DM B8 Team 8 FDR - Workplan Team 9 - Final and 5-15-03 Draft 523

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS

UPON THE UNITED STATES
TEAM #9 WORKPLAN
EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT:

NEW YORK CITY AND THE PENTAGON
Team Members: John Farmer

John Azzarello
Mark Bittinger
Sam Caspersen
Kevin Shaeffer
Emily Walker
Item 1 Key Questions
Item 2 Suggested Readings
Item 3 Document Requests
Item 4 Interview Candidates

Team #9
Item 1: Key Questions
I. Principal Issues and Questions to be Addressed
Team 9 has been charged with investigating the nature and adequacy of the
emergency response to the 9/11 attacks in the immediate aftermath of the
attacks. Specifically, the investigation is to cover the emergency response
and consequence management of decision makers concerning New York City
and the Pentagon, and the nature and effectiveness of any strategic
contingency plans that were put into place.
Much has been written about the attacks on the World Trade Center and
Pentagon and the chaos they created and challenges they posed for emergency
responders at all levels (excerpts from some of the published accounts are
appended). It is fair to conclude, however, that because the accounts to date
have each taken a harrow perspective, the definitive account of the emergency
response to the events of September 11, 2001 in New York City and
Washington, D.C. has yet to be written. Team 9's work, coupled with Team
8's analysis of-emergency decision making at the level of national leadership,
will enable the Commission to provide such an overall assessment.
Although the published accounts of emergency response on 9/11 differ greatly

in their particulars, they are consistent in one important respect: all
responders tended to assess the situation by thinking first about the nature of
the damage to the buildings themselves, second about evacuating the people
inside the buildings, and third about more general crisis response issues such
as command and control and communications. Team 9 has chosen to use this
consistent thought process as the organizing principle for its inquiry.
1. Questions related to THE BUILDINGS
A. In General
Given that the buildings lay in close proximity to existing flight paths,
were the buildings designed to withstand the potential impact of
commercial aircraft and, if so, what types of aircraft?
Was any assessment done of the buildings' ability to withstand

damage from large-scale explosions and fires?
Were the design and structure of the buildings reviewed periodically to

determine whether their safety features were antiquated?

B. Lessons Learned
What steps have been taken in New York City and Washington, D.C.
to assure coordination between first responders and structural
engineers and architects in the event of future catastrophic events?
In analyzing the performance of the WTC and Pentagon buildings,

what are the most significant lessons to be learned regarding building
design, fireproofing, fire protection, and egress standards?
2. Questions related to THE EVACUATIONS
A. In general
Were building evacuations conducted in accordance with existing

plans?
Were the evacuations successful?
B. Lessons Learned (Most are to be determined)
Should rooftop evacuation capabilities be mandated for all high rise

buildings (as it is in Los Angeles but not in New York)?
3. Questions related to CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
A. In general
1) Command and Control
Was a clear command structure established?
How did the command structure adapt to changing conditions?
Did the command structure provide strategic direction to response

efforts?
2) Communications
Did first responders experience significant communications

failures?
Were communications failures the result of faulty infrastructure,

protocols, or both?
3) Securing the Scene

How successfully were differing institutional perspectives of first

responders (law enforcement, fire fighting, emergency medical)
integrated in the actual response?
B. Lessons Learned
How has emergency and continuity of government and business

operations planning been adjusted since September 11?
What steps have been taken to implement the recommendations of

after-action reports such as the McKinsey Reports on the NYPD and
the FDNY and the Arlington County Fire Department's After-Action
Study?
What steps have been taken to achieve interoperability and to develop

a clearly defined Incident Command Structure?
How effective has the new Department of Homeland Security been in

improving communication between federal intelligence agencies and
state and local governments?
To what extent do budgetary constraints jeopardize reform measures?
II. Investigative Process and End Product
Team 9's investigation will proceed as follows:
(Phase 1) Recreate from contemporaneous documentation, after-the-fact

agency assessments, and interviews with relevant officials the minute-by-
minute reactions of government and the private sector at all levels to the
condition of the buildings, the need to evacuate, and need to manage the
ongoing crisis.
(Phase 2) Compare the real-life, real-time reactions of government agencies

to any strategic contingency plans that may have existed, assessing the
adequacy of those contingency plans in light of what we have learned about
the emergency response.
(Phase 3) Assess the adequacy of inter-agency coordination and

communication, with particular regard to the nature and quality of intelligence
information that existed and the extent to which it was shared in the aftermath
of the attacks.

(Phase 4) Ultimately, render a qualitative judgment about 1) WTC and

Pentagon building performance, 2) WTC and Pentagon building evacuation
actions, and 3) crisis management actions, providing recommendations
pursuant to statute relating to the "structure, coordination, management, and
procedure" of emergency response efforts taken by federal, state, and local
governments as well as relevant nongovernmental entities.

New York City Fire Department. Increasing FDNY's Preparedness. New

York: McKinsey & Company, Executive Summary, August 2002.
New York City Police Department. Improving NYPD Emergency

Preparedness and Response. New York: McKinsey & Company,
Executive Summary, August 2002.
Arlington County. Arlington County: After-Action Report on the Response to

the September 11 Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon. Reston, VA: Titan,
Executive Summary, 2002.
United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of

Operations Plan (CONPLAN), January 2001.
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/conplan/conplan.pdf
Federal Response Plan (FRP) 9230.1-PL, January 2003.

http://www.fema. gov/pdf/rrr/frp/frp2003 .pdf
Federal Emergency Management Agency. State and Local Guide (SLG 101)
Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning. Chapter 6,
Attachment G "Terrorism," April 2001.
General Accounting Office. GAO-03-251, Report to Congress on the

Vulnerability of U.S. Financial Markets to Wide Scale Disasters.
Executive Summary, pp. 1-2, February 2003.
Advisory Panel to Assess Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving

Weapons of Mass Destruction. Fourth Annual Report to the President and
the Congress: Implementing the National Strategy. Arlington, VA:
RAND, pp. 40, 86-103,1-1 -1-14, December 2002.
National Guard Bureau. September 11, 2001 Comprehensive Reference

Resource. McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation,
CD-ROM, November 2002.
National Institute of Justice. Why Can't We Talk? Working Together To

Bridge the Communications Gap To Save Lives. National Task Force on
Interoperability, February 2003.

Team #9
Item 4: Document Requests
1. New York:
a. Transcripts of all FDNY post-September 11 interviews conducted by

McKinsey & Company (over 100 total interviews.)
b. Transcripts of all NYPD post-September 11 interviews conducted by

McKinsey & Company (109 total interviews.)
c. Transcripts of all FDNY internal department interviews relating to

September 11th emergency response actions.
d. Transcripts of all NYPD internal department interviews relating to

e. Radio communication tapes (and transcripts) for all FDNY

communications September 11, 2001.
f. Radio communication tapes (and transcripts) for all NYPD

communications September 11,2001.
g. All FDNY dispatch records for September 11 - 20,2001.
h. All NYPD dispatch records for September 11 - 20,2001.
i. All FDNY operational logs for September 11 - 20, 2001.
j. All NYPD operational logs for September 11 - 20,2001.
k. All FDNY post-September 11 internal after-action "task forces"

transcripts and final reports.
1. All NYPD post-September 11 internal after-action "task forces"

transcripts and final reports.
m. All NYPD post-September 11 personnel survey results conducted by

McKinsey & Company.
n. All FDNY "WTC Briefings" (briefings prepared September 11, 2001

December 31,2001.)

o. All NYPD "WTC Briefings" (briefings prepared September 11, 2001 -

December 31,2001.)
p. NYPD "Criminal Justice Bureau Report"
q. All NYPD "SWAMP site maps"
r. All FDNY incident reports relevant to September 11 response and

recovery operations.
s. All NYPD incident reports relevant to September 11 response and

t. NYPD pre-September 11 "Patrol Guides," "Disorder Control Guidelines,"

'Training Manuals," "Citywide Security Assessments Plan(s)."
u. Transcripts of all New York City 9-1-1 calls September 11 - 20, 2001.
v. All internal FDNY video footage of September 11 attacks emergency

response and recovery operations.
w. All internal NYPD video footage of September 11 attacks emergency

response operations.
x. All FDNY pre-September 11 emergency recall plans and guidance.
y. All NYPD pre-September 11 emergency recall plans and guidance.
z. All NYPD pre-September 11 "precinct disaster plans."
aa. All Port Authority of operational logs September 11 - 20, 2001.
bb. All Port Authority dispatch records September 11 - 20,2001.
cc. All Port Authority communication tapes and transcripts for September 11.
dd. All Port Authority Pre-September 11 WTC Building Evacuation Plans.
ee. All Port Authority Airport Control Tower Logs for September 11.
ff. All Port Authority Airport Control Tower communications tapes and
transcripts for September 11.
gg. All Port Authority Airport Management communications with WTC

Building Management on September 11.
hh. All Port Authority Port Commerce logs for September 11.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY "t
ii. All Port Authority Harbor Ferry logs for September 11.
2. Pentagon:
a. Transcripts of all ACFD internal department interviews relating to

b. Transcripts of all ACPD internal department interviews relating to

c. Radio communication tapes (and transcripts) for all ACFD

communications September 11,2001.
d. Radio communication tapes (and transcripts) for all ACPD

communications September 11, 2001.
e. All ACFD dispatch records for September 11 - 20,2001.
f. All ACPD dispatch records for September 11 - 20,2001.
g. Transcripts of all ACFD internal department interviews relating to

h. Transcripts of all ACPD internal department interviews relating to

i. All ACFD operational logs for September 11 - 20,2001.
j. All ACPD operational logs for September 11 - 20,2001.
k. All ACFD "Pentagon Briefings" (briefings prepared September 11, 2001

-December 31,2001.)
1. All ACPD "Pentagon Briefings" (briefings prepared September 11,2001

-December 31,2001.)
m. All ACFD incident reports relevant to September 11 response and

n. All ACPD incident reports relevant to September 11 response and

o. All internal ACFD video footage of September 11 attacks emergency

response and recovery operations.

p. All internal ACPD video footage of September 11 attacks emergency

response operations.
q. All ACFD pre-September 11 emergency recall plans and guidance,
r. All ACPD pre- September 11 emergency recall plans and guidance.
s. Transcripts of all Defense Protective Service radio communications

September 11,2001.
t. All Defense Protective Service operational logs September 11 - 20, 2001.
u. Transcripts of all Department of Defense official public briefings for

September 11 - 20,2001.

Team #9
Item 4: Interview Candidates
The following federal, state, and local organizations are relevant to Team 9's
completing a "full and complete account" of emergency response and crisis
management following the September 11th attacks. Individuals of interest
within each organization (present during September 11 - 20, 2001) will be the
specific focus of Commission fact-determining interviews.
1. Federal Government:
- Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
• Joe M Allbaugh, former FEMA Director
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
• Barry Mawn, Director in Charge New York Field Office
• Kevin P. Donovan, Assistant Director in Charge New York
Field Office
• Van A.,Harp, Assistant Director in Charge Washington D.C. Field
Office
• Arthur Eberhart, Special Agent in Charge Washington Field Office
• Pasquale J. D'Amuro, Associate Special Agent in Charge of the
Criminal Division in the FBI's New York Field Office
• Special Agent Breznay, (Senior FBI official on scene)
• Stephen Wiley, Special Agent in Charge of the Critical Incident
Response Group (CIRG)
• Robert Blecksmith, Assistant Special Agent in Charge
• Rick McFeely, Supervisory Special Agent
• John Kerr, Supervisory Special Agent
• Christopher Combs, Special Agent National Capital Response Squad
• Special Agent in Charge of the Crisis Management Unit (CMU)
• Special Agent in Charge of the Rapid Deployment Logistics Unit
(RDLU)
• Special Agent in Charge of the Disaster Squad
• John Adams, Special Agent in Charge of the Evidence Recovery
Team
- Department of Justice, Office of Domestic Preparedness (DoJ OOP)
- Department of Defense, Defense Protective Service (DPS)
• John Jester, Chief, DPS
- Department of Defense, Military District of Washington (MDW)
- United States Capitol Police
- United States Park Police, District of Columbia base
- Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Emergency
Preparedness (OEP)
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
Environmental Protection Agency, Criminal Investigation Division (CID)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1Q
- Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

• Michael Brown, Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness &
Response, Department of Homeland Security
2. New York:
Governor's office
• George Pataki, Governor
New York State Emergency Management Office (SEMO)
• Edward Jacoby, Jr., Director SEMO
- New York State Police
• James W. McMahon, Superintendent
New York National Guard
• Major General Thomas P. Maguire, Jr., Adjutant General NY
3. New Jersey (note: John Farmer will recuse himself from NJ aspects):
- Governor's office
• Donald DiFrancesco, Acting Governor
- New Jersey Office of Emergency Management
- New Jersey State Police
- New Jersey National Guard
4. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

• Ernesto Butcher, Chief Operating Officer
• Peter Rinaldi, Structural Engineer
• Richard Garlock, Structural Engineer, LERA Corp.
5. Virginia:
- Governor's office
• Jim Gilmore, Governor
- Virginia State Police
• Colonel W. Gerald Massengill, Superintendent
- Virginia National Guard
• Maj. Gen. Claude A. Williams, Adjutant General
- Virginia Department of Emergency Management
• Michael Cline, Director
6. Washington DC:
- Mayor's office
• Anthony Williams, Mayor
DC Emergency Management Agency
• Peter G. LaPorte, Director
- DC Fire & Emergency Medical Services Department
• Ronnie Few, Chief
- DC Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)
• Charles H. Ramsey, Chief
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 11
7. Pennsylvania:
- Governor's office
• Tom Ridge, Governor
Pennsylvania State Police
• Paul J. Evanko, Commissioner
- Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
• David Smith, Director
8. New York City:

- Mayor's office
• Rudy Giuliani, Mayor
• Joe Lhota, Chief of Staff to the Mayor
- New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM)
- Fire Department of New York City (FDNY)
• Thomas Von Essen, Commissioner FDNY
• Daniel Nigro, Assistant Fire Chief of Operations, FDNY
• Peter Hayden, Deputy Fire Chief, FDNY
• Stephen Mosiello, Fire Marshall FDNY
• Joseph Callan, Chief FDNY
• Albert Turi, Deputy Assistant Chief of Fire Safety, FDNY
• Vincent Dunn, Deputy Fire Chief, FDNY Retired
• Joseph Pfeifer, Captain FDNY
• Thomas Fitzpatrick, Deputy Fire Chief, FDNY
• Walter Kowalczyk, Emergency Medical Service Officer
- New York City Police Department (NYPD)
• Bernie Kerik, Commissioner NYPD
• John Picciano, Chief Aide to Commissioner NYPD
8. Pentagon Area:
- Arlington County Fire Department (ACFD)
• Edward Plaugher, Fire Chief, ACFD
• James Schwartz, Assistant Chief for Operations, ACFD
• Shawn Kelley, Assistant Fire Chief, ACFD
• John White, Assistant Chief for Technical Support, ACFD
• Mark Penn, Deputy Coordinator of Emergency Services
• Edward Blunt, Captain ACFD
- Arlington County Police Department (ACPD)
• Edward Flynn, Chief ACPD
• Deputy Chief Ho
• Rebecca Hackney, Captain ACPD
- Arlington County Sheriffs Office (ASCO)
• Beth Arthur, Sheriff
- Montgomery County Urban Search and Rescue Team
- Fairfax County Departments

- City of Alexandria Departments
- Louden County Departments
- Greenbelt Maryland Departments
- Manassas County Police Department
- MWAA Fire Department at Ronald Reagan Airport
9. Financial Sector:
- Verizon Corporation
- ConEdison Power Corporation
- Cantor Fitzgerald
- Morgan Stanley
- Select tenants of the World Trade Center and financial district
- NYSE
- American Stock Exchange
- NASDAQ
Federal Reserve of NY
- SEC

IN (J 1 JZO 1W VV/\J\_L> /MN UN V JDO 11VJ/A. 11 V £1 rivrtlN J"<lgC I Ul
WORKPLAN - TEAM 9
EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT:
NEW YORK CITY AND THE PENTAGON
I. Principal Issues and Questions to be Addressed
Team 9 has been charged with investigating the nature and adequacy of the
emergency response to the 9/11 attacks in the immediate aftermath of the attacks.
Specifically, the investigation is to cover the emergency response and consequence
management of decision makers concerning New York City and the Pentagon, and the
nature and effectiveness of any strategic contingency plans that were put into place.
Much has been written about the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon and the
chaos they created and challenges they posed for emergency responders at all levels
(excerpts from some of the published accounts are appended). It is fair to conclude,
however, that because the accounts to date have each taken a narrow perspective, the
definitive account of the emergency response to the events of September 11, 2001 in New
York City and Washington, D.C. has yet to be written. Team 9's work, coupled with Team
8's analysis of emergency decision making at the level of national leadership, will enable
the Commission to provide such an overall assessment.
Although the published accounts of emergency response on 9/11 differ greatly in their
particulars, they are consistent in one important respect: all responders tended to assess the
situation by thinking first about the nature of the damage to the buildings themselves,
second about evacuating the people inside the buildings, and third about more general
crisis response issues such as command and control and communications. Team 9 has
chosen to use this consistent thought process as the organizing principle for its inquiry.
1. Questions related to THE BUILDINGS
A. In General
Given that the buildings lay in close proximity to existing flight paths, were the
buildings designed to withstand the potential impact of commercial aircraft and, if
so, what types of aircraft?
Was any assessment done of the buildings' ability to withstand damage from large-
scale explosions and fires?
Were the design and structure of the buildings reviewed periodically to determine
whether their safety features were antiquated?
B. Lessons Learned
What steps have been taken in New York City and Washington, D.C. to assure
coordination between first responders and structural engineers and architects in the
event of future catastrophic events?
In analyzing the performance of the WTC and Pentagon buildings, what are the
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most significant lessons to be learned regarding building design, fireproofing, fire

protection, and egress standards?
2 Questions related to THE EVACUATIONS
A. In general
Were building evacuations conducted in accordance with existing plans?
Were the evacuations successful?
B. Lessons Learned (Most are to be determined)
Should rooftop evacuation capabilities be mandated for all high rise buildings (as it
is in Los Angeles but not in New York)?
3. Questions related to CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
A. In general
1. Command and Control
Was a clear command structure established?
How did the command structure adapt to changing conditions?
Did the command structure provide strategic direction to response efforts?
2) Communications
Did first responders experience significant communications failures?
Were communications failures the result of faulty infrastructure, protocols, or

both?
3) Securing the Scene
How successfully were differing institutional perspectives of first responders

(law enforcement, fire fighting, emergency medical) integrated in the actual
response?
B. Lessons Learned
How has emergency and continuity of government and business operations

planning been adjusted since September 11?
What steps have been taken to implement the recommendations of after-action

reports such as the McKinsey Reports on the NYPD and the FDNY and the
Arlington County Fire Department's After-Action Study?
What steps have been taken to achieve interoperability and to develop a clearly
defined Incident Command Structure?
.../view.php?thismailbox=rNBOX&index=588&id=2&actionID-113&minie=087e4c83f27c33895/15/03
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How effective has the new Department of Homeland Security been in improving
communication between federal intelligence agencies and state and local
governments?
To what extent do budgetary constraints jeopardize reform measures?
II. Investigative Process and End Product
Team 9's investigation will proceed as follows:
(Phase 1) Recreate from contemporaneous documentation, after-the-fact agency

assessments, and interviews with relevant officials the minute-by-minute reactions of
government and the private sector at all levels to the condition of the buildings, the need
to evacuate, and need to manage the ongoing crisis.
(Phase 2) Compare the real-life, real-time reactions of government agencies to any

strategic contingency plans that may have existed, assessing the adequacy of those
contingency plans in light of what we have learned about how the emergency response.
(Phase 3) Assess the adequacy of inter-agency coordination and communication, with

particular regard to the nature and quality of intelligence information that existed and the
extent to which it was shared in the aftermath of the attacks.
(Phase 4) Ultimately, render a qualitative judgment about 1) WTC and Pentagon building
performance, 2) WTC and Pentagon building evacuation actions, and 3) crisis
management actions, providing recommendations pursuant to statute relating to the
"structure, coordination, management, and procedure" of emergency response efforts
taken by federal, state, and local governments as well as relevant nongovernmental
entities.
III. Suggested Unclassified Reading
Langewiesche, William, American Ground: Unbuilding the World Trade Center. New
York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2002, pp. 5-34.
Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, The Cell. New York: Hyperion Press, 2002,
pp.7-27.
Smith, Dennis, Report From Ground Zero. New York: Penguin Books, 2002.
Von Essen, Thomas, Strong of Heart. New York: HarperCollins, 2002, pp. 11-59.
New York City Fire Department. Increasing FDNY's Preparedness. New York: McKinsey
& Company, Executive Summary, August 2002.
New York City Police Department. Improving NYPD Emergency Preparedness and
Response. New York: McKinsey & Company, Executive Summary, August 2002.
Arlington County. Arlington County: After-Action Report on the Response to the

September 11 Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon. Reston, VA: Titan, Executive
Summary, 2002.
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Federal Emergency Management Agency. State and Local Guide (SLG 101) Guide for All-
Hazard Emergency Operations Planning. Chapter 6, Attachment G "Terrorism," April
2001.
National Institute of Justice. Why Can't We Talk? Working Together To Bridge the
Communications Gap To Save Lives. National Task Force on Interoperability,
February 2003, pp. 1-14.
United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan

(CONPLAN), January 2001. http://www.fbi.gov/publications/conplan/conplan.pdf
Federal Response Plan (FRP) 9230.1-PL, January 2003.

http ://www. fema.gov/pdf/rrr/frp/frp2003 .pdf
General Accounting Office. GAO-03-251, Report to Congress on the Vulnerability of U.S.

Financial Markets to Wide Scale Disasters. Executive Summary, pp. 1-2, February
2003.
Advisory Panel to Assess Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of

Mass Destruction. Fourth Annual Report to the President and the Congress:
Implementing the National Strategy. Arlington, VA: RAND, pp. 40, 86-103,1-1 -1-14,
December 2002.
National Guard Bureau. September 11, 2001 Comprehensive Reference Resource.

McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, CD-ROM, November
2002.
IV. Documents to be requested
1. New York:
a. Transcripts of all FDNY post-September 11 interviews conducted by McKinsey

& Company (over 100 total interviews.)
b. Transcripts of all NYPD post-September 11 interviews conducted by McKinsey

& Company (109 total interviews.)
c. Transcripts of all FDNY internal department interviews relating to September

11 emergency response actions.
d. Transcripts of all NYPD internal department interviews relating to September

e. Radio communication tapes (and transcripts) for all FDNY communications
September 11,2001.
f. Radio communication tapes (and transcripts) for all NYPD communications

September 11,2001.
g. All FDNY dispatch records for September 11 - 20, 2001.
h. All NYPD dispatch records for September 11 - 20, 2001.
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i. All FDNY operational logs for September 11 - 20, 2001.
j. All NYPD operational logs for September 11 - 20, 2001.
k. All FDNY post-September 11 internal after-action "task forces" transcripts and

final reports.
1. All NYPD post-September 11 internal after-action "task forces" transcripts and

final reports.
m. All NYPD post-September 11 personnel survey results conducted by McKinsey

& Company.
n. All FDNY "WTC Briefings" (briefings prepared September 11, 2001 -

December 31,2001.)
o. All NYPD "WTC Briefings" (briefings prepared September 11, 2001 -

December 31,2001.)
p. Copy of NYPD "Criminal Justice Bureau Report"
q. Copy of all NYPD "SWAMP site maps"
r. Copies of all FDNY incident reports relevant to September 11 response and

s. Copies of all NYPD incident reports relevant to September 11 response and

t. Copies of NYPD pre-September 11 "Patrol Guides," "Disorder Control

Guidelines," "Training Manuals," "Citywide Security Assessments Plan(s)."
u. Transcripts of all New York City 9-1-1 calls September 11 - 20, 2001.
v. All internal FDNY video footage of September 11 attacks emergency response

and recovery operations.
w. All internal NYPD video footage of September 11 attacks emergency response

operations.
x. Copy of all FDNY pre-September 11 emergency recall plans and guidance.
y. Copy of all NYPD pre- September 11 emergency recall plans and guidance,
z. All NYPD pre-September 11 "precinct disaster plans."
aa. All Port Authority of operational logs September 11 - 20, 2001 .
ab. All Port Authority dispatch records September 11 - 20, 2001.
ac. All Port Authority communication tapes and transcripts for September 11.
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ad. All Port Authority Pre-September 11 WTC Building Evacuation Plans.
ae. All Port Authority Airport Control Tower Logs for September 11.
af. All Port Authority Airport Control Tower communications tapes and transcripts
for September 11.
ag. All Port Authority Airport Management communications with WTC Building
Management on September 11.
ah. All Port Authority Port Commerce logs for September 11.
ai. All Port Authority Harbor Ferry logs for September 11.
2. Pentagon:
a. Transcripts of all ACFD internal department interviews relating to September

11th emergency response actions.
b. Transcripts of all ACPD internal department interviews relating to September
c. Radio communication tapes (and transcripts) for all ACFD communications
September 11,2001.
d. Radio communication tapes (and transcripts) for all ACPD communications

September 11,2001.
e. All ACFD dispatch records for September 11 - 20, 2001.
f. All ACPD dispatch records for September 11 - 20, 2001.
g. Transcripts of all ACFD internal department interviews relating to September

h. Transcripts of all ACPD internal department interviews relating to September
i. All ACFD operational logs for September 11 - 20, 2001.
j. All ACPD operational logs for September 11 - 20, 2001.
k. All ACFD "Pentagon Briefings" (briefings prepared September 11, 2001 -

December 31,2001.)
1. All ACPD "Pentagon Briefings" (briefings prepared September 11, 2001 -

December 31,2001.)
m. Copies of all ACFD incident reports relevant to September 11 response and

n. Copies of all ACPD incident reports relevant to September 11 response and
i(j\\s\r^u /VLN UN vnoiivj.tt.il vc, ri^ttTN J"<igc / ui
o. All internal ACFD video footage of September 1 1 attacks emergency response

and recovery operations.
p. All internal ACPD video footage of September 1 1 attacks emergency response

operations.
q. Copy of all ACFD pre-September 1 1 emergency recall plans and guidance.
r. Copy of all ACPD pre- September 1 1 emergency recall plans and guidance.
s. Transcripts of all Defense Protective Service radio communications September

11,2001.
t. Copies of all Defense Protective Service operational logs September 1 1 - 20,

2001.
u. Transcripts of all Department of Defense official public briefings for September

11-20,2001.
V. Potential witnesses to interview
The following federal, state, and local organizations are relevant to Team 9's completing a
"full and complete account" of emergency response and crisis management following the
September 11 attacks. Individuals of interest within each organization (present during
September 11 - 20, 2001) will be the specific focus of National Commission fact-
determining interviews.
1 . Federal Government:
• Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
• Joe M Allbaugh, former FEMA Director
• Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
• Barry Mawn, Director in Charge New York Field Office
• Kevin P. Donovan, Assistant Director in Charge New York
Field Office
• Van A. Harp, Assistant Director in Charge Washington D.C. Field
Office
• Arthur Eberhart, Special Agent in Charge Washington Field Office
• Pasquale J. D'Amuro, Associate Special Agent in Charge of the Criminal

Division in the FBI's New York Field Office
• Special Agent Breznay, (Senior FBI official on scene)
• Stephen Wiley, Special Agent in Charge of the Critical Incident Response
Group (CIRG)
• Robert Blecksmith, Assistant Special Agent in Charge
• Rick McFeely, Supervisory Special Agent
• John Kerr, Supervisory Special Agent
• Christopher Combs, Special Agent National Capital Response Squad
• Special Agent in Charge of the Crisis Management Unit (CMU)
• Special Agent in Charge of the Rapid Deployment Logistics Unit
(RDLU)
• Special Agent in Charge of the Disaster Squad
• John Adams, Special Agent in Charge of the Evidence Recovery
Team
• Department of Justice, Office of Domestic Preparedness (DoJ ODP)
• Department of Defense, Defense Protective Service (DPS)
• John Jester, Chief
• Department of Defense, Military District of Washington (MDW)
• United States Capitol Police
• United States Park Police, District of Columbia base
• Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Emergency

Preparedness (OEP)
• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
• Environmental Protection Agency, Criminal Investigation Division (CID)
• Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
• Michael Brown, Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness & Response,

Department of Homeland Security
2. New York:
• Governor's office
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• George Pataki, Govenor
- New York State Emergency Management Office (SEMO)
• Edward Jacoby, Jr., Director SEMO
- New York State Police
• James W. McMahon, Superintendent
- New York National Guard
• Major General Thomas P. Maguire, Jr., Adjutant General NY
3. New Jersey (note: John Farmer will recuse himself from NJ aspects):
• Donald DiFrancesco, Acting Governor
• New Jersey Office of Emergency Management
• New Jersey State Police
• New Jersey National Guard
4. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
• Lewis M. Eisenberg, Chairman
• Chairman A. Gargano, Vice Chairman
• Ronald Shiftan, Interim Executive Director
• Ernesto Butcher, Chief Operating Officer
• Peter Rinaldi, Structural Engineer
• Richard Gar lock, Structural Engineer, LERA Corp.
• Greg Bumham , Chief Techno logy Office
• Joseph J. Seymour, PA ED
• Victoria Cross Kelly, Deputy Director Path System
• Commerce Director
• Cargo Director
• Head of Bridges and Tunnels
mo i \^> vv/vivu /-VJ.-N UN v no i ivxtt. 11 v n rj^rtiN rage iu ui iz
• Head of Airports
• Public Affairs
5. Virginia:
• Jim Gilmore, Governor
• Virginia State Police
• Colonel W. Gerald Massengill, Superintendent
• Virginia National Guard
• Maj. Gen. Claude A. Williams, Adjutant General
• Virginia Department of Emergency Management
• Michael Cline, Director
6. Washington DC:
• Mayor's office
• Anthony Williams, Mayor
• DC Emergency Management Agency
• Peter G. LaPorte, Director
• DC Fire & Emergency Medical Services Department
• Ronnie Few, Chief
• DC Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)
• Charles H. Ramsey, Chief
7. Pennsylvania:
• Tom Ridge, Governor
• Pennsylvania State Police
• Paul J. Evanko, Commissioner
• Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
i ^j vv/vrvL' /VLN UN VJ3J iivj/\11 v jc, ro^^uN rage 11 ui
o David Smith, Director
8. New York City:
• Mayor's office
• Rudy Giuliani, Mayor
• Joe Lhota, Chief of Staff to the Mayor
• New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM)
• Fire Department of New York City (FDNY)
• Thomas Von Essen, Commissioner
• Daniel Nigro, Assistant Fire Chief of Operations
• Peter Hayden, Deputy Fire Chief,
• Stephen Mosiello, Fire Marshall
• Joeseph Callan, Chief
• Albert Turi, Deputy Assistant Chief of Fire Safety,
• Vincent Dunn, Deputy Fire Chief, Retired
• Joseph Pfeifer, Captain
• Thomas Fitzpatrick, Deputy Fire Chief,
• Walter Kowalczyk, Emergency Medical Service Officer
• New York City Police Department (NYPD)
• Bernie Kerik, Commissioner
• John Picciano, Chief Aide to Commissioner
8. Pentagon Area:
• Arlington County Fire Department (ACFD)
• Edward Plaugher, Fire Chief,
• James Schwartz, Assistant Chief for Operations,
• Shawn Kelley, Assistant Fire Chief,
• John White, Assistant Chief for Technical Support,
r
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• Mark Perm, Deputy Coordinator of Emergency Services
• Edward Blunt, Captain
• Arlington County Police Department (ACPD)
• Edward Flynn, Chief
• Deputy Chief Ho
• Rebecca Hackney, Captain
• Arlington County Sheriffs Office (ASCO)
• Beth Arthur, Sherrif
• Montgomery County Urban Search and Rescue Team
• Fairfax County Departments
• City of Alexandria Departments
• Louden County Departments
• Greenbelt Maryland Departments
• Manassas County Police Department
• MWAA Fire Department at Ronald Reagan Airport
9. Financial Sector:
• Verizon Corporation
• ConEdison Power Corporation
• Cantor Fitzgerald
• Morgan Stanley
• Select tenants of the World Trade Center and financial district
. NYSE
• American Stock Exchange
. NASDAQ
. SEC
.../view.php?thismailbox=rNBOX&index=588&id=2&actionID=113&mime=087e4c83f27c33895/15/03

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DM B8 Team 8 FDR - Workplan Team 9 - Final and 5-15-03 Draft 523

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS

EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT:

Team Members: John Farmer

Item 1 Key Questions

Item 2 Suggested Readings

Item 3 Document Requests

Item 4 Interview Candidates

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

I. Principal Issues and Questions to be Addressed

Although the published accounts of emergency response on 9/11 differ greatly

1. Questions related to THE BUILDINGS

Was any assessment done of the buildings' ability to withstand

Were the design and structure of the buildings reviewed periodically to

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In analyzing the performance of the WTC and Pentagon buildings,

2. Questions related to THE EVACUATIONS

Were building evacuations conducted in accordance with existing

Were the evacuations successful?

B. Lessons Learned (Most are to be determined)

Should rooftop evacuation capabilities be mandated for all high rise

3. Questions related to CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

1) Command and Control

Was a clear command structure established?

How did the command structure adapt to changing conditions?

Did the command structure provide strategic direction to response

Did first responders experience significant communications

Were communications failures the result of faulty infrastructure,

3) Securing the Scene

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

How successfully were differing institutional perspectives of first

How has emergency and continuity of government and business

What steps have been taken to implement the recommendations of

What steps have been taken to achieve interoperability and to develop

How effective has the new Department of Homeland Security been in

To what extent do budgetary constraints jeopardize reform measures?

II. Investigative Process and End Product

Team 9's investigation will proceed as follows:

(Phase 1) Recreate from contemporaneous documentation, after-the-fact

(Phase 2) Compare the real-life, real-time reactions of government agencies

(Phase 3) Assess the adequacy of inter-agency coordination and

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(Phase 4) Ultimately, render a qualitative judgment about 1) WTC and

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

New York City Fire Department. Increasing FDNY's Preparedness. New

New York City Police Department. Improving NYPD Emergency

Arlington County. Arlington County: After-Action Report on the Response to

United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of

Federal Response Plan (FRP) 9230.1-PL, January 2003.

General Accounting Office. GAO-03-251, Report to Congress on the

Advisory Panel to Assess Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving

National Guard Bureau. September 11, 2001 Comprehensive Reference

National Institute of Justice. Why Can't We Talk? Working Together To

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

a. Transcripts of all FDNY post-September 11 interviews conducted by

b. Transcripts of all NYPD post-September 11 interviews conducted by

c. Transcripts of all FDNY internal department interviews relating to

d. Transcripts of all NYPD internal department interviews relating to

e. Radio communication tapes (and transcripts) for all FDNY

f. Radio communication tapes (and transcripts) for all NYPD

g. All FDNY dispatch records for September 11 - 20,2001.

h. All NYPD dispatch records for September 11 - 20,2001.