On Memory and Reminiscence Aristotle (ca. 350 b.c.

Classics in the History of Psychology An internet resource developed by Christopher D. Green York University, oronto, !ntario !n "e#ory and $e#iniscence Aristotle %ca. &'( b.c.) translated by *. +. ,eare !riginally published in $oss, -. D. %.d.) %/0&(). he 1orks of Aristotle %vol. &). !2ford3 Clarendon Press. Part / -e have, in the ne2t place, to treat of "e#ory and $e#e#bering, considering its nature, its cause, and the part of the soul to 1hich this e2perience, as 1ell as that of $ecollecting, belongs. 4or the persons 1ho possess a retentive #e#ory are not identical 1ith those 1ho e2cel in po1er of recollection5 indeed, as a rule, slo1 people have a good #e#ory, 1hereas those 1ho are 6uick7 1itted and clever are better at recollecting. -e #ust first for# a true conception of these ob8ects of #e#ory, a point on 1hich #istakes are often #ade. 9o1 to re#e#ber the future is not possible, but this is an ob8ect of opinion or e2pectation %and indeed there #ight be actually a science of e2pectation, like that of divination, in 1hich so#e believe)5 nor is there #e#ory of the present, but only sense7perception. 4or by the latter 1e kno1 not the future, nor the past, but the present only. ,ut #e#ory relates to the past. 9o one 1ould say that he re#e#bers the present, 1hen it is present, e.g. a given 1hite ob8ect at the #o#ent 1hen he sees it5 nor 1ould one say that he re#e#bers an ob8ect of scientific conte#plation at the #o#ent 1hen he is actually conte#plating it, and has it full before his #ind57of the for#er he 1ould say only that he perceives it, of the latter only that he kno1s it. ,ut 1hen one has scientific kno1ledge, or perception, apart fro# the actuali:ations of the faculty concerned, he thus ;re#e#bers; %that the angles of a triangle are together e6ual to t1o right angles)5 as to the for#er, that he learned it, or thought it out for hi#self, as to the latter, that he heard, or sa1, it, or had so#e such sensible e2perience of it. 4or 1henever one e2ercises the faculty of re#e#bering, he #ust say 1ithin hi#self, ;+ for#erly heard %or other1ise perceived) this,; or ;+ for#erly had this thought;. "e#ory is, therefore, neither Perception nor Conception, but a state or affection of one of these, conditioned by lapse of ti#e. As already observed, there is no such thing as #e#ory of the present 1hile present, for the present is ob8ect only of perception, and the future, of e2pectation, but the ob8ect of #e#ory is the past. All #e#ory, therefore, i#plies a ti#e elapsed5 conse6uently only those ani#als 1hich perceive ti#e re#e#ber, and the organ 1hereby they perceive ti#e is also that 1hereby they re#e#ber. he sub8ect of ;presentation; has been already considered in our 1ork !n the <oul. -ithout a presentation intellectual activity is i#possible. 4or there is in such activity an incidental affection identical 1ith one also incidental in geo#etrical de#onstrations. 4or in the latter case, though 1e do not for the purpose of the proof #ake any use of the fact that the 6uantity in the triangle %for e2a#ple, 1hich 1e have dra1n) is deter#inate, 1e nevertheless dra1 it deter#inate in 6uantity. <o like1ise 1hen one e2erts the intellect %e.g. on the sub8ect of first principles), although the ob8ect #ay not be 6uantitative, one envisages it as 6uantitative, though he thinks it in abstraction fro# 6uantity5 1hile, on the other hand, if the ob8ect of the intellect is essentially of the class of things that are 6uantitative, but indeter#inate, one envisages it as if it had deter#inate 6uantity, though subse6uently, in thinking it, he abstracts fro# its deter#inateness. -hy 1e cannot e2ercise the intellect on any ob8ect absolutely apart fro# the continuous, or apply it even to non7te#poral things unless in conne2ion 1ith ti#e, is another 6uestion. 9o1, one #ust cogni:e #agnitude and #otion by #eans of the sa#e faculty by 1hich one cogni:es ti#e %i.e. by that 1hich is also the faculty of

#e#ory), and the presentation %involved in such cognition) is an affection of the sensus co##unis5 1hence this follo1s, vi:. that the cognition of these ob8ects %#agnitude, #otion ti#e) is effected by the %said sensus co##unis, i.e. the) pri#ary faculty of perception. Accordingly, #e#ory %not #erely of sensible, but) even of intellectual ob8ects involves a presentation3 hence 1e #ay conclude that it belongs to the faculty of intelligence only incidentally, 1hile directly and essentially it belongs to the pri#ary faculty of sense7perception. Hence not only hu#an beings and the beings 1hich possess opinion or intelligence, but also certain other ani#als, possess #e#ory. +f #e#ory 1ere a function of %pure) intellect, it 1ould not have been as it is an attribute of #any of the lo1er ani#als, but probably, in that case, no #ortal beings 1ould have had #e#ory5 since, even as the case stands, it is not an attribute of the# all, 8ust because all have not the faculty of perceiving ti#e. -henever one actually re#e#bers having seen or heard, or learned, so#ething, he includes in this act %as 1e have already observed) the consciousness of ;for#erly;5 and the distinction of ;for#er; and ;latter; is a distinction in ti#e. Accordingly if asked, of 1hich a#ong the parts of the soul #e#ory is a function, 1e reply3 #anifestly of that part to 1hich ;presentation; appertains5 and all ob8ects capable of being presented %vi:. aistheta) are i##ediately and properly ob8ects of #e#ory, 1hile those %vi:. noeta) 1hich necessarily involve %but only involve) presentation are ob8ects of #e#ory incidentally. !ne #ight ask ho1 it is possible that though the affection %the presentation) alone is present, and the %related) fact absent, the latter7that 1hich is not present7is re#e#bered. % he 6uestion arises), because it is clear that 1e #ust conceive that 1hich is generated through sense7perception in the sentient soul, and in the part of the body 1hich is its seat7vi:. that affection the state 1hereof 1e call #e#ory7to be so#e such thing as a picture. he process of #ove#ent %sensory sti#ulation) involved the act of perception sta#ps in, as it 1ere, a sort of i#pression of the percept, 8ust as persons do 1ho #ake an i#pression 1ith a seal. his e2plains 1hy, in those 1ho are strongly #oved o1ing to passion, or ti#e of life, no #ne#onic i#pression is for#ed5 8ust as no i#pression 1ould be for#ed if the #ove#ent of the seal 1ere to i#pinge on running 1ater5 1hile there are others in 1ho#, o1ing to the receiving surface being frayed, as happens to %the stucco on) old %cha#ber) 1alls, or o1ing to the hardness of the receiving surface, the re6uisite i#pression is not i#planted at all. Hence both very young and very old persons are defective in #e#ory5 they are in a state of flu2, the for#er because of their gro1th, the latter, o1ing to their decay. +n like #anner, also, both those 1ho are too 6uick and those 1ho are too slo1 have bad #e#ories. he for#er are too soft, the latter too hard %in the te2ture of their receiving organs), so that in the case of the for#er the presented i#age %though i#printed) does not re#ain in the soul, 1hile on the latter it is not i#printed at all. ,ut then, if this truly describes 1hat happens in the genesis of #e#ory, %the 6uestion stated above arises3) 1hen one re#e#bers, is it this i#pressed affection that he re#e#bers, or is it the ob8ective Ou seja, a thing fro# 1hich this 1as derived= +f the for#er, it 1ould follo1 that 1e re#e#ber nothing 1hich is lembrana absent5 if the latter, ho1 is it possible that, though perceiving directly only the i#pression, 1e diz respeito re#e#ber that absent thing 1hich 1e do not perceive= Granted that there is in us so#ething like an i#pression or picture, 1hy should the perception of the #ere i#pression be #e#ory of so#ething imagem else, instead of being related to this i#pression alone= 4or 1hen one actually re#e#bers, this atual ou i#pression is 1hat he conte#plates, and this is 1hat he perceives. Ho1 then does he re#e#ber impresso 1hat is not present= !ne #ight as 1ell suppose it possible also to see or hear that 1hich is not present. +n reply, 1e suggest that this very thing is 6uite conceivable, nay, actually occurs in que a e2perience. A picture painted on a panel is at once a picture and a likeness3 that is, 1hile one and originou? the sa#e, it is both of these, although the ;being; of both is not the sa#e, and one #ay conte#plate it either as a picture, or as a likeness. *ust in the sa#e 1ay 1e have to conceive that the #ne#onic presentation 1ithin us is so#ething 1hich by itself is #erely an ob8ect of conte#plation, 1hile, in7 relation to so#ething else, it is also a presentation of that other thing. +n so far as it is regarded in itself, it is only an ob8ect of conte#plation, or a presentation5 but 1hen considered as relative to so#ething else, e.g. as its likeness, it is also a #ne#onic token. Hence, 1henever the residual sensory process i#plied by it is actuali:ed in consciousness, if the soul perceives this in so far as it is so#ething absolute, it appears to occur as a #ere thought or presentation5 but if the soul perceives it 6ua related to so#ething else, then,78ust as 1hen one conte#plates the painting in the picture as being a likeness, and 1ithout having %at the #o#ent) seen the actual >oriskos, conte#plates it as a likeness of >oriskos, and in that case the e2perience involved in this conte#plation of it %as relative) is different fro# 1hat one has 1hen he conte#plates it si#ply as a

painted figure7%so in the case of #e#ory 1e have the analogous difference for), of the ob8ects in the soul, the one %the unrelated ob8ect) presents itself si#ply as a thought, but the other %the related ob8ect) 8ust because, as in the painting, it is a likeness, presents itself as a #ne#onic token. -e can no1 understand 1hy it is that so#eti#es, 1hen 1e have such processes, based on so#e for#er act of perception, occurring in the soul, 1e do not kno1 1hether this really i#plies our having had perceptions corresponding to the#, and 1e doubt 1hether the case is or is not one of #e#ory. ,ut occasionally it happens that %1hile thus doubting) 1e get a sudden idea and recollect that 1e heard or sa1 so#ething for#erly. his %occurrence of the ;sudden idea;) happens 1henever, fro# conte#plating a #ental ob8ect as absolute, one changes his point of vie1, and regards it as relative to so#ething else. he opposite %sc. to the case of those 1ho at first do not recogni:e their phantas#s as #ne#onic) also occurs, as happened in the cases of Antipheron of !reus and others suffering fro# #ental derange#ent5 for they 1ere accusto#ed to speak of their #ere phantas#s as facts of their past e2perience, and as if re#e#bering the#. his takes place 1henever one conte#plates 1hat is not a likeness as if it 1ere a likeness. "ne#onic e2ercises ai# at preserving one;s #e#ory of so#ething by repeatedly re#inding hi# of it5 1hich i#plies nothing else %on the learner;s part) than the fre6uent conte#plation of so#ething %vi:. the ;#ne#onic;, 1hatever it #ay be) as a likeness, and not as out of relation. As regards the 6uestion, therefore, 1hat #e#ory or re#e#bering is, it has no1 been sho1n that it is the state of a presentation, related as a likeness to that of 1hich it is a presentation5 and as to the 6uestion of 1hich of the faculties 1ithin us #e#ory is a function, %it has been sho1n) that it is a function of the pri#ary faculty of sense7perception, i.e. of that faculty 1hereby 1e perceive ti#e. Part ? 9e2t co#es the sub8ect of $ecollection, in dealing 1ith 1hich 1e #ust assu#e as funda#ental the truths elicited above in our introductory discussions. 4or recollection is not the ;recovery; or ;ac6uisition; of #e#ory5 since at the instant 1hen one at first learns %a fact of science) or e2periences %a particular fact of sense), he does not thereby ;recover; a #e#ory, inas#uch as none has preceded, nor does he ac6uire one ab initio. +t is only at the instant 1hen the aforesaid state or affection %of the aisthesis or upolepsis) is i#planted in the soul that #e#ory e2ists, and therefore #e#ory is not itself i#planted concurrently 1ith the continuous i#plantation of the %original) sensory e2perience. 4urther3 at the very individual and concluding instant 1hen first %the sensory e2perience or scientific kno1ledge) has been co#pletely i#planted, there is then already established in the person affected the %sensory) affection, or the scientific kno1ledge %if one ought to apply the ter# ;scientific kno1ledge; to the %#ne#onic) state or affection5 and indeed one #ay 1ell re#e#ber, in the ;incidental; sense, so#e of the things %i.e. ta katholou) 1hich are properly ob8ects of scientific kno1ledge)5 but to re#e#ber, strictly and properly speaking, is an activity 1hich 1ill not be i##anent until the original e2perience has undergone lapse of ti#e. 4or one re#e#bers no1 1hat one sa1 or other1ise e2perienced for#erly5 the #o#ent of the original e2perience and the #o#ent of the #e#ory of it are never identical. A Necessidade de um espaamento Again, %even 1hen ti#e has elapsed, and one can be said really to have ac6uired #e#ory, this is not necessarily recollection, for firstly) it is obviously possible, 1ithout any present act of recollection, to re#e#ber as a continued conse6uence of the original perception or other e2perience5 1hereas 1hen %after an interval of obliviscence) one recovers so#e scientific kno1ledge 1hich he had before, or so#e perception, or so#e other e2perience, the state of 1hich 1e above declared to be #e#ory, it is then, and then only, that this recovery #ay a#ount to a recollection of any of the things aforesaid. ,ut, %though as observed above, re#e#bering does not necessarily i#ply recollecting), recollecting al1ays i#plies re#e#bering, and actuali:ed #e#ory follo1s %upon the successful act of recollecting).

recorda implica a memria: primeiro h uma imagem espontne que se refere a um ,ut secondly, even the assertion that recollection is the reinstate#ent in consciousness of impresso so#ething 1hich 1as there before but had disappeared re6uires 6ualification. his assertion #ay passada, be true, but it #ay also be false5 for the sa#e person #ay t1ice learn %fro# so#e teacher), or t1ice depois discover %i.e. e2cogitate), the sa#e fact. empreend se uma busca consciente de tempo

Accordingly, the act of recollecting ought %in its definition) to be distinguished fro# these acts5 i.e. recollecting #ust i#ply in those 1ho recollect the presence of so#e spring over and above that fro# 1hich they originally learn. Acts of recollection, as they occur in e2perience, are due to the fact that one #ove#ent has by nature another that succeeds it in regular order. +f this order be necessary, 1henever a sub8ect e2periences the for#er of t1o #ove#ents thus connected, it 1ill %invariably) e2perience the latter5 if, ho1ever, the order be not necessary, but custo#ary, only in the #a8ority of cases 1ill the sub8ect e2perience the latter of the t1o #ove#ents. ,ut it is a fact that there are so#e #ove#ents, by a single e2perience of 1hich persons take the i#press of custo# #ore deeply than they do by e2periencing others #any ti#es5 hence upon seeing so#e things but once 1e re#e#ber the# better than others 1hich 1e #ay have been fre6uently. -henever therefore, 1e are recollecting, 1e are e2periencing certain of the antecedent #ove#ents until finally 1e e2perience the one after 1hich custo#arily co#es that 1hich 1e seek. his e2plains 1hy 1e hunt up the series %of kineseis) having started in thought either fro# a present intuition or so#e other, and fro# so#ething either si#ilar, or contrary, to 1hat 1e seek, or else fro# that 1hich is contiguous 1ith it. <uch is the e#pirical ground of the process of recollection5 for the #ne#onic #ove#ents involved in these starting7points are in so#e cases identical, in others, again, si#ultaneous, 1ith those of the idea 1e seek, 1hile in others they co#prise a portion of the#, so that the re#nant 1hich one e2perienced after that portion %and 1hich still re6uires to be e2cited in #e#ory) is co#paratively s#all. hus, then, it is that persons seek to recollect, and thus, too, it is that they recollect even 1ithout the effort of seeking to do so, vi:. 1hen the #ove#ent i#plied in recollection has supervened on so#e other 1hich is its condition. 4or, as a rule, it is 1hen antecedent #ove#ents of the classes here described have first been e2cited, that the particular #ove#ent i#plied in recollection follo1s. -e need not e2a#ine a series of 1hich the beginning and end lie far apart, in order to see ho1 %by recollection) 1e re#e#ber5 one in 1hich they lie near one another 1ill serve e6ually 1ell. 4or it is clear that the #ethod is in each case the sa#e, that is, one hunts up the ob8ective series, 1ithout any previous search or previous recollection. 4or %there is, besides the natural order, vi:. the order of the pral#ata, or events of the pri#ary e2perience, also a custo#ary order, and) by the effect of custo# the #ne#onic #ove#ents tend to succeed one another in a certain order. Accordingly, therefore, 1hen one 1ishes to recollect, this is 1hat he 1ill do3 he 1ill try to obtain a beginning of #ove#ent 1hose se6uel shall be the #ove#ent 1hich he desires to rea1aken. his e2plains 1hy atte#pts at recollection succeed soonest and best 1hen they start fro# a beginning %of so#e ob8ective series). 4or, in order of succession, the #ne#onic #ove#ents are to one another as the ob8ective facts %fro# 1hich they are derived). Accordingly, things arranged in a fi2ed order, like the successive de#onstrations in geo#etry, are easy to re#e#ber %or recollect) 1hile badly arranged sub8ects are re#e#bered 1ith difficulty. $ecollecting differs also in this respect fro# relearning, that one 1ho recollects 1ill be able, so#eho1, to #ove, solely by his o1n effort, to the ter# ne2t after the starting7point. -hen one cannot do this of hi#self, but only by e2ternal assistance, he no longer re#e#bers %i.e. he has totally forgotten, and therefore of course cannot recollect). +t often happens that, though a person cannot recollect at the #o#ent, yet by seeking he can do so, and discovers 1hat he seeks. his he succeeds in doing by setting up #any #ove#ents, until finally he e2cites one of a kind 1hich 1ill have for its se6uel the fact he 1ishes to recollect. 4or re#e#bering %1hich is the condicio sine 6ua non of recollecting) is the e2istence, potentially, in the #ind of a #ove#ent capable of sti#ulating it to the desired #ove#ent, and this, as has been said, in such a 1ay that the person should be #oved %pro#pted to recollection) fro# 1ithin hi#self, i.e. in conse6uence of #ove#ents 1holly contained 1ithin hi#self. ,ut one #ust get hold of a starting7point. his e2plains 1hy it is that persons are supposed to recollect so#eti#es by starting fro# #ne#onic loci. he cause is that they pass s1iftly in thought fro# one point to another, e.g. fro# #ilk to 1hite, fro# 1hite to #ist, and thence to #oist, fro# 1hich one re#e#bers Autu#n %the ;season of #ists;), if this be the season he is trying to recollect.

+t see#s true in general that the #iddle point also a#ong all things is a good #ne#onic starting7 point fro# 1hich to reach any of the#. 4or if one does not recollect before, he 1ill do so 1hen he has co#e to this, or, if not, nothing can help hi#5 as, e.g. if one 1ere to have in #ind the nu#erical series denoted by the sy#bols A, ,, G, D, ., @, +, H, !. 4or, if he does not re#e#ber 1hat he 1ants at ., then at . he re#e#bers !5 because fro# . #ove#ent in either direction is possible, to D or to @. ,ut, if it is not for one of these that he is searching, he 1ill re#e#ber %1hat he is searching for) 1hen he has co#e to G if he is searching for H or +. ,ut if %it is) not %for H or + that he is searching, but for one of the ter#s that re#ain), he 1ill re#e#ber by going to A, and so in all cases %in 1hich one starts fro# a #iddle point). he cause of one;s so#eti#es recollecting and so#eti#es not, though starting fro# the sa#e point, is, that fro# the sa#e starting7point a #ove#ent can be #ade in several directions, as, for instance, fro# G to + or to D. +f, then, the #ind has not %1hen starting fro# .) #oved in an old path %i.e. one in 1hich it #oved first having the ob8ective e2perience, and that, therefore, in 1hich un7;ethi:ed; phusis 1ould have it again #ove), it tends to #ove to the #ore custo#ary5 for %the #ind having, by chance or other1ise, #issed #oving in the ;old; 1ay) Custo# no1 assu#es the role of 9ature. Hence the rapidity 1ith 1hich 1e recollect 1hat 1e fre6uently think about. 4or as regular se6uence of events is in accordance 1ith nature, so, too, regular se6uence is observed in the actuali:ation of kinesis %in consciousness), and here fre6uency tends to produce %the regularity of) nature. And since in the real# of nature occurrences take place 1hich are even contrary to nature, or fortuitous, the sa#e happens a fortiori in the sphere s1ayed by custo#, since in this sphere natural la1 is not si#ilarly established. Hence it is that %fro# the sa#e starting7point) the #ind receives an i#pulse to #ove so#eti#es in the re6uired direction, and at other ti#es other1ise, %doing the latter) particularly 1hen so#ething else so#eho1 deflects the #ind fro# the right direction and attracts it to itself. his last consideration e2plains too ho1 it happens that, 1hen 1e 1ant to re#e#ber a na#e, 1e re#e#ber one so#e1hat like it, indeed, but blunder in reference to %i.e. in pronouncing) the one 1e intended. hus, then, recollection takes place. ,ut the point of capital i#portance is that %for the purpose of recollection) one should cogni:e, deter#inately or indeter#inately, the ti#e7relation %of that 1hich he 1ishes to recollect). here is,7let it be taken as a fact,7so#ething by 1hich one distinguishes a greater and a s#aller ti#e5 and it is reasonable to think that one does this in a 1ay analogous to that in 1hich one discerns %spacial) #agnitudes. 4or it is not by the #ind;s reaching out to1ards the#, as so#e say a visual ray fro# the eye does %in seeing), that one thinks of large things at a distance in space %for even if they are not there, one #ay si#ilarly think the#)5 but one does so by a proportionate #ental #ove#ent. 4or there are in the #ind the like figures and #ove#ents %i.e. ;like; to those of ob8ects and events).

herefore, 1hen one thinks the greater ob8ects, in 1hat 1ill his thinking those differ fro# his thinking the s#aller= %+n nothing,) because all the internal though s#aller are as it 1ere proportional to the e2ternal. 9o1, as 1e #ay assu#e 1ithin a person so#ething proportional to the for#s %of distant #agnitudes), so, too, 1e #ay doubtless assu#e also so#ething else proportional to their distances. As, therefore, if one has %psychically) the #ove#ent in A,, ,., he constructs in thought %i.e. kno1s ob8ectively) GD, since AG and GD bear e6ual ratios respectively %to A, and ,.), %so he 1ho recollects also proceeds). -hy then does he construct GD rather than @H= +s it not because as AG is to A,, so is ! to += hese #ove#ents therefore %sc. in A,, ,., and in !3+) he has si#ultaneously. ,ut if he 1ishes to construct to thought @H, he has in #ind ,. in like #anner as before %1hen constructing GD), but no1, instead of %the #ove#ents of the ratio) !3+, he has in #ind %those of the ratio >3A5 for >3A33@A3,A. %<ee diagra#.) -hen, therefore, the ;#ove#ent; corresponding to the ob8ect and that corresponding to its ti#e concur, then one actually re#e#bers. +f one supposes %hi#self to #ove in these different but concurrent 1ays) 1ithout really doing so, he supposes hi#self to re#e#ber. 4or one #ay be #istaken, and think that he re#e#bers 1hen he really does not. ,ut it is not possible, conversely, that 1hen one actually re#e#bers he should not suppose hi#self to re#e#ber, but should re#e#ber unconsciously. 4or re#e#bering, as 1e have conceived it, essentially i#plies consciousness of itself. +f, ho1ever, the #ove#ent corresponding to the ob8ective fact takes place 1ithout that corresponding to the ti#e, or, if the latter takes place 1ithout the for#er, one does not re#e#ber. he #ove#ent ans1ering to the ti#e is of t1o kinds. <o#eti#es in re#e#bering a fact one has no deter#inate ti#e7notion of it, no such notion as that e.g. he did so#ething or other on the day before yesterday5 1hile in other cases he has a deter#inate notion7of the ti#e. <till, even though one does not re#e#ber 1ith actual deter#ination of the ti#e, he genuinely re#e#bers, none the less. Persons are 1ont to say that they re#e#ber %so#ething), but yet do not kno1 1hen %it occurred, as happens) 1henever they do not kno1 deter#inately the e2act length of ti#e i#plied in the ;1hen;. +t has been already stated that those 1ho have a good #e#ory are not identical 1ith those 1ho are 6uick at recollecting. ,ut the act of recollecting differs fro# that of re#e#bering, not only chronologically, but also in this, that #any also of the other ani#als %as 1ell as #an) have #e#ory, but, of all that 1e are ac6uainted 1ith, none, 1e venture to say, e2cept #an, shares in the faculty of recollection. he cause of this is that recollection is, as it 1ere a #ode of inference. 4or he 1ho endeavours to recollect infers that he for#erly sa1, or heard, or had so#e such e2perience, and the process %by 1hich he succeeds in recollecting) is, as it 1ere, a sort of investigation. ,ut to investigate in this 1ay belongs naturally to those ani#als alone 1hich are also endo1ed 1ith the faculty of deliberation5 %1hich proves 1hat 1as said above), for deliberation is a for# of inference. hat the affection is corporeal, i.e. that recollection is a searching for an ;i#age; in a corporeal substrate, is proved by the fact that in so#e persons, 1hen, despite the #ost strenuous application of thought, they have been unable to recollect, it %vi:. the ana#nesis B the effort at recollection) e2cites a feeling of disco#fort, 1hich, even though they abandon the effort at recollection, persists in the# none the less5 and especially in persons of #elancholic te#pera#ent. 4or these are #ost po1erfully #oved by presentations. he reason 1hy the effort of recollection is not under the control of their 1ill is that, as those 1ho thro1 a stone cannot stop it at their 1ill 1hen thro1n, so he 1ho tries to recollect and ;hunts; %after an idea) sets up a process in a #aterial part, %that) in 1hich resides the affection. hose 1ho have #oisture around that part 1hich is the centre of sense7 perception suffer #ost disco#fort of this kind. 4or 1hen once the #oisture has been set in #otion it is not easily brought to rest, until the idea 1hich 1as sought for has again presented itself, and thus the #ove#ent has found a straight course. 4or a si#ilar reason bursts of anger or fits of terror, 1hen once they have e2cited such #otions, are not at once allayed, even though the angry or terrified persons %by efforts of 1ill) set up counter #otions, but the passions continue to #ove the# on, in the sa#e direction as at first, in opposition to such counter #otions. he affection rese#bles also that in the case of 1ords, tunes, or sayings, 1henever one of the# has beco#e inveterate on the lips. People give the# up and resolve to avoid the#5 yet again they find the#selves hu##ing the forbidden air, or using the prohibited 1ord. hose 1hose upper parts are abnor#ally large, as is the case 1ith d1arfs, have abnor#ally 1eak #e#ory, as co#pared 1ith their opposites, because of

the great 1eight 1hich they have resting upon the organ of perception, and because their #ne#onic #ove#ents are, fro# the very first, not able to keep true to a course, but are dispersed, and because, in the effort at recollection, these #ove#ents do not easily find a direct on1ard path. +nfants and very old persons have bad #e#ories, o1ing to the a#ount of #ove#ent going on 1ithin the#5 for the latter are in process of rapid decay, the for#er in process of vigorous gro1th5 and 1e #ay add that children, until considerably advanced in years, are d1arf7like in their bodily structure. <uch then is our theory as regards #e#ory and re#e#bering their nature, and the particular organ of the soul by 1hich ani#als re#e#ber5 also as regards recollection, its for#al definition, and the #anner and causes7of its perfor#ance.