July 25, 2003

Primary issues to be resolved - Team 3

1 . By August, 1 998, it appears the USG had strategic warning that Usama bin Laden and al
Qaeda posed a serious threat to U.S. national security. How did the government react?

• Did the USG appreciate the terrorist threat, and did it devise an appropriate strategy to
counter that threat?
• Were the agencies fully on board with the government's strategy?
• Did the strategy include all the appropriate instruments at the government's disposal to fight
terrorism? Were the agencies wielding their instruments effectively?

With these questions in mind, we anticipate policy recommendations emerging from the
following areas of concern:

Leadership'.
• Was there a failure of leadership on the part of the White House in its lack of clear guidance
on how to respond to al Qaeda and effectively communicate policy and/or shape public
opinion to support policy?
• Were there failures at different levels of leadership within the agencies to respond to national
security policy (for example, within the Department of Defense)?

Priorities:
• Was there a failure to put counterterrorism as the national security priority on the part of the
White House? -on the part of agencies?

Instruments:
• Were there impediments inherent to or imposed upon instruments of counterterrorism policy
that limited their effectiveness (for example, legal restraints imposed on the CIA's ability to
target UBL)?

2. With the attacks on the U.S. September 1 1th, counterterrorism has now become the
government's national security priority, receiving primary focus and resources. But is the
government's current strategy putting too much emphasis on "swatting flies", and not focusing
sufficiently on the longer term goals of "draining the swamp" and ensuring the strongest possible
defensive posture at home? In other words, is the government focusing too much on picking off
individual agents of terrorism rather than dealing with the long-term threat of radical Islam, and
implementing a broad range of effective security measures to prevent another attack on America?

Longer-term strategies:
• Preventing the rise of terrorist sanctuaries;
• Shaping public opinion/educating the American public to appreciate the threat of terrorism in
order to allow policy makers to pursue all necessary options in the war on terrorism;
• Maintaining a defensive posture to effectively defend the homeland;
• Public diplomacy: committing resources to change negative attitudes toward the U.S. and
address the root causes of terrorism.
 Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

DRAFT 7/25/03
Outline of Team Three Monograph on Counterterrorism Policy

I. How did the United States try to fight terrorism before 9-11?

A. Narrative: What did senior decision makers see as the U.S. "strategy" infighting
terrorism ? In fighting al-Qa 'ida ?

1. How did they articulate this strategy?

2. Was it shared at all senior levels?

3. Was it shared with the field (commands, CIA stations, diplomatic posts,
etc)? How was it understood by those in the field?

4. Did policymakers recognize the unusual nature of the al-Qa'ida

challenge?

5. How did the strategy evolve over time and adapt to developments?

6. Key decision points linked to events

a) Which specific policy responses were considered after each key

event (Le. African Embassy and U.S.S. Cole bombings)?

b) What were the "windows for the use of force" for each considered
response and did the U.S.G. miss these "windows"?

7. Policy statements, documents, bureaucratic changes, and other

manifestations

B. Description of each Department or Agency participation

1. Did the CIA contribute with robust covert action efforts?

a) What instruments did the CIA use and why?

b) What contributions did these instruments make?

(1) To counterterrorism

(2) To efforts against al-Qa'ida

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c) What were the limits of each instrument? Were instruments used

in a timely fashion?

d) What instruments were not used?

(1) Why were they ruled out?

(2) What contribution might they have made?

e) What obstacles impaired the CIA's ability to target Bin Ladin?

2. Did the DoD and the military consider the full range of its capabilities?

a) What instruments did the military use and why?

b) What contributions did these instruments make?

(1) To counterterrorism

(2) To efforts against al-Qa 'ida

b) What were the limits of each instrument? Were instruments used

in a timely fashion?

c) What instruments were not used?

(1) Why were they ruled out?

(2) What contribution might they have made?

d) What obstacles impacted the,mih'tary's ability to use force against

al-Qa'ida? Was it limited to 'tTLAM therapy"?

e) What was the extent of the DoD's cooperation with the CIA? To
what extent did it support the CIA's covert action mission?

f) What steps, between 1998-2001, did the DoD prepare for a 9-11
attack?

g) To what extent did the DoD participate in homeland defense?

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3. Did the DoJ ensure a robust legal strategy and response?

a) What instruments did the DoJ use?

b) What contributions did these instruments make?

(1) To counterterrorism

(2) To efforts against al-Qa'ida

c) What were the limits of each instrument? Were instruments used

in a timely fashion?

d) What instruments were not used?

(1) Why were they ruled out?

(2) What contribution might they have made?

e) How legalistic were the lawyers? What was their relationship with
those operating in the field?

f) Were there times when a legal response was not appropriate?

g) Was the legal strategy coordinated and consistent with the overall
U.S. strategy?

4. To what extent did the State Department properly emphasize

counterterrorism in overall diplomacy? What were State's priorities from
1998-2001?

a) What instruments were used and what contributions did they

make?

(1) To counterterrorism

(2) To efforts against al-Qa 'ida

b) What were the limits of each instrument? Were instruments used

in a timely fashion?

c) What instruments were not used?

(1) Why were they ruled out?

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(2) What contribution might they have made?

5. Coordination

a) Did agencies coordinate with each other? How did they do so?

b) Did the White House ensure proper coordination and leadership

on counterterrorism issues?

6. Did counterterrorism support and attention go beyond senior (political)

levels of the agencies to include the civil service (and vice-versa)?

7. Did support and attention extend to the USG field offices, which would be
coordinating efforts in the field?

C. Were there gaps in U.S. strategy?

1. What gaps existed, if any, given the threat that was emerging?

2. Did policymakers recognize the gaps? If not, why not?

3. Did policymakers try to fill them?

4. Why were certain instruments not used?

5. Why did policymakers select cruise missiles strikes after the 1998
Embassy bombings. Why were other responses not employed?

6. Why was there no response to the attack on U.S.S. Cole?

7. Given the gaps in our strategy, was sufficient attention given to homeland
defense?

II. Did we miss opportunities to stop al-Qa'ida before 9-11?

A. Could we have stopped al-Qa 'ida in Sudan ?

1. Was Bin Ladin recognized as a problem during his time in Sudan? Was
al-Qa'ida? To what extent did we discuss the Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida
issues with Sudan? What about the presence of terrorists in general?

2. What other goals did the United States have in Sudan?

3. What leverage did the United States have with Sudan? With its
neighbors?

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4. What instruments were considered for pressing Sudan? Which ones were
used and why?

5. Why was Bin Ladin expelled?

B. Could we have stopped al-Qa 'ida in Afghanistan ?

1. When was Bin Ladin, and al-Qa'ida, recognized as a problem by senior

policymakers?

2. What other goals did the United States have in Afghanistan? With its
neighbors? To what extent did regional relations shape our Afghan policy?

3. What leverage did the United States have over the Taliban? Were there
indirect forms of leverage (e.g. through Pakistan)?

4. What instruments were considered? Which ones were used and why?

5. How successful were the various instruments?

C. Was stopping al-Qa 'ida apriority in the many permissive environments in which it
operated?

1. Identify range of al-Qa'ida operating environments and select several

(Pakistan, Germany, and Saudi Arabia) for particular scrutiny.

a) Describe the al-Qa'ida problem

b) Type of activity conducted in the country

c) Government response, or lack thereof

d) Degree of government cooperation with al-Qa'ida (or penetration),

if any

2. Explaining U.S. policy

a) Was al-Qa'ida recognized as a problem by senior policymakers in

the United States with regard to the various countries?

b) What other goals did the United States have in these countries?
How much did these conflict with our counterterrorism agenda?

c) What leverage did the United States have?

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d) What instruments were considered? Which ones were used and

why?

e) Why did the various instruments fail or succeed?

III. To what extent did the following bear on our efforts to fight terrorism and al-Qa'ida?

A. Conflicting priorities/focus

B. Resources

C. Recognition of the enormity of the threat

D. Levels of popular support for dramatic change

1. How strong was the opposition?

2. Was there an attempt to shape/lead public opinion?

E. Levels of foreign government support

1. Regimes that supported al-Qa'ida

2. Regimes sympathetic to al-Qa'ida's ideology

3. Regimes fearful of a confrontation with Islamists

4. Regimes that did not enjoy close relations with the United States

5. Lack of regime capacity for cracking down on al-Qa'ida (Le. resources,

civil liberty issues, etc)

F. Poor bureaucratic coordination and communication in the U.S.

G. Possible disconnects between Washington and the field

H. "Somalia syndrome"/casualty aversion

I. President Clinton's political troubles

J. Bureaucratic resistance (discuss for various bureaucracies, as appropriate,

including the U.S. military)

1. Did not see al-Qa'ida as their institution's mission

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2. Did not see al-Qa'ida as a sufficient threat

3. Institution unable to contribute due to lack of capabilities

K. Attitudes towards using covert action

L. Many to add here

IV. Have these issues been addressed?

A. Sufficient m oney ?

B. Sufficient focus?

C. Degree of institutionalization?

D. New problems that have emerged?

V. Are we doing the right thing now? (And is the lack of attacks tied to this?)

A. WMD, loose nukes

B. Iraq

C. MEPP

D. Draining the swamp

E. Anti-Americanism

F. Are we encouraging other countries (Le. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) to cooperate
and address terrorism? What is the quality and sincerity of their efforts?

Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

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