EN BANC G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989 SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner, vs.

CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAUL DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.: The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this petition. The antecedent facts are as follows: 1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur. 2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity). 3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said members, respondents Acmad Tomawis and Pakil Dagalangit, filed on March 23, 1987 with the Commission on Elections their respective certificates of candidacy in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections for the district of Lanao del Sur but they later withdrew from the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed again their positions as members of the Assembly. 4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter which reads: The Committee on Muslim Affairs well undertake consultations and dialogues with local government officials, civic, religious organizations and traditional leaders on the recent and present political developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII. The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues would hopefully chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod the President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the Commission. You are requested to invite some members of the Pampook Assembly of your respective assembly on November 1 to 15, 1987, with venue at the Congress of the Philippines. Your presence, unstinted support and cooperation is (sic) indispensable. 5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as "our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang pampook ... ." 6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting Secretary Alimbuyao sent to the members of the Assembly the following telegram:

TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE CONGRESSMAN JIMMY MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST SAID COMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15. HENCE WERE ALL ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO SESSION IN NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE HEARING OF CONGRESS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG PAMPOOK OF MATALAM FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS. 7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice, with the following assemblymen present: 1. Sali, Salic 2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic) 3. Dagalangit, Rakil 4. Dela Fuente, Antonio 5. Mangelen, Conte 6. Ortiz, Jesus 7. Palomares, Diego 8. Sinsuat, Bimbo 9. Tomawis, Acmad 10. Tomawis, Jerry After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant. 8. On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly resumed with the following Assemblymen present: 1. Mangelen Conte-Presiding Officer 2. Ali Salic 3. Ali Salindatu 4. Aratuc, Malik 5. Cajelo, Rene 6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic) 7. Dagalangit, Rakil 8. Dela Fuente, Antonio 9. Ortiz, Jesus

10 Palomares, Diego 11. Quijano, Jesus 12. Sinsuat, Bimbo 13. Tomawis, Acmad 14. Tomawis, Jerry An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads: HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House, with the presence of our colleagues who have come to attend the session today, I move to call the names of the new comers in order for them to cast their votes on the previous motion to declare the position of the Speaker vacant. But before doing so, I move also that the designation of the Speaker Pro Tempore as the Presiding Officer and Mr. Johnny Evangelists as Acting Secretary in the session last November 2, 1987 be reconfirmed in today's session. HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions. PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions presented? Me chair hears none and the said motions are approved. ... Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant; one abstained and none voted against. 1 Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows: WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that(a) This Petition be given due course; (b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on November 5, 1987, and on any day thereafter; (c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null and void; (d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting, and (e) Making the injunction permanent. Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable. 2 Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution filed by the Sangguniang Pampook, "EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AUTONOMOUS REGION XII," 3 on the grounds, among other things, that the petitioner "had caused to be prepared and signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections. . . and

nothing in the record of the Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula was ever made . . ." 4 and that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation of the power of the Assembly," 5 that the petitioner "had recently caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the nonpayment of the salaries and emoluments of some Assembly [sic]," 6 and that he had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," 7 for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic". 8 The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made the case moot and academic. We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reason simply of the expulsion resolution so issued. For, if the petitioner's expulsion was done purposely to make this petition moot and academic, and to preempt the Court, it will not make it academic. On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the expulsion in question is of no force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense, assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the other hand, what appears in the records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the respondents) that "since November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the Sangguniang Pampook." 9 "To be sure, the private respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted him to come to Cotabato City," 10 but that was "so that their differences could be threshed out and settled." 11 Certainly, that avowed wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute for the notice and hearing contemplated by law. While we have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative law, does not absolutely require notice and that a party need only be given the opportunity to be heard, 12 it does not appear herein that the petitioner had, to begin with, been made aware that he had in fact stood charged of graft and corruption before his collegues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now levelled amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion. In the second place, (the resolution) appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen against the petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be abduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution) speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assemblyman act which some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity and character as representative of the people" 13 an act that cannot possibly justify expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution, 14 and, unless the recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts.

We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due process. And while it is within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse. It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the courts may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less strike down their acts. We come, therefore, to the second issue: Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of selfgovernment given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII? The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree No. 1618 15 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree established "internal autonomy" 16 in the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution," 17 with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities 18 specified therein. It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative matters for the respective regions," 19 except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National Government," 20 "which include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) National defense and security; (2) Foreign relations; (3) Foreign trade; (4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and external borrowing, (5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural resources; (6) Air and sea transport (7) Postal matters and telecommunications; (8) Customs and quarantine; (9) Immigration and deportation; (10) Citizenship and naturalization; (11) National economic, social and educational planning; and (12) General auditing. 21 In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions ..." 22 Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," 23 "and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities

and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." 24 At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" 25over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." 26 He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. 27 Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. 28 But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere administration is a question foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local government unit constituted prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy now, in this case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the proper case. Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus: Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. Here shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. 29 Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 30 xxx xxx xxx See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. 31 An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). 32 If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internalacts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the

autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." 33 In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services, thus: SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook shall exercise local legislative powers over regional affairs within the framework of national development plans, policies and goals, in the following areas: (1) Organization of regional administrative system; (2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region; (3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous Region; (4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region; (5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region; (6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree; (7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the Autonomous Region; (8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other social services, programs and facilities; (9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and culture indigenous to the Autonomous Region; and (10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the enactment of such measures as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the people in the Autonomous Region. The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national legislation, policies, plans and programs. The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa. 34 Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker. Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the Sanggunian, in convening on November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole purpose of declaring the office of the Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since the Assembly was then on recess; and (2) assuming that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective nevertheless for lack of quorum. Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules,

"[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook," 35 but it provides likewise that "the Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals." 36 Of course, there is disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the recess called by the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is the "recess of short intervals" referred to; the petitioner says that it is while the respondents insist that, to all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and that "recess" as used by their Rules only refers to "a recess when arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally and obviate dissenssion [sic] and disunity. 37 The Court agrees with the respondents on this regard, since clearly, the Rules speak of "short intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the Speaker could not have validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on November 1, the date session opens under the same Rules. 38 Hence, there can be no recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt any session. But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could. do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith. It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid "recess" in order to forestall the Assembly from bringing about his ouster. This is not apparent from the pleadings before us. We are convinced that the invitation was what precipitated it. In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken as establishing a precedent, since, as we said, a recess can not be validly declared without a session having been first opened. In upholding the petitioner herein, we are not giving him a carte blanche to order recesses in the future in violation of the Rules, or otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings thereof. Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from reorganizing itself pursuant to its lawful prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at the proper time. In the event that be petitioner should initiate obstructive moves, the Court is certain that it is armed with enough coercive remedies to thwart them. 39 In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII, is ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member, Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. No costs. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC G.R. No. 118303 January 31, 1996 SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, SENATOR JOSE D. LINA, JR., MR. NICASIO B. BAUTISTA, MR. JESUS P. GONZAGA, MR. SOLOMON D. MAYLEM, LEONORA C. MEDINA, CASIANO S. ALIPON, petitioners, vs. HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. RAFAEL ALUNAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. JOSE MIRANDA, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Santiago and HON. CHARITO MANUFAY, HON. VICTORINO MIRANDA, JR., HON. ARTEMIO ALVAREZ, HON. DANILO VERGARA, HON. PETER DE JESUS, HON. NELIA NATIVIDAD, HON. CELSO CALEON and HON. ABEL MUSNGI, in their capacity as SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBERS, MR. RODRIGO L. SANTOS, in his capacity as Municipal Treasurer, and ATTY. ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, in his capacity as Municipal Administrator, respondents.

Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be Known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the Senate. It was introduced by Senator Vicente Sotto III, as principal sponsor, on May 19, 1993. This was just after the House of Representatives had conducted its first public hearing on HB No. 8817. On February 23, 1994, or a little less than a month after HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate, the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. On March 1, 1994, the said committee submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the recommendation that it be approved without amendment, taking into consideration the reality that H.B. No. 8817 was on all fours with SB No. 1243. Senator Heherson T. Alvarez, one of the herein petitioners, indicated his approval thereto by signing said report as member of the Committee on Local Government. On March 3, 1994, Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading on March 14, 1994. On March 22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate. The enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed by the Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city. The question as to the validity of Republic Act No. 7720 hinges on the following twin issues: (I) Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the computation of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent component city, and (II) Whether or not, considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version of HB No. 8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives. I The annual income government unit includes the IRAs of a local

DECISION HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: Of main concern to the petitioners is whether Republic Act No. 7720, just recently passed by Congress and signed by the President into law, is constitutionally infirm. Indeed, in this Petition for Prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction, petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," mainly because the Act allegedly did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Also, petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual income required under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a component city. Undisputed is the following chronicle of the metamorphosis of House Bill No. 8817 into Republic Act No. 7720: On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the House of Representatives with Representative Antonio Abaya as principal author. Other sponsors included Representatives Ciriaco Alfelor, Rodolfo Albano, Santiago Respicio and Faustino Dy. The bill was referred to the House Committee on Local Government and the House Committee on Appropriations on May 5, 1993. On May 19, 1993, June 1, 1993, November 28, 1993, and December 1, 1993, public hearings on HB No. 8817 were conducted by the House Committee on Local Government. The committee submitted to the House a favorable report, with amendments, on December 9, 1993. On December 13, 1993, HB No. 8817 was passed by the House of Representatives on Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading on December 17, 1993. On January 28, 1994, HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate.

Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its average annual income for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices falls below the required annual income of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for its conversion into a city, petitioners having computed Santiago's average annual income in the following manner: Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1991 Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1992 Total income for 1991 and 1992 Minus: P 20,379,057.07 P 21,570,106.87 P 41,949,163.94

IRAs for 1991 and 1992 Total income for 1991 and 1992 Average Annual Income

P 15,730,043.00 P 26,219,120.94 P 13,109,560.47 ===============

By dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992, after deducting the IRAs, the average annual income arrived at would only be P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices. Thus, petitioners claim that Santiago's income is far below the aforesaid Twenty Million Pesos average annual income requirement. The certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance, which indicates Santiago's average annual income to be P20,974,581.97, is allegedly not accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were not excluded from the computation. Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and/or budgetary aid from the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing. In this regard, we hold that petitioners asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units. It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must, among others, have an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices.1 Such income must be duly certified by the Department of Finance. Resolution of the controversy regarding compliance by the Municipality of Santiago with the aforecited income requirement hinges on a correlative and contextual explication of the meaning of internal revenue allotments (IRAs) vis-a-vis the notion of income of a local government unit and the principles of local autonomy and decentralization underlying the institutionalization and intensified empowerment of the local government system. A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs.3 Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio,4 the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.5 Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral local government units to develop not only at their own pace and discretion but also with their own resources and assets. The practical side to development through a decentralized local government system certainly concerns the matter of financial resources. With its broadened powers and increased responsibilities, a local government unit must now operate on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn, entail more expenses. Understandably, the

vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every local government unit is accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions.7 Availment of such resources is effectuated through the vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue; (2)the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.8 The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds accrue to the general fund of the local government and are used to finance its operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided for in the Local Government Code and its implementing rules and regulations. For instance, not less than twenty percent (20%) of the IRAs must be set aside for local development projects.9 As such, for purposes of budget preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of the income of the local government unit, among others, the IRAs and the share in the national wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income. This is as it should be, since income is defined in the Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the local government unit.10 The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit.11 They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds. For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the Department of Finance certified, among others, that the municipality had an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. This, the Department of Finance did after including the IRAs in its computation of said average annual income. Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that "the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income." To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of "funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations".12 Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 35-9313 correctly encapsulizes the full import of the above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be "revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed

assets, and similar others" (Emphasis ours).14 Such order, constituting executive or contemporaneous construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the task of interpreting and applying the same, is entitled to full respect and should be accorded great weight by the courts, unless such construction is clearly shown to be in sharp conflict with the Constitution, the governing statute, or other laws.15 II In the enactment there was compliance Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of RA with No. Section 7720, 24,

and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate. xxx xxx xxx

Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional prescription,16 originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursive not only of the said Act in question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant controversy. Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already approved on Third Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted its public hearing on HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading on December 17, 1993 and transmitted to the Senate on January 28, 1994; a little less than a month thereafter, or on February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate held in abeyance any action on SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817, already approved on the Third Reading, from the House of Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill. We have already addressed this issue in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance.17 There, on the matter of the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law, which, as a revenue bill, is nonetheless constitutionally required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, we explained: . . . To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. . . . as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute

It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely to "take [H. No. 11197] into consideration" in enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause (which, it would seem petitioners admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either case the result are two bills on the same subject. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. . . .18 III Every law, has in of constitutionality including its favor RA the No. 7720, presumption

It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the presumption of constitutionality.19Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one; in other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.20 Those who petition this court to declare a law to be unconstitutional must clearly and fully establish the basis that will justify such a declaration; otherwise, their petition must fail. Taking into consideration the justification of our stand on the immediately preceding ground raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 7720, the Court stands on the holding that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is, therefore, inevitable. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit with costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC G.R. No. 132988 July 19, 2000 AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR., petitioner, vs. Hon. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Hon. EMILIA BONCODIN in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, respondents.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and direct: SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including state universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations and local governments units will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for nonpersonal services items, along the following suggested areas: 1. Continued implementation of the streamlining policy on organization and staffing by deferring action on the following: a. Operationalization of new agencies; b. Expansion of organizational units and/or creation of positions; c. Filling of positions; and d. Hiring of additional/new consultants, contractual and casual personnel, regardless of funding source. 2. Suspension of the following activities: a. Implementation of new capital/infrastructure projects, except those which have already been contracted out; b. Acquisition of new equipment and motor vehicles; c. All foreign travels of government personnel, except those associated with scholarships and trainings funded by grants; d. Attendance in conferences abroad where the cost is charged to the government except those clearly essential to Philippine commitments in the international field as may be determined by the Cabinet; e. Conduct of trainings/workshops/seminars, except those conducted by government training institutions and agencies in the performance of their regular functions and those that are funded by grants; f. Conduct of cultural and social celebrations and sports activities, except those associated with the Philippine Centennial celebration and those involving regular competitions/events; g. Grant of honoraria, except in cases where it constitutes the only source of compensation from government received by the person concerned; h. Publications, media advertisements and related items, except those required by law or those already being undertaken on a regular basis; i. Grant of new/additional benefits to employees, except those expressly and specifically authorized by law; and j. Donations, contributions, grants and gifts, except those given by institutions to victims of calamities.

DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: The Constitution vests the President with the power of supervision, not control, over local government units (LGUs). Such power enables him to see to it that LGUs and their officials execute their tasks in accordance with law. While he may issue advisories and seek their cooperation in solving economic difficulties, he cannot prevent them from performing their tasks and using available resources to achieve their goals. He may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the law. Thus, the withholding of a portion of internal revenue allotments legally due them cannot be directed by administrative fiat. The Case Before us is an original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking (1) to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order (AO) No. 372, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services; and (2) to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments. On November 17, 1998, Roberto Pagdanganan, through Counsel Alberto C. Agra, filed a Motion for Intervention/Motion to Admit Petition for Intervention,1 attaching thereto his Petition in Intervention2 joining petitioner in the reliefs sought. At the time, intervenor was the provincial governor of Bulacan, national president of the League of Provinces of the Philippines and chairman of the League of Leagues of Local Governments. In a Resolution dated December 15, 1998, the Court noted said Motion and Petition. The Facts and the Arguments On December 27, 1997, the President of the Philippines issued AO 372. Its full text, with emphasis on the assailed provisions, is as follows: "ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372 ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998 WHEREAS, the current economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation requires continued prudence in government fiscal management to maintain economic stability and sustain the country's growth momentum; WHEREAS, it is imperative that all government agencies adopt cash management measures to match expenditures with available resources;

3. Suspension of all tax expenditure subsidies to all GOCCs and LGUs 4. Reduction in the volume of consumption of fuel, water, office supplies, electricity and other utilities 5. Deferment of projects that are encountering significant implementation problems 6. Suspension of all realignment of funds and the use of savings and reserves SECTION 2. Agencies are given the flexibility to identify the specific sources of costsavings, provided the 25% minimum savings under Section 1 is complied with. SECTION 3. A report on the estimated savings generated from these measures shall be submitted to the Office of the President, through the Department of Budget and Management, on a quarterly basis using the attached format. SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld. SECTION 5. The Development Budget Coordination Committee shall conduct a monthly review of the fiscal position of the National Government and if necessary, shall recommend to the President the imposition of additional reserves or the lifting of previously imposed reserves. SECTION 6. This Administrative Order shall take effect January 1, 1998 and shall remain valid for the entire year unless otherwise lifted. DONE in the City of Manila, this 27th day of December, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety-seven." Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4 of AO 372, by reducing to five percent (5%) the amount of internal revenue allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs. Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the power of control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the President, however, only the power of general supervision over LGUs, consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Petitioner further argues that the directive to withhold ten percent (10%) of their IRA is in contravention of Section 286 of the Local Government Code and of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, providing for the automatic release to each of these units its share in the national internal revenue. The solicitor general, on behalf of the respondents, claims on the other hand that AO 372 was issued to alleviate the "economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation" and constituted merely an exercise of the President's power of supervision over LGUs. It allegedly does not violate local fiscal autonomy, because it merely directs local governments to identify measures that will reduce their total expenditures for non-personal services by at least 25 percent. Likewise, the withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA does not violate the statutory prohibition on the imposition of any lien or holdback on their revenue shares, because such

withholding is "temporary in nature pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal situation." The Issues The Petition3 submits the following issues for the Court's resolution: "A. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion [in] ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in violation of the LGU[']S fiscal autonomy "B. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the withholding of 10% of the LGU[']S IRA" In sum, the main issue is whether (a) Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent; and (b) Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of general supervision over local governments. Additionally, the Court deliberated on the question whether petitioner had the locus standi to bring this suit, despite respondents' failure to raise the issue.4 However, the intervention of Roberto Pagdanganan has rendered academic any further discussion on this matter. The Court's Ruling The Petition is partly meritorious. Main Issue: Validity of AO 372 Insofar as LGUs Are Concerned Before resolving the main issue, we deem it important and appropriate to define certain crucial concepts: (1) the scope of the President's power of general supervision over local governments and (2) the extent of the local governments' autonomy. Scope of President's Power of Supervision Over LGUs Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President's power over local governments to one of general supervision. It reads as follows: "Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. x x x" This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. In Mondano v. Silvosa,5 the Court contrasted the President's power of supervision over local government officials with that of his power of control over executive officials of the national government. It was emphasized that the two terms -- supervision and control - differed in meaning and extent. The Court distinguished them as follows: "x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to

make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."6 In Taule v. Santos,7 we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether local governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. "Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body,"8 we said. In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim,9 the difference between control and supervision was further delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President.10 The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed.11 In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the Presidents supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law. Extent of Local Autonomy Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the President's power over local governments is the state policy of ensuring local autonomy.12 In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals,13 we said that local autonomy signified "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization." The grant of autonomy is intended to "break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments, x x x not x x x to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government units x x x." Paradoxically, local governments are still subject to regulation, however limited, for the purpose of enhancing self-government.14 Decentralization simply means the devolution of national administration, not power, to local governments. Local officials remain accountable to the central government as the

law may provide.15 The difference between decentralization of administration and that of power was explained in detail in Limbona v. Mangelin16 as follows: "Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments 'more responsive and accountable,'17 and 'ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.'18 At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises 'general supervision'19over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.'20 He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.21 Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency."22 Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., municipal governments are still agents of the national government.23 The Nature of AO 372 Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudential precepts, let us now look into the nature of AO 372. As its preambular clauses declare, the Order was a "cash management measure" adopted by the government "to match expenditures with available resources," which were presumably depleted at the time due to "economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation." Because of a looming financial crisis, the President deemed it necessary to "direct all government agencies, state universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations as well as local governments to reduce their total expenditures by at least 25 percent along suggested areas mentioned in AO 372. Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal

autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the constraints thereof. They are not formulated at the national level and imposed on local governments, whether they are relevant to local needs and resources or not. Hence, the necessity of a balancing of viewpoints and the harmonization of proposals from both local and national officials,24who in any case are partners in the attainment of national goals. Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of the government,25 primarily responsible for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs26 for the entire country. However, under the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such policies and programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local government units." The President cannot do so unilaterally. Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:27 "x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x." There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one. Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before the issuance and the implementation of AO 372. At the very least, they did not even try to show that the national government was suffering from an unmanageable public sector deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted consultations with the different leagues of local governments. Without these requisites, the President has no authority to adjust, much less to reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment.

The solicitor general insists, however, that AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his power of supervision over local governments. It is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country, which is facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control. While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 have a rather commanding tone, and while we agree with petitioner that the requirements of Section 284 of the Local Government Code have not been satisfied, we are prepared to accept the solicitor general's assurance that the directive to "identify and implement measures x x x that will reduce total expenditures x x x by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation" is merely advisory in character, and does not constitute a mandatory or binding order that interferes with local autonomy. The language used, while authoritative, does not amount to a command that emanates from a boss to a subaltern. Rather, the provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would do well to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is understood, however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not follow such advice. It is in this light that we sustain the solicitor general's contention in regard to Section 1. Withholding a Part of LGUs' IRA Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution.28 The Local Government Code29 specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose."30 As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning.31 The provision is, therefore, imperative. Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the country. Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means "something held back or withheld, often temporarily."32 Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retention by the national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited. In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in times of national crisis, Section 4 thereof has no color of validity at all. The latter provision effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments. Concededly, the President was well-intentioned in issuing his Order to withhold the LGUs IRA, but the

rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods. Refutation of Justice Kapunan's Dissent Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan dissents from our Decision on the grounds that, allegedly, (1) the Petition is premature; (2) AO 372 falls within the powers of the President as chief fiscal officer; and (3) the withholding of the LGUs IRA is implied in the President's authority to adjust it in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit. First, on prematurity. According to the Dissent, when "the conduct has not yet occurred and the challenged construction has not yet been adopted by the agency charged with administering the administrative order, the determination of the scope and constitutionality of the executive action in advance of its immediate adverse effect involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial function." This is a rather novel theory -- that people should await the implementing evil to befall on them before they can question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional. Be it remembered that the real issue here is whether the Constitution and the law are contravened by Section 4 of AO 372, not whether they are violated by the acts implementing it. In the unanimous en banc case Taada v. Angara,33 this Court held that when an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. Said the Court: "In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. 'The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.'34 Once a 'controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court x x x , it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.'35 xxx xxx xxx

"x x x Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where the statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act unconstitutional and void." By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws, as in the present case, settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts. Besides, the issue that the Petition is premature has not been raised by the parties; hence it is deemed waived. Considerations of due process really prevents its use against a party that has not been given sufficient notice of its presentation, and thus has not been given the opportunity to refute it.38 Second, on the President's power as chief fiscal officer of the country. Justice Kapunan posits that Section 4 of AO 372 conforms with the President's role as chief fiscal officer, who allegedly "is clothed by law with certain powers to ensure the observance of safeguards and auditing requirements, as well as the legal prerequisites in the release and use of IRAs, taking into account the constitutional and statutory mandates."39 He cites instances when the President may lawfully intervene in the fiscal affairs of LGUs. Precisely, such powers referred to in the Dissent have specifically been authorized by law and have not been challenged as violative of the Constitution. On the other hand, Section 4 of AO 372, as explained earlier, contravenes explicit provisions of the Local Government Code (LGC) and the Constitution. In other words, the acts alluded to in the Dissent are indeed authorized by law; but, quite the opposite, Section 4 of AO 372 is bereft of any legal or constitutional basis. Third, on the President's authority to adjust the IRA of LGUs in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit. It must be emphasized that in striking down Section 4 of AO 372, this Court is not ruling out any form of reduction in the IRAs of LGUs. Indeed, as the President may make necessary adjustments in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit, as stated in the main part of this Decision, and in line with Section 284 of the LGC, which Justice Kapunan cites. He, however, merely glances over a specific requirement in the same provision -- that such reduction is subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and, more importantly, with the presidents of the leagues of local governments. Notably, Justice Kapunan recognizes the need for "interaction between the national government and the LGUs at the planning level," in order to ensure that "local development plans x x x hew to national policies and standards." The problem is that no such interaction or consultation was ever held prior to the issuance of AO 372. This is why the petitioner and the intervenor (who was a provincial governor and at the

"As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases,36 it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government." In the same vein, the Court also held in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy:37

same time president of the League of Provinces of the Philippines and chairman of the League of Leagues of Local Governments) have protested and instituted this action. Significantly, respondents do not deny the lack of consultation. In addition, Justice Kapunan cites Section 28740 of the LGC as impliedly authorizing the President to withhold the IRA of an LGU, pending its compliance with certain requirements. Even a cursory reading of the provision reveals that it is totally inapplicable to the issue at bar. It directs LGUs to appropriate in their annual budgets 20 percent of their respective IRAs for development projects. It speaks of no positive power granted the President to priorly withhold any amount. Not at all. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents and their successors are hereby permanently PROHIBITEDfrom implementing Administrative Order Nos. 372 and 43, respectively dated December 27, 1997 and December 10, 1998, insofar as local government units are concerned. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC G.R. No. 169752 September 25, 2007 PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, DIR. RODULFO J. ARIESGA (in his official capacity as Director of the Commission on Audit), MS. MERLE M. VALENTIN and MS. SUSAN GUARDIAN (in their official capacities as Team Leader and Team Member, respectively, of the audit Team of the Commission on Audit), Respondents.

SEC. 5. One-half of all the fines imposed and collected through the efforts of said society, its members or its agents, for violations of the laws enacted for the prevention of cruelty to animals and for their protection, shall belong to said society and shall be used to promote its objects. (emphasis supplied) Subsequently, however, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a portion of the fines collected for violation of animal-related laws were recalled by virtue of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 148,4 which reads, in its entirety, thus: Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines: Section 1. Section four of Act Numbered Twelve hundred and eighty-five as amended by Act Numbered Thirty five hundred and forty-eight, is hereby further amended so as to read as follows: Sec. 4. The said society is authorized to appoint not to exceed ten agents in the City of Manila, and not to exceed one in each municipality of the Philippines who shall have the authority to denounce to regular peace officers any violation of the laws enacted for the prevention of cruelty to animals and the protection of animals and to cooperate with said peace officers in the prosecution of transgressors of such laws. Sec. 2. The full amount of the fines collected for violation of the laws against cruelty to animals and for the protection of animals, shall accrue to the general fund of the Municipality where the offense was committed. Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved, November 8, 1936. (Emphasis supplied) Immediately thereafter, then President Manuel L. Quezon issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 63 dated November 12, 1936, portions of which provide: Whereas, during the first regular session of the National Assembly, Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Forty Eight was enacted depriving the agents of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of their power to arrest persons who have violated the laws prohibiting cruelty to animals thereby correcting a serious defect in one of the laws existing in our statute books. xxxx Whereas, the cruel treatment of animals is an offense against the State, penalized under our statutes, which the Government is duty bound to enforce; Now, therefore, I, Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Philippines, pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution, hereby decree, order, and direct the Commissioner of Public Safety, the Provost Marshal General as head of the Constabulary Division of the Philippine Army, every Mayor of a chartered city, and every municipal president to detail and organize special members of the police force, local, national, and the Constabulary to watch, capture, and prosecute offenders against the laws enacted to prevent cruelty to animals. (Emphasis supplied)

DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before the Court is a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 2 of Rule 64, filed by the petitioner assailing Office Order No. 2005-0211 dated September 14, 2005 issued by the respondents which constituted the audit team, as well as its September 23, 2005 Letter2 informing the petitioner that respondents audit team shall conduct an audit survey on the petitioner for a detailed audit of its accounts, operations, and financial transactions. No temporary restraining order was issued. The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one hundred years ago by virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on January 19, 1905, by the Philippine Commission. The petitioner, at the time it was created, was composed of animal aficionados and animal propagandists. The objects of the petitioner, as stated in Section 2 of its charter, shall be to enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted upon animals or the protection of animals in the Philippine Islands, and generally, to do and perform all things which may tend in any way to alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their welfare.3 At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1285, the original Corporation Law, Act No. 1459, was not yet in existence. Act No. 1285 antedated both the Corporation Law and the constitution of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Important to note is that the nature of the petitioner as a corporate entity is distinguished from the sociedad anonimasunder the Spanish Code of Commerce. For the purpose of enhancing its powers in promoting animal welfare and enforcing laws for the protection of animals, the petitioner was initially imbued under its charter with the power to apprehend violators of animal welfare laws. In addition, the petitioner was to share one-half (1/2) of the fines imposed and collected through its efforts for violations of the laws related thereto. As originally worded, Sections 4 and 5 of Act No. 1285 provide: SEC. 4. The said society is authorized to appoint not to exceed five agents in the City of Manila, and not to exceed two in each of the provinces of the Philippine Islands who shall have all the power and authority of a police officer to make arrests for violation of the laws enacted for the prevention of cruelty to animals and the protection of animals, and to serve any process in connection with the execution of such laws; and in addition thereto, all the police force of the Philippine Islands, wherever organized, shall, as occasion requires, assist said society, its members or agents, in the enforcement of all such laws.

On December 1, 2003, an audit team from respondent Commission on Audit (COA) visited the office of the petitioner to conduct an audit survey pursuant to COA Office Order No. 2003-051 dated November 18, 20035 addressed to the petitioner. The petitioner demurred on the ground that it was a private entity not under the jurisdiction of COA, citing Section 2(1) of Article IX of the Constitution which specifies the general jurisdiction of the COA, viz: Section 1. General Jurisdiction. The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and officers that have been granted fiscal autonomy under the Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government, and for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto. (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner explained thus: a. Although the petitioner was created by special legislation, this necessarily came about because in January 1905 there was as yet neither a Corporation Law or any other general law under which it may be organized and incorporated, nor a Securities and Exchange Commission which would have passed upon its organization and incorporation. b. That Executive Order No. 63, issued during the Commonwealth period, effectively deprived the petitioner of its power to make arrests, and that the petitioner lost its operational funding, underscore the fact that it exercises no governmental function. In fine, the government itself, by its overt acts, confirmed petitioners status as a private juridical entity. The COA General Counsel issued a Memorandum6 dated May 6, 2004, asserting that the petitioner was subject to its audit authority. In a letter dated May 17, 2004,7 respondent COA informed the petitioner of the result of the evaluation, furnishing it with a copy of said Memorandum dated May 6, 2004 of the General Counsel. Petitioner thereafter filed with the respondent COA a Request for Re-evaluation dated May 19, 2004,8 insisting that it was a private domestic corporation. Acting on the said request, the General Counsel of respondent COA, in a Memorandum dated July 13, 2004,9 affirmed her earlier opinion that the petitioner was

a government entity that was subject to the audit jurisdiction of respondent COA. In a letter dated September 14, 2004, the respondent COA informed the petitioner of the result of the re-evaluation, maintaining its position that the petitioner was subject to its audit jurisdiction, and requested an initial conference with the respondents. In a Memorandum dated September 16, 2004, Director Delfin Aguilar reported to COA Assistant Commissioner Juanito Espino, Corporate Government Sector, that the audit survey was not conducted due to the refusal of the petitioner because the latter maintained that it was a private corporation. Petitioner received on September 27, 2005 the subject COA Office Order 2005-021 dated September 14, 2005 and the COA Letter dated September 23, 2005. Hence, herein Petition on the following grounds: A. RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON AUDIT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO ITS AUDIT AUTHORITY. B. PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF SOUGHT, THERE BEING NO APPEAL, NOR ANY PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW AVAILABLE TO IT.10 The essential question before this Court is whether the petitioner qualifies as a government agency that may be subject to audit by respondent COA. Petitioner argues: first, even though it was created by special legislation in 1905 as there was no general law then existing under which it may be organized or incorporated, it exercises no governmental functions because these have been revoked by C.A. No. 148 and E.O. No. 63; second, nowhere in its charter is it indicated that it is a public corporation, unlike, for instance, C.A. No. 111 which created the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, defined its powers and purposes, and specifically stated that it was "An Act to Create a Public Corporation" in which, even as amended by Presidential Decree No. 460, the law still adverted to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines as a "public corporation," all of which are not obtaining in the charter of the petitioner; third, if it were a government body, there would have been no need for the State to grant it tax exemptions under Republic Act No. 1178, and the fact that it was so exempted strengthens its position that it is a private institution; fourth, the employees of the petitioner are registered and covered by the Social Security System at the latters initiative and not through the Government Service Insurance System, which should have been the case had the employees been considered government employees; fifth, the petitioner does not receive any form of financial assistance from the government, since C.A. No. 148, amending Section 5 of Act No. 1285, states that the "full amount of the fines, collected for violation of the laws against cruelty to animals and for the protection of animals, shall accrue to the general fund of the Municipality where the offense was committed"; sixth, C.A. No. 148 effectively deprived the petitioner of its powers to make arrests and serve processes as these functions were placed in the hands

of the police force; seventh, no government appointee or representative sits on the board of trustees of the petitioner; eighth, a reading of the provisions of its charter (Act No. 1285) fails to show that any act or decision of the petitioner is subject to the approval of or control by any government agency, except to the extent that it is governed by the law on private corporations in general; and finally, ninth, the Committee on Animal Welfare, under the Animal Welfare Act of 1998, includes members from both the private and the public sectors. The respondents contend that since the petitioner is a "body politic" created by virtue of a special legislation and endowed with a governmental purpose, then, indubitably, the COA may audit the financial activities of the latter. Respondents in effect divide their contentions into six strains: first, the test to determine whether an entity is a government corporation lies in the manner of its creation, and, since the petitioner was created by virtue of a special charter, it is thus a government corporation subject to respondents auditing power; second, the petitioner exercises "sovereign powers," that is, it is tasked to enforce the laws for the protection and welfare of animals which "ultimately redound to the public good and welfare," and, therefore, it is deemed to be a government "instrumentality" as defined under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of which is connected with the administration of government, as purportedly affirmed by American jurisprudence; third, by virtue of Section 23,11 Title II, Book III of the same Code, the Office of the President exercises supervision or control over the petitioner; fourth, under the same Code, the requirement under its special charter for the petitioner to render a report to the Civil Governor, whose functions have been inherited by the Office of the President, clearly reflects the nature of the petitioner as a government instrumentality;fifth, despite the passage of the Corporation Code, the law creating the petitioner had not been abolished, nor had it been re-incorporated under any general corporation law; and finally, sixth, Republic Act No. 8485, otherwise known as the "Animal Welfare Act of 1998," designates the petitioner as a member of its Committee on Animal Welfare which is attached to the Department of Agriculture. In view of the phrase "One-half of all the fines imposed and collected through the efforts of said society," the Court, in a Resolution dated January 30, 2007, required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the parties to comment on: a) petitioner's authority to impose fines and the validity of the provisions of Act No. 1285 and Commonwealth Act No. 148 considering that there are no standard measures provided for in the aforecited laws as to the manner of implementation, the specific violations of the law, the person/s authorized to impose fine and in what amount; and, b) the effect of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions on whether petitioner continues to exist or should organize as a private corporation under the Corporation Code, B.P. Blg. 68 as amended. Petitioner and the OSG filed their respective Comments. Respondents filed a Manifestation stating that since they were being represented by the OSG which filed its Comment, they opted to dispense with the filing of a separate one and adopt for the purpose that of the OSG. The petitioner avers that it does not have the authority to impose fines for violation of animal welfare laws; it only enjoyed the privilege of sharing in the fines imposed and

collected from its efforts in the enforcement of animal welfare laws; such privilege, however, was subsequently abolished by C.A. No. 148; that it continues to exist as a private corporation since it was created by the Philippine Commission before the effectivity of the Corporation law, Act No. 1459; and the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions. The OSG submits that Act No. 1285 and its amendatory laws did not give petitioner the authority to impose fines for violation of laws12 relating to the prevention of cruelty to animals and the protection of animals; that even prior to the amendment of Act No. 1285, petitioner was only entitled to share in the fines imposed; C.A. No. 148 abolished that privilege to share in the fines collected; that petitioner is a public corporation and has continued to exist since Act No. 1285; petitioner was not repealed by the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions which contain transitory provisions maintaining all laws issued not inconsistent therewith until amended, modified or repealed. The petition is impressed with merit. The arguments of the parties, interlaced as they are, can be disposed of in five points. First, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the "charter test" cannot be applied. Essentially, the "charter test" as it stands today provides: [T]he test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and are compulsory members of the Government Service Insurance System. xxx (Emphasis supplied)13 The petitioner is correct in stating that the charter test is predicated, at best, on the legal regime established by the 1935 Constitution, Section 7, Article XIII, which states: Sec. 7. The National Assembly shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.14 The foregoing proscription has been carried over to the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions. Section 16 of Article XII of the present Constitution provides: Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability. Section 16 is essentially a re-enactment of Section 7 of Article XVI of the 1935 Constitution and Section 4 of Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. During the formulation of the 1935 Constitution, the Committee on Franchises recommended the foregoing proscription to prevent the pressure of special interests upon the lawmaking body in the creation of corporations or in the regulation of the same. To permit the lawmaking body by special law to provide for the organization,

formation, or regulation of private corporations would be in effect to offer to it the temptation in many cases to favor certain groups, to the prejudice of others or to the prejudice of the interests of the country.15 And since the underpinnings of the charter test had been introduced by the 1935 Constitution and not earlier, it follows that the test cannot apply to the petitioner, which was incorporated by virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on January 19, 1905. Settled is the rule that laws in general have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.16 All statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect.17 There are a few exceptions. Statutes can be given retroactive effect in the following cases: (1) when the law itself so expressly provides; (2) in case of remedial statutes; (3) in case of curative statutes; (4) in case of laws interpreting others; and (5) in case of laws creating new rights.18 None of the exceptions is present in the instant case. The general principle of prospectivity of the law likewise applies to Act No. 1459, otherwise known as the Corporation Law, which had been enacted by virtue of the plenary powers of the Philippine Commission on March 1, 1906, a little over a year after January 19, 1905, the time the petitioner emerged as a juridical entity. Even the Corporation Law respects the rights and powers of juridical entities organized beforehand, viz: SEC. 75. Any corporation or sociedad anonima formed, organized, and existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands and lawfully transacting business in the Philippine Islands on the date of the passage of this Act, shall be subject to the provisions hereof so far as such provisions may be applicable and shall be entitled at its option either to continue business as such corporation or to reform and organize under and by virtue of the provisions of this Act, transferring all corporate interests to the new corporation which, if a stock corporation, is authorized to issue its shares of stock at par to the stockholders or members of the old corporation according to their interests. (Emphasis supplied). As pointed out by the OSG, both the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions contain transitory provisions maintaining all laws issued not inconsistent therewith until amended, modified or repealed.19 In a legal regime where the charter test doctrine cannot be applied, the mere fact that a corporation has been created by virtue of a special law does not necessarily qualify it as a public corporation. What then is the nature of the petitioner as a corporate entity? What legal regime governs its rights, powers, and duties? As stated, at the time the petitioner was formed, the applicable law was the Philippine Bill of 1902, and, emphatically, as also stated above, no proscription similar to the charter test can be found therein.

The textual foundation of the charter test, which placed a limitation on the power of the legislature, first appeared in the 1935 Constitution. However, the petitioner was incorporated in 1905 by virtue of Act No. 1258, a law antedating the Corporation Law (Act No. 1459) by a year, and the 1935 Constitution, by thirty years. There being neither a general law on the formation and organization of private corporations nor a restriction on the legislature to create private corporations by direct legislation, the Philippine Commission at that moment in history was well within its powers in 1905 to constitute the petitioner as a private juridical entity.1wphi1 Time and again the Court must caution even the most brilliant scholars of the law and all constitutional historians on the danger of imposing legal concepts of a later date on facts of an earlier date.20 The amendments introduced by C.A. No. 148 made it clear that the petitioner was a private corporation and not an agency of the government. This was evident in Executive Order No. 63, issued by then President of the Philippines Manuel L. Quezon, declaring that the revocation of the powers of the petitioner to appoint agents with powers of arrest "corrected a serious defect" in one of the laws existing in the statute books. As a curative statute, and based on the doctrines so far discussed, C.A. No. 148 has to be given retroactive effect, thereby freeing all doubt as to which class of corporations the petitioner belongs, that is, it is a quasi-public corporation, a kind of private domestic corporation, which the Court will further elaborate on under the fourth point. Second, a reading of petitioners charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by any agency of the State, unlike government-owned and -controlled corporations. No government representative sits on the board of trustees of the petitioner. Like all private corporations, the successors of its members are determined voluntarily and solely by the petitioner in accordance with its by-laws, and may exercise those powers generally accorded to private corporations, such as the powers to hold property, to sue and be sued, to use a common seal, and so forth. It may adopt bylaws for its internal operations: the petitioner shall be managed or operated by its officers "in accordance with its by-laws in force." The pertinent provisions of the charter provide: Section 1. Anna L. Ide, Kate S. Wright, John L. Chamberlain, William F. Tucker, Mary S. Fergusson, Amasa S. Crossfield, Spencer Cosby, Sealy B. Rossiter, Richard P. Strong, Jose Robles Lahesa, Josefina R. de Luzuriaga, and such other persons as may be associated with them in conformity with this act, and their successors, are hereby constituted and created a body politic and corporate at law, under the name and style of "The Philippines Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals." As incorporated by this Act, said society shall have the power to add to its organization such and as many members as it desires, to provide for and choose such officers as it may deem advisable, and in such manner as it may wish, and to remove members as it shall provide. It shall have the right to sue and be sued, to use a common seal, to receive legacies and donations, to conduct social enterprises for the purpose of obtaining funds, to levy dues

upon its members and provide for their collection to hold real and personal estate such as may be necessary for the accomplishment of the purposes of the society, and to adopt such by-laws for its government as may not be inconsistent with law or this charter. xxxx Sec. 3. The said society shall be operated under the direction of its officers, in accordance with its by-laws in force, and this charter. xxxx Sec. 6. The principal office of the society shall be kept in the city of Manila, and the society shall have full power to locate and establish branch offices of the society wherever it may deem advisable in the Philippine Islands, such branch offices to be under the supervision and control of the principal office. Third. The employees of the petitioner are registered and covered by the Social Security System at the latters initiative, and not through the Government Service Insurance System, which should be the case if the employees are considered government employees. This is another indication of petitioners na ture as a private entity. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Republic Act No. 8282, otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1997, defines the employer: Employer Any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries on in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment, except the Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government: Provided, That a self-employed person shall be both employee and employer at the same time. (Emphasis supplied) Fourth. The respondents contend that the petitioner is a "body politic" because its primary purpose is to secure the protection and welfare of animals which, in turn, redounds to the public good. This argument, is, at best, specious. The fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed with public interest does not, by that circumstance alone, make the entity a public corporation, inasmuch as a corporation may be private although its charter contains provisions of a public character, incorporated solely for the public good. This class of corporations may be considered quasi-public corporations, which are private corporations that render public service, supply public wants,21 or pursue other eleemosynary objectives. While purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its members, they are required by law to discharge functions for the public benefit. Examples of these corporations are utility,22railroad, warehouse, telegraph, telephone, water supply corporations and transportation companies.23 It must be stressed that a quasi-public corporation is a species of private corporations, but the qualifying factor is the type of service the former renders to the public: if it performs a public service, then it becomes a quasi-public corporation.241wphi1

Authorities are of the view that the purpose alone of the corporation cannot be taken as a safe guide, for the fact is that almost all corporations are nowadays created to promote the interest, good, or convenience of the public. A bank, for example, is a private corporation; yet, it is created for a public benefit. Private schools and universities are likewise private corporations; and yet, they are rendering public service. Private hospitals and wards are charged with heavy social responsibilities. More so with all common carriers. On the other hand, there may exist a public corporation even if it is endowed with gifts or donations from private individuals. The true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is public or private is found in the totality of the relation of the corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the State as the latters own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental functions, then that corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is private. Applying the above test, provinces, chartered cities, and barangays can best exemplify public corporations. They are created by the State as its own device and agency for the accomplishment of parts of its own public works.25 It is clear that the amendments introduced by C.A. No. 148 revoked the powers of the petitioner to arrest offenders of animal welfare laws and the power to serve processes in connection therewith. Fifth. The respondents argue that since the charter of the petitioner requires the latter to render periodic reports to the Civil Governor, whose functions have been inherited by the President, the petitioner is, therefore, a government instrumentality. This contention is inconclusive. By virtue of the fiction that all corporations owe their very existence and powers to the State, the reportorial requirement is applicable to all corporations of whatever nature, whether they are public, quasi-public, or private corporationsas creatures of the State, there is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate the activities of a corporation to determine whether it acted within its powers. In other words, the reportorial requirement is the principal means by which the State may see to it that its creature acted according to the powers and functions conferred upon it. These principles were extensively discussed in Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government.26 Here, the Court, in holding that the subject corporation could not invoke the right against selfincrimination whenever the State demanded the production of its corporate books and papers, extensively discussed the purpose of reportorial requirements, viz: x x x The corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It received certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserve[d] right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not, in the exercise of sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the production of the corporate books and papers for that purpose. The defense amounts to this, that an officer of the corporation which is

charged with a criminal violation of the statute may plead the criminality of such corporation as a refusal to produce its books. To state this proposition is to answer it. While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation vested with special privileges and franchises may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges. (Wilson v. United States, 55 Law Ed., 771, 780.)27 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner is DECLARED a private domestic corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The respondents are ENJOINED from investigating, examining and auditing the petitioner's fiscal and financial affairs. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC G.R. No. 161081 May 10, 2005 RAMON M. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Governor of the Province of Occidental Mindoro, petitioner, vs. JOSE T. VILLAROSA, in his capacity as Governor of the Province of Occidental Mindoro, respondent.

Such authority even include everything necessary for the legislative research program of the Sanggunian.3 Unimpressed, the respondent Governor issued the Memorandum dated July 1, 2002 relating to the "TERMINATION OF CONTRACT OF SERVICES OF CASUAL/JOB ORDER EMPLOYEES AND REAPPOINTMENT OF THE RESPECTIVE RECOMMENDEES." The said memorandum reads: For faithful and appropriate enforcement and execution of laws and issuances and to promote efficiency in the government service, effective immediately, all existing contract of employment casual/job order basis and reappointment of the recommendees entered into by Vice-Governor Ramon M. Atienza are hereby terminated for being unauthorized. Aside from being signed by the unauthorized signatory, the following facts regarding the appointments were considered: 1. The appointment of 28 clerks on top of existing permanent employees is a clear manifestation of an excessive and bloated bureaucracy; 2. The appointment of an X-ray Technician detailed at the Provincial Health Office and some clerks detailed at various offices in the province were not proper to be assigned by the Vice-Governor; 3. The appointment of 30 messengers, utility workers and drivers ran counter to COA Opinion as cited in the letter of the undersigned dated 28 June 2002, addressed to the Vice-Governor. However, in order to accommodate the Vice-Governor and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, the undersigned, in his capacity as the local chief executive of the province, will allow four (4) casual/job order employees to be assigned to the Vice-Governor and one (1) casual/job order employee to be assigned to each member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The Vice-Governor and all the Sanggunian Members are hereby directed to submit immediately the names of their recommendees to the undersigned for immediate approval of their respective appointments. Please be guided accordingly.4 On July 3, 2002, the respondent Governor issued another Memorandum regarding the "ENFORCIBILITY (sic) OF PREVIOUS MEMORANDA ISSUED ON JUNE 20, 26 AND JULY 1, 2002." It provides that: Please be properly advised that the Memoranda dated June 20, 26 and July 1, 2002 issued by the undersigned regarding the issuance of permit to travel and authority to sign Purchase Orders of supplies, materials, equipment, including fuel, repairs and maintenance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, is to be strictly adhered to for compliance. Likewise for strict compliance is the Memorandum dated July 1, 2002 with reference to the Cancellation of the Appointment of Casual/Job Order Employees of the

DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.: Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by Ramon M. Atienza, in his capacity as Vice-Governor of the Province of Occidental Mindoro, seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated November 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72069. The assailed decision dismissed the petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Atienza which had sought to enjoin the implementation of the Memoranda dated June 25, 2002 and July 1, 2002 issued by Jose T. Villarosa, Governor of the same province. The present case arose from the following undisputed facts: Petitioner Atienza and respondent Villarosa were the Vice-Governor and Governor, respectively, of the Province of Occidental Mindoro. On June 26, 2002, the petitioner Vice-Governor received the Memorandum dated June 25, 2002 issued by the respondent Governor concerning the "AUTHORITY TO SIGN PURCHASE ORDERS OF SUPPLIES, MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT[S], INCLUDING FUEL, REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE OF THESANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN." The said memorandum reads: For proper coordination and to ensure efficient and effective local government administration particularly on matters pertaining to supply and property management, effective immediately, all Purchase Orders issued in connection with the procurement of supplies, materials and equipment[s] including fuel, repairs and maintenance needed in the transaction of public business or in the pursuit of any undertaking, project or activity of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, this province, shall be approved by the undersigned in his capacity as the local chief executive of the province. The provision of DILG Opinion No. 148-1993 which states that the authority to sign Purchase Orders of supplies, materials and equipment[s] of the Sanggunian belongs to the local chief executive, serves as basis of this memorandum. For strict compliance.2 In reply to the above memorandum, the petitioner Vice-Governor wrote the respondent Governor stating that: We are of the opinion that purchase orders for supplies, materials and equipment are included under those as authorized for signature by the Vice-chief executive of the Sanggunian on the basis of the DILG Opinion No. 96-1995 as affirmed by the COA Opinions on June 28, April 11 and February 9, 1994 and coursing it to the Governor for his approval is no longer necessary, the fact that [Secs.] 466 and 468, RA 7160 already provides for the separation of powers between the executive and legislative.

Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members/Office of the Vice-Governor previously signed by Vice-Governor Ramon M. Atienza. Please be guided accordingly.5 In his Letter dated July 9, 2002, the petitioner Vice-Governor invoked the principle of separation of powers as applied to the local government units, i.e., the respondent, as the Governor, the head of the executive branch, and the petitioner, as the ViceGovernor, the head of the legislative branch, which is the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The petitioner Vice-Governor reiterated his request for the respondent to make a "deeper study" on the matter before implementing his memoranda. The request, however, went unheeded as the respondent Governor insisted on obliging the department heads of the provincial government to comply with the memoranda. The petitioner Vice-Governor thus filed with the Court of Appeals the petition for prohibition assailing as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion the respondent Governor's Memoranda dated June 25, 2002 and July 1, 2002. The petitioner Vice-Governor claimed that these memoranda excluded him from the use and enjoyment of his office in violation of the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 7160, or the Local Government Code of 1991, and its implementing rules and regulations. It was prayed that the respondent Governor be enjoined from implementing the assailed memoranda. The appellate court, in its Decision dated November 28, 2003, dismissed the petition for prohibition. Citing Section 3446 of Rep. Act No. 7160, the CA upheld the authority of the respondent Governor to issue the Memorandum dated June 25, 2002 as it recognized his authority to approve the purchase orders. The said provision provides in part that "approval of the disbursement voucher by the local chief executive himself shall be required whenever local funds are disbursed." The CA explained that Section 466(a)(1)7 of the same Code, relied upon by the petitioner Vice-Governor, speaks of the authority of the Vice-Governor to sign "all warrants drawn on the public treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang panlalawigan." In declaring this provision inapplicable, the CA reasoned that the approval of purchase orders is different from the power of the Vice-Governor to sign warrants drawn against the public treasury. Section 3618 was, likewise, held to be inapplicable ratiocinating, thus: [R]equisitioning, which is provided under Section 361 of RA 7160, is the act of requiring that something be furnished. In the procurement function, it is the submission of written requests for supplies and materials and the like. It could be inferred that, in the scheme of things, approval of purchase requests is different from approval of purchase orders. Thus, the inapplicability of Section 361. Anent the Memorandum dated July 1, 2002, the CA ruled that the issue on whether it could be enjoined had already been rendered moot and academic. The CA pointed out that the subject of the said memorandum could no longer be enjoined or restrained as the termination of the employees had already been effected. It opined that where the

act sought to be enjoined in the prohibition proceedings had already been performed and there is nothing more to restrain, the case is already moot and academic. The petitioner Vice-Governor now seeks recourse to this Court alleging that the appellate court committed reversible error in ruling that it is the Governor, and not the Vice-Governor, who has the authority to sign purchase orders of supplies, materials, equipment, including fuel, repairs and maintenance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The petitioner Vice-Governor, likewise, takes exception to the holding of the CA that the issue relating to the July 1, 2002 Memorandum had been rendered moot and academic. He points out that the appointment of casual/job order employees is exercised by the appointing authority every six months in the case of casual employees and per job order as to job order employees. Thus, while the July 1, 2002 Memorandum had already been implemented, what is being sought to be enjoined is the respondent Governor's continued usurpation of the petitioner Vice-Governor's authority to appoint the employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan under the pertinent provisions of Rep. Act No. 7160. For his part, the respondent Governor maintains that his Memoranda dated June 25, 2002 and July 1, 2002 are valid. He asserts that the approval of purchase orders is different from the power of the Vice-Governor to sign warrants drawn against the provincial treasury under Section 466(a)(1) of Rep. Act No. 7160. Rather, he insists on the application of the last clause in Section 344 which states that the approval of the disbursement by the local chief executive is required whenever local funds are disbursed. The respondent Governor likewise defends the validity of the Memorandum dated July 1, 2002 stating that it was issued upon finding that the petitioner Vice-Governor appointed, among others, 28 clerks on top of the existing permanent employees resulting in an excessive and bloated bureaucracy. He concedes the appointing power of the Vice-Governor but submits that this is limited to the employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and that he is not authorized to appoint officials and employees of the Office of the Vice-Governor. As correctly presented by the appellate court, the issues for resolution in this case are: A. Who between the petitioner and the respondent is authorized to approve purchase orders issued in connection with the procurement of supplies, materials, equipment, including fuel, repairs and maintenance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan? B. Does respondent Villarosa, as local chief executive, have the authority to terminate or cancel the appointments of casual/job order employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members and the Office of the Vice-Governor?9 Before resolving the foregoing issues, it is noted that petitioner Atienza and respondent Villarosa had ceased to be the Vice-Governor and Governor, respectively, of the Province of Occidental Mindoro effective June 30, 2004 when the newly-elected officials of the province took their oaths of offices. The petitioner Vice-Governor did not run for re-election during the May 2004 elections while the respondent Governor did not succeed in his re-election bid. The expiration of their terms of offices has effectively rendered the case moot. However, even in cases where supervening events

had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the public.10 In this case, there is compelling reason for the Court to resolve the issues presented in order to clarify the scope of the respective powers of the Governor and Vice-Governor under the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991. To resolve the substantive issues presented in the instant case, it is well to recall that Rep. Act No. 7160 was enacted to give flesh to the constitutional mandate to "provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanism of recall, initiative and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units."11 In this connection, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 7160 are anchored on principles that give effect to decentralization. Among these principles are: [t]here shall be an effective allocation among the different local government units of their respective powers, functions, responsibilities, and resources; [t]here shall be established in every local government unit an accountable, efficient, and dynamic organizational structure and operating mechanism that will meet the priority needs and service requirements of its communities; [p]rovinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions; and [e]ffective mechanisms for ensuring the accountability of local government units to their respective constituents shall be strengthened in order to upgrade continually the quality of local leadership.12 With these guideposts, the Court shall now address the issue on who between the Governor and Vice-Governor is authorized to approve purchase orders issued in connection with the procurement of supplies, materials, equipment, including fuel, repairs and maintenance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. We hold that it is the Vice-Governor who has such authority. Under Rep. Act No. 7160, local legislative power for the province is exercised by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan13and the Vice-Governor is its presiding officer.14 Being vested with legislative powers, the Sangguniang Panlalawiganenacts ordinances, resolutions and appropriates funds for the general welfare of the province in accordance with the provisions of Rep. Act No. 7160.15 The same statute vests upon the Vice-Governor the power to: (1) Be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan and sign all warrants drawn on the provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang panlalawigan. 16 Further, Section 344 provides:

Sec. 344. Certification on, and Approval of, Vouchers. No money shall be disbursed unless the local budget officer certifies to the existence of appropriation that has been legally made for the purpose, the local accountant has obligated said appropriation, and the local treasurer certifies to the availability of funds for the purpose. Vouchers and payrolls shall be certified to and approved by the head of the department or office who has administrative control of the fund concerned, as to validity, propriety and legality of the claim involved. Except in cases of disbursements involving regularly recurring administrative expenses such as payrolls for regular or permanent employees, expenses for light, water, telephone and telegraph services, remittances to government creditor agencies such as the GSIS, SSS, LBP, DBP, National Printing Office, Procurement Service of the DBM and others, approval of the disbursement voucher by the local chief executive himself shall be required whenever local funds are disbursed. In cases of special or trust funds, disbursements shall be approved by the administrator of the fund. In case of temporary absence or incapacity of the department head or chief of office, the officer next-in-rank shall automatically perform his function and he shall be fully responsible therefor. Reliance by the CA on the clause "approval of the disbursement voucher by the local chief executive himself shall be required whenever local funds are disbursed" of the above section (Section 344) to rule that it is the Governor who has the authority to approve purchase orders for the supplies, materials or equipment for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is misplaced. This clause cannot prevail over the more specific clause of the same provision which provides that "vouchers and payrolls shall be certified to and approved by the head of the department or office who has administrative control of the fund concerned." The Vice-Governor, as the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, has administrative control of the funds of the said body. Accordingly, it is the Vice-Governor who has the authority to approve disbursement vouchers for expenditures appropriated for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. On this point, Section 39 of the Manual on the New Government Accounting System for Local Government Units, prepared by the Commission on Audit (COA), is instructive: Sec. 39. Approval of Disbursements. Approval of disbursements by the Local Chief Executive (LCE) himself shall be required whenever local funds are disbursed, except for regularly recurring administrative expenses such as: payrolls for regular or permanent employees, expenses for light, water, telephone and telegraph services, remittances to government creditor agencies such as GSIS, BIR, PHILHEALTH, LBP, DBP, NPO, PS of the DBM and others, where the authority to approve may be delegated. Disbursement vouchers for expenditures appropriated for the operation of the Sanggunian shall be approved by the provincial Vice Governor, the city ViceMayor or the municipal Vice-Mayor, as the case may be.17 While Rep. Act No. 7160 is silent as to the matter, the authority granted to the ViceGovernor to sign all warrants drawn on the provincial treasury for all expenditures

appropriated for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawiganas well as to approve disbursement vouchers relating thereto necessarily includes the authority to approve purchase orders covering the same applying the doctrine of necessary implication. This doctrine is explained, thus: No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding of events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus.18 Warrants are "order[s] directing the treasurer of the municipality to pay money out of funds in city treasury which are or may become available for purpose specified to designated person[s]."19 Warrants of a municipal corporation are generally orders payable when funds are found. They are issued for the payment of general municipal debts and expenses subject to the rule that they shall be paid in the order of presentation.20 The ordinary meaning of "voucher" is a document which shows that services have been performed or expenses incurred. It covers any acquittance or receipt discharging the person or evidencing payment by him. When used in connection with disbursement of money, it implies some instrument that shows on what account or by what authority a particular payment has been made, or that services have been performed which entitle the party to whom it is issued to payment.21 Purchase order, on the other hand, is "an authorization by the issuing party for the recipient to provide materials or services for which issuing party agrees to pay; it is an offer to buy which becomes binding when those things ordered have been provided."22 When an authorized person approves a disbursement voucher, he certifies to the correctness of the entries therein, among others: that the expenses incurred were necessary and lawful, the supporting documents are complete and the availability of cash therefor. Further, the person who performed the services or delivered the supplies, materials or equipment is entitled to payment.23 On the other hand, the terms and conditions for the procurement of supplies, materials or equipment, in particular, are contained in a purchase order. The tenor of a purchase order basically directs the supplier to deliver the articles enumerated and subject to the terms and conditions specified therein.24 Hence, the express authority to approve disbursement vouchers and, in effect, authorize the payment of money claims for supplies, materials or

equipment, necessarily includes the authority to approve purchase orders to cause the delivery of the said supplies, materials or equipment. Since it is the Vice-Governor who approves disbursement vouchers and approves the payment for the procurement of the supplies, materials and equipment needed for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, then he also has the authority to approve the purchase orders to cause the delivery of the said supplies, materials or equipment. Indeed, the authority granted to the Vice-Governor to sign all warrants drawn on the provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as well as to approve disbursement vouchers relating thereto is greater and includes the authority to approve purchase orders for the procurement of the supplies, materials and equipment necessary for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Anent the second issue, the appellate court likewise committed reversible error in holding that the implementation of the Memorandum dated July 1, 2002 had rendered the petition moot and academic. It is recognized that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is "capable of repetition yet evading review."25 Even if the employees whose contractual or job order employment had been terminated by the implementation of the July 1, 2002 Memorandum may no longer be reinstated, still, similar memoranda may be issued by other local chief executives. Hence, it behooves the Court to resolve whether the Governor has the authority to terminate or cancel the appointments of casual/job order employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office of the Vice-Governor. We hold that the Governor, with respect to the appointment of the officials and employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, has no such authority. Among the powers granted to the Governor under Section 465 of Rep. Act No. 7160 are: Sec. 465. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The provincial governor, as the chief executive of the provincial government, shall exercise such powers and perform such duties and functions as provided by this Code and other laws. (b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the province and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the provincial governor shall: (v) Appoint all officials and employees whose salaries and wages are wholly or mainly paid out of provincial funds and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in this Code, as well as those he may be authorized by law to appoint. On the other hand, Section 466 vests on the Vice-Governor the power to, among others:

(2) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, appoint all officials and employees of the sangguniang panlalawigan, except those whose manner of appointment is specifically provided in this Code. Thus, while the Governor has the authority to appoint officials and employees whose salaries are paid out of the provincial funds, this does not extend to the officials and employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan because such authority is lodged with the Vice-Governor. In the same manner, the authority to appoint casual and job order employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan belongs to the Vice-Governor. The authority of the Vice-Governor to appoint the officials and employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is anchored on the fact that the salaries of these employees are derived from the appropriation specifically for the said local legislative body. Indeed, the budget source of their salaries is what sets the employees and officials of theSangguniang Panlalawigan apart from the other employees and officials of the province. Accordingly, the appointing power of the Vice-Governor is limited to those employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as well as those of the Office of the Vice-Governor, whose salaries are paid out of the funds appropriated for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. As a corollary, if the salary of an employee or official is charged against the provincial funds, even if this employee reports to the ViceGovernor or is assigned to his office, the Governor retains the authority to appoint the said employee pursuant to Section 465(b)(v) of Rep. Act No. 7160. However, in this case, it does not appear whether the contractual/job order employees, whose appointments were terminated or cancelled by the Memorandum dated July 1, 2002 issued by the respondent Governor, were paid out of the provincial funds or the funds of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Nonetheless, the validity of the said memorandum cannot be upheld because it absolutely prohibited the respondent ViceGovernor from exercising his authority to appoint the employees, whether regular or contractual/job order, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and restricted such authority to one of recommendatory nature only.26 This clearly constituted an encroachment on the appointment power of the respondent Vice- Governor under Section 466(a)(2) of Rep. Act No. 7160. At this juncture, it is well to note that under Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the Local Government Code prior to Rep. Act No. 7160, the Governor was the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan: Sec. 205. Composition. (1) Each provincial government shall have a provincial legislature hereinafter known as the sangguniang panlalawigan, upon which shall be vested the provincial legislative power. (2) The sangguniang panlalawigan shall be composed of the governor, vice-governor, elective members of the said sanggunian, and the presidents of the katipunang panlalawigan and the kabataang barangay provincial federation who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines. Sec. 206. Sessions.

(3) The governor, who shall be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan, shall not be entitled to vote except in case of a tie. With Rep. Act No. 7160, the union of legislative and executive powers in the office of the local chief executive under the BP Blg. 337 has been disbanded, so that either department now comprises different and non-intermingling official personalities with the end in view of ensuring a better delivery of public service and provide a system of check and balance between the two.27 Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the principal author of Rep. Act No. 7160, explained that "the Vice-Governor is now the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The City Vice-Mayor presides at meetings of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and the Municipal Vice-Mayor at the sessions of the Sangguniang Bayan. The idea is to distribute powers among elective local officials so that the legislative, which is the Sanggunian, can properly check the executive, which is the Governor or the Mayor and vice versa and exercise their functions without any undue interference from one by the other."28 The avowed intent of Rep. Act. No. 7160, therefore, is to vest on the Sangguniang Panlalawigan independence in the exercise of its legislative functions vis-a-vis the discharge by the Governor of the executive functions. The Memoranda dated June 25, 2002 and July 1, 2002 of the respondent Governor, which effectively excluded the petitioner Vice-Governor, the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, from signing the purchase orders for the procurement of supplies, materials or equipment needed for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as well as from appointing its casual and job order employees, constituted undue interference with the latter's functions. The assailed memoranda are clearly not in keeping with the intent of Rep. Act No. 7160 and their implementation should thus be permanently enjoined. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Memoranda dated June 25, 2002 and July 1, 2002 issued by respondent Governor Jose T. Villarosa are NULL AND VOID. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC G.R. No. 175352 DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and SALVADOR M. VIARI, Petitioners, vs. RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent.

cause of the public officers forfeiture of office. In this case, respondent has been working as a Red Cross volunteer for the past 40 years. Respondent was already Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors when he was elected Senator in May 2004, having been elected Chairman in 2003 and re-elected in 2005. Respondent contends that even if the present petition is treated as a taxpayers suit, petitioners cannot be allowed to raise a constitutional question in the absence of any claim that they suffered some actual damage or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal act of respondent. Furthermore, taxpayers are allowed to sue only when there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or that public money is being diverted to any improper purpose, or where petitioners seek to restrain respondent from enforcing an invalid law that results in wastage of public funds. Respondent also maintains that if the petition is treated as one for declaratory relief, this Court would have no jurisdiction since original jurisdiction for declaratory relief lies with the Regional Trial Court. Respondent further insists that the PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation and that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution does not apply in the present case since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an office nor an employment. In their Reply, petitioners claim that their petition is neither an action for quo warranto nor an action for declaratory relief. Petitioners maintain that the present petition is a taxpayers suit questioning the unlawful disbursement of funds, considering that respondent has been drawing his salaries and other compensation as a Senator even if he is no longer entitled to his office. Petitioners point out that this Court has jurisdiction over this petition since it involves a legal or constitutional issue which is of transcendental importance. The Issues Petitioners raise the following issues: 1. Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government- owned or controlled corporation; 2. Whether Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution applies to the case of respondent who is Chairman of the PNRC and at the same time a Member of the Senate; 3. Whether respondent should be automatically removed as a Senator pursuant to Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution; and 4. Whether petitioners may legally institute this petition against respondent.4 The substantial issue boils down to whether the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution. The Courts Ruling We find the petition without merit.

DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This is a petition to declare Senator Richard J. Gordon (respondent) as having forfeited his seat in the Senate. The Facts Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed with this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. During respondents incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, 1 he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads: SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected. Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC,2 which held that the PNRC is a governmentowned or controlled corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuant to Flores v. Drilon,3 which held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to another government office. In his Comment, respondent asserts that petitioners have no standing to file this petition which appears to be an action for quo warranto, since the petition alleges that respondent committed an act which, by provision of law, constitutes a ground for forfeiture of his public office. Petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, only a person claiming to be entitled to a public office usurped or unlawfully held by another may bring an action for quo warranto in his own name. If the petition is one for quo warranto, it is already barred by prescription since under Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the action should be commenced within one year after the

Petitioners Have No Standing to File this Petition A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is an action for quo warranto. Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against: (a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise; (b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which by provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or (c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act. (Emphasis supplied) Petitioners allege in their petition that: 4. Respondent became the Chairman of the PNRC when he was elected as such during the First Regular Luncheon-Meeting of the Board of Governors of the PNRC held on February 23, 2006, the minutes of which is hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex "A." 5. Respondent was elected as Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, during his incumbency as a Member of the House of Senate of the Congress of the Philippines, having been elected as such during the national elections last May 2004. 6. Since his election as Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, which position he duly accepted, respondent has been exercising the powers and discharging the functions and duties of said office, despite the fact that he is still a senator. 7. It is the respectful submission of the petitioner[s] that by accepting the chairmanship of the Board of Governors of the PNRC, respondent has ceased to be a Member of the House of Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, x xx xxxx 10. It is respectfully submitted that in accepting the position of Chairman of the Board of Governors of the PNRC on February 23, 2006, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the House of Senate and, therefore, has long ceased to be a Senator, pursuant to the ruling of this Honorable Court in the case of FLORES, ET AL. VS. DRILON AND GORDON, G.R. No. 104732, x x x 11. Despite the fact that he is no longer a senator, respondent continues to act as such and still performs the powers, functions and duties of a senator, contrary to the constitution, law and jurisprudence. 12. Unless restrained, therefore, respondent will continue to falsely act and represent himself as a senator or member of the House of Senate, collecting the salaries, emoluments and other compensations, benefits and privileges appertaining and due

only to the legitimate senators, to the damage, great and irreparable injury of the Government and the Filipino people.5 (Emphasis supplied) Thus, petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short, petitioners filed an action for usurpation of public office against respondent, a public officer who allegedly committed an act which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly, such an action is for quo warranto, specifically under Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such an action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another, in which case he can bring the action in his own name. The person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at any stage.6 In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the present petition. Even if the Court disregards the infirmities of the petition and treats it as a taxpayers suit, the petition would still fail on the merits. PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions On 22 March 1947, President Manuel A. Roxas signed Republic Act No. 95,7 otherwise known as the PNRC Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation.8 The PNRC provides six major services: Blood Services, Disaster Management, Safety Services, Community Health and Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary Service.9 The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions, established the PNRC as a voluntary organization for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929.10 The Whereas clauses of the PNRC Charter read: WHEREAS, there was developed at Geneva, Switzerland, on August 22, 1864, a convention by which the nations of the world were invited to join together in diminishing, so far lies within their power, the evils inherent in war; WHEREAS, more than sixty nations of the world have ratified or adhered to the subsequent revision of said convention, namely the "Convention of Geneva of July 29 [sic], 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field" (referred to in this Charter as the Geneva Red Cross Convention); WHEREAS, the Geneva Red Cross Convention envisages the establishment in each country of a voluntary organization to assist in caring for the wounded and sick of the armed forces and to furnish supplies for that purpose; WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines became an independent nation on July 4, 1946 and proclaimed its adherence to the Geneva Red Cross Convention on February

14, 1947, and by that action indicated its desire to participate with the nations of the world in mitigating the suffering caused by war and to establish in the Philippines a voluntary organization for that purpose as contemplated by the Geneva Red Cross Convention; WHEREAS, there existed in the Philippines since 1917 a Charter of the American National Red Cross which must be terminated in view of the independence of the Philippines; and WHEREAS, the volunteer organizations established in the other countries which have ratified or adhered to the Geneva Red Cross Convention assist in promoting the health and welfare of their people in peace and in war, and through their mutual assistance and cooperation directly and through their international organizations promote better understanding and sympathy among the peoples of the world. (Emphasis supplied) The PNRC is a member National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (Movement), which is composed of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (International Federation), and the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (National Societies). The Movement is united and guided by its seven Fundamental Principles: 1. HUMANITY The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavors, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples. 2. IMPARTIALITY It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress. 3. NEUTRALITY In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature. 4. INDEPENDENCE The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the Movement. 5. VOLUNTARY SERVICE It is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any manner by desire for gain. 6. UNITY There can be only one Red Cross or one Red Crescent Society in any one country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory.

7. UNIVERSALITY The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in which all Societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other, is worldwide. (Emphasis supplied) The Fundamental Principles provide a universal standard of reference for all members of the Movement. The PNRC, as a member National Society of the Movement, has the duty to uphold the Fundamental Principles and ideals of the Movement. In order to be recognized as a National Society, the PNRC has to be autonomous and must operate in conformity with the Fundamental Principles of the Movement.11 The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by warring belligerents as neutral workers during international or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers must not be seen as belonging to any side of the armed conflict. In the Philippines where there is a communist insurgency and a Muslim separatist rebellion, the PNRC cannot be seen as government-owned or controlled, and neither can the PNRC volunteers be identified as government personnel or as instruments of government policy. Otherwise, the insurgents or separatists will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies when the volunteers tend to the wounded in the battlefield or the displaced civilians in conflict areas. Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and independent in order to conduct its activities in accordance with the Fundamental Principles. The PNRC must not appear to be an instrument or agency that implements government policy; otherwise, it cannot merit the trust of all and cannot effectively carry out its mission as a National Red Cross Society.12 It is imperative that the PNRC must be autonomous, neutral, and independent in relation to the State. To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be owned or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress.13 The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors, as provided under Section 11 of the PNRC Charter: SECTION 11. As a national voluntary organization, the Philippine National Red Cross shall be financed primarily by contributions obtained through solicitation campaigns throughout the year which shall be organized by the Board of Governors and conducted by the Chapters in their respective jurisdictions. These fund raising campaigns shall be conducted independently of other fund drives by other organizations. (Emphasis supplied) The government does not control the PNRC. Under the PNRC Charter, as amended, only six of the thirty members of the PNRC Board of Governors are appointed by the President of the Philippines. Thus, twenty-four members, or four-fifths (4/5), of the PNRC Board of Governors are not appointed by the President. Section 6 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, provides: SECTION 6. The governing powers and authority shall be vested in a Board of Governors composed of thirty members, six of whom shall be appointed by the

President of the Philippines, eighteen shall be elected by chapter delegates in biennial conventions and the remaining six shall be selected by the twenty-four members of the Board already chosen. x x x. Thus, of the twenty-four members of the PNRC Board, eighteen are elected by the chapter delegates of the PNRC, and six are elected by the twenty-four members already chosen a select group where the private sector members have three-fourths majority. Clearly, an overwhelming majority of four-fifths of the PNRC Board are elected or chosen by the private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Board of Governors, which exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC, elects the PNRC Chairman and all other officers of the PNRC. The incumbent Chairman of PNRC, respondent Senator Gordon, was elected, as all PNRC Chairmen are elected, by a private sector-controlled PNRC Board four-fifths of whom are private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Chairman is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official. Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution,14 the President appoints all officials and employees in the Executive branch whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution or by law. The President also appoints those whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under this Section 16, the law may also authorize the "heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards" to appoint officers lower in rank than such heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards.15 In Rufino v. Endriga,16 the Court explained appointments under Section 16 in this wise: Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. x x x xxx In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the Secretary. The law may not authorize the Undersecretary, acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive department. In an agency, the power is vested in the head of the agency for it would be preposterous to vest it in the agency itself. In a commission, the head is the chairperson of the commission. In a board, the head is also the chairperson of the board. In the last three situations, the law may not also authorize officers other than the heads of the agency, commission, or board to appoint lowerranked officers. xxx

The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked officers specifically in the "heads" of the specified offices, and in no other person. The word "heads" refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not to their members, for several reasons. The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the head of any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a government official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment. Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,17 the President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive branch. If an office is legally not under the control of the President, then such office is not part of the Executive branch. In Rufino v. Endriga,18 the Court explained the Presidents power of control over all government offices as follows: Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under the Executive, Legislative, or Judicial branches, or must belong to one of the independent constitutional bodies, or must be a quasi-judicial body or local government unit. Otherwise, such government office, entity, or agency has no legal and constitutional basis for its existence. The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government. The CCP is also not one of the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under the Executive branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency "not placed by law or order creating them under any specific department" falls "under the Office of the President." Since the President exercises control over "all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices," the President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the President "shall have control of all executive . . . offices," Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office one performing executive functions outside of the independent constitutional bodies from the Presidents power of control. There is no dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions. The Presidents power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is true whether such officers are appointed by the President or by heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The power of control means the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion. In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises "control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices." There can be no instance under the Constitution where an officer of the Executive branch is outside the control of the

President. The Executive branch is unitary since there is only one President vested with executive power exercising control over the entire Executive branch. Any office in the Executive branch that is not under the control of the President is a lost command whose existence is without any legal or constitutional basis. (Emphasis supplied) An overwhelming four-fifths majority of the PNRC Board are private sector individuals elected to the PNRC Board by the private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Board exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC. The PNRC is controlled by private sector individuals. Decisions or actions of the PNRC Board are not reviewable by the President. The President cannot reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Board. Neither can the President reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. It is the PNRC Board that can review, reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. This proves again that the office of the PNRC Chairman is a private office, not a government office.1avvphi1 Although the State is often represented in the governing bodies of a National Society, this can be justified by the need for proper coordination with the public authorities, and the government representatives may take part in decision-making within a National Society. However, the freely-elected representatives of a National Societys active members must remain in a large majority in a National Societys governing bodies. 19 The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one year. Thus, any one between 6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC member for one year upon contributing P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for the year.20 Even foreigners, whether residents or not, can be members of the PNRC. Section 5 of the PNRC Charter, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1264,21 reads: SEC. 5. Membership in the Philippine National Red Cross shall be open to the entire population in the Philippines regardless of citizenship. Any contribution to the Philippine National Red Cross Annual Fund Campaign shall entitle the contributor to membership for one year and said contribution shall be deductible in full for taxation purposes. Thus, the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable organization. The PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Petitioners anchor their petition on the 1999 case of Camporedondo v. NLRC,22 which ruled that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation. In ruling that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation, the simple test used was whether the corporation was created by its own special charter for the exercise of a public function or by incorporation under the general corporation law. Since the PNRC was created under a special charter, the Court then ruled that it is a government corporation. However, the Camporedondo ruling failed to consider the definition of a government-owned or controlled corporation as provided under Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987: SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. x x x

(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or controlled corporations may be further categorized by the Department of the Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to such corporations.(Boldfacing and underscoring supplied) A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. In the case of a non-stock corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the members must be government officials holding such membership by appointment or designation by the government. Under this criterion, and as discussed earlier, the government does not own or control PNRC. The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against the Creation of Private Corporations by Special Law The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when the PNRC was created by special charter on 22 March 1947. Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, as amended, reads: SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. The subsequent 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain similar provisions prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations except by general law. Section 1 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, creates the PNRC as a "body corporate and politic," thus: SECTION 1. There is hereby created in the Republic of the Philippines a body corporate and politic to be the voluntary organization officially designated to assist the Republic of the Philippines in discharging the obligations set forth in the Geneva Conventions and to perform such other duties as are inherent upon a National Red Cross Society. The national headquarters of this Corporation shall be located in Metropolitan Manila. (Emphasis supplied) In Feliciano v. Commission on Audit,23 the Court explained the constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations in this wise: We begin by explaining the general framework under the fundamental law. The Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to private corporations created under a general law. The second refers to government-owned or controlled corporations created by special charters. Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution provides: Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled

corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability. The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations except by general law applicable to all citizens. The purpose of this constitutional provision is to ban private corporations created by special charters, which historically gave certain individuals, families or groups special privileges denied to other citizens. In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently, only corporations created under a general law can qualify as private corporations. Under existing laws, the general law is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives. The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or controlled corporations through special charters. Since private corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that Congress can create corporations with special charters only if such corporations are government-owned or controlled.24 (Emphasis supplied) In Feliciano, the Court held that the Local Water Districts are government-owned or controlled corporations since they exist by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 198, which constitutes their special charter. The seed capital assets of the Local Water Districts, such as waterworks and sewerage facilities, were public property which were managed, operated by or under the control of the city, municipality or province before the assets were transferred to the Local Water Districts. The Local Water Districts also receive subsidies and loans from the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). In fact, under the 2009 General Appropriations Act,25 the LWUA has a budget amounting toP400,000,000 for its subsidy requirements.26 There is no private capital invested in the Local Water Districts.The capital assets and operating funds of the Local Water Districts all come from the government, either through transfer of assets, loans, subsidies or the income from such assets or funds. The government also controls the Local Water Districts because the municipal or city mayor, or the provincial governor, appoints all the board directors of the Local Water Districts. Furthermore, the board directors and other personnel of the Local Water Districts are government employees subject to civil service laws and anti-graft laws. Clearly, the Local Water Districts are considered government-owned or controlled corporations not only because of their creation by special charter but also because the government in fact owns and controls the Local Water Districts. Just like the Local Water Districts, the PNRC was created through a special charter. However, unlike the Local Water Districts, the elements of government ownership and control are clearly lacking in the PNRC. Thus, although the PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a government-owned or controlled corporation in the absence of the essential elements of ownership and control by the government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition against the creation of private corporations by special charters provides no exception even for non-profit or charitable

corporations. Consequently, the PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and grants it corporate powers,27 is void for being unconstitutional. Thus, Sections 1,28 2,29 3,30 4(a),31 5,32 6,33 7,34 8,35 9,36 10,37 11,3812,39 and 1340 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, are void. The other provisions41 of the PNRC Charter remain valid as they can be considered as a recognition by the State that the unincorporated PNRC is the local National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and thus entitled to the benefits, exemptions and privileges set forth in the PNRC Charter. The other provisions of the PNRC Charter implement the Philippine G overnments treaty obligations under Article 4(5) of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, which provides that to be recognized as a National Society, the Society must be "duly recognized by the legal government of its country on the basis of the Geneva Conventions and of the national legislation as a voluntary aid society, auxiliary to the public authorities in the humanitarian field." In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers. SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 80767 April 22, 1991 BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FORTUNATO ESGUERRA, ROBERTO MALABORBOR, ESTANISLAO MISA, VICENTE EVANGELISTA, and MARCELINO GARCIA,respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:p This Petition for Certiorari is directed at (1) the Decision, 1 dated 27 February 1987, and (2) the Resolution 2 dated 16 October 1987, both issued by the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") in Case No. 1637-84. Private respondents Fortunato C. Esquerra, Roberto O. Malaborbor, Estanislao M. Misa, Vicente N. Evangelista and Marcelino P. Garcia, had all been rank-and-file employees of petitioner Boy Scouts of the Philippines ("BSP"). At the time of termination of their services in February 1985, private respondents were stationed at the BSP Camp in Makiling, Los Baos, Laguna. The events which led to such termination of services are as follows: On 19 October 1984, the Secretary-General of petitioner BSP issued Special Orders Nos. 80, 81, 83, 84 and 85 addressed separately to the five (5) private respondents, informing them that on 20 November 1984, they were to be transferred from the BSP Camp in Makiling to the BSP Land Grant in Asuncion, Davao del Norte. These Orders were opposed by private respondents who, on 4 November 1984, appealed the matter to the BSP National President. On 6 November 1984, petitioner BSP conducted a pre-transfer briefing at its National Headquarters in Manila. Private respondents were in attendance during the briefing and they were there assured that their transfer to Davao del Norte would not involve any diminution in salary, and that each of them would receive a relocation allowance equivalent to one (1) month's basic pay. This assurance, however, failed to persuade private respondents to abandon their opposition to the transfer orders issued by the BSP Secretary-General. On 13 November 1984, a complaint 3 (docketed as NLRC Case No. 16-84J) for illegal transfer was filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment, Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch IV, San Pablo City, Laguna. Private respondents there sought to enjoin implementation of Special Orders Nos. 80, 81, 83, 84 and 85, alleging, among other things, that said orders were "indubitable and irrefutable action[s] prejudicial not only to [them] but to [their] families and [would] seriously affect [their] economic stability and solvency considering the present cost of living." On 21 November 1984 (or the day immediately following the date of scheduled transfer), the BSP Camp Manager in Makiling issued a Memorandum requiring the five (5) private respondents to explain why they should not be charged administratively for insubordination. The Memorandum was a direct result of the refusal by private respondents, two (2) days earlier, to accept from petitioner BSP their respective boat tickets to Davao del Norte and their relocation allowances.

Meanwhile, in a letter of the same date, the BSP National President informed private respondents that their refusal to comply with the Special Orders was not sufficiently justified and constituted rank disobedience. Memoranda subsequently issued by the BSP Secretary-General stressed that such refusal as well as the explanations proffered therefor, were unacceptable and could altogether result in termination of employment with petitioner BSP. These warnings notwithstanding, private respondents continued pertinaciously to disobey the disputed transfer orders. Petitioner BSP consequently imposed a five-day suspension on the five (5) private respondents, in the latter part of January 1985. Subsequently, by Special Order dated 12 February 1985 issued by the BSP Secretary-General, private respondents' services were ordered terminated effective 15 February 1985. On 22 February 1985, private respondents amended their original complaint to include charges of illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice against petitioner BSP. 4 The Labor Arbiter thereafter proceeded to hear the complaint. In a decision 5 dated 31 July 1985, the Labor Arbiter ordered the dismissal of private respondents' complaint for lack of merit. On 27 February 1987, however, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter was reversed by public respondent, NLRC, which held that private respondents had been illegally dismissed by petitioner BSP. The dispositive portion of the NLRC decision read: WHEREFORE, premises considered the Decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered ordering the respondent-appellee [petitioner BSP] to reinstate the complainants-appellants [private respondents] to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and other benefits appurtenant thereto and with full backwages from the time they were illegally dismissed from the service up to the date of their actual reinstatement. SO ORDERED. The Court notes at the outset that in the Position Paper 6 filed by petitioner BSP with the Labor Arbiter, it was alleged in the second paragraph thereof, that petitioner is a "civic service, non-stock and non-profit organization, relying mostly [on] government and public support, existing under and by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended, by Presidential Decree No. 460 . . . " A similar allegation was contained in the Brief for Appellee 7 and in the Petition 8 and Memorandum 9 filed by petitioner BSP with public respondent NLRC and this Court, respectively. The same allegation, moreover, appeared in the Comment 10 (also treated as the Memorandum) submitted to this Court by the Solicitor General on behalf of public respondent NLRC; for their part, private respondents stated in their Appeal Memorandum11 with the NLRC that petitioner BSP is "by mandate of law a Public Corporation," a statement reiterated by them in their Memorandum 12 before this Court. In a Resolution dated 9 August 1989, this Court required the parties and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to file a comment on the question of whether or not petitioner BSP is in fact a government-owned or controlled corporation.

Petitioner, private respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel filed their respective comments. The central issue is whether or not the BSP is embraced within the Civil Service as that term is defined in Article IX (B) (2) (1) of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows: The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentality mentalities and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. xxx xxx xxx The answer to the central issue will determine whether or not private respondent NLRC had jurisdiction to render the Decision and Resolution which are here sought to be nullified. The responses of the parties, on the one hand, and of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, upon the other hand, in compliance with the Resolution of this Court of 9 August 1989, present a noteworthy uniformity. Petitioner BSP and private respondents submit substantially the same view "that the BSP is a purely private organization". In contrast, the Solicitor General and the Government Corporate Counsel take much the same position, that is, that the BSP is a "public corporation' or a "quasi-public corporation" and, as well, a "government controlled corporation." Petitioner BSP's compliance with our Resolution invokes the following provisions of its Constitution and By-laws: The Boy Scouts of the Philippines declares that it is an independent, voluntary, nonpolitical, non-sectarian and non-governmental organization, with obligations towards nation building and with international orientation. The BSP, petitioner stresses, does not receive any monetary or financial subsidy from the Government whether on the national or local level. 13 Petitioner declares that it is a "purely private organization" directed and controlled by its National Executive Board the members of which are, it is said, all "voluntary scouters," including seven (7) Cabinet Secretaries. 14 Private respondents submitted a supplementary memorandum arguing that while petitioner BSP was created as a public corporation, it had lost that status when Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 111 as amended by P.D. No. 460 conferred upon it the powers which ordinary private corporations organized under the Corporation Code have: Sec. 2. The said corporation shall have perpetual succession with power to sue and be sued; to hold such real and personal estate as shall be necessary for corporate purposes, and to receive real and personal property by gift, devise, or bequest; to adopt a seal, and to alter or destroy the same at pleasure; to have offices and conduct its business and affairs in the City of Manila and in the several provinces; to make and adopt bylaws, rules and regulations not inconsistent with the laws of the Philippines, and generally to do all such acts and things (including the establishment of regulations for

the election of associates and successors: as may be necessary to carry into effect the provisions of the Act and promote the purposes of said corporation. Private respondents also point out that the BSP is registered as a private employer with the Social Security System and that all its staff members and employees are covered by the Social Security Act, indicating that the BSP had lost its personality or standing as a public corporation. It is further alleged that the BSP's assets and liabilities, official transactions and financial statements have never been subjected to audit by the government auditing office, i.e., the Commission on Audit, being audited rather by the private auditing firm of Sycip Gorres Velayo and Co. Private respondents finally state that the appointments of BSP officers and staff were not approved or confirmed by the Civil Service Commission. The views of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel on the above issue appeared to be generally similar. The Solicitor General's Office, although it had appeared for the NLRC and filed a Comment on the latter's behalf on the merits of the Petition forCertiorari, submitted that the BSP is a government-owned or controlled corporation, having been created by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 111 entitled "An Act to Create a Public Corporation to be known as the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and to Define its Powers and Purposes." The Solicitor General stressed that the BSP was created in order to "promote, through organization, and cooperation with other agencies the ability of boys to do things for themselves and others, to train them in scoutcraft, and to teach them patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues, using the methods which are now in common use by boy scouts." 5 He further noted that the BSP's objectives and purposes are "solely of a benevolent character and not for pecuniary profit by its members. 16 The Solicitor General also underscored the extent of government participation in the BSP under its charter as reflected in the composition of its governing body: The governing body of the said corporation shall consist of a National Executive Board composed of (a) thePresident of the Philippines or his representative; (b) the charter and life members of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines; (c) the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Philippine Scouting Foundation; (d) the Regional Chairman of the Scout Regions of the Philippines; (e) the Secretary of Education and Culture, the Secretary of Social Welfare, the Secretary of National Defense, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Youth and Sports, and the Secretary of local Government and Community Development; (f) an equal number of individuals from the private sector; (g) the National President of the Girl Scouts of the Philippines; (h) one Scout of Senior age from each Scout Region to represent the boy membership; and (i) three representatives of the cultural minorities. Except for the Regional Chairman who shall be elected by the Regional Scout Councils during their annual meetings, and the Scouts of their respective regions, all members of the National Executive Board shall be either by appointment or cooption, subject to ratification and confirmation by the Chief Scout, who shall be the Head of State. . . . 17 (Emphasis supplied) The Government Corporate Counsel, like the Solicitor General, describes the BSP as a "public corporation" but, unlike the Solicitor General, suggests that the BSP is more of

a "quasi corporation" than a "public corporation." The BSP, unlike most public corporations which are created for a political purpose, is not vested with political or governmental powers to be exercised for the public good or public welfare in connection with the administration of civil government. The Government Corporate Counsel submits, more specifically, that the BSP falls within the ambit of the term "government-owned or controlled corporation" as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 2029 (approved on 4 February 1986) which reads as follows: A government-owned or controlled corporation is a stock or a non-stock corporation, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, which is directly chartered by special law or if organized under the general corporation law is owned or controlled by the government directly, or indirectly through a parent corporation or subsidiary corporation, to the extent of at least a majority of its outstanding capital stock or its outstanding voting capital stock. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied) Examining the relevant statutory provisions and the arguments outlined above, the Court considers that the following need to be considered in arriving at the appropriate legal characterization of the BSP for purposes of determining whether its officials and staff members are embraced in the Civil Service. Firstly, BSP's functions as set out in its statutory charter do have a public aspect. BSP's functions do relate to the fostering of the public virtues of citizenship and patriotism and the general improvement of the moral spirit and fiber of our youth. The social value of activities like those to which the BSP dedicates itself by statutory mandate have in fact, been accorded constitutional recognition. Article II of the 1987 Constitution includes in the "Declaration of Principles and State Policies," the following: Sec. 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. At the same time, BSP's sanctions do not relate to the governance of any part of territory of the Philippines; BSP is not a public corporation in the same sense that municipal corporations or local governments are public corporations. BSP's functions can not also be described as proprietary functions in the same sense that the functions or activities of government-owned or controlled corporations like the National Development Company or the National Steel Corporation can be described as proprietary or "business-like" in character. Nevertheless, the public character of BSP's functions and activities must be conceded, for they pertain to the educational, civic and social development of the youth which constitutes a very substantial and important part of the nation. The second aspect that the Court must take into account relates to the governance of the BSP. The composition of the National Executive Board of the BSP includes, as noted from Section 5 of its charter quoted earlier, includes seven (7) Secretaries of Executive Departments. The seven (7) Secretaries (now six [6] in view of the abolition

of the Department of Youth and Sports and merger thereof into the Department of Education, Culture and Sports) by themselves do not constitute a majority of the members of the National Executive Board. We must note at the same time that the appointments of members of the National Executive Board, except only the appointments of the Regional Chairman and Scouts of Senior age from the various Scout Regions, are subject to ratification and confirmation by the Chief Scout, who is the President of the Philippines. Vacancies to the Board are filled by a majority vote of the remaining members thereof, but again subject to ratification and confirmation by the Chief Scout. 18 We must assume that such confirmation or ratification involves the exercise of choice or discretion on the part of ratifying or confirming power. It does appears therefore that there is substantial governmental (i.e., Presidential) participation or intervention in the choice of the majority of the members of the National Executive Board of the BSP. The third aspect relates to the character of the assets and funds of the BSP. The original assets of the BSP were acquired by purchase or gift or other equitable arrangement with the Boy Scouts of America, of which the BSP was part before the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. The BSP charter, however, does not indicate that such assets were public or statal in character or had originated from the Government or the State. According to petitioner BSP, its operating funds used for carrying out its purposes and programs, are derived principally from membership dues paid by the Boy Scouts themselves and from property rentals. In this respect, the BSP appears similar to private non-stock, non-profit corporations, although its charter expressly envisages donations and contributions to it from the Government and any of its agencies and instrumentalities. 19 We note only that BSP funds have not apparently heretofore been regarded as public funds by the Commission on Audit, considering that such funds have not been audited by the Commission. While the BSP may be seen to be a mixed type of entity, combining aspects of both public and private entities, we believe that considering the character of its purposes and its functions, the statutory designation of the BSP as "a public corporation" and the substantial participation of the Government in the selection of members of the National Executive Board of the BSP, the BSP, as presently constituted under its charter, is a government-controlled corporation within the meaning of Article IX. (B) (2) (1) of the Constitution. We are fortified in this conclusion when we note that the Administrative Code of 1987 designates the BSP as one of the attached agencies of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports ("DECS"). 20An "agency of the Government" is defined as referring to any of the various units of the Government including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, government-owned or-controlled corporation, or local government or distinct unit therein. 21 "Government instrumentality" is in turn defined in the 1987 Administrative Code in the following manner: Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy usually through a charter. This term

includesregulatory agencies, chartered institutions controlled corporations. 22 (Emphasis supplied)

and

government-owned

or

The same Code describes a "chartered institution" in the following terms: Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the State. 23 (Emphasis supplied) We believe that the BSP is appropriately regarded as "a government instrumentality" under the 1987 Administrative Code. It thus appears that the BSP may be regarded as both a "government controlled corporation with an original charter" and as an "instrumentality" of the Government within the meaning of Article IX (B) (2) (1) of the Constitution. It follows that the employees of petitioner BSP are embraced within the Civil Service and are accordingly governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations. It remains only to note that even before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution employees of the BSP already fell within the scope of the Civil Service. In National Housing Corporation v. Juco, 24 decided in 1985, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Gutierrez, held: There should no longer be any question at this time that employees of governmentowned or controlled corporations are governed by the civil service law and civil service rules and regulations. Section 1, Article XII-B of the [19731 Constitution specifically provides: The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the Government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation. . . . The 1935 Constitution had a similar provision in its Section 1, Article XII which stated: A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the Government shall be provided by law. The inclusion of "government-owned or controlled corporations" within the embrace of the civil service shows a deliberate effort of the framers to plug an earlier loophole which allowed government-owned or controlled corporations to avoid the full consequences of the all encompassing coverage of the civil service system. The same explicit intent is shown by the addition of "agency" and "instrumentality" to branches and subdivisions of the Government. All offices and firms of the government are covered. The amendments introduced in 1973 are not idle exercises or meaningless gestures. They carry the strong message that civil service coverage is broad and allembracing insofar as employment in the government in any of its governmental or corporate arms is concerned. 25

The complaint in NLRC Case No. 1637-84 having been filed on 13 November 1984, when the 1973 Constitution was still in force, our ruling in Juco applies in the case at bar. 26 In view of the foregoing, we hold that both the Labor Arbiter and public respondent NLRC had no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by private respondents in NLRC Case No. 1637-84; neither labor agency had before it any matter which could validly have been passed upon by it in the exercise of original or appellate jurisdiction. The appealed Decision and Resolution in this case, having been rendered without jurisdiction, vested no rights and imposed no liabilities upon any of the parties here involved. That neither party had expressly raised the issue of jurisdiction in the pleadings poses no obstacle to this ruling of the Court, which may motu proprio take cognizance of the issue of existence or absence of jurisdiction and pass upon the same. 27 ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 31 July 1985, and the Decision dated 27 February 1987 and Resolution dated 16 October 1987, issued by public respondent NLRC, in NLRC Case No. 1637-84, are hereby SET ASIDE. All other orders and resolutions rendered in this case by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are likewise SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.

EN BANC G. R. No. 155027 February 28, 2006 THE VETERANS FEDERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by Esmeraldo R. Acorda, Petitioner, vs. Hon. ANGELO T. REYES in his capacity as Secretary of National Defense; and Hon. EDGARDO E. BATENGA in his capacity as Undersecretary for Civil Relations and Administration of the Department of National Defense, Respondents.

1. RA 2640 dated 18 June 60 Section 1 ... "hereby created a body corporate, under the control and supervision of the Secretary of National Defense." 2. RA 2640 Section 12 ... "On or before the last day of the month following the end of each fiscal year, the Federation shall make and transmit to the President of the Philippines or to the Secretary of National Defense, a report of its proceedings for the past year, including a full, complete and itemized report of receipts and expenditures of whatever kind." 3. Republic Act 3518 dated 18 June 1963 (An Act Creating the Philippine Veterans Bank, and for Other Purposes) provides in Section 6 that ... "the affairs and business of the Philippine Veterans Bank shall be directed and its property managed, controlled and preserved, unless otherwise provided in this Act, by a Board of Directors consisting of eleven (11) members to be composed of three ex officio members to wit: the Philippine Veterans Administrator, the President of the Veterans Federation of the Philippines and the Secretary of National Defense x x x. It is therefore in the context of clarification and rectification of what should have been done by the DND (Department of National Defense) for and about the VFP and PVB that I am requesting appropriate information and report about these two corporate bodies. Therefore it may become necessary that a conference with your staffs in these two bodies be set. Thank you and anticipating your action on this request. Very truly yours, (SGD) ANGELO T. REYES [DND] Secretary On 10 June 2002, respondent DND Secretary issued the assailed DND Department Circular No. 04 entitled, "Further Implementing the Provisions of Sections 12 and 23 of Republic Act No. 2640," the full text of which appears as follows: Department of National Defense Department Circular No. 04 Subject: Further Implementing the Provisions of Sections 1 & 2 of Republic Act No. 2640 Authority: Republic Act No. 2640 Executive Order No. 292 dated July 25, 1987 Section 1 These rules shall govern and apply to the management and operations of the Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP) within the context provided by EO 292 s-1987.

DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with a prayer to declare as void Department Circular No. 04 of the Department of National Defense (DND), dated 10 June 2002. Petitioner in this case is the Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP), a corporate body organized under Republic Act No. 2640, dated 18 June 1960, as amended, and duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Respondent Angelo T. Reyes was the Secretary of National Defense (DND Secretary) who issued the assailed Department Circular No. 04, dated 10 June 2002. Respondent Edgardo E. Batenga was the DND Undersecretary for Civil Relations and Administration who was tasked by the respondent DND Secretary to conduct an extensive management audit of the records of petitioner. The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows: Petitioner VFP was created under Rep. Act No. 2640,1 a statute approved on 18 June 1960. On 15 April 2002, petitioners incumbent president received a letter dated 13 April 2002 which reads: Col. Emmanuel V. De Ocampo (Ret.) President Veterans Federation of the Philippines Makati, Metro Manila Dear Col. De Ocampo: Please be informed that during the preparation of my briefing before the Cabinet and the President last March 9, 2002, we came across some legal bases which tended to show that there is an organizational and management relationship between Veterans Federation of the Philippines and the Philippine Veterans Bank which for many years have been inadvertently overlooked. I refer to Republic Act 2640 creating the body corporate known as the VFP and Republic Act 3518 creating the Phil. Vets [sic] Bank.

Section 2 DEFINITION OF TERMS for the purpose of these rules, the terms, phrases or words used herein shall, unless the context indicates otherwise, mean or be understood as follows: Supervision and Control it shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of a duty; restrain the commission of acts; approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs. Power of Control power to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former to that of the latter. Supervision means overseeing or the power of an officer to see to it that their subordinate officers perform their duties; it does not allow the superior to annul the acts of the subordinate. Administrative Process embraces matter concerning the procedure in the disposition of both routine and contested matters, and the matter in which determinations are made, enforced or reviewed. Government Agency as defined under PD 1445, a government agency or agency of government or "agency" refers to any department, bureau or office of the national government, or any of its branches or instrumentalities, of any political subdivision, as well as any government owned or controlled corporation, including its subsidiaries, or other self-governing board or commission of the government. Government Owned and Controlled Corporation (GOCC) refer to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the government directly or through its instrumentalities wholly or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least 50% of its capital stock. Fund sum of money or other resources set aside for the purpose of carrying out specific activities or attaining certain objectives in accordance with special regulations, restrictions or limitations and constitutes an independent, fiscal and accounting entity. Government Fund includes public monies of every sort and other resources pertaining to any agency of the government. Veteran any person who rendered military service in the land, sea or air forces of the Philippines during the revolution against Spain, the Philippine American War, World War II, including Filipino citizens who served in Allied Forces in the Philippine territory and foreign nationals who served in Philippine forces; the Korean campaign, the Vietnam campaign, the Anti-dissidence campaign, or other wars or military campaigns; or who rendered military service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and has been honorably discharged or separated after at least six (6) years total cumulative active service or sooner separated due to the death or disability arising from a wound or injury received or sickness or disease incurred in line of duty while in the active service.

Section 3 Relationship Between the DND and the VFP 3.1 Sec 1 of RA 3140 provides "... the following persons (heads of various veterans associations and organizations in the Philippines) and their associates and successors are hereby created a body corporate, under the control and supervision of the Secretary of National Defense, under the name, style and title of "Veterans Federation of the Philippines ..." The Secretary of National Defense shall be charged with the duty of supervising the veterans and allied program under the jurisdiction of the Department. It shall also have the responsibility of overseeing and ensuring the judicious and effective implementation of veterans assistance, benefits, and utilization of VFP assets. 3.2 To effectively supervise and control the corporate affairs of the Federation and to safeguard the interests and welfare of the veterans who are also wards of the State entrusted under the protection of the DND, the Secretary may personally or through a designated representative, require the submission of reports, documents and other papers regarding any or all of the Federations business transactions particularly those relating to the VFP functions under Section 2 of RA 2640. The Secretary or his representative may attend conferences of the supreme council of the VFP and such other activities he may deem relevant. 3.3 The Secretary shall from time to time issue guidelines, directives and other orders governing vital government activities including, but not limited to, the conduct of elections; the acquisition, management and dispositions of properties, the accounting of funds, financial interests, stocks and bonds, corporate investments, etc. and such other transactions which may affect the interests of the veterans. 3.4 Financial transactions of the Federation shall follow the provisions of the government auditing code (PD 1445) i.e. government funds shall be spent or used for public purposes; trust funds shall be available and may be spent only for the specific purpose for which the trust was created or the funds received; fiscal responsibility shall, to the greatest extent, be shared by all those exercising authority over the financial affairs, transactions, and operations of the federation; disbursements or dispositions of government funds or property shall invariably bear the approval of the proper officials. Section 4 Records of the FEDERATION As a corporate body and in accordance with appropriate laws, it shall keep and carefully preserve records of all business transactions, minutes of meetings of stockholders/members of the board of directors reflecting all details about such activity. All such records and minutes shall be open to directors, trustees, stockholders, and other members for inspection and copies of which may be requested. As a body corporate, it shall submit the following: annual report; proceedings of council meetings; report of operations together with financial statement of its assets and liabilities and fund balance per year; statement of revenues and expenses per year;

statement of cash flows per year as certified by the accountant; and other documents/reports as may be necessary or required by the SND. Section 5 Submission of Annual and Periodic Report As mandated under appropriate laws, the following reports shall be submitted to the SND, to wit: a. Annual Report to be submitted not later than every January 31 of the following year. Said report shall consist of the following: 1. Financial Report of the Federation, signed by the Treasurer General and Auditor General; 2. Roster of Members of the Supreme Council; 3. Roster of Members of the Executive Board and National Officers; and 4. Current listing of officers and management of VFP. b. Report on the proceedings of each Supreme Council Meeting to be submitted not later than one month after the meeting; c. Report of the VFP President as may be required by SND or as may be found necessary by the President of the Federation; d. Resolutions passed by the Executive Board and the Supreme Council for confirmation to be submitted not later than one month after the approval of the resolution; e. After Operation/Activity Reports to be submitted not later than one month after such operation or activity; Section 6 Penal Sanctions As an attached agency to a regular department of the government, the VFP and all its instrumentalities, officials and personnel shall be subject to the penal provisions of such laws, rules and regulations applicable to the attached agencies of the government. In a letter dated 6 August 2002 addressed to the President of petitioner, respondent DND Secretary reiterated his instructions in his earlier letter of 13 April 2002. Thereafter, petitioners President received a letter dated 23 August 2002 from respondent Undersecretary, informing him that Department Order No. 129 dated 23 August 2002 directed "the conduct of a Management Audit of the Veterans Federation of the Philippines."4 The letter went on to state that respondent DND Secretary "believes that the mandate given by said law can be meaningfully exercised if this department can better appreciate the functions, responsibilities and situation on the ground and this can be done by undertaking a thorough study of the organization."5 Respondent Undersecretary also requested both for a briefing and for documents on personnel, ongoing projects and petitioners financial condition. The letter ended by stating that, after the briefing, the support staff of the Audit Committee would begin their work to meet the one-month target within which to submit a report.

A letter dated 28 August 2003 informed petitioners President that the Management Audit Group headed by the Undersecretary would be paying petitioner a visit on 30 August 2002 for an update on VFPs different affiliates and the financial statement of the Federation. Subsequently, the Secretary General of the VFP sent an undated letter to respondent DND Secretary, with notice to respondent Undersecretary for Civil Relations and Administration, complaining about the alleged broadness of the scope of the management audit and requesting the suspension thereof until such time that specific areas of the audit shall have been agreed upon. The request was, however, denied by the Undersecretary in a letter dated 4 September 2002 on the ground that a specific timeframe had been set for the activity. Petitioner thus filed this Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, praying for the following reliefs: 1. For this Court to issue a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction to enjoin respondent Secretary and all those acting under his discretion and authority from: (a) implementing DND Department Circular No. 04; and (b) continuing with the ongoing management audit of petitioners books of account; 2. After hearing the issues on notice a. Declare DND Department Circular No. 04 as null and void for being ultra vires; b. Convert the writ of prohibition, preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction into a permanent one.6 GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION Petitioner asserts that, although cases which question the constitutionality or validity of administrative issuances are ordinarily filed with the lower courts, the urgency and substantive importance of the question on hand and the public interest attendant to the subject matter of the petition justify its being filed with this Court directly as an original action.7 It is settled that the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals also exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition. As we have held in numerous occasions, however, such concurrence of original jurisdiction does not mean that the party seeking extraordinary writs has the absolute freedom to file his petition in the court of his choice.8 Thus, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Leal,9 we held that: Such concurrence of original jurisdiction among the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals and this Court, however, does not mean that the party seeking any of the extraordinary writs has the absolute freedom to file his petition in the court of his choice. The hierarchy of courts in our judicial system determines the appropriate forum for these petitions. Thus, petitions for the issuance of the said writs against the first level (inferior) courts must be filed with the Regional Trial Court and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of this Courts original

jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only where there are special and important reasons therefor, specifically and sufficiently set forth in the petition. This is the established policy to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention, which are better devoted to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket. Thus, it was proper for petitioner to institute the special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the RTC order denying his motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction. The petition itself, in this case, does not specifically and sufficiently set forth the special and important reasons why the Court should give due course to this petition in the first instance, hereby failing to fulfill the conditions set forth in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Leal.10 While we reiterate the policies set forth in Leal and allied cases and continue to abhor the propensity of a number of litigants to disregard the principle of hierarchy of courts in our judicial system, we, however, resolve to take judicial notice of the fact that the persons who stand to lose in a possible protracted litigation in this case are war veterans, many of whom have precious little time left to enjoy the benefits that can be conferred by petitioner corporation. This bickering for the power over petitioner corporation, an entity created to represent and defend the interests of Filipino veterans, should be resolved as soon as possible in order for it to once and for all direct its resources to its rightful beneficiaries all over the country. All these said, we hereby resolve to give due course to this petition. ISSUES Petitioner mainly alleges that the rules and guidelines laid down in the assailed Department Circular No. 04 expanded the scope of "control and supervision" beyond what has been laid down in Rep. Act No. 2640.11 Petitioner further submits the following issues to this Court: 1. Was the challenged department circular passed in the valid exercise of the respondent Secretarys "control and supervision"? 2. Could the challenged department circular validly lay standards classifying the VFP, an essentially civilian organization, within the ambit of statutes only applying to government entities? 3. Does the department circular, which grants respondent direct management control on the VFP, unduly encroach on the prerogatives of VFPs governing body? At the heart of all these issues and all of petitioners prayers and assertions in this case is petitioners claim that it is a private non-government corporation. CENTRAL ISSUE: IS THE VFP A PRIVATE CORPORATION? Petitioner claims that it is not a public nor a governmental entity but a private organization, and advances this claim to prove that the issuance of DND Department Circular No. 04 is an invalid exercise of respondent Secretarys control and supervision.12

This Court has defined the power of control as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former to that of the latter."13The power of supervision, on the other hand, means "overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties."14 These definitions are synonymous with the definitions in the assailed Department Circular No. 04, while the other provisions of the assailed department circular are mere consequences of control and supervision as defined. Thus, in order for petitioners premise to be able to support its conclusion, petitioners should be deemed to imply either of the following: (1) that it is unconstitutional/impermissible for the law (Rep. Act No. 2640) to grant control and/or supervision to the Secretary of National Defense over a private organization, or (2) that the control and/or supervision that can be granted to the Secretary of National Defense over a private organization is limited, and is not as strong as they are defined above. The following provision of the 1935 Constitution, the organic act controlling at the time of the creation of the VFP in 1960, is relevant: Section 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned and controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.15 On the other hand, its counterparts in the 1973 and 1987 constitutions are the following: Section 4. The National Assembly shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.16 Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned and controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.17 From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that our constitutions explicitly prohibit the regulation by special laws of private corporations, with the exception of governmentowned or controlled corporations (GOCCs). Hence, it would be impermissible for the law to grant control of the VFP to a public official if it were neither a public corporation, an unincorporated governmental entity, nor a GOCC.18 Said constitutional provisions can even be read to prohibit the creation itself of the VFP if it were neither of the three mentioned above, but we cannot go into that in this case since there is no challenge to the creation of the VFP in the petition as to permit this Court from considering its nullity. Petitioner vigorously argues that the VFP is a private non-government organization, pressing on the following contentions:

1. The VFP does not possess the elements which would qualify it as a public office, particularly the possession/delegation of a portion of sovereign power of government to be exercised for the benefit of the public; 2. VFP funds are not public funds because a) No budgetary appropriations or government funds have been released to the VFP directly or indirectly from the Department of Budget and Management (DBM); b) VFP funds come from membership dues; c) The lease rentals raised from the use of government lands reserved for the VFP are private in character and do not belong to the government. Said rentals are fruits of VFPs labor and efforts in managing and administering the lands for VFP purposes and objectives. A close analogy would be any Filipino citizen settling on government land and who tills the land for his livelihood and sustenance. The fruits of his labor belong to him and not to the owner of the land. Such fruits are not public funds. 3. Although the juridical personality of the VFP emanates from a statutory charter, the VFP retains its essential character as a private, civilian federation of veterans voluntarily formed by the veterans themselves to attain a unity of effort, purpose and objectives, e.g. a. The members of the VFP are individual members and retirees from the public and military service; b. Membership in the VFP is voluntary, not compulsory; c. The VFP is governed, not by the Civil Service Law, the Articles of War nor the GSIS Law, but by the Labor Code and the SSS Law; d. The VFP has its own Constitution and By-Laws and is governed by a Supreme Council who are elected from and by the members themselves; 4. The Administrative Code of 1987 does not provide that the VFP is an attached agency, nor does it provide that it is an entity under the control and supervision of the DND in the context of the provisions of said code. 5. The DBM declared that the VFP is a non-government organization and issued a certificate that the VFP has not been a direct recipient of any funds released by the DBM. These arguments of petitioner notwithstanding, we are constrained to rule that petitioner is in fact a public corporation. Before responding to petitioners allegations one by one, here are the more evident reasons why the VFP is a public corporation: (1) Rep. Act No. 2640 is entitled "An Act to Create a Public Corporation to be Known as the Veterans Federation of the Philippines, Defining its Powers, and for Other Purposes." (2) Any action or decision of the Federation or of the Supreme Council shall be subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense.19

(3) The VFP is required to submit annual reports of its proceedings for the past year, including a full, complete and itemized report of receipts and expenditures of whatever kind, to the President of the Philippines or to the Secretary of National Defense.20 (4) Under Executive Order No. 37 dated 2 December 1992, the VFP was listed as among the government-owned and controlled corporations that will not be privatized. (5) In Ang Bagong Bayani OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC,21 this Court held in a minute resolution that the "VFP [Veterans Federation Party] is an adjunct of the government, as it is merely an incarnation of the Veterans Federation of the Philippines. And now to answer petitioners reasons for insisting that it is a private corporation: 1. Petitioner claims that the VFP does not possess the elements which would qualify it as a public office, particularly the possession/delegation of a portion of sovereign power of government to be exercised for the benefit of the public; In Laurel v. Desierto,22 we adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office, that it is "the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public." In the same case, we went on to adopt Mechems view that the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government is "[t]he most important characteristic" in determining whether a position is a public office or not.23 Such portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, must attach to the office for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer. The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.24 The issue, therefore, is whether the VFAs officers have been delegated some portion of the sovereignty of the country, to be exercised for the public benefit. In several cases, we have dealt with the issue of whether certain specific activities can be classified as sovereign functions. These cases, which deal with activities not immediately apparent to be sovereign functions, upheld the public sovereign nature of operations needed either to promote social justice25 or to stimulate patriotic sentiments and love of country.26 As regards the promotion of social justice as a sovereign function, we held in Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) v. Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO),27that the compelling urgency with which the Constitution speaks of social justice does not leave any doubt that land reform is not an optional but a compulsory function of

sovereignty. The same reason was used in our declaration that socialized housing is likewise a sovereign function.28 Highly significant here is the observation of former Chief Justice Querube Makalintal: The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government [into constituent and ministrant functions] quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals," continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here[,] as almost everywhere else[,] the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here, of course, this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice.29 (Emphasis supplied.) It was, on the other hand, the fact that the National Centennial Celebrations was calculated to arouse and stimulate patriotic sentiments and love of country that it was considered as a sovereign function in Laurel v. Desierto.30 In Laurel, the Court then took its cue from a similar case in the United States involving a Fourth of July fireworks display. The holding of the Centennial Celebrations was held to be an executive function, as it was intended to enforce Article XIV of the Constitution which provides for the conservation, promotion and popularization of the nations historical and cultural heritage and resources, and artistic relations. In the case at bar, the functions of petitioner corporation enshrined in Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 264031 should most certainly fall within the category of sovereign functions. The protection of the interests of war veterans is not only meant to promote social justice, but is also intended to reward patriotism. All of the functions in Section 4 concern the well-being of war veterans, our countrymen who risked their lives and lost their limbs in fighting for and defending our nation. It would be injustice of catastrophic proportions to say that it is beyond sovereigntys power to reward the people who defended her. Like the holding of the National Centennial Celebrations, the functions of the VFP are executive functions, designed to implement not just the provisions of Rep. Act No. 2640, but also, and more importantly, the Constitutional mandate for the State to provide immediate and adequate care, benefits and other forms of assistance to war veterans and veterans of military campaigns, their surviving spouses and orphans.32 2. Petitioner claims that VFP funds are not public funds. Petitioner claims that its funds are not public funds because no budgetary appropriations or government funds have been released to the VFP directly or indirectly from the DBM, and because VFP funds come from membership dues and lease rentals earned from administering government lands reserved for the VFP. The fact that no budgetary appropriations have been released to the VFP does not prove that it is a private corporation. The DBM indeed did not see it fit to propose

budgetary appropriations to the VFP, having itself believed that the VFP is a private corporation.33 If the DBM, however, is mistaken as to its conclusion regarding the nature of VFPs incorporation, its previous assertions will not prevent future budgetary appropriations to the VFP. The erroneous application of the law by public officers does not bar a subsequent correct application of the law.34 Nevertheless, funds in the hands of the VFP from whatever source are public funds, and can be used only for public purposes. This is mandated by the following provisions of Rep. Act No. 2640: (1) Section 2 provides that the VFP can only "invest its funds for the exclusive benefit of the Veterans of the Philippines;" (2) Section 2 likewise provides that "(a)ny action or decision of the Federation or of the Supreme Council shall be subject to the approval of the Secretary of National Defense." Hence, all activities of the VFP to which the Supreme Council can apply its funds are subject to the approval of the Secretary of National Defense; (3) Section 4 provides that "the Federation shall exist solely for the purposes of a benevolent character, and not for the pecuniary benefit of its members;"1avvphil.net (4) Section 6 provides that all funds of the VFP in excess of operating expenses are "reserved for disbursement, as the Supreme Council may authorize, for the purposes stated in Section two of this Act;" (5) Section 10 provides that "(a)ny donation or contribution which from time to time may be made to the Federation by the Government of the Philippines or any of its subdivisions, branches, offices, agencies or instrumentalities shall be expended by the Supreme Council only for the purposes mentioned in this Act."; and finally, (6) Section 12 requires the submission of annual reports of VFP proceedings for the past year, including a full, complete and itemized report of receipts and expenditures of whatever kind, to the President of the Philippines or to the Secretary of National Defense. It is important to note here that the membership dues collected from the individual members of VFPs affiliate organizations do not become public funds while they are still funds of the affiliate organizations. A close reading of Section 135 of Rep. Act No. 2640 reveals that what has been created as a body corporate is not the individual membership of the affiliate organizations, but merely the aggregation of the heads of the affiliate organizations. Thus, only the money remitted by the affiliate organizations to the VFP partake in the public nature of the VFP funds. In Republic v. COCOFED,36 we held that the Coconut Levy Funds are public funds because, inter alia, (1) they were meant to be for the benefit of the coconut industry, one of the major industries supporting the national economy, and its farmers; and (2) the very laws governing coconut levies recognize their public character. The same is true with regard to the VFP funds. No less public is the use for the VFP funds, as such use is limited to the purposes of the VFP which we have ruled to be sovereign functions. Likewise, the law governing VFP funds (Rep. Act No. 2640) recognizes the public character of the funds as shown in the enumerated provisions above.

We also observed in the same COCOFED case that "(e)ven if the money is allocated for a special purpose and raised by special means, it is still public in character."37 In the case at bar, some of the funds were raised by even more special means, as the contributions from affiliate organizations of the VFP can hardly be regarded as enforced contributions as to be considered taxes. They are more in the nature of donations which have always been recognized as a source of public funding. Affiliate organizations of the VFP cannot complain of their contributions becoming public funds upon the receipt by the VFP, since they are presumed aware of the provisions of Rep. Act No. 2640 which not only specifies the exclusive purposes for which VFP funds can be used, but also provides for the regulation of such funds by the national government through the Secretary of National Defense. There is nothing wrong, whether legally or morally, from raising revenues through non-traditional methods. As remarked by Justice Florentino Feliciano in his concurring opinion in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr.38 where he explained that the funds raised by the Online Lottery System were also public in nature, thus: x x x [T]he more successful the government is in raising revenues by non-traditional methods such as PAGCOR operations and privatization measures, the lesser will be the pressure upon the traditional sources of public revenues, i.e., the pocket books of individual taxpayers and importers. Petitioner additionally harps on the inapplicability of the case of Laurel v. Desierto39 which was cited by Respondents. Petitioner claims that among the reasons National Centennial Commission Chair Salvador Laurel was considered a public officer was the fact that his compensation was derived from public funds. Having ruled that VFP funds from whatever source are public funds, we can safely conclude that the Supreme Councils compensation, taken as they are from VFP funds under the term "operating expenses" in Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 2640, are derived from public funds. The particular nomenclature of the compensation taken from VFP funds is not even of relevance here. As we said in Laurel concerning compensation as an element of public office: Under particular circumstances, "compensation" has been held to include allowance for personal expenses, commissions, expenses, fees, an honorarium, mileage or traveling expenses, payments for services, restitution or a balancing of accounts, salary, and wages.40 3. Petitioner argues that it is a civilian federation where membership is voluntary. Petitioner claims that the Secretary of National Defense "historically did not indulge in the direct or micromanagement of the VFP precisely because it is essentially a civilian organization where membership is voluntary."41 This reliance of petitioner on what has "historically" been done is erroneous, since laws are not repealed by disuse, custom, or practice to the contrary.42 Furthermore, as earlier stated, the erroneous application of the law by public officers does not bar a subsequent correct application of the law.43 Neither is the civilian nature of VFP relevant in this case. The Constitution does not contain any prohibition, express or implied, against the grant of control and/or

supervision to the Secretary of National Defense over a civilian organization. The Office of the Secretary of National Defense is itself a civilian office, its occupant being an alter ego of the civilian Commander-in-Chief. This set-up is the manifestation of the constitutional principle that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.44 There being no such constitutional prohibition, the creation of a civilian public organization by Rep. Act No. 2640 is not rendered invalid by its being placed under the control and supervision of the Secretary of National Defense. Petitioners stand that the VFP is a private corporation because membership thereto is voluntary is likewise erroneous. As stated above, the membership of the VFP is not the individual membership of the affiliate organizations, but merely the aggregation of the heads of such affiliate organizations. These heads forming the VFP then elect the Supreme Council and the other officers,45 of this public corporation. 4. Petitioner claims that the Administrative Code of 1987 does not provide that the VFP is an attached agency, and nor does it provide that it is an entity under the control and supervision of the DND in the context of the provisions of said code. The Administrative Code, by giving definitions of the various entities covered by it, acknowledges that its enumeration is not exclusive. The Administrative Code could not be said to have repealed nor enormously modified Rep. Act No. 2640 by implication, as such repeal or enormous modification by implication is not favored in statutory construction.46 5. Petitioner offers as evidence the DBM opinion that the VFP is a non-government organization in its certification that the VFP "has not been a direct recipient of any funds released by the DBM." Respondents claim that the supposed declaration of the DBM that petitioner is a nongovernment organization is not persuasive, since DBM is not a quasi-judicial agency. They aver that what we have said of the Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF) in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) v. City of Davao47 can be applied to DBM: In any case, it is contended, the ruling of the Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF) that petitioners exemption from local taxes has been restored is a contemporaneous construction of Section 23 [of R.A. No. 7925 and, as such, is entitled to great weight. The ruling of the BLGF has been considered in this case. But unlike the Court of Tax Appeals, which is a special court created for the purpose of reviewing tax cases, the BLGF was created merely to provide consultative services and technical assistance to local governments and the general public on local taxation and other related matters. Thus, the rule that the "Court will not set aside conclusions rendered by the CTA, which is, by the very nature of its function, dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of tax problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject, unless there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of authority" cannot apply in the case of the BLGF.

On this score, though, we disagree with respondents a nd hold that the DBMs appraisal is considered persuasive. Respondents misread the PLDT case in asserting that only quasi-judicial agencies determination can be considered persuasive. What the PLDT case points out is that, for an administrative agencys o pinion to be persuasive, the administrative agency involved (whether it has quasi-judicial powers or not) must be an expert in the field they are giving their opinion on. The DBM is indeed an expert on determining what the various government agencies and corporations are. This determination is necessary for the DBM to fulfill its mandate: Sec. 2. Mandate. - The Department shall be responsible for the formulation and implementation of the National Budget with the goal of attaining our national socioeconomic plans and objectives. The Department shall be responsible for the efficient and sound utilization of government funds and revenues to effectively achieve our country's development objectives.48 The persuasiveness of the DBM opinion has, however, been overcome by all the previous explanations we have laid so far. It has also been eclipsed by another similarly persuasive opinion, that of the Department of National Defense embodied in Department Circular No. 04. The DND is clearly more of an expert with respect to the determination of the entities under it, and its Administrative Rules and Regulations are entitled to great respect and have in their favor the presumption of legality.49 The DBM opinion furthermore suffers from its lack of explanation and justification in the "certification of non-receipt" where said opinion was given. The DBM has not furnished, in said certification or elsewhere, an explanation for its opinion that VFP is a non-government organization. THE FATE OF DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 04 Our ruling that petitioner is a public corporation is determinative of whether or not we should grant petitioners prayer to declare Department Circular No. 04 void. Petitioner assails Department Circular No. 04 on the ground that it expanded the scope of control and supervision beyond what has been laid down in Rep. Act No. 2640. Petitioner alleges that "(t)he equation of the meaning of `control and `supervision of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the same `control and supervision under Rep. Act No. 2640, takes out the context of the original legislative intent from the peculiar surrounding circumstances and conditions that brought about the creation of the VFP."50 Petitioner claims that the VFP "was intended as a self-governing autonomous body with a Supreme Council as governing authority," and that the assailed circular "pre-empts VFPs original self-governance and autonomy (in) representing veterans organizations, and substitutes government discretion and decisions to that of the veterans own determination."51 Petitioner says that the circulars provisions practically render the Supreme Council inutile, despite its being the statutory governing body of the VFP.52

As previously mentioned, this Court has defined the power of control as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former to that of the latter."53 The power of supervision, on the other hand, means "overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties."54 Under the Administrative Code of 1987:55 Supervision and control shall include the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs. x x x The definition of the power of control and supervision under Section 2 of the assailed Department Circular are synonymous with the foregoing definitions. Consequently, and considering that petitioner is a public corporation, the provisions of the assailed Department Circular No. 04 did not supplant nor modify the provisions of Republic Act No. 2640, thus not violating the settled rule that "all such (administrative) issuances must not override, but must remain consistent and in harmony with the law they seek to apply or implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law."56 Section 3.2 of the assailed department circular, which authorizes the Secretary of National Defense to "x x x personally or through a designated representative, require the submission of reports, documents and other papers regarding any or all of the Federations business functions, x x x." as well as Section 3.3 which allows the Secretary of DND to x x x [F]rom time to time issue guidelines, directives and other orders governing vital government activities including, but not limited to, the conduct of elections, the acquisition, management and dispositions of properties, the accounting of funds, financial interests, stocks and bonds, corporate investments, etc. and such other transactions which may affect the interests of the veterans. are merely consequences of both the power of control and supervision granted by Rep. Act No. 2640. The power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate has done in the performance of his duties, or to see to it that subordinate officers perform their duties in accordance with law, necessarily requires the ability of the superior officer to monitor, as closely as it desires, the acts of the subordinate. The same is true with respect to Sections 4 and 5 of the assailed Department Circular No. 04, which requires the preservation of the records of the Federation and the submission to the Secretary of National Defense of annual and periodic reports. Petitioner likewise claims that the assailed DND Department Circular No. 04 was never published, and hence void.57Respondents deny such non-publication.58 We have put forth both the rule and the exception on the publication of administrative rules and regulations in the case of Taada v. Tuvera:59

x x x Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules on guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Even assuming that the assailed circular was not published, its validity is not affected by such non-publication for the reason that its provisions fall under two of the exceptions enumerated in Taada. Department Circular No. 04 is an internal regulation. As we have ruled, they are meant to regulate a public corporation under the control of DND, and not the public in general. As likewise discussed above, what has been created as a body corporate by Rep. Act No. 2640 is not the individual membership of the affiliate organizations of the VFP, but merely the aggregation of the heads of the affiliate organizations. Consequently, the individual members of the affiliate organizations, who are not public officers, are beyond the regulation of the circular. Sections 2, 3 and 6 of the assailed circular are additionally merely interpretative in nature. They add nothing to the law. They do not affect the substantial rights of any person, whether party to the case at bar or not. In Sections 2 and 3, control and supervision are defined, mentioning actions that can be performed as consequences of such control and supervision, but without specifying the particular actions that shall be rendered to control and supervise the VFP. Section 6, in the same vein, merely state what the drafters of the circular perceived to be consequences of being an attached agency to a regular department of the government, enumerating sanctions and remedies provided by law that may be availed of whenever desired. Petitioner then objects to the implementation of Sec. 3.4 of the assailed Department Circular, which provides that 3.4 Financial transactions of the Federation shall follow the provisions of the government auditing code (PD 1445) i.e. government funds shall be spent or used for public purposes; trust funds shall be available and may be spent only for the specific purpose for which the trust was created or the funds received; fiscal responsibility shall, to the greatest extent, be shared by all those exercising authority over the financial affairs, transactions, and operations of the federation; disbursements or dispositions of government funds or property shall invariably bear the approval of the proper officials. Since we have also previously determined that VFP funds are public funds, there is likewise no reason to declare this provision invalid. Section 3.4 is correct in requiring the VFP funds to be used for public purposes, but only insofar the term "public purposes" is construed to mean "public purposes enumerated in Rep. Act No. 2640." Having in their possession public funds, the officers of the VFP, especially its fiscal officers, must indeed share in the fiscal responsibility to the greatest extent.

As to petitioners allegation that VFP was intended as a self-governing autonomous body with a Supreme Council as governing authority, we find that the provisions of Rep. Act No. 2640 concerning the control and supervision of the Secretary of National Defense clearly withholds from the VFP complete autonomy. To say, however, that such provisions render the VFP inutile is an exaggeration. An office is not rendered inutile by the fact that it is placed under the control of a higher office. These subordinate offices, such as the executive offices under the control of the President, exercise discretion at the first instance. While their acts can be altered or even set aside by the superior, these acts are effective and are deemed the acts of the superior until they are modified. Surely, we cannot say that the offices of all the Department Secretaries are worthless positions. In sum, the assailed DND Department Circular No. 04 does not supplant nor modify and is, on the contrary, perfectly in consonance with Rep. Act No. 2640. Petitioner VFP is a public corporation. As such, it can be placed under the control and supervision of the Secretary of National Defense, who consequently has the power to conduct an extensive management audit of petitioner corporation. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The validity of the Department of National Defense Department Circular No. 04 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002 FRANCISCO vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY CORPORATION,respondents.

I. and AMARI COASTAL

CHAVEZ, petitioner, BAY DEVELOPMENT

by land pledge No. 5 and approximately Three Million Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (3,382,888) square meters of reclaimed areas at varying elevations above Mean Low Water Level located outside the Financial Center Area and the First Neighborhood Unit."3 On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City. The Freedom Islands have a total land area of One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty One (1,578,441) square meters or 157.841 hectares. On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding.4 On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA.5 On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.6 On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997.7 Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal. On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice,8 the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel,9 and the Government Corporate Counsel.10 The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.11 On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there were on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos. According to these reports, PEA Director Nestor

CARPIO, J.: This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation. The Facts On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land. On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands."1 On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay"2 under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP). On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA." Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29, 1981, which stated: "(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and such other works in the MCCRRP as may be agreed upon by the parties, to be paid according to progress of works on a unit price/lump sum basis for items of work to be agreed upon, subject to price escalation, retention and other terms and conditions provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1594. All the financing required for such works shall be provided by PEA. xxx (iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to cede and transfer in favor of PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and participation of CDCP in and to all the areas of land reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP as of December 30, 1981 which have not yet been sold, transferred or otherwise disposed of by CDCP as of said date, which areas consist of approximately Ninety-Nine Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Three (99,473) square meters in the Financial Center Area covered

Kalaw, PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired Navy Officer Sergio Cruz composed the negotiating panel of PEA. On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed the petition "for unwarranted disregard of judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of the case before the proper court."12 On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion. After several motions for extension of time,13 PEA and AMARI filed their Comments on October 19, 1998 and June 25, 1998, respectively. Meanwhile, on December 28, 1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to submit the terms of the renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for issuance of a temporary restraining order; and (c) to set the case for hearing on oral argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999. In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda. On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement ("Amended JVA," for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA. Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."14 The Issues The issues raised by petitioner, PEA15 and AMARI16 are as follows: I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS; II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR FAILING TO OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;

III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT; V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION INCLUDES OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A FINAL AGREEMENT; VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT FOR THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS, RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; AND VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR RAISING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT. The Court's Ruling First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic because of subsequent events. The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the "terms and conditions of the ongoing negotiations for a new agreement." The petition also prays that the Court enjoin PEA from "privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any new agreement with AMARI." PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and academic because AMARI furnished petitioner on June 21, 1999 a copy of the signed Amended JVA containing the terms and conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations. Thus, PEA has satisfied petitioner's prayer for a public disclosure of the renegotiations. Likewise, petitioner's prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA is now moot because PEA and AMARI have already signed the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999. Moreover, the Office of the President has approved the Amended JVA on May 28, 1999. Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by simply fast-tracking the signing and approval of the Amended JVA before the Court could act on the issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the constitutional issue or remove it from the ambit of judicial review. We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction. PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from alienating lands of the public domain to private corporations. If the Amended JVA indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the

Court to enjoin its implementation, and if already implemented, to annul the effects of such unconstitutional contract. The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private corporation. It now becomes more compelling for the Court to resolve the issue to insure the government itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution intended to safeguard the national patrimony. Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. In the instant case, if the Amended JVA runs counter to the Constitution, the Court can still prevent the transfer of title and ownership of alienable lands of the public domain in the name of AMARI. Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and the public.17 Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions of the Court involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution,18 covered agricultural lands sold to private corporations which acquired the lands from private parties. The transferors of the private corporations claimed or could claim the right to judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles19 under Title II of Commonwealth Act. 141 ("CA No. 141" for brevity). In the instant case, AMARI seeks to acquire from PEA, a public corporation, reclaimed lands and submerged areas for non-agricultural purposes by purchase under PD No. 1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA No. 141. Certain undertakings by AMARI under the Amended JVA constitute the consideration for the purchase. Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim judicial confirmation of their titles because the lands covered by the Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to be reclaimed. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title requires open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain for at least thirty years since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Besides, the deadline for filing applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect title expired on December 31, 1987.20 Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses. The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the reclamation project.21 Second issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe the principle governing the hierarchy of courts. PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from the Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public.22 The Court can resolve this case without

determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case. Third issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial intervention in compelling PEA to disclose publicly certain information without first asking PEA the needed information. PEA claims petitioner's direct resort to the Court violates the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It also violates the rule that mandamus may issue only if there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. PEA distinguishes the instant case from Taada v. Tuvera23 where the Court granted the petition for mandamus even if the petitioners there did not initially demand from the Office of the President the publication of the presidential decrees. PEA points out that in Taada, the Executive Department had an affirmative statutory duty under Article 2 of the Civil Code24 and Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63825 to publish the presidential decrees. There was, therefore, no need for the petitioners in Taada to make an initial demand from the Office of the President. In the instant case, PEA claims it has no affirmative statutory duty to disclose publicly information about its renegotiation of the JVA. Thus, PEA asserts that the Court must apply the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies to the instant case in view of the failure of petitioner here to demand initially from PEA the needed information. The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a government corporation. Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code,26 the disposition of government lands to private parties requires public bidding. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law obligated PEA to make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention. Moreover, and this alone is determinative of this issue, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question.27 The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case. Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his constitutional right to information without a showing that PEA refused to perform an affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA also claims that petitioner has not shown that he will suffer any concrete injury because of the signing

or implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands worth billions of pesos, information which the Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation. Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public. In Chavez v. PCGG,28 the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer's suit on matters of transcendental importance to the public, thus "Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an issue of 'transcendental importance to the public.' He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the social, economic and moral well being of the people.' Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, such as in this case. He invokes several decisions of this Court which have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case involved public interest. xxx In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the action. In the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right then recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in connection with the rule that laws in order to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners' legal standing, the Court declared that the right they sought to be enforced 'is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.' Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Taada, further declared that 'when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the general 'public' which possesses the right.'

Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have been involved under the questioned contract for the development, management and operation of the Manila International Container Terminal, 'public interest [was] definitely involved considering the important role [of the subject contract] . . . in the economic development of the country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved.' We concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for upholding the petitioner's standing. Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to official records, documents and papers a right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should be allowed." We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights - to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources - matters of transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi. Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final agreement. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to information on matters of public concern in this manner: "Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." (Emphasis supplied) The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's right to information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus: "Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest." (Emphasis supplied) These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policymaking and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights. These twin provisions are essential to the exercise of freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its official acts, transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say, even if expressed without any restraint, will be speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are also essential to hold public officials "at all times x x x accountable to the people,"29 for unless citizens have the proper information, they cannot hold public officials accountable for anything. Armed with the right

information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. As explained by the Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.30 "An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit." PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,31 that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to information is limited to "definite propositions of the government." PEA maintains the right does not include access to "intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the 'exploratory stage'." Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-decisional stage or before the closing of the transaction. To support its contention, AMARI cites the following discussion in the 1986 Constitutional Commission: "Mr. Suarez. And when we say 'transactions' which should be distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself? Mr. Ople: The 'transactions' used here, I suppose is generic and therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer. Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction. Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest. Mr. Suarez: Thank you."32 (Emphasis supplied) AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the right. Requiring government officials to reveal their deliberations at the predecisional stage will degrade the quality of decision-making in government agencies. Government officials will hesitate to express their real sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate public dissemination of their discussions, putting them under all kinds of pressure before they decide. We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires PEA to disclose publicly, and information the constitutional right to information requires PEA to release to the public. Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its own and without demand from anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its property. These include the size, location, technical description and nature of the property being disposed of, the terms and conditions of the disposition,

the parties qualified to bid, the minimum price and similar information. PEA must prepare all these data and disclose them to the public at the start of the disposition process, long before the consummation of the contract, because the Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA fails to make this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time during the bidding process. Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the government. From this moment, the public's right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary information leading to such definite proposition. In Chavez v. PCGG,33 the Court ruled as follows: "Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information." (Emphasis supplied) Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission understood that the right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction."Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.1wphi1.nt Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest." The right covers three categories of information which are "matters of public concern," namely: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions; and (3) government research data used in formulating policies. The first category refers to any document that is part of the public records in

the custody of government agencies or officials. The second category refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing, establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official acts, transactions or decisions of government agencies or officials. The third category refers to research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the government and used in formulating government policies. The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA.34 The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and copying.35 The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the separation of powers.36 The right does not also apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts have long recognized as confidential.37 The right may also be subject to other limitations that Congress may impose by law. There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress,38 are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.39 This is not the situation in the instant case. We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiationsbefore a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order.40 Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to information in several legislations.41 Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution. The Regalian Doctrine The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public

domain. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories and possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.42 The King, as the sovereign ruler and representative of the people, acquired and owned all lands and territories in the Philippines except those he disposed of by grant or sale to private individuals. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the State, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public domain. The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."43 Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889, which is now Article 420 of the Civil Code of 1950, incorporated the Regalian doctrine. Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first statutory law governing the ownership and disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines. On May 18, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which provided for the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. Later, on November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act, which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, whichauthorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. CA No. 141 continues to this day as the general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of 1889 Under the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the shores, bays, coves, inlets and all waters within the maritime zone of the Spanish territory belonged to the public domain for public use.44 The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 allowed the reclamation of the sea under Article 5, which provided as follows: "Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority." Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea belonged to the party undertaking the reclamation, provided the government issued the necessary permit and did not reserve ownership of the reclaimed land to the State. Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows: "Art. 339. Property of public dominion is 1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;

2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is employed in some public service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until granted to private individuals." Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast, property devoted to public service referred to property used for some specific public service and open only to those authorized to use the property. Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to property not so used but employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property constituted property of public dominion although employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase the national wealth. Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed the re-classification of property of public dominion into private property, to wit: "Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the private property of the State." This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive department pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer needed for public use or territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate the property to private parties.45 Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which regulated the lease of reclaimed and foreshore lands. The salient provisions of this law were as follows: "Section 1. The control and disposition of the foreshore as defined in existing law, and the title to all Government or public lands made or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise throughout the Philippine Islands, shall be retained by the Government without prejudice to vested rights and without prejudice to rights conceded to the City of Manila in the Luneta Extension. Section 2. (a) The Secretary of the Interior shall cause all Government or public lands made or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise to be divided into lots or blocks, with the necessary streets and alleyways located thereon, and shall cause plats and plans of such surveys to be prepared and filed with the Bureau of Lands. (b) Upon completion of such plats and plans the Governor-General shall give notice to the public that such parts of the lands so made or reclaimed as are not needed for public purposes will be leased for commercial and business purposes, x x x. xxx (e) The leases above provided for shall be disposed of to the highest and best bidder therefore, subject to such regulations and safeguards as the Governor-General may by executive order prescribe." (Emphasis supplied)

Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all lands reclaimed by the government. The Act also vested in the government control and disposition of foreshore lands. Private parties could lease lands reclaimed by the government only if these lands were no longer needed for public purpose. Act No. 1654 mandated public bidding in the lease of government reclaimed lands. Act No. 1654 made government reclaimed lands sui generis in that unlike other public lands which the government could sell to private parties, these reclaimed lands were available only for lease to private parties. Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Act No. 1654 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea under Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters. Lands reclaimed from the sea by private parties with government permission remained private lands. Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act.46 The salient provisions of Act No. 2874, on reclaimed lands, were as follows: "Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into (a) Alienable or disposable, (b) Timber, and (c) Mineral lands, x x x. Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act." Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited or classified x x x. xxx Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, shall be classified assuitable for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise. Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows: (a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means; (b) Foreshore; (c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers;

(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes. x x x. Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-six shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the GovernorGeneral, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis supplied) Section 6 of Act No. 2874 authorized the Governor-General to "classify lands of the public domain into x x x alienable or disposable"47 lands. Section 7 of the Act empowered the Governor-General to "declare what lands are open to disposition or concession." Section 8 of the Act limited alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified." Section 56 of Act No. 2874 stated that lands "disposable under this title48 shall be classified" as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands, as well as other lands. All these lands, however, must be suitable for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive non-agricultural purposes. These provisions vested upon the Governor-General the power to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into disposable lands of the public domain. These provisions also empowered the Governor-General to classify further such disposable lands of the public domain into government reclaimed, foreshore or marshy lands of the public domain, as well as other non-agricultural lands. Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable lands of the public domain classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands "shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise."The Governor-General, before allowing the lease of these lands to private parties, must formally declare that the lands were "not necessary for the public service." Act No. 2874 reiterated the State policy to lease and not to sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain, a policy first enunciated in 1907 in Act No. 1654. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain that the government could not sell to private parties. The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the government prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties. The State always reserved these lands for some future public service. Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 56 (d). Lands falling under Section 56 (d) were the only lands for non-agricultural purposes the government could sell to private parties. Thus, under Act No. 2874, the government could not sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands to private parties, unless the legislature passed a law allowing their sale.49

Act No. 2874 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea pursuant to Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Lands reclaimed from the sea by private parties with government permission remained private lands. Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution On May 14, 1935, the 1935 Constitution took effect upon its ratification by the Filipino people. The 1935 Constitution, in adopting the Regalian doctrine, declared in Section 1, Article XIII, that "Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant." (Emphasis supplied) The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources the State could alienate. Thus, foreshore lands, considered part of the State's natural resources, became inalienable by constitutional fiat, available only for lease for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The government could alienate foreshore lands only after these lands were reclaimed and classified as alienable agricultural lands of the public domain. Government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain, being neither timber nor mineral lands, fell under the classification of public agricultural lands.50 However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to classification as disposable public agricultural lands, could only be leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874. The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain was only a statutory prohibition and the legislature could therefore remove such prohibition. The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit individuals and corporations from acquiring government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain that were classified as agricultural lands under existing public land laws. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution provided as follows: "Section 2. No private corporation or association may acquire, lease, or hold public agricultural lands in excess of one thousand and twenty four hectares, nor may any individual acquire such lands by purchase in excess of one hundred and forty hectares, or by lease in excess of one thousand and twenty-four hectares, or by homestead in

excess of twenty-four hectares. Lands adapted to grazing, not exceeding two thousand hectares, may be leased to an individual, private corporation, or association." (Emphasis supplied) Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature did not repeal Section 58 of Act No. 2874 to open for sale to private parties government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain. On the contrary, the legislature continued the long established State policy of retaining for the government title and ownership of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain. Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly approved Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, which compiled the then existing laws on lands of the public domain. CA No. 141, as amended, remains to this day the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands.51 Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the public domain into "alienable or disposable"52lands of the public domain, which prior to such classification are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Section 7 of CA No. 141 authorizes the President to "declare what lands are open to disposition or concession." Section 8 of CA No. 141 states that the government can declare open for disposition or concession only lands that are "officially delimited and classified." Sections 6, 7 and 8 of CA No. 141 read as follows: "Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into (a) Alienable or disposable, (b) Timber, and (c) Mineral lands, and may at any time and in like manner transfer such lands from one class to another,53 for the purpose of their administration and disposition. Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act. Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. x x x." Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public domain, the President must first officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable, and

then declare them open to disposition or concession. There must be no law reserving these lands for public or quasi-public uses. The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain, are as follows: "Sec. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, is intended to be used for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural, and is open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise. Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows: (a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means; (b) Foreshore; (c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers; (d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes. Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may be, to any person, corporation, or association authorized to purchase or lease public lands for agricultural purposes. x x x. Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-nine shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis supplied) Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, Section 58 of Act No. 2874 prohibiting the sale of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain. All these lands are intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural purposes. As before, Section 61 allowed only the lease of such lands to private parties. The government could sell to private parties only lands falling under Section 59 (d) of CA No. 141, or those lands for non-agricultural purposes not classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain. Foreshore lands, however, became inalienable under the 1935 Constitution which only allowed the lease of these lands to qualified private parties. Section 58 of CA No. 141 expressly states that disposable lands of the public domain intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive purposes other than agricultural "shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise." Under Section 10 of CA No. 141, the term "disposition" includes lease of the land. Any disposition of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes must comply with Chapter IX, Title III of CA No. 141,54 unless a subsequent law amended or repealed these provisions.

In his concurring opinion in the landmark case of Republic Real Estate Corporation v. Court of Appeals,55 Justice Reynato S. Puno summarized succinctly the law on this matter, as follows: "Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use. So too are lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means. Act 1654 mandated that the control and disposition of the foreshore and lands under water remained in the national government. Said law allowed only the 'leasing' of reclaimed land. The Public Land Acts of 1919 and 1936 also declared that the foreshore and lands reclaimed by the government were to be "disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise." Before leasing, however, the Governor-General, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, had first to determine that the land reclaimed was not necessary for the public service. This requisite must have been met before the land could be disposed of. But even then, the foreshore and lands under water were not to be alienated and sold to private parties. The disposition of the reclaimed land was only by lease. The land remained property of the State." (Emphasis supplied) As observed by Justice Puno in his concurring opinion, "Commonwealth Act No. 141 has remained in effect at present." The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain, first implemented in 1907 was thus reaffirmed in CA No. 141 after the 1935 Constitution took effect. The prohibition on the sale of foreshore lands, however, became a constitutional edict under the 1935 Constitution. Foreshore lands became inalienable as natural resources of the State, unless reclaimed by the government and classified as agricultural lands of the public domain, in which case they would fall under the classification of government reclaimed lands. After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain continued to be only leased and not sold to private parties.56 These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain the government could not sell to private parties. Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No. 141 does not authorize the President to reclassify government reclaimed and marshy lands into other nonagricultural lands under Section 59 (d). Lands classified under Section 59 (d) are the only alienable or disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes that the government could sell to private parties. Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires congressional authority before lands under Section 59 that the government previously transferred to government units or entities could be sold to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 declares that "Sec. 60. x x x The area so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, be reasonably necessary for the purposes for which such sale or lease is requested, and shall not exceed one hundred

and forty-four hectares: Provided, however, That this limitation shall not apply to grants, donations, or transfers made to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government for the purposes deemed by said entities conducive to the public interest; but the land so granted, donated, or transferred to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress: x x x." (Emphasis supplied) The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No. 141 mirrors the legislative authority required in Section 56 of Act No. 2874. One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA No. 141 exempted government units and entities from the maximum area of public lands that could be acquired from the State. These government units and entities should not just turn around and sell these lands to private parties in violation of constitutional or statutory limitations. Otherwise, the transfer of lands for non-agricultural purposes to government units and entities could be used to circumvent constitutional limitations on ownership of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In the same manner, such transfers could also be used to evade the statutory prohibition in CA No. 141 on the sale of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes by operation of law a lien on these lands.57 In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain falling under Section 59 of CA No. 141, Sections 63 and 67 require a public bidding. Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 provide as follows: "Sec. 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this chapter are not needed for public purposes, the Director of Lands shall ask the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of Natural Resources) for authority to dispose of the same. Upon receipt of such authority, the Director of Lands shall give notice by public advertisement in the same manner as in the case of leases or sales of agricultural public land, x x x. Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made by oral bidding; and adjudication shall be made to the highest bidder. x x x." (Emphasis supplied) Thus, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public auction all leases or sales of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.58 Like Act No. 1654 and Act No. 2874 before it, CA No. 141 did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Private parties could still reclaim portions of the sea with government permission. However, the reclaimed land could become private land only if classified as alienable agricultural land of the public domain open to disposition under CA No. 141. The 1935 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands. The Civil Code of 1950

The Civil Code of 1950 readopted substantially the definition of property of public dominion found in the Civil Code of 1889. Articles 420 and 422 of the Civil Code of 1950 state that "Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. x x x. Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." Again, the government must formally declare that the property of public dominion is no longer needed for public use or public service, before the same could be classified as patrimonial property of the State.59 In the case of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain, the declaration of their being disposable, as well as the manner of their disposition, is governed by the applicable provisions of CA No. 141. Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950 included as property of public dominion those properties of the State which, without being for public use, are intended for public service or the "development of the national wealth." Thus, government reclaimed and marshy lands of the State, even if not employed for public use or public service, if developed to enhance the national wealth, are classified as property of public dominion. Dispositions under the 1973 Constitution The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, likewise adopted the Regalian doctrine. Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution stated that "Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant." (Emphasis supplied) The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with the exception of "agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain." In contrast, the 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except "public agricultural lands." However, the term "public

agricultural lands" in the 1935 Constitution encompassed industrial, commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the public domain.60 If the land of public domain were neither timber nor mineral land, it would fall under the classification of agricultural land of the public domain. Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, therefore, prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the public domain. The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Private corporations, even if wholly owned by Philippine citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain unlike in the 1935 Constitution. Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution declared that "Sec. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account conservation, ecological, and development requirements of the natural resources, shall determine by law the size of land of the public domain which may be developed, held or acquired by, or leased to, any qualified individual, corporation, or association, and the conditions therefor.No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by leasenot to exceed one thousand hectares in area nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares or acquire by purchase, homestead or grant, in excess of twenty-four hectares. No private corporation or association may hold by lease, concession, license or permit, timber or forest lands and other timber or forest resources in excess of one hundred thousand hectares. However, such area may be increased by the Batasang Pambansa upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority." (Emphasis supplied) Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. Only individuals could now acquire alienable lands of the public domain, and private corporations became absolutely barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The constitutional ban extended to all kinds of alienable lands of the public domain, while the statutory ban under CA No. 141 applied only to government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain. PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates Authority On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA, a wholly government owned and controlled corporation with a special charter. Sections 4 and 8 of PD No. 1084, vests PEA with the following purposes and powers: "Sec. 4. Purpose. The Authority is hereby created for the following purposes: (a) To reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by dredging, filling or other means, or to acquire reclaimed land; (b) To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands, buildings, estates and other forms of real property, owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government;

(c) To provide for, operate or administer such service as may be necessary for the efficient, economical and beneficial utilization of the above properties. Sec. 5. Powers and functions of the Authority. The Authority shall, in carrying out the purposes for which it is created, have the following powers and functions: (a)To prescribe its by-laws. xxx (i) To hold lands of the public domain in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by statute. (j) To reclaim lands and to construct work across, or otherwise, any stream, watercourse, canal, ditch, flume x x x. xxx (o) To perform such acts and exercise such functions as may be necessary for the attainment of the purposes and objectives herein specified." (Emphasis supplied) PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain. Foreshore areas are those covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of the tide.61 Submerged areas are those permanently under water regardless of the ebb and flow of the tide.62 Foreshore and submerged areas indisputably belong to the public domain63 and are inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public service. The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain did not apply to PEA since it was then, and until today, a fully owned government corporation. The constitutional ban applied then, as it still applies now, only to "private corporations and associations." PD No. 1084 expressly empowers PEA "to hold lands of the public domain" even "in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by statute."Thus, PEA can hold title to private lands, as well as title to lands of the public domain. In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands. This legislative authority is necessary in view of Section 60 of CA No.141, which states "Sec. 60. x x x; but the land so granted, donated or transferred to a province, municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress; x x x." (Emphasis supplied) Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain would be subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. Hence, such legislative authority could only benefit private individuals.

Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, has adopted the Regalian doctrine. The 1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources are "owned by the State," and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot be alienated. Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution state that "Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. x x x. Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant. Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor." (Emphasis supplied) The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141. The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring, except through lease, alienable lands of the public domain is not well understood. During the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the commissioners probed the rationale behind this ban, thus: "FR. BERNAS: Mr. Vice-President, my questions have reference to page 3, line 5 which says: `No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.'

If we recall, this provision did not exist under the 1935 Constitution, but this was introduced in the 1973 Constitution. In effect, it prohibits private corporations from acquiring alienable public lands. But it has not been very clear in jurisprudence what the reason for this is. In some of the cases decided in 1982 and 1983, it was indicated that the purpose of this is to prevent large landholdings. Is that the intent of this provision? MR. VILLEGAS: I think that is the spirit of the provision. FR. BERNAS: In existing decisions involving the Iglesia ni Cristo, there were instances where the Iglesia ni Cristo was not allowed to acquire a mere 313-square meter land where a chapel stood because the Supreme Court said it would be in violation of this." (Emphasis supplied) In Ayog v. Cusi,64 the Court explained the rationale behind this constitutional ban in this way: "Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public agricultural lands by private corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage 'owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm' and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge landholdings by corporations or private persons had spawned social unrest." However, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have followed the limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution. If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the next. In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain. The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting

corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the constitutional ban. The Amended Joint Venture Agreement The subject matter of the Amended JVA, as stated in its second Whereas clause, consists of three properties, namely: 1. "[T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially eroded islands along Emilio Aguinaldo Boulevard in Paranaque and Las Pinas, Metro Manila, with a combined titled area of 1,578,441 square meters;" 2. "[A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters contiguous to the three islands;" and 3. "[A]t AMARI's option as approved by PEA, an additional 350 hectares more or less to regularize the configuration of the reclaimed area."65 PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves "the development of the Freedom Islands and further reclamation of about 250 hectares x x x," plus an option "granted to AMARI to subsequently reclaim another 350 hectares x x x."66 In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750-hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the 592.15 hectares are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay. Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the sum of P1,894,129,200.00 for PEA's "actual cost" in partially reclaiming the Freedom Islands. AMARI will also complete, at its own expense, the reclamation of the Freedom Islands. AMARI will further shoulder all the reclamation costs of all the other areas, totaling 592.15 hectares, still to be reclaimed. AMARI and PEA will share, in the proportion of 70 percent and 30 percent, respectively, the total net usable area which is defined in the Amended JVA as the total reclaimed area less 30 percent earmarked for common areas. Title to AMARI's share in the net usable area, totaling 367.5 hectares, will be issued in the name of AMARI. Section 5.2 (c) of the Amended JVA provides that "x x x, PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay the necessary deed of transfer or conveyance of the title pertaining to AMARI's Land share based on the Land Allocation Plan. PEA, when requested in writing by AMARI, shall then cause the issuance and delivery of the proper certificates of title covering AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI, x x x; provided, that if more than seventy percent (70%) of the titled area at any given time pertains to AMARI, PEA shall deliver to AMARI only seventy percent (70%) of the titles pertaining to AMARI, until such time when a corresponding proportionate area of additional land pertaining to PEA has been titled." (Emphasis supplied) Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled in its name.

To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEA-AMARI joint venture PEA's statutory authority, rights and privileges to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended JVA states that "PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its rights and privileges to perform Rawland Reclamation and Horizontal Development as well as own the Reclamation Area, thereby granting the Joint Venture the full and exclusive right, authority and privilege to undertake the Project in accordance with the Master Development Plan." The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 and its supplemental agreement dated August 9, 1995. The Threshold Issue The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which state that: "Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. x x x. xxx Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, x x x."(Emphasis supplied) Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In its Memorandum,67 PEA admits that "Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain: 'Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows: (a) Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means; x x x.'" (Emphasis supplied) Likewise, the Legal Task Force68 constituted under Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 admitted in its Report and Recommendation to then President Fidel V. Ramos, "[R]eclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain."69 The Legal Task Force concluded that "D. Conclusion Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain. However, by statutory authority, the rights of ownership and disposition over reclaimed lands have been transferred to PEA,

by virtue of which PEA, as owner, may validly convey the same to any qualified person without violating the Constitution or any statute. The constitutional provision prohibiting private corporations from holding public land, except by lease (Sec. 3, Art. XVII,70 1987 Constitution), does not apply to reclaimed lands whose ownership has passed on to PEA by statutory grant." Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural resources" and consequently "owned by the State." As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be alienated," unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.71 Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified."72 The President has the authority to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. In Laurel vs. Garcia,73 the Executive Department attempted to sell the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan, which was acquired by the Philippine Government for use as the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. Although the Chancery had transferred to another location thirteen years earlier, the Court still ruled that, under Article 42274 of the Civil Code, a property of public dominion retains such character until formally declared otherwise. The Court ruled that "The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership 'until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such' (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]." (Emphasis supplied) PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the issuance of special land patents for lands reclaimed by PEA from the foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay. On January 19, 1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 in the name of PEA for the 157.84 hectares comprising the partially reclaimed Freedom Islands. Subsequently, on April 9, 1999 the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paranaque issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311 and 7312 in the name of PEA pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529 authorizing the issuance of certificates of title corresponding to land patents. To this day, these certificates of title are still in the name of PEA. PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the

Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino's issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties. At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had already reclaimed the Freedom Islands although subsequently there were partial erosions on some areas. The government had also completed the necessary surveys on these islands. Thus, the Freedom Islands were no longer part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass. Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks." Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters x x x owned by the State" forming part of the public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands because CDCP, then a private corporation, reclaimed the islands under a contract dated November 20, 1973 with the Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI, citing Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, argues that "if the ownership of reclaimed lands may be given to the party constructing the works, then it cannot be said that reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain which the State may not alienate."75 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters reads as follows: "Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority." (Emphasis supplied) Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could reclaim from the sea only with "proper permission" from the State. Private parties could own the reclaimed land only if not "otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority." This clearly meant that no one could reclaim from the sea without permission from the State because the sea is property of public dominion. It also meant that the State could grant or withhold ownership of the reclaimed land because any reclaimed land, like the sea from which it emerged, belonged to the State. Thus, a private person reclaiming from the sea without permission from the State could not acquire ownership of the reclaimed land which would remain property of public dominion like the sea it replaced.76 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 adopted the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."77 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws subsequently enacted on the disposition of public lands. In particular, CA No. 141 requires that lands

of the public domain must first be classified as alienable or disposable before the government can alienate them. These lands must not be reserved for public or quasipublic purposes.78 Moreover, the contract between CDCP and the government was executed after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. This contract could not have converted the Freedom Islands into private lands of a private corporation. Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973, revoked all laws authorizing the reclamation of areas under water and revested solely in the National Government the power to reclaim lands. Section 1 of PD No. 3-A declared that "The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it under a proper contract. (Emphasis supplied) x x x." PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 because reclamation of areas under water could now be undertaken only by the National Government or by a person contracted by the National Government. Private parties may reclaim from the sea only under a contract with the National Government, and no longer by grant or permission as provided in Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, designated PEA as the National Government's implementing arm to undertake "all reclamation projects of the government," which "shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity." Under such contract, a private party receives compensation for reclamation services rendered to PEA. Payment to the contractor may be in cash, or in kind consisting of portions of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. The reclaimed land can be used as payment in kind only if the reclaimed land is first classified as alienable or disposable land open to disposition, and then declared no longer needed for public service. The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15 hectares which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title. There can be no dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their present state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the Constitution, "waters x x x owned by the State," forming part of the public domain and consequently inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas be classified as public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only natural resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural lands, the government may then officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands

open to disposition. Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer needed for public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within the commerce of man. The classification of PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands into alienable or disposable lands open to disposition is necessary because PEA is tasked under its charter to undertake public services that require the use of lands of the public domain. Under Section 5 of PD No. 1084, the functions of PEA include the following: "[T]o own or operate railroads, tramways and other kinds of land transportation, x x x; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such systems of sanitary sewers as may be necessary; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such storm drains as may be necessary." PEA is empowered to issue "rules and regulations as may be necessary for the proper use by private parties of any or all of the highways, roads, utilities, buildings and/or any of its properties and to impose or collect fees or tolls for their use." Thus, part of the reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands held by the PEA would actually be needed for public use or service since many of the functions imposed on PEA by its charter constitute essential public services. Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that PEA "shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government." The same section also states that "[A]ll reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; x x x." Thus, under EO No. 525, in relation to PD No. 3-A and PD No.1084, PEA became the primary implementing agency of the National Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain. EO No. 525 recognized PEA as the government entity "to undertake the reclamation of lands and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting public welfare and interests."79 Since large portions of these reclaimed lands would obviously be needed for public service, there must be a formal declaration segregating reclaimed lands no longer needed for public service from those still needed for public service.1wphi1.nt Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by the PEA," could not automatically operate to classify inalienable lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Otherwise, reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain would automatically become alienable once reclaimed by PEA, whether or not classified as alienable or disposable. The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law than either PD No. 1084 or EO No. 525, vests in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR" for brevity) the following powers and functions: "Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The Department shall: (1) x x x xxx (4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable public lands, mineral resources and, in the process of exercising such control, impose

appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such form of levy and collect such revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such resources; xxx (14) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of licenses, permits, concessions, lease agreements and such other privileges concerning the development, exploration and utilization of the country's marine, freshwater, and brackish water and over all aquatic resources of the country and shall continue to oversee, supervise and police our natural resources; cancel or cause to cancel such privileges upon failure, non-compliance or violations of any regulation, order, and for all other causes which are in furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and supportive of the national interest; (15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for classification, subclassification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies."80 (Emphasis supplied) As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State, DENR exercises "supervision and control over alienable and disposable public lands." DENR also exercises "exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain." Thus, DENR decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay, should be reclaimed or not. This means that PEA needs authorization from DENR before PEA can undertake reclamation projects in Manila Bay, or in any part of the country. DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the public domain. Hence, DENR decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA should be classified as alienable under Sections 681 and 782 of CA No. 141. Once DENR decides that the reclaimed lands should be so classified, it then recommends to the President the issuance of a proclamation classifying the lands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. We note that then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. countersigned Special Patent No. 3517 in compliance with the Revised Administrative Code and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141. In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water, whether directly or through private contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain. Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.

Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain. Only such an official classification and formal declaration can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and Title III83 of CA No. 141 and other applicable laws.84 PEA's Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, the reclaimed lands shall be disposed of in accordance with CA No. 141, the Public Land Act. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141, admits that reclaimed lands transferred to a branch or subdivision of the government "shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress: x x x."85(Emphasis by PEA) In Laurel vs. Garcia,86 the Court cited Section 48 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which states that "Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following: x x x." Thus, the Court concluded that a law is needed to convey any real property belonging to the Government. The Court declared that "It is not for the President to convey real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence." (Emphasis supplied) PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the legislative authority allowing PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, provides that "The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila Bay pursuant to the contract for the reclamation and construction of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project between the Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines dated November 20, 1973 and/or any other contract or reclamation covering the same area is hereby transferred, conveyed and assigned to the ownership and administration of the Public Estates Authority established pursuant to PD No. 1084; Provided, however, That the rights and interests of the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines pursuant to the aforesaid contract shall be recognized and respected. Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise the rights and assume the obligations of the Republic of the Philippines (Department of Public Highways) arising from, or incident to, the aforesaid contract between the Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines. In consideration of the foregoing transfer and assignment, the Public Estates Authority shall issue in favor of the Republic of the Philippines the corresponding shares of stock

in said entity with an issued value of said shares of stock (which) shall be deemed fully paid and non-assessable. The Secretary of Public Highways and the General Manager of the Public Estates Authority shall execute such contracts or agreements, including appropriate agreements with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, as may be necessary to implement the above. Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources in favor of the Public Estates Authority without prejudice to the subsequent transfer to the contractor or his assignees of such portion or portions of the land reclaimed or to be reclaimed as provided for in the above-mentioned contract. On the basis of such patents, the Land Registration Commission shall issue the corresponding certificate of title." (Emphasis supplied) On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, provides that "Sec. 3. All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the PEA which shall be responsible for its administration, development, utilization or disposition in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084. Any and all income that the PEA may derive from the sale, lease or use of reclaimed lands shall be used in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084." There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." EO No. 525 expressly states that PEA should dispose of its reclaimed lands "in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084," the charter of PEA. PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands x x x owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government."87(Emphasis supplied) There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial propertiesin accordance with the PEA charter free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands. PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private individuals since, with the legislative authority, there is no longer any statutory prohibition against such sales and the constitutional ban does not apply to individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private corporations since Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits such sales. The legislative authority benefits only individuals. Private corporations remain barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain, including government reclaimed lands.

The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could be transferred by PEA to the "contractor or his assignees" (Emphasis supplied) would not apply to private corporations but only to individuals because of the constitutional ban. Otherwise, the provisions of PD No. 1085 would violate both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. The requirement of public auction in the sale of reclaimed lands Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public service, PEA would have to conduct a public bidding in selling or leasing these lands. PEA must observe the provisions of Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 requiring public auction, in the absence of a law exempting PEA from holding a public auction.88 Special Patent No. 3517 expressly states that the patent is issued by authority of the Constitution and PD No. 1084, "supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended." This is an acknowledgment that the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the disposition of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain unless otherwise provided by law. Executive Order No. 654,89 which authorizes PEA "to determine the kind and manner of payment for the transfer" of its assets and properties, does not exempt PEA from the requirement of public auction. EO No. 654 merely authorizes PEA to decide the mode of payment, whether in kind and in installment, but does not authorize PEA to dispense with public auction. Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code, the government is required to sell valuable government property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that "Section 79. When government property has become unserviceable for any cause, or is no longer needed, it shall, upon application of the officer accountable therefor, be inspected by the head of the agency or his duly authorized representative in the presence of the auditor concerned and, if found to be valueless or unsaleable, it may be destroyed in their presence. If found to be valuable, it may be sold at public auction to the highest bidder under the supervision of the proper committee on award or similar body in the presence of the auditor concerned or other authorized representative of the Commission, after advertising by printed notice in the Official Gazette, or for not less than three consecutive days in any newspaper of general circulation, or where the value of the property does not warrant the expense of publication, by notices posted for a like period in at least three public places in the locality where the property is to be sold. In the event that the public auction fails, the property may be sold at a private sale at such price as may be fixed by the same committee or body concerned and approved by the Commission." It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which case the Commission on Audit must approve the selling price.90 The Commission on Audit implements Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code through Circular No. 8929691 dated January 27, 1989. This circular emphasizes that government assets must be disposed of only through public auction, and a negotiated sale can be resorted to only in case of "failure of public auction."

At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Private corporations are barred from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the Freedom Islands on December 10, 1991. PEA imposed a condition that the winning bidder should reclaim another 250 hectares of submerged areas to regularize the shape of the Freedom Islands, under a 60-40 sharing of the additional reclaimed areas in favor of the winning bidder.92 No one, however, submitted a bid. On December 23, 1994, the Government Corporate Counsel advised PEA it could sell the Freedom Islands through negotiation, without need of another public bidding, because of the failure of the public bidding on December 10, 1991.93 However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares.94 The failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares,95 is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned. Besides, the failure of public bidding happened on December 10, 1991, more than three years before the signing of the original JVA on April 25, 1995. The economic situation in the country had greatly improved during the intervening period. Reclamation under the BOT Law and the Local Government Code The constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is absolute and clear: "Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, x x x." Even Republic Act No. 6957 ("BOT Law," for brevity), cited by PEA and AMARI as legislative authority to sell reclaimed lands to private parties, recognizes the constitutional ban. Section 6 of RA No. 6957 states "Sec. 6. Repayment Scheme. - For the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of any infrastructure projects undertaken through the build-operate-andtransfer arrangement or any of its variations pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the project proponent x x x may likewise be repaid in the form of a share in the revenue of the project or other non-monetary payments, such as, but not limited to, the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional requirements with respect to the ownership of the land: x x x." (Emphasis supplied) A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a government BOT project, cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain in view of the constitutional ban. Section 302 of the Local Government Code, also mentioned by PEA and AMARI, authorizes local governments in land reclamation projects to pay the contractor or developer in kind consisting of a percentage of the reclaimed land, to wit:

"Section 302. Financing, Construction, Maintenance, Operation, and Management of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector. x x x xxx In case of land reclamation or construction of industrial estates, the repayment plan may consist of the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land or the industrial estate constructed." Although Section 302 of the Local Government Code does not contain a proviso similar to that of the BOT Law, the constitutional restrictions on land ownership automatically apply even though not expressly mentioned in the Local Government Code. Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local Government Code, the contractor or developer, if a corporate entity, can only be paid with leaseholds on portions of the reclaimed land. If the contractor or developer is an individual, portions of the reclaimed land, not exceeding 12 hectares96 of non-agricultural lands, may be conveyed to him in ownership in view of the legislative authority allowing such conveyance. This is the only way these provisions of the BOT Law and the Local Government Code can avoid a direct collision with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Registration of lands of the public domain Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the ownership of the reclaimed lands to public respondent PEA transformed such lands of the public domain to private lands." This theory is echoed by AMARI which maintains that the "issuance of the special patent leading to the eventual issuance of title takes the subject land away from the land of public domain and converts the property into patrimonial or private property." In short, PEA and AMARI contend that with the issuance of Special Patent No. 3517 and the corresponding certificates of titles, the 157.84 hectares comprising the Freedom Islands have become private lands of PEA. In support of their theory, PEA and AMARI cite the following rulings of the Court: 1. Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato,97 where the Court held "Once the patent was granted and the corresponding certificate of title was issued, the land ceased to be part of the public domain and became private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction." 2. Lee Hong Hok v. David,98 where the Court declared "After the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein."3. Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas,99 where the Court ruled "While the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he may do so only so long as the land remains part of the public domain and continues to be under his exclusive control; but once the patent is registered and a certificate of title is issued,

the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction." 4. Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,100 where the Court held "When the lots in dispute were certified as disposable on May 19, 1971, and free patents were issued covering the same in favor of the private respondents, the said lots ceased to be part of the public domain and, therefore, the Director of Lands lost jurisdiction over the same." 5.Republic v. Court of Appeals,101 where the Court stated "Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot, validly sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a 'fee simple' title or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents involving public lands, provides that 'Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United States or to the Government of the Philippines are alienated, granted or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act (Land Registration Act, Act 496) and shall become registered lands.'" The first four cases cited involve petitions to cancel the land patents and the corresponding certificates of titles issued to private parties. These four cases uniformly hold that the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over private lands or that upon issuance of the certificate of title the land automatically comes under the Torrens System. The fifth case cited involves the registration under the Torrens System of a 12.8-hectare public land granted by the National Government to Mindanao Medical Center, a government unit under the Department of Health. The National Government transferred the 12.8-hectare public land to serve as the site for the hospital buildings and other facilities of Mindanao Medical Center, which performed a public service. The Court affirmed the registration of the 12.8-hectare public land in the name of Mindanao Medical Center under Section 122 of Act No. 496. This fifth case is an example of a public land being registered under Act No. 496 without the land losing its character as a property of public dominion. In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the name of PEA, a wholly government owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary functions. No patent or certificate of title has been issued to any private party. No one is asking the Director of Lands to cancel PEA's patent or certificates of title. In fact, the thrust of the instant petition is that PEA's certificates of title should remain with PEA, and the land covered by these certificates, being alienable lands of the public domain, should not be sold to a private corporation. Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant private or public ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred by any of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership. Registration does not give the registrant a

better right than what the registrant had prior to the registration.102 The registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private lands.103 Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable land of the public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA. The transfer of the Freedom Islands to PEA was made subject to the provisions of CA No. 141 as expressly stated in Special Patent No. 3517 issued by then President Aquino, to wit: "NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the Constitution of the Philippines and in conformity with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084, supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, there are hereby granted and conveyed unto the Public Estates Authority the aforesaid tracts of land containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters; the technical description of which are hereto attached and made an integral part hereof." (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters not covered by PD No. 1084. Section 60 of CA No. 141 prohibits, "except when authorized by Congress," the sale of alienable lands of the public domain that are transferred to government units or entities. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes, under Section 44 of PD No. 1529, a "statutory lien affecting title" of the registered land even if not annotated on the certificate of title.104 Alienable lands of the public domain held by government entities under Section 60 of CA No. 141 remain public lands because they cannot be alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes a law authorizing their disposition. Congress, however, cannot authorize the sale to private corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain because of the constitutional ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law. The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of a government agency tasked to dispose of public lands. This will allow private corporations to acquire directly from government agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior to such law, are concededly public lands. Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central implementing agency of the National Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain. Thus, EO No. 525 declares that "EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 525 Designating the Public Estates Authority as the Agency Primarily Responsible for all Reclamation Projects

Whereas, there are several reclamation projects which are ongoing or being proposed to be undertaken in various parts of the country which need to be evaluated for consistency with national programs; Whereas, there is a need to give further institutional support to the Government's declared policy to provide for a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation of lands; Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 3-A requires that all reclamation of areas shall be limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it under proper contract; Whereas, a central authority is needed to act on behalf of the National Government which shall ensure a coordinated and integrated approach in the reclamation of lands; Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1084 creates the Public Estates Authority as a government corporation to undertake reclamation of lands and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting public welfare and interests; and Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1416 provides the President with continuing authority to reorganize the national government including the transfer, abolition, or merger of functions and offices. NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1416, do hereby order and direct the following: Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government. All reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; Provided, that, reclamation projects of any national government agency or entity authorized under its charter shall be undertaken in consultation with the PEA upon approval of the President. x x x ." As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide, with authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of other alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable of disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands. Furthermore, PEA's charter expressly states that PEA "shall hold lands of the public domain" as well as "any and all kinds of lands." PEA can hold both lands of the public domain and private lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable lands of the public domain

like the Freedom Islands are transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEA's name does not automatically make such lands private. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn around, as PEA has now done under the Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which was intended to diffuse equitably the ownership of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipinos, now numbering over 80 million strong. This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public domain since PEA can "acquire x x x any and all kinds of lands." This will open the floodgates to corporations and even individuals acquiring hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the guise that in the hands of PEA these lands are private lands. This will result in corporations amassing huge landholdings never before seen in this country - creating the very evil that the constitutional ban was designed to prevent. This will completely reverse the clear direction of constitutional development in this country. The 1935 Constitution allowed private corporations to acquire not more than 1,024 hectares of public lands.105 The 1973 Constitution prohibited private corporations from acquiring any kind of public land, and the 1987 Constitution has unequivocally reiterated this prohibition. The contention of PEA and AMARI that public lands, once registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, automatically become private lands is contrary to existing laws. Several laws authorize lands of the public domain to be registered under the Torrens System or Act No. 496, now PD No. 1529, without losing their character as public lands. Section 122 of Act No. 496, and Section 103 of PD No. 1529, respectively, provide as follows: Act No. 496 "Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the x x x Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or the public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands." PD No. 1529 "Sec. 103. Certificate of Title to Patents. Whenever public land is by the Government alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Decree." (Emphasis supplied) Based on its legislative history, the phrase "conveyed to any person" in Section 103 of PD No. 1529 includes conveyances of public lands to public corporations. Alienable lands of the public domain "granted, donated, or transferred to a province, municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government," as provided in Section 60 of CA No. 141, may be registered under the Torrens System pursuant to Section 103 of

PD No. 1529. Such registration, however, is expressly subject to the condition in Section 60 of CA No. 141 that the land "shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress." This provision refers to government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain that have been titled but still cannot be alienated or encumbered unless expressly authorized by Congress. The need for legislative authority prevents the registered land of the public domain from becoming private land that can be disposed of to qualified private parties. The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also recognizes that lands of the public domain may be registered under the Torrens System. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Code states "Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following: (1) x x x (2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, but titled in the name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality." (Emphasis supplied) Thus, private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of a public wharf may be titled in the name of a government corporation regulating port operations in the country. Private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of an airport may also be titled in the name of the government agency tasked to administer the airport. Private property donated to a municipality for use as a town plaza or public school site may likewise be titled in the name of the municipality.106 All these properties become properties of the public domain, and if already registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, remain registered land. There is no requirement or provision in any existing law for the de-registration of land from the Torrens System. Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its power of eminent domain become unquestionably part of the public domain. Nevertheless, Section 85 of PD No. 1529 authorizes the Register of Deeds to issue in the name of the National Government new certificates of title covering such expropriated lands. Section 85 of PD No. 1529 states "Sec. 85. Land taken by eminent domain. Whenever any registered land, or interest therein, is expropriated or taken by eminent domain, the National Government, province, city or municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality exercising such right shall file for registration in the proper Registry a certified copy of the judgment which shall state definitely by an adequate description, the particular property or interest expropriated, the number of the certificate of title, and the nature of the public use. A memorandum of the right or interest taken shall be made on each certificate of title by the Register of Deeds, and where the fee simple is taken, a new certificate shall be issued in favor of the National Government, province, city, municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality exercising such right for the land so taken. The legal

expenses incident to the memorandum of registration or issuance of a new certificate of title shall be for the account of the authority taking the land or interest therein." (Emphasis supplied) Consequently, lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not exclusively private or patrimonial lands. Lands of the public domain may also be registered pursuant to existing laws. AMARI makes a parting shot that the Amended JVA is not a sale to AMARI of the Freedom Islands or of the lands to be reclaimed from submerged areas of Manila Bay. In the words of AMARI, the Amended JVA "is not a sale but a joint venture with a stipulation for reimbursement of the original cost incurred by PEA for the earlier reclamation and construction works performed by the CDCP under its 1973 contract with the Republic." Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a joint venture, the fact remains that the Amended JVA requires PEA to "cause the issuance and delivery of the certificates of title conveying AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI."107 This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that private corporations "shall not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease." The transfer of title and ownership to AMARI clearly means that AMARI will "hold" the reclaimed lands other than by lease. The transfer of title and ownership is a "disposition" of the reclaimed lands, a transaction considered a sale or alienation under CA No. 141,108 the Government Auditing Code,109 and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and submerged areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Historically, lands reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not available for sale to private parties unlike other alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service. Alienable lands of the public domain, increasingly becoming scarce natural resources, are to be distributed equitably among our ever-growing population. To insure such equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Those who attempt to dispose of inalienable natural resources of the State, or seek to circumvent the constitutional ban on alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations, do so at their own risk. We can now summarize our conclusions as follows: 1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. 3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. 4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409112 of the Civil Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of men," are "inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio. Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of whether the Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government. Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio. SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 165641 August 25, 2010 ENGR. RANULFO C. FELICIANO, in his capacity as General Manager of the Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD), Tacloban City, Petitioner, NAPOLEON G. ARANEZ, in his capacity as President and Chairman of "No Tax, No Impairment of Contracts Coalition, Inc.," Petitioner-in-intervention, vs. HON. CORNELIO C. GISON, Undersecretary, Department of Finance, Respondent.

LMWD filed a petition for review10 with the CA raising the issues of whether the CTA decided the case in accord with the evidence presented and the applicable law, and whether the LMWD is a GOCC with original charter. The CA found the petition to be unmeritorious and affirmed the CTAs ruling that the LMWD is a GOCC with original charter, and not a private corporation or entity as LMWD argued. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari filed by LMWD with this Court. THE PETITION LMWD appeals to us primarily to determine whether water districts are, by law, GOCCs with original charter. Citing the Constitution and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198,11 LMWD claims that water districts are private corporations and as such are entitled to certain tax exemptions under the law. LMWD argues that P.D. No. 198 is a general law, similar to the Corporation Code and other general laws, and is not a special law. Because it is a general law, water districts constituted under its terms are private corporations, not a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) with original charter. In support of its position, LMWD points out provisions in P.D. No. 198 that it claims implements the general policy of the decree as enunciated in its Section 2, specifically, Section 512 (pertaining to the purpose of water districts), Section 6 (formation of a water district), as amended by P.D. No. 1479,13 and Section 7 (filing of resolution forming a water district), as amended by P.D. No. 768,14 of Chapter II. LMWD concludes from this examination that P.D. No. 198 is not an original charter but a general act authorizing the formation of water districts on a local option basis, similar to the Corporation Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 68). In drawing parallelism with the Corporation Code, LMWD cites (1) the Resolution of Formation passed by thesanggunian under PD 198 for the creation of a water district as an equivalent to the Articles of Incorporation and By-laws under the Corporation Code, and (2) the filing of the Resolution of Formation of the water district with the LWUA as the counterpart of the issuance of the Certificate of Filing of the Articles of Incorporation and By-lawsto the private corporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The juridical personality of a water district is acquired on the date of filing of the resolution in the same way that the juridical personality of a private corporation is acquired on the date of issuance of the certificate of filing with the SEC. LMWD further claims that the Constitution does not limit the meaning of the term "general law" to the Corporation Code, as there are other general laws such as Republic Act (R.A.) No. 693815 (including R.A. No. 6939 -- An Act Creating the Cooperative Development Authority), and R.A. No. 6810.16 Under R.A. No. 6938 and R.A. No. 6810, any group of individuals can form a cooperative and a Countryside and Barangay Business Enterprise (CBBE), respectively, and acquire a juridical personality separate and distinct from their creators, members or officers provided that they comply with all the requirements under said laws. In the same manner, any group of individuals in a given local government unit can form and organize themselves into a water district provided that they comply with the requirements under P.D. No. 198.

DECISION BRION, J.: Before this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD) through its General Manager, Engr. Ranulfo C. Feliciano, which seeks to set aside the July 14, 2004 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)2 that in turn affirmed the ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) in CTA Case No. 6165.3 The CTA dismissed LMWDs petition for lack of jurisdiction to try the case. Joining the petitioner is the "No Tax, No Impairment of Contracts Coalition, Inc." (Coalition), a corporation represented by its President and Chairman, Napoleon G. Aranez, which filed a motion for leave to admit complaint-petition in intervention on February 17, 2005.4 The Court granted said motion and required the Coalition, together with LMWD, to submit their respective memoranda in a resolution dated July 5, 2006.5 BACKGROUND FACTS The present petition arose from the tax case initiated by LMWD after it filed with the Department of Finance (DOF) a petition requesting that certain water supply equipment and a motor vehicle, particularly a Toyota Hi-Lux pick-up truck, be exempted from tax. These properties were given to LMWD through a grant by the Japanese Government for the rehabilitation of its typhoon-damaged water supply system. In an indorsement dated July 5, 1995, the DOF granted the tax exemption on the water supply equipment but assessed the corresponding tax and duty on the Toyota Hi-Lux pick-up truck.6 On June 9, 2000, LMWD moved to reconsider the disallowance of the tax exemption on the subject vehicle. The DOF, through then Undersecretary Cornelio C. Gison, denied LMWDs request for reconsideration because the tax exemption privileges of government agencies and government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) had already been withdrawn by Executive Order No. 93.7This prompted LMWD, through its General Manager Engr. Ranulfo C. Feliciano, to appeal to the CTA. After considering the evidence presented at the hearing, the CTA found LMWD to be a GOCC with an original charter. For this reason, the CTA resolved to dismiss LMWDs appeal for lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.8The CTAs resolution was without prejudice to the right of LMWD to refile the case, if it so desires, in the appropriate forum. Likewise, the CTA denied LMWDs motion to reconsider the dismissal of its appeal.9

Part of LMWDs theory is that P.D. No. 198 is not the operative act that created the local water districts; they are created through compliance with the nine separate and distinct operative acts found in the Procedural Formation of a Water District prescribed under Section 6 of P.D. No. 198 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The last step of these operative acts is the filing of the Resolution of Formation of the sanggunian concerned with the LWUA after the latter has determined that such resolution has conformed to the requirements of Section 6 and the policy objectives in Section 2 of P.D. No. 198, as amended.17 According to LMWD, no water district is formed by the enactment of P.D. No. 198. The decree merely authorized the formation of water districts by the sanggunian, in the same manner that the Corporation Code authorizes the formation of private corporations. LMWD theorizes that what is actually chartered, formed and created under P.D. No. 198 is the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as provided in Section 49 of the decree. This provision establishing LWUAs charter and the policy statement in Section 2 of P.D. No. 198, are in stark contrast to the decrees failure to provide an express provision on what constitutes the water districts charter, leading to the inference that the decree is not the charter of the water districts but merely authorizes their formation, on a local option basis. THE PETITION-IN-INTERVENTION On February 17, 2005, Napoleon G. Aranez (Aranez), acting in behalf of the "No Tax, No Impairment of Contracts Coalition, Inc." (Coalition) filed a motion for leave to admit complaint-petition in intervention in connection with the petition for review on certiorari filed by LMWD with this Court. Aranez is the Coalitions president and chairman. The Coalition claims to indirectly represent all the water district concessionaires of the entire country figuring to more or less four hundred million, aside from the 26,000 concessionaires situated in the city of Tacloban and the municipalities of Dagami, Palo, Pastrana, Sta. Fe, Tabon-Tabon, Tanauan, Tolosa -- all within the province of Leyte. The petition in intervention raises three main arguments: (1) that the water districts are not GOCCs as they are quasi-public corporations or private corporations exercising public functions, (2) that classifying the water districts as GOCCs will result in an unjust disregard of the "non-impairment of contracts" clause in the Constitution, and (3) that the appealed CA decision, if not corrected or reversed, would result in a nationwide crisis and would create social unrest. Interestingly, the Coalition sets forth the premise that P.D. No. 198 is not entirely a special law or a general law, but a composite law made up of both laws: Title II Local Water District Law being the general law, and Title III Local Water Utilities Law being the special law or charter. For the rest of the petition in intervention, the Coalition adopts supporting arguments similar, if not exactly the same, as those of LMWDs. THE COURTS RULING We find no merit in the petition and the petition in intervention, particularly in their core position that water districts are private corporations, not GOCCs. The question is

a long-settled matter that LMWD and the Coalition seek to revive and to re-litigate in their respective petitions. The present petition is not the first instance that the petitioner LMWD, through Engr. Ranulfo C. Feliciano, has raised for determination by this Court the corporate classification of local water districts.18 LMWD posed this exact same question in Feliciano v. Commission on Audit (COA).19 In ruling that local water districts, such as the LMWD, are GOCCs with special charter, the Court even pointed to settled jurisprudence20 culminating in Davao City Water District v. Civil Service Commission21 and recently reiterated in De Jesus v. COA. 22 In Feliciano, LMWD likewise claimed that it is a private corporation and therefore, should not be subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA. LMWD then argued that P.D. No. 198 is not an "original charter" that would place the water districts within the audit jurisdiction of the COA as defined in Section 2 (1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution.23Neither did P.D. No. 198 expressly direct the creation of the water districts. LMWD posited that the decree merely provided for their formation on an optional or voluntary basis and what actually created the water districts is the approval of the Sanggunian Resolution.24 Significantly, these are the very same positions that the LMWD and the Coalition (as petitioner-intervenor) submit in the present petition. Our ruling in Feliciano squarely addressed the difference between a private corporation created under general law and a GOCC created by a special charter, and we need only to quote what Feliciano said: We begin by explaining the general framework under the fundamental law. The Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to private corporations created under a general law. The second refers to government-owned or controlled corporations created by special charters. Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution provides: Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability. The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations except by a general law applicable to all citizens. The purpose of this constitutional provision is to ban private corporations created by special charters, which historically gave certain individuals, families or groups special privileges denied to other citizens. In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently, only corporations created under a general law can qualify as private corporations. Under existing laws, that general law is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives.

The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or controlled corporations through special charters. Since private corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that Congress can create corporations with special charters only if such corporations are government-owned or controlled. Obviously, LWDs [referring to local water districts] are not private corporations because they are not created under the Corporation Code. LWDs are not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Section 14 of the Corporation Code states that "[A]ll corporations organized under this code shall file with the Securities and Exchange Commission articles of incorporation x x x." LWDs have no articles of incorporation, no incorporators and no stockholders or members. There are no stockholders or members to elect the board directors of LWDs as in the case of all corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The local mayor or the provincial governor appoints the directors of LWDs for a fixed term of office. This Court has ruled that LWDs are not created under the Corporation Code, thus: From the foregoing pronouncement, it is clear that what has been excluded from the coverage of the CSC are those corporations created pursuant to the Corporation Code. Significantly, petitioners are not created under the said code, but on the contrary, they were created pursuant to a special law and are governed primarily by its provision. (Emphasis supplied)" (Citations Omitted)25 Feliciano further categorically held that P.D. No. 198 constitutes the special charter by virtue of which local water districts exist. Unlike private corporations that derive their legal existence and power from the Corporation Code, water districts derive their legal existence and power from P.D. No. 198. Section 6 of the decree in fact provides that water districts "shall exercise the powers, rights and privileges given to private corporations under existing laws, in addition to the powers granted in, and subject to such restrictions imposed under this Act." Therefore, water districts would not have corporate powers without P.D. No. 198. As already mentioned above, the Court reiterated this ruling i.e. that a water district is a government-owned and controlled corporation with a special charter since it is created pursuant to a special law, PD 198 albeit with respect to the authority of the COA to audit water districts, in De Jesus v. COA.26 In light of these settled rulings, specifically rendered conclusive on LMWD by Feliciano v. COA and the application of the principle of "conclusiveness of judgment," we cannot but deny the present petition and petition in intervention. The principle of doctrine of "conclusiveness of judgment" a branch of the rule on res judicata27 provides that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action. Where there has been a previous final judgment on the merits between the same parties or substantially the same parties, rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction over the matter and the parties, the matters or issues raised and adjudged in the previous final judgment shall be conclusive on the parties although they are now litigating a different cause of action28 and shall continue to be binding between the

same parties for as long as the facts on which that judgment was predicated continue to be the facts of the case or incident before the court.29 No doubt exists that the judgment in Feliciano v. COA was a final judgment rendered by a court with competent jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. The decision was in fact a ruling of this Court on the same issue posed in the present case. The ruling was also on the merits as it squarely responded to the issues the parties raised on the basis of their submitted arguments. There was, likewise, between Feliciano v. COA and the present case a substantial identity of parties and issue presented. In both cases, the main petitioner has been LMWD, represented by its General Manager Engr. Ranulfo C. Feliciano. While the respondents in these cases were different government offices the Commission on Audit and the Department of Finance they nevertheless represented and spoke for the same government; thus, a substantial identity of respondents obtained in resolving the same contentious issue of whether local water districts should be treated as private corporations and not as GOCCs with special charter. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we hereby DENY the petition and the petition for intervention for lack of merit and accordingly AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 14, 2004 affirming the ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals in CTA Case No. 6165. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.