaching implications, not least of which has been the dramatically changed dynamic in both the relationships between the market and the state and between those who can actively participate in the former versus those who remain primarily dependent on the latter. The poor and already vulnerable who have largely depended on ODA flows through the state have, not surprisingly, been among the major losers in this new scenario of greatly diminishing ODA. In this context, NGOS that have largely depended on their governments or multilateral agencies for their funding (eg in Canada) have also had to contemplate a future without aid, or at least with greatly diminished aid. While it is true that many governments and multilateral donors are placing an increasing proportion of their shrinking ODA resources through NGOS, the overall magnitude of the cuts to the aid budget in many industrialised countries has nevertheless resulted in diminished contributions to NGOS in these countries. Moreover, many northern bilateral donors arc increasingly channelling their diminished ODA directly to Southern NGOS, bypassing Northern NGOS in many instances. Development education centres run in the North that have, in many situations, been totally dependent on ODA, have also often suffered most, with many of them closing forever. Coupled with increased market pressures is competition for the private donor dollar. For the context of shrinking states forces a proliferation of overseas-focused NGOS to compete with domestically focused charities and social welfare organisations that face increasing demands from within the industrialised North itself. Many Northern development NGOS, especially those without solid and committed constituencies or tried and tested marketing and fundraising strategies, have found that their non-ODA private funding base has significantly shrunk at the same time that their ODA contributions have reduced. While not universally applicable, a reduction in the funding base of many northern NGOS appears to have been a general trend cutting across most industrialised countries during the mid to late 1990sa trend that remains true today.
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Aid Dependence DA
Despite short-term problems, cutting aid now will improve the transition to aid independence Kamal Malhotra, Senior Adviser on Civil Society for the United Nations Development Programme, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 667
The metamorphosis in roles and responsibilities suggested in the preceding pages, especially for the current major NGO service providers, will neither be easy or without pain. It will require major institutional surgery that is always more painful when forced (as in an NGO future without aid) compared with when it comes voluntarily. It will also require NGOS to 'compete' with citizens' social movements and other groups in both North and South that have never entered the aid resource transfer paradigm hut historically have instead chosen, since their very inception, to play the role of societal watchdogs and activists. Despite the obvious difficulties and challenges, it is still worthwhile and necessary to stimulate a global movement for social change and against poverty that is not premised on the old aid paradigm of resource transfer. Indeed, only then will we be able to move closer to the desirable vision of 'a more global view of development problems built upon alliances of competent agencies having wide experience and bringing complementary resources and skill to bearsuch alliances must be made up of a wide variety of non-governmental agencies, people's organisations, women's movements, environmental groups as well as those human rights, peace and lobbying organisations who are dealing with the broader issues.' (Roche, 1998). Indeed, this is the brave new unfamiliar world that many currently large NGOS will find themselves forced into for survival for the first time in a future without aid or with vastly diminished aid. This will require both rapid and significant institutional downsizing and a fast learning curve all at once if such NGOS are to survive and build or retain their relevance and credibility with their erstwhile or new partners in the new millennium we have just entered.
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Decreased aid good

Decreasing aid to NGOs allows them to focus on political empowerment Kamal Malhotra, Senior Adviser on Civil Society for the United Nations Development Programme, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 665-6
As part of their seriousness in pursing this outcome, NGOS need to help politically committed governments to build a socially cohesive and integrated national, regional and global constituency for such a social agenda. An emphasis on long-term development education of the kind already discussed will make an important contribution to this objective. NGOS are clearly better placed than governments and intergovernmental organisations to play such roles. All of the above implies that in an NGO future without aid, such organisations can be and, hopefully, are more likely to direct their limited resources and energies to campaigning, advocacy and other policy influencing strategies aimed at ensuring that states and intergovernmental organisations fulfil their core responsibilities and nationally and internationally agreed commitments. Indeed, such tasks will be increasingly attractive thanks to their cost-effectiveness as well as their civic appropriateness! Policy influencing should be directed at the major national, regional and global power holders, including but not limited to governments. Such a task also implies an NGO commitment to monitoring the performance of official organisations against commitments made by them (eg Social Watch) or pioneering process and content alternatives to the dominant mainstream policies of the international financial institutions (eg as the Structural Adjustment Paiticipatory Review Initiative (SAI'RI) and the broader network, SAPRIN, are attempting to do). Notwithstanding a changed emphasis prioritising 'non-funding' roles over funding and service delivery and even in an environment of diminished aid, NGOS should, through their grassroots-level initiatives, he able to continue to strengthen those aspects of government policies and services which contribute to the realisation of the latter's core responsibilities. This is best achieved through practical, innovative, grassroots, community-based NGO programmes of action, grammes of action, (sic) which politically committed governments can replicate and scale up (Famngton & Bebbington, 1993).
Decreasing aid is good. NGOs are structurally incapable of large-scale social programs Kamal Malhotra, Senior Adviser on Civil Society for the United Nations Development Programme, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 665
The appropriate framework for determining desirable NGOS functions needs to consciously consider areas in which they have a distinct potential or a demonstrated comparative advantage vis-vis the state and the market (Korten, 1990). Here again, NGO strengths do not lie in the largescale service delivery that is necessary to make a significant dent in either poverty or inequality reduction, employment creation or even social integration. Only governments and intergovernmental multilateral institutions are equipped to operate on the scale that is necessary if poverty eradication, full employment and social integration are to be achieved in a sustainable manner. Assigning such roles to NGOS instead of to governments and intergovernmental organisations whose main duty this should be is, therefore, both inappropriate and counterproductive, especially in the long run. An NGO future without aid should make such roles less possible and frequent. This change would increase the chance that more appropriate roles, which require significantly fewer Financial resources than surrogate service delivery, will receive a higher priority from most NGOS than they have been accorded so far. As argued above, potential functions should primarily be in the 'watchdog' areas of monitoring, advocacy and policy influencing to ensure that an enabling environment is created and sustained by states and intergovernmental organisations.
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Decreased aid good

Decreasing aid leads to NGO grassroots political empowerment Kamal Malhotra, Senior Adviser on Civil Society for the United Nations Development Programme, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 666
NGOS should also concentrate more on finding strategic ways in which such micro practical work can directly influence broader macro-policy alternatives which are better suited to achieving the core responsibilities and commitments of states to the poor and vulnerable in society. This will clearly require a range of negotiating and advocacy skills that most NGOS have not demonstrated either an interest, willingness or capability of developing so far. However, this is slowly hut surely changing as more NGOS realise that their objectives will remain Utopian without linking such micro-macro issues. An NGU future of greatly diminished aid should surely give an impetus to such programmes that require relatively little financial input, especially in relation to their strategic value and potential impact and 'multiplier' outcomes. Other appropriate functions that NGOS may be more willing to take up in a future without aid (not least because they will or should be less worried that bilateral sources will reduce their financial resources) include: (a) Effectively challenging the authoritarian roles and tendencies of governments, while simultaneously attempting to identify and strengthen the enabling and activist role that the state has also played in the erstwhile 'economic miracle' and aspiring miracle countries of East and Southeast Asia. This is particularly important in non-democratic states where it is hard to see how NGOS can work in partnership or collaboration with their governments and where, therefore, putting continuous pressure on such governments for change in appropriate ways may be the primary enabling environment role that NGOS should prioritise and play, if this is realistic. (b) Helping lo build transparent and accountable states and governments with the political will, capacity and ability to guard, strongly regulate and enforce legislation and other appropriate action against the excesses of both an unregulated market and civil society on behalf of and in favour of poor, vulnerable and marginalized people all over the world. This is an increasingly urgent but challenging task in the current global and regional environment. It is nevertheless essential for the achievement of the core duties and commitments of states. (c) Devising an appropriate and effective response to the major and increasing service delivery gaps being created by the dominance of macrocconomic neoliberalism, which is simultaneously causing the roll-back of the state and the growing asymmetrical power of the market, especially big business, over both governments and civil society. It is crucial that NGOS find ways of doing this without themselves becoming mere ladles in the global soup kitchen'. While this does not imply that NGOS should never be involved in direct poverty reduction or employment expansion programmes, it does imply (hat their state substitution roles in scaled-up direct service delivery should be limited to situations of short-term crisis and humanitarian response as far as possible.
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Aid => dependence

Turn: Aid to NGOs causes dependence, not empowerment
Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p.161 Indigenous NGOs, in general, are consequently on shaky ground and have far to go in order to build a strong and supportive constituency within the wider community. As long as the general public perceives them cynically as money-making fronts and forums for personal enrichment, their ability to command a strong following or empowering role is limited. A study of Luwero found that 'people want assistance which meets immediate needs' (Kwesiga and Ratter, 1993, p. 47). Another study found that approximately 20 out of 56 NGOs operating in Luwero have left no impact, according to the District Administrator Francis Wanyina (The Monitor, 11-14 May 1993). Increasingly, many NGOs are becoming like middle-men in the dispensation of aid, creating a growing rural dependency on NGOs. This reflects the climate of aid provision. Economic liberalization has pressured NGOs to focus their efforts on service-provision and tangible results rather than focusing on intangibles such as empowerment. A heavy reliance on foreign donors for continued survival often places NGOs in a position where they are more accountable to their donors then they are to their own constituency and participants. Many intermediate-level NGOs therefore become virtual middle-brokers in the facilitation of aid money between foreign donors and grassroots groups. This does not help to empower people, but often serves to create a new dependency on foreign aid Filtered through NGOs. 57 It also weakens the NGOs because this dependence creates long-term instability and lack of continuity in programme planning. NGOs are becoming more rather than less dependent on donor funding, decreasing the prospects for short-term if not long-term selfsufficiency.
Aid dependency is caused by funneling through NGOs. They lose focus on their real agenda
Alex De Waal, co-director of African Rights, Famine crimes : politics & the disaster relief industry in Africa, 1997, p. 141 From the early 1980s, more and more NGOs have taken more and more government money for relief programmes and become what David Korten calls 'public service contractors'. At first the significance of this passed almost unnoticed, perhaps because emergency work was considered a distraction from the main task of 'development', and emergencies occasioned a partial suspension of critical faculties as well as a readiness to bend the normal operating rules. For example. Oxfam put a ceiling on the proportion of income it could receive from governments for 'development' work, but made an exception for relief. Three-quarters of UK food aid is now handled by NGOs, and the major US relief agencies - CARE, Catholic Relief Services and World Vision - regularly undertake major food aid programmes funded in large part or even wholly by USAID. The creation and rapid expansion of the European Commission Humanitarian Office has led to some European agency programmes being wholly reliant on EU funding. Even Christian Aid, a non-operational agency explicitly dedicated to a high level of quality control in its grant-giving, has taken high levels of government money, chiefly for its emergency programmes. The proportion of its income from the British Government rose from zero in 1975 to 35 per cent by 1989/90 (Ondine Smerdon pers. comm.). The donors are making no compromise by engaging NGOs: for twenty years the neoliberal paradigm has been to contract out public services to the independent sector. When they first made a strategic alliance with governmental donors, NGOs recognized that they might forfeit some independence in policy-making. Most NGOs would claim that they have gained from the deal: their programmes are much bigger and more secure, and they still criticize governments over (for example) slowness in sending troops to Rwanda, unwillingness to ban land mines, and cuts in aid budgets. Most private agencies have not become agents of government. But there have been more
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subtle changes. Cases of NGOs taking consistent stands against official relief policy in specific countries are extremely rare. The cool and even hostile relations between NGOs and donor governments' embassies that characterized the situation in Ethiopia in 19834, let alone Biafra and Cambodia, are now consigned to the past. The criticism of the French military intervention in Rwanda by MSF-France was merely a hiccup in an otherwise cosy relationship. NGOs may have gained influence at the margin in ministries of development co-operation, but they have lost the capacity to set themselves against the entire system.
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Aid => competition (kills cooperation)

Foreign aid causes NGO competition for funds, preventing crucial cooperation Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 28-29
A heavy reliance on foreign aid also induces a tendency toward competition rather than cooperation. NGOs may be capable of empowering their individual constituencies without much interaction with other organizations, but in order to achieve broader empowerment of the wider community and the development of civil society, they must work together (Sandbrook and Halfani, 1993, p. 168). Thus, umbrella organizations play key roles in linking various NGOs together, but in Uganda there are few such effective organizations. This is partially due to the relative youth and weakness of the NGO sector, as well as the competitive disposition of many indigenous NGOs. Because of a primary reliance on scarce foreign funding, many NGOs in Uganda tend to compete for this funding rather than pool their resources and efforts. Many of the above factors examined are intimately connected. For example, indigenous NGO dependence on foreign aid is intimately linked to the lack of domestic funding available due to a general level of poverty in Uganda. In many cases, a paucity of finances helps precipitate competition rather than co-operation among NGOs. Similarly, a lack of accountability to the NGO constituency and a lack of democratic decision-making can be traced to greater accountability to foreign donors than to recipients or NGO members.
Competition for funds ruins NGO solvency Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p.166
The heavy reliance on foreign donors often instills a spirit of competition rather than co-operation among the NGOs, and many NGOs end up competing for scarce donor funds rather than coordinating efforts to make the greatest impact. This, for example, is the case with some women's NGOs like ACFODE (Action for Development) and FIDA (Association of Women LawyersUganda) which have similar programmes in legal networking, but do not work together. The acting executive secretary of FIDA, when asked about co-ordination efforts between FIDA and ACFODE stated that, 'if ACFODE has a legal program in one district, we do not interfere. . (76 Even though NGOs may not officially co-ordinate their activities, there is a substantial degree of individual overlap in organizations. For example several FIDA members were also ACFODE members, while one was even a member of FIDA, ACFODE and the Director of the Uganda Law Society Legal Aid Project J" Kwesiga and Ratter found that NGO competitiveness and lack of co-ordination was characterized by NGOs being '. . . too competitive and insufficiently cooperative one with another. They compete for funding, for recognition for status, and this contributes to their insularity and reluctance to provide and share information about themselves and their activities' (1993, p. 24).
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NGOs cant solve

NGOs are ineffective: four reasons (not identifying the poorest groups, addressing povertys symptoms not causes, educational bias, sexism) Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 127
The NGO record in poverty alleviation and service provision, however, has not been flawless. A 1992 study on Ugandan NGOs argues that, in fact, many NGOs have failed to undertake detailed analyses which would identify the poorest-of-the-poor group and help to cure the causes of their poverty rather than just address the symptoms (de Coninck, 1992, p. 107). In addition de Coninck found that '...most programmes with an "economic focus" were characterised by the lack of attention given to the issue of Social differentiation. . .', resulting in some of the most needy being effectively by-passed (de Coninck, 1992, p. 107). Similarly, another study found that the more educated the individual or group, the more likely it was that the NGO would consult them. Men were also consulted 67.6 per cent of the time more than women (Kwesiga and Ratter, 1993, p. 43). This last point is somewhat disturbing given that there are 8,203,300 women in comparison with only 7,869,200 men in Uganda (World Bank, 1993, p. 158), with more women in the rural areas as well as more being involved in actual production and work in Uganda than men.
Voluntary and Grassroots NGOs (VOs and POs) cant solve, even with financial support Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 8
POs are closely related to VOs. Like VOs, POs give voice to popular demands and engage in collective action. They differ from VOs in the sense that they are usually more narrowly focused on a particular constituency, like women, and aim to empower not only their membership but also the wider community. They are often driven by strong values and member interests, usually geared, among other things, toward empowering communities that have been traditionally disempowered. Although this type of NGO is perceived to be the most likely to help develop a stronger civil society and ultimately a more democratic polity (Korten, 1991, Bratton. 1Y89)'" it is the least prevalent in Africa. This type of NGO provides important forums for civic education or schools of democracy as well as for public policy advocacy. The case study of ACFODE (Action for Development), a womens' NGO, illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of the PO in Uganda. Although VOs and POs have the greatest potential for empowerment and pressuring the regime for democratic transition, there are not enough of them to effect any significant change. However, even if there was a flood of PO development in Africa, the current political economy of liberalization tends to relegate these NGOs to service-provision or gap-filling roles. This has negative implications for the development of a democratic civil society and polity. Along with the flood of external funding to NGOs, there has been the rapid development of a fourth type of NGO: the Briefcase NGO.
There are intrinsic limits to NGO solvency Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p.172
NGOs in Uganda are also hampered by several intrinsic limitations. There are numerous smallscale, self-help grassroots organizations, but these tend to be unorganized, locally-focused and issue-oriented. The indigenous intermediate NGOs, which have more potential to engender political empowerment and impact on democratization in Uganda, are also handicapped by internal deficiencies. Most NGOs in Uganda are gap-fillers or service-provision oriented NGOs. They focus on the provision of basic services, often buttressing the national development plan of the NRM. The few NGOs that can be considered pressure-group or advocacy-oriented are often hesitant to adopt an overtly political or critical agenda, through fear of regime intolerance and/or co-optation. In addition, most of these organizations lack internal democracy and beneficiary participation in
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decision-making, and have an external accountability to foreign donors. Because of this external focus many are prone to competition rather than co-operation and co-ordination of activities. Some, in fact, increasingly assume the image of brief-case NGOs.
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NGOs cant solve

Decreasing aid to NGOs is good, six reasons Kamal Malhotra, Senior Adviser on Civil Society for the United Nations Development Programme, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 662-4
While money is not always determining in a relationship, control over such an essential resource certainly provides a large part of the power over any development situation. A future without aid or with greatly diminished aid can significantly reduce the power that funding has conferred on NNGOS. Consequently, such a new scenario should make the following desirable outcomes more possible: 1. De-operationalisntion of Northern NGOS from the South. This will apply to operational NNGOS and should increase the emphasis on capacity building of SNGOS and people's organisations to take over roles traditionally played by many NNGOS. 2. Embracing mutual transparency and accountability mechanisms. Such mechanisms have primarily been one-way rather than mutual (eg SNGOS to NNGOS). This remains a major arena for change. Desirable transformations in this area are more likely to happen in an NGO future with vastly diminished aid because of a subordination of current imperatives, which priorities financial accountability to Northern donors. Boards and Charity Commissions (eg in the UK). Instead, accountability will be linked to a broader vision and goals of building a global movement for social change which is based on mutual trust, respect and coresponsibility among its members, regardless of whether they are from the South or North. 3. Redefining the NNGO policy role. This is more likely to happen because of the change in the balance of power between NNGOS and SNGOS in favour of the latter. It will involve modifying, and in many cases, reducing the current typical NNGO role of speaking on behalf of their Southern partners. NNGOS
will also be less able to conduct direct policy research in the South. Instead, they are more likely to be forced to redefine their institutional role in policy advocacy and lobbying in the South. The task will be to focus much more than they currently do on mobilising, synthesising and disseminating information (which is often much more readily available in the North) rapidly and in relevant popular form to people's organisations, SNGOS and Southern support NGOS (SSNGOS). This should also result in Southern organisations and other groups being forced to do more of their own policy research in the South. NNGOS, on the other hand, will be called upon to facilitate and enable much more direct advocacy and lobbying by SNGOS in Washington DC, Brussels and other traditional Northern centres of power. 4. Working in the North. A lack of aid-based financial
resources may lead NNGOS to place an increased emphasis on social justice and development work in their own countries. One reason is that fewer financial resources are necessary to do this compared with the implementation
of surrogate service delivery in the South. This should enable NNGOS to truly become part of a South-North alliance of organisations working on similar issues in their respective countries. This step should enhance NNGO credibility with many of their Southern partners. Why? Because it is increasingly clear that. whether NNGOS like it or not, legitimacy in partnership relationships with SNGOS and SSNGOS who are most credible in their home countries will only be possible if NNGOS are seriously and more substantially engaged with the poverty and social justice problems of their own countries, especially as these continue to escalate and become more explicit and visible (eg in the USA and UK). Such engagements can be achieved in a variety of ways. They do not necessarily imply starting a direct project-based poverty alleviation programme in the UK, USA or Canada requiring significant financial resources. Nevertheless, the onus of demonstrating a more intense, appropriate and effective engagement with traditional Northern publics and policy makers will increasingly rest with NNGOS. Domestic initiatives should, at the very least, involve a more substantial element of development education, mobilisation and conscientisation of Northern publics about international development problems and issues, their lifestyles and their roles in contributing to global poverty and injustice. While these arc politically and personally sensitive issues, often difficult to raise with Northern publics, they involve activities which require relatively small amounts of finance for the potentially significant level of strategic impact or outcomes that can be achieved. Such engagement in the North should also lead to strategic alliances between NNGOS and workers, women's and other groups in their own countries at relatively little cost compared with the finance-intensive social service delivery programmes that many NGOS are currently involved with. 5. Educating domestic
constituencies. A greater emphasis can be placed on development education and awareness raising of the unemployed, the working underclass and other discriminated-against publics, for example political and economic migrants and refugees, the victims of jobless economic growth and unemployment, the urban poor, farmers and the socially excluded. The key focus of such desirable programmes should be on
interpreting the work of Southern partners and broader 'global South' development issues to these groups with the view of raising awareness leading to action and subsequent changes in the latter's attitudes. This should also
result in new welcome alliances between groups in the North and South who are being similarly affected by newly emerging global instruments for a rule-based world order (eg the World Trade Organization (wto)). 6. Building domestic constituencies. Related to and based on the above, there is an urgent need for NNGOS to build or enlarge their organised constituencies in their home countries and enable their active and direct participation in a global movement for social justice and change. A solid, educated and aware constituency from different societal strata in both the 'global south' and 'north'
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of the traditional North will be the best guarantor of the longevity and sustainahility of a global movement for social justice in the richer industrialised countries. Again, ironically, this may have a higher chance of
becoming a reality in an NGO future with diminished aid than in an era with large amounts of it. Few NNGOS currently prioritise or emphasise the desirable roles described above. In fact, because of a concern for institutional survival, many appear to have consciously de-emphasised these possibilities for change. Ironically, such reforms may have a much higher chance of becoming a reality in an NGO future with diminished aid than in the prevailing resource transfer paradigm.
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NGOs cant solve crises

Failure of NGOs in the Rwanda demonstrate their inability to manage genocide Alex De Waal, co-director of African Rights, Famine crimes : politics & the disaster relief industry in Africa, 1997, p. 197-8
For the humanitarian international and its donors, the 'refugees' obscured the genocide and justice. After the mass exodus, the issues of genocide and justice slipped down Oxfam's agenda: an immediate humanitarian response for the 'refugees' became its priority (both in lobbying and in its own operations). This could be interpreted cynically; Oxfam needed to work in the camps because it was an unmissable fund-raising opportunity, and a programme for 'refugees' entailed not offending their extremist political leadership. A more generous reading is that the genocide was now over (in fact it was not), and that the agency's urgent priority was saving the lives of 'refugees'. Oxfam's policy adviser wrote: 'Oxfam believes in the indivisibility of all rights: the right to relief, for example, is neither greater nor less than the right to protection from physical attack'. (Cairns, 1995: 8). This state- ment is perhaps more revealing than its author intended: it is in fact an elevation of the 'right to relief to the same level as fundamental rights such as protection from execution or genocide a legal innovation. 22 Moreover, the work of relief agencies' is based precisely on the separation of the 'right to relief from other rights. Agencies deliver on the 'right to relief where other rights are not enforced. Their advocacy concentrates on it. Given the de facto separability of these rights, Oxfam's argument implies that it can be justifiable to compromise other basic rights in order to fulfil the 'right to relief. This is precisely what happened in Rwanda: the 'right to relief took priority over the search for justice. The agencies fulfilled the charitable imperative but violated the spirit of international lawJ This episode illustrates how an aid agency's portrayal of a situation can not be divorced from its institutional interests. Ironically, Oxfam is a substantial target for criticism precisely because it went further than other agencies in developing a political and ethical approach to the genocide. If it had confined itself simply to service delivery and ignored human rights issues, it would have avoided much of the criticism. But it could not escape from its institutional (including legal and fund-raising) constraints, and the contradiction was exposed. The contradictions matter so much because the Western media and Western governments thrust the humanitarian agencies into such an exposed position. The agencies can argue with some justification that they were betrayed or manipulated by higher powers: they were used to cover the nakedness of Western policy. But this very prominence (wanted or not) indicates the humanitarians' political significance.
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NGO gap-filling excuses government inaction

NGO gap-filling is bad. Government should be responsible for poverty and social progams Kamal Malhotra, Senior Adviser on Civil Society for the United Nations Development Programme, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 662
NGO roles and responsibilities in a beyond-aid framework should prioritise the societal watchdog rather than the surrogate service deliverer function. Why? Because NGO outreach to the poorestimated to be. at best, 15-20% of the world's total of 1.2 billion people living on a dollar a day or lesswill always be modest. While obviously morally just, it remains a 'gap filling' and surrogate approach that does not get to the structural heart of poverty as a product of human action that is amenable to human resolution (Sogge, 1996). If people, directly and through their governments, really want to eradicate poverty they have the means to do so. The NGO task is to keep this agenda on the table by holding both government and society to account for the growing gap between anti-poverty rhetoric and practice. As far as North-South NGO relationships are concerned, ideally funding should only be one (preferably small) part of the overall organisational relationship if it is necessary at all (as, realistically, it will be for Southern and some Northern NGOS for some time to come!). This is because building strong relationships between different organisations (especially but not restricted to those between Northern and Southern ones) is usually fraught with problems, dilemmas and inequities. Examples of such problems include significant unequal access to information and to the centres of global power and decision making among Southern organisations. Adding a funding dimension worsens what is an already difficult relationship between Northern and Southern organisations. Building genuine partnership relationships requires bridging gaps and creating a basis of trust that can often take years. When funding is introduced as a major variable in this equation (as it is in most current situations), achieving genuine partnership becomes more complex and is often unattainable (Malena, 1995).
NGOs should not be gap-fillers Kamal Malhotra, Senior Adviser on Civil Society for the United Nations Development Programme, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 664
A future without significant aid implies that NGOS will not be engaged in large-scale social programmes that perpetuate a surrogate role and in the perception that this is their primary value to society. If this is the case, NGOS should be better able to select functions and interface with the state, governments and intergovernmental organisations in a wider variety of ways. The definition of what constitutes appropriate NGO roles, functions and tasks should be considered against a likely 21st century context in many poor countries. Here, the core social, economic, political and cultural responsibilities and commitments of governments to their citizens, especially those who are already poor or vulnerable, will be increasingly difficult to meet from within a dominant framework of neoliberal macroeconomics policy, financial globalisation, structural adjustment programmes and trade liberalisation. This context, however likely, is not a good rationale to justify NGOS becoming substitutes for the state in service delivery in areas where the latter has a primary and legitimate role (eg health, education, water, power, roads and other public infrastructure). Nevertheless, it is the context in which more suitable NGO roles need to be analysed.
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NGOs get co-opted by corrupt regimes

Apolitical NGOs get co-opted by corrupt regimes Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 18-19
The pluralist and neo-liberal models also tend to ignore the political and social reality that exists in many sub-Saharan African countries. For example, many NGOs hesitate to become politically active. They often adopt what one analyst has phrased as a by-pass strategy. ... they eschew any relations with political parties, in particular opposition groups. They operate in non-controversial areas building schools, providing water and health care, and extending services, credit, and information to the poor and needy. In these activities, they are often backed by the state which sees them as supplementing their efforts and often takes the credit for those services. In such ways, NGOs can prop up weak and discredited governments and actually act to disempower people. (Manuh. 1993, p. 125) These NGOs get co-opted (consciously or uNGOnsciously) by the regime which uses them for legitimacy building and social service gap-filling. This 'by-pass strategy' creates NGOs that become akin to gap-filler NGOs. Governments use NGOs as their agents to '. . . undertake those grassroots humanitarian, welfare or development activities that governments cannot or will not do' (Anina, 1993, p. 140). Because they do not challenge the state, because they do not go beyond simple service provision and because they apply a band-aid solution to the problem rather than petitioning for reform, their ability to link the empowerment of the powerless with the development of a democratic society and polity is limited, since their role becomes increasingly relegated to service provision and regime support. Sometimes, NGOs have to camouflage their actual intent to make it acceptable to state interests (Fowler, 1993, p. 335). This highlights the paradox of civil society, that is, '. .. a real democracy depends on a strong civil society, while at the same time, civil society depends on an effective, democratic environment' (Foley and Edwards, 1996, p. 47).
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NGOs hurt gov legitimacy and => instability

Successful NGOs demonstrate the governments faults and undercut political stability Alex De Waal, co-director of African Rights, Famine crimes : politics & the disaster relief industry in Africa, 1997, p. 136-7
The situation is more complicated if relief is distributed by foreign agencies. A tightly regulated NGO programme can be identical to a government distribution, and in most cases (such as the Sudanese example above) NGO programmes use local intermediaries. Even the most independent programme brings financial benefits to the exchequer in terms of hard currency. Often, the creation of parallel structures by relief agencies has been seen to undermine the ability of host governments to deliver services. This is a variant on the theme of empowering the powerful, not a refutation of it: it is the more accountable and welfare-oriented sections of government that generally suffer, and the more authoritarian and security-oriented sections that gain in power when government capacity is undermined. The strategy followed by Mobutli Sese Seko in Zaire is an extreme instance: he deliberately set out to destroy any institutions other than the Presidency and its security networks (with almost $900m. of US aid). Perhaps the most common subversive impact of foreign-run relief programmes is that they invite favourable comparison with the government's own efforts, thus undermining the legitimacy of government.
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No solvency: bad communication

Poor communication systems undermine African NGOs Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 26
African countries provide a hostile environment for NGOs. Several factors account for this including the overall poor economic performance of many African states, the limited legitimacy that many African states have and the cultural heterogeneity present in most African states (see Halfani. 1993, p. 34; and Nyerere, 1993, p. 18). These conditions make the African state suspicious of NGO activity and political participation. In the case of Africa, the structural conditions foster fragmentation and isolation among community and civil associations. Poor communication systems, a history of social divisiveness and hostility, and competition for scarce resources undermine the potential for united action among these groups. (Sandbrook and Halfani, 1993, p. 169)
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No solvency: bad coordination

Lack of regulation makes NGOs a dangerous place to send money Alex De Waal, co-director of African Rights, Famine crimes : politics & the disaster relief industry in Africa, 1997, p. 81
NGOs spurn adopting professional standards or self-regulation. It might appear to be in the interests of the more reputable NGOs to negotiate a set of minimum standards with host governments and donors - in effect placing restrictions on entry to the select club of bona fide relief NGOs. But even the NGOs that pride themselves on having the highest standards refuse to do this. It may be an instinctive aversion to any form of regulation (though independence has already been ceded in more insidious ways, through accepting government funding), or a fear that their own emergency operations might not always meet the minimum standards. One result is that there are no formal barriers to entry to the relief NGO sector: literally anyone can start an NGO, obtain funds by public appeal or other means, and try their hand at running feeding centres, clinics or orphanages, (And they do.) The lack of regulation leaves the NGO sector open to manipulation. Donor governments are increasingly undertaking their own evaluations of NGO programmes that they support. But without agreed standards these evaluations become subjective, widen in scope to cover the entire agency rather than just the programme under consideration, and become a tool for the donor to exercise power over the NGO (Smillie. 1995: 158)
Poor coordination prevents NGO success Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 29
Weak co-ordination of NGOs is also linked to the relative youth of indigenous, intermediate NGOs in Uganda, and to the impact of years of civil war and repression. A plethora of NGOs and local self-help groups exist in Uganda, but are seldom interconnected. This is partially due to the unwillingness of many NGOs and self-help groups to engage the regime directly. In fact, postcolonial Uganda has a history of societal disengagement from the state, which Chapter 2 will illustrate. Similarly, as the case of NOCEM will illustrate in Chapters 4 and 5, when attempts are made to co-ordinate NGOs for democratic initiatives they often fail to mitigate ethno-religious differences and objectives. In short, civil society is weak in Uganda. It is weak in the sense that it does not provide a democratic challenge to the state. Contrary to pluralist theory, the empirical evidence in Uganda suggests that NGOs will only have limited impact on the prospects for democratic transition in Uganda.
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No solvency: factionalism
Aiding through NGOs only supports factionalism and indeterminacy in actual assistance Alex De Waal, co-director of African Rights, Famine crimes : politics & the disaster relief industry in Africa, 1997, p. 142-3
Understandably, most large NGOs prefer not to have to make such a stark choice. Instead, they manage on an ad hoc basis, while anxiously examining what principles might make institutional sense. (Intermin- able institutional reorganization is one symptom of this lack of confidence.) The idea has been put forward that it is the very ambiguity of NGOs' position that is their strength: their adaptiveness and qualities of 'partnership' with local organizations and communities, rather than their adoption of the 'right' model of work (ibid.: 224-7). In theory, being both a 'third' and a 'first force' should strengthen both. Debate at headquarters and public action should help bring vitality to field programmes, while field experience brings credibility to lobbying and advocacy, and substance to research. For some single-issue organizations with strong leadership, this formula has worked well. Examples include the advocacy of children's charities on child labour and prostitution and the involvement of mines clearance organizations in the campaign to ban land mines. A key reason for this success is that the agencies concerned can make a substantial contribution to achieving these goals in full: child labour can be outlawed and land mines banned. (Enforcing such prohibitions will require a different kind of organization.) For generalist organizations, including the mainstream relief NGOs, the formula does not work. Taking on a much broader cause, such as the conquest of poverty, injustice or famine across the world, is a wholly different matter. Claiming that 'such-andsuch an agency is on the side of the poor and oppressed' is mere rhetoric. Humanitarian agencies simply cannot make a comparable contribution to conquering famine. In the meantime, the ambiguity is an obstacle to fighting famine. A vigorous debate within an agency is ipso fonto a good thing, but it does not necessarily lead to the required results. For a start, an agency busy talking to itself may find it difficult to listen and respond to what its 'recipients' want. The issues are being problematized inside a Western institution, not in public, and even less in disaster-vulnerable countries. Secondly, the absence of a clear philosophy gives more leeway to fund-raising departments and 'can-do' emergency officers - the principal engines of 'debasement'. Most importantly, such an ambiguous status reinforces the indeterminacy of aid negotiations and the opacity of the humanitarian language (see below), and in general the mystique and lack of accountability of the humanitarian business. The humanitarian Gresham's Law militates against supporting local political contracts. In their role as subcontracted service providers, foreign NGOs could work within such contracts, provided the regulatory framework were subject to some form of popular accountability. Radical independent agencies can also support progressive political contracts. But in their current unclear situation, subject to powerful pressures to adopt a high media profile, it is extremely difficult for international NGOs to play a progressive political role in recipient countries.
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No solvency: internal corruption

Financial corruption destroys NGO effectiveness Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 128
Many intermediate NGOs are composed of elites, often bureaucrats or professionals who have discovered NGOs as an alternative and lucrative source of iNGOme. Many civil servants are unable to make even a living wage at their government jobs, and given the flood of donor money some have turned to the NGO sector for personal profit. Since the private sector is still very weak, and because the state has lost its former lucrative offerings, many have switched to NGOs instead to further their ambitions. The extent to which NGOs are characterized by self-interest and greed varies, although the number operating almost strictly on the basis of personal gain is increasing. Examples of NGOs that have engaged in questionable activities can be found in
Desire for self-perpetuation corrupts NGOs Peter van Tuijl, Senior Policy Advisor with the Netherlands Organisation for International Cooperation and a member of Oxfam International, Third World Quarterly, vol.21n.4, 1998, p. 617
Today's critical discourse on NGOS seems to highlight how they are caught in their own trap. Instead of helping the poor. NGOS tend to become self-perpetuating (Cameron, in this issue). NGOS talk a lot about partnership but turn it into a 'something-nothing' word (Malhotra, 1997). NGOS intend to be innovative, flexible and participatory, but a closer look at the reality of their work shows that many of their supposedly 'unique selling points' are often overstated and feeble. NGOS do not hesitate to question the legitimacy or conduct of everyone else in the world, but have no adequate answer if their own accountability is questioned. In short, NGOS promise much but have too little to show (Edwards et al, 1999).
NGOs are populated by a professional elite. Their radical policies have faded Alex De Waal, co-director of African Rights, Famine crimes : politics & the disaster relief industry in Africa, 1997, p. 65-6
One is the 'humanitarian international' - the international elite of the staff of international relief agencies, academics, consultants, specialist journalists, lobbyists and also, to an increasing extent, 'conflict resolution' specialists and human rights workers. It is a subgroup of the larger aid and development industry. A generation ago, this group did not exist: governments, UN agencies and NGOs were staffed by different kinds of people who more often disputed common assumptions than shared them. Since 1980 there has been a marked convergence towards a common culture. One consequence of this is the ease with which individuals can move between different institutions. How can so many welleducated, cosmopolitan and to a fair degree well-intentioned people work within institutions with such noble goals, to such little effect? 'Actually existing humanitarianism" is a disappointment.
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No solvency: masks capitalism

NGOs just put a smiley face on capitalism and neo-liberalism Alex De Waal, co-director of African Rights, Famine crimes : politics & the disaster relief industry in Africa, 1997, p. 66
The second concept is the distinction between 'soft' and 'hard' humanitarian interests. This is an elementary point but it is obscured with astonishing regularity in the writings of international humanitarians. 'Soft' humanitarian interests can be defined as the stated aims of humanitarian institutions: succouring the poor and vulnerable, protecting human rights, preventing war, etc. 'Hard' humanitarian interests are the institutional demands of the organizations themselves and their staff: for institutional expansion, career security, prestige, a sense of job satisfaction, etc. Clearly there is an overlap between the two: only relief organizations in good financial health can deliver the goods. But relief agencies have a powerful tendency to go much further and conflate their own interests with those of the people they avow to help. The central contention of this and the following chapters is that the expansion of internationalized humanitarianism in the 1980s and 1990s reflects a retreat from accountability, akin to the dominance of neo- liberalism. This is no coincidence: the internationalization of social welfare is closely linked to the decline of state authority, which is central to the neo-liberal project. The humanitarian international may he the 'human face' of neo-liberalism. but it is a charitable face with little accountability. Moreover, both neo-liberalism and international humanitarianism are justifications for foreign institutions to intrude into the domestic politics of African countries. Usually, they have intruded when things were going badly wrong, but even when the intrusions have succeeded on their own terms, they have rarely supported progressive political contracts.
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No solvency: democratization
NGOs are structurally incapable of promoting democratzation Susan Dicklitch, assistant professor at Franklin and Marshall College, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa, 1998, p. 3-4
Drawing upon evidence mainly from Uganda, I argue that as currently structured. NGOs are not viable vehicles for African democratization. Their democratic promise is impeded by inhospitable structural conditions, historical legacies, regime restrictions and internal (NGO) limitations. The current political economy of neo-liberalism in Africa, which eNGOurages privatization, and the supremacy of the market, significantly undermines the empowerment function of NGOs. NGOs are increasingly relegated to service-provision and gap-filling activities by the retreating state, but those supportive functions are not matched with increased political efficacy. As Fowler argues, the end result is that '. . . African NGOs [become] aid-dependent unofficial parastatals rather than development organizations co-existing alongside governments, but distinct from and not simply substituting for them' (Fowler. 1991, p. 70). These current structural impediments reinforce lingering historical legacies such as the weak development of political parties and the ethnic, regional and religious divisions that often characterize African societies. NGOs are also fundamentally constrained by regime impediments and the current political-economy of development. NGOs are allowed to function as gap-fillers, but are often discouraged from performing more politically sensitive advocacy or empowerment roles by the regime as well as the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). These constraints reinforce internal NGO shortcomings including a heavy reliance on foreign aid, a tendency toward competition rather than co-operation between NGOs, weak co-ordination, relative youth, a lack of democratic decision-making, and a paucity of finances which in turn leads to external dependence. For the most part, NGOs fail to empower their constituencies or wider community, and fail to provide a stable source of pressure on the regime for democratic transition and consolidation. Given the rapid economic restructuring occurring in Uganda, and the influx of NGOs since the 1986 National Resistance Movement (NRM) take-over, Uganda offers an ideal case for examining the actual and potential role that NGOs play in empowering their constituencies and the wider community and the implications that this has for the development of a democratic civil society and polity. Because of its largely successful and eager implementation of SAPs, Uganda has become the golden child of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. But democratization has not simultaneously occurred. The core findings of this study, based on Field research in Uganda from 19923, suggest that NGOs are not the panacea that they have been made out to be. If unchecked, the various constraints facing NGOs are severe enough to undermine their long-term democratic potential. The combination of internal and external constraints mainly facing indigenous NGOs, plus the weak development and state limitation of intermediary actors such as political parties and the media significantly limits the overall potential for the development of a democratic civil society and polity.' Thus, this study challenges the dominant discourse of neo-liberalism which tends to uncritically view NGOs as important building blocks for civil society and the transition to, and more long-term consolidation of, democracy.
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Private Peacekeeping Bad

Private peacekeeping is bad 12 reasons. Zarate, 1998 (Federal Law Clerk, Southern District of California, J.D. Harvard Law School, Stanford Journal of International Law, Winter, 34 Stan. J Intl L. 75, p. l/n)
There are several potential negative consequences from the emergence of SCs. To the Special Rapporteur, EO presents the best example of the new threats posed by SCs. First, EO is not accountable to any state since it has no formal connections with the South African government. 439 Second, EO is comprised of ex-members of the most notorious and ruthless commando units of the apartheid regime, used in "mercenary" fashion to attack the sovereignty of southern African countries. 440 In the past, these individuals acted without concerns of accountability or human rights. 441 Third, the company engages in actual combat, raising questions of accountability in the field, undue influence on the internal conflicts of a state, and potential human rights abuses. EO's involvement in the field also raises the possibility that it will act solely for its own benefit against all actors (including EO's employers) in the conflict, much as Denard and Schramme led their infamous mercenary revolt in the Congo in 1967. [*147] Fourth, EO and other SCs are closely tied to other companies with diverse economic interests, such as arms dealers, energy and mining companies, and construction firms. As a result, EO and other companies appear to be engaging in African and other conflicts solely as a means of obtaining concessions and related contracts for their corporate brethren. By aiding struggling regimes willing to grant valuable concessions, EO and its parent SRC could then gain hegemonic power in the countries, leading a vanguard for the "neocolonialism of the twenty-first century." 442 Not only does this type of corporate association represent an amalgam of concentrated economic and military power reminiscent of the mercantile companies of the eighteenth century, but it creates the opportunity for greater corruption and influence on the internal dynamics of the employing states. 443 Fifth, SCs could fuse their power with that of arms traffickers, drug dealers, and terrorist groups, thereby creating an unholy alliance of non-state agents with the economic, military, and political power to overwhelm states and the state system in general. 444 They could also assist rogue states unable to receive military aid through the international state system. Sixth, SCs could switch sides in an ongoing conflict based on the highest bidder. 445 Seventh, SCs could turn on their home state and represent a challenge to the legitimate use of force in that society. 446 In the least, SCs are competitors for the best military talent in the home state. 447 Eighth, SCs could aggravate conflicts and give military life to illegitimate regimes that would otherwise have to settle their conflicts peacefully. 448 In this sense, SCs could be agents of the status quo, aiding only those governments with enough money to retain power while suppressing potentially legitimate resistance movements. Ninth, the supply of SCs gives incumbent regimes an incentive not to prepare their defense forces properly and to cede their internal security duties to private agents. Tenth, SCs could fight each other or their own countries' national forces in third-party countries. Even if this scenario does not appear likely, there is the possibility that SCs could drag their home states into conflicts or force them to come to the SCs' assistance with national [*148] military power. Also, former clients could use the skills learned from SCs against SCs' home states. 449 Eleventh, SCs may allow countries to supersede public debate about involvement in foreign countries by subcontracting their foreign policy to private companies. Twelfth, SCs also could be used as covert agents. Finally, SCs simply legitimate the profession of mercenarism, thereby unleashing the dangerous threat of mercenaries in general. All of these negative effects represent a potential challenge to the nation-state system and the traditional powers of the state.
page 85 of 98
Private peacekeeping Bad

Private peacekeeping fails several reasons. Taulbee, 2003, (Associate Prof. of Poly. Sci. @ Emory, Fall, Emory International Law Review, 17 Emory Intl L. Rev. 1109, p. l/n)
Gerson and Colletta summarize the positives and negatives of using private forces. 36 However, their subsequent discussion skirts the issues, focusing on technical rather than broader political issues. First, privatization as normally put forward presumes a movement from the neutrality of peacekeeping to an active peace enforcement/imposition strategy. The problem of peacekeeping has always been that one cannot keep a "peace" that doesn't have substance - that is, one cannot keep a peace if there is no peace to be kept. Second, their analysis underplays the aversion of many humanitarian NGOs based upon a perception that private military companies/private security companies are merely the latest incarnation of the mercenary plague that has infected Africa (and elsewhere) since the 1960s. Third, they do not address the tension between many human rights and humanitarian NGOs and any military action. These organizations have often sought to claim the "moral high ground" which by definition precludes any cooperation with the military. 37 On the obverse side, both the United Nations and the NGO community have begun to engage private security/private military firms 38 to fill the logistics and organizational gap left by great power disengagement and disinterest. At one point, many humanitarian and human rights NGOs expected that their neutrality and impartiality would suffice. In contemporary conflicts, this has proved problematic. As NGOs move from impartiality to activism, [*1125] the need for security will increase. The acceptance of private security firms in support roles should not be extrapolated too far. The move from support, relatively low profile tasks, to the relatively high profile active "enforcement/peace-building" missions forms a major psychological barrier. Curiously, one detects little enthusiasm among the influential western states for privatizing the military part of peacekeeping, let alone the more daunting task of peacebuilding.
page 86 of 98
Private Peacekeeping Bad

Private peacekeeping is unaccountable, prolongs wars, and causes neo-colonialism. Howe, 1998 (Prof. African Politics @ Georgetown, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs Journal, 22 Fletcher F. World Aff. 1, p. l/n)
Critics have generally labeled private security companies as threats to global security because of alleged nonaccountability, including a disrespect for human rights, their possible use by neo-colonial forces and a tendency to alienate the local military. Finally, some critics charge soldiers or companies of fortune with incompetence, perhaps looking to prolong the war and thus their contracts. Accountability Machiavelli cautioned his Prince that competent mercenaries could threaten their state employer, and the Trojan Horse and Rogue Warrior metaphors arise often in mercenary literature. Critics assume that money drives mercenaries' actions and that greed will quickly shred any accountability or loyalty. Private security companies may have several masters: their own government, the employing government, and possibly a private business. The Angolan and then Sierra Leonean
governments hired the South African-based Executive Outcomes which had exceptionally close links to Branch Minerals and Heritage Oil and Gas. Once inside the country and its defense establishment, a private firm could exert powerful leverage upon the state. Private security's coupling with powerful multinational companies dramatically increases the foreigners' 9 power within a beleaguered state. Enforcement of norms is lacking; no effective international sanctions exist. The
hiring government or insurgency may have little control over the powerful foreign force and could hesitate to discipline its presumed allies at a time of need. Mercenaries often move unimpeded and unrecorded through immigration, thus lessening chances for future investigations into alleged misbehavior. 10 These implicit licenses for illegal behavior encouraged past mercenary groups to engage in serious violations of human right. The
Congolese during the 1960's labeled mercenaries as les affreux for often despicable behavior. More recently, Carlos Castano, a leader of a right-wing paramilitary force in Columbia, has been accused of brutal mercenary activities. Foreign military 11 personnel [*4] often show little knowledge of or sensitivity to local customs and institutions. As Western
governments increasingly work with private firms, some critics worry that such cooperation may circumvent public oversight and enforcement. The U.S. government in 1995 reportedly sidestepped a United Nations embargo that proscribed state supplying of military equipment to Rwanda by hiring Ronco, a private de-mining company, to provide armored transport vehicles and explosives. Last Gasp of Colonialism? Africans especially distrust private security groupings, although numerous states and insurgencies have hired them. Accusations of white neo-colonial, mercenary muscle gaining cheap mineral concessions and thus threatening self-determination have some basis in fact, especially in Africa. During the 1960s, mercenaries often received financing from Western businesses and fought against African governments. Bob Denard, an aging Frenchman, has attempted to overthrow several governments over the past thirty years. Chief R.O.A. Akinjide of the International Law Commission notes that: The crime of mercenarism is particularly obnoxious within the African context. In Africa, the mercenary is seen as the representative of colonialism and racial oppression -- an assassin hired to kill freedom fighters in wars of national liberation and wars against racial oppression. 12 Relations With National Militaries Private foreign personnel -- especially combat units -- may foment bitterness, and perhaps revolt, within the national army. The hiring of private personnel is an ipso facto judgement by the government of its own military. The foreigner's often vaunted military background, their often superior weaponry, and their higher salaries may further anger the government's military. Foreigners in various African conflicts, such as Congo, Biafra and Sierra Leone as well as Papua New Guinea
have embittered various local officers. Papua New Guinea officers mutinied in 1997 against the introduction of the Britishbased Sandline military force and forced Prime Minister Julian Chan to step down.
page 87 of 98
Private Pecaekeeping = no accountability

Private peacekeeping is unaccountable. Riza, 2003 (Chef de Cabinet to the UN Secretary-General, Winter/Spring, 27 Fletcher F. World Aff. 39, p. l/n)
RIZA: There has been talk, but no serious consideration, and I do not see it happening. The UN is an intergovernmental organization. Governments have assumed obligations and responsibilities, one of which is to provide troops for United Nations operations and money to buy troops. There is the question of responsibility. Obviously, troops that are sent out from a particular country remain responsible not only to the United Nations but also to their own government. That would not be the case in private operations. It would be very difficult to control private personnel who did not keep to the rules or infringed limits, and so on. Right now, if this happens with personnel that come from a government, that government is responsible for trying them. Can that arrangement be worked out nationality-by-nationality with private personnel? I doubt it. It would be very difficult, so I do not see this as something that is likely to happen.
Private corporations have no accountability Singer, 2003 [Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]
Second, privatization also raises certain risks stemming from problems of adverse selection and a lessening of accountability. Military provider firms are not always looking for the most congenial workforce, but instead, understandably enough, recruit those known for their effectiveness. For example, many former members of the most notorious and ruthless units of the Soviet and apartheid regimes have found employment in the industry. These individuals acted without concern for human rights in the past and certainly could do so again. In either case, the industry cannot be described as imbued with a culture of peacekeeping. Even if the firms are scrupulous in screening their hires (which is hard to accomplish, given that few prospective employees would think to include an atrocities committed section on their resumes), it is still difficult for them to monitor their troops in the field. Furthermore, if employees do commit violations, there is little incentive for a firm to turn them over to any local authorities. To do so risks scaring off both clients and other prospective employees. This turned out to be the case recently in the Balkans. Employees of Dyncorp, who had been contracted to perform police duties for the U.N. and aircraft maintenance for the U.S. Army, were later implicated in child prostitution rings. Dyncorps Bosnia site supervisor even filmed himself raping two women. These employees were transferred out of the country, and none were ever criminally prosecuted.
page 88 of 98
Private peacekeeping = no accountability

Private peacekeepers violate international law. Zarate, 1998 (Federal Law Clerk, Southern District of California, J.D. Harvard Law School, Stanford Journal of International Law, Winter, 34 Stan. J Intl L. 75, p. l/n)
The existence of SCs calls into question their legality. International law on mercenaries, as captured in U.N. resolutions and state action, has failed to crystallize. To the extent that such law can be identified, it provides little guidance regarding the services SCs provide, whether training or actual combat. 20 First, there is the question of how to define [*79] a "mercenary." Recent codification has tried to define a mercenary, in contradistinction to an international volunteer, by his motivations. 21 In general, a mercenary is defined as a soldier-for-hire, primarily motivated by pecuniary interests, who has no national or territorial stake in a conflict and is paid a salary above the average for others of his rank. 22 This definition has faced criticism from most of the members of the United Nations because of the ambiguity of "motivation." 23 To many countries there remain subtle, if not artificial, distinctions
between a mercenary and other types of combatants, such as "freedom fighters" motivated by ideology or foreigners enlisted in a national army, like the Gurkhas in the British Army or members of the French Foreign Legion. International attention focused initially on the problem of mercenaries during the 1960s post-colonial era in Africa. Shortly after the Congo gained independence, the United Nations deployed a "peace-keeping" force, United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), to suppress the Katangan secession, which was being aided by European mercenaries. 24 Since that period, mercenaries have been involved in numerous tumultuous episodes in Africa in which they have tried to depose established 25 regimes or otherwise fuel insurrection. These incidents have caused concern that colonial powers or those
loyal to them were utilizing mercenaries to regain power in particular countries or to destabilize regimes that were seen by European countries as uncooperative. As a result, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) galvanized a movement opposing the use of mercenaries, ultimately resulting in U.N. Security Council resolutions banning the recruitment, use, and training of mercenaries for the purpose of destabilizing nascent regimes or supporting national liberation movements. Because the resolutions ban only these particular uses of mercenaries, it is unclear whether the use of mercenaries to protect legitimate governments or "recognized" national liberation movements is illegal under international norms. Although the law against mercenaries seems absolute regardless of their employers or the purpose for which they are employed, the development of this body of law in the wake of African independence from colonial rule calls into question whether certain types of mercenaries may be legally acceptable depending on the 26 legitimacy of the employer and the nature of the service provided. [*80]
Private corporations fall outside rule of international law Singer, 2003 [Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]
Industry executives counter that U.N. peacekeepers have certainly been involved in crimes of their own in the past, so the risks of human rights violations occurring during peace operations are nothing new. The difference with privatization, though, is that while soldiers in U.N. missions are ultimately held responsible under their national military code of justice, contracted peacekeepers are subject only to the laws of the market. Current international law has been found inapplicable to the actions of the industry, as the firms fall outside of the outdated legal conventions that deal only with individual mercenaries. The only possible regulation must then come either from the law of the state in which the operation is taking place or the law of the state in which the firm is based. Since the collapse of the rule of law is what tends to create the conditions for hiring firms in the first place, the first alternative is almost never an option. The transnational nature of the industry makes the second option of home-state regulation difficult as well. Besides the fact that extraterritorial monitoring (i.e., of firms operating outside national boundaries) is very difficult, any time a firm finds the regulation too onerous, it can simply transfer to more friendly environs. Moreover, even among firms that stay based in the few countries with the ability and will to regulate, the jurisdiction is still problematic. For example, U.S. criminal law does not apply outside of U.S. territorial and special maritime jurisdictions, so that if an employee of an American military firm commits an offense abroad, the likelihood of prosecution is extremely low. Consequently, other than nonrenewal of contract, there are no real checks and balances on military firms that will ensure full accountability.
page 89 of 98
Private Peacekeeping = No accountability

Private forces dont have any accountability/Private forces dont fall into the trap of statism Hukill 2004 [Traci Selling Mercenaries to the U.N. as privatized peacekeeping. The Progress Report. May 20 http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/8509.html]
For the United Nations, bringing private military firms into peacekeeping is anything but a troublefree solution. The involvement of two CACI International employees in the Abu Ghraib prisonerabuse scandal in Iraq is an exclamation point at the end of a long list of problems with private military firms: They undermine the principle that the state should have a monopoly on organized violence; they lure away, with high salaries, special forces in whom the military has invested heavily; they operate beyond the public's field of vision; and they're functionally accountable to no one. The U.N. would have no guarantee that the firms would stay in a situation that gets messy or runs over budget, and if a firm's employees misbehave, the U.N. would have little recourse
Private forces dont have any accountability Balkans proves Hukill 2004 [Traci Selling Mercenaries to the U.N. as privatized peacekeeping. The Progress Report. May 20 http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/8509.html]
DynCorp's presence in the Balkans became infamous three years ago, when a DynCorp employee in Bosnia reported that several of her fellow employees were running a child-prostitution ring. The accused were transferred out of Bosnia, but they never faced charges. The whistle-blower, meanwhile, was fired by the company (and was later awarded $173,000 in damages by a British court).
page 90 of 98
Private Peacekeeping -> Conflict

Private peacekeeping causes corruption and promotes conflict. Zarate, 1998 (Federal Law Clerk, Southern District of California, J.D. Harvard Law School, Stanford Journal of International Law, Winter, 34 Stan. J Intl L. 75, p. l/n)
Concern about these SCs, like concern about mercenaries, pirates, and terrorists, stems from the inherent violence of their profession combined with a lack of control over and accountability for their actions. 14 Since these are private companies, countries which recommend or export them arguably can disavow any connection to SCs' activities. Potentially, this allows exporting governments to use SCs as political pawns to affect the internal affairs of a country or region while retaining their official neutrality in such conflicts. Such "SC expor- [*78] tation" seems like a convenient way for exporting countries to intervene with impunity in foreign wars. Meanwhile, countries importing SCs gain quick access, with seemingly no political strings attached, to needed military expertise during a crisis. 15 The contracting country can use and dispose of these services readily without concern for the company's political ambitions or for political favors which may need to be repaid. This "clean hands" approach to foreign policy appears dangerous to those who see transparent nation-state accountability as essential to controlling human rights violations and the type and quality of military activity throughout the world.
page 91 of 98
Peacekeeping cant solve long-term

Private corporations dont solve the long-term causes of violence Singer, 2003 [Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]
The third challenge of privatization is its long-term implications for local parties. The key to any durable peace is the restoration of legitimacy. In particular, this requires the return of control over organized violence to public authorities. Unfortunately, if peacekeeping is privatized, the companies may become a temporary mechanism for preserving peace but still do little to address the underlying causes of unrest and violence.
page 92 of 98
Private peacekeeping = no training

Private corporations are unable to handle the things UN peacekeepers are trained for Singer, 2003 [Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]
In the view of many, most importantly the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping (which may have a vested bureaucratic interest in opposing the privatization of forces), the act of becoming a peacekeeper is about more than just changing the color of ones helmet or beret. Peacekeepers roles and responsibilities differ markedly from regular military operations. They require an entirely new cultural outlook focused on humanitarian concerns, which at times can duel with or shackle normal military instincts. Not only must peacekeepers operate under very different rules of engagement, but the most important directive is a guiding ethic of neutrality, the act of not taking sides. Thus, the most successful peacekeeping operations (such as experiences in Mozambique, Namibia, and Guatemala) are not simply about placing third-party troops on the ground. Instead, they include a wide variety of peacebuilding activities designed to restore torn social fabrics and foster cooperation among local parties. These range from cease-fire monitoring and troop disarmament and demobilization to reconstruction and election monitoring. Thus, U.N. operations are often so unwieldy for the very reason that they must also carry on these essential activities. Private military firms, untrained or uninterested in the culture of peacekeeping, might be ill-equipped to handle them. Moreover, reliance on an outside private force does little to reestablish the local social contract. Instead, it appears more likely to reinforce the idea that power belongs only to those with the ability to afford it.
page 93 of 98
Peacekeeping = prone to market failure

Market failures -> peacekeeping failures Singer, 2003 [Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]
The first issue is the contractual dilemmas that arise with privatization. There are obvious market incentives for firms to act in their clients interests. Any company that does otherwise risks not being hired again. The problem is that market constraints are always imperfect and tend to work only over the long term. In actuality, the security goals of clients are often in tension with the firms aim of profit maximization. The result is that considerations of the good of the private company are not always identical with the public good. For privatized peacekeeping, the ensuing dangers include all the problems one has in standard contracting and business outsourcing. The hired firms have incentives to overcharge, pad their personnel lists, hide failures, not perform to their peak capacity, and so on. The worry, though, is that these are all now transferred into the security realm, where peoples lives are at stake.
Private corporations are controlled by market forces not humanitarian need Singer, 2003 [Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]
The most worrisome contractual dilemma, however, is that outsourcing also entails turning over control of the actual provision of service. For peacekeeping, this means the troops in the field are not part of national armies, but private citizens hired off the market, working for private firms. Security is now at the mercy of any change in market costs and incentives. One example of the resulting danger derives from the nasty habit humanitarian interventions have of becoming more complex over time. A firm hired to establish a safe haven might later find the situation more difficult than it originally expected. The operation might become unprofitable or, due to any increase in local opposition, more dangerous than anticipated. Thus, the company could find it in its corporate interest to pull out. Or, even if the company is kept in line by market constraints, its employees might decide that the personal risks they face in sticking it out in an operation are too high relative to their pay. Not bound by military law, they can simply break their contracts without fear of punishment and find safer, better paying work elsewhere. In either case, the result is the same: the abandonment of those who were dependent on private protection without consideration for the political costs or the clients ability to quickly replace them.
page 94 of 98
Private peacekeeping = same problems as standing army

The same problems with a standing army apply to a private corporation Singer, 2003 [Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]
Finally, the nitty-gritty details of implementation often bedevil privatizations promise in regular government contracting and general industry; they likely will do so with peacekeeping as well. For example, there is no clear answer to the question of who should have the power to hire private military firms. The first scenario of contracted protection not only challenges norms of aid group neutrality, but also perhaps hazardously expands the powers of these outside organizations, which are responsible only to their donors. The presence of such protection forces entails a further multiplication of armed forces on the ground, hardly the best thing in the midst of a complex operation. Likewise, if the power to hire military firms for peacekeeping is restricted to the U.N., it is still unclear what body of the institution should decide. The decision-making process of the General Assembly is certainly unwieldy and also biased against certain states. Limiting authority to the Security Council, however, leaves the developing world the very place where the privatized deployments are likely to occur underrepresented. The result is that many of the same arguments that have been made against the U.N.s having its own standing army also apply to it having its own contracted force.
page 95 of 98
Perm Solvency
The perm solves the UN can use its own peacekeepers in coordination with private corporations Singer, 2003 [Paul, June, Policy Review, www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html]
The U.N. should also seriously explore the possibility of using the private market to get a better bang for its buck out of existing peacekeeping units. Military support firms already provide the transport, communications, and logistics of operations for many militaries from well-off states. For example, Brown & Root Services provides such support to U.S. forces deployed in the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Gulf. Units from the developing world, which make up the majority of U.N. forces, are glaringly weak in performing these functions. By outsourcing these services and standardizing them over the whole U.N. peacekeeping system, a synergy of public troops and private support might become possible. Similarly, military consultant firms might be able to provide training and assistance that would improve U.N. operational output.
NGOs have to collaborate with regional governments Schnabel and Horowitz 2002 [Albrecht and Shale. International Network. NGOs critical role in advancing human rights in transition societies. http://www.tolerance-net.org/news/podium/podium071.html]
NGOs must collaborate with regional organizations and the UN in advocating and promoting good human rights practices, and in monitoring human rights improvements. They need to curb turf fights and, instead, coordinate efforts with other NGOs. Moreover, international NGOs need to train and build capacities of domestic NGOs. More than at present, civil society actors must engage issues heavily affected by relativism. In this context, they need to play a critical role in social dialogue and persuasion, and search for constructive joint positions with traditional subgroups on issues of basic human rights. In collaboration with states and IGOs, they should give more attention to an evolving universalist consensus that does not incorporate all human rights, but distinguishes a rational core that reaches civil, economic and social rights.
page 96 of 98
Answers to: NGOs solve human rights

NGOs are constrained by local governments Schnabel and Horowitz 2002 [Albrecht and Shale. International Network. NGOs critical role in advancing human rights in transition societies. http://www.tolerance-net.org/news/podium/podium071.html]
Yet human rights NGOs and their supporters are strongly constrained by local conditions. Most importantly, ruling regimes may impose strong restrictions against organized human rights advocacy, to the point of imposing arbitrary, draconian punishments on all those who try. There are also other types of barriers. Based on past national and local experiences, human rights NGOs may be associated with undesirable imposition of alien standards and policies. And even when the will is there, more pressing needs and threats such as poverty, economic instability and civil conflict necessarily limit locally available audiences and resources.
ngo counterplan zag scholars Misc.
page 97 of 98
CATEGORY OF "WOMEN" IS USEFUL - THEORETICALLY AND STRATEGICALLY, OUTWEIGHS ESSENTIALISM Hilary Charlesworth, & Christine Chinkin, Professors of Law at University of Adelaide and University of South Hampton, The boundaries of international law: a feminist analysis, 2000, p. 55 The category of "women" has powerful theoretical and political potential in scrutinizing international law. It has theoretical force in the sense that it is using a patriarchal tool against patriarchy, removing women from the category of the particular to which they are usually assigned. And it has political implications in its ability to mobilize. Feminist analysis must negotiate a strategic path between theoretical purity and political principle. Gayarit Spivak has explained the dilemma well: You pick up the universal that will give you the power to fight against the other side and what you are throwing away by doing that is your theoretical purity. Whereas the great custodians of the anti-universal are obliged therefore simply to act in the interest of a great narrative, the narrative of exploitation, while they keep themselves clean by not committing themselves to anything. FEMINISTS NO LONGER ESSENTIALIZE MEN Terrell Carver, Professor of Political Theory, University of Bristol, et al., REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 1998, p.284. It is these ontological debates, and the questioning of essentialist perspectives, which have motivated the transition from working on women to theorizing gender. Echoing developments in feminist theory, the 1980s witnessed a growing concern about, and literature on, the shifting nature of men's lives. As Lynne Segal notes, 'books researching fatherhood, men's violence against women and children, male identities and male mythologies now interrogate men, as a sex, in a way until recently reserved for women -- as a problem'. It is now becoming common to speak of 'masculinities' in the plural and to explore the fluctuating constitution of hegemonic and subordinate forms of masculinity. Far from assuming the polarized analyses of some forms of early second-wave feminism in which 'all men' oppressed 'all women', sexual politics currently takes as its focus the transgression of all existing gender boundaries. FEMINIST KRITIK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW NOT A "WESTERN FEMINIST" GOAL - SHARED BY THIRD WORLD FEMINISTS AS WELL Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, & Shelley Wright, University of Melbourne Law School and University of Sydney Law School, October 1991, The American Journal International Law, 85 A.J.I.L. 613, p. 621 Despite differences in history and culture, feminists from all worlds share a central concern: their domination by men. Birgit Brock-Utne writes: "Though patriarchy is hierarchical and men of different classes, races or ethnic groups have different places in the patriarchy, they are united in their shared relationship of dominance over their women. And, despite their unequal resources, they are dependent on each other to maintain that domination." <=56> n55 Issues raised by Third World feminists, however, require a reorientation of feminism to deal with the problems of the most oppressed women, rather than those of the most privileged. Nevertheless, the constant theme in both western and Third World feminism is the challenge to structures that permit male domination, although the form of the challenge and the male structures may differ from society to society. An international feminist perspective on international law will have as its goal the rethinking and revision of those structures and principles which exclude most women's voices.
page 98 of 98
WORKING THROUGH THE MALE DOMINATED LEGAL SYSTEM COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO ADVANCING WOMEN'S CONCERNS Martti Koskenniemi, University of Helsinki, January, 1995, The American Journal International Law, 89 A.J.I.L. 227, p. 227 (HARVOC2154) Traditional feminism, in law as elsewhere, sought to "put women on the agenda" -- for example, to make violence against women a violation of international human rights. While first-wave feminism concentrated on legal reform, the second wave has lost faith. Reform has often been ineffectual or led to transformation, rather than eradication, of male dominance. Sometimes, "using" law may have seemed to be a fatal concession. For the law and legal method may themselves, with their adversarial style and obsession with authority and rationality, be bastions of stereotypical masculinity-hence, of male domination. This applies also to the rhetoric of liberal rights ("men's rights," Shelley Wright, p. 120). While "rights," like reformism, may have played a beneficial role in early feminist struggles, they have also proved counterproductive. They oversimplify complex power relations (within the family, for instance); they are individualistic, indeterminate, conflictual and easily appropriated to enhance domination (as the right of free speech is used to defend pornography).

NGO Counterplan For Debate

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NGO COUNTERPLAN and index

***NGO Solvency............................................................................................................................ 7 NGOs Solve..................................................................................................................................... 8

NGOs solve the economy.............................................................................................................. 18

Activism solvency .......................................................................................................................... 19

Human rights solvency ................................................................................................................. 20

NGOs are key to civil society ....................................................................................................... 23

Most NGOs are gap-fillers ........................................................................................................... 24

NGOs gap-filling solves ................................................................................................................ 25

NGOs solve fundability................................................................................................................. 26

NGOs decrease regime corruption.............................................................................................. 27

*** Solve Specific Areas/Things.................................................................................................. 28 NGOs Solve Congo ...................................................................................................................... 29

NGO solve democratization ......................................................................................................... 31

ngo counterplan zag scholars

Environment solvency .................................................................................................................. 32

NGOs solve feminism.................................................................................................................... 33

NGOs solve poverty ...................................................................................................................... 34

***Private Corporations Solvency.............................................................................................. 35 Private Corporations Solve .......................................................................................................... 36

***Answers to the Perm............................................................................................................... 46

***NGOs better than the UN ..................................................................................................... 50

*** UN Peacekeepers Bad............................................................................................................ 53

***Answers To............................................................................................................................... 56 Answers to: No accountability..................................................................................................... 57

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AT: Aid dependence bad.............................................................................................................. 58

******AFF ANSWERS ................................................................................................................ 61 NGOs bad....................................................................................................................................... 61

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Third, NGOs solve area/action <insert specific card>

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NGOs solve the economy

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Human rights solvency

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Human Rights Solvency

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Human Rights Solvency

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NGOs are key to civil society

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Most NGOs are gap-fillers

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NGOs gap-filling solves

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NGOs solve fundability

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NGOs decrease regime corruption

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*** Solve Specific Areas/Things

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NGOs Solve Congo