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Home >Document Librar> Prgressive Era >Woodrow Wilson >The Study of Administrtion
Home >Document Librar> Eecutive Brndl >Woodrow Wilson >The Study of Administrtion
The Study of Administration
Woodrow Wilson
Noverer 1, 1886
An Essay
I suppose that no prctical science is ever studied wher ther is no need to know it. The ver
fact, therfor, that the errnently prctical science of administrtion is finding its way into college
coures in this country would prve that this country needs to kow rr about administrtion,
wer such prof of the fact rquired to mke out a case. It need not be said, however, that we do
not look into college prgrms for prof of this fact. It is a thing alrst taken for grnted arng
us, that the prsent rvemnt called civil serice rfor must, after the accomlishmnt of its firt
purose, expand into effors to imprve, not the personnel only, but also the oranization and
mthods of our govermnt offices: because it is plain that their organizations and mthods need
imrvemnt only less than their personnel. I is the object of administrtive study to discover,
firt, what governmnt can prpery and successfully do, and, secondly, how it can do these prper
things with the utrst possible efficiency and at the least possible cost either of rney or of
enery. On both these points there is obviously mch need of light arng us; and only carful study
can supply that light.
Bfor enterng on that study, however, it is needful:
I. To take som account of what other have done in the sam line; that is to say, of the histor of
the study.
II. To ascertain just what is its subject-mtter.
III. To detemne just what ar the best mthods by which to develop it, and the rst clarfying
political conceptions to car with us into it.
Unless we know and settle these things, we shall set out without char or comass.
I.
The science of adrnistration is the latest frit of that study of the science of politics which was
begun som twenty-two hundrd year ago. It is a birh of our own century, alrst of our own
generation.
Why was it so late in coming? Why did it wait till this too busy century of our to demnd attention
for itself? Adrnistrtion is the rst obvious par of govermnt; it is governmnt in action; it is the
executive, the opertive, the mst visible side of govermnt, and is of course as old as
govermnt itself. I is govermnt in action, and one nght very naturlly expect to find that
govermnt in action had arsted the attention and prvoked the scrtiny of wrters of politics
ver early in the history of systemtic thought.
But such was not the case. No one wrte systemtically of adninistrtion as a brnch of the
science of governmnt until the prsent century had passed its firt youth and had begun to put
forh its charcterstic flower of the systemtic kowledge. Up to our own day all the political
wrter whom we now rad had thought, arued, dogmtized only about the constitution of
govermnt; about the natur of the state, the essence and seat of soverignty, popular power
and kngly prrgative; about the gratest manings lying at the hear of govermnt, and the high
ends set befor the purose of govermnt by mn's nature and mn's aim. The centrl field of
contrvery was that grat field of theory in which mnarhy rde tilt against demcrcy, in which
oligarhy would have built for itself strngholds of prvilege, and in which tyranny sought opporunity
to mke good its claim to rceive subnssion frm all cometitor. Amidst this high warfar of
prnciples, adnnistrtion could commnd no pause for its own considertion. The question was
always: Who shall mke law, and what shall that law be? The other question, how law should be
adnnisterd with enlightenmnt, with equity, with speed, and without frction, was put aside as
"prctical detail" which clers could arnge afer doctor had agred upon prnciples.
That political philosophy took this dirction was of coure no accident, no chance prefernce or
perere whim of political philosopher. The philosophy of any tim is, as Hegel says, "nothing but
the spirit of that tim exprssed in abstract thought"; and political philosophy, lik philosophy of
ever other knd, has only held up the nirror to contemorar affairs. The trouble in eary tims was
almst altogether about the constitution of govermnt; and consequently that was what
engrssed mn's thoughts. Ther was little or no trouble about administrtion,-at least little that
was heeded by adninistrator. The functions of govermnt wer simple, because life itself was
simle. Gvermnt went about impertively and comelled mn, without thought of consulting their
wishes. Ther was no complex system of public rvenues and public debts to puzzle financiers;
ther wer, consequently, no financier to be puzzled. No one who possessed power was long at a
loss how to use it. The grat and only question was: Who shall possess it? Populations wer of
mnageable number; propery was of simple sors. Ther wer plenty of farm, but no stock and
bonds: mr cattle than vested intersts.
I have said that all this was tre of "eary tims"; but it was substantially tre also of comaratively
late tims. One does not have to look back of the last centur for the beginnings of the prsent
comlexities of trde and perlexities of comrial speculation, nor for the porentous birh of
national debts. God Queen Bss, doubtless, thought that the mnopolies of the sixteenth centur
wer har enough to handle without buming her hands; but they are not rmmerd in the
prsence of the giant mnopolies of the nineteenth centur. When Blacktone lamnted that
corporations had no bodies to be kicked and no souls to be damed, he was anticipating the prper
tim for such rgrts by a full centur. The pernnial discords between mster and worn which
now so often disturb industral society began before the Back Dath and the Statute of Laborr;
but never befor our own day did they assum such omnous prportions as they wear now. In bref,
if difficulties of govermntal action ar to be seen gathering in other centuries, they ar to be seen
culmnating in our own.
This is the rason why admnistrative task have nowadays to be so studiously and systemtically
adjusted to carfully tested standars of policy, the rason why we ar having now what we never
had befor, a science of admnistration. The weightier debates of constitutional prnciple ar even
yet by no mans concluded; but they ar no longer of mr irdiate prctical mmnt than
questions of administrtion. It is getting to be harder to run a constitution than to fram one.
Her is Mr. Bgehot's graphic, whimical way of depicting the differnce between the old and the
new in admnistration:
In eary tims, when a despot wishes to govem a distant prvince, he sends down a
satrp on a grnd hore, and other people on little hores; and very little is hear of the
satrp again unless he send back som of the little people to tell what he has been
doing. No grat labour of superntendence is possible. Comn rmur and casual rport
are the soures of intelligence. If it seem cerain that the province is in a bad state,
satrp No. I is rcalled, and satrp No. 2 sent out in his stead. In civilized countres the
process is difernt. You erect a bureau in the prvince you want to govem; you mke
it wrte letter and copy letter; it sends hom eight rpors per diem to the head
burau in St. Petersbur. Nobody does a sum in the prvince without som one doing
the sam sum in the capital, to "check" him, and see that he does it corctly. The
consequence of this is, to thrw on the heads of deparmnts an amunt of rading and
labour which can only be accomlished by the gratest natural aptitude, the mst
efficient training, the mst fir and rgular industry.
(Essay on Sir William Pitt. [All footnotes WW's.])
Ther is scarely a single duty of govermnt which was once simle which is not now comlex;
govermnt once had but a few mster; it now has scors of mster. Majorties formry only
underent governmnt; they now conduct govermnt. Wher govermnt once mght follow the
whim of a cour, it mst now follow the views of a nation.
And those views ar steadily widening to new conceptions of state duty; so that, at the sam tim
that the functions of govermnt ar everday becomng mr complex and dificult, they ar also
vastly multiplying in number. Administrtion is everwher putting its hands to new underakngs.
The utility, cheapness, and success of the govermnt's postal serice, for instance, point towars
the eary establishmnt of govermntal contrl of the telegrph system. Or, even if our govermnt
is not to follow the lead of the govermnts of Europe in buying or building both telegrph and
rilrad lines, no one can doubt that in som way it mst mke itself mster of msterful
cororations. The cration of national commssioner of railroads, in addition to the older state
comssions, involves a ver imorant and delicate exension of administrative functions. Whatever
hold of authorty state or federal govermnts ar to tak upon corportions, ther must follow
cars and rsponsibilities which will rquir not a little wisdom kowledge, and experience. Such
things must be studied in orer to be well done. And these, as I have said, ar only a few of the
door which ar being opened to ofices of govermnt. The idea of the state and the consequent
ideal of its duty ar underoing noteworthy change; and ''the idea of the state is the conscience of
adrnistrtion." Seeing ever day new things which the state ought to do, the next thing is to see
clearly how it ought to do them.
This is why there should be a science of adrnistration which shall seek to strighten the paths of
govermnt, to mke its business less unbusinesslike, to strengthen and purify its organization, and
to crwn its duties with dutifulness. This is one rason why ther is such a science.
But wher has this science grwn up? Surely not on this side the sea. Not much imarial scientific
mthod is to be discered in our adrnistrative practices. The poisonous atmspher of city
govermnt, the croked secrts of state adrnistrtion, the confusion, sinecursm, and corption
ever and again discoverd in the buraux at Washington forbid us to believe that any clear
conceptions of what constitutes good administrtion ar as yet ver widely curnt in the United
States. No; Amrcan writer have hitherto taken no very imporant par in the advancemnt of this
science. I has found its doctor in Eurpe. I is not of our mking; it is a foreign science, speaking
ver little of the language of English or Amrcan principle. It emloys only forign tongues; it utter
none but what ar to our rnds alien ideas. Its aim, its examles, its conditions, ar almst
exclusively grunded in the histories of foreign rces, in the prcedents of forign system, in the
lessons of forign rvolutions. It has been developed by Frnch and Grn prfessor, and is
consequently in all pars adapted to the needs of a comact state, and mde to fit highly
centralized for of govermnt; wheras, to answer our puroses, it mst be adapted, not to a
simle and comact, but to a complex and mltiform state, and mde to fit highly decentrlized
for of govermnt. If we would emloy it, we mst Amricanize it, and that not formlly, in
language mrly, but radically, in thought, prnciple, and aim as well. I mst lear our constitutions
by hear; mst get the buraucratic fever out of its veins; must inhale mch fre Amrcan air.
If an explanation be sought why a science mnifestly so susceptible of being mde useful to all
govermnts alike should have rceived attention firt in Eurpe, wher govermnt has long been a
mnopoly, rther than in England or the United States, wher governmnt has long been a commn
frnchise, the rason will doubtless be found to be twofold: firt, that in Europe, just because
govermnt was independent of popular assent, ther was mr govering to be done; and, second,
that the desir to keep govermnt a mnopoly mde the mnopolists intersted in discoverng the
least iritating mans of govering. They wer, besides, few enough to adopt mans prmtly.
I will be instrctive to look into this mtter a little mr closely. In speakng of Eurpean
govermnts I do not, of coure, include England. She has not rfused to change with the tims.
She has simly temerd the severty of the trnsition frm a polity of arstocrtic privilege to a
system of demcrtic power by slow masurs of constitutional rfor which, without prventing
rvolution, has confined it to paths of peace. But the countres of the continent for a long tim
desperately strggled against all change, and would have divered revolution by softening the
asperities of absolute govermnt. They sought so to perect their mchinery as to destry all
wearng frction, so to sweeten their mthods with consideration for the intersts of the govered
as to placate all hindering hatrd, and so assiduously and opporunely to offer their aid to all classes
of undertakings as to rnder themelves indispensable to the industrious. They did at last give the
people constitutions and the franchise; but even after that they obtained leave to continue
despotic by becoing pateral. They mde themelves too efficient to be dispensed with, too
smothly operative to be noticed, too enlightened to be inconsiderately questioned, too benevolent
to be suspected, too powerul to be coped with. All this has rquird study; and they have closely
studied it.
On this side the sea we, the while, had kown no grat difficulties of govermnt. With a new
country in which ther was rom and rmnertive emloymnt for everybody, with liberl principles
of governmnt and unlimited skll in prctical politics, we wer long exemted frm the need of being
anxiously carful about plans and mthods of administrtion. We have naturally been slow to see
the use or significance of those mny volums of leared rsearh and painstaking exaination into
the ways and mans of conducting govermnt which the prsses of Eurpe have been sending to
our librares. Like a lusty child, govermnt with us has exanded in natur and grwn grat in
statur, but has also becom awkar in mvemnt. The vigor and incrase of its life has been
altogether out of prportion to its skill in living. It has gained strngth, but it has not acquird
depormnt. Grat, therfor, as has been our advantage over the countres of Eurpe in point of
ease and health of constitutional developmnt, now that the tim for mr carful adinistrative
adjustmnts and larer adinistrative kowledge has com to us, we ar at a signal disadvantage
as compard with the transatlantic nations; and this for rasons which I shall try to mke clear.
Judging by the constitutional histores of the chief nations of the mdem word, there my be said
to be thre perods of growth through which governmnt has passed in all the mst highly developed
of exsting system, and thrugh which it prises to pass in all the rst. The firt of these perods
is that of absolute rler, and of an adinistrtive system adapted to absolute rle; the second is
that in which constitutions ar framd to do away with absolute rler and substitute popular
contrl, and in which administrtion is neglected for these higher concers; and the thir is that in
which the sovereign people undertake to develop adinistration under this new constitution which
has brught them into power.
Those govermnts ar now in the lead in adinistrtive practice which had rler still absolute but
also enlightened when those mdem days of political illuination cam in which it was mde evident
to all but the blind that goverors ar prpery only the serants of the govered. In such
govermnts administration has been oranized to subsere the generl weal with the simlicity and
efectiveness vouchsafed only to the underakngs of a single will.
Such was the case in Prssia, for instance, wher adinistration has been mst studied and mst
nearly perected. Frderic the Grat, stern and msterul as was his rle, still sincerly prfessed to
rgar himelf as only the chief serant of the state, to consider his grat office a public trst; and
it was he who, building upon the foundations laid by his father, began to oranize the public serice
of Prssia as in ver earest a serice of the public. His no less absolute successor, Frderic William
III, under the inspirtion of Stein, again, in his tum, advanced the wor still further, planning mny
of the brader strctural featurs which give finess and for to Prssian adrnistration to-day.
Alrst the whole of the adrrble system has been developed by kingly initiative.
Of sirlar orgin was the prctice, if not the plan, of rdem Frnch adrnistration, with its
symtrical divisions of tertor and its ordery gradations of office. The days of the Revolution of
the Constituent Assemly wer days of constitution-writing, but they can harly be called days of
constitution-makng. The rvolution heralded a period of constitutional developmnt, -the entrance
of Frnce upon the second of those perods which I have enumrated,-but it did not itself
inaugurate such a perod. I interrupted and unsettled absolutism, but it did not destroy it. Napoleon
succeeded the rnarhs of Frnce, to exerise a power as unrstricted as they had ever
possessed.
The rcasting of Frnch adrnistration by Napoleon is, therefor, m second examle of the
perecting of civil mchiner by the single will of an absolute rler befor the dawn of a
constitutional era. No corporte, popular will could ever have effected arngemnts such as those
which Napoleon comnded. Arangemnts so simple at the expense of local prjudice, so logical in
their indiffernce to popular choice, rght be decreed by a Constituent Assembly, but could be
established only by the unlirted authority of a despot. The system of the year VIII was rthlessly
thorugh and hearlessly perect. I was, besides, in lare par, a rtur to the despotism that had
been overhrwn.
Arng those nations, on the other hand, which enterd upon a season of constitution-mkng and
popular rfor befor administration had received the imrss of liberl principle, administrtive
imrvemnt has been tary and half-done. Once a nation has emared in the business of
mnufacturng constitutions, it finds it exceedingly difficult to close out that business and open for
the public a burau of skilled, econorcal adrnistration. Ther seem to be no end to the tinkerng
of constitutions. Your ordinary constitution will last you hardly ten year without rpair or
additions; and the tim for adrnistrtive detail coms late.
Her, of coure, our exmples ar England and our own country. In the days of the Angevin kings,
befor constitutional life had taken rot in the Grat Charer, legal and administrtive rfom began
to prceed with sense and vigor under the imulse of Henry II's shrwd, busy, pushing, indomitable
spirt and purose; and kingly initiative seemd destined in England, as elsewher, to shape
govermntal growth at its will. Bt imulsive, erant Richard and weak despicable John wer not
the mn to cary out such schems as their father's. Adrnistrtive developmnt gave place in their
rigns to constitutional strggles; and Parliamnt becam king before any English rnarh had had
the practical genius or the enlightened conscience to devise just and lasting fom for the civil
serice of the state.
The English rce, consequently, has long and successfully studied the ar of curing executive
power to the constant neglect of the art of perfecting executive mthods. It has exerised itself
mch rr in contrlling than in enerizing govermnt. It has been rr concered to rnder
govermnt just and rderte than to mke it facile, well-orerd, and effective. English and
Amrcan political histor has been a histor, not of adrnistrtive developmnt, but of legislative
overight,-not of prgrss in govermntal oranization, but of advance in law-mkng and political
crticism. Consequently, we have rached a tim when administrtive study and cration ar
imeratively necessar to the well-being of our govermnts saddled with the habits of a long perod
of constitution-mking. That perod has practically closed, so far as the establishmnt of essential
prnciples is concered, but we cannot shake off its atmspher. We go on crticizing when we
ought to be crating. We have rached the thir of the periods I have mntioned,-the perod,
namly, when the people have to develop admnistrtion in accorance with the constitutions they
won for themelves in a prvious perod of strggle with absolute power; but we ar not prpard
for the tasks of the new perod.
Such an explanation seem to affor the only escape frm blank astonishmnt at the fact that, in
spite of our vast advantages in point of political libery, and above all in point of practical political
skill and sagacity, so mny nations ar ahead of us in administrtive oranization and admnistrtive
skill. Why, for instance, have we but just begun purfying a civil serice which was rtten full fifty
year ago? To say that slavery divered us is but to rpeat what I have said-that flaws in our
constitution delayed us.
Of course all rasonable prfernce would declar for this English and Amrcan course of politics
rther than for that of any Eurpean countr. We should not like to have had Prssia's histor for
the sake of having Prssia's admnistrtive skill; and Prssia's paricular system of administration
would quite suffocate us. I is better to be untrined and free than to be serile and systemtic.
Still there is no denying that it would be better yet to be both fre in spirt and prficient in
prctice. It is this even mr rasonable prfernce which impels us to discover what ther my be
to hinder or delay us in naturlizing this mch-to-be-desird science of administrtion.
What, then, is ther to prvent?
Well, principally, popular soverignty. It is harer for demcrcy to oranize admnistration than for
mnarhy. The ver completeness of our mst chershed political successes in the past emarsses
us. We have enthrned public opinion; and it is forbidden us to hope durng its rign for any quick
schooling of the soverign in executive experness or in the conditions of perect functional balance
in governmnt. The very fact that we have ralized popular rle in its fullness has mde the task of
organizaing that rle just so mch the mre difficult. In orer to mke any advance at all we must
instrct and persuade a multitudinous mnarh called public opinion,-a mch less feasible
underaking than to influence a single mnarh called a kng. An individual soverign will adopt a
simle plan and car it out dirctly: he will have but one opinion, and he will emody that one
opinion in one comnd. But this other soverign, the people, will have a scor of differng opinions.
They can agre upon nothing simple: advance mst be mde thrugh comromse, by a
comounding of differnces, by a trmng of plans and a supprssion of too strightforar
prnciples. Ther will be a succession of rsolves rnning thrugh a coure of year, a drpping fir
of comnds rnning through the whole gamt of mdifications.
In governmnt, as in virue, the harest of things is to mke prgrss. Forry the reason for this
was that the single peron who was sovereign was generally either selfish, ignornt, tinid, or a
fool,-albeit ther was now and again one who was wise. Nowadays the rason is that the mny, the
people, who ar soverign have no single ear which one can apprach, and ar selfish, ignorant,
tind, stubbor, or foolish with the selfishness, the ignornces, the stubbomnesses, the tindities, or
the follies of severl thousand persons,-albeit there ar hundrds who ar wise. Once the
advantage of the rforr was that the soverign's nind had a definite locality, that it was
contained in one mn's head, and that consequently it could be gotten at; though it was his
disadvantage that the mind leared only reluctantly or only in smll quantities, or was under the
influence of som one who let it lear only the wrng things. Now, on the contrr, the rformr is
bewildered by the fact that the soverign's nnd has no definite locality, but is contained in a voting
mjorty of several nillion heads; and emarssed by the fact that the nind of this soverign also is
under the influence of favortes, who ar none the less favortes in a good old-fashioned sense of
the word because they ar not perons by prconceived opinions; i.e., prjudices which ar not to
be rasoned with because they are not the childrn of rason.
Wherver rgar for public opinion is a first prnciple of govermnt, prctical rfor must be slow
and all refor mst be full of comprnses. For wherver public opinion exsts it mst rle. This is
now an axiom half the word over, and will prsently com to be believed even in Russia. Whoever
would effect a change in a rdern constitutional govermnt mst firt educate his fellow-citizens
to want some change. That done, he mst peruade them to want the paricular change he wants.
He mst firt mke public opinion willing to listen and then see to it that it listen to the rght things.
He mst stir it up to search for an opinion, and then mnage to put the rght opinion in its way.
The firt step is not less difficult than the second. With opinions, possession is rr than nine
points of the law. I is next to impossible to dislodge them. Institutions which one genertion
rgars as only a mkeshift apprximtion to the realization of a principle, the nex genertion
honor as the nearst possible apprximtion to that prnciple, and the next worhips the prnciple
itself. It takes scarely thre genertions for the apotheosis. The grandson accepts his
grndfather's hesitating expermnt as an integrl par of the fixed constitution of natur.
Even if we had clear insight into all the political past, and could for out of perectly instrcted
heads a few steady, infallible, placidly wise mxim of governmnt into which all sound political
doctrne would be ultimtely rsolvable, would the countr act on them? That is the question. The
bulk of mnknd is rgidly unphilosophical, and nowadays the bulk of mnknd votes. A trth mst
becom not only plain but also comrnplace before it will be seen by the people who go to their
wor ver early in the rming; and not to act upon it mst involve grat and pinching
inconveniences befor these sam people will mke up their ninds to act upon it.
And wher is this unphilosophical bulk of mnkind rr mltifarious in its composition than in the
United States? To know the public nind of this country, one mst know the mind, not of Amrcans
of the older stock only, but also of Irshmn, of Gerns, of negres. In order to get a footing for
new doctrne, one mst influence ninds cast in ever ruld of rce, ninds inherting ever bias of
envirnmnt, warped by the histores of a scor of differnt nations, ward or chilled, closed or
expanded by almst every climte of the globe.
So rch, then, for the histor of the study of administrtion, and the peculiary difficult conditions
under which, enterng upon it when we do, we rst underake it. What, now, is the subject-mtter
of this study, and what ar its charcterstic objects?
D.
The field of administrtion is a field of business. It is rmved frm the huny and strife of politics; it
at mst points stands apar even frm the debatable grund of constitutional study. I is a par of
political life only as the mthods of the counting house ar a par of the life of society; only as
mchiner is part of the mnufacturd prduct. Bt it is, at the sam tim, raised ver far above
the dull level of mr technical detail by the fact that thrugh its greater principles it is dirctly
connected with the lasting mxm of political wisdom the pernent trths of political prgress.
The object of administrative study is to rscue executive mthods frm the confusion and costliness
of emirical exermnt and set them upon foundations laid deep in stable principle.
It is for this rason that we rst rgar civil-serice rfor in its present stages as but a prlude
to a fuller adrnistrtive rfor. We ar now rctifying mthods of appointmnt; we must go on to
adjust executive functions mr fitly and to prscribe better mthods of executive organization and
action. Civil-serice rform is thus but a mrl prpartion for what is to follow. It is clearng the
mrl atmsphere of official life by establishing the sanctity of public office as a public trst, and,
by mking serice unpartisan, it is opening the way for mking it businesslike. By sweetening its
mtives it is rnderng it capable of imrving its mthods of work.
Let m expand a little what I have said of the prvince of adrnistration. Most imortant to be
obsered is the trth alrady so much and so forunately insisted upon by our civil-serice
rforrs; namly, that adrnistration lies outside the prper sphere of politics. Administrtive
questions ar not political questions. Although politics sets the task for administrtion, it should not
be sufferd to mnipulate its offices.
This is distinction of high authority; ernent Grn wrters insist upon it as of course. Bluntschli,
for instance, bids us separte administrtion alik frm politics and frm law. Politics, he says, is
state activity "in things grat and univeral", while "adrnistrtion, on the other hand," is "the
activity of the state in individual and smll things. Politics is thus the special prvince of the
statesmn, administrtion of the technical official. " "Policy does nothing without the aid of
adrnistrtion"; but administrtion is not therfor politics. But we do not rquir Germn authorty
for this position; this discrrnation between adrnistrtion and politics is now, happily, too obvious
to need furher discussion.
Ther is another distinction which rst be wored into all our conclusions, which, though but
another side of that between administrtion and politics, is not quite so easy to keep sight of: I
man the distinction between constitutional and adrnistrative questions, between those
govermntal adjustmnts which ar essential to constitutional prnciple and those which ar mrly
instrmntal to the possibly changing purposes of a wisely adapting convenience.
One cannot easily mk clear to ever one just wher administrtion rsides in the varous
departmnts of any practicable govermnt without entering upon pariculars so numrus as to
confuse and distinctions so mnute as to distrct. No lines of demrcation, setting apar
admnistrtive from non-admnistrative functions, can be rn between this and that deparmnt of
govermnt without being rn up hill and down dale, over dizzy heights of distinction and thrugh
dense jungles of statutor enactmnt, hither and thither around "ifs" and "buts," "whens" and
"however," until they becom altogether lost to the comn eye not accustomd to this sor of
sureying, and consequently not acquainted with the use of the theodolite of logical discermnt. A
grat deal of administration goes about incognito to mst of the word, being confounded now with
political "mnagemnt," and again with constitutional prnciple.
Peraps this ease of confusion my explain such utternces as that of Niebuhrs: "Ubery," he says,
"depends incomarbly mr upon admnistrtion than upon constitution." At firt sight this appear
to be largely tre. Apparently facility in the actual exerise of liberty does depend mr upon
admnistrtive arrngemnts than upon constitutional guarantees; although constitutional
guarntees alone secur the exstence of libery. But-upon second thought-is even so mch as this
tre? Libery no mr consists in easy functional mvemnt than intelligence consists in the ease
and vigor with which the lims of a strng mn mve. The prnciples that rle within the mn, or the
constitution, ar the vital sprngs of libery or seritude. Bcause independence and subjection ar
without chains, ar lightened by ever easy-worng device of considerte, pateral govermnt,
they are not therby transford into libery. Libery cannot live apar frm constitutional principle;
and no admnistration, however perfect and liberal its mthods, can give mn mr than a poor
counterfeit of libery if it rst upon illiberal prnciples of govermnt.
A clear view of the difference between the prvince of constitutional law and the prvince of
admnistrtive function ought to leave no room for misconception; and it is possible to nam som
rughly definite crtera upon which such a view can be built. Public admnistration is detailed and
systemtic execution of public law. Ever paricular application of generl law is an act of
admnistrtion. The assessmnt and rising of taxes, for instance, the hanging of a crmnal, the
trnsportation and delivery of the mils, the equipmnt and rcriting of the ar and navy, etc.,
ar all obviously acts of admnistration; but the generl laws which dirct these things to be done
ar as obviously outside of and above administrtion. The brad plans of govermntal action ar
not administrtive; the detailed execution of such plans is admnistrative. Constitutions, therfor,
prperly concer themelves only with those instrmntalities of govermnt which ar to contrl
general law. Our federl constitution obseres this prnciple in saying nothing of even the gratest
of the purly executive offices, and speaking only of that Prsident of the Union who was to shar
the legislative and policy-mkng functions of govermnt, only of those judges of highest
jursdiction who wer to interrt and guard its principles, and not of those who wer mrly to give
utternce to them.
This is not quite the distinction between Will and answerng Ded, because the admnistrtor should
have and does have a will of his own in the choice of mans for accolliishing his work. He is not
and ought not to be a mr passive instrmnt. The distinction is between generl plans and special
mans.
Ther is, indeed, one point at which adrnistrtive studies trnch on constitutional grund-or at
least upon what seem constitutional grund. The study of adrnistrtion, philosophically viewed, is
closely connected with the study of the prper distribution of constitutional authorty. To be
efficient it mst discover the siliest arangemnts by which rsponsibility can be unrstakbly
fixed upon officials; the best way of dividing authorty without halerng it, and rsponsibility
without obscurng it. And this question of the distribution of authority, when taken into the spher
of the higher, the orginating functions of govermnt, it is obviously a central constitutional
question. If administrtive study can discover the best prnciples upon which to base such
distrbution, it will have done constitutional study an invaluable serice. Montesquieu did not, I am
convinced, say the last wor on this head.
To discover the best prnciple for the distribution of authority is of grater importance, possibly,
under a demcratic system where officials sere mny mster, than under other wher they
sere but a few. All soverigns are suspicious of their serants, and the soverign people is no
exception to the rle; but how is its suspicion to be allayed by kowledge? If that suspicion could
but be clarified into wise vigilance, it would be altogether salutary; if that vigilance could be aided
by the unrstakble placing of rsponsibility, it would be altogether beneficent. Suspicion in itself is
never healthful either in the prvate or in the public rnd. Trust is strength in all rlations of life;
and, as it is the office of the constitutional rforr to crate conditions of trstfulness, so it is the
office of the administrtive oranizer to fit adrnistrtion with conditions of clear-cut rsponsibility
which shall insure trstworhiness.
And let m say that lare power and unhallerd discrtion seem to m the indispensable
conditions of rsponsibility. Public attention mst be easily dircted, in each case of good or bad
adrnistrtion, to just the mn desering of prise or blam. Ther is no danger in power, if only it
be not irrsponsible. If it be divided, dealt out in shars to mny, it is obscured; and if it be
obscurd, it is mde irsponsible. But if it be centerd in heads of the serice and in heads of
brnches of the serice, it is easily watched and brught to book. If to kep his office a mn mst
achieve open and honest success, and if at the sam tim he feels himelf entrsted with large
fredom of discretion, the grater his power the less likly is he to abuse it, the mr is he nered
and soberd and elevated by it. The less his power, the mr safely obscur and unnoticed does he
feel his position to be, and the mr radily does he rlapse into rmissness.
Just here we mnifestly emre upon the field of that still larer question,-the prper rlations
between public opinion and adrnistrtion.
To whom is official trstworthiness to be disclosed, and by whom is it to be rwared? Is the official
to look to the public for his med of prise and his push of prmtion, or only to his superor in
office? Ar the people to be called in to settle administrtive discipline as they ar called in to settle
constitutional principles? These questions evidently find their rot in what is undoubtedly the
fundamntal prblem of this whole study. That prblem is: What par shall public opinion take in the
conduct of administrtion?
The rght answer seem to be, that public opinion shall play the par of authortative crtic.
But the method by which its authorty shall be mde to tell? Our peculiar Amrcan difficulty in
oranizing adnnistrtion is not the danger of losing libery, but the danger of not being able or
willing to separate its essentials from its accidents. Our success is mde doubtful by that besetting
err of our, the err of tring to do too mch by vote. Self-governmnt does not consist in
having a hand in everything, any mr than housekeeping consists necessarily in cooking dinner with
one's own hands. The cook mst be trsted with a lare discrtion as to the mnagemnt of the
firs and the ovens.
In those countries in which public opinion has yet to be instrcted in its prvileges, yet to be
accustomd to having its own way, this question as to the prvince of public opinion is mch mr
rady soluble than in this country, wher public opinion is wide awake and quite intent upon having
its own way anyhow. It is pathetic to see a whole book written by a Grn prfessor of political
science for the purpose of saying to his countrymn, "Please try to have an opinion about national
afair"; but a public which is so mdest my at least be expected to be ver docile and
acquiescent in learing what things it has not a rght to think and speak about imeratively. It my
be sluggish, but it will not be mddlesom. It will subnt to be instrcted befor it tries to instrct.
Its political education will com befor its political activity. In tring to instrct our own public
opinion, we ar dealing with a pupil apt to think itself quite suficiently instrcted beforhand.
The prblem is to mke public opinion efficient without sufferng it to be mddlesom. Dirctly
exerised, in the overight of the daily details and in the choice of the daily mans of govermnt,
public criticism is of course a clumy nuisance, a rstic handling delicate mchinery. But as
superntending the grater fores of fortive policy alike in politics and administrtion, public
crticism is altogether safe and beneficent, altogether indispensable. Let administrtive study find
the best mans for giving public crticism this control and for shutting it out frm all other
intererence.
But is the whole duty of adninistrative study done when it has taught the people what sor of
adninistrtion to desir and demnd, and how to get what they demnd? Ought it not to go on to
drll candidates for the public serice?
Ther is an admirble mvemnt towards univeral political education now afoot in this countr. The
tim will soon com when no college of rspectability can affor to do without a well-filled chair of
political science. But the education thus impared will go but a cerain length. It will multiply the
numer of intelligent crtics of govermnt, but it will crate no component body of adnnistrator.
It will prepar the way for the developmnt of a sur-footed understanding of the generl principles
of governmnt, but it will not necessarly foster skill in conducting govermnt. It is an education
which will equip legislators, peraps, but not executive officials. If we ar to imrve public opinion,
which is the mtive power of govermnt, we mst prpar better officials as the apparatus of
govermnt. If we ar to put in new boilers and to mnd the firs which drive our govermntal
mchinery, we must not leave the old wheels and joints and valves and bands to crak and buzz
and clatter on as best they my at bidding of the new fore. We mst put in new rnning pars
wherver ther is the least lack of strngth or adjustmnt. It will be necessary to organize
demcracy by sending up to the cometitive examinations for the civil serice mn definitely
prpard for standing liberl tests as to technical knowledge. A technically schooled civil serice will
prsently have becom indispensable.
I know that a corps of civil serants prpard by a special schooling and drilled, after appointmnt,
into a perfected oranization, with apprprate hierarhy and characterstic discipline, seem to a
grat mny ver thoughtful perons to contain elemnts which night comine to mke an offensive
official class,- a distinct, seni-corporte body with symathies divored frm those of a
prgrssive, fre-spirted people, and with hears narwed to the manness of a bigoted officialism.
Cerainly such a class would be altogether hateful and harul in the United States. Any masur
calculated to produce it would for us be masurs of raction and of folly.
But to fear the cration of a domineerng, illiberl officialism as a rsult of the studies I am her
prposing is to miss altogether the prnciple upon which I wish mst to insist. That principle is, that
adninistrtion in the United States mst be at all points sensitive to public opinion. A body of
thorughly trined officials sering durng good behavior we mst have in any case: that is a plain
business necessity. But the apprhension that such a body will be anything un-Amrican clear
away the mmnt it is asked. What is to constitute good behavior? For that question obviously
cares its own answer on its face. Steady, heary allegiance to the policy of the govermnt they
sere will constitute good behavior. That policy will have no taint of officialism about it. It will not
be the cration of pernent officials, but of statesmn whose rsponsibility to public opinion will be
dirct and inevitable. Breaucrcy can exist only wher the whole serice of the state is rmved
frm the comn political life of the people, its chiefs as well as its rnk and file. Its mtives, its
objects, its policy, its standars, must be buraucratic. It would be difficult to point out any
examles of imudent exclusiveness and aritrrness on the part of officials doing serice under a
chief of deparmnt who rally sered the people, as all our chiefs of departmnts mst be mde to
do. It would be easy, on the other hand, to adduce other instances like that of the influence of
Stein in Prssia, wher the leadership of one statesmn imued with tre public spirt trnsformd
argant and perunctory buraux into public-spirited instrmnts of just govermnt.
The ideal for us is a civil serice culturd and self-sufficient enough to act with sense and vigor,
and yet so intimtely connected with the popular thought, by mans of elections and constant
public counsel, as to find aritrariness of class spirit quite out of the question.
m.
Having thus viewed in som sort the subject-mtter and the objects of this study of adnnistrtion,
what are we to conclude as to the mthods best suited to it-the points of view mst advantageous
for it?
Gvermnt is so near us, so mch a thing of our daily familiar handling, that we can with difficulty
see the need of any philosophical study of it, or the exact points of such study, should be
underaken. We have been on our feet too long to study now the art of walking. We ar a practical
people, mde so apt, so adept in self-govermnt by centuries of experimntal drll that we ar
scarely any longer capable of pereiving the awkwarness of the paricular system we my be
using, just because it is so easy for us to use any system. We do not study the ar of govering:
we gover. Bt mr unschooled genius for affair will not save us frm sad blunder in
adrnistrtion. Though dercrts by long inhertance and repeated choice, we ar still rther crde
dercrats. Old as dercrcy is, its oranization on a basis of rdem ideas and conditions is still an
unaccomplished wor. The dercrtic state has yet to be equipped for caring those enorus
burens of adrnistrtion which the needs of this industral and trading age ar so fast
accumlating. Without comartive studies in govermnt we cannot rid ourselves of the
rsconception that adrnistrtion stands upon an essentially differnt basis in a dercrtic state
frm that on which it stands in a non-dercrtic state.
After such study we could grnt dercracy the sufficient honor of ultimtely detenining by debate
all essential questions affecting the public weal, of basing all strcturs of policy upon the mjor
will; but we would have found but one rle of good adrnistrtion for all govermnts alike. So far
as administrtive functions ar concered, all govermnts have a strng structurl likeness; rr
than that, if they ar to be uniformly useful and efficient, they must have a strng strctural
likeness. A fre mn has the sam bodily orans, the sam executive pars, as the slave, however
difernt my be his rtives, his serices, his energies. Monarhies and dercrcies, rdically
differnt as they ar in other rspects, have in rality mch the sam business to look to.
I is abundantly safe nowadays to insist upon this actual likeness of all govermnts, because these
ar days when abuses of power ar easily exposed and arsted, in countres like our own, by a
bold, aler, inquisitive, detective public thought and a stury popular self-dependence such as never
existed befor. We ar slow to apprciate this; but it is easy to apprciate it. Try to imgine
peronal govermnt in the United States. I is like trying to imgine a national worhip of Zeus. Our
imginations ar too rdem for the feat.
But, besides being safe, it is necessary to see that for all govermnts alike the legitimte ends of
adrnistrtion are the sam, in order not to be frghtened at the idea of looking into forign system
of adrnistrtion for instruction and suggestion; in orer to get rd of the apprhension that we
rght perhance blindly borw somthing incomatible with our prnciples. That mn is blindly astry
who denounces attemts to trnsplant foreign system into this country. It is imossible: they
simly would not grw her. But why should we not use such pars of forign contrvances as we
want, if they be in any way sericeable? We ar in no danger of using them in a forign way. We
borwed rice, but we do not eat it with chopstick. We borwed our whole political language frm
England, but we leave the wors "king" and "lors" out of it. What did we ever orginate, except the
action of the federl govermnt upon individuals and som of the functions of the federl suprm
cour?
We can borw the science of administration with safety and prfit if only we rad all fundamntal
differnces of condition into its essential tenets. We have only to filter it through our constitutions,
only to put it over a slow fir of crticism and distil away its forign gases.
I know that there is a sneaking fear in som conscientiously patrotic rnds that studies of Eurpean
system rght signalize som forign mthods as better than som Amrcan mthods; and the fear
is easily to be undertood. But it would scarely be avowed in just any company.
I is the mr necessar to insist upon thus putting away all prjudices against lookng anywher in
the world but at hor for suggestions in this study, because nowher else in the whole field of
politics, it would seem, can we mke use of the historcal, comarative mthod mr safely than in
this prvince of adrnistration. Perhaps the mr novel the fon we study the better. We shall the
sooner lear the peculiarities of our own mthods. We can never lear either our own weakesses or
our own virues by comarng ourselves with ourelves. We ar too used to the appearnce and
prcedur of our own system to see its tre significance. Peraps even the English system is too
mch like our own to be used to the mst prfit in illustrtion. I is best on the whole to get entirly
away from our own atmspher and to be mst careful in exarning such system as those of
Frnce and Gnny. Seeing our own institutions thrugh such media, we see ourelves as
forigner rght see us wer they to look at us without prconceptions. Of ourelves, so long as we
know only ourelves, we know nothing.
Let it be noted that it is the distinction, alrady drawn, between administration and politics which
mkes the comartive mthod so safe in the field of adrnistrtion. When we study the
adrnistrtive system of Frnce and Gnny, kowing that we are not in searh of political
prnciples, we need not car a pepperor for the constitutional or political reasons which
Frnchmn or Genns give for their prctices when explaining them to us. If I see a mrerus
fellow sharening a knife clevery, I can borw his way of sharening the kife without borwing
his prbable intention to comrt murer with it; and so, if I see a mnarhist dyed in the wool
mnaging a public burau well, I can lear his business mthods without changing one of m
rpublican spots. He my sere his king; I will continue to sere the people; but I should like to
sere m soverign as well as he seres his. By keeping this distinction in view,-that is, by studying
adrnistrtion as a mans of putting our own politics into convenient prctice, as a mans of mking
what is demcratically politic towars all adrnistratively possible towars each,-we ar on perectly
safe grund, and can learn without err what forign system have to teach us. We thus devise an
adjusting weight for our comarative mthod of study. We can thus scrtinize the anatom of
forign govermnts without fear of getting any of their diseases into our veins; dissect alien
system without apprhension of blood-poisoning.
Our own politics must be the touchstone for all theores. The prnciples on which to base a science
of adrnistrtion for Amrca mst be prnciples which have demcratic policy ver mch at hear.
And, to suit Amrcan habit, all generl theores mst, as theores, keep mdestly in the backgrund,
not in open arumnt only, but even in our own minds,-lest opinions satisfactor only to the
standards of the librry should be dogmtically used, as if they mst be quite as satisfactory to the
standards of practical politics as well. Dctrinair devices must be postponed to tested prctices.
Arngemnts not only sanctioned by conclusive experence elsewher but also congenial to
Amrcan habit must be prferd without hesitation to theortical perection. In a wor, steady,
prctical statesmnship must com firt, closet doctrine second. The cosmpolitan what-to-do mst
always be comnded by the Amrcan how-to-do-it.
Our duty is, to supply the best possible life to a federal oranization, to system within system; to
mke town, city, county, state, and federal governmnts live with a like strngth and an equally
assurd healthfulness, keeping each unquestionably its own mster and yet mking all
interependent and co-opertive comining independence with mtual helpfulness. The task is grat
and imorant enough to attrct the best minds.
This interlacing of local self-governmnt with federal self-govermnt is quite a mdem conception.
I is not like the arngemnts of imeral federtion in Grny. Ther local govermnt is not yet,
fully, local sel-govermnt. The buraucrat is everywher busy. His efficiency sprngs out of esprit
de corps, out of car to mke ingrtiating obeisance to the authorty of a superor, or at best, out
of the soil of a sensitive conscience. He seres, not the public, but an irsponsible minister. The
question for us is, how shall our series of govermnts within governmnts be so administerd that
it shall always be to the interst of the public officer to sere, not his superior alone but the
comnity also, with the best efforts of his talents and the soberst serice of his conscience?
How shall such serice be mde to his commnest interst by contributing abundantly to his
sustenance, to his dearst interst by furherng his amition, and to his highest interst by
advancing his honor and establishing his charcter? And how shall this be done alike for the local
part and for the national whole?
If we solve this prblem we shall again pilot the world. There is a tendency-is ther not?- a
tendency as yet dim, but alrady steadily imulsive and cleary destined to prvail, towars, firt
the confedertion of pars of emirs like the Btish, and finally of grat states themelves. Instead
of centralization of power, ther is to be wide union with tolerted divisions of prrgative. This is a
tendency towards the Amrcan type of govermnts joined with govermnts for the puruit of
comn purposes, in honorry equality and honorable subordination. Like principles of civil liberty ar
everwher fosterng like mthods of govermnt; and if comartive studies of the ways and
mans of govermnt should enable us to offer suggestions which will prcticably combine openness
and vigor in the adrnistration of such govermnts with rady docility to all serious, well-sustained
public criticism, they will have apprved themelves worhy to be ranked amng the highest and
mst fritful of the grat deparmnts of political study. That they will issue in such suggestions I
confidently hope.
WOODROW WILSON
UR: http: //www .TeachingAmrcanHistory .er/library /index.asp?doc umntprint =65