Stegeman v. Superior Court, et.

, al
No.: 08-16174-CC
COMES NOW, Appellant James B. Stegeman and timely files his Reply to

Appellees Georgia Power, Scott A Farrow, and Brian P Watt’s Response in

Opposition to Appellant’s Motion to Reinstate Appeal. Appellant brings to the

Court’s attention the fact that Superior Court Appellees did not oppose or object to

Appellant’s Motion to Set Aside Dismissal, Remedy Default, and Reinstate Appeal,

and/or Motion for Leave to File Documents Out of Time and Remedy Default,

and/or Motion to Stay Mandate or Recall Mandate, or any other Motion.

ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITY

Appellant’s Brief and Record Excerpts1 were hand delivered to the Court

April 13, 2009, do not show filed until April 16, 2009.2 Appellant on May 8, 2009

received a letter from the Clerk of this Court stating that the Court did not receive

the Order appealed from and Certificate of Service for the Record Excerpts. There

is no logical explanation why the Clerk did not immediately notice the defect and

notify the Appellant of such omission for correction.

Appellees’ Opposition is extremely contradictory; they argue that Appellant

has an understanding of the laws, Rules; then they make reference to numerous

mistakes/errors, (response in general) showing that Appellant does need counsel.

1
Records Excerpts consisted of: District Court Docket Sheet, Complaint, Answers
from both sets of Appellees, the Rulings Appealed, Certificate of Interested
Persons, and Certificate of Service.
2
Appellant fails to understand why the Court consistently has refused to file his
documents and/or has held documents several days before filing them.

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 Stegeman v. Superior Court, et., al
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Appellees’ contradictions continue @2-3 with: “ability to comprehend”;

“prolific citations”;3 “unilateral mistake”4; “baseless and dilatory”; Appellant and

his filings cannot at the same time be both proper and improper, “baseless” and

“dilatory”, as well as “negligent” and “prolific”.

Rather than file their Brief, appellees attempt to discredit Appellant:

“negligent omission”.5 Two of these appellees are licensed attorneys; to compare

their legal knowledge to that of a disabled pro se litigant, or that of an ordinary

prudent person is ludicrous. This Court held in Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225

(11th Cir. 09/17/2003):

“The law does not entertain the legal fiction that every individual
has achieved a state of legal omniscience; … there is no
presumption that all of the citizens actually know all of the law
all of the time. Practically speaking, citizens must educate
themselves about the law” See West Covina, 525 U.S. at 241,
119 S. Ct. at 682 (noting that an individual "can turn to these
public sources to learn about the remedial procedures available
to him"); id. at 242, 119 S. Ct. at 682 (noting that a citizen "could
not reasonably be expected to educate himself about the
procedures available to protect his interests"); United States v.
Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 108, 105 S. Ct. 1785, 1799-1800 (1985)”

3
prolific, adjective 1. intellectually productive; "a prolific writer"
ttp://dictionary.reference.com
4
unilateral mistake. Contracts. A mistake by only one party to a contract. West
Group Black’s Law Dictionary 7th Ed. pg 1017 (Appellant fails to comprehend
the relevance a contract has to this appeal)
5
negligent, adj. … a person’s failure to exercise the degree if care that someone of
ordinary prudence would have exercised in the same circumstance West Group
Black’s Law Dictionary 7th Ed. pg. 1058 omission, n. A failure to do something
West Group Black’s Law Dictionary 7th Ed. pg. 1116.

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 Stegeman v. Superior Court, et., al
No.: 08-16174-CC
Appellees misquote, and distort Appellant’s statements: “the theme…that his

‘disabled pro se litigant’ status should excuse his negligent omission.”

Appellant had actually stated @1:

“Appellant’s experience with Courts as a disabled pro se litigant
has revealed that the Court’s have a lack of tolerance for pro se
litigants/ appellants, often holding them to much more stringent
standards than attorneys.”

Appellees make meritless claims that Appellant has demonstrated a “practice

of compounding this litigation by filing baseless and dilatory motions” (response

@ 3) is a lie.6 Appellees themselves have compounded, impeded resolution

through fraud upon the Court, falsely sworn claims, falsified documents, and

criminal acts, (R1-3.2-10) to which Appellees have judicially confessed:

“committed fraud upon the court, maliciously and negligently

abused process within the Court, made false statements to and
within the Court, then requested the Court to Falsify a record for
them … Georgia Power and its attorneys sought to have the case
against it dismissed.”

Appellees @ 2 recite “USCS Ct. App. 11th Cir., Cir. R. 31-1(b)”.

Responding, Appellant states that upon Recusal, Motion for Appointment of

Counsel (which appellees pointed out does delay briefing) would have been

reviewed by different judges who may have granted the appointment. Appellees

distinct reference “record excerpts”, (@1) coupled with the clerk’s letter claiming

the Order missing, gives reason to assume that these appellees suggested removing

6
Appellant has only sought to ensure a fair/impartial tribunal, and due process of
law, both of which are guaranteed him, yet to date not forthcoming.

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 Stegeman v. Superior Court, et., al
No.: 08-16174-CC
7
something from record excerpts. Appellees do whatever it takes for dismissal;

they are not above manipulation of record, 8 interfering with this Appeal.

Appellees appear to insist that this Court doesn’t have authority to reinstate

the appeal. This Court, as well as other Federal Appellate Courts, have reinstated

Appeals, “is at most a non-jurisdictional defect.” “insufficient to warrant

dismissal” See Marcaida v. Rascoe, 569 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 03/02/1978):

“This court is not required to dismiss every appeal which does

not meet the time limitations of Rule 31. In Phillips v. Employers
Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 239 F.2d 79, 80 n.2 (5 Cir. 1956), … late
filing of briefs is “at most [a] non-jurisdictional [defect]…,
which we consider insufficient to warrant dismissal.” See also
King v. Laborers Internat’l Union, 443 F.2d 273 (6 Cir. 1971);
United States v. Edwards, 366 F.2d 853 (2 Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 908, 87 S. Ct. 852, 17 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967); cf.
Walker v. Mathews, 546 F.2d 814 (9 Cir. 1976) (late filing of
record).”
9
2) the trial court’s dismissal under Younger is manifest error as shown in

Ankenedrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992) Certiorari to The United States

Court of Appeals for the 5th Cir. No. 91-367 (1992) in holding:

7
“negligent omission” @ 1, Appellant did not omit the Order from the Record
excerpts, his copy has the Order included.
8
Appellant received his stamped Filed copy of Reply to Appellees’ Objection to
Motion to Recuse, yet it was never shown on this Court’s Docket Report and he
never received communication from the Court that there was an error concerning
the filing
9
Under both Federal and State Civil Practice Rules, dismissal with prejudice is a
decision on the merits and concludes the case. When Appellant’s Superior Court
case was dismissed with prejudice, that was the Final Order the case was over,
period.

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 Stegeman v. Superior Court, et., al
No.: 08-16174-CC
“The District Court erred in abstaining from exercising
jurisdiction under Younger doctrine. Although this Court has
extended Younger…it has never applied the notions of comity so
critical to Younger where, as here, no proceeding was pending in
state tribunals.” “‘[a]bstention from … federal
jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.’ Colorado River
Water Conversation Dist. V. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813
(1976). Abstention rarely should be invoked,…federal courts
have a ‘virtually unflagging obligation…to exercise the
jurisdiction given them.’ Id., at 817.”

District Court cited Wexler which was reversed and remanded: “…

abstention may be appropriate…where the plaintiff in the federal case chose not to

assert a constitutional defense as defendant in state court.” Plaintiffs/Appellant’s

Motion for Reconsideration pointed out that in both Courts, they were Plaintiffs.

Order Denying Reconsideration changed Plaintiffs’ party status to counterclaim

defendants. Wexler still doesn’t work. Plaintiffs’ case, dismissed with prejudice,

decided on the merits. Counterclaim also had to be dismissed, it could not stand on

its own, the Ruling would have had to specify circumstances why counterclaim

could not be Ruled on at the same time.

Furthermore, the Court in Wexler held:

“…The comity Justice Black wrote… between state courts and
federal courts…does not offend the respectful relationship
between state and federal courts…there is no doctrine that the
availability or even the pendency of state judicial proceedings
excludes the federal courts.” NOPSI, 109 S.Ct. at 2521”
“… parallel proceedings…do not present…”undue interference”
in state court proceedings necessary to apply Younger. NOPSI,
109 S.Ct. at 2513. Nor would a federal injunction of the kind
sought in this case, usurp the state courts’ ability to “perform

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 Stegeman v. Superior Court, et., al
No.: 08-16174-CC
their judicial functions.” Id. at 2518. See also Pennzoil Co., 107
S.Ct. at 1526. We, therefore, vacate… dismissal and remand…”

The District Court’s Ruling goes against stare decisis and this Court’s past

decision “recalling the Supreme Court’s reasoning that a litigant be forced to bring

their federal claims in the State Court even if the claim is supported by the same

facts”:

“First, we find no federal authority supporting…that federal

claims…supported by the same alleged facts must be raised by
state plaintiffs…under state law in state courts. Instead, we recall
the Supreme Court’s reasoning from 1964: “[t]here are
fundamental objections to any conclusion that a litigant who has
properly invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to
consider federal constitutional claims can be compelled … to
accept instead a state court’s determination of those claims.”
England v. La. State Bd. Of Med. Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 84
S.Ct. 461, 464, 11 L.Ed.2d 440 (1964). We recently wrote that
“generally, as between state and federal courts, the rule is that the
pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings
concerning the same matter in the Federal court having
jurisdiction.” Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Morales, 368 F.3d
1320, 1328 (11th Cir.2004) (quoting Colorado River).”
“Younger doctrine does not require abstention merely because a
federal plaintiff, alleging a constitutional violation in federal
court, filed a claim under state law, in state court, on the same
underlying facts. See Rogers v. Desiderio, 58 F.3d 299, 301 (7th
Cir.1995); Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 882 (3rd Cir.1994);
Crawley v. Hamilton County Comm’rs, 744 F.2d 28, 30 (6th
Cir.1984). …would not prevent the state court from exercising its
jurisdiction just as a state court’s ruling against the parties who
are federal plaintiffs would not offend the federal courts.”

The District Court case was brought due to fraud upon the Court, fraudulent

concealment of legal 1937 Rail/Power pole placement map showing Fields as

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 Stegeman v. Superior Court, et., al
No.: 08-16174-CC
owner, use of falsified land documents (felony in GA), conspiracy, due process

violations under color of law in order to allow the taking of private property void

of mandated statutory process. The Supreme Court and other Circuits have held:

United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53-
54, 114 S. Ct. 492, 501 (1993) (concluding that the right to
maintain control over one’s home is “a private interest of historic
and continuing importance”); United States v. All Assets of
Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1992)
(noting, under the Mathews test, that the interest in one’s home
“merits special constitutional protection”); United States v. 141st
Street Corp. by Hersh, 911 F.2d 870, 875 (2d Cir. 1990)
(observing that the home occupies a privileged place in the eyes
of the law). One’s home…the most cherished property interests
that due process protects, and the uninterrupted enjoyment of its
comforts and security is undoubtedly a significant private
interest.”

2) the Superior Court’s latest Rulings continue violations of The Georgia and

United States Constitutions, Georgia law, Federal law, and stare decisis. There are

specific statutory procedural requirements concerning land, proceedings required

to be in rem, requiring specific statutory procedures be followed.10 The Civil

Practice Act would be applicable

“except to the extent that specific rules of practice and procedure

in conflict [t]herewith are expressly prescribed”; “the trial…,
shall submit to a special master…”; “a special master must
first be appointed”; “Without the appointment of a special
master…the trial court was not authorized to enter…against
them. See Bonner v. Bonner, 272 Ga. 545 (2) (533 SE2d 72)
(2000)” Woodruff v. Morgan County, 670 S.E.2d 415, 284 Ga..

Superior Court and Judge Becker were named defendants in District Court for the
10

very actions that the Judge and Court continued with until its Final Judgment.

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 Stegeman v. Superior Court, et., al
No.: 08-16174-CC
651 (Ga. 11/17/2008) Reversed and Remanded.

In Superior Court, all statutory requirements were ignored, the proceeding

was not in rem,11 as required for jurisdiction over the property; no appointment of

an examiner/ auditor/master; dismissed with prejudice, equivalent to default.12

Eight months later, Judge Becker claims to have had Summary Judgment, with no

case, no property, no Plaintiffs, no hearing.13 Becker deemed that Georgia Power’s

fraudulent easement document granted easement, and McDonald /Stegeman have a

permanent injunction against their property Rights. Georgia Power claimed that

prescription makes a bad title good (Summary Judgment Brief) Superior Court

didn’t even provide Appellant the Order, Appellee Watt did, which makes it highly

inappropriate.

The fiasco and Judge Becker’s actions are almost identical to Chudasama v.

Mazda Motor Corp. 123 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1997). Appellant had filed March 12,

2008 Motion to Strike Answers and Counterclaim; March 20, 2008 Motion to Stay

Discovery Pending Ruling. Appellant had provided undisputed evidence the

document, provided by Georgia Power, their only defense and only support for the
11
O.C.G.A. §§44-2-61: all proceedings in the court in relation to registered land
shall be proceedings in rem against the land;
12
O.C.G.A. §44-2-81 No decree shall be rendered by default and without the
necessary facts being shown.
13
Hearing scheduled for 9:30 a.m.. Judge Becker claims to have read both sides’
briefs (Appellant tried to file a brief, it was stamped Filed, mailed back. She read
what had not been filed, for a Summary Judgment with no case, no plaintiffs, and
Final Order was Filed at 9:12 a.m. before the hearing started see Exhibit A

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 Stegeman v. Superior Court, et., al
No.: 08-16174-CC
counterclaim, was fraudulent. To this day Appellees have refused to address the

document’s legality; the issue had to be decided before the case could continue.

GA law mandates Summary Judgments concerning land, easements must be

decided by a Jury!

Thompson, et., al,. v. McDougal, 248 Ga. App. 270, 546 S.E.2d
44 (2001) Judgment reversed; the Court held: “But use alone is
insufficient to acquire prescriptive…establishes at most, a
revocable license.” “Factual question…regarding whether a
prescriptive easement has been established must be resolved by
a jury. See Hasty v. Wilson, 233 Ga. 739, 743(2)(a)(158 SE2d
915) (1967).

Judge Becker ignored everything Plaintiffs filed, only Ruled on Georgia

Power’s Motions. In Chudasama this Court held:

[36]: “the district court began an alarming trend by adopting

nearly verbatim the proposed sharing protective order drafted”14
[71]: “…hard to believe that Georgia law would recognize such
a claim…we conclude…dubious enough to require the district
court to rule…prior to entering the compel order.”
[75]: “As with the court’s refusal to rule on the motion to
dismiss,…this mismanagement by the court strongly suggests …
abused its discretion in issuing the compel order.”
[78]: “Moreover, a district court abuses its discretion under Rule
37(b)(2) if it enters a default when "less draconian but equally
effective sanctions were available." Adolph Coors Co. v.
Movement Against Racism & the Klan, 777 F.2d 1538, 1543
(11th Cir.1985).
[80]: “Mazda brought these complications to the court's
attention…before and after the compel order was entered….
disregarded…requests for rulings… issued a compel order…”
14
Judge Becker adopted fully verbatim Orders drafted by Georgia Power, and
failed to cite authority al together.

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 Stegeman v. Superior Court, et., al
No.: 08-16174-CC
[86]: “…never ruled on Mazda’s motion to dismiss… or had
given the motion serious consideration…did not analyze the
needs of the case…the sanctions order…vacated.”
[90]: “…the judge’s practice of delegating…drafting sensitive,
dispositive orders to plaintiffs…uncritically adopting…verbatim,
would belie the appearance of justice to the ‘average observer.”

Supreme Court of Georgia and Georgia Court of Appeals have consistently

Ruled against Georgia Power when attempting prescriptive easements, see Lanier

et., al., v. Burnette, et., al., 245 Ga. App. 566, 538 S.E.2d 476 (2000) which held:

“Since utility companies have the power of eminent domain, then

the utility can acquire all necessary easements through and
acquire all necessary easements through the exercise of such
power. O.C.G.A. §22-2-100(5); Harwell v. Georgia Power
Co.,246 Ga. 203 (269 SE2d 464) (1980).

CONCLUSION

Appellant will suffer irreparable harm and manifest injustice should the

Court Deny Motion to Reinstate. Appellant prays this Court will GRANT the

Motion and allow this Appeal to proceed.

Respectfully submitted, this 13th day of May, 2009,

By: ______________________________
JAMES B. STEGEMAN, Pro Se
821 Sheppard Rd,
Stone Mtn, GA 30083
(404) 300-9782

U. S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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 Stegeman v. Superior Court, et., al
No.: 08-16174-CC
James B. Stegeman vs. Superior Court, et., al., Appeal No. 08-16174-CC

I Certify that I have this 4th day of February, 2009 served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Appellant’s Reply to Georgia Power Appellees’ Opposition to
Motion to Set Aside Dismissal, Remedy Default and Reinstate Appeal; and/or
Motion for Leave to File Documents Out of Time and Remedy Default; and/or
Motion to Stay Mandate or Recall Mandate. upon Defendants/Appellees, through
their attorneys on record by causing to be deposited with the U.S.P.S., First Class
Mail, proper postage affixed thereto, addressed as follows:

Daniel S. Reinhardt Devon Orland

Troutman Sanders, LLP State of Georgia Dept. of Law
Bank of America Plaza – Suite 5200 40 Capitol Square, S.W.
600 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, GA 30334-1300
Atlanta, GA 30308-2216

_______________________________
JAMES B. STEGEMAN, Pro Se
821 Sheppard Rd
Stone Mountain, GA 30083
(404) 300-9782

11