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ISSN 2277 3126

rni NO. UPENG/2011/37063

`100 US$ 10

Vol. 3

Issue. 3

may jun 2013



Dynamically Jumpstart Your GIS
Quickly identify, locate, manage, and update all of your public works assets. Build configurable applications to better understand and streamline your organizations workflow. Deploy easy-to-use, map-based, task-oriented web applications your entire team can use. With Intergraphs GeoMedia Smart Client, youre fully equipped to make smarter decisions. Learn more about our solutions for public works at HxGN LIVE, Hexagons International Conference, on 3-6 June in Las Vegas, NV. Visit conference.hexagon.com/sgi to register today! geospatial.intergraph.com/SMARTCLIENT

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Weaponisation of space

Guest Articles
Militarisation of Space 16
Space has emerged as the new battleground, but not everyone is in favour of its weaponisation. The article tries to examine the issue and the difficulties in defining a space weapon


Space: The New Battleground? 22

Is weaponisation of space the final frontier of battlefield or is it going to be the beginning of the end of mankind as we know it?Even though R&D is being carried out to develop technology to place weapons in space, more and more voices are openly against any such move. The future will only decide who wins?

Kevin Pomfret
Executive Director, Centre for Spatial Law & Policy, USA

Chairman MP Narayanan Publisher Sanjay Kumar Managing Editor Lt Gen (Dr) AKS Chandele (Retd) Executive Editor Bhanu Rekha Product Manager Harsha Vardhan Madiraju Assistant Editor Aditi Bhan Designed by Debjyoti Mukherjee Circulation Manager Amit Shahi Circulation Executive Vijay Kumar Singh Owner, Publisher & Printer Sanjay Kumar Printed at M. P. Printers, B - 220, Phase-II, Noida - 201 301, Gautam Budh Nagar (UP) India Publication Address A - 92, Sector - 52, Gautam Budh Nagar, Noida, India Editor Sanjay Kumar Price `100, US$ 10 Geospatial Media and Communications Pvt. Ltd. (formerly GIS Development Pvt. Ltd.) A - 145, Sector - 63, Noida, India Tel + 91 120 4612500 Fax + 91 120 4612555/666 Geospatial Media and Communications Pvt. Ltd. does not necessarily subscribe to the views expressed in the publication. All views expressed in this issue are those of the contributors. The publication is not responsible for any loss to anyone due to the information provided.


Transformational Challenges
So far, the world has only witnessed NCW operations between the leader in technology and a weaker adversary. But what if the conflict takes place between nations having matching NCW capabilities? Should technologically weaker nations develop their own capabilities or directly acquire them from others? How can the technology gap between countries be bridged? Countries throughout the world, are facing several such challenges

Smarter Decisions for Public Safety


Geospatial technology is increasingly being used by security agencies for maintaining internal security of the country. After all, how can police, fire or other emergency agencies reach you if they dont know where you are


In an age of information overflow, standards are essential to ensure communication between various applications and sharing of data from multiple sources. Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC) has been actively working with industry and security agencies to develop open and international geospatial standards

Editorial................................................ 05 News..................................................... 06 Events................................................... 35 Image Intelligence .......................... 42

Geointelligence may - jun 2013 3

Geodata Fusion Study Shows Value of Open Standards




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Battlefield Space - The Final Frontier

umans have forever been fascinated with space. No sooner had they achieved the capability to fly, they started looking at what lies beyond. The early 20th century saw the pioneering efforts of rocket scientists such as Tsiolkovsky, Goddard, Von Braun (World War II V2 rockets). The cold war era was a period of hectic activity in space exploration. In the 50s, the Soviets surprised the Americans with the Sputnik flights, being the first to send a man into space. It was a wake up call for the US. They vowed to be the first to send a man to the moon. The race for space had begun. A number of space exploration missions followed - Vanguard, Explorer, Vostok, Mercury, Gemini, Soyuz, Apollo, Skylab, Mir, Space shuttle and an orbiting international space station. Other nations joined in - China, UK, France, Germany, Japan, Koreas and India. There are over two dozen nations today having space exploration programmes with billions of dollars invested. Space has numerous peaceful uses - terrestrial resources and environmental mapping, navigation (on land, sea and air), communication, weather forecasting and early warning of natural disasters etc., Over 5,000 satellites have been launched into space, of which about 10 per cent are presently functional. A large number are being launched every year. Satellites provide a host of communication (radio, TV, telephone, internet) and navigation facilities (GPS),which have transformed the world we live in. While scientists were busy with their experiments, statesmen the world over were aware of the dangers which would accompany space exploration. They were concerned that this space race, and the possible militarisation and weaponisation to follow, would pose a serious threat to the security and safety of the human race. This concern was responsible in shaping the Outer Space Treaty (OST), which lays down that space should be reserved for peaceful uses by all nations for the benefit of mankind and prohibits placing of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction in space or on other celestial bodies. But the militarisation, utilising space based assets for military communications, navigation, surveillance and targeting, had begun with the earliest satellite launches. Every year, for almost 30 years, the UN General Assembly has adopted a majority supported resolution to prevent an arms race in space. Most nations of the world, including Russia and China, are against weaponisation (physical placement of weapons in space). However, pronouncements by policy makers and statesmen indicate that, whether by subtle circumvention or outright violation of existing treaty obligations and majority world view, the US intends to drive home its technological edge and maintain its position as the global military super power in space. The US military-industry-political caucas has too much at stake in pursuing the weaponisation of space. China, which feels that it is the primary target of this weaponisation, Russia and may be some other nations will have no choice but follow suit. Unfortunately for mankind, the momentum is building up for a full fledged arms race in battlefield space, the final frontier.

Lt Gen (Dr) AKS Chandele PVSM, AVSM (Retd) ajay@geospatialmedia.net

Managing Editor

Geointelligence may - jun 2013 5

Harris Corporation receives order for Falcon III tactical radios

India to use G-sats for missile defence

India is planning to use its array of geostationary satellites (G-sats) for monitoring missile activities in an area of 6,000 km. This will make G-sats constellation the first line of defence in its anti-missile shield. This project, which is independent of the observation grid installed by defence and intelligence agencies, is aimed at installing sensitive surveillance equipment along with other payload on the G-sats. The advantage of using these satellites is their fixed position at a height of 36,000 km and the fact that they are synchronised with the earths movement. The report further stated that the programme would not compromise Indias space policy since it is not meant as an offensive posture, and data collected wont be shared with any other country.

Geointelligence may - jun 2013

GPS system to counter threats from North Korea

South Korea is beefing up its surveillance system against North Korea's electronic jamming signals as the latter had targeted the former's civilian facilities in the past. According to Yonhap News Agency, the Ministry of Science,

Courtesy: Harris Corporation

Harris Corporation has received a USD 29 million order to provide a nation in Asia with Falcon III wideband tactical radios. The radios will provide the country's armed forces with critical country-wide data communications and improved mission capabilities as part of an overall modernisation effort. The nation is acquiring the company's new RF-7800H highfrequency wideband manpack ICT & Future Planning is planning to set up a GPS surveillance system which can track down the attack point and impact of GPS jamming attempts from North Korea. There is also a proposal to pass on the technology developed by the state-run Electronics and Telecomunications Research (ETRI) to a civilian firm to establish the surveillance system.

and RF-7800W High-Capacity Lineof-Sight radios. According to the company, the new RF-7800H is the world's first HF radio with highspeed wideband data capabilities. These advanced capabilities allow users to efficiently transmit large data files such as images over very long range beyond-line-ofsight links. The radio is 20 per cent smaller and lighter and offers data rates that are 10 times greater than other HF radios.

Source: TOI

Surveillance system established by China

China is reported to have established a national island surveillance and monitoring system and completed airborne remote-sensing surveillance of its 4,406 islands. According to Xinhua news agency, the national system is mainly built on aerial

surveillance, with satellites, unmanned planes and cruisers as auxiliary instruments.

Belarusian, Russian armies to share geospatial data

The joint board of the Belarusian Defense Ministry and the Russian Defense Ministry has approved a draft agreement on mutual exchange of geospatial data between their armed forces. The agreement will allow providing quality survey support and navigation support for operative and combat exercises of the regional military force. Also, efforts of navigation and surveying military units will be combined for creating geospatial data which they will freely exchange.

tracks low, fast targets both day and night and passes them to the Hawk's fire control radar. According to the company, the upgrades to the baseline configuration include a new 640 x 480 pixel infrared sensor that will more than double the resolution of the current system. The upgrade will also include a new charged-coupled device camera that will increase resolution and enhance operation in low-light environments. The upgrades also include more reliable and sustainable electronics to ensure continued logistics support for the system. All existing TAS, improved TAS and Advanced Infrared TAS systems can be upgraded to the 4G TAS configuration. The 4G TAS is a gimbaled, stabilised, high-resolution sensor system that provides passive EO/IR searching, tracking, launch and pass-off capability for the Hawk air defence system. It can provide threat assessment and identification beyond visual range, providing real-time situational awareness, the company added. The Hawk and TAS sensors are in operation throughout the world.

needs of the Brazilian Armed Forces by forming strategic, long-term relationships with proven Brazilian companies. "Partnering with Santos Lab is the first step in establishing a local presence for technology transfer, which will enable Insitu's UAS business in Brazil to grow. We are excited to team with Santos Lab one of the country's most successful indigenous UAS companies," said Insitu President and CEO Steve Morrow.

Advanced sensors for Hawk Air Defence System

Northrop Grumman Corporation has launched its Fourth Generation Tracking Adjunct Sensor (4G TAS), the latest upgrade to the company's range of high-resolution electrooptical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors for the Hawk air defence system. 4G TAS, the only approved EO/ IR upgrade available to Hawk customers worldwide, detects and

Overwatch enhances ELT geospatial intelligence softwares user interface

Overwatch, an operating unit of Textron Systems, a Textron Inc. company, has announced the latest release of its ELT geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) software, featuring a new intuitive and customisable user interface. ELT, which fuses image processing functionality with geographic information systems support, is used by analysts for military intelligence, mission planning and disaster management.

Insitu partners with Santos Lab

Insitu recently announced its partnership with Santos Lab, a leading/innovative developer and manufacturer of hand launched unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). The company claims that the alliance demonstrates its commitment to meet the diversified

Geointelligence may - jun 2013 7

n e ws
The contemporary, ribbon-based interface in the new version of ELT enables users to customise the screen to better visualise and tailor the software's wide variety of image viewing and analysis applications to their specific mission needs. The software interface offers large, logically-grouped high-resolution icons and an improved workflow to reduce the time needed to process commands and execute tasks. the intelligence they need to protect their valuable intellectual property and sensitive commercial information from being stolen or compromised by cyber criminals, said the company. Scalable to any organisation, CyberReveal processes billions of data records generated by hundreds of thousands of user devices every single day, identifying and prioritising the security events that could have the biggest impact. Critically, it gives analysts a single view of network activity across their whole IT estate, detecting attacks by their behaviour not just by the signatures of previous attacks, added the company. CyberReveal comprises three core components: Platform, Analytics and Investigator. It is said to be designed to help analysts protect their organisations faster, driving more value by integrating with existing infrastructure and security systems, with plug-in analytics packs providing cost-effective protection to combat evolving threats.

DISA selects private company for data storage

US Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) has awarded a USD 45 million non-competitive contract to Alliance Technology Group to develop a large data object (LDOS) cloud service. The secure intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) cloud, which will be capable of storing exabytes

Cyber Reveal launched

BAE Systems Detica recently announced the launch of its defence-grade cyber security product, CyberReveal. Designed primarily for companies with their own security analysts, CyberReveal is an analytics and investigation product that gives companies

New precision targeting system to increase accuracy of US Armys threat detection

Geointelligence may - jun 2013

BAE Systems has been awarded USD 15 million contract to support the US Armys Joint Effects Targeting System (JETS) programme with the companys new Handheld Azimuth Measuring, Marking, Electrooptic imaging and Ranging (HAMMER) precision targeting system. The contract initiates a three-year engineering and manufacturing development phase for HAMMER with the JETS programme.This lightweight precision targeting system allows

dismounted combat operators to locate and mark targets in all weather and lighting conditions, with the precision required for GPS-guided and laser-guided munitions, said Dr Mark Hutchins, Director of Targeting Programmes at BAE Systems. Building on the companys alreadyfielded Target Reconnaissance Infrared Geolocating Rangefinder (TRIGR) system, the HAMMER architecture enhances precision targeting capabilities by adding a

compact laser marker and a nonmagnetic compass. BAE Systems has teamed with Elbit Systems of America to provide a laser marker based on laser target designators they have developed and fielded with the US Marine Corps. When fielded as part of the JETS programme, the HAMMER system will help soldiers distinguish friends from foes with satellite positioning and surveillance information, and allow them to rapidly receive and transmit targeting data, said the company.

Courtesy: BAE Systems

of data on billions of imagery files, will be accessible across networks. Further, it will be used to store a variety of ISR data, including widearea motion imagery, standard and high-definition full-motion video, and images in LiDAR, hyperspectral, electro-optical/ infrared and synthetic aperture radar formats. According to www.gcn.com, some of the data to be stored include full-motion video files from UAVs and satellites. DISA wants the cloud to be capable of storing geospatial data from smartphones and iPads as well.

Northrop Grumman to bolster cyber protections

Northrop Grumman Corporation has signed a memorandum of agreement with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that will enable the expansion of cybersecurity protections for the nation's critical infrastructure. Northrop Grumman is now starting the security accreditation process which is required before approval to operate as a commercial services provider under the DHS Enhanced Cybersecurity Services (ECS) programme. UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) in both size and price with all the capabilities and features needed by the most sophisticated UAVs, said the company. UTC Aerospace Systems is a unit of United Technologies Corp. The Piccolo Nano is a new fully compatible member of the Piccolo autopilot family in both software and feature capability, the Piccolo Nano provides a small, lightweight, flexible architecture to support the myriad of designs in small hand launched or uniquely configured UAVs. This unenclosed, distributable autopilot system provides maximum installation flexibility to the system integrator and is a perfect fit in small UAVs where the vehicle structure provides the enclosure and the autopilot components need to be distributed within the airframe's available space.

Lockheed to aid USAF in testing civil navigation message capability

Lockheed Martin-developed GPS satellites already in orbit will participate in testing a new modernised civilian navigation message (CNAV) capability designed to enhance GPS navigation service, according to Avionics Intelligence. The report further states that the US Air Force Space Command plans to begin formal testing of the new capability during the summer of 2013. The tests are expected to ensure enterprise-level readiness to operate, broadcast and receive modernised civil navigation messages using L2C and L5 signals prior to the expected deployment of the Next Generation Operational Control System (OCX) in mid2016. The CNAV testing planned is considered to be the next major step in the Air Forces GPS modernisation programme.

ECS is an information-sharing programme to assist critical infrastructure owners and operators in enhancing the cybersecurity protections of their information systems from unauthorised access, exploitation and data exfiltration. Under ECS, DHS will share classified and unclassified cyber threat indicators with designated commercial service providers, and the commercial services providers will utilise the threat indicators to provide approved cybersecurity services to authorised critical infrastructure entities. The Piccolo Nano will be priced in the USD 1000 range, addressing the need for economy in small UAVs while maintaining a professional grade fully supported autopilot, according to the company. The unit can be upgraded with the same options as the Piccolo SL and Piccolo II which include DGPS precision auto land, moving baseline landing support, VTOL support and more.

UTC Aerospace Systems announces the release of the Cloud Cap Technology Piccolo Nano autopilot, the smallest addition to the industry standard Cloud Cap Technology Piccolo family of flight management systems. The Piccolo Nano is designed to meet the requirements of the smallest

The SI Organization, Inc. (the SI) has acquired Applied Communication Sciences (ACS), a leading provider of applied research, technical consulting and technology solutions to US defence and intelligence agencies, US civil government organisations, and commercial customers. Formerly the research and engineering arm of Telcordia Technologies and with its

Geointelligence may - jun 2013 9

UTC Aerospace Systems introduces smaller UAV autopilots

The SI acquires Applied Communication Sciences

n ew s Chip to help navigate when GPS is not available

highly-accurate master clock into a single miniature system, smaller than the size of a penny. Three pieces of information are needed to navigate between known points A and B with precision: orientation, acceleration and time. This new chip integrates state-of-the-art devices that can measure all three simultaneously, according to the organisation. This design is accomplished through new fabrication processes in high-quality materials for multi-layered, packaged inertial sensors and a timing unit, all in a tiny 10 cubic millimeter package. Each of the six microfabricated layers of the TIMU is only 50 microns thick, approximately the thickness of a of approximately 1.5 kilometers (0.9 miles) in tests conducted in March and April 2013. Lockheed Martin is developing the transportable, ground-based ADAM laser system to provide a defence against shortrange threats, including improvised rockets such as Qassam rockets, unmanned aerial systems and small boats. The tests represent increasingly complex scenarios against representative airborne targets. In 2012, the system successfully destroyed 11 small-caliber rocket targets in simulated flight tethered to a cable at a range of approximately 2 kilometers (1.2 miles). The system also successfully engaged an unmanned aerial system target in flight at a range of approximately 1.5 kilometers (0.9 miles) in 2012. Designed for short-range defence of high-value assets including forward operating bases, the ADAM system's 10-kilowatt fiber laser is engineered human hair. Each layer has a different function, akin to floors in a building. Both the structural layer of the sensors and the integrated package are made of silica, said Andrei Shkel, DARPA programme manager. The hardness and the high-performance material properties of silica make it the material of choice for integrating all of these devices into a miniature package. The resulting TIMU is small enough and should be robust enough for applications (when GPS is unavailable or limited for a short period of time) such as personnel tracking, handheld navigation, small diameter munitions and small airborne platforms. The goal of the Micro-Technology for Positioning, Navigation and Timing (Micro-PNT) programme is to develop technology for self-contained, chipscale inertial navigation and precision guidance. to destroy targets up to 2 kilometers (1.2 miles) away. The system precisely tracks targets in cluttered optical environments and has a tracking range of more than 5 kilometers (3.1 miles). The system is being designed to be flexible enough to operate against rockets as a standalone system and to engage unmanned aerial systems with an external cue. Lockheed Martin based the design on commercial hardware components paired with its laser beam control architecture and software to provide the performance needed for these types of threats without the cost and time required for full custom development, said the company. The system is integrated in a container that is mounted on a trailer, making it readily transportable. "High-energy lasers complement kinetic energy systems and have unique attributes, including very low cost per engagement, a virtually unlimited 'magazine' and minimal collateral damage," said Doug Graham, Lockheed Martin's Vice President of advanced programmes


DARPA researchers at the University of Michigan have made significant progress with a timing and inertial measurement unit (TIMU) that contains everything needed to aid navigation when GPS is temporarily unavailable. The single chip TIMU prototype contains a six axis IMU (three gyroscopes and three accelerometers) and integrates a origins tracing back to Bell Laboratories, ACS was established in January 2012 to mitigate any US government concerns arising from the concurrent acquisition of Telcordia by Swedish-based Ericsson. ACS's key capability areas include cyber security and information assurance, network and operations, data analytics, advanced software and methodologies, wireless and mobility, application engineering and integration, smart grid, and optical networking and quantum technologies.

Geointelligence may - jun 2013 10

Lockheed Martin demonstrates ADAM ground-based laser system

Lockheed Martin recently announced that it has successfully demonstrated the Area Defense Anti-Munitions (ADAM) system in multiple tests against freeflying Qassam-like rocket targets. The prototype laser system has destroyed eight small-caliber rocket targets in flight at a range

for strategic and missile defence systems.

Fourth GPS IIF-4 satellite launched

A United Launch Alliance (ULA) Atlas V rocket recently successfully launched the fourth GPS IIF-4 satellite for the US Air Force. The successful delivery of the GPS IIF-4 mission represents the 70th launch success in the 77 months since ULA was formedan accomplishment made possible by seamless

integration of the customer and industry team; reliable production and launch operation processes; and a one-launch-at-a-time focus on mission success for these critical space assets, said Jim Sponnick, ULA Vice President, Mission Operations. GPS IIF-4 is the fourth in a series of next generation GPS satellites and will join a worldwide timing and navigation system utilising 24 satellites in six different planes, with a minimum of four satellites per plane positioned in orbit approximately 11,000 miles

above the earths surface. The GPS IIF series provides improved accuracy and enhanced performance for GPS users.

Lockheed Martin delivers major new crime-solving capabilities

The FBI's Next Generation Identification (NGI) Increment 3 was deployed recently providing significant improvement in latent fingerprint search accuracy and a new nationwide palm print identification system to help solve cold cases and improve crime-solving capabilities. These new resources are among the latest upgrades delivered by a Lockheed Martin-led team for the FBI's NGI system. According to the company, the improvements are the largest so far in a series of phased upgrades to the FBI's biometric identification services, providing powerful new and enhanced biometric capabilities for more than 18,000 local, state, tribal and federal law enforcement agencies across the country. Increment 3 incorporates powerful matching algorithms developed by Morpho, and supplied by US subsidiary MorphoTrak. The new technology is three times more effective in matching latent fingerprints submitted by investigators to those in the national database, greatly enhancing law enforcement agencies' ability to identify suspects and solve cases, added the company.

In addition to creating a system with powerful matching algorithms, the new National Palm Print System (NPPS) contains latent palm prints that Lockheed Martin says, will be searchable on a nationwide basis for the first time. Identification of palm prints, which represent about a third of all latent prints, has been used successfully in the past by investigators to match prints from a crime scene against those of known suspects. Now, law enforcement agencies can use the NPPS to compare latent palm prints in a matter of minutes to all of the records in the national database. NGI Increment 3 also includes improvements that are extending the breadth of searches. Records are managed more efficiently using the case management capabilities of a MorphoTrak product, which when combined with Lockheed Martin-developed software and Morpho search algorithms, allows for the processing of all hand friction. NGI expansion and enhancements will continue through 2014 to deliver the world's largest electronic repository of biometric identification and criminal history information to assist law enforcement to solve and prevent crimes and terrorist activities and assist employers in hiring qualified workers.


Geointelligence may - jun 2013 11

n ew s BAE Systems to provide critical mine detection sensor prototype

BAE Systems has been awarded a USD 20 million contract to develop an advanced prototype system that detects mines and obstacles in near-shore waters for the US Navy and Marine Corps. As part of the Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis (COBRA) programme, the laser-based airborne system will provide 24-hour capability to ensure troops safe transition from ship to shore. The COBRA programme leverages BAE Systems borderless approach to harness key resources in design, integration, and testing, said the company. The work will be performed at the companys facilities in Honolulu, Hawaii; Greenlawn, New York; Acton, Massachusetts; and Hudson, New Hampshire. Subsequent phases will focus on the implementation of specific research applications from the determination of oceanographic features such as winds and waves in typhoons and hurricanes to disaster response. Other applications will include studies of Arctic sea ice and environmental monitoring, as well as mapping and change detection. (FSD), a wholly owned subsidiary of Nuance Communications, Inc. Viecore FSD provides advanced software and systems development services to the US military and Federal Government. Viecore FSD is a focused team that specialises in the design, development and support of advanced decision support technologies and data management systems, from prototype through production. Its solutions and services will be integrated into EOIR's portfolio of innovative engineering products and services for customers within the National Security market.

Booz Allen Hamilton to provide specialised scientific research to NGA

Booz Allen Hamilton recently announced that it has received USD 315 million single award contract to support the NGA InnoVision Directorate. Booz Allen will provide specialised scientific and technical research and development subject matter expertise to all facets of the InnoVision Future Solutions Programme (IFSP) through November 2017. IFSP provides support to perform pathbreaking scientific research and transitions innovative concepts and capabilities required to solve the intelligence community and Department of Defenses most complex problems, said the company. Additionally, IFSP explores emerging scientific capabilities and opportunities such as high-performance computing or big data, and surveillance, in highthreat environments. This announcement comes on the heels of eight major task orders awarded to Booz Allen in October 2012 to provide management and technical services to the NGA through the Enterprise Support to Management and Resources for Technical Services (ESMARTS) contract.

Successful test of new air-launched missile target prototype

Lockheed Martin and the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) have successfully tested a prototype airlaunched Extended Medium-range Ballistic Missile (eMRBM) target at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. Lockheed Martin is developing the air-launched eMRBM target for the MDA for testing of the Ballistic Missile Defense System to enable warfighters to gain experience with system performance in realistic scenarios. "This new target is designed to provide the threat realism that is essential to ensuring that missile defense systems are developed against accurate representations of the systems they would likely encounter in an operational environment," said John Holly, Vice President of Missile Defense Systems and Deputy for Strategic and Missile Defense Systems, Lockheed Martin Space Systems. Under the Targets and Countermeasures Prime Contract, Lockheed Martin is developing and producing a total of 17 missile targets of various types and ranges, including five eMRBM targets.

CSTARS awarded USD 16.5 million ONR contract

The University of Miamis Center for Southeastern Tropical Advanced Remote Sensing (CSTARS) recently announced that it has been awarded a contract by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) to continue collecting, processing, and disseminating data from global Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite systems. The goal of the project is to provide SAR imagery collected in near-real time to aid in US Navy operations around the world. The first phase of the grant will allow CSTARS scientists to procure processing terminals that will assist in the development of hardware and software for the next generation of commercial imagery. CSTARS will continue to develop its numerous algorithms of image analysis using new imaging modes and insights derived from research and testing of data with the availability of the new satellite sensors.
Geointelligence may - jun 2013

EOIR Technologies acquires Viecore FSD

EOIR Technologies, Inc., a portfolio company of The White Oak Group, recently today that it will acquire Viecore Federal Systems Division


ULA successfully launches second SBIRS satellite

A United Launch Alliance (ULA) Atlas V rocket successfully launched the second Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) GEO-2 satellite for the US Air Force recently. ULA launched the first satellite in the constellation, GEO-1, aboard an Atlas V on May 7, 2011. This was the 3rd ULA launch of the year, the 37th Atlas V mission, and the 69th ULA launch since the company was formed in December 2006. SBIRS is a consolidated system intended to meet United States infrared space surveillance needs for decades to come. The SBIRS programme addresses critical warfighter needs in the areas of missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence and battlespace characterisation, said the company. The EELV programme was established by the United States Air Force to provide assured access to space for Department of Defense and other government payloads. The commercially developed EELV Programme supports the full range of government mission requirements, while delivering on schedule and providing significant cost savings over the heritage launch systems, added the company.


Geointelligence may - jun 2013


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and significantly enhancing the ability of users to handle hazardous threats safely. It is more dexterous, cost effective and, as a package, four times faster than any other UGV," said Greg Roberts, Managing Director, defence and security, Northrop Grumman Information Systems Europe. CUTLASS offers the latest technology in a modular design, enabling the user to deal safely with the full range of hazardous threats from a distance, including the detection and disposal of explosive ordnance. Its highly versatile design means that it is capable of accommodating a wide range of payloads, sensors and tools. It carries all of the tools and sensors it needs to perform the full range of operations required for explosive ordnance disposal and other applications, avoiding the need to deploy two standard UGVs. CUTLASS saves up to 50 percent on the through-life costs when compared to owning and operating two standard UGVs. Using CUTLASS, a hazardous situation can be restored to normal up to four times more quickly than with any other UGV. The combination of the speed of the wheeled platform, which can reach speeds of up to 12 kph, and the ability of CUTLASS to carry multiple tools and sensors negates the need to return to the incident control point, thus saving considerable time. The robot is able to creep along at deliberately slow speeds for delicate operations and may accelerate to high speeds to enable rapid travel. The six-wheeled design offers mobility on all types of hard and soft terrain and in all weather conditions. to help companies assess risk levels of political violence and terrorism. Produced in collaboration with global risk management consultancy, The Risk Advisory Group plc, the 2013 Map is complimented by an online and interactive version providing clients a clear global and country level view on terrorism and political violence ratings, according to the company. Aon's 2013 Terrorism and Political Violence Map points to a continued threat of a terrorist attack or political violence as 44 per cent of countries measured have an identifiable risk of terrorist attacks. This trend is especially prevalent in African and the Northern African countries. Despite 19 countries showing improved terrorism and political violence ratings, including the UK and Germany, data and analysis reflected by the map suggest continued and growing awareness is needed for businesses looking to expand. The three perils measured indicate the different forms of political violence most likely to be encountered by businesses:

Enhanced Paveway II GBU-50 delivered

Raytheon Company has completed delivery of more than 200 Paveway GBU-50 guidance kits to a European partner. The GBU-50 provides the 2,000-pound MK-84 or the BLU-109 penetrator with all-weather GPS navigation combined with precision terminal laser guidance. A full range of selectable terminal impact angles combined with a mature combatproven, height-of-burst maximises the capabilities of both the MK-84 and BLU-109. Each Enhanced Paveway II guidance and control section is compatible with warheads ranging from the 250-pound MK-81 to the 2,000-pound MK-84 along with the BLU-109. There is no need for the warfighter to acquire a different guidance and control section for different warhead use.

Next generation UGV, CUTLASS launched

Northrop Grumman Corporation has launched CUTLASS, its latest generation unmanned ground vehicle (UGV), expanding its range of industry-leading capabilities in unmanned systems for the remote handling and surveillance of hazardous threats.
Geointelligence may - jun 2013

 Terrorism and sabotage  Strikes, riots, civil commotion and

malicious damage to property

 Insurrection, revolution, rebellion,

mutiny, coup d'etat, war and civil war.

 Colour-coded ratings of the

CUTLASS has been designed, developed and manufactured by Northrop Grumman in the UK, and includes significant advances in technology and performance and a range of features that provides state-of-the-art capabilities for national security and resilience applications. "Our CUTLASS vehicle is setting new standards in the UGV market

200 countries and territories measured act as a gauge for the overall intensity of the risk of terrorism and political violence to business in each country.

Terrorism and Political Violence Map released

Aon Risk Solutions, the global risk management business of Aon plc, has released its 10th annual Terrorism and Political Violence Map

The map measures political violence and terrorism in 200 countries and territories. Terrorism threat is defined as an assessment of the intent and capability for terrorist groups to stage attacks and the likelihood that they will succeed. The map can be accessed at http://www.aon.com/ terrorismmap.


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new frontier of war

Militarisation of Space
India Centric Thoughts and Perspectives
<< Space has emerged as the new battleground, but not everyone is in favour of its weaponisation. The article tries to examine the issue and the difficulties in defining a space weapon >>

Geointelligence may - jun 2013

Courtesy: http://st.gdefon.ru

pace has always been the mysterious unknown, the daunting yet alluring concept that has encouraged both exploration and investment. The borderless, unconquered nature of space makes sovereignty unclear at the same time providing opportunities to build military and commercial infrastructure. Since

the early conceptualisation of space exploration in the 20th century, the international community is yet to fully comprehend the benefits and challenges that space has to offer. The recent technological advances and increasing integration of outer space capabilities in security and war-fighting doctrines have changed the nature of warfare

as well as security perceptions, signalling the dawn of space as a new domain for competition and leveraging superiority. The far-reaching military, economic and political ramifications of this imminent transformation in the use of space are yet to be fully appreciated or factored into the


future political strategies and security and defence doctrines of major military powers. The withdrawal of the US from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in June 2002, the US Space Vision 2020, the US attempts for a spacebased interceptor test-bed as part of its national missile defence, the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test, its robust space programme and developing a space based C4ISR system for its Anti Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM) have generated fresh debate on the need for preserving outer space as the common heritage and not allowing any deployment of weapon systems in space.

Space Force Application (delivery of ordnance from space). It is now evolving into the next level of weaponisation of space with actual placement of weapons planned by the US for decisive military advantage and China too contemplating the same. Thus, weaponisation seems to be the next logical step in this endless struggle for mastering the ultimate high ground. Though the idea of placing weapons in space or using weapons through space can be found first in 20th century fiction, it was not until the Cold War that this concept became a reality.

Space as a New Frontier

Acquisition of capabilities and capacities to dominate the adversary has been the perennial feature of military campaigns. As Wing Commander Kaza Litendra argues in his paper titled Space Security: Some Issues of Militarisation and Weaponisation, aircrafts revolutionalised warfare during the 20th century, leading to command of the air as a key strategic concept. By extension, following the shooting down of the U-2, the quest for safer observation went further up into space. The same principle of denial led to struggles for control of space and both the US and USSR conducted exercises with nuclear and conventional devices such as ASATs. Thus, the militarisation of space is not a new phenomenon, with almost all the space-based military missions having been exercised during the first decade of the space age, that is, Space Support (the launching of satellites and day-to-day managing of on-orbit satellites), Space Force Enhancement (a broader mission category that includes all space operations aimed at enhancing the terrestrial military operations), Space Control (ensuring friendly access and denying enemy access to the medium of space), and

Militarisation vs Weaponisation
Militarisation of space in simple terms means use of space in support of ground, sea and air operations; and refers to developing assets to be based in space with supporting ground infrastructure for military uses, such as early warning, communications, command and control, Position Navigation and Timing (PNT) and monitoring (remote sensing), and National Technical Means (NTM) that can be used for verification purposes and for surveillance and intelligence purposes. It helps improve command, control and communications, strategic and battlefield surveillance, and weapons targeting. The legitimacy for use of satellites for military purposes has come in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 where both superpowers agreed on the use of observation satellites for promoting international security and reducing the risk of accidental war and preemptive strikes. Further, unlike the 1959 Antarctic Treaty which requires activities on that continent to be exclusively for peaceful purposes, the Outer Space Treaty (OST) 1967, under a combination of Article I and Article IV permits that space is free for exploration and use by all states,

except for placement of weapons in space. Therefore the term peaceful purposes has come to be understood as non-aggressive means or permitting space to be used for military support functions. The states party to the OST accept that peaceful purposes include military use, even that which is not particularly peaceful for example, the use of Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) for targetting, guided by a feed from Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites. Space is considered a sanctuary only in so far that no weapons are deployed there. The US now feels that the time has come to act under the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter, which implies, A state could also use military force to defend itself against hostile actions. This, when coupled with Article III of the OST which states, International law and the UN Charter extends to the exploration and use of Outer Space ensures that a state can undertake space control and space force application missions to protect its assets in space. The use of satellites for force enhancement of military operations has been unquestionably demonstrated in the last decade and a half in Operation Desert Storm (Kuwait, Iraq 1991), Operation Allied Force (Kosovo, 1999), Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan, 2002) and Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. With increasing dependence on satellites for conduct of terrestrial operations, the US concern for their safety has been echoed in its Vision 2020 and the US Space Policy 2010. Not surprisingly, Washington is keen to progress from Space Force Enhancement to Space Control and ultimately to Space Force Application. Although currently there may be no weapon in space, nonetheless there are numerous components of weapon systems each of which forms a vital element in modern war-fighting. For example, the effectiveness of the Chinese ASBM is the


Geointelligence may - jun 2013

<< The militarisation of space is not a new phenomenon, with almost all the space-based military missions having been exercised during the first decade of the space age >>

warning of a missile attack. There were also weather forecasting, TV and other systems in operation. India has 19 communication, imaging and other satellites suitable for military use. China has a robust space programme which is deemed as a key element of its comprehensive national power. China is known to possess spacebased ELINT or SIGINT capabilities, though the specific platforms associated with these missions are not identified. China does possess a space-based meteorological and weather assessment capability provided through its Fengyun series satellites and it has reception centers to receive foreign meteorological data. It has now moved ambitiously into the navigation and positioning segment through its Beidou satellite constellation which, though not as precise as the GPS, could nonetheless be used to improve the accuracy of its conventional weapons. Chinas space systems also include other scientific satellites and an orbital module associated with its manned space programme. Many of the space programmes are dual use, commercial and military. This has obvious cost advantages, but more importantly helps mask covert military activities. Importantly, the military reliance on space for C4ISR is well established. While it provides enormous benefits, these are susceptible to attack from the ASAT weapons. The air-sea doctrine of the US to deal with Chinese anti access and area denial strategy is based on puncturing holes in Chinese ISR systems by degrading or destroying its SAR, optical reconnaissance, navigation and ELINT satellites. Space, therefore, stands militarised for the last five decades, except for placing weapons in space.

combined efficiency of the C2ISR, that includes significant space configuration to include, SAR, optical reconnaissance, navigation and ELINT satellites. Similarly there are military communications satellites (MILSTAR - to communicate from command centers and between troops), espionage and surveillance satellites (to intercept communications by an adversary and collect images of troop movements and weapon placements), early warning satellites (to provide information on missile launches) and military GPS satellites to allow troops and vehicles to navigate quickly and accurately identify targets and guide smart bombs and UAVs. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the US deployed 6,600 GPS guided munitions and over 100,000 precision lightweight GPS receivers in Iraq and used 10 times the satellite capacity employed in the Gulf War of 1991. Nine days before the start of the war, a new defence satellite communications system was installed to interconnect US military forces on land, sea and air with the Pentagon, the White House, the State Department and the US Space Command. Over 100 military satellites supported the US and the UK war efforts; 27 GPS satellites were available to help determine the exact location of special operations teams and of targets; and around 24 communications satellites for command and control and to give

objects even though the means and the reasons for doing so were available. The restraint could be attributed to the reliance on satellites ISR activities for keeping a check on each others conventional and strategic weapon deployments. The aspect of early warning in a sense acted as a deterrence, which was responsible for preventing escalation during crisis situation. However, given the increasing scope of space assets in the doctrinal thinking of major military powers particularly the US, Russia, China and India to cite a few, a prospective opponent will understandably view any space capability contributing to the opposing military as part of the forces arrayed against it. When the space capabilities represent an easier target than the other critical nodes, one can expect interference with them and hence, greater protection for them. The natural consequence of space integration into military activity is a more hostile environment for space. However, the shift in the US military thinking is evident from the planning and policy documents released in recent years that envision the development and deployment of anti-satellite weapons and space-based weapons. These new systems are meant to fulfill four general missions:

 Defending US satellites and

ensuring freedom of action to operate in space use space assets

 Denying adversaries the ability to  Intercepting ballistic missiles

Geointelligence may - jun 2013

using space-based interceptors or in the air using space-based weapons.

 Attacking targets on the ground

Road to Weaponisation
In the past half-century, no weapons have been used against space

These have been included in the US space policy document released in 2006, which states, The US considers space capabilities including the ground and space segments and supporting links


vital to its national interests. Consistent with this policy, the US will preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to the US national interests. This document has evoked criticism across the globe, notably in China and Russia. China too has expanded its space-based ISR, navigation, meteorological and communications satellite constellations. It is developing a multi-dimensional programme to improve capabilities to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by adversaries through ASAT weapons.

Weaponisation of Space
For many in India, militarisation and weaponisation are synonymous. One can attribute the present state of Indian militarisation of space to this fact. Reacting to the need of the Indian Air Force (IAF) for an Aerospace Command, the then External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, stated at an international seminar hosted by the IAF in 2007, There is merit in asking for the creation of separate institutions to oversee the assets that take warfare into space... it does not mean that India will go back on international commitments and weaponise space-based assets. Recent developments have shown that we are treading a thin line between current defence related uses of space and its actual weaponisation. While the reaction of the former defence minister underscores the fine line separating militarisation and weaponisation, the need to weaponise space was expressed by former Air Chief P V Naik while

alluding to Chinese ASAT test. He mentioned: A quiet space race and even weaponisation to some extent is the current reality. These statements underline the fact that there is still a lot of ground to be covered in India on dispelling the myth about militarisation and weaponisation being synonymous. However, for the world at large, the common understanding has been that weaponisation is a subset of militarisation and there is but a subtle difference between the two. If one envisions a continuum running from space systems being used for civil purposes to satellites providing services to support terrestrial military operations, to satellites being integral parts of terrestrial weapon systems or to weapons themselves being deployed in space, weaponisation occurs when the upper range of the spectrum is reached. At its most extreme, space weaponisation would include the deployment of a full range of space weapons, including satellite-based systems for Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), space based ASATs, and a variety of Space-To-Earth Weapons (STEW). Two subsets of weaponisation of space are Space Control and Space Force Application. Space Control/ Denial (or space dominance) mission involves protecting onorbit assets of own and friendly countries, attacking enemy assets, and denying enemy access to space. The primary means of achieving these tasks are either launch suppression, or destroying or degrading the performance of enemy satellites. These actions can either be defensive (protecting friendly assets) or offensive (denying the enemy the benefits of spacebased assets). It is more or less analogous to sea and air control/ denial, both of which likewise involve ensuring friendly access and denying the same to an adversary. There is no difference in principle between defensive and offensive space control operations conducted in any other medium of warfare.

It is simply a matter of technical feasibility, desirability in principle, and cost-effectiveness for the payoff being sought. The reason for the hiatus in moving forward on the desirability of space control in the aftermath of the initial surge in the early sixties appears to be the lack of political and public consensus, as to whether actual combat, as opposed to passive surveillance and other terrestrial enabling functions, should be allowed to migrate to space and, thus, violate the status of space as a weapons free sanctuary, quite apart from the more practical question of whether preparing for space combat was even needed then at that still embryonic stage of space weapons development. This could be partly due to the fear that the other superpower (former Soviet Union) may also embark on such a mission and deny any advantage to the US. However, today, both the US and China view space control as an essential precondition to maintain information dominance and deny any advantage to the likely adversary. Space Force Application envisages attacking terrestrial targets from space-based weapons which would reduce the reaction time, cost of human attrition and the other associated problems of attacking strategic targets. The idea of having satellites/ space planes orbiting overhead, awaiting a signal to rain down weapons on any nation at the pleasure of the US has alarmed many nations. The Rods from God being developed by the US is an example of force application from space. Skeptics of weaponisation, more notably China, have argued that all these missions are possible from ground, sea and air-based operations and view the US drive as a move to assert its hegemony on the emerging players in the medium of space.

What is a Space Weapon?

There is no consensus on the definition of a space weapon. The


Geointelligence may - jun 2013

debate encompasses the problems of whether or not the international community should define the weapon based on its position, that is, on land, sea, air or in space, or based on its intended target. Hence, there is a possibility for space to space, space to earth, earth to space, and earth to earth (through space) weapon. Different technologies could be employed to destroy, disrupt or damage the intended targets. These could be kinetic kill vehicles that destroy by impact (the Chinese ASAT) or Rods from God (a proposal to fire tungsten rods from space to ground-based targets), missiles with conventional warheads, killer satellites, Directed Energy Weapons (DEW), etc. Further, the micro/nano/pico satellites being designed in a defensive role as bodyguard satellites or for close proximity operations with the host satellites also have a dual role, in that they

can be used as space weapons: to destroy adversaries satellites through kinetic kill or disrupt the use of satellite by spraying paint on the solar panels, view finders, etc.

other kinds of WMD can freely transit outer space, as long as they do not orbit the earth. Likewise, WMD that escape the earth orbit are permitted except that they may not be installed on celestial bodies or otherwise stationed in outer space. Other non-nuclear/nonWMD weapons may be placed in orbit (but not on the moon or other celestial bodies) and used to attack targets in space or on the earth. The foregoing implies that whilst the rules developed by the OST are fairly comprehensive, it does not apply to the present generation of space weapons being considered. Theoretically, then, the new generation of space weapons could be developed and deployed without violating the OST.

Courtesy: www.nasa.gov


The OST with respect to treating outer space as a common heritage of mankind is akin to a barbed wire fence. It attempts to protect the property (space) without obstructing the view (exploitation by the superpowers for militarising and weaponising space). It is pertinent to note that even after the ratification of the OST in 1967, and the ABM Treaty in 1972, both the superpowers continued to undertake the testing and development of ASAT weapons. While OST and ABM treaty prohibited the stationing of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in space, along with the development, testing and deployment of space-based ABM systems and components in space, there are no limits on non-nuclear tests in space or tests against space targets from ground, sea or air. The OST is also silent on the definition of space weapons. Hence, in strict definitional terms, none of the existing ASATs could be called space weapons. The ASATs were permitted, if one were to analyse Paragraph 1 of Article IV of the OST which implies that objects carrying nuclear weapons or any

US plans of a space-based interceptor test-bed; its space policy and the Chinese ASAT test have started an action-reaction process in the race to weaponisation of space. With this, the future of space is at a crossroads: will the 50-year tradition of international cooperation and space sanctuary prevail; or, will the fear of military and/or economic domination drive nations to compete aggressively for primacy in the ultimate high ground. These questions need to be debated in the near future. Further, with the dual use capability of most ISR satellites and the rapid commercialisation of space, it would be more prudent for nations to migrate more of the dedicated military missions onto the commercial satellites in order to decrease dependence on a handful of dedicated military satellites and thus obviate the need for spacebased weapons to protect key satellites. A non-state actor would at best be able to destroy one or two satellites in Low Earth Orbit, and an adversary state having established launch facilities may be able to destroy double


Geointelligence may - jun 2013

<< The idea of having satellites/ space planes orbiting overhead, awaiting a signal to rain down weapons on any nation at the pleasure of the US has alarmed many nations >>

Comparison of various weapon systems which could be classified as space weapons PRINCIPLE DEW Laser, Microwaves, Particle Beams ADVANTAGE Direct Invisible Invisible Fast ADVANTAGES/COUNTER MEASURES Energy; Line of sight, atmosphere; Counter-measures (CM) Low resolution CM Propagation Energy Production Acceleration of the collision mass; homing space debris, multiplication energy and technical problems WARNING TIME Seconds to minutes


Homing missiles/ Kill vehicles Collision Devices EM Guns

High Closing speed Hard to identify High closing speeds Lethality, destruction radii

Minutes/ hours/days Minutes/ hours Minutes


Nuclear Weapons

Destroys own satellites


the number (provided it knows with certainty which satellites it wants to knock out) before retaliatory action is initiated. The states attempting to destroy an adversarys space assets are also fully aware of the debris effect on their space assets and this in itself would act as a deterrent for weaponising space, or attacking other nations space-based assets. The need of the hour for the international community is to find ways to prevent weaponisation of space by engaging in meaningful dialogue and assuring each other that there is no threat to their space-based assets. The states can aim to enhance collective security of their space-based assets from a non-state actor by increasing their space situational awareness and sharing of information. Further, states can undertake passive defence of their satellites in the form of:

rather than forgo an important satellite to an EMP or a kinetic hit

 building redundancy by deploying

back-up systems for the majority of the tasks or having some reserve capacity on commercial satellites so that the military tasks can be transferred to them

4. David Webb, On the Definition of a Space Weapon (When is a Space Weapon Not a Space Weapon?),Praxis Centre, Leeds Metropolitan University , < http:// praxis.leedsmet.ac.uk/praxis/ documents/space_weapons.pdf> 5. Sujan Datta, Air Force Guns for Space Power-No Laughing Matter, The Telegraph (Internet VersionWWW), Monday, February 05, 2007. 6. http://news.rediff.com/ report/2010/jan/22/how-indiaprepares-for-a-space-war.htm 7. Benjamin S.Lambeth, Mastering the Ulimate High Ground: Next Steps in the Military Uses of Space(Santa Monica:RAND, 2003), p. 105. 8.1 Ibid
Geointelligence may - jun 2013 21

 maneuvering satellites from

accidental collision with debris or other satellites

These measures would mitigate the threat of an arms race in outer space as against the international norms of treaties being inked after the weapon systems have been deployed, and would ensure that a treaty is put in place to prevent the heavens being armed. REFERENCES 1.Wing Commander Kaza Lalitendra, Space Security: Some Issues of Militarisation and Weaponisation, Air Power Journal Vol. 3 No. 1 SPRING 2008 2. Ibid pp 109 3. http://www.whitehouse.gov/ sites/default/files/national_space_ policy_6-28-10.pdf, pp 3

 hardening of satellites against

limited kinetic kill and EMP. Though this may increase the cost of launching satellites, nations that are yet to master the technology of micro/nano/pico satellites will have to bear the burden of increased cost/launch

Brig Arun Sahgal (Retd)


new frontier of war

The New Battleground?
<< Is weaponisation of space the final frontier of battlefield or is it going to be the beginning of the end of mankind as we know it? Even though R&D is being carried out to develop technology to place weapons in space, more and more voices are openly against any such move. The future will only decide who wins? >>

Geointelligence may - jun 2013

echnology has driven strategy and tactics over the centuries, providing strategists and military thinkers methods and means to wage war and surprise and overwhelm the opponent. In the 20th century, nuclear weapons and rocket technology added a new dimension to war waging capabilities of nations, opening another dimension and radically changing the method of conducting war. However, this was limited to a select few. Now, as more nations achieve technological prowess, the scene is changing with challenges being posed to current world powers. Space has been militarised since the cold war when communication satellites were launched; and even though space is heavily militarised, so far it has not been weaponised. Militarisation of outer space: Militaries all over the world rely on satellites for command and control, communication, monitoring, early warning and navigation. Peaceful uses of outer space include military uses such as using satellites to identify targets, direct bombing raids, control

and direct drone strikes or to orchestrate a prompt global strike capability, anti-access strategy or ballistic missile defence. Weaponisation of outer space: Space weaponisation refers to the placement of space-based devices in orbit that have a destructive capacity. Ground-based systems designed or used to attack space-based assets also constitute space weapons, though they are not technically part of the weaponisation of outer space since they are not placed in orbit. Weapons that travel through space in order to reach their targets, such as hypersonic technology vehicles, also contribute to the weaponisation of space. Many elements of the missile defence system currently being developed or planned could constitute space weapons as well, as many possess dual-use characteristics, allowing them to destroy space assets as well as ballistic missiles.

on space or related aspects chronologically are :1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water 1967 Outer Space Treaty (formally titled Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies) The Treaty was largely based on the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, which had been adopted by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 1962 (XVIII) in 1963, but added a few new provisions. The Treaty was opened for signature by the three depository governments (USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) in January 1967, and it entered into force in October 1967. The Outer Space Treaty provides the basic framework on international space law, including the following principles:  the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for

Existing legal instruments

Existing treaties and conventions


the benefit and in the interest of all countries and shall be the province of all mankind;  outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all states;  outer space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means;  States shall not place nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies or station them in outer space in any other manner; t  he Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes;  astronauts shall be regarded as the envoys of mankind;  States shall be responsible for national space activities whether carried out by governmental or

non-governmental entities;  States shall be liable for damage caused by their space objects; and  States shall avoid harmful contamination of space and celestial bodies. 1968 Rescue Agreement (formally titled as the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects launched into Outer Space) 1971 Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization Intelsat (with annexes and operating agreement) 1972 Liability Convention (formally titled as the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects) 1975 Registration Convention (formally titled the Convention on the Registration of Objects launched into Outer Space)

1979 Moon Agreement (formally the Agreement governing the activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies) 1985 Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) with annex and operating agreement (1976); as amended in 1985; with Protocol (1981)

Since the beginning of the space age, roughly 5,400 man-made objects have been placed in orbit around the earth. Some 580 of these satellites are believed to be still functioning as they were intended. About 270 of these functioning satellites are in Low Earth Orbits (LEO). This region extends from about 100 kilometers altitude to about 1,000 km. At present, this region contains at least 24 US military reconnaissance, electronic intelligence and meteorological satellites. France, Israel and Russia

Courtesy: http://arts-wallpapers.com


Geointelligence may - jun 2013

have similar military satellites in this region, which the Russians also use for tactical military communication and navigation. In future, the US plans to place the Space Based Infrared System Low (SBIRS Low) network of two dozen infrared missile-tracking satellites for Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and National Missile Defense (NMD) in this region. It is this LEO region, closest to earth, which will be most vulnerable in the near future to earth-based Anti-Satellite (ASATs) weapons (missiles, lasers,particle beams, etc.), currently under development by several states. The technical prowess required for great accuracy would not be necessary to harm the targeted satellite: a simple nuclear explosion, or the dispersal of a cloud of pebbles, is sufficient to damage all satellites in a large region of LEO for an extended period of time. There are some 40 to 50 satellites in Middle Earth Orbits (MEO) orbiting at altitudes between 1,000 and 35,786 kilometers above the surface of the earth. Most of these MEO satellites are in highly elliptical orbits, dipping into the LEO

region during part of their travels. During these close approaches to earth, they would have the same vulnerability as do the LEO satellites. Finally, there are about 300 satellites in Geostationary Earth Orbits (GEO). These circulate easterly, precisely 35,786 kilometers above the Equator with a period of 24 hours; hence they remain stationary with respect to any given position on the surface of the earth. At least 29 of these belong to the US military. Other militaries owning satellites in this region are Australia, Russia and the UK. These stationary satellites serve for communications, relay, earth observation, search and rescue, weather and research. There are also constantly staring early-warning-satellites designed to detect (and initially track) ballistic missile launchings via the intense infrared emitted by their rocket engines. For the foreseeable future, the only threats to such far-out satellites would come either from other such satellites or from the rockets capable of launching such satellites from ground to GEO (releasing conventional or nuclear space mines or gravel clouds). At

present only China, France, India, Japan, Russia, Ukraine and the US possess such rocketry.

Positions adopted by nations

In July 2010, the Obama administration released the new US National Space Policy. It states that the US shall pursue bilateral and multilateral transparency and confidence-building measures to encourage responsible action in, and the peaceful uses of space. The new policy also notes that the US will consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively verifiable and enhance the national security of the US and its allies. However, the actual implications of this change are still unknown. The Russian-Chinese joint draft treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) would not meet these criteria according to the US, as it is fundamentally flawed and would not provide any grounds for commencing negotiations. The United States Department of Defense continues to invest in programmes that could provide anti-satellite and space-based weapons capabilities. While the technology itself is highly controversial, it presents major business opportunities to companies that know how to overcome moral, logistical and financial roadblocks. War has always been highly profitable, and dominance of outer space leads to further profits in conventional warfare. As the Air Force Space Command stated in its 2003 Strategic Master Plan, the ability to gain space superiority (the ability to exploit space while selectively disallowing it to adversaries) is critically important and maintaining space superiority is an essential prerequisite in modern warfare. Superiority in conventional warfare relies on military assets in

Geointelligence May - jun 2013

Courtesy: www.thelivingmoon.com


space, especially satellites, which are used for intelligence, remote sensing, navigation and monitoring, among other things. Since the US currently asserts its political will through force, protection of its own space assets and disturbance of others is key to guaranteeing the US dominance.

of any kind of offensive weapons in space, and a more efficient use of inspection and data exchange mechanisms established in line with the START 1 treaty. The Russian view point was also articulated in 2007 at the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) at Geneva as In Russias opinion, the militarisation of outer space could have unpredictable consequences for the international community, and will provoke nothing less than the beginning of a nuclear era. And more than once we have come forward with initiatives designed to prevent the placement of weapons in outer space The issue of Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space, PAROS, has many facets and dimensions. We have been constantly discussing them at the CD. We all become increasingly dependent on outer space technologies and more and more use of these technologies in the key areas of activities of humankind. Security in outer space must be guaranteed. This is a call of our time. The CD must prove that this can be achieved through multilateral agreement, taking into account legitimate interests of all states and through covering the well known lacunae in the international outer space law.

On June 17, 2009 immediately after the ninth heads of state summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Yekaterinburg, Russia, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Chinese President Hu Jintao announced that they would draft a joint treaty to ban the deployment of weapons in outer space and this treaty would be presented to the United Nations General Assembly. A statement by the presidents reflected a common purpose to avoid the weaponisation of space: Russia and China advocate peaceful uses of outer space and oppose the prospect of it being turned into a new area for deploying weapons. Near simultaneously, Russian Deputy Defence Minister was quoted saying, Russia warns that technology failure with weapons in space may accidentally invite a massive response amounting to nuclear war and that our nations response to American weapons in orbit would be asymmetric but adequate. At the same time, Commander of Russias Strategic Missile Forces, said, A new strategic arms reduction pact with the United States must prohibit any kind of offensive weapons in space, and expounded on his nations concerns by adding: Our country is interested in including limitations not only on the number of nuclear warheads, but also on the number of their delivery vehicles in the new arms reduction treaty. We also stand for maintaining the ban on the deployment of strategic weapons, offensive and defensive, outside national borders, the prohibition

<< The overwhelming majority of UN member states are concerned that the weaponisation of outer space will lead to an arms race and insist that a multilateral treaty is the only way to prevent such an arms race >>

by it has cemented its place in space militarisation and if required, in weaponisation as well.

France has developed technical capabilities which can be used for placing weapons in space.

India, another country which has nuclear weapons and a growing space programme, recently intensified its own missile defence testing. It also closely watches Chinas ASAT and missile defence tests.

A number of countries including Russia, China and the US, are reported to be already developing anti-satellite weapons.

China successfully launched a land-based missile interceptor on January 28, 2013, China claimed that it had accomplished the pre-set goal, and that the test was defensive in nature and targeted no country. Chinas only previous missile interceptor test, on January 11, 2010, did involve a target. In 2007, China conducted an ASAT test, destroying one of its own satellites instead of a test warhead. The country has a robust civil space programme and is likely to come on par with the other two space leaders. This demonstration of technical prowess

Is weaponisation actually required?

An overwhelming majority of UN member states is concerned that the weaponisation of outer space will lead to an arms race and insist that a multilateral treaty is the only way to prevent such a race. In 2006, Russia argued that if all states observe a prohibition on space weaponisation, there will be no arms race. Russia and China also support establishing an obligation of no use or threat of use of force
Geointelligence may - jun 2013 25

<< At present, states do profess a choice to prevent weaponisation of space. However, the R&D of cutting edge technology indicates otherwise their intention to possess a capability to place weapons in space >>
against space objects and have submitted a draft treaty to the UN on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space. However, those in favour of weaponisation of space argue:-

Arguments against space weaponisation are:-

 D estroy strategic balance and

stability, and will inevitably lead to a new arms race national security

 U ndermine international and  D isrupt existing arms control

instruments in particular those related to nuclear weapons and missiles to their potential creation of space debris in Earths orbital sphere their capacity to inadvertently destroy other satellites including, in particular, satellites required for monitoring military activities enormous technical challenges to their effective use and the availability of better Earthbound alternative measures with existing treaties currently in force establishing space as a peaceful zone possibility of war into the boundless future of space

treaty. Such a treaty would ban the testing, production, deployment or use of weapons in space or use of earth-based weapons which operate into space; require the notification of all planned space activities; establish monitoring and verification procedures; include procedures for resolving conflicts regarding military use of space and enforcement mechanisms for violations of the treaty.

Although the current international legal instruments concerning outer space do, to some extent, prohibit and restrict the deployment of weapons, use of force as well as military activities in certain parts of space, the related provisions contained in them are seen by some states to be limited in scope and therefore inadequate for preventing weaponisation of outer space. The progress of science and technology could make it necessary to strengthen the existing international legal system. At present, states do profess a choice to prevent weaponisation of space. However, their research and development of cutting edge technology indicates otherwise - their intention to possess a capability to place weapons in space. The final frontier space became militarised during the Cold War. It is now open to weaponisation as technology provides the wherewithal to place a range of weapons or counter systems in space and, political and national security compulsions force nations to take recourse in use of space for national defence. 

 Polluting and hazardous due

 Counter-productive, due to

 Weapons and warfare are likely

to spread wherever humans go. And states will ultimately do whatever they believe to be in their self-interest and air power reveal a striking pattern leading towards the weaponisation of space and eventually in its exploitation. History teaches us that the new strategically important weapons quickly become embedded into national security strategies. In general, such weapons become so deeply embedded in the dominant political paradigm that they are largely impossible to remove from the strategic arena over adversaries or future threats. Current research should continue on emerging cutting edge technologies investment in and economic dependence on space technology will make attacking satellites very attractive to enemy states. Thus, states need to build space weapons in order to defend them.

 Examples of the evolution of sea

 I nadequate due to the

 Illegal in their potential conflict

 Immoral for they bring the

The world has only two options, either to: 1. Plan, research, develop and deploy weapons systems to protect interests and infrastructure in space. The effect of this approach will be an arms race in outer space as countries move to protect their interests against possible attack. 2. To develop multi-laterally negotiated controls on weapons in space through a new space

 Maintain technological edge

Geointelligence may - jun 2013

 The rapidly growing commercial

Lt Gen BS Nagal (Retd)

Former GOC-in-C, Strategic Forces Command



Location can be revealed in a variety of ways a number of which we take for granted
<< With satellite imagery just a click away, UAVs increasingly being used for civilian mapping applications, location data of anyone or any place easily obtainable - little wonder many defence experts and policymakers throughout the world are advocating regulation on the use and distribution of geodata. In a tte--tte with GeoIntelligence, Kevin Pomfret, Executive Director, Centre for Spatial Law & Policy, tells us why there is need for security agencies to re-look at the applicability of geospatial information... >>
Geolocation has never been as important as it is today. Be it for security, or during natural calamity or for gathering market intelligence for formulating business policies, geolocation is required for everything. Do you think policies have been able to keep up with the rapid technological changes that we are witnessing in this sector?
Policies have not been able to keep up with rapid technological advancements in geospatial technology. While this is not surprising, as policies and laws tend to lag behind technology, it is unfortunate. Moreover, I would argue that the policies are further behind geospatial technology than many other types of technology.

Kevin Pomfret
Executive Director Centre for Spatial Law & Policy, USA

Many often argue that since geodata is very versatile, it can be used for a variety of purposes both positive and negative. What would be your recommendation so that developmental needs are met and security is also not compromised?


Geointelligence may - jun 2013

Geointelligence may - jun 2013

Most technologies can be used in both positive and negative ways cell phones or computers for example. So I think it would be unfair to treat technologies that collect, use or distribute geoinformation differently. That is not to suggest that there might not be some justifiable restrictions on use and/ or access to certain types of geoinformation, but such restrictions should be limited in scope and weighed against the opportunity costs associated with that information not being made available. Because information is so versatile, restricting access for one use often means it is not available for other uses as well. Too often that is not taken into account.

think it happened because policymakers have reservations towards the use of commercial satellite imagery for defence and intelligence purposes? If yes, what needs to be done in this regard?
It is important to keep in mind that the US government remains a significant consumer of commercial satellite imagery. Moreover, there were a number of factors that contributed to changes in the EnhancedView programme. However, I do think that a lack of appreciation within the US government in the value of high resolution commercial satellite imagery was a contributing factor. One step to raise awareness of its value would be to make it easier for civilian agencies to get access to the imagery. In the past, civilian agencies have experienced difficulties in obtaining the imagery, even though it is unclassified and paid in full. NGA has taken steps to improve access

for civilian agencies, so hopefully such awareness will increase. Another step is for policymakers to recognise the economic value of geolocation. For example, according to a recent report by the Boston Consulting Group, the geospatial industry generated USD 73 billion in revenues in 2011 and at least

We have seen how defence budget cuts affected National Geospatial-Intelligence Agencys (NGA) EnhancedView programme in the USA, thus leaving the organisation with no choice but to opt for just one company, DigitalGlobe for providing it imagery. Do you

<< Most technologies can be used in both positive and negative ways cell phones or computers for example. So I think it would be unfair to treat geospatial technologies differently. That is not to suggest that there might not be some justifiable restrictions on use and/or access to certain types of geoinformation >>


500,000 high-wage jobs in the US alone. The industry itself is on track to grow by 25 per cent or more over the next 5 years. The broader US economy also depends heavily on this technology. For example, US business leaders estimated that geospatial drives USD 1.6 trillion in revenue, and USD 1.4 trillion in cost savings, per year.

World over, unmanned aerial vehicles are in demand for various civilian mapping applications. Imagery collected through aerial vehicles is likely to heighten the perceived security risks, thus resulting in increased efforts to regulate the collection and use of imagery. How is the US dealing with this challenge? What do you think will be the potential problems when UAVs start flying?
As with other types of technology, everyone agrees that UAVs should not be used to infringe an individuals privacy and do harm to others. In fact, I would imagine that most jurisdictions in the US already have laws and policies in place that would punish those who use UAVs for such purposes. However, for a variety of reasons UAVs have become lightening rod for both sides of the political spectrum. As a result, there is a growing trend in the US to try to legislate or regulate this issue before UAVs are broadly in use. Much of this is occurring at the state level. My concern is that these laws and policies will be overly broad or so restrictive that they will have unintended consequences.

<< It is unrealistic for governments to think that they can limit information being collected about their territory. This has been happening for a number of years and has been sanctioned through such initiatives as the UN Principles of Remote Sensing and the Open Skies Treaty >>
I think it is unrealistic for governments to think that they can limit information being collected about their territory. This has been happening for a number of years and has been sanctioned through such initiatives as the UN Principles of Remote Sensing and the Open Skies Treaty. Instead of trying to fight collection, in most cases it would be more productive for governments to determine how this information can be best used to serve their citizens and to address critical trans-national issues such as sustainable development.

street level image of his house was available on the internet. He said he was concerned because there had been some burglaries recently in the neighbourhood and the image would make it more likely for him to be robbed. However, the same article also distributed over the internet - mentioned his name, age, business title, city and even his neighbourhood. It also included an image which although blurred showed enough information to make the house identifiable. Location information regarding the individual can be determined from both sources of information, but many people take one type for granted and worry about the other. It will be difficult to develop transparent and technology-neutral laws without a better understanding of what the privacy risk is being protected and why.

Right from tracking people to analysing their behaviour, the potential of geospatial technology is enormous. It is because of this power of technology that many policymakers believe that precise geolocation information is sensitive and should be subjected to greater protection. Your take.
The power of the technology is undoubtedly part of the reason as the geolocation information collected from mobile devices raises a number of privacy considerations. But just as big if not bigger reason is that the technology and many of the applications are new. This makes people uncomfortable. It also seems to result in people focusing on the perceived risks rather than the potential benefits. Currently, there are discussions taking place in legislative bodies around the world on this important issue. It is important for the geospatial community to begin to take a more active role in this discussion. Otherwise, we may find that laws and policies that develop do not adequately take into consideration the benefits of geospatial technology.

While commercial satellite companies are playing an important role in collection and supply of satellite imageries, how can countries ensure that these companies do not provide data about their sensitive areas to other countries? Is there any provision in this regard?

First, I think we must better understand what privacy means to us from a location standpoint. Moreover, it is not easy to define location in a legal context; our location can be revealed in a variety of ways a number of which we take for granted. For example, recently there was a newspaper article about a person complaining that a


Geointelligence may - jun 2013

Policymakers and citizens are concerned about the possibility of location data being extracted from smartphones without the users knowledge or permission. We have seen that happen in the past. What has been done or should be done to ensure that companies do not compromise the privacy of individuals for their profits?

Net-Centric Warfare

Courtesy: http://academic.emporia.edu

Transformational challenges
<< So far, the world has only witnessed Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) operations between the leader in technology and a weaker adversary. But what if the conflict takes place between nations having matching NCW capabilities? Should technologically weaker nations develop their own capabilities or directly acquire them from others? How can the technology gap between countries be bridged? Countries throughout the world, are facing several such challenges... >>
resent global strategic space includes sub-conventional operations, low intensity conflicts, counter terrorism operations, cyberspace, aerospace, maritime, amphibious operations and recently, anti satellite (ASAT) operations. In such a scenario, question of being NCW-enabled or not, loses its relevance for any nation. In a distributed operational environment both, in time and
Geointelligence may - jun 2013

space with multiple stakeholders, the need to be networked was never as pressing as it is. The term network-centric as applied to warfare was probably borrowed from network-centric computing which arose through advances in information technology that allowed computers to interact with each other while using different operating systems. NCW

suggests a new and technologyfocused concept for fighting future wars and conflicts employing technology as opposed to the traditional personnel, tactics, and logistics in providing a force the access to new and previously unreachable types of information. The ability to operate with this new type of information provides the armed forces an advantage broadly


characterised by significantly improved capabilities for sharing and accessing information. The advantages NCW brings to the battlespace are particularly relevant to the tactical and operational levels of war, but they impact all levels of military activity from the tactical to the strategic. Though, NCW now has a track record of successful operations in Iraq and Afganistan wars, still, NCW is a developing concept, not yet fully formed for deployment in a full scale conflict. Transforming todays programmes and platforms into a network-centric one will require developing and refining networkcentric concepts of operation and evolving them with doctrine, organisation, command approach systems, and other components needed to run the military. Only the US and a few others have made noticeable progress. The future shape of the NCW doctrine can only be guessed at best. So far, we have witnessed NCW operations by the leader in technology vs weaker adversary having near zero NCW capability. Future conflicts between nations having matching NCW capabilities would redefine the roadmap for development of NCW technologies. Nevertheless, the fact that NCW has emerged as a winner in the above operations is driving the armed forces across the globe in that direction. Developing nations have realised that military too has to adopt to a new way of thinking - NCW way of thinking in a fast developing network centric environment in commercial as well as non-military areas around it. However, due to a gap of 10-15 years in technology as compared to developed nations, implementing NCW infrastructure and developing network centric capabilities poses a variety of challenges to the military leadership of these nations. For most of the developing nations, often, it is a question of priority. In

<< NCW capabilities need to be developed in a sustained manner over a period of time. Even, its implementation in the US has not followed a specific order or relationship that is required >>
a tight/ moderate economy, due to the high cost of implementation of NCW, invariably the axe falls on modernisation projects. Absence of proven templates or best practices for its development and implementation further adds to the dilemma.

nukes? Brute force shall prevail in the end! However, fast developing economies like China and India which have large armies shall not like to depend on import of military hardware and software in the long run. Considering the fact that other than the US, no other nation can be termed as fully NCW capable - be it possession of technologies or having a force fully fine-tuned to NCW drills/ procedures. In view of the above, have the developing nations actually missed the bus? Cant the gap of 15 years in technology be bridged in due course of time? Some of the developing economies already have sufficient, if not the best, resources and industrial base either in place or growing at a rapid pace. In a way, these nations have an advantage in learning from Iraq and Afganistan Operations to design and develop their own NCW platform to suit their strategic doctrine and needs. How and how much to go about implementing NCW doctrine and in what timeframe are the issues confronting the leadership of developing nations? NCW is no substitute to key leadership issues and the act of war, intelligence, training, initiative, etc. One of the major tenets of NCW paradigm is creating a real-time situational awareness at all levels, thus, assisting in reducing the OODA loop, time taken in the kill chain. Human aspects of waging a war, that is, morale, commitment, pride, still remain essential ingredients in any kind of operation. Net-centric Operation (NCO) can do what technology permits it to do. What technology cant do, NCO cant do. This issue, often, brings to the fore the dilemma in deciding a full fledged adoption of NCW concept for any large sized armed force, because it involves complete transformation of battle drills and procedures from top leadership down to a soldier in the TBA. One could also argue that a NCW

Issues and challenges

NCW capabilities need to be developed in a sustained manner over a period of time. Even, its implementation in the US has not followed a specific order or relationship that is required. The entire process of transformation to NCW regime is not clear enough to be imitated or templated by the developing nations to execute the concept from start to finish. Putting cart before the horse philosophy in developing NCW technologies, that is, developing technology based on NCW concept rather than exploiting a time tested technology in developing the new combat systems as done in the past, may not be feasible for many small nations considering the cost and time involved in R&D efforts. This may lead to various nations coming together and forming a new alignment around those having a fully realised NCW platform. They may directly acquire NCW capabilities and train themselves in a much shorter timeframe at low cost. This may, perhaps, suit a few small nations having nuclear capability. Of what use can an NCW platform be against an adversary having no or very limited NCW capability but possessing


Geointelligence may - jun 2013

<< A countrywide robust backbone network for the services is the most essential requirement for the realisation of NCW doctrine. Its installation is independent of the development cycle of the other NCW components >>

networks for its non-operational needs. The logistic trail/ footprint which a fully dedicated network for the armed forces would leave favours offloading services like MET, weather, GIS, communication/ backbone infrastructure to other government agencies. This can only happen if all the government agencies are suitably networked, which, often is not the case with the developing nations. Considering the resource constraints, allocation of priorities to other pressing needs of a developing nation, the leadership is left with no choice but to adopt a phased NCW implementation strategy to be executed in a timeframe spread over 10-15 years. This kind of a timeframe not only presents a huge risk of being left out of the loop in the global scenario, but also renders the nation vulnerable to external/ internal threats. Hence, it becomes extremely important to identify areas within the above cycle of implementation for the fast track deployment. Certain low cost technologies can be implemented across board. Whereas, high cost replacement of legacy combat platform be restricted to a few numbers during initial period in selected units for integration tests in the NCW network as well as for training and validating NCW drills and procedures. While employing this cart-beforethe-horse methodology, tentative doctrine, warfare theory and defence management should not be planned as if the actual pieces of network-centric warfare are already developed, and only an organisation is needed to put the pieces into place. The basic premise behind NCW theory is that it is a totally new and evolved way to conduct military operations and that the practices of the past are inefficient, if not irrelevant. NCW is a system of systems dynamically linked with distributed and dynamic information processing.

enabled military soldier is coming to mission areas already trained and prepared to work in tense military operation environment within NCW enterprise; however, it would be pertinent to mention that, first, even the most realistic training could not encompass all uncertainties of real life; and second, tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting NCO are yet to be fully developed, therefore, nobody knows whether the NCW doctrine will be present in all participating arms in a tri services-joint operations scenario. Absence of face-to-face human interactions may have a non-complementary effect on knowledge conversion between tacit and explicit in a so-called situational aware network. Another important fact which obstructs a rapid transformation to NCW is the presence of legacy combat platforms and military hardware which is not network ready in all the developing nations. This is true in case of even most advanced nations as well. Replacing legacy systems is a time consuming and cost prohibitive process which no developing nation can afford. A nations armed forces cannot be effectively networked unless the nation itself is not networked. Though, a separate backbone network for the services is essential due to the security issues, it needs to be integrated with the countries, state and non-state

The term RMA postulated that they are usually declared after the demonstration of an event, invention or discovery. NCW is based on the premise and demonstration of internet technologies encompassing concepts and protocols like distributed data warehousing, interconnected communication suites, X.25, open source codes and host of other technologies and services. These are all shaky inferences, the failure and compromise of which are being routinely reported almost on a daily basis. The term evolutionary is probably more appropriate and relevant in transforming to NCW doctrine. To a large extent, NCW is shooter, sensor and information oriented; yet the tenets of mass, speed and manoeuvre are eclipsed. System and platform independence fades under the concept. Consequently, if the system is poached, sensor or shooter platforms are compromised. Apprehensions of the leadership and issues as brought out, yet at the same time to meet the inescapable requirement of implementing NCW, an evolutionary, incremental and hybrid approach is most suited for the developing nations. NCW revolves around two fundamental components sensors and shooter elements. Both, when integrated through the C2 grid become the NCW system. Sensor grid can be established at a faster rate as compared to legacy shooter grid. Similarly, C2 system can be implemented and validated in a much shorter timeframe compared to other components. Network infrastructure - A countrywide robust backbone network for the services is the most essential requirement for the realisation of NCW doctrine. Its installation is independent of the development cycle of the other NCW components. It is a national asset and should be viewed and implemented as such with no relation to futuristic outcome of the


Geointelligence may - jun 2013

NCW doctrine. It must be in place within 2-3 years from the word go. Datalinks are the new weapons of the information age. Selective vs full scale deployment of NCW assets While selective, evolutionary and incremental deployment in a phased manner is recommended for the armed forces as a whole, a full scale deployment of these assets is more suited for small sized forces, for specialised operations, deep strike missions, joint operations teams. This can be achieved in a very short time and cost and can give realistic feedback and confidence to the main programme. For the phased implementation though atleast, one fully functional corps level formation along with its

joint services elements in each sector/ theatre is the minimum requirement to exercise, train and adopt NCW battle drills and procedures before jumping onto the next phase. Technology acquisition - Ironically, the most daunting obstacle to achieving a fully networked force is the same acquisition process that will make it possible. There is general consensus that platforms and systems must be joint, interoperable and built as much as possible around common technology. In reality, industry, services and government priorities invariably clash from time to time. Sensor grid - Development cycle can be eclipsed to a 3+2 year cycle; first three years, go for the full scale deployment of sensor elements and network assets in the selected force by implementing customised COTS solutions, training and integration process. Customisation to be carried out for achieving interoperability with other elements of the network by using standard indigenous protocols and security solutions. Carry out concurrent limited integration with shooter grid elements and C2 system with feedback to central coordinating agency. For remaining two years, execute implementation in other

sectors, expanding network domain, incorporating modifications/ enhancements based on feedbacks. Shooter grid (10-15years) - shooter grid will always lag sensor and C2 system even in the case of developed economies. Complex combat systems consume considerable amount of time and cost in their development. Their absorption in the hands of troops takes another few years. Thus, replacement/ upgrading of legacy systems is a mammoth effort and always cost prohibitive. At best, limited fielding of network ready systems can be done to validate NCW concepts for initial two years. Subsequently, move in the direction of new procurements. The fact that 90 per cent of the shooter grid platforms are legacy systems in most of the developing nations necessitates development of external interfaces (both Hw & Sw) for their integration to the NCW system. These steps can be completed between 2 to 5 years thereby achieving a functional NCW system in place, even by the developing nations. C2 system - can certainly be in place in a cycle of 3-5 years. Developing the C2 grid would involve customisation of existing applications to suit NCW requirements, acquiring/ developing new applications


Geointelligence may - jun 2013

<< The fact that 90 per cent of the shooter grid platforms are legacy systems in most of the developing nations necessitates development of external interfaces for their integration to the NCW system >>

Courtesy: http://ipvideocorp.com

using standard protocols and indigenous security solutions. Development of a robust network management system and testing it under all conditions, real or simulated. Training of manpower, developing a habit of staying connected and situationally aware amongst commanders at all levels are prerequisite to successful exploitation of C2 system. Instant collection and collation of information plays a major role in reducing the OODA loop, that is, reducing time taken to activate the shooters even for the legacy platforms. NCW concepts do not have any direct effect on enhancing the lethality or rate of fire of the combat platforms. Hence, if a nation can implement net-centricity in its C2 and sensor grids with a reasonable level of handshake with the shooter elements in a timeframe of 5-7 years taking bureaucratic delays, project time overruns, budgetary constraints etc into account, it certainly cant be viewed to have missed the bus!

<< Instant collection and collation of information plays a major role in reducing the OODA loop, that is, reducing time taken to activate the shooters even for the legacy platforms >>

data. Vendors too have legitimate concerns about exposing proprietary technology and information to their competitors.

Most of the developing nations military leaders, political leadership, industry leaders and analysts appear to understand the NCW potential, and the challenges, they face. Timelines drawn and the suggested roadmap for implementing NCW doctrine may vary from one nation to another. A lot will depend on the leaderships resolve and commitment in preparing and sticking to the comprehensive plan for transformation. It may take a decade or two before the NCW concepts are fully realised but, certainly it is in the nature of transformation that the process will never be complete. Network-centric operations were applied unevenly, and imperfectly, in Afghanistan and Iraq, but those campaigns have validated the concepts potential. They have also provided learning opportunities to correct gaps, fix problems, and chart a course by the armed forces undergoing the transformation. REFERENCES 1. Volume 10, 2008 Baltic Security & Defence Review, 2. Alberts (2002:135), 3. The challenge and promises of network centric warfare by Luddy

impede network effectiveness. As most sensors and communications links are deployed through space platforms or aircraft, networked operations have benefitted from the freedom of action due to absence of space threats, so far. Space-based sensors and communications assets today face no significant anti-satellite (ASAT) threat. However, the scenario is bound to change in future. In the likely eventuality that ASAT threats emerge, network operations may become suddenly vulnerable. Even now, active jamming efforts and other interference can threaten the flow of information. For any developing nation to pursue its goal towards NCW, its government must be an active and constructive partner. The government must come out with support policies and budgets that help to shorten procurement cycles and adopt capabilities based acquisition for systems as much as possible. The leadership must resist pressure to protect legacy programmes from changes or even termination, because those changes may be necessary to produce networkcapable systems. Many aspects of the procurement process, at times, discourage industry from adopting net-centric thinking. Traditional single-service procurement leads vendors to develop equipment in relative isolation with little concern for interoperability. Systems built by different vendors are often unable to communicate and share

Bandwidth is the informationcarrying lifeline of any network, and network-centric operations devour signal bandwidth. As technology proliferates and expectation for information right now increases, NCO will constantly crave for more and more bandwidth, thus, imposing recurring challenges to the services and industry. As such, developing nations are below poverty line with regards to available bandwidth and spectrum exploitation. They must make constant efforts to manage bandwidth more efficiently, with better communications technology, and command-and-control systems that are able to prioritise and manage signal flow in better ways. Technology is always vulnerable, and very often fragile, hence networks must be tough, flexible and redundant. False or incomplete technical information can distort or

Geointelligence may - jun 2013

Lt Gen (Dr) AKS Chandele

Managing Editor, GeoIntelligence



MAY Heli Russia 2013

May 16-18, 2013 Crocus Expo Center Moscow, Russia


August 12-15, 2013 Walter E. Washington Convention Center Washington DC USA


October 13-16, 2013 Tampa Convention Center Tampa, Florida USA


http://www.auvsishow.org/auvsi13/public/enter. aspx

May 28-29, 2013 Hilton Park Nicosia Cyprus

MAKS 2013


August 13-18, 2013 Sukhovsky, LII Gromov Russia

Seoul International Aerospace & Defense Expo

Oct 29Nov 3, 2013 Republic of Korea


June 4-6, 2013 Tel-Aviv, Israel


September 10-13, 2013 ExCel Exhibition Center London, UK

NOVEMBER Defense & Security 2013

November 4-7, 2013 IMPACT Expo center Bangkok, Thailand


Soldier Technology
June 11-14, 2013 Olympia Conference Centre London, UK


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Dubai Airshow 2013

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June 13-14, 2013 Taj Palace New Delhi India

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November 17-21, 2013 Dubai World Central (DWC) Jebel Ali Dubai


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September 26-29, 2013 Romexpo Exposition Center Bucharest Romania


November 19-23, 2013 Paris Nord Villepinte France


Paris Air Show

June 17-23, 2013 Le Bourget Airport Paris France


Undersea Defence Technology

Geointelligence may - jun 2013 35

June 18-20, 2013 Hamburg Germany


JULY IMDS - International Maritime Defence Show

July 3-7, 2013 St. Petersburg, Russia

Internal security


Smarter Decisions for Public Safety

<< Geospatial technology is increasingly being used by security agencies for maintaining internal security of the country. After all, how can police, fire or other emergency agencies reach you if they dont know where you are >>
he rise in terrorism and natural disasters has placed the spotlight on public safety over the past decade. So has the explosive growth of cities. More people and problems require more, and better, services. In order to deal with these major emergencies and daily demands, governments have increased their public safety focus. New personnel and equipment are important (and visible) signs of investment. But some of the most important investments investments in geospatial technologies arent

always apparent to citizens. The geospatial aspects of managing infrastructure or mapping property are obvious, but not everyone realises how critical geospatial information is to public safety. When asked about police or fire departments, most people probably think of uniforms and sirens, not data collection and sharing. But those dedicated public safety professionals cant help you if they dont know where you are. Its as simple as that. Police, fire and emergency medical agencies

depend on accuracy and precision. Public safety, therefore, depends on geospatial information. Think about it: every piece of safety or security information has a spatial reference. Thats why information about homes, buildings, streets and more are included in the interactive, realtime maps used in computer-aided dispatch (CAD) systems at public safety communications centres. But thats not all there is to it. Geospatial information management doesnt begin or


Geointelligence may - jun 2013

end with a map. For instance, CAD combines a map display with so much more: incident data, records, mobile data from the field and more to ensure agencies have accurate information when lives are on line.

Beyond data
In other words, it is not enough to see the data. You have to be able to do something with it. To me, thats the promise of geospatial information. It is not just about visualisation, but also geospatially powered analytics and response. It is about seeing, understanding and acting all in one. Its about making smarter decisions. When put into action, this concept yields powerful results. Lets look at dispatching. In So Paulo, Brazil, emergency medical services agency SAMU deployed a new, comprehensive CAD system. With a population of 11 million, So Paulo is the biggest city in Latin America and SAMU is the largest emergency medical services agency in the region, responding to 8,000 emergency calls daily. Using its new geospatially powered system, SAMU reduced the time it takes to respond to emergency calls from an average of 35 minutes to 10 minutes, a nearly 72 per cent improvement that saves lives. Then theres also mobility. Access to large volumes of spatial data is important for responders. The ability to tap into data on or from a mobile device for instant, relevant information can have a measurable impact. For example, Copenhagen Fire Brigade and KMS, the Danish national survey and cadastre agency, took advantage of the widespread use of mobile phones in the Danish capital, deploying a mobile app for citizens to report emergencies. Location data from the app is sent to public safety communications centers for dispatching. Previously, emergency calls from mobile

<< Agencies have to plan ahead in order to figure out how to allocate their resources most effectively. They need to understand what happened before and predict what may happen next. They cant just work harder, they have to work smarter >>
devices could identify only a rough location of the applicable cell tower typically within several hundred metres. The new app can locate the caller within a few metres, with no need for a nearby street name.

When Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department, United States, learned it was at high risk for roadway accidents, it deployed geospatial analytics to pinpoint accident hot spots and create easyto-understand visuals for the public, including detailed maps of accident times and locations. With geospatial analytics, the department reduced accident analysis and reporting time from 4 hours to 10 minutes, and, importantly, it can now prioritise safety improvements based on the results. There are many other examples. A government agency in China uses geospatial information to monitor dam vulnerabilities. Multiple public safety agencies in Germany have joined forces to deploy a virtual command centre using a geospatially enabled Web client. A fire agency in New Zealand uses geospatial information to plan for and respond to wildfires. The list goes on, because the uses of information are as limitless as the threats to public safety.

Not just response

The takeaway from these examples is obvious: geospatial information helps public safety professionals act fast, responding to the right place at the right time with the right information. In the case of crimes, fires or medical emergencies, saving time helps saves lives. But it doesnt stop there, because immediate response isnt always enough. Agencies have to plan ahead too, in order to figure out how to allocate their resources most effectively. They need to understand what happened before and predict what may happen next. They cant just work harder, they have to work smarter. Again, geospatial information can help. Every day, public safety agencies capture and manage massive amounts of important data. By merging this geospatially enabled data with analytics, agencies can pinpoint areas of concern, such as high crime and traffic accidents. By knowing where the problems are, they can figure out how to solve them.

It is all about the results

It is clear that geospatial information is the foundation. From it, agencies can better see, understand and act. They can make those smarter decisions that protect their citizens and their communities. Ultimately, thats all that really matters. It is not about the information for its own sake, but the results.

John Graham
President Security, Government & Infrastructure Intergraph
The article was originally published in Geospatial World, January 2013 edition


Geointelligence may - jun 2013


Geodata Fusion Study Shows Value of Open Standards

<< In an age of information overflow, standards are essential to ensure communication between various applications and sharing of data from multiple sources. Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC) has been actively working with industry and security agencies to develop open and international geospatial standards >>
n the 2010 Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC) Fusion Standards study, Data Fusion was defined as: the act or process of combining or associating data or information regarding one or more entities considered in an explicit or implicit knowledge framework to improve ones capability (or provide a new capability) for detection, identification or characterization of that entity. Though the focus of the study was on military intelligence (INT), decision fusion is relevant to business intelligence, urban planning and many other domains. Interoperability based on open standards is radically changing the classical domains of data fusion while inventing entirely new ways to discern relationships in data with little structure. Associations based on locations and times are of the most primary type. For OGC, Open Standard means that the standards document is freely and publicly available in a non-discriminatory fashion with no license fee, vendor and data neutral, and agreed to by a formal consensus process. Recommendations from the study were subsequently addressed in the OGC series of OGC Web Services (OWS) testbeds including OWS-8 in 2011 and OWS-9 in 2012. Results of the testbeds were recorded in OGC

Figure 1:Two examples of Fusion based on OGC WMS standard. Each composite web map view shows several distinct layers of geospatial information fused into a single map visualisation

Engineering Reports[1] and videos[2], demonstrated to the sponsors and additional communities, and have affected further development of OGC standards.

volumes and unanticipated analytical challenges. Some elements of the desired open standards-based fusion framework are pervasive now. For example, the OGC Web Map Service (WMS) enables fusion of maps. WMS allows for maps as pictorial layers from different sources to be geographically overlaid to create a composite map suitable to the users need (Figure 1). Three categories of data fusion (Figure 2) were used to organise the study: Observation Fusion; Feature Fusion; and Decision Fusion. These categories are described below.

Geodata Fusion and Open Standards

Many of the fusion processes described here can be achieved in closed architectures with existing, single-provider software and hardware solutions. However, without the use of open standards multiple islands of data and services emerge that are difficult to automate and scale. Standardsbased data, applications and services enable an automated and interoperable fusion environment supporting secure sharing of data and transparent reuse of pluggable services for handling large data

Geointelligence MAY - JUN 2013

Observation Fusion
It involves merging multiple sensor measurements of the same


phenomena into a combined observation. Fusion processes include combination of various sensor measurements into well characterised observations including uncertainties, for example, to support signature analysis. The basic requirements for sensor fusion include:

Discovery of sensor systems,

observations and observation processes that meet a users immediate needs capabilities and quality of measurements
Figure 2: The three data fusion categories used in this study: with sources of geodata and an increasing semantic context

Determination of a sensors  Access to sensor parameters that

automatically allow software to process and geo-locate observations

processed, can serve as input into fusion processes or they may be used to identify recognisable objects that are then treated as input into a fusion process. Standards for Observation Fusion are relatively mature; in particular the OGC Sensor Web Enablement (SWE) standards have been adopted as consensus standards with implementations for several years. The SWE architecture document provides an overview[3]. A study on SWE Implementation Maturity is currently underway. The study is considering implementation of SWE by US DOD, NASA, NOAA, EEA, and many other programmes. The following areas for future work were developed in the Fusions Standards study for Observation Fusion

and opportunistic sensing

 Further develop Secure Sensor   Registries for Sensor/

Web by applying security services to SWE Observation Fusion, for example, for signatures definitions for sensor terms precise geolocation

 Retrieval of real-time or

time-series observations in standard encodings including encoding the uncertainty of the measurement, and parameters need to process the measurements observations of interest

 Online community sanctioned   Harmonisation of the process of   Characterising and propagating

uncertainty of measurements electromagnetic signatures

 Tasking of sensors to acquire  Subscription to and publishing

of alerts to be issued by sensors or sensor services based upon certain criteria classification and association by providing access to processing engines and needed reference information (for example, signatures and training data)

 Increasing use of geometric and

Feature Fusion
Feature fusion includes processing of observations into higher order semantic features and feature processing. It improves understanding of the operational situation and assessment of potential threats and impacts to identify, classify, associate and aggregate entities of interest. Feature fusion processes include generalisation and conflation of features. Conflation technology offers useful options to deal with imperfect, heterogeneous, conflicting and duplicated data.

 Entity identification,

 Enablement of fusion processing

Much information suitable for fusion begins with or is derived from observations by sensors or humans. This is particularly true for information that is highly dynamic in nature and of a timely nature. These observations, either raw or

 Further develop Event handling

in the OWS Architecture

 Use of open standards for

Motion Imagery and location coordinated with MISB

 Apply SWE to Mobile Internet 


Geointelligence MAY -JUN 2013

 Coverage fusion based on Web

Coverage Service and Web Coverage Processing Language.

area with strong ties to Karzai, and a target of IED. The largest polling station in the area was at Compano Mosq, with an estimated 13,700 voters. An attack here on an election day was likely to impact the outcome. The Decision Fusion Node defined in this study is a scalable concept ranging from a person with a mobile computer to a Fusion Center such as the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Fusion Centers as operated by the US Department of Homeland Security[4]. Implicit in the concept of the Decision Fusion Node is the collaboration with other nodes, for example, distributed decision fusion. Information available to an operations node is from multiple intelligence collection types (multiINT). Intelligence sources are people, documents, equipment or technical sensors, and can be grouped according to intelligence disciplines:

Figure 3: Feature Fusion workflow example from the OGC Web Services, Phase 5 (OWS-5) testbed. The workflow is composed of a conflation service and a topology quality assessment service operating on features.

A service-oriented architecture is well suited to support distributed conflation rules services. Feature fusion yields information resources that are more powerful, flexible and accurate than any of the original sources. A workflow of Feature Fusion is presented in Figure 3 including conflation rules and processing services followed by a Topology Quality Assessment (TQAS) service. Recommendations from the Fusion Study Phase 1 were implemented in the OGC Web Services, Phase 7 (OWS-7) testbed. OWS-7 built on the OWS-6 Geoprocessing Workflow and Decision Support Services work. It employed fusion for Feature and Statistical Analysis (FSA). These recommendations relevant to Fusion Standards Study were noted:

Decision Fusion
Decision fusion involves processes supporting a humans ability to make a decision by providing an environment of interoperable network services for situation assessment, impact assessment and decision support, using information from multiple sensors and processed information. Decision Fusion provides analysts an environment where they can using a single client interface access interoperable tools to review, process and exploit multiple types of data or products from multiple sensors and databases. Decision Fusion includes the use of information from multiple communities, for example, multiINT, in order to assess a situation, and to collaborate with a common operational picture. This study also considered more recent advances such as social networking to support decision fusion. Figure 4 shows an example of decision fusion that goes beyond current web mapping tools to associate trends and causes from multiple sources. In an Afghanistan election attack scenario (Figure 4), a likely target for an attack against the Pashtun during the 2009 election was considered to be in Jalalabad, a largely Pashtun

Human intelligence (HUMINT)  Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT),

including Imagery Intelligence

Signals intelligence (SIGINT)  Measurement and signature

intelligence (MASINT)

 Open-source intelligence (OSINT)

 WPS profiles are needed in

order to achieve semantic interoperability of geoprocessing challenge not only regarding choosing the appropriate input and output type definitions, but also regarding choosing appropriate classifications WPS in OGC Catalogues are missing and hinder the use of the publish-find-bind pattern

Geointelligence MAY - JUN 2013

 Designing WPS Profiles is a

(OSINT involves finding, selecting and acquiring information from publicly available sources, as opposed to covert or classified sources; it is not related to open-source software or public intelligence.)

Technical intelligence (TECHINT)

Examples of multi-INT for an urban situation are shown in Figure 5[5]. Information elements are placed in the table according to generating source (header row) and classification between hard and soft information (below and above the diagonal, respectively).

 Metadata profiles for registering


A conclusion of the Decision Fusion Workshop is that additional development remains to be done on standards for structured information that supports Decision Fusion both internal to OGC and with other standards bodies. For example, further work is needed on methods for schema mapping, like identification of rules for mappings, and an increase in the focus on handling of associations as the identification of an association between entities is at the heart of fusion. Developing a Decision as first class object in information modelling will assist in quick response in template form. The most effective environment for accomplishing the various types of fusion is expected to be a networkcentric architecture with distributed databases and services based on a common core of standardsbased data formats, algorithms, services, and applications. Such an environment allows the various forms of information to be collected, stored, managed, fused and disseminated vertically (from international to individual level) and horizontally (peer to peer).

Figure 5 Multi-INT examples for an urban situation

about decision fusion are still needed, for example, to support the pattern of if this event occurs, then consider these actions. For further information, see the OGC Fusion Standards Study, Phase 2 Engineering Report[6] and the OWS8 Demonstrations webpage[2]. Further work on fusion should consider the great advances in mobile development. Mobile devices now serve as decision fusion platforms and they are increasingly loaded with sensors that can be used for fusion local to the device or part of the larger sensor web. The Internet of Things approach opens a broad set of fusion topics that can be addressed for multiple domains. REFERENCES 1. OGC Engineering Reports http://www.opengeospatial.org/ standards/per 2. OGC Web Services Testbed, Phase 8 (OWS-8) Demonstrations, http:// www.opengeospatial.org/pub/ www/ows8/index.html 3. Botts, M. et. al., OGC Sensor Web Enablement (SWE): Overview And High Level Architecture, OGC White Paper, OGC Document OGC 07-165r1, (2 April 2013) . https://portal.opengeospatial.org/

files/?artifact_id=48492 4. Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global). Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers: A Supplement to the Fusion Center Guidelines US Government, Department of Justice (2008). 5. Pravia, M., Generation of a Fundamental Data Set for Hard/ Soft Information Fusion. Fusion 2008: The 11th International Conference on Information Fusion. Cologne: International Society of Information Fusion (2008). 6. Percivall, G., ed., OGC Fusion Standards Study, Phase 2 Engineering Report, OGC Document 10-184, (13 December 2010). http://portal.opengeospatial. org/files/?artifact_id=41573

The Fusion Study identified a framework for advancements in observation fusion and feature fusion. Decision fusion recommendations have been addressed but much more can be done in this area. Open standards

George Percivall
Chief Engineer Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC)

Fig 4: Decision Fusion Ex (Source: FortiusOne)


Geointelligence MAY -JUN 2013

Image Intelligence

Satellite images reveal that 2,275 homes were destroyed in April 2013 during a military raid to hunt down Boko Harem militants in Baga in Nigeria

Damaged Areas
Google/ Human Rights Watch

Nigeria: Caught in a Religious Battle

After struggling for years with military rulers, Nigeria finally achieved civilian rule in 1999, but the country is now finding itself in turmoil once again with militant Islamist group Boko Haram having waged a war against the state. Boko Haram, which means Western education is forbidden, is advocating creation of an Islamic state. Founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002, the group carried out a series of attacks on police and government institutions in Maiduguri in 2009. The ensuing response by the government led to the death of hundreds of its supporters including Yusuf. However, the insurgents re-grouped under a new leader, Abubakar Shekau, and in 2010, freed hundreds of its supporters from a Bauchi jail. Since then, it has carried out a number of attacks across the country, establishing a pan-nation presence. In November 2011, US Congressional report mentioned Boko Haram as an emerging threat to the US and its interests. The group is also said to have links with al-Qaeda-linked groups in Africa. However, Boko Haram has denied these reports.
Image/ Text Courtesy: BBC


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