Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
TEAM #6 WORKPLAN
Premise Statement
Team #6
Premise Statement
The September 11 terrorist attacks were carried out by 19 hijackers, who lived
openly and freely in the United States for varying periods of time prior to the attacks.
The six leaders of the plot spent considerable time training in the United States for the
attacks, traveling throughout the country during this time. The U.S. Intelligence
Community generally, and the FBI more specifically, were aware prior to attacks that
three of these individuals had ties to al-Qa'ida. Although the plot was primarily financed
and orchestrated from overseas, the hijackers also had contact with and received
assistance from a number of individuals in the United States. Some of the hijackers'
associates were known to the FBI prior to September 11 through its counterintelligence
and counterterrorism investigations. The FBI also had other indications of a possible
attack in the summer of 2001, including the Moussaoui investigation, the Phoenix EC,
and the U.S. Intelligence Community's heightened state of alert.
Based on previous reviews, it is now clear that the FBI did not respond
aggressively and appropriately to all of the available intelligence, and failed in many
respects to "connect the dots" prior to the attacks. Less closely studied is the extent to
which the FBI's inability to detect the hijackers' activities and associations while in the
United States represented a systemic intelligence failure. Was the hijackers' ability to
avoid detection by the FBI while in the United States an indication of excellent
operational tradecraft by the hijackers, or does it represent a failure on the part of the
FBI? If the former, can changes be made to detect this type of tradecraft in the future? If
the latter, what accounts for these failures?
Finally, we will review the current state of the U.S. Government's domestic
intelligence efforts, to assess whether they are adequate to remedy the pre-September 11
systemic problems identified through the course of our investigation. If not, we will
make recommendations to address these problems.
Team #6
Item 1: Key Questions
1. What relevant information did the FBI have prior to the September 11 attacks?
• What information was available to U.S. Intelligence and law enforcement entities
prior to September 11 regarding the 19 hijackers and their associates? When was
this information known and by whom, and how was this information shared and
utilized prior to the attacks?
• Did the FBI have all of the information about the 19 hijackers available to other
U.S. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and their foreign intelligence and
law enforcement partners?
2. What was the FBI's approach to combating international terrorist activity in the
United States prior to September 11?
• How did the FBI collect, process, analyze and disseminate intelligence
information about foreign terrorist activity in the United States prior to September
11, and why did the FBI adopt this approach? What were the strengths and
weaknesses of the FBI's approach to information collection?
• How effectively did the FBI collaborate, coordinate, and share information with
foreign law enforcement and intelligence partners, local and state law
enforcement authorities, and other federal agencies prior to the attacks?
• How effective was the FBI's leadership and management in directing its
counterterrorism program prior to September 11 ?
• What role did the White House, Congress, the Director of Central Intelligence,
and the various Justice Department components play in the FBI's
counterterrorism program, from a policy, budgetary, and investigative standpoint,
prior to the September 11 attacks?
• To what extent did legal authorities and the resultant sensitivities regarding civil
liberties impact on the FBI's counterterrorism mission?
3. To what extent was the FBI's inability to prevent the September 11 attacks an
intelligence failure, and was the FBI's approach to combating terrorism a critical
factor in the overall failure to prevent the attacks?
• In what ways did the FBI fail to adequately collect, process, analyze and
disseminate information relevant to the September 11 attacks, and what accounts
for any failures in this regard?
• In what ways did the FBI fail to adequately collaborate, coordinate, and share
information relevant to the September 11 attacks with foreign law enforcement
and intelligence partners, local and state law enforcement authorities, and other
federal agencies prior to the attacks, and what accounts for any failures in this
regard?
• What particularly glaring or significant failures stand out in terms of the FBI's
inability to prevent the September 11 attacks, and what accounts for these
failures?
• Are the FBI's traditional law enforcement mission and resulting organizational
structures and cultures incompatible with a successful counterterrorism program?
• Does the current system provide for the adequate collection, processing,
analysis, and dissemination of counterterrorism-related intelligence, and if not,
what are the primary barriers to success?
• What are the pros and cons, including transition costs and feasibility, of
establishing a separate agency to handle counterintelligence and foreign
intelligence collection within the United States?
• What can we learn from other countries' approaches to and experiences with
domestic intelligence issues?
• What additional legal and policy changes, if any, are necessary and appropriate
for the U.S. Government to establish a successful domestic intelligence
capability?
Team #6
Item 2: Suggested Readings and Briefing Plan
A. Reading List
1. Relevant portions of the Joint Inquiry Classified Final Report, including Senator
Shelby's Additional Views [Why it is relevant: The Joint Inquiry has already
performed considerable investigation on the performance of the FBI relating to
the September 11 attacks. In determining the scope and focus of our
investigation, the Commission should be aware of what the Joint Inquiry found
and concluded. Senator Shelby's additional views contain important and relevant
conclusions about the systemic problems with the FBI prior to the attacks.]
2. Joint Inquiry Unclassified Staff Statements, dated: September 24, 2002 (as
supplemented on October 17, 2002) and October 8, 2002. [Why it is relevant:
these statements cover a number of topics relevant to our investigation including:
the Phoenix Electronic Communication, the Moussaoui investigation, the
information regarding aircraft as weapons, and the U.S. Intelligence Community's
handling of the information regarding the hijackers prior to the attacks.]
3. Selected portions of the October 2002 Markle Foundation Task Force report on
National Security in the Information Age. [Why it is relevant: contains important
policy recommendations for the U.S. Government relating to the impact of
information and information technology on national security.]
4. Senator John Edwards's February 2003 one page fact sheet on the proposed
creation of a Homeland Intelligence Agency. [Why it is relevant: the fact sheet
contains some of the arguments in favor of the creation of a new domestic
intelligence agency.]
5. Jeff Smith's June 18, 2002 Washington Post Op-Ed, entitled "Haste and the
Homeland Plan," on homeland security and domestic intelligence. [Why it is
relevant: the op-ed briefly describes the problems with the current system, and his
proposals to remedy these problems.]
7. The Cell, by John Miller [Why it is relevant: the author provides a detailed
explanation of why he believes the FBI and CIA failed to prevent the September
11 attacks. He traces the origins of al-Qa'ida in the United States, beginning in
the early 1990s, and how the U.S. Government failed to adequately respond to
this growing threat.]
B. Recommended Briefers
Team #6
Item 3: Document Requests
11. Any policy statements, directives, or guidance from the Attorney General,
Deputy Attorney General, or Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division
to the FBI or to U.S. Attorneys' Offices on Counterterrorism matters from 1998-
Present, not relating to individual investigations.
15. Copy of annual report on the FBI's National Foreign Intelligence Program
budget, produced by the Director of Central Intelligence's Community
Management Staff, FY1995-FY2004.
Team #6:
Item 4: Interview Candidates
*List of possible interviews at FBI field office in the areas where the hijackers
lived and operated relating to: (1) the hijackers' activities and associations in the
United States; (2) the way that these field offices collected, processed, analyzed,
and disseminated information about potential terrorist activity prior to 9/11,
(3) the offices' focus on counterterrorism and al-Qa'ida prior to the attacks:
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL# \N SENSITIVE \t of possible interviews related to White $buse
' / /ru ^ \
[Maureen Baginski. \ Information Dissemination/reports
Other U.S. Government Agencies \ Threat Integration 6enter (in conjunction with team #2):
JJudge Webster,
I
Dale Watson, James I
Current and former White House officials:
John Podesta, Jim Steinberg, Jamie Baker£ iDan Benjamin,
Dick Clarke