Samuel R.

Berger
555 13th Street, NW
Suite 300W
Washington, DC 20004

May 13, 2004

Chairman Thomas H. Kean and Vice Chairman Lee H. Hamilton

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
301 7th Street, SW, Room 5125
Washington, DC 20407

RE: Comments on Staff Statements 5-8

Dear Chairmen Kean and Hamilton:

Over the past months, you and your staff have undertaken a monumental effort in an attempt to
understand a complex mosaic of facts related to terrorism and September 11.

I congratulate the highly professional way in which you and your staff have approached that task
- notably including the great care that clearly went into Staff Statements 5-8 on Diplomacy,
Military, Intelligence and National Policy Coordination.

I noted that you indicated in your staff statements a willingness to make revisions, and so it is
that spirit that I offer the following comments regarding issues with which I personally am
familiar and where I believe the staff statements inadvertently are misleading. I offer these
comments in the spirit of seeking to enhance your ability to characterize the record as accurately
as possible.

Alleged Sudanese offer of bin Laden

"Yet both Berger and Clarke also said the lack of an indictment [of bin Laden] made no
difference. Instead they said the idea was not worth pursuing because there was no chance
that Sudan would ever turn Bin Ladin over to a hostile country. If Sudan had been serious,
Clarke said, the United States would have worked something out. " (Staff Statement 5,
Diplomacy)

Your language that we concluded such an effort was "not worth pursuing" is misleading in that it
suggests we could have chosen to pursue such an option but decided not to. hi fact, we never
decided taking bin Laden from Sudan was "not worth pursuing" because, as Mr. Clarke knows,
taking bin Laden from Sudan was not ever an option before us.

"... the U.S. government did approach other countries hostile to Sudan and Bin Ladin about
whether they would take Bin Ladin. One was apparently interested. No handover took
place." (Staff Statement 5, Diplomacy)

I am not aware of any country having indicated any "apparent interest" in taking bin Laden from
Sudan. Several countries did rebuff our approaches on the matter.

"It is unclear whether any U.S. officials considered whether or how to intercept Bin Ladin
[upon his departure from Khartoum] " (Staff Statement 5, Diplomacy)

One could infer from your language that we had information about bin Laden's travel plans and
that it might have been possible for the US to have "intercepted" bin Laden's flight. I am not
aware that we had information about his travel plans, including any refueling stop in the UAE.

Also, I'd like to re-state President Clinton's testimony that he misspoke before an audience on
Long Island in 2002 regarding an alleged Sudanese offer, and does not claim to have been
"misquoted" (as Commissioner Bob Kerrey reported on April 9, 2004 to radio station WDAY).

Al Shifa

"Two possible targets were identified in Sudan, including a pharmaceutical plant at which,
the President was told by his aides, they believed VX nerve gas was manufactured with
Usama Bin Ladin's financial support. " (Staff Statement 6, Military)

In fact, the President was not told that VX was manufactured at al Shifa. Rather, he was advised
by the intelligence community that VX was found at or near the al Shifa facility.

"The controversy over the Sudan attack, in particular, shadowed future discussions about the
quality of intelligence that would be needed about other targets. (Staff Statement 6, Military)

I don't believe that to be correct. We were then and remain now quite confident in our decision
to strike al Shifa and did not allow public criticism to affect our judgments on future targets.
Intelligence information was, at best, always uncertain, and our unwillingness to act in the
absence of actionable intelligence was unchanged by the strike on al Shifa.

Cruise Missile Strikes on Khost

"This strike [on Khost] was launched on August 20. The missiles hit their intended targets,
but neither Bin Ladin nor any other terrorist leaders were killed. " (Staff Statement 6,
Military)

The Intelligence Community reported to us at the time that we had succeeded in killing 20-30 al
Qaeda terrorists at the camp.
 "National Security Adviser Berger and others told us that more strikes, if they failed to kill
Bin Ladin, could actually be counterproductive—increasing Bin Ladin 's stature." (Staff
Statement 6, Military)

I believe our concern was that we might fail to kill bin Laden or any of his key lieutenants. On
balance, we felt that striking camps and killing no significant al Qaeda figures would be
counterproductive.

Kandahar, December 1998

"... in December 1998, in Kandahar ... There was intelligence that Bin Ladin was staying at
a particular location ... The principal advisers to the President agreed not to recommend a
strike ... DCI Tenet told staff that the military, supported by everyone else in the room, had
not wanted to launch a strike because no one had seen Bin Ladin in a couple of hours. "
(Staff Statement 6, Military)

It is unlikely that we would not have launched a strike for the lack of a bin Laden sighting in a
few hours. I certainly didn't require 100% certitude on bin Laden's whereabouts to support a
strike. What ultimately mattered was that President Clinton's principal intelligence adviser DCI
Tenet did not believe the intelligence on bin Laden's presence was reliable enough to justify a
strike on the Kandahar location in 1998.

The Desert Camp, February 1999

"The lead CIA official in the field felt the intelligence reporting ... was very reliable; the
UBL unit chief at the time agrees ... Clarke told us the strike was called off because the
intelligence was dubious, and it seemed to him as if the CIA was presenting an option to
attack America's best counterterrorism ally in the Gulf. " (Staff Statement 6, Military)

With respect to the views of the lead CIA field officer and the bin Laden unit chief, the President
must rely for intelligence judgments on his Director of Central Intelligence, and DCI Tenet did
not favor a strike based on the available intelligence information.

Military Strike Options/Boots on the Ground

"When they briefed policymakers, the military presented both the pros and cons of those
strike options, and briefed policymakers on the risks associated with them ... General Shelton
made clear, however, that upon direction from policymakers the military would proceed with
[a special forces] operation and carry out the order. " (Staff Statement 6, Military)

Lieutenant General William Boykin: "The opportunities [to use Special Operations Forces]
were missed because of an unwillingness to take risks and a lack of vision ..." (Staff
Statement 6, Military)

It should be made clear that General Shelton and the military leadership recommended against
further military action directed at al Qaeda or the Taliban under the then prevailing
circumstances, including the deployment of special forces into Afghanistan. (Of course, the
military would comply with any lawful order from the Commander-in-Chief, even one they
believed was foolish.)

Regarding Lt. General Boykin's comments, I would only note that President Clinton and I both
pressed the military repeatedly and emphatically for special forces options.

Cruise Missiles

"The Tomahawk's long range, lethality, and extreme accuracy made it the missile of choice.
However, as a means to attack al Qaeda and UBL-linked targets pre-9/11, cruise missiles
were problematic. " (Staff Statement 6, Military)

This staff statement failed to note that President Clinton deployed two submarines off the coast
of Pakistan for the purpose of reducing the time delay between actionable intelligence on bin
Laden and a missile strike. It was a significant step on our part, not favored by the Pentagon.

Law Enforcement

"Since the terrorists were understood as loosely affiliated sets of individuals, the basic
approach for dealing with them was that of law enforcement... The Khobar bombing began
as a law enforcement case ... The Khobar bombing also was an intelligence case. " (Staff
Statement 5, Diplomacy)

Though we did use law enforcement techniques to investigate and pursue terrorists, that does not
mean that our basic approach for dealing with terrorists was that of law enforcement. We
regarded terrorism as a national security issues early on and we used the assets and capabilities
of every relevant federal agency, including DoD, State, Treasury, CIA and yes, the FBI (plus
others) to execute our counterterrorism strategy.

That the FBI was charged with investigating the Khobar bombing did not make it a "law
enforcement case" nor did the involvement of the CIA make it an "intelligence case." Rather,
the FBI and CIA were the two US Government agencies which had the capacity to determine
responsibility for the attack. How to respond to FBI and CIA conclusions regarding culpability
for the attack was an entirely different matter, and was very much a decision for the President's
National Security Council.

"Definitive" Judgments

"National Security Adviser Berger ... stressed the need for a definitive intelligence judgment
[on Khobar] ...he explained, the DCI and the Director of the FBI must make a definitive
judgment based on the professional opinions of their experts. " (Staff Statement 5,
Diplomacy)
 Berger and other senior policymakers said that ... they never received the sort of definitive
judgment from the CIA or the FBI that at Qaeda was responsible [for attacking the USS
Cole]. " (Staff Statement 6, Military)

Berger told us he wanted a more definitive judgment [on culpability for the attack on the USS
Cole] from the DCI before using force. (Staff Statement 8, National Policy Coordination )

I was careful not to use the word "definitive" in my public testimony on March 24. To be sure, it
was important that we received firm and clear conclusions from the intelligence and law
enforcement communities before using American force. I was not prepared to recommend action
to the President based on preliminary information. (I had too often experienced "preliminary"
conclusions ultimately to be incorrect.) I wanted to be reasonably confident of our information,
but I never required, nor did I imagine we could ever hope for certitude from the FBI or CIA.
"Definitive" (although I conceivably used that word in my less formal private testimony) was not
a standard we required from the intelligence or law enforcement communities on matters of
terrorism.

USS Cole

"Documents show that, in late 2000, the President's advisers received a cautious
presentation of the evidence showing that individuals linked to al Qaeda had carried out or
supported the attack [on the USS Cole], but that the evidence could not establish that Bin
Ladin himself had ordered the attack. " (Staff Statement 6, Military)

Staff Statements #6 and #8 both report on the lack of conclusions regarding "outside direction of
the attack" and the lack of evidence establishing a clear bin Laden link to the attack. I do not
believe that proving a personal bin Laden link to the attack was a prerequisite for President
Clinton or any of his national security principals to justify a military response against al Qaeda
and their Taliban supporters. Our requirement for a military strike was the presentation of more
than "preliminary" conclusions from the CIA and/or FBI that al Qaeda had been responsible for
the attack - firm conclusions which they never presented to us.

Individuals inside the intelligence community may have reached the conclusion that al Qaeda
definitely was responsible, but as a factual matter, neither the President nor I were ever advised
by the CIA or FBI that the attack on the USS Cole was al Qaeda's responsibility.

Indeed, in an exchange during public hearings on March 23, Commissioners Lehman and
Gorelick agreed that an internal CIA conclusion regarding al Qaeda's culpability for the attack
on the USS Cole, was "not conveyed to decision-makers."

There has been much misreporting on this subject and I hope the Commission will take great
care in how it characterizes conclusions that were not conveyed to the White House.
 UNOCAL

"A secondary consideration was that stability [in Afghanistan] would allow an oil pipeline to
be built through the country ... by ... UNOCAL." (StaffStatement 5, Diplomacy)

As President Clinton's National Security Adviser, and as a participant in every important policy
decision on Afghanistan, I have no awareness of any consideration related to UNOCAL or other
pipeline interests having affected US policy towards Afghanistan.

Taliban

"This period [1998-1999] may have been the high-water mark for diplomatic pressure on the
Taliban. " (Staff Statement 5, Diplomacy)

While it is true that 1998-99 was a period of intensive diplomatic pressure on the Taliban, this
assertion fails to take into account significant continued Clinton Administration diplomatic
pressure on the Taliban during 2000, including the message we delivered to the Taliban in
January 2000 that, henceforth, we would hold them directly responsible for bin Laden's actions
against us ~ and respond accordingly — as well as President Clinton trip to Islamabad in 2000
(over the objections of the Secret Service) for the purpose of influencing the Taliban through
considerable US pressure on Pakistani President Musharraf.

"President Clinton issued an executive order in July 1999 effectively declaring that the
[Taliban] regime was a state sponsor of terrorism. UN economic and travel sanctions were
added in October 1999 in UN Security Council Resolution 1267. " (Staff Statement 5,
Diplomacy)

Though not listed in your staff statement, please note that the Clinton Administration adopted
tough unilateral sanctions against the Taliban, seized their US assets and effectively shut down
their national airline, Ariana.

"In early 1999 the State Department counterterrorism office proposed a comprehensive
diplomatic strategy for all the states involved in the Afghanistan problem ...Its author,
Ambassador Sheehan, told us that it had been watered down to the point that nothing was
then done with it." (Staff Statement 5, Diplomacy)

The notion put forward by Amb. Sheehan that nothing was done with his proposals is incorrect.
Mike Sheehan's recommendations were not disregarded. Many were implemented. In fact,
President Clinton's national security principals approved a comprehensive diplomatic approach
entitled "A New Strategy to Get Bin Laden" which was based on many of Sheehan's ideas,
including imposing our own sanctions, freezing the Taliban's U.S. assets and prohibiting trade
with Afghanistan until bin Laden was turned over.

As your own report later notes "National Security Adviser Berger wondered about a trade of
getting Bin Ladin in exchange for softer treatment of a relatively benign military regime fin
Pakistan]." This was precisely the sort of effort Sheehan had called for, and which we examined
during this period.

"A Taliban delegation visited Washington in December [1997]. U.S. officials

pressed them on the treatment of women, negotiating an end to the civil war, and narcotics
trafficking. Bin Ladin was barely mentioned." (Staff Statement 5, Diplomacy)

Former Assistant Secretary of State Rick Inderfurth has advised me that bin Laden was raised at
the meeting in question, in addition to the other issues listed in your Staff Statement. Though I
did not attend the session in question, my understanding is that terrorism was treated as a
significant matter, more than what one might infer from your statement that bin Laden was
"barely mentioned."

"From the spring of 1997 to September 2001 the U.S. government tried to persuade the
Taliban to expel Bin Ladin to a country where he could face justice and stop being a
sanctuary for his organization. " (Staff Statement 5, Diplomacy)

Please be assured that our efforts were much more about "pressuring" the Taliban than
"persuading" them.

Pakistan

"William Milam, told us that U.S. policy [on Pakistan] "had too many moving parts" and
could never determine what items had the highest priority. " (Staff Statement 5, Diplomacy)

While there were, necessarily, a number of critical issues on our agenda with Pakistan, including
preventing nuclear war on the subcontinent, Presidents Sharif and Musharraf both knew very
well the exceptionally high priority President Clinton placed on terrorism and bin Laden.

Saudi Financing

"The issue [of Saudi money flows] was not a consistent U.S. priority. " (Staff Statement 5,
Diplomacy)

Saudi money flows was a consistent priority for our Administration, so much so, that in addition
to Vice President Gore's efforts, (as noted in Staff Statement 5), we created a senior position at
the Treasury Department specifically for the purpose of institutionalizing our ongoing efforts.

Proxy Forces

"... reluctance to authorize direct action by CIA personnel against Bin Ladin inside the
Afghanistan sanctuary led policymakers to rely on ... proxies ...By deciding to use proxies to
carry out covert actions in Afghanistan before 9/11, both administrations placed the
achievement of policy objectives in the hands of others. " (Staff Statement 7, Intelligence)
This language erroneously asserts a reluctance by policymakers (such as myself) to use CIA
personnel against bin Laden inside Afghanistan, and thus a decision by to "rely" on proxies. In
point of fact, though the CIA was well aware of the importance and urgency we placed on
getting bin Laden, they never proposed "direct action" by CIA personnel against him. It was my
understanding at the time that the agency lacked the capability to launch direct action inside
Afghanistan using their own people.

I firmly believe any such proposal by DCI Tenet to undertake "direct action by CIA personnel"
against bin Laden inside Afghanistan would have been quickly approved.

"In December 2000, the CIA sent their ["Blue Sky " memo] to the NSC staff...
[recommending] increased support to anti-Taliban groups ... No action was taken on these
ideas in the few remaining weeks of the Clinton administration. (Staff Statement 7,
Intelligence)

For the record, I do not recall seeing or being briefed on the CIA's "Blue Sky" memo in the last
months of our administration.

Small Group and CSG

"National Secunty Adviser Berger told us that he designed the Small Group process to keep
the highly-sensitive information closely held ... One tradeoff... was that other senior
officials in agencies around the government sometimes had little knowledge about what was
being decided in this group ... This sometimes led to misunderstandings and friction ... since
the Deputies and other subcabinet officials were not members of the CSG ..." (Staff
Statement 8, National Policy Coordination)

I purposely included Deputy National Security Advisers James Steinberg and Lieutenant General
Donald Kerrick in the Small Group in order to ensure that knowledge of Small Group decisions
and directives would be shared with senior officials in the Deputies Committee — and from them
out to the broader counterterrorism community. I believe this system was effective.

Delenda Plan

"After the August 1998 military strikes against Afghanistan and Sudan, Clarke turned his
attention to ... Political-Military Plan Delenda ...to immediately eliminate any significant
threat to Americans from the "Usama Bin Ladin network, " [by combining] four main
approaches: [diplomacy, covert action, financial measures, military action] ... This strategy
was not formally adopted ..." (Staff Statement 8, National Policy Coordination)

Though there may not be a formal document codifying the Delenda Plan, our counterterrorism
efforts proceeded on all four fronts: diplomacy, covert action, financial measures and military
action. We adopted most of Clarke's recommendations.
 Millennium After-Action Recommendations

"The principals endorsed a four-part agenda to strengthen the U.S. government's

counterterrorism efforts: [increase disruption efforts, strengthen enforcement of domestic
counterterrorism laws, prevent foreign terrorists from entering the United States, improve
the security of the U.S.-Canadian border.} Some particular program ideas ... were adopted.
Others ... were not." (Staff Statement 8, National Policy Coordination)

To be precise, policymakers did adopt and approve the post-Millennium counterterrorism

program proposals. Some, but not all of the proposals were implemented.

Counterterrorism Budget

"Overall U.S. government spending connected to counterterrorism grew rapidly during the
late 1990s. Congress appropriated billions of additional dollars in supplemental
appropriations ... The CIA told us that Clarke kept promising more budget support, but
could never deliver. The Clinton administration began proposing significant increases in the
overall national intelligence budget in January 2000, for Fiscal Year 2001. Until that time,
at least, CIA officials have told us that their main effort had been to rebuild the Agency's
operating capabilities after what they said had been years of cuts and retrenchment. " (Staff
Statement 8, National Policy Coordination)

Overall Clinton Administration counterterrorism funding grew from over $5 billion in FY '96 to
over $11 billion in FY '01, during a period of budget stringency. I hope future Commission
reporting will take note of this fact.

Predator UAV

"In August [2000], Clarke urged that the CSG and the Principals Committee be ready for
emergency meetings to decide whether to fire cruise missiles if Bin Ladin were spotted by the
Predator ...In September, Clarke wrote that the drones were providing "truly astonishing"
imagery, including a "very high probability" of a Bin Ladin sighting." (Staff Statement 8,
National Policy Coordination)

It should be noted that the CIA insisted that the initial deployment of the Predator over
Afghanistan in September/October 2000 be conducted as a "proof of concept" trial run and not
be used operationally - such as leading to a cruise missile strike — to evaluate whether the
Predator could be an effective intelligence platform. (Mr. Clarke has confirmed that fact to me
personally.)

"Berger noted to Clarke, though, that before considering any action he would need more
than a verified location; he would also need data on a pattern of movements to provide some
assurance that Bin Ladin would stay in place. " (Staff Statement 8, National Policy
Coordination)
I do not recall telling Mr. Clarke that I required "data on a pattern of movements" to ensure bin
Laden would remain at a given target site before supporting a missile strike, and very much
doubt I ever would have required that level of intelligence data to support a missile strike. I
pressed DCI Tenet very hard to develop the predictive intelligence required for a successful
missile strike on bin Laden but did not interject standards into the intelligence process that would
have made their task more difficult.

One final correction of my own submission: In my prepared written testimony, as well as my

oral testimony before your Commission on March 24,1 asserted that among the terrorist cells the
Clinton Administration broke up in the weeks preceding the Millennium celebrations was one in
Toronto. While al Qaeda activity was suspected in Toronto, the Canadian al Qaeda cell which
we broke up in late 1999 was in Montreal. Please note my correction for the record.

Thank you for this opportunity to comment on Staff Statements 5-8. Again, I commend the
Commission on the professionalism of its work.

I hope these considerations will assist you in the final writing of your report and remain available
to help in any way possible as you complete your work.

Sincerely,

Samuel R. Berger

cc: Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste

Commissioner Fred F. Fielding
Commissioner Jamie S. Gorelick
Commissioner Slade Gorton
Commissioner Bob Kerrey
Commissioner John F. Lehman
Commissioner Timothy J. Roemer
Commissioner James R. Thompson
Executive Director Philip D. Zelikow
General Counsel Daniel Marcus

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