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Park, S & C. Weaver Chapter 3: The Anatomy of Autonomy: The Case of the World Bank
In Joel E. Oestreich (Ed.) International Organizations as Self-Directed Actors: A Framework for Analysis. New York, NY: Routledge, 2012.

Susan Park
PhD Sydney Dr Parks examines the rise, spread and efficacy of accountability mechanisms that have been created by Multilateral Development Banks in order to redress the negative impacts of development projects on local communities Research interests: International Relations; Constructivist theory, processes of socialisation and identity change; International Organisations and Global Governance; The World Bank Group and Regional Development Banks

Catherine Weaver
Associate Professor of Public Affairs; Graduate Adviser, Masters in Global Policy Studies at the University of Texas PhD in Political Science from the University of Wisconsin-Madison research focus: culture, behaviour and reform of international financial institutions (WB and IMF); issues of transparency and accountability in international development aid

Notes:
WB is an indisputable world leader in lending and production of development knowledge Leader in the IO community in articulating and implementing the sustainable development and anticorruption agendas o Subject to extensive analysis and criticism WB and agency? o The chapter reveals how any notion of an IOs autonomy and agency that treats the IO as an unified actor is prone to incomplete and inaccurate conclusions regarding haw we describe an IOs self-directed action Internal workings and the international forces shaping IO autonomy and agency o IOs are open systems driven by political relationships and resource dependencies o Complex bureaucracies collective action characteristics, organizational histories, structures, staff dynamics and cultures o IOs comprise of individuals it is important to understand their mind-set and roles o If we want to arrive at a faithful image of working of an IO, we have to embark on tedious empirical journey into the multiple levels of its constitution IOs agency: o Staff and management acting in ways unforeseen by those who installed them there o So what are the opportunities and constraints? Discretion vis--vis principals, i.e. states Autonomy of executive heads vis--vis external environment and internal structure The two Wolfs 1

simon.fiala@seznam.cz Mid-level examination of the executive service of two heads of WB James Wolfensohn successful promotion of the agendas of sustainable development and anticorruption initiatives despite hostile environment o Paul Wolfowitzs failure to push through aggressive anti-corruption crusade Explaining IO agency: bridging the rationalist-constructivist divide o Combining diverging theories insights: Principal-Actor theory (PA) and Constructivism o The principal-agency model Delineates relationships embedded in complex delegation chains that affect ability of an IO leader to pursue their own agenda Who is the agent and who is the principal? Depends on what segment of the chain we examine. In IOs? Usually the agent is the management and principals are member governments What affects the managements agency? The proximity and strength of principals preferences in a given issue (do they care?) The degree of heterogeneity among collective and individual principals (do they balance each other out?) The costs to principals to control the agent (oversight and control mechanisms) The degree of informational asymmetry (how much does agents expertise allow him to disguise his own initiative) If executive of the IO is the principal and staff is the agent Again the discretion of agents vis--vis the principal depends on the organization landscape and the divergence of preferences In the case of WB Allows us to discern the scope of agency of the presidents vis--vis the Board members Allows us to perceive the dynamics of the presidents relation towards 14000 members of staff o Constructivist organizational theory Allows for perceiving the non-material factors of executive heads discretion in IO Ideas such as sustainable development and corruption exist beyond the IOs agendas and are part of wider intellectual landscape, which in effect limits or enhances their potential to be acted upon Takes into account organizational culture; appreciates the fluid processes of adoption and exclusion of values and principles The tale of Wolf I: Greening the bank and the cancer of corruption o Greening the bank By the time Wolfensohn took charge WB faced long-ranging critique of the impact of its policies and programs on the environment (dams, oil pipelines, ) Wolfensohn allowed the newly established Inspection panel to inspect several big projects o o

simon.fiala@seznam.cz W. halted several controversial projects before the panel could deliver its findings A reform: establishment of the post of Vice-President for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Dev. (ESSD) power to green agenda, boosting number of environ. experts in on board Sought to mainstream environmental considerations throughout the Bank Pushing environmentally conscious mind-set into WBs structure and culture What Wolfensohn did: Scale up Banks environmental activities Institute new monitoring mechanisms for staff Made alliance with environmentalists and some powerful states o Partially appeased the mounting opposition o Cleaning the bank Until the 1990s the bank avoided the issue of corruption because of its political nature Wolfensohn unilaterally proclaimed corruption to be cancer and criticised previous neglect of the issue. Steps taken: Corruption redefined: political issue economic and social issue o Good governance statistically distinguished form poor govern. Staff hired: a new (reformist) chief economist and a number of specialists Established mechanisms to report and pursue corruption in Banks projects Problems Staff still reluctant of addressing corruption o Institutional means for solving corruption problems lacking o Fear of antagonizing borrowing governments while loans from midincome countries was already on decline Banks apolitical mandate challenged Problems prevented the full embrace of the anti-corruption agenda Late 1990s shift to aggressive fight against corruption and its failure The OECD, The UN, the Council of Europe, NGO sector = war on corruption But implementation of the anti-corruption policies selective and ineffective o Corruption increasingly addressed and aimed at; Number of corruption cases were brought to conclusion; Country Assistance Strategy papers reflected the concern with corruption o But at the same time the WB failed to develop means to persuade borrowers to endure reform and misidentified political drivers for corruption corruption treated as a sector rather than a crosscutting theme Conflict between rewarding countries responsiveness and simultaneous punishment for insufficient eradication of corruption o Wolfensohns achievements as an agent Mainstreaming environmental concerns into Banks processes and projects Introducing corruption as an suitable topic Tale of the Wolf II: integrating the environment and crusading of anticorruption 3

simon.fiala@seznam.cz Greenwashing the World Bank? Background: MICs increasingly to borrow from private lenders, decreased WBs budget Large-scale mergers of departments Animosity of US government at that time towards environmental agenda Wolfowitz appointed US republican advisors and cut himself from senior WB staff Insensitive internal reform Significant slash-backs in environmental departments Lack of leadership in helping countries to grapple with sustainable development while promoting poverty reduction and economic growth o Staining the World Bank? Soon after his arrival, Wolfowitz cancelled or withheld loans from 9 major recipients on the basis of concerns over corruption and bad governance Boosted staff and resources in anti-corruption work But WB itself struggles with allegations of non-transparency Wolfowitz aggressive attempt to eradicate corruption made large opposition NGOs criticized his approach as punitive and arbitrary Borrowing states opposed major interference in their sovereignty Wolfowitz strived to radically interfere with the WB internal culture Wolfowitz accused of making cuts in loans in line with US foreign policy and perpetuating cronyism by appointing republican loyalists Eventually removed from his position Conclusion o There are limits on self-directed action of IOs at the executive level o Action can be realized through building internal and external coalitions Creating consensus, attaining and redistributing resources, undertaking necessary intellectual work (persuading, crafting and disseminating knowledge) o Expectations must be pragmatic Space for exercising agency must be carefully carved and may be easily lost Attempt to dominate initiates response; mobilises opposition Soft power should be appreciated o