UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM

To: Witness File

From: Scott H. Allan
Date: May 21,2003

RE: Policy/Intelligence Witnesses

On March 31, 2003, Abraham Sofaer, Daniel Byman, Brian Jenkins and Magnus
Ranstorp appeared before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States (the "Commission"). During this open hearing, the witnesses described, in
both verbal and written statements, their views of Al-Qaeda, the intelligence community
and the USG's counter-terrorism policy. They recommended, either explicitly or
implicitly, areas on which the Commission should focus and-improvements the USG
should make. Listed below are the issues they identified and which the Commission
should be mindful of as its work progresses.

Did the USG possess a comprehensive counter-terrorism policy before 9-11? What
policy changes have been made since 9-11? (Byman)

• Was there an overall lack of leadership in connection with counter-terrorism

policy? (Byman)
• Did counter-terrorism policy vary between agencies? (Byman)
• How is the USG currently measuring success against Al-Qaeda? Is it too
concerned with strict "body counts" as opposed to measuring other aspects,
such as reducing morale within Al-Qaeda? (Byman)
• To what extent are we cooperating and coordinating with other countries in
the fight against Al-Qaeda? (Ranstorp)

Were the proper resources (and attention) directed to the USG's counter-terrorism efforts
before 9-11? (Byman)

• Was enough priority given to fighting terrorism or was it eclipsed by the

USG's focus on China, the Balkans, etc.? (Byman)
• What percentage of the intelligence community's budget was directed towards
counter-terrorism and was this amount sufficient? (Byman)

Did we understand Al-Qaeda well enough? (Ranstorp)

• How did the USG educate itself about the philosophy/motivations of the Al-
Qaeda movement and the nature of its threat? What did the USG know about
 Al-Qaeda's recruitment and fundraising methods? Which agencies were most
involved in these areas? (Ranstorp)
• Did the USG understand the "root causes" (i.e. political, economic and social
factors) of Islamic extremism and how did it address them? (Jenkins and
Ranstorp)
• Were there any efforts by the USG to delegitimize the Wahhabi sect of Islam
and the martyrdom associated with suicide bombings? (Byman and Ranstorp)
• Did the USG study the prior Al-Qaeda attacks closely enough? Did the USG
fail to learn lessons from the prior attacks? (Byman)
• Did the USG consult with other nations that had experience with Al-Qaeda?
(Ranstorp)

Did the USG fail to confront terrorist sanctuaries such as the Sudan and Afghanistan?
(Byman and Ranstorp)

• What agencies were responsible for monitoring Al-Qaeda in those countries?

(Byman) ~
• What actions were taken against those countries and were they effective?
(Byman)

Did the USG approach terrorism as a criminal problem (i.e. employing FBI
investigations, arrests and trials) as opposed to a military one that required the use of
force? If so was this the wrong approach? (Sofaer and Byman)

• Why was preemption not a major focus in the USG's pre 9-11 counter-
terrorism policy? (Sofaer and Ranstorp)

Was the intelligence community properly organized to combat terrorism, and specifically
Al-Qaeda? (Byman and Jenkins)

• Was the intelligence community too "reactive" in connection with counter-

terrorism? Did it fail to keep pace with the fluid structure of Al-Qaeda?
(Jenkins)
• How did the intelligence community change its operations after it learned that
Al-Qaeda had "declared war" on the United States and vowed to attack it?
(Jenkins)
• Did the USG focus its intelligence efforts too heavily on Al-Qaeda's foreign
activities as opposed to monitoring Al-Qaeda's stateside operations? (Byman)
• Were too many agencies taking parallel courses in monitoring Al-Qaeda while
failing to acknowledge gaps in intelligence coverage? (Byman)
• To what extent did the culture of secrecy in the intelligence community
restrict it from sharing information? (Byman, Jenkins and Ranstorp)
• Did the FBI's mandate (requiring it to prepare evidence for criminal cases)
restrict it from collecting and sharing intelligence with other agencies?
(Byman, Jenkins and Ranstorp)
Before 9-11, how was threat information shared: 1) within the agencies of the
intelligence community and 2) between the entire intelligence community and
local law enforcement? (Jenkins)
Was there any intelligence gathered by local law enforcement groups and how
was it shared with federal agencies? Should local intelligence play a larger
role in the future? (Jenkins)
Why did the 9-11 threat warnings not get the proper response? Were there any
attempts to create defensive protections after the threat warnings? (Byman)
What improvements should be made to enhance intelligence capabilities?
(Sofaer) Have quality changes been made in this area since 9-11? (Byman)