RURAL BANK OF PARARAQUE, INC., petitioner, vs. ISIDRA REMOLADO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Facts: This case is about the repurchase of mortgage property after the period of redemption and had expired. Isidra Remolado, 64, a widow, and resident of Makati, Rizal, owned a lot with an area of 308 square meters. In 1966 she mortgaged it to the Rural Bank of Paraaque, Inc. as security for a loan of P15,000. She paid the loan. On April 17, 1971 she mortgaged it again to the bank. She eventually secured loans totalling P18,000 the loans become overdue. The bank foreclosed the mortagage on July 21, 1972 and bought the property at the foreclosure sale for P22,192.70. The one-year period of redemption was to expire on August 21, 1973. The bank then advised Remolado about the redeeming of the said property. Despite the several noticed and extension given to Remolado, still she has taken no action. So on September 3, 1973 consolidated its ownership to the said lot, Remolados title was cancelled and a new title was issued to the bank. The on September 24, 1973 Remolado was given a chance to repurchase (not redeem since the period of redemption had expired) the property within 37 days. The bank did not specify the price. On October 26, 1973 Remolado and her daughter, Patrocinio Gomez, promised to pay the bank P33,000 on October 31 for the repurchase of the property. Contrary to her promise, Remolado did not repurchase the property on October 31, Five days later, or on November 5, Remolado and her daughter delivered P33,000 rash to the bank's assistant manager as repurchase price. The money was returned the next day, the asst. manager has no intention of receiving the money, it was just left by Remolado. At that time, the bank was no longer willing to allow the repurchase.

WON: Does Remolado has the right of redemption?

Ruling: We hold that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in ordering the reconveyance of the property, There was no binding agreement for its repurchase. Even on the assumption that the bank should be bound by its commitment to allow repurchase on or before October 31, 1973, still Remolado had no cause of action because she did not repurchase the property on that date.

Justice is done according to law. As a rule, equity follows the law. There may be a moral obligation, often regarded as an equitable consideration (meaning compassion), but if there is no enforceable legal duty, the action must fail although the disadvantaged party deserves commiseration or sympathy.

In the instant case, the bank acted within its legal rights when it refused to give Remolado any extension to repurchase after October 31, 1973. It had given her about two years to liquidate her obligation. She failed to do so.

SPOUSES CELEDONIO MANZANILLA and DOLORES FUERTE, and INES CARPIO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JUSTINA CAMPO, respondents.

Fact: In 1963, the spouses Manzanilla sold on installment an undivided one-half portion of their residential house. At the time of sale, the said property was mortgaged to GSIS which fact was known to the vendees, spouses Campo. The Campo spouses took possession of the premise upon payment of the first installment on April 17, 1963 and up to present. Some payments were made to Manzanilla spouses while some where made directly to GSIS. On May 17, 1965 filed its application to foreclose the mortgage property for the failure of the Manzanilla to pay their monthly amortizations. On October 11, 1965, the property was sold at public auction where GSIS was the highest bidder. Two months before the expiration of the period to redeem or on August 31, 1966, the Manzanilla spouses executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of the undivided one half portion of their property in favor of the Campo spouses. Upon the expiration of the period to redeem without the Manzanilla spouses exercising their right of redemption, title to the property was consolidated in favor of the GSIS and a new title issued in its name. In January 1969, the Manzanilla spouses made representations and succeeded in re-acquiring the property from the GSIS. Upon full payment of the purchase price, an Absolute Deed of Sale was executed by GSIS in favor of the Manzanilla spouses. On May 14, 1973, the Manzanilla spouses mortgaged the property to the Bian Rural Bank. On September 7, 1973, petitioner Ines Carpio purchased the property from the Manzanilla spouses and agreed to assume the mortgage in favor of Bian Rural Bank. On November 12, 1973, private respondent Justina Campo registered her adverse claim over TCT No. 188293 with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. On October 3, 1977, petitioner Ines Carpio filed an ejectment case against private respondent Justina Campo in Civil Case No. 31350, with the City Court of Quezon City.

WON: 1. Whether Or Not A Buyer Of One-Half Portion Of A Mortgaged Property With Full Knowledge Of Said Mortgage, May Demand Reconveyance From The Seller/Mortgagor Who Was Able To Buy Said Property From The Mortgagee After It Was Legally Foreclosed And Ownership Duly Consolidated In The Name Of The Mortgagee, Under The Doctrine Of Implied Trust.

2. Whether Or Not A Purchaser Of Real Property Is Bound To Go Beyond The Title Thereof In Determining The Real Status Of Said Property To Be Considered A Buyer In Good Faith.

3. Whether Or Not Private Respondent Is Guilty Of Laches.

Ruling: Doctrine of Implied Trust is not applicable to this case, Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. There was no mistake nor fraud on the part of petitioners when the subject property was re-acquired from the GSIS. The fact that they previously sold one-half portion thereof has no more significance in this re-acquisition. Private respondent's right over the one-half portion was obliterated when absolute ownership and title passed on to the GSIS after the foreclosure sale. The property as held by GSIS had a clean title. The property that was passed on to petitioners retained that quality of title.

As regards the rights of private respondent Ines Carpio, she is a buyer in good faith and for value. There was no showing that at the time of the sale to her of the subject property, she knew of any lien on the property except the mortgage in favor of the Bian Rural Bank. No other lien was annotated on the certificate of title. She is also not required by law to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. When there is nothing on the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property or any encumbrances thereon, the purchaser is not to explore further than what the Torrens Title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right thereof.

A.O. FISHER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOHN C. ROBB, defendant-appellant.

Facts: Philippine Greyhound Club Inc. (PGC) told the herein defendant appellant John Robb to make a business trip to Shanghai to study the operation of dog racing course. Then later on he came to know the manager of American Club where he used to stay. And the manager was interested in the Philippine Greyhound Club Inc. and decided to have part. Then the plaintiff filled a subscription and sent a telegraphic transfer of P3000 as first payment for his subscription. Later the defendant returned to Manila. Some months thereafter, the PGC issued a call for the second payment of the subscriptions. Due to the manipulations of the board of Directors during the absence of the defendant undertook the organization called Philippine Racing Club. . The defendant immediately endeavored to save the investment of those who had subscribed to the PGC, by having the PGC acquire the remaining assets of the PGC. Because of what happened the defendant-appellant told the plaintiff-appellee that he felt morally responsible for the second payments which had been made to carry out his plan, and that Mr. Hilscher and he would do everything possible so that the stockholders who had made second payments may receive the amount paid by them from their personal funds because they voluntarily assumed the responsibility to make such payment as soon as they receive from the Philippine racing Club certain shares for their services as promoters of said organization, it does not appear that the plaintiff-appellee had consented to said form of reimbursement of the P2,000 which he had directly paid to the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., in satisfaction of the second installment.

WON:

Whether or not there was sufficient consideration to justify the promise made by the defendantappellant

Ruling: In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold, that the promise made by an organizer of a dog racing course to a stockholder to return to him certain amounts paid by the latter in satisfaction of his subscription upon the belief of said organizer that he was morally responsible because of the failure of the enterprise, is not the consideration required by article 1261 of the Civil Code as an essential element for the legal existence of an onerous contract which would bind the promisor to comply with his promise.