2008 Japan Soft Power

Japan Soft Power DA
Heidt, Silber, Petersen, and Clark 7 Week Juniors Lab
Japan Soft Power DA

Japan Soft Power DA...........................................................................................................1 Japanese Soft Power- 1NC...................................................................................................3 Japanese Soft Power- 1NC...................................................................................................4 Uniqueness- SoPo high- perception ....................................................................................5 Uniqueness- SoPo high- economy proves...........................................................................6 Uniqueness- SoPo high- Enviro...........................................................................................7 AT- Soft Power Alt Cause ..................................................................................................8 Uniqueness- SoPo high- diverse markets............................................................................9 Uniqueness- SoPo high- multilateral coop........................................................................10 Uniqueness- SoPo high- culture.........................................................................................11 Uniqueness/Link- Japan tech= soft power.........................................................................13 Link- environmental leadership key soft power................................................................15 Link- Alternative Energy key to SoPo...............................................................................16 Link- Commitment key to Enviro Leadership...................................................................17 Link- Japan Backlash.........................................................................................................18 Link- U.S.-Japan Zero Sum...............................................................................................19 Impact- Internal Link- Japan Solo Action key to Relations..............................................20 Impact- U.S.-Japan Relations............................................................................................21 Impact- Japanese Economy................................................................................................22 Impact- Internal Link- Rearm............................................................................................23 Impact- Economy Internal Link to Rearm.........................................................................24 Impact- Japan Rearm.........................................................................................................25 Impact- Japan Rearm.........................................................................................................26 Impact- U.S. Japan- Taiwan...............................................................................................27 Impact- U.S. Japan- Taiwan...............................................................................................28 Impact- U.S.-Japan Relations k to Econ............................................................................29 Impact- U.S. Japan Relations Spillover.............................................................................30 Impact- Japan SoPo key to the economy...........................................................................31 Impact- Japanese Economy................................................................................................32 Impact- Internal Link- Japanese Economy key to World Economy..................................33 Impact- Japan SoPo is key to Hard Power.........................................................................34 Impact- Asian Wars...........................................................................................................35 Impact-key to Asian peace and economy..........................................................................36 Impact- U.S. Alliance key to Chinese-Japanese Relations................................................37 Impact- China-Japan (Straight Times)...............................................................................38 Impact-Chinese-Japanese...................................................................................................39 Impact-Chinese-Japanese...................................................................................................40 Impact-Chinese-Japanese...................................................................................................41 Impact-Chinese-Japanese...................................................................................................42 Aff- Japanese SoPo key.....................................................................................................43 Aff AT: Soft Power NB Alt Causes................................................................................44 Aff- U.S. Action key to U.S. SoPo....................................................................................45
Japan Soft Power DA
Aff AT: Japan Economy NB..............................................................................................46 Aff AT: Japan NB..............................................................................................................47 Aff: Climate not key to SoPo.............................................................................................48 Aff- SoPo Low Now..........................................................................................................49
Japan Soft Power DA
Japanese Soft Power- 1NC

Sustaining alternative technology competitiveness is key to Japanese leadership. Gulf News, 8 (Ramadan Al Sherbini correspondent, Japan showcases clean energy initiatives, 7-10-8, http://www.gulfnews.com/business/General/10227489.html, AG) 'Environmentally friendly products available here', 'For a low-carbon planet' and 'Don't forget your eco-bag'. These and other catchphrases are most likely to draw your attention wherever you go in Japan, as the country is trying to assert its global leadership in innovative clean energy technologies. With an estimated 80 million conventional cars running on Japan's roads, the nation's major automakers are now developed nextgeneration vehicles. "There are some 60 fuel cell vehicles [FCVs], which use hydrogen as fuel," said Hishashi Yano, the director of the Japan Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Vehicle Demonstration Project, an industrial research effort supported by the Japanese government. "These cars cut carbon dioxide to about one third compared to the gasoline cars and emit only water while driving," Yano told Gulf News. "The FCVs significantly mark a shift from the fossil fuel-based society to the hydrogen-based society." Yano expects the FCVs to be commercialised in 15 years' time. "It costs 15 million yen [around Dh510,000] at present. The challenge facing us is to cut the cost." According to Yano, some automakers, involved in the project like Honda, have started leasing this "ecocars" for 60,000 yen per month. Leaders of the Group of Eight (G8) - Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the US - on Tuesday worked on a deal to fight climate change. Japan is seeking support for an initiative that could make its frugal energy levels the new standards for global industries, thereby increasing overseas demand for Japanese energy technology. Target Japan and the European Union have already agreed on a target of halving global greenhouse gases by 2050, but the US is reluctant to set any ambitious goals unless emerging nations, mainly China and India, agree to join the framework. Capitalising on the three-day summit, Japan looks at pains to tout its energy-efficient technologies particularly in view of surging oil prices. Fuel cell and electric vehicles are used as shuttle buses for transporting guests between the summit-related events in the resort of Toyako on Japan's northern island. The G8 First Ladies were given the chance on Tuesday to test-drive the eco-cars. Their husbands will follow suit. Green information technology (IT) is another innovative concept marketed at another Hokkaido exhibition. "This concept focuses on both energy-saving IT equipment and systems as well as on energy-sufficient society by IT usage," said Erika Takeshi, an employee of a Japanese maker of 'environmentally conscious' personal computers. "Our personal computers reduce carbon dioxide emission per year by 33 per cent and have a high power-saving feature." Event Eco-business is, meanwhile, the focus of the 'Environmental Showcase', an exhibition set up inside a major centre for media representatives covering the G8 gathering. "This exposition features Japan's latest technologies and efforts in addressing environmental challenges," Yasuko Yoshida, a guide at the exhibition, told Gulf News. One of the key innovative technologies showcased is 'snow-and-ice cryogenic energy'. "More local and private businesses in Japan's snowy regions are utilising snow and ice stored in winter for air-conditioning and refrigeration in summer. Besides cutting the costs of cooling and refrigeration, this technology will optimally utilise snows, considered by residents of snowy areas to be a headache that prevents social activities during winter," she explained.
Japan Soft Power DA
Japanese Soft Power- 1NC

Independent Japanese leadership on environment key to increase soft power Nikkei weekly 1/16/1995 "nations diplomatic policies should center on environmental protection" LN) <Although Japan has committed itself to never becoming a military power, the nation's considerable economic and technological resources make it the ideal candidate to take up the sword of leadership in another type of war: the struggle to preserve and protect the global environment. The nation should adopt this quest as the center of its diplomatic agenda, which in past years has not been strong enough to stand on its own. Championing ecological causes also offers Japan the opportunity to move out of the shadow of the U.S. diplomatic umbrella and help erase the image that Tokyo's embracement of pacifism is self-serving. With the Cold War over, the perception of security has undergone radical changes. The threat of a catastrophic war between two superpowers has now vanished, to be replaced by concerns that have a more immediate impact on everyday life, such as the squandering of global resources and the abuse of drugs. For threats of this type, the nuclear umbrella is meaningless, and even militarily weak nations can play a major role in eradicating them. However, economic power does not automatically translate into political clout. While Japanese assistance has played a significant role in the economic development of neighboring Asian countries, it is often noted that this aid has done little to win Tokyo greater political trust. Most recipients have tended to regard assistance from Japan as a fee of sorts for access to their natural resources or markets. One way in which Japan is trying to change its image is by placing a higher priority on environmental protection in its official development assistance. At the Group of Seven summit in 1989, Tokyo pledged 300 billion yen in environmental ODA over three years. As it turned out, the amount actually committed exceeded the promised sum by 100 billion yen. At the Earth Summit in 1992, Japan pledged to provide up to 1 trillion yen in such aid over a five-year period. Nevertheless, even this amount won't be sufficient if Japan wishes to make environmental assistance the focal point of its diplomatic thrust. The scale of the U.S.'s Marshall Plan for European recovery after World War II should be remembered . Many experts agree that environmental diplomacy is one area in which Japan is highly competent to lead and where its own interests agree with those of the international community. That assessment is supported by the fact that other countries have increased their reliance on Japan in coping with environmental problems. The U.S. State Department last year called on Japan to engage in bilateral cooperation over environmental issues. And China, with Japan's assistance, is scheduled to launch an environmental-preservation center in Beijing to promote bilateral exchanges in such areas as research and development. When National Institute of Research Associations Director General Susumu Hoshino called for the creation of a North Pacific Energy and Environment Community last year, his proposal drew strong interest. The proposal calls for all major countries in the region, including China, Russia, South Korea, Canada and the U.S. to cooperate and complement each other on energy and environmental needs. With its highly advanced antipollution know-how, Japan is sufficiently equipped to advance environmental diplomacy on a full scale. There is also international demand for such initiatives from Japan. All that is needed now is the national will to undertake the task . > <Insert SoPo impact>
Japan Soft Power DA
Uniqueness- SoPo high- perception

Japan has soft power global commitments, financial incentives, and perception proves Green, 8 DIRECTOR: CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (Michael, THE ROLE OF JAPAN IN SECURING STABILITY IN ASIA, 5/28/2008, http://www.cnponline.org/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/6405) //HBG Japans own defense capabilities well, Japan spends only a little less than 1 percent on GDP. The Chinese, for example, looking at the Taiwan Straits although Japan has no defense commitment to Taiwan the Chinese side now has to calculate that any use of force would be would bring potentially Japan into this. And this is the purely based on Japan's self-defense capability. So its an added measure of stability in the region and dissuasion for those that might consider using force even, as I said, within Japans constitution and self-defense missions. Japan is important. Remember, its the second largest contributor to most of the major international financial institutions, whether its the World Bank or the IMF, the Asian Development Bank, the UN. Japan has soft power. It has some problems on history to be sure, although I would note, and some of you may have seen, that Prime Minister Fukuda had a very good meeting in Tokyo with President Hu Jintao. And today, the Chinese asked Japan to send self-defense forces to Szechwan to help with the earthquake, which is truly a remarkable development and even more remarkably, the self defense forces said yes. So there will be C-130s going. So there are some history problems. There are some efforts to manage those that are encouraging. But Japan is not an isolated, unloved country in Asia, as the Western and American press often tries to argue. Again, Gallup polls, Pew polls show that in Southeast Asia, in South Asia, Japan is a more respected country than either the U.S. or China. And the BBC, in its annual polls on what country you respect or think contributes to the world, Japan over the past few years has either won or tied. Last year, they tied with Canada. Thats sometimes soft power is a mushy, squishy thing. Its hard to know how to tap it, but Japan has considerable good will around the world. That's useful to the United States. Of course, Japan has a key role in demonstrating the importance of our shared values of democracy, of open regionalism, and so forth.
Japan Soft Power DA
Uniqueness- SoPo high- economy proves

Japans Soft power is high economic stability proves Akaha, 5 -- Monterey Institute of International Studies (Tsuneo, DEBATING "SOFT POWER" IN JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICY:IMPLICATIONS FOR ALLIANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES, March 2005, http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/6/9/2/1/pages69216/p692161.php)//HBG For example, Japan's state-led economic development in the postwar decades provided its neighboring countries with an "Asian model" of economic development as an alternative to the U.S.-based liberal market model. Many saw Japan as leading the "flying geese" pattern of economic development across the entire East Asian region. However, others, including many in the United States, feared Japans rising economic power and criticized the "mercantilist" competition of the second largest economy in the world. Moreover, the bursting of Japan's economic bubble raised serious questions both inside and outside of Japan about the sustainability of the Japanese model. The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 also appeared to vindicate the view that traditional Asian values and their institutional weaknesses limited the transparency and robustness of their economies, permitting crony capitalism and counterproductive collusion of political and business interests. However, confidence returned to the political and business elite in Asia as they managed to navigate their economies out of the crisis more quickly than many outside observers predicted. Japan's post-bubble recessionthe longest and the most serious since the immediate postwar periodalso appears to be over, with the nations economy experiencing steady, if limited growth in 2003-04. Japanese corporations, having made some painful reforms, improving productivity, and investing heavily in research and development, are poised to compete in the global market. Although the power of attraction may be generally preferable to coercive power, there are several complications and limitations to the use of soft power as an instrument of national policy. They relate to the nature of soft power. First, effective use of soft power requires that the target recognize and accept soft power as such. That is, a nation's action to project its soft power may be viewed by other nations as attempts to legitimize its hard power role in international security. For example, is the Japanese SDF presence in Iraq perceived by the local populations as a demonstration of soft power, i.e., humanitarian assistance and post-conflict reconstruction aid, or as an aspect of the U.S.-led occupation of their country? We will discuss this question later Concerning Japan's soft power Nye states, "Japan has more potential soft power resources than any other Asian country."13 He observes that Japan is first in the world in number of patents, third in expenditures and development as a percent of gross domestic product, third in international air travel, second in book sales and music sales, second in the number of Internet hosts, second in high-tech exports, first in development assistance, and first for life expectancy. 14 The human development index puts Japan in ninth place in the world, just behind the United States. 15 To the extent that Japan's economic performance is an object of international admiration, the fact that the nation's GDP grew from $1,075 billion in 1980 to $3,053 billion in 1990 to $4,470 billion in 2000 speaks volumes for its soft power.16 As well, Japan's global trade expanded from $445,931 million in 1980 to $758,324 million to $1,124,378 million in 2000. 17 Japan's ODA disbursement grew from $3,353 million in 1980 to $9,222 million in 1990 and to $13,419 million in 2000. 18 Another area in which a nation can exercise its soft power is international peacekeeping. Here, too, Japan has come a long way since its first direct participationas opposed to financial contributionin Cambodia in 1992-93. As of June 2004, Japan was participating in 16 UN peacekeeping operations around the world. However, there are limits to Japans soft power. Nye notes, for example, that the nation has not fully come to terms with its record of foreign aggression in the 1930s, and this limits Japans attraction to the international community, particularly to the Asian neighbors.
Japan Soft Power DA
Uniqueness- SoPo high- Enviro

Japan Soft power high their environmental policy plays a leadership role globally Akaha, 5 -- Monterey Institute of International Studies (Tsuneo, DEBATING "SOFT POWER" IN JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICY:IMPLICATIONS FOR ALLIANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES, March 2005, http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/6/9/2/1/pages69216/p692161.php) //HBG Although Japan had moved up one notch from the previous year, Chinas standing had improved even more, from the 29 th The United States led the ranking in 2004, followed by Singapore, Canada, Australia, Ireland, Hong Kong, and Denmark. This annual rating measures the ability of national economies to attract and retain investment through the creation of a globally competitive business environment. A recent Japanese study is illustrative of how Japanese intellectuals see their nation's power, including soft power. In 2004, one hundred intellectuals were asked to assess Japan's relative power in the world in nine areaseconomy, politics, popular culture, society and education, science and technology, defense and military, food and energy resources, environment, and speech and thought (genron and shiso). Most respondents believed Japan was very strong and progressive in the areas of environment, economy, science and technology, and popular culture. Particularly in the environmental field the respondents thought Japan was strategically positioned to play a leading role in the world. In contrast, the survey participants thought Japan was weak in food, energy, politics, speech and thought, and military power. There was a widely shared view that the nation lacked active policy debate, that journalism contributed little to policy debate, and that Japan should develop multiple and multi-level intellectual networks. 24 In short, their assessment of Japan's foundation of soft power was mixed. Therefore, it is not surprising that most participants in a related survey expressed rather modest hopes for Japan's diplomacy. Nearly 40 percent of the respondents said that in international diplomacy it would be wrong for Japan to possess a sense of big power (taikoku ishiki), and that it was very risky to pursue a particular ideology or goal in the international society. Instead, they believed that Japan should enhance its raison d'tre by demonstrating various meritorious characteristics of the Japanese people. Only one-quarter of the respondents said that because Japan would continue to be a big economic power the nation should make international contributions commensurate with that status in the United Nations and other multilateral fields. 25 These modest expectations contrast rather sharply with the language that many Japanese diplomats use in advancing the foreign policy goals of their government. They advocate, for example, Japan's assumption of a permanent UN Security Council position, more active and more visible participation in international peacekeeping activities, and stronger military alliance with the United States. It is to these areas of international security that we now turn
Japan Soft Power DA
AT- Soft Power Alt Cause

Although Japan has a multi-dimensional soft power agenda, the environment is the vital internal link to global Japanese Soft power The Nikkei Weekly, 6 (Japan should tap its 'soft power' in economy, diplomacy, 10/10/2006 http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do? docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T4235901222&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T4235901225& cisb=22_T4235901224&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=8002&docNo=7 ) //HBG Faced with the challenges of a falling birthrate and aging population, Japan is clearly a mature nation. But along with this maturity also comes cultural sophistication, which new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe can use to his advantage in devising the nation's foreign and economic growth strategies. Abe has vowed to achieve high economic growth and accelerate the structural reform program initiated by his predecessor, former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. His governing principle is "there will be no rebuilding of state finances without growth." The key question is how will Japan be able to achieve economic growth at a time when its population is declining. Abe is the third postwar prime minister to advocate a policy of high economic growth during his tenure. The first was Hayato Ikeda, who became prime minister in 1960 and launched an income-doubling plan and thus paved the way for Japan's high economic growth in the 1960s. The second was Kakuei Tanaka, who sought to drive economic growth through major development projects after assuming office in 1972. When Ikeda called for doubling incomes, nobody doubted that Japan was poised for a high growth path. Tanaka sought to do the trick by starting public works projects across the nation. Abe will have a much harder task than his two predecessors in accomplishing his high-growth objective. This does not mean Abe has no chance of achieving his goal, however. His options will increase if he leverages Japan's latent cultural power. It goes without saying that the Abe government should seek to encourage Japanese companies and other organizations to raise their productivity by utilizing innovation in the informationtechnology sector. But raising productivity in the financial and other service industries really holds the key to achieving high growth in the new age. These industries include such culturally oriented fields as fashion, design, film-making and music, and it takes sophisticated cultural tastes to do well in these areas. They can play a decisive role in an Abe strategy to induce high economic growth. Seven Samurai. Japanese culture is well known around the globe now. Adam Posen, a U.S. economist known for his harsh assessment of the Japanese economy, has a big poster of the classic Japanese film "Shichinin no Samurai" ("The Seven Samurai") in his office. He says he has seen the Akira Kurosawa movie more than a dozen times. Japan has been able to tap demand for goods and services required by China and other East Asian countries that have been experiencing growth spurts. Economic integration in the region might have proceeded much further than it has were it not for Japan's strained relationships with China and South Korea because of differing interpretations of modern history. As Harvard University Prof. Joseph Nye has warned, the issue of the visits by Japan's leaders to the war-related Yasukuni Shrine has considerably hurt Japan's potential "soft power" in Asia. The initiative to create a common economic community in East Asia will test the Abe government's ability to carry out its growth and diplomatic strategies. Abe would be well advised to hold summits with his Chinese and South Korean counterparts as soon as possible and try to bring this concept into practice. Specifically, Japan should lead the effort in promoting regional cooperation in environmental technology and offer blueprints for establishing closer financial ties through economic partnership agreements and an Asian Currency Unit. It is high time for Japan to propose a future-oriented strategy for the entire region. This will go a long way toward recovering the soft power influence it was beginning to lose in Asia. Japan can also make its presence more strongly felt on the international stage by conducting multidimensional diplomacy. As the only country that has suffered atomic bombings, Japan has made it a national policy to prevent nuclear proliferation. But Japan has played virtually no role in the United Nations-led efforts to dissuade both North Korea and Iran from acquiring nuclear arms capabilities. Of course, the basic pillar of Japanese diplomacy is its alliance with the U.S., especially at a time when there are such flash points as North Korea in its vicinity. But the conduct of Japan's diplomacy should be more multidimensional with the ongoing multipolarization of the world as the European Union enlarges its membership and deepens the relations among its member states, and developing countries come into their own economically, following in China's footsteps. Japan will need such a broad perspective if it wants its voice heard in the global forum. Japan, which has focused on developing its economic power in the postwar period, has yet to recognize the potential of its soft power. The nation's soft power, which runs the gamut from traditional and youth culture to goodwill generated by a wide range of international cooperation projects, has potentially much more extensive influence than many Japanese think. It is the Abe government's historical mission to tap and develop this potential. Naoaki Okabe is chief editorial page editor of The Nihon Keizai Shimbun.
Japan Soft Power DA
Uniqueness- SoPo high- diverse markets

Japans Soft Power is high diverse consumer market proves The Business Times, 7 (Japan could extend 'soft power' influence in region; Plans for S'pore to be gateway for cultural products, 324-07, http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do? docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T4235901222&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T4235901225& cisb=22_T4235901224&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=11432&docNo=3 ) //HBG JUST selling cars and electronic gizmos to the world is no longer enough for Japan, which now wants to export less tangible products. And the country's cultural exporters are looking to Singapore as a base from which to boost the trade. The move is aimed at extending Japan's so-called 'soft power' by making the country's media, publishing, animation, music, and a host of other cultural products better known throughout Asia and beyond. In the process, the soft-power invasion could do a good deal to boost Japan's service industry exports, according to Osamu Watanabe, chairman and chief executive of the Japan External Trade Organisation (Jetro), which is coordinating the drive. While Japan's manufactured exports have achieved major market penetration in overseas markets, its cultural products have not achieved similar recognition. Jetro's initiative coincides with a parallel one by Singapore to promote the idea of a Japan Cultural Centre in Singapore. During his official visit to Tokyo this week, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said the idea of the Japan Cultural Centre had been well received by Japanese politicians, parliamentarians and business leaders he met. 'It is an idea which we are keen on and the Japanese have also taken up,' he said. 'The idea is not so much to target the Singapore market, but to use Singapore as an Asian gateway, to reach out to other South-east Asian countries and to get Japan's culture, its popular culture and its language and media productions across so as to increase people's empathy for and understanding of Japan, and therefore increase Japan's influence and standing in the region.' Jetro is undergoing a reorganization, and one of the priorities of the restructured organisation will be to promote soft-power exports, according to Mr Watanabe, citing areas such as media, publishing, music and animation as examples of areas in which Japan has achieved considerable success but by no means universal recognition. The term 'soft power' was originally applied to Japan by US senior official Joseph Nye. He argued that Japan had exerted its power by use of example and persuasion rather than by military force in the postwar period, for example, by its non-nuclear pacifism and by setting a model for the East Asian economic miracle which other countries could copy. But more recently, the term has come to embrace anything from Japanese video games, anime (or animation techniques) and cartoon characters through to music, poetry forms such as haika, karate, judo, sumo and hot-springs as well as board games, flower arrangements and the tea ceremony, according to Kiyoshi Sugawa, a former visiting fellow at the Centre for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the US Brookings Institution. Japanese animation has gained huge popularity because of its high level of artistic content and interesting themes. According to a Media Development Research Institute report, the size of Japan's animation market (sales of films, videos, TV programmes and Internet Broadband) reached a value of $227US billion by 2005. Around 60 per cent of the animation seen around the world is Japanese. Still, there are opportunities for anime and many other examples of Japanese soft culture to penetrate further into Asia, according to Mr Watanabe and others. 'Japanese culture is in a position to offer fresh perspectives to the international community,' Jetro argued in a briefing on business topics. 'Japanese society has long been engaged in a process of importing Chinese culture and re-fashioning it into a distinctively Japanese culture.'
Japan Soft Power DA
Uniqueness- SoPo high- multilateral coop

Japan Soft Power high multilateral cooperation boost Japans creditability and relations Weng Kin, 7 Japan Correspondent for The Strait Times (Kwan, Japan keen on S'pore in 'soft power' drive; PM Abe shares his views on bilateral ties and vision for the region ahead of PM Lee's visit, 3-17-08, http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do? docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T4240773893&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=26&resultsUrlKey=29_T4240773896 &cisb=22_T4240773895&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=144965&docNo=42_ //HBG TOKYO - JAPAN is keen to explore ways of cooperating with Singapore to boost its cultural presence in South-east Asia, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said yesterday. 'We want to disseminate our pop culture, such as manga, and promote Japanese-language education and other cultural fields in the region,' he told Tokyo-based Singapore journalists here. The interview was held ahead of Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's official visit here, which starts tomorrow. But Mr Abe was non-committal when asked how Japan planned to achieve its goal. 'As for concrete measures, I would like to discuss this with Mr Lee when he comes, since Singapore is the hub of South-east Asia,' he said. Such cooperation, if realised, is likely to represent a new milestone in the relations between the two countries, which enjoy close and friendly ties. Besides its already huge political and economic presence in the region, Japan is now also seeking to strengthen its influence abroad through cultural and other fields as a way of extending its 'soft power' influence. Since becoming Prime Minister last September, Mr Abe has been touting his 'Asia Gateway' vision, which hopes to disseminate information on Japanese culture and trends to the rest of the world. The vision also calls for a free flow of people, goods, culture, money and information between Asia and the rest of the world using Japan as the gateway. In recent years, Japanese movies, fashion, music and television shows have become very popular throughout East and South-east Asia. But Japan faces competition for cultural influence from other regional powers like China and South Korea. Turning to Japan's relations with Singapore, Mr Abe noted that bilateral ties were 'excellent'. He also pointed out that the two countries shared universal values such as freedom, democracy and basic human rights. 'As two countries that share these values, we must cooperate for the sake of regional peace and stability. I believe such cooperation will be very meaningful,' he said. He added that Japan would like to develop a relationship with Singapore in which each side would consider the other as a 'reliable partner'. Japan and Singapore already cooperate closely at international forums, including the United Nations, the Asean Plus Three, and the East Asia Summit (EAS). Mr Abe said that he intended to have a 'frank' exchange of views on bilateral ties, as well as the future of East Asia, with Mr Lee when they meet on Monday. Asked if he hoped to visit Singapore as Prime Minister, the Japanese leader said he looked forward to visiting the Republic when it hosts the EAS later this year. He praised Singapore for its constant growth and its readiness to take on new challenges. 'Despite the small size of its territory, Singapore is able to absorb the energy of Asia and make full use of it. It is also a window for Western companies venturing into the region,' he noted. 'Singapore is full of vitality and is always changing into the future. I would like to have another look,' said Mr Abe, who visited the Republic many times before becoming Premier. Asked how Japan-China ties would impact on the region, he said both countries had agreed to develop a 'mutually beneficial relationship' based on common strategic interests when he visited Beijing last year. 'We hope to use such relations to urge China to play a responsible role in the region, and believe it will lead to the constructive use of China's potential power for the long-term stability and prosperity of the region,' he said. Asked how Japan intended to boost cooperation with the members of Asean as a whole, he pointed to the implementation of a five-year exchange programme, under which Japan planned to invite 6,000 youths every year from EAS member states. The EAS has 16 member nations: the 10 Asean members, plus China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. Japan also planned to step up cooperation with Asean in energy-saving measures and the promotion of bio-energy through the human resources training and financial aid.
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Japan Soft Power DA
Uniqueness- SoPo high- culture

Japan has strong Soft Power promotion of culture and cooperation proves Jae-woong, 7 -- Director of the Korean Overseas Information Service (Yoo, Smart, soft powers key to promoting national interests, 12-30-2007, http://www.korea.net/News/news/newsView.asp? serial_no=20071224024&part=111&SearchDay) //HBG It's a competition between "smart powers." The United States was leading in that department since the Cold War followed by Japan. Lately, the United Kingdom, Germany and China have joined the race. Smart power refers to enhanced development of "soft power" to be harmonized well with hard power symbolized through military and economic factors. Thus soft power stands at the core of smart power and is eagerly pursued by many nations. The national power of a country depends on how well one takes advantage of that soft power. Soft power strengthens through interaction with public diplomacy. If a country has much soft power, its public diplomacy will be strengthened. In reverse, if a country performs well in its public diplomacy, it will add more strength to its soft power. This shows that effective public diplomacy is the true power of the 21st century. It is no exaggeration that a country's future image will depend on how well it facilitates its soft power strategy and vision. Japan too is joining in the race to establish a strong soft power with the emergence of its new Diet. Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda showed deep interest toward the influence of its national image during his 24-hour stay in Washington last month. For example, he met with 26 representatives of Japanese education to pick out items of "immediate importance" among the status of Japanese studies in the U.S., the popularity of learning Japanese, private exchange and further drumming up of U.S.-Japanese cultural exchange. Fukuda's interest toward strengthening national image was also confirmed through one U.S expert last October. Gerald Curtis, professor of Columbia University in his contribution to Japanese press expressed how the prime minister showed concern toward the lower-than-expected scholarly exchange between the U.S. and Japan. Reflecting on his encounter, Curtis said Fukuda seemed truly concerned with development of Japan's soft power as a whole along with strengthening relations with the U.S. The professor added he welcomed that thought and said active promotion of Japanese society and its value would greatly enhance Japanese influence in the world. In relations to Japan's budget for public promotion, dividing the sum by total population he revealed its investment to be one third of Germany's Goethe Institute and 1/17th of the British Council. The total number of officials in the Japan Foundation is 348, he pointed out
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Japan Soft Power DA
A2: Environmental Soft Power

Alt Cause Japan Soft power low due to geographical implications, immigration policies, and foreign agression Akaha, 5 -- Monterey Institute of International Studies (Tsuneo, DEBATING "SOFT POWER" IN JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICY:IMPLICATIONS FOR ALLIANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES, March 2005, http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/6/9/2/1/pages69216/p692161.php) //HBG However, there are limits to Japans soft power. Nye notes, for example, that the nation has not fully come to terms with its record of foreign aggression in the 1930s, and this limits Japans attraction to the international community, particularly to the Asian neighbors.19 Japan also faces serious demographic challenges, with its population reaching its peak in 2005 and beginning an anticipated long decline. 20 The nations restrictive immigration policy and cultural insularity further limit its ability to attract productive foreign labor. Moreover, the Japanese language is used by a small segment of the worlds population, constraining the Japanese peoples ability to communicate with the rest of the world. The weakness of the political process is an additional constraint on Japans soft power that Nye notes. 21 The World Competitiveness Scoreboard 2004, compiled by the Swiss-based International Institute of Management Development, placed Japan in 23 rd place, just one spot ahead of China.
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Japan Soft Power DA
Uniqueness/Link- Japan tech= soft power

Japans environmental technology growth will solve for soft power and the US will inevitably follow. Taizo Yakushiji 1994 Japan's International Agenda p. 79 Japan is a leading country in both environmental legislation and technology. Admittedly, Japan is not a political superstate. But even as a political dwarf, Japan might be able to gain political leverage if it more actively engages in the international politics of the global environment, departing from hitherto passive attitudes of a following a conservative course taken by the United States, the United Kingdom, and other industrialized countries. It is quite noteworthy that Germany recently showed, at the 1990 Houston Summit, a more assertive stance with respect to the global environment. If Japan plays a major role in singlehandedly giving her superior environmental and/or energy-saving technologies to countries who are seriously suffering from both security and economic threats caused by deforestation, desertification, acid rain, etc., Japan would be able to fulfill two prerequisites to becoming a soft hegemon, that is, a hegemon capable of exercising co-optive power. These prerequisites are exactly the same as those necessary for hard-power hegemony. They are (1) asymmetry; and (2) the existence of followers. The requirement of asymmetry would be fulfilled by asymmetrical donation of Japanese environmental and/or energysaving technologies to the world, as well as its active engagement in environmental politics and support of environmentally suffering nations. The second requirement would be consummated when other major countries, including the United States, would, in due course, revise their conservative stances in environmental politics and follow the course laid out by Japan.
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Japan Soft Power DA
Uniqueness- Japan SoPo high now

Japanese Soft Power is high now- multiple factors China Daily, 07 (Li Xing, Opening up should include speaking up, March 15, 2007, P: Access World News) A recent survey by the British Broadcasting Corp's World Service asked some 28,000 people from 27 countries to evaluate 12 countries on measures of positive or negative influences on the world.China came out among the countries with a more positive than negative ranking, but still fell behind Canada and Japan, which took the top two spots for good world image. I agree with the researchers who conducted the poll that countries exerting what they term "soft power" tend to win more favor internationally than those that rely on wielding "hard power", or military might. A country's soft power comes from its efforts to promote social progress and well-being domestically and throughout the world through business, education, culture, environmental protection, healthcare, poverty relief and many other areas.Communication to make such efforts understood, paralleling increased participation in international endeavors to make the world a better place to live, also is important. We still have problems getting these messages across to the rest of the world. It's not enough to accuse outsiders of ignorance about China. Nor is it enough to support Confucius Institutes all over the world to help address such ignorance, although of course this is a very positive step. We must improve our own understanding of others, recognizing that our own limited knowledge of the outside world is one reason for failed communications. Japanese SoPo is high now- Cultural Impact proves The Daily Yomiuri, 5-5-07 (Aaron Gerow, Japan cool showcased at film festival in Germany, P: Access World News) "Japan cool" is the buzzword today in cultural relations. While foreign fans of Japanese anime and manga often just want to see stories and styles different from their own domestic fare, Foreign Minister Taro Aso hopes to take advantage of this popularity to promote Japan's "soft power" internationally. Nippon Connection, possibly Europe's biggest Japanese film and culture festival, is a product of this era, representing the fashion for Japan and also exploring new connections that problematize the narratives of fandom and soft power. Japanese SoPo high now- U.S. declining now The Japan Times, 07 (Brad Glosserman, Asias shift in global importance, January 14, 2007, P: Access World News) Nonetheless, the U.S. must be careful. It cannot be seen as opposed to Asian integration; it doesn't have the power to stop it and hindering something that Asians desire is the easiest way to make enemies. Washington's reputation was tarred by its seeming indifference to the 1997 Asian financial crisis. That "may have marked the beginning of the decline in American 'soft power' in the region. When we failed to ride quickly to their rescue, we seemed to many in the region to care less about their wellbeing than we had during the cold war years." Abramowitz and Bosworth are optimistic about the future: Flash points can be managed, nationalism won't get out of hand, and China can become, with proper encouragement, a positive force in the region. Japan's economic recovery holds out hope for Tokyo to play a larger diplomatic role. China figures large in their analysis and few assessments are as concise and accurate. It is, they argue, "the most important question in international affairs in the first half of this century." But as they note, it is a complex and nuanced discussion: China defies simple characterization. The authors support Japan's search for a more constructive and assertive role in the region and the world, but worry about the mixed signals it -- and its U.S. ally -- send about its intentions. Alarm bells ring when former President Kim Dae Jung, a supporter of Japan-South Korea reconciliation, "bluntly told us that he was more worried by Japan's defense buildup than by China's and that he feared the resurgence of Japanese militarism."
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Link- environmental leadership key soft power

Perception of environmental leadership sustains Japanese soft power --- substitutes for military power and helps create a national identity Miyaoka, 4 (Isao, Osaka University of Foreign Studies, Department of International Studies, Japans Conciliation with the United States in Climate Change, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 4, 75-77)//vrs States are concerned about their status in the international system. Alastair Johnston (2001) mentions three motivations for maximizing status, honor and prestige: power, material interests and psychological well-being.4 First, for neo-realist Robert Gilpin, 'Prestige is the reputation for power, and military power in particular*, i.e. 'the perceptions of other states with respect to a state's capacities and its ability and willingness to exercise its power* (Gilpin, 1987, p. 31). In this sense, prestige embraces the concept of a reputation for toughness or resolve (Mercer, 1996). Although Gilpin associates the ultimate sources of prestige solely with military and economic power, prestige can also be linked to what Joseph Nye calls 'soft power', i.e. the power of 'getting others to do want what you want' (Nye, 1990. p. 188), which relies on intangible resources such as an attractive ideology and culture. Second, as neo-liberal institutionalists argue, states attempt to maximize their reputations as trustworthy partners in order to pursue their own material interests. This type of reputation is an asset for making future agreements, on a wide range of issues, with other states on terms advantageous to the reputation holders (Keohane. 1984; McElroy, 1992). Finally, state actors may also seek status in the international system a a means to bolster psychological well-being with social praise. In this case, status can be considered a 'personal' type of state identity, which James Fearon defines as a 'socially distinguishing feature that a person takes a special pride in' (Fearon, 1999, p. 36). In short, for various reasons, states are inclined to improve or at least maintain their international status in some issue areas of international politics. In the latter half of the 1980s, a number of important environmental events started to attract international attention (Caldwell. 1990): the discovery of the ozone hole above the Antarctic in 1985. the world's worst nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1987. and the extraordinary heatwaves and droughts in 1988 in several parts of the world, taken by many as evidence of global warming. These events served as eye-openers for policymakers, scientists and ordinary people, especially in industrialized countries. As Caroline Thomas puts it. moreover, 'the ending of the Cold War provided a real window of opportunity, without which the environmental cause would not have been promoted so successfully at the international level' (Thomas. 1992. p. 14). The protection of the global environment was increasingly accepted as a basic value of international society, which promoted the formation of international environmental norms and regimes. In the year 1989. which Time magazine called 'the year of the earth', global environmental problems such as deforestation, ozone depletion, global warming and biological diversity climbed to the top of the international political agenda. In this international political climate, it is not surprising that 'a few states had begun to regard leadership on the global environment as a means of enhancing their international status' (Porter and Brown. 2000. p. 42). Japan chose the global environment as an ideal arena for its international contribution (MOFA. 1990. pp. 107-109; 1995, pp. 85-87). Japan had several particular reasons for this choice. First, at that time, Japan was searching for an appropriate role as the world's second-largest economy in the post-Cold-War world. This search became serious, especially after Japan was criticized for its slow and inadequate response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Japan could not easily cooperate more fully by using military force, due in part to Article 9 (renunciation of the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes) of its Constitution and to the anticipated negative reaction of its neighbors. Second, Japan's environmental contribution to international society could mitigate the increasing economic conflict between Japan and other countries. The economic presence of Japan was felt more strongly after the Plaza Accord in 1985. This agreement led to a sharp appreciation of the yen. which made the Japanese economy look larger in US dollar terms.-s Between 1986 and 1991. moreover. Japan enjoyed the second longest post-war economic boom. later known as the Heisei bubble economy. The demise of the Cold War highlighted the importance of economic competition as well as international cooperation for global problems. Japan became an economic competitor to. rather than a member of, the West (Mastanduno, 1991, p. 82). Japan was often criticized for enjoying a free ride in the open international economic system. The Japanese government tried to change the international perception of itself from a free-rider to a cooperative state by jumping on the bandwagon of global environmental politics. Third, the emerging principle of sustainable development created a sense of state identity. Japan defined itself as a model state for sustainable development based on its own experiences of late industrialization and pollution control. In Japan's national report to UNCED, the Japanese government proudly stated that 'The experience of Japan, which has endeavored to overcome serious industrial pollution in order to preserve the environment and at the same time achieve economic growth, therefore should be of value' (Government of Japan. 1991. p. 3). In tact. Japan had a comparative advantage in environmental assistance to developing countries since it possessed technologies for achieving an energy-efficient society and for overcoming the serious pollution problems generated in its catch-up economic growth. The antipollution equipment industry became a $5bn sector in the early 1990s (Government of Japan, 1991. p. 32). Japan, as the largest provider of official development assistance (ODA). was able to redirect some of its funding to buttress this new self-image as an environmentally proactive state. In short, concern for international status can explain why Japan became relatively more active in the area of the global environment as a whole. This factor alone, however, is not sufficient to explain Japan's more nuanced attitudes toward various environmental regimes.
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Japan Soft Power DA
Link- Alternative Energy key to SoPo

Japan needs to use its leadership in the area of alternative energy and renewable energies to prop up its dying economy and gain international soft power. Lee 8 LA times Staff Writer (July 7, 2008 G-8 summit gives Japan a green spotlight)//CP During the three-day summit, Japan's energy-efficient products will be on full display. The large international media center was built for the summit with 95% recyclable or reusable materials and is being cooled not by air conditioners but by 7,000 tons of snow under the floor, hauled from the mountains nearby. On the schedule for spouses of G-8 leaders are visits to a zero-emission house and testdriving of eco-cars from Toyota, Honda and others. "We know how to conserve food and energy," said Tokyo economist Atsuo Mihara. Noting that this experience could help Japan emerge from its long economic doldrums, he added, "Our time is finally coming." It also presents an opportunity for the country to take a global leadership role on a pressing world issue. On this, however, many Japanese are decidedly less confident, citing a variety of factors, including the country's don't-stand-out group culture and a kind of timidity stemming from historical circumstances and communication style.
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Japan Soft Power DA
Link- Commitment key to Enviro Leadership

A stronger commitment away from fossil fuel use will bolster its leadership. The world is watching and will follow. Japan Today, 8 (WWF head urges stronger leadership from Japan on climate change, 2-16-08, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0XPQ/is_2008_Feb_18/ai_n24270930/pg_1?tag=artBody;col1, AG) James Leape, director general of WWF International, urged the Japanese government on Friday to take a stronger leadership role in the fight against climate change as chair of this year's Group of Eight summit in Hokkaido. Leape told a press conference that Japan has historically led the world in areas crucial to tackling climate change such as in energy efficient technology, but that is not enough. ''Japan has a proud history to build on. The challenge now...is (for) Japan to step up to a leadership role in helping the world,'' Leape said. Leape expressed his appreciation for the efforts of Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda's administration to lead research on the invention of zero emission technology and to create a world technology fund to help developing countries reduce emissions. But he said he expects more from the Japanese government with regard to its leadership role at the G-8 summit, which will be held in July in the Lake Toya resort area of Hokkaido. Leape noted that Japanese officials have discussed halving global greenhouse gas emissions from present levels by 2050. But he emphasized that Japan must lead other industrialized nations in the setting of medium-term emissions reduction goals. Japan has yet to notably demonstrate its leadership ''the way one would expect,'' Leape said. ''We have to start emissions reduction from now and get some serious reductions, 25 to 40 percent reductions by 2020,'' Leape said. ''What we are looking for is real leadership from Japanese government toward that end'' as chair of the G-8 summit, he said. Meanwhile, Japanese Environment Minister Ichiro Kamoshita expressed his dissatisfaction with comments Thursday by Yvo de Boer, executive secretary of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, that Japan would be able to lead the summit discussions if it set ''ambitious'' medium-term emissions cut targets. The U.N. executive secretary should not comment on the emissions reduction goals of specific countries, Kamoshita told a press conference. ''We need to think of voluntary goals in taking a leadership role'' as chair of the G-8, Kamoshita said.
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Japan Soft Power DA
Link- Japan Backlash

US strength comes at Japan's expense Japanese economic backlash will undermine the alliance Bergsten et al. 2001 No More Bashing: Building a New Japan-United States Economic Relationship p. 236-7 There is considerable evidence that Japanese resistance to gaiatsu has risen substantially and that future efforts to deploy it will be more likely to jeopardize the overall relationship than to win Japanese acceptance of US objectives. As was discussed in chapter 6, this effect could be compounded by the inevitable fiscal pressures of Japan's huge budget defecit and national debt, and the subsequent rapid aging of the population. These pressures have already led to modest cuts in Japan's aid budget and calls to reduce "support costs" for the US military, and they could pose an increasing threat to the security relationship, especially if the overall ties between the countries were to sour. One traditional element in the security debate, emanating from the foreign policy and national security community, has always been that the economic tensions should be ignored or at least downplayed to avoid jeopardizing the broader relationship. As the relative importance of security issues has again risen in the US calculus, with the ascent of China replacing the decline and demise of the Soviet Union, that concept clearly takes on added weight. For the future, the prospects of US "success" for any Japan-specific policy are thus even slimmer. Indeed, one should be careful in measuring "success" in Japan-United States negotiations. If it is measured in terms of a "level playing field," by harmonizing regulation, there is a chance that further negotiations can succeed. However, if it is measured by limiting the amount of Japanese exports to the United States or artificially increasing the amount of US exports to Japan, then its chances are slim.
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Japan Soft Power DA
Link- U.S.-Japan Zero Sum

US competitiveness trades off with Japanese this risks the alliance Omar Sanchez 2002 "The Perils of a Trade-First US Foreign Policy" Australian Journal of International Affairs p. 150-1 This article takes the concept of national interest in a broad sense (that is, not exclusively economic). Hence, questions of security and power cannot be sidelined. Using data from an eighty-year period starting 1908 to test the impact of security alliances on trade, Princeton scholar Joanne Gowa concludes, the play of power politics is an inexorable element of any agreement to open international markets, because of the security externalities that trade produces (quoted in Moran 1990, 182). This study reinforces popular conceptions: trade has been made to serve security throughout the twentieth centurynot just during the Cold War period. Presumably, one can safely extrapolate this observation to previous centuries. The new proposals for economic-centred foreign policy approaches, quite simply, stand in the face of decades of carefully crafted diplomacy, a diplomacy that has always deemed security (and thus peace) paramountconfirming Joseph Nyes dictum. The pre1914 and interwar periods were arguably unipolar moments (Britain being the hegemon in the first case; the United States, in the second), much like the post-1989 epoch. Trade also represented at that time more than a quarter of American GDP, and American growth rested largely on trade; yet, security was never subordinated to other concerns. Past reasoning remains soundand applicable to todays international arena. Moreover, is it really accurate to assert that threats to world peace have receded? This reading of the world made by many in 1990 (and it continues to be made!) does not stand the test of scrutiny. Events since then are eloquent enough: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, the nuclear missiles quandary in North Korea, the Rwandan ethnic cleansing, the East Timor conflict, all attest to the unstable nature of the world. This calls for a pro-active security policy, one that prevents conflict and averts threats. Economism is happy to deal with such problems as they arise, a sure formula for disaster. The sensible prescription: multilateral trade Ultimately, a healthy environment for US exporters lies in the health of the world economy. The recent Asian financial crisis should drive home a lesson for proponents of an aggressive American stance in trade negotiations. In the final analysis, US exports as a whole would stand more to gain had a new world financial architecture been built and such a crisis averted. The lesson is that without a healthy international economy there will be no demand for US exports, no matter how open the markets of US partners happen to be. A crisis such as Southeast Asias puts sectoral disputes and their (rather insignificant) weight into perspective. It, once again, reminds all the parties concerned of the true nature of the economic game. It is a game best described as positive-sum when international trade flourishes and negative-sum when it is stagnant. And for international commerce to flourish, a long term multilateral approach to trade scrapping quotas and lowering tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs)is imperative.
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Japan Soft Power DA
Impact- Internal Link- Japan Solo Action key to Relations

Independent Japanese action to increase its soft power is critical to maintaining a US-Japan alliance Kuriyama 2000 Former Japanese Ambassador to the United States and Advisor to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Takakazu, Japan Review of International Affairs, Challenges Foreign Policy Future, p218) In closing I would like to touch on three issues that will be of critical importance to Japanese foreign policy in the twenty-first century. First is Japan's relationship with the United States. From the standpoint of market democracies and the Asia-Pacific, the two sets of foreign policy coordinates, it is evident that Japan's most important partner in the joint efforts to build a new international order will be the United States. In light of this, Japan will have to keep the strengthening of the bilateral relationship a prime goal of its policy. The major problem in Japan's relationship with the United States, however, lies in the wide qap between the respective influence of the two partners . It is difficult to maintain a healthy relationship with a country that wields great influence in every sphere. It is easy for such a relationship to become one of subservience, which leads to a psychological backlash in the mind of the junior partner, who wishes to become independent from its powerful counterpart. In Japan's case in particular, this is a constant danger, given the countrys need to lean heavily on America for its security. (This need springs from the constraints placed on Japan by its history, a factor I will address shortly.) The best way to avoid this kind of antiAmerica backlash is for Japan itself to strengthen its diplomatic and soft power and pursue a more proactive posture . This will lead to a more equal relationship between Japan and the United States, a close partnership for building an international order. Increase in Japanese hegemony will allow Japan to take the role of a supporter of the United States and enter into the model of cooperative hegemony. Rix 1989 (Alan, Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia, Japans Foreign Aid Policy: A Capacity for Leadership? Japans actions do not suggest that transfer of hegemonic power will be necessarily straightforward or certain. Hegemony, if the preserve of a single state, is today a frayed and ragged authority. Japanese observers have taken a variety of approaches to Japans emergence but the model of cooperative hegemony through a continuing U.S.-Japan linkage, is widely accepted. Inoguchi foresees continued Japanese support for trilateralism and the U.S.-Japan security relationship but redefines Japans role in terms of what he calls a supporter a cooperative partner of the hegemony but with wider options and greater power. Amaya Naohiro, a long-time observer of Japans world role, also foresees joint hegemony, but with a regional slant, which he dubs Pax Pacifica. Okita Saburo, with a slightly different view, sees Japan still searching for a new and vibrant goal for its energies, content to remain as number two without assuming dominance of leadership.
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Japan Soft Power DA
Impact- U.S.-Japan Relations

Competitiveness undermines U.S.-Japan relations Omar Sanchez 2002 - "The Perils of a Trade-First US Foreign Policy" Australian Journal of International Affairs p. 158-9 This article has argued that a US foreign policy based primarily on economic considerations is unwarranted and counterproductive. It is unwarranted because opening markets abroad is, to put it mildly, not the best way to promote American economic prosperity. It is counterproductive because an aggressive, self-serving stance in the world economic arena antagonises US allies and produces negative spillovers into broader political and security dimensions of American diplomacy. A policy dear to the economics-first school was in fact tried during the first Clinton administration. Washington was not able to achieve most of its market-opening targets, while the negative repercussions it generated in other areas of the multifaceted US-Japan bilateral relationship were all too evident. A fixation with correcting bilateral trade deficits, opening foreign markets, and achieving particular numerical targets generates a political backlash on the part of targeted nations, undermines the cause of multilateral trade liberalisation, and brings negligible or no economic returns. As every nation participating in the international arena sooner or later discovers, once foreign policy goals have been set there remains the task of justifying them in the international arena. Nowhere is this truer than in trade relationswhere a countrys policy stance directly impinges upon othersand particularly so for a nation-state that represents 20 percent of world trade and 25 percent of the world economy. What the managed trade experience showed was that a neomercantilist, arm-twisting economic agenda could never hope to gain justification in the international arena.
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Japan Soft Power DA
Impact- Japanese Economy

Technological competition is key to Japanese economic power. Taizo Yakushiji 1994 Japan's International Agenda p. 57-8 Second, technological supremacy promotes a blind belief in economic rationality and efficiency. For example, economically efficient mass production with standardized technology is believed to add wealth, so that new technological endeavors that would shut down the current profitable production lines are rejected. An example is General Electrics rejection of transistors in the 1950s. Third, when a nation assumes a technological lead, it easily develops strong techno-parochialism, leading to technological arrogance. This arrogance blinds people to the secret of preeminence, that is, emulous power. Without the copying and improvement of advanced technologies both abroad and at home, technological leads quickly erode.
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Japan Soft Power DA
Impact- Internal Link- Rearm

Keeping an effective JASA is key to preventing Japanese Rearmament Okimoto, 98 Professor of Political Science at Stanford 1998 (Daniel, The Japan-America Security
Alliance: Prospects for the Twenty-First Century, http://fsi.stanford.edu/publications/japanamerica_security_alliance_prospects_for_the_twentyfirst_century_t he/) This is not to say that the Kissinger-Kahn-Gallois prediction will never come true. The further the time horizon is extended, the greater the chances that their forecasts might materialize. What realist theory emphasizes is the potentially powerful impact on Japan of the rise of formidable rivals in the region like China, a unified Korea, or a revanchist Russia. Power shifts involving Japan and its Asian neighbors could turn out to be the most dangerous fault line in Asia. A power inversion, if one took place, could touch off largescale tremors. Japan might move to acquire military power. Whether such tremors lead to a system-shaking earthquake will depend on a number of factors, not the least of which is JASA's viability. If JASA remains effective, Japan may choose to continue relying the U.S. security umbrella. As long as Japan is comfortable about entrusting its security to JASA, the alliance ought to obviate the need to "go it alone." If JASA is terminated, however, and Japan feels threatened by a powerful Asian neighbor, Japan is likely to embark on a crash program of rearmament. A lot will depend on the nature of the security threat. China's acquisition of a power projection capability is by itself not necessarily a threat; but the combination of an enhanced military capability and uncertainties about Chinese intentions would be worrisome. US withdrawal would result in Japanese nuclearization and militarization. Khalilzad RAND Corporation 1995 (Zalmay, Losing the Moment? The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, pg. 84, Spring, Lexis) Given a U.S. withdrawal from the world, Japan would have to look after its own security and build up its military capabilities. China, Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia already fear Japanese hegemony. Without U.S. protection, Japan
is likely to increase its military capability dramatically -- to balance the growing Chinese forces and stillsignificant Russian forces. This could result in arms races, including the possible acquisition by Japan of nuclear weapons. Given Japanese technological prowess, to say nothing of the plutonium stockpile Japan has acquired in the development of its nuclear power industry, it could obviously become a nuclear weapon state relatively quickly, if it should so decide. It could also build long-range missiles and carrier task forces.
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Japan Soft Power DA
Impact- Economy Internal Link to Rearm

Japanese economic downturn will lead to rearm Time Magazine, 71 (Japan: Into a Colder World, September 6, 1971, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,9438572,00.html) High Emotional Content. The U.S., for its part, wants Japan to become the leading economicnot militaryforce in Asia. That view matches Tokyo's own ambition to become a purely economic superstate, offensive to no one. But the vision could fade if Japan's economy suffers too severe a setback, or if Tokyo finds the world of international diplomacy so cold that it feels compelled to rearm. Avoiding that possibility depends, most of all, on restoring close and easy communications with Washington. Richard Nixon is aware of the high emotional content in the Japanese decision-making process, and that is doubtless why he quickly announced his plans to meet Emperor Hirohito later this month in Anchorage, Alaska, where the Emperor has scheduled a stop on his first world tour. But it will take more than a few symbolic gestures to convince Tokyo that its cold, new world might not be such a dreadful place after all.
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Japan Soft Power DA
Impact- Japan Rearm

Japanese rearm would be rapid and cause India/Pakistan arms races Business Week, 03 -- INTERNATIONAL -- ASIAN COVER STORY (Why Japan Just Might Build Nukes, 1-20-03, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/03_03/b3816027.htm) //HBG No wonder, then, that Tokyo is worried about North Korea's nukes. If Pyongyang were to launch a nuclear warhead, a likely target would be Japan, still despised for its brutal rule on the Korean peninsula in the 20th century's first half. "North Korea now regards Japan as its biggest regional threat and the country most likely to go nuclear in the future," says Takashi Hirose, an expert on Japanese nuclear issues. That has policymakers in Tokyo and beyond considering the once-unthinkable prospect of a nuclear-armed Japan. The U.S. "should remove [its] objections to Japan developing nuclear weapons," said Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) on Jan. 5. The following day, the Cato Institute, the conservative think tank, recommended that the U.S. reduce its military forces in South Korea and Japan and give both countries a nuclear green light. Even in Japan, some senior politicians have broken a long-standing taboo by discussing the possibility of a nuclear buildup. Yasuo Fukuda, the chief Cabinet Secretary, last June confided to Japanese reporters that "depending on the world situation, circumstances and public opinion could require Japan to possess nuclear weapons." Shinzo Abe, the Deputy Cabinet Secretary, said later that it would be acceptable for Japan to develop small, strategic nuclear weapons. Granted, there are big legal, cultural, and political barriers to a nuclear Japan. The memory of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remains burned into the national psyche, and historically some 80% of Japanese are opposed. Furthermore, Japan would have to amend its constitution, which bans nuclear arms. "U.S. policymakers talk about getting Japan to make nuclear weapons, but it will never happen," insists former diplomat Satoshi Morimoto, now a Takushoku University security expert. If Japan could get beyond the hurdles, it likely wouldn't need long to develop a bomb. It has five tons of plutonium stored in the nuclear research center of Tokai-mura, north of Tokyo, and its scientists know how to convert it to weapons-grade material. Hideyuki Ban, director of the nonprofit Citizens' Nuclear Information Center, says Japan could build a nuclear bomb within months. And its civilian rocket and satellite launching system could easily be converted to military use. Japan also has superbly equipped land, sea, and air forces that could deliver medium-range nukes to North Korea. But if Japan decides to build its own nukes, get ready for an Asian arms race. China would likely want to boost its arsenal, which would prompt India to develop more nuclear weapons, which would spur Pakistan to do the same--and on and on into an ever more perilous future. Now is key arms racing will ruin Indian dtente and cause nuclear war Dallas morning news, 04 (AntiOutsourcing on India, 5/15/04, http://www.itpaa.org/modules.php? name=News&file=print&sid=697) //HBG Whether you like or dislike the surprising outcome of India's national elections, which yesterday forced the resignation of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, you have to love the process. India isn't exactly the kind of country where one normally would expect democracy to flourish. Although it has a large and rising middle class, 83 percent of its 1 billion people occupy what Indian public policy expert Sundeep Waslekar calls "the bullock cart economy" people so poor that they can't afford an automobile, a scooter, a motorcycle or even a bicycle. Yet Indians aren't disadvantaged at the ballot, and they showed it by tossing out Mr. Vajpayee's Bharatiya Janata Party. The new administration probably will be a coalition dominated by the Congress Party, led by Sonia Gandhi of the Gandhi political dynasty. The new administration should retain the best of the old dtente with Pakistan and China, openness to trade and investment, and cooperation in the war against Islamist terrorism. The dtente is important to avoid a dangerous and debilitating nuclear arms race, which easily could deteriorate into nuclear war. The free-market strategy is necessary to create jobs for India's deep ranks of unemployed. And the defense cooperation is essential to defeat the Islamists, who have both India and the United States in their sights. But the new administration should do some things differently than the old. (Indeed, that's undoubtedly what voters had in mind.) It should try harder to ensure that the benefits of India's 8 percent economic growth flow to the 300 million Indians who live on a dollar per day or less. It should guide India away from the Hindu nationalism of the old administration, which fostered violence against the country's 30 million Christians, tensions with its 120 million Muslims and an ill-advised expansion of its nuclear arsenal. And it should improve India's response to AIDS, which could infect 10 million to 20 million people by 2010. The United States should cheer the elections as a triumph for democracy. At the same time, it should strongly encourage India to curtail its nuclear ambitions as a contribution to world peace. With the legitimacy that comes from free elections, the potential of India's new administration to achieve is limited only by the quality of its vision India's Reverse: New leader should dampen religious tensions Editorial: Dallas Morning News. For your info only
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Japan Soft Power DA
Impact- Japan Rearm

Conflicts lead to nuclear lash out, causing extinction Fai, 01 -- Executive Director of the Washington-based Kashmiri American Council (Washington Times) (Ghulam Nabi, India-Pakistan Summit and the Issue of Kashmir, 7-8-01, http://www.pakistanlink.com/Letters/2001/July/13/05.html) //HBG The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The Director of Central Intelligence, the Department of Defense, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention. The boiling witches brew in Kashmir should propel the United States to assertive facilitation or mediation of Kashmiri negotiations. The impending July 14-16 summit in New Delhi between President Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee featuring Kashmir on the agenda does not justify complacency. The fatal flaw in bilateral Kashmir diplomacy - which the United States has unreflectively endorsed - is the exclusion of the people whose international law and human rights are at stake and must be satisfied for a viable solution, namely, 13 million Kashmiris and their most representative political arm, the All-Parties Hurriyet Conference (APHC). We, at the Kashmiri American Council are guardedly
optimistic. Because both India and Pakistan have agreed to place Kashmir on the agenda. They have ended a long period of negotiating estrangement. This is good for the region of South Asia that is home to one fifth of total human race. We will support any initiative that will bring Pakistan and India into greater harmony and amity. But one point we want to highlight is critical. In the past weather at Tashkent, Simla or Lahore negotiations over Kashmir ultimately ship wrecked because Kashmiris themselves were excluded from the diplomatic process. That is like attempting to solve the Northern Ireland problem without talking directly with Sinn Fein, or attempting to cut the Gordian knot in the East Timor without including the East Timorese. And was not Kosovos conflict with then Serb president Milosovic addressed through negotiations that included Kosovar Albanians? In sum it strains credibility to believe serious progress can be made over Kashmir without at some time including genuine Kashmiri leadership - the APHC as full integers in the negotiating equation. Indeed, that preposition seems incontestable after 54 years of bilateralism has been utterly barren of results. Any negotiation over the issue of Kashmir without the participation of the Kashmiri leadership is performing Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. Kashmiri history is compelling. Kashmir was one of more than 500 princely states during the British raj subject to British paramountcy in defense and foreign affairs. Paramountcy lapsed on August 15, 1947, the same day that partition established India and Pakistan as separate states. Kashmir then acquired nationhood under international law because it had neither acceded to India nor to Pakistan unlike the vast majority of other princely states. At the inception of its birth, Kashmir was ruled by an autocratic and religiously bigoted Hindu Maharaja despite its 80 percent Muslim population. But his regime was then crumbling under the assault of a widespread indigenous insurrection. Outside support was negligible. Religious freedom, democracy, and self-determination were the lodestars of the freedom fighters. Islam in Kashmir has been exceptionally respectful of the three other Kashmir faiths: Hindu, Sikh, and Buddhist. India, however, intrigued with the Maharaja to thwart the Kashmiri popular will. In return for Indias dispatch of muscular military forces on October 27, 1947, to prop up his oppressive rule, the Maharaja purportedly signed an instrument of accession to India. (Meticulous scholarship by Britains Alistair Lamb convincingly suggests the document is fraudulent). Indias military fought the Kashmiri resistance to a standstill, which ultimately hardened into a cease-fire line. India remains on one side illegally occupying two-thirds of Kashmir, while Pakistan exerts ascendancy of the other side in Azad Kashmir. The crux of the Kashmir conflict, contrary to prevailing orthodoxy, are the rights of the Kashmiri people who have been subjugated and treated as expendable pons for long years. On August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949, the United Nations Security Council, at the behest of India, adopted resolutions mandating a self-determination plebiscite conducted by the United Nations to settle Kashmirs sovereignty. Indias then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru characterized a self-determination solution as the fairest imaginable. But he reneged on Indias commitment, and unilaterally annexed Kashmir in the 1950s. The annexation commands no international recognition, but India has suffered no consequences for its might-makes-right Kashmir gambit. Therefore, the Kashmir issue cannot be regarded as a border dispute between India and Pakistan. Nor is it a fight between Hindus and Muslims. Nor is it a struggle between secularism and theocracy. Nor is it a battle for autonomy. It is about the future, human rights and the right of self-determination of the 13 million people of Kashmir. And they have not conferred on any sovereignty the power to bargain away these priceless possessions. For more than 50 years, India and Pakistan have negotiated sporadically over Kashmir without result. Meanwhile, Indian occupied Kashmir has descended into a human rights inferno vastly worse than anything witnessed in Kosovo, Bosnia, or East Timor. Since 1989, Kashmiri deaths at the hands of the Indian military or its proxies has surged past 65,000, coupled with horrifying incidences of torture, rape, arson, abduction, plunder, custodial disappearances, and savage suppression of political dissent. But the indigenous Kashmiri resistance persists, and largely speaks through the APHC. That umbrella political organization is devoted exclusively to peaceful, non-violent means to achieve the self-determination that United Nations Security Council resolutions and morality have exalted for more than half a century. In sum, the United States should place Kashmir at least on a national security par with Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and the Balkans. It should establish official contacts with the APHC leadership and insist on the
. The United States should also offer India tangible rewards for acceding to Kashmir self-determination subject to safeguards to prevent Kashmiri freedom from threatening Indias national security interests: support for permanent Indian membership in the Security Council; grandfathered nuclear status under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; the ending of sanctions for Indias 1998 nuclear tests; and, closer military ties that would strengthen Indias hand in its border and companion quarrels with China. Only the United States can midwife a Kashmir solution. And the strength of its national security, human rights, and international law interests implicated clearly justify an unstinting effort
inclusion of its leadership in all Kashmir negotiations. The United States should appoint a person of an international standing , like President George H. Bush or President Nelson Mandela, to be a special envoy on Kashmir
26
Japan Soft Power DA
Impact- U.S. Japan- Taiwan

A strong alliance deters china from invading Taiwan and ensures regional stability Okamoto, 02 -- top diplomatic aide from Japan Policy & Politics in News (Yukio, Japan and the united states, Spring, 2002, http://www.twq.com/02spring/okamoto.pdf ) //HBG Opinion is divided about the rise of China as a political, economic, and military power. Some view Chinas admission into the World Trade Organization, the emergence of a civil society in the country, and the decline of the Communist Partys revolutionary ideology as hints of a bright future in which China will seek peaceful coexistence with the rest of the world while its political and human rights practices slowly evolve toward global norms. Others see echoes of the rise of the great imperial powers in the nineteenth century and foresee a fearful global struggle against a vengeful, recidivist Chinese state. Recent events, including the Chinese governments quiet support of the U.S. war on terrorism and the absence of criticism of Japans 2001 dispatch of the SDF, tend to support the first, more optimistic view. Regardless of whether Chinas development takes the bright path or the fearful one, however, reason for concern exists on one issue: the resolution of the status of Taiwan. Chinese citizens from all walks of life have an attachment to the reunification of Taiwan and the mainland that transcends reason. The U.S.-Japan alliance represents a significant hope for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem. Both Japan and the United States have clearly stated that they oppose reunification by force. When China conducted provocative missile tests in the waters around Taiwan in 1996, the United States sent two aircraft carrier groups into nearby waters as a sign of its disapproval of Chinas belligerent act. Japan seconded the U.S. action, raising in Chinese minds the possibility that Japan might offer logistical and other support to its ally in the event of hostilities. Even though intervention is only a possibility, a strong and close tie between Japanese and U.S. security interests guarantees that the Chinese leadership cannot afford to miscalculate the consequences of an unprovoked attack on Taiwan. The alliance backs up Japans basic stance that the two sides need to come to a negotiated solution. Amending the constitution is so onerous, it has never been attempted
27
Japan Soft Power DA
Impact- U.S. Japan- Taiwan

U.S.-Japan alliance prevents China-Taiwan conflicts Chu-kwang, 98 -- Senior fellow at the Atlantic council (Chin, The U.S.-Japan joint declaration: Strategic implications for Taiwan's security, winter 1998, World affairs, Volume 160, Number 3, P. 161) //HBG CONCLUSION The primary purpose of the U.S.-Japan security alliance is to maintain peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The principal threat to the security of the region comes from mainland China, and the chief flashpoint is Taiwan. To sustain its regime and maintain domestic stability, mainland China must be economically prosperous. Prosperity comes at the price of implementing economic reforms and adopting policies of openness. Reform and greater openness, in turn, will inevitably increase interactions with the international community. For this to occur, mainland China's leaders believe it must elevate its comprehensive national strength by building up and modernizing its military assets. This escalation already has produced fundamental adjustments in the structure of mainland China's military and in its strategic doctrine. With an aim to "enter the ocean, toward the world" (jin ru hai yang, zhou Xiang shi jie), mainland China has transformed its national defense policy from a "continental strategy" to a "maritime strategy." Under the stewardship of an authoritarian regime with strong nationalistic and irredentist notions, mainland China is likely to replace its defensive strategy with an offensive one that could include a willingness to engage in military adventurism. Such a calamitous use of China's growing power would cause inestimable and long-range harm to the security balance of the Asia-Pacific region, and even the world. The current and future threat to Taiwan comes chiefly from mainland China. Yet it is far beyond Taiwan's ability to deal effectively with the mainland both militarily and economically. Furthermore, Taiwan cannot unilaterally bring about peaceful evolution in the mainland. The U.S.-Japan security relationship is conducive to the stability of the Taiwan Strait, and its East Asia strategy is aimed at preventing war, not preparing for war. Therefore, Taiwan is more than willing to support the successful implementation of the joint declaration. This declaration guarantees that there would be no drastic change in the Taiwan Strait situation in the near future. However, no status quo can be sustained forever. Taiwan has to face the reality that its future is inextricably tied to that of the mainland. In the final analysis, Taiwan's security will be assured by the emergence of a benign and democratic Chinese mainland, with which some form of union could take place. Fortuitously, the present mainland leadership has promised that the late Deng Xiaoping's policies of reform and "opening" will continue unabated in the coming century. This posture implies that there will be no turning back of the mainland's free market economy and that there is a strong desire on the part of the mainland for stability and prosperity. Such a progressive attitude would continue to exert a positive influence on cross-strait relations. However, until the fundamental cross-strait differences can be resolved, Taiwan has no choice but to maintain a credible deterrent force. A key challenge is to utilize Taiwan's strategic importance within the parameters of the U.S.- Japan Joint Declaration, while developing an overall strategy to ensure Taiwan's security.
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Japan Soft Power DA
Impact- U.S.-Japan Relations k to Econ

Relations are key to the global economy Tyson 2k (Laura, former economic advisor to the Clinton Administration, Council on Foreign Relations, Future Directions for U.S. Economic Policy Toward Japan) The ongoing changes within Japan's economy provide both American policymakers and businesses with opportunities to craft a new economic relationship between Japan and the United States. Task Force members agree that this relationship must rest on the
premise that a healthy Japanese economy serves America's economic and geopolitical interests. Despite its decade-long stagnation, Japan remains the largest economy in Asia, America's third-largest trading partner, and its major ally in the Asia-Pacific region.
Economic collapse causes nuclear war Cook, Retired Federal Analyst for the U.S. Treasury Department, now a writer and consultant, 2k7 (Richad, June 14th, "It's Official: The Crash of the U.S. Economy has begun," Global Research, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=5964 ) Times of economic crisis produce international tension and politicians tend to go to war rather than face the economic music . The classic example is the worldwide depression of the 1930s leading to World War II . Conditions in the coming years could be as bad as they were then. We could have a really big war if the U.S. decides once and for all to haul off and let China, or whomever, have it in the chops. If they don't want our dollars or our debt any more, how about a few nukes?
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Japan Soft Power DA
Impact- U.S. Japan Relations Spillover

Problems on trade spillover to overall relations Kelly 95 (James, president of Pacific Forum CSIS, Washington Quarterly, Summer, lexis) Third, a related shortcoming would be the notion prevalent in Washington that the economic, political, and security spheres can be worked on by different officials using uncoordinated strategies without the effects of their work overlapping from one sphere into another. Although it would be a mistake to sacrifice trade interests blindly for security interests -- a failing often alleged but rare in practice since the 1970s -- it is equally wrongheaded to pretend that damaged relations in one sector
do not cross to another, from, for example, trade or finance to politics or security. This is especially true for Japan, which is still the most important U.S. ally in the region. It has been seen recently that unresolved and bitter trade disputes with
Japan can adversely affect the U.S.-Japan security relationship. n6 This does not mean that trade problems are not serious or should not be aggressively pursued: it does mean that a broader range of U.S. officials needs to be involved with each set of issues.
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Japan Soft Power DA
Impact- Japan SoPo key to the economy

Japanese SoPo is necessary to its economy and global politics David Leheny 6 Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Beyond Japan: The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism, Ed. Peter J.Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi. Chapter: A Narrow Place to Cross Swords <Although Japanese scholars of international relations doubtless knew of "soft power" shortly after Nye coined the term, few used it with regard to Japan until McGray's article appeared. Only the United States, in most eyes, had soft power. In 2001, before becoming finance minister, Takenaka-then a professor at Keio University-edited a volume on the possible development of soft power for Japan. Takenaka's introduction deals with soft power cautiously, arguing that, for historical and linguistic reasons, the United States has soft power resources that will likely remain elusive forJapan. But he also suggests that Japanese economic reform can pave the way toward a more vibrant economy that will once again shape other countries' plans and expectations (Takenaka 2001 a, 2001 b). Other authors in the collection address more straightforwardly the issue of popular culture and soft power. Kamiya Matake (2001) of National Defense University takes seriously Nye sjudgrnent regarding the importance of shared values, and not just the spread of American commodities; he argues that Pokemon and other Japanese anime exports will not lead to greater soft power. Instead, he locates japan's likely soft power in its ability to reform its economy and then take a more active and open role in global politics. The renowned anthropologist Aoki Tamotsu (z oo i ] writes nearly with despair about the uselessness of pop culture in promoting soft power; even though European children watch Pokemon,Japanese studies centers are shrinking, andJapan seems not to be in vogue as a topic or a country.>
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Japan Soft Power DA
Impact- Japanese Economy

SoPo its critical to Japans economy David Leheny 6 Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Beyond Japan: The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism, Ed. Peter J.Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi. Chapter: A Narrow Place to Cross Swords <Japan's economic policymakers have seized on soft power as a crucial wedge for funding and supporting their efforts to promote Japan's "content industries," a term that refers largely to online content. With the Internet revolution, virtually any cultural productfilm, piece of music, artwork, and so forth-can be digitized and transmitted globally. Because the money in information technology now appears to lie largely in the content itself, and not necessarily in the infrastructure used to transmit it, there can be significant rewards for firms, individual artists, and perhaps even governments able to sell people what they want, or perhaps influence what they want. The old Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications11 began to commission reports on inIorrnation technologies in 1995, as did its research affiliate, the Posts and Ielecommunications Research Institute (Uehara 2003, 2). Although these focused primarily on the types of infrastructure involved, they presaged an era in which the government would start to consider the importance of government intervention in the content and not just existence of information.>
XTN Japanese SoPo is key to its economy David Leheny 6 Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Beyond Japan: The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism, Ed. Peter J.Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi. Chapter: A Narrow Place to Cross Swords <This leaves open the question of how Japanese popular culture will ultimately matter in Asia, even if one starts [rom the assumption that its entertainment industries will continue to grow and even dominate. In one possible view, consumers watchingJapanese video games, listening to.J-Pop songs, or displaying a poster of pop star Matsuura Aya on their walls are cogs in the "culture industry" (see, e.g., Adorno 19~Jl). The spread of Japanese convenience stores or fast-food chains like Hoka-Hoka Bento in Indonesia (iHainichi Shimbun 2004) prove nothing more than do the ubiquitous Kentucky Fried Chicken shops in the region. These examples represent little other than the ability of Japanese firms to sell their mass-produced icons and ditties to an increasingly and depressingly global market. This might be good for Japanese firms and, if properly managed, for the overall Japanese economy, but its political benefits for Japan are likely negligible.>
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Japan Soft Power DA
Impact- Internal Link- Japanese Economy key to World Economy

Japanese economy is key to the world economy monetary shifts Meltzer, 00 Professor of Political Economy and Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon University 2000 (Allan H. Meltzer, Cato Journal, Monetary Policy in the New Global Economy: The Case of Japan, Spring/Summer 2000, P: Google Scholar) The argument is often made that devaluation of the yen is harmful to Japans neighbors and trading partners. Japan, it is said, should not recover at others expense. Such statements are based on a misunderstanding. The real exchange ratethe quoted exchange rate adjusted for differences in prices at home and abroadmust change to restore Japans competitive position in the world economy. The only issue is not whether the real exchange rate changes, but how. There are three possibilities. First, Japan can use expansive monetary policy to devalue its quoted (or market) exchange rate. Second, it has been doing the opposite recently, so it must in the future let prices and wages fall enough to restore equilibrium. Third, it can hope that the United States, Europe, and others inflate enough to ease the Japanese adjustment. Or, it can rely on a mixture of price and exchange rate changes. Putting aside hopes that principal foreign countries inflate, wage and price deflation is the alternative to devaluation. There are no others. Those who oppose devaluation as too costly for Japans neighbors and trading partners should recognize that Japanese deflation is expensive also, for its trading partners, its neighbors, and its citizens. In my viewsupported by the experience of the past decade devaluation would be a cheaper, and I believe, faster way to restore prosperity to Japan and its neighbors. The Japanese work force is talented and productive. Japanese producers in many industries have been creative and strong competitors. That is why Japan has become the worlds second largest economy. Although there are the much discussed structural problems, there is a sizeable competitive core that would take advantage of the yens devaluation to produce more. As Japan returned to high employment and growth, imports from neighbors and trading partners would increase. The yen would appreciate. Japans growth would help to restore Asian prosperity and contribute to growth of the world economy. The Japanese economy is key to the world economy trade relationships Kaoru, 92 - Director of the Japan Research Centre at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 1992 (Sugihara Kaoru, Japan Forum, Japan, the Middle East and the world economy, April 1, 1992, http://www.informaworld.com/index/777430768.pdf) Yet Japanese economic growth has been an integral part of world economic growth ever since the 1950s, not least because of the successful diversification of her resource base world-wide, including with respect to Middle Eastern oil. Between late 1973 and 1985 a major trade imbalance emerged between Japan and the Middle East, as a result of the sudden rise in oil prices. Unlike developing countries, Japan managed to continue to buy large amounts of oil from the Middle East at very high prices for about twelve years. The main reason for this was that she was able to earn a similar amount of foreign exchange by exporting manufactured goods such as automobiles, consumer electronics, heavy machinery, and computers to the rest of the world, primarily the United States and the EC (hereafter referred to as advanced Western economies). Although the relations between the Middle East and advanced Wetern economies were complex, it seems reasonable to assume that the majority of the oil money which the Middle East obtained from Japan was invested in the Euro-dollar market (and to a lesser degree in the United States), thus offsetting the two major bilateral trade imbalances created by the Japanese pattern of trade. The Japanese economy is key to the world economy foreign investment Garten, 89 Managing Director of the Stamford Company 1989 (Jeffrey E. Garten, The Pacific Review, Japan and Germany in the World Economy, January 1, 1989, http://www.informaworld.com/index/776479189.pdf) Let me put it this way. The world is changing rapidly. No one can predict what it will look like a decade from now, but we know the kinds of changes to anticipate. We know, for example, that the Asian developing nations are going to be worldclass producers of manufactured goods, and causing all sorts of trade problems. We know that world financial markets will be increasingly integrated and that some form of global regulation, not now in place, will be required. We know that the wave of mergers and acquisitions and the explosion of Japanese foreign investment will see Americans exporting Japanese cars and Japanese computers east, west, and south from the continental US, lending new meaning to interdependence and its associated problems. We know that the IMF, World Bank and the GATT are already falling behind current needs and will have to undergo some major structural reform if they are to cope. And we know that Washington, Bonn and Tokyo will be at the centre of it all.
33
Japan Soft Power DA
Impact- Japan SoPo is key to Hard Power

Japanese SoPo is critical to its international partnerships and a prerequist to its hard power David Leheny 6 Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Beyond Japan: The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism, Ed. Peter J.Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi. Chapter: A Narrow Place to Cross Swords <The appeal of soft power is understandable-and very broad. For japanese liberals, soft power represents a way for nonmilitary Japan to have an effect on global politics. Tsujimoto Kiyomi, the now-disgraced former policy chief of the Social Democratic Party, emphasized that Iapan ' s security policy should begin with a downgrading of the Defense Agency's role and shift from hard power to soft power, primarily expressed through economic assistance." For mainstream or more conservative observers, soft power can help Japan be seen as more "trustworthy," meaning that the global spread of Japanese popular culture can increase international friendship and trust. In this framework, soft power and support for the arts become a component of public diplomacy, thereby helping japan make more effective use of its hard power (Takashina, Fukukawa, and Fujii 2003, esp. comments by Fujii, 20, and Takashina, 22). Indeed, japan's recent expansion of its global security role in support of U.S. military activities in Afghanistan and Iraq would have been impossible without government efforts to build trust with its Asian neighbors (Midford 2(03).7 Because of its impressive elasticity, soft power appeals equally, though very differently, toJapanese policy- and lawmakers of virtually all stripes. Ii Moreover, soft power may represent to concerned Japanese what it did to concerned Americans-that reports of their country's demise are premature. > Japanese SoPo will determine its role in the Asia region David Leheny 6 Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Beyond Japan: The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism, Ed. Peter J.Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi. Chapter: A Narrow Place to Cross Swords <For this reason, the rapid increase in attention in Japan to soft power and Japan's cultural weight elsewhere probably has less value as a tool for evaluating Japan's regional importance than it does as a heuristic device for grasping how Japanese policymakers now see their regional role. And the motifs I have discussed-contemporary Japan's rise from the ashes of economic recession, the continuity between rebellious Japan's pop culture and earlier cultural traditions, and the political weight afforded by the wide acceptance of Japanese entertainment icons-figure prominently in contemporary understandings of Japanese soft power. Whether one wants a nonmilitary and generousJapan or an assertive yet trustedJapan, the prescription is similar.japan needs to support the spread of its popular culture overseas in order for other countries to see what today's Japan really is. It is a changed country, a country of originality and even individuality, a country that remembers its traditions even as it boldly meets the challenges of modernity. It is a country that would not hurt a fly.
34
Japan Soft Power DA
Impact- Asian Wars

Japanese SoPo deters Asian wars David Leheny 6 Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Beyond Japan: The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism, Ed. Peter J.Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi. Chapter: A Narrow Place to Cross Swords <For some, the idea that Japanese popular culture represents modernity to Asia would be highly attractive to Japanese policymakers. In one line of argument, Japan would be an especially appealing country for many around the globe, particularly in Asia, specifically because it has successfully negotiated between the demands of economic and political liberalization , on the one hand, and the maintenance of a distinctive culture, on the other (Takashina, Fukukawa, and Fujii 200g, esp. Fujii, 2g). If countries aspire to be like Japan, perhaps that confers a kind of soft power-an ability to persuade rather than coerce.>
35
Japan Soft Power DA
Impact-key to Asian peace and economy

Japanese SoPo is vital to its Asian image deterring militaristic fears and spreading economic growth David Leheny 6 Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Beyond Japan: The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism, Ed. Peter J.Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi. Chapter: A Narrow Place to Cross Swords <Can Japanese leaders learn how to harness their symbolic place as a lifestyle leader in Asia? The evidence thus far is not encouraging, though not because of any failure on the part of Japan 's entertainment or culture industries, Instead, like those Americans who deploy the term "soft power," Japanese policymakers are likely to be preoccupied by their deeply held views of their nation's values and its proper global role; they are rather less likely to see their nation as outsiders do. Because of concerns in both countries over national decline, there should be little wonder that first Americans and now Japanese have been so quick to embrace the soft power idea, given its reliance on appealing images of each nation. Soft: power contains a special charm for Japanese elites because oftheir country's mixed, ambiguous relationship with Asia Pacific. In one variant, it represents a peaceful Japan that can encourage other nations to become wealthy and wise through Japan's own example and its generosity. In another, it offers the opportunity to convince other people that japarr's development as a normal country, with a normal military, is not to be feared, because this is a nation that has only the best of intentions. If people just get to know the Japanese-through their songs, their television hits, their anime-theywill realize that they are kind and decent, creative and curious, and not to be feared. But no policymakers seem ready to concede that the images being transmitted are of a prosperous imagined future forJapan's neighbors, notJapanese values of transparent and immediately accessible meaning. And so, perhaps what is most remarkable about the sudden interest inJapanese pop culture's political role in Asia is what it reveals about how the Jap- anese government views the region and itself. From this rarefied perspective, the rest of Asia, like Japan, struggles to maintain traditional identities in the face of modernization, and so soft power both emanates from and employs Japan's special position as a non-Western country that has successfully developed both politically and economically. In this logic, part of Japan's bumpy ride to modernization has been the post-bubble collapse of traditional authority structures, and the flowering of creative talents too long suppressed by the country's social stagnation. And so now, as in the past, it is the government'sjob to make sure that these talents are successfully developed, harnessed, and turned to the nation's advantage. I do not mean to argue that government strategies for promoting "digital contents" will fail as industrial policy. Instead, I simply suggest that the discourses surrounding the confounding and ambiguous place of transnational cultural flows provide clues about official intentions and prevailing political trends. These too may be important, and may become especially so through state efforts to utilize current popular trends. But I do not emy those trying to disentangle the Gordian knot of transnational cultural flows-trying to determine what is Japanese, American, Korean, or Chinese-particularly if their political success depends on their somehow getting it right. Roughly thirty minutes into Kitano's film, Zatoichi faces off against a ronin in the middle of a tiny restaurant. Because the ronin, like Zatoichi, is a brilliant and fearless swordsman, their extended battle would be a messy and unsatisfying affair in such a cramped room. Zatoichi blocks the ronin and quietly says, "Konna sernai tokoro de katana 0 sonna fu ni tsukanja dame da yo" (You shouldn't brandish your sword in a narrow space like this). With a narrow space like the Asia Pacific, and an especially large number of swords, it might be impossible to tell whose is whose. '>
36
Japan Soft Power DA
Impact- U.S. Alliance key to Chinese-Japanese Relations

The US is key to prevent a collapse of Sino-Japanese relations- we must act now to prevent a massive conflict in the near future. Minxin Pei and Michael Swaine 05 (Minxin Pei and Michael Swaine are Senior Associates, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) Although the United States has so far carefully stayed out of the fray, Washingtons policy toward Japan and China is one of the principal factors influencing the strategic calculus of Chinese and Japanese leaders. Indeed, U.S. behavior has contributed to SinoJapanese tensions in some respects. At this delicateand historicmoment, the United States must act more decisively to reverse the destructive geopolitical dynamics between China and Japan. Strong, evenhanded U.S. support for a cooling-off period, followed by several concrete initiatives designed to address some of the key sources of the dispute, can significantly reduce the chances of a fullblown strategic conflict emerging in the near future. A Chinese-Japanese war would destroy regional grown, stability, lead to a new cold war, lower US flexibility, and drag in the US conflict with China. Current US efforts fail. Minxin Pei and Michael Swaine 05 (Minxin Pei and Michael Swaine are Senior Associates, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) The stakes for the United States in the renewed Sino-Japanese rivalry in East Asia are huge. It is not in Washingtons interest for Asias two most powerful and influential states to be locked in an emotionally charged, deteriorating relationship that could disrupt regional growth and stability and even increase the chances that a new cold war would develop in the region. A deepening SinoJapanese rivalry would severely limit U.S. flexibility and might eventually drag the United States into a confrontation, or even a conflict, with China, especially if Tokyo became even more closely tied to Washington. More broadly, an intensified rivalry could divide Asia by driving a wedge between the United States and Japan on one side, and China and much of the rest of Asia on the other. Yet to some extent, the United States relatively unsophisticated effort to encourage Japan to take a more activist regional and global security role, combined with its poorly handled response to Chinas growing regional presence and military capabilities, ha contributed to the worsening Sino-Japanese dispute. Washington must give far more thought to how its effort to position Japan as a full-blown security partner in Asia influences Chinas (and other countries) security concerns. It must also pay closer attention to how the Pentagons sometimes alarmist message regarding Chinas growing military capabilities affects Japanese politics and policy.
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Japan Soft Power DA
Impact- China-Japan (Straight Times)

This will escalate to global nuclear war and cause extinction it also turns the economy advantage Cheong, 2000 East Asia Correspondent (Ching Cheong, The Straits Times, No one gains in war over Taiwan, 6-25-2000, Lexis-Nexis Universe)
In the third of a four-part special on China-Taiwan relations, East Asia Correspondent CHING CHEONG assesses the cost should war break out in the Taiwan strait
WHAT if China and Taiwan were to come to blows, will the neighbourhood go up in flames too?
The impact on the region will depend on the intensity of the conflict. Broadly speaking, the Chinese strategists have postulated three scenarios. BLOCKADE: LOSERS AND WINNERS AT THE bottom of the scale is a low-intensity conflict, with Beijing using minimal force to bring an increasingly assertive and independence-minded Taiwan to heel. It will mount a blockade on the island with the limited political objective of getting the Taiwanese back to the negotiation table for a peaceful settlement. No missile will be hurled, neither a physical occupation. Since the use of force is limited to enforcing the blockade, loss of life and property will be kept to the minimum. In such a scenario, the United States will not feel compelled to get involved other than to make some form of token protest. Once that is done and Beijing has made its point, Washington is expected to pile on the pressure on Taiwan to accept the "one China" principle. The negative impact will mainly be borne by the Chinese themselves while other countries in the region might even gain in the short run. Right now, the entire Greater China region is enjoying one of its best moments in history in terms of economic growth.
A cross-strait conflict, even at the lowest end of the intensity scale, will suffice to truncate, if not to reverse, the steep GNP growth trends of the past few years.
Other than the quantifiable losses from disrupted trade flows, there is also the longer-term damage to consider. For example, it took Taiwan almost three decades to establish itself as the third largest producer of information technology (IT) products in the world. It is now the island's single largest foreign exchange earner. The Sept 21 earthquake last year demonstrated the risk involved in Taiwan's dependence on the IT industry. A few days of power blackouts disrupted chip-manufacturing operations on the island, which in turn sent prices of these components soaring worldwide. Not surprisingly, a scramble followed for alternative sources of supply. A blockade lasting three months will devastate the industry in Taiwan. Similarly, it has taken China more than two decades to establish itself as the second largest recipient of private direct investment. In recent years, such investment has amounted to more than 20 per cent of China's total capital formation. A capital outflow will follow if there is trouble across the strait. Other than China and Taiwan, Japan's economy is likely to be hurt too if the blockade disrupts its "life-line" -the sea lane through which flows its supplies of oil and other commodities. Though no physical loss will be incurred, the blockade will force up prices across the board as Japan is so dependent on this sea lane. The Asean region stands to gain in the short run. Those with strong IT industries, like Singapore and Malaysia, will carve a big slice from what was previously Taiwan's share. Similarly, as investment flees China, the Asean countries might be able to intercept this flow and benefit thereby. Politically, the blockade is likely to provoke Sino-phobia in the region. Japan's rightwing forces will seize this golden opportunity to demand a revision of the post-war Constitution prohibiting its rearmament. Asean countries having territorial disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea will beef up their defence budgets. Ethnic Chinese population in these countries may have to contend with increased suspicion or worse as Sino-phobia rises. The US stands to gain. So long as its stays on the sidelines, it does not lose the Chinese market. At the same time its defence industry gains as countries in the region start stocking up on arms in anticipation of trouble. DESTROYING THE TAIWAN MILITARY
THE medium intensity scenario postulates a situation in which Beijing wages a war against Taiwan .
The objective here is to obliterate its military capability which is seen as underpinning its independence movement.
Taiwan is brought to its knees but only after widespread death and destruction have been inflicted on the island and the coastal provinces of China.
The outcome: In this scenario, the US while feeling obliged to support Taiwan militarily is not party to a full-scale war with China. Washington's primary concern would be to keep it to a "limited war" to prevent hostilities from spinning out of control. Limited though it may be, the war will set back the economies of China and Taiwan by at least two to three decades. All the short-term gains enjoyed by the Asean countries in the low-intensity scenario will be nullified as the conflict intensifies. In this medium-intensity scenario, no one gains. Politically, all countries are forced to take sides. This decision is particularly hard to make in those countries having a sizeable ethnic-Chinese population.
THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war.
THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire.
opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape . The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase.
And the conflagration may not end there as Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability,
there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of
using nuclear weapons.

The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention.
Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option.
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Impact-Chinese-Japanese
A strong alliance deters Chinese aggression and ensures Taiwanese stability Self, 01-- senior associate at the stemson center, (Benjamin L., Chapter 12: The China Problem, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security of Taiwan, 2001, http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=RESSpecNet&fileid=C8D09CBF-3F88-F467-B52A01842714CA38&lng=en) // HBG As discussed above, the United States and Japan share a basic interest in preserving the status quo regarding Taiwan itself, pending the emergence of an environment more conducive to Peaceful Resolution. Thus, the number one priority for the two countries in regard to Taiwan is to: Preserve separate status of Taiwan at minimal cost. Minimal cost means more than the costs associated with direct military deterrence of China, to say nothing of military conflict with China. It must also include avoiding a breakdown of cooperation with China in areas of vital interest. The U.S. and Japan share vital interests in several areas of cooperation with the PRC. To be brief, these are: Supporting a constructive regional role for China on the Korean Peninsula and in the South China Sea. Avoiding turmoil or oppression within China. Preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced military technologies (AWACS, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, encryption, etc.)The allies also share interests and values that impel them to seek some transformation in the character of the PRC regime: Advance the rule of law in both economic and political arenas. Promote respect for human rights. Support the rise of pluralism and gradual democratization. Policy Tools for Maintaining the Security of Taiwan The allies have available to them a wide range of tools with which to advance these interests. Typically these are considered in two groups: military options for deterrence or defense; and economic, cultural, and other interactions for engagement. Diplomacy straddles the divide, as it can either signal to China that military pressure on Taiwan will lead to confrontation or assure China that the allies have no intention to support Taiwans independence. The alliance itself, properly understood as a broad-based partnership rather than a purely military one, can serve as an umbrella to approach China. In particular, it can contribute to stability in the area around Taiwan, embodying both the deterrence function and the reassurance function. The following elements include those that are traditionally considered alliance functions as well as those that have in the past been conducted outside the rubric of the alliance but could conceivably be folded in. U.S. forward-deployed forces U.S. use of SDF bases and Japanese civilian facilities Joint operations with Japan Self-Defense Forces Support for Taiwans defense capability through arms sales and cooperation Strengthening Taiwans economic and political development Confidence-building measures, including military-to-military dialogue U.S.-based forces Trilateral or multilateral dialogue, including political exchange Arms control Trade and investment agreements, especially the World Trade Organization (WTO) Scientific, cultural, and other cooperation, including peaceful space development. Recommendations for Advancing Alliance Interests in China/Taiwan Always place them in the context of broader regional interests. A narrow focus on Taiwan leads to simplistic linkage of tools to aims without sufficient consideration of larger but extraneous factors. The alliance is clearly the greatest interest of the United States and Japan in the region, and although defense of Taiwan is also a major interest, it would be a mistake to unnecessarily put the alliance at risk for the benefit of Taiwan. The U.S.-Japan alliance is our strongest asset, but a clear and direct role for it in defense of Taiwan may not be the best solution to the military threat to Taiwans security. Establishing such a role would overlook the second-order ramifications, such as increased politicization of defense policy in Japan at a time when Tokyo is finally overcoming decades of stagnation and defense allergy. Because Japan is largely unwilling to sacrifice relations with China over this issue, it may be impossible to make the alliance stronger if it is seen as only for Taiwans defense. While we should be confident that Japanese national interests are much more clearly in maintaining the alliance if push comes to shove, we should also recall Tokyos deer in the headlights response to the Persian Gulf crisis. Hoping to minimize damage to Japan-China relations, Tokyo may dawdle even in the face of disaster. Again, although the political elite strongly supports the alliance, there is probably enough caution to cause paralysis. If Japan does make China angry and Tokyo must not be afraid to do that might not the deterioration in ties with China embolden Taiwan to move even more briskly toward solidifying its separate status, enabling the very crisis we are hoping to prevent? The point here is emphatically not to argue against using the alliance as the basis for approaching China. In fact, the very opposite is intended. The U.S.-Japan alliance must come first in our regional policy formulation, and then a strong, common U.S.-Japan posture can assert control over the flow of events and policy positions. What this means to argue against is the notion that Japan can be used, after policies are decided in Washington, as an adjunct to U.S. power. This is the tradition and it has been easy to do
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Japan Soft Power DA
Chinese military spending and economic growth guarantees conflict without a stronger U.S. Japan alliance Okazaki, 2 -- ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Thailand, research fellow at the Yomiuri Research Institute, 3-4-2002, Lexis //HBG
By most accounts, the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the United States have changed the world. U.S. public opinion--which has exerted a decisive influence on the course of world events in the 20th century--is leading the country toward, on the one hand, a resurgence of patriotism and displays of comradeship among its compatriots and, on the other hand, interventionism, as opposed to isolationism, in foreign relations. This is noticeably reflected in U.S. President George W. Bush's Jan. 29 State of the Union address. Here, one reservation is made by saying "most accounts," because public opinion is by nature unpredictable, and no one can say how long this new U.S. tendency will continue. Worthy of note in connection with this is that some countries are little affected by changes in the United States. A case in point is China, which has formed a microcosm unto itself throughout history. The fate of the world this century will depend considerably on the future of China as well as the new posture of the United States. A week before the terrorist attacks, Newsweek spotlighted China in its Sept. 3 edition, calling it "China Inc." an obvious pun on what Japan was called at one time--"Japan Inc." The two-page illustration depicted China as a huge red octopus spreading its tentacles over the globe. This was an image that struck a nerve in news centers the world over. The Sept. 11 attacks turned the media's attention away from China for some months. After the war against terrorism passed a critical stage, the Jan. 30 issue of the Japaneselanguage version of Newsweek put the focus back on China, this time playing up the danger that Chinese economic aggression poses to Japan. On the cover was a giant blue fire-breathing dragon. If not for the events
China's economic growth must surely rank as one of the wonders of the modern world, but the problem is that it has resulted in more harm than benefit to neighboring economies. And its increasing strength threatens to destabilize the power balance in the Asian region in the long run.
triggered by Sept. 11, the glare of the world's media would have been trained on China throughout the autumn as Beijing readied itself to join the World Trade Organization. Economic wonder. Last summer, critics around the world began warning of the menace posed by China after it posted its economic figures for the first half of the year 2001. The data showed that China was the sole winner in trade competition on the international market. Whether it can keep up the pace is an open question, and predictions abound on the future of the Chinese economy. One school of thought insists that the dragon cannot keep breathing flames for long. Adherents to this theory point to a range of factors that could work to slow China's high economic growth: internal tension within the socialist economic system; constraints due to environmental pollution; public demand for democratization, which is expected to rise as a result of economic development and a subsequent decline in the central authority of the ruling party. There may be some substance to these predictions, and they certainly cannot be ruled out. However, it seems that the probabilities of such developments will be more or less lower than the chances of the Chinese economy continuing to expand for the foreseeable future. Since no one can really predict the future, it is more expedient for us to confine our attention to those things that may directly affect Japan. This is in line with the dictates of "senyu-koraku"--wise men worry ahead of common people and
, the risk that China will enter a stagnant phase in both economic and military strength should by rights worry Chinese the most. It is not Japan's business to butt in on things that are not our concern, although we may deal with such problems as and when they affect us. It would be reckless for us to be complacent, assuming that China's high economic growth is bound to stop in the near future. I have long been convinced, from a macroeconomic point of view, that the Chinese people have a high potential for achieving sustainable growth. China has a population
enjoy themselves afterward. In other words of 1.2 billion and a long list of accomplishments that include one of history's most advanced civilizations and a succession of great dynasties. Each individual member of this highly talented society has been striving to be richer tomorrow than today ever since the launching of the reform policy in 1978. China's economic growth is assured as long as its growth potential, which is based on low labor costs, is retained. China's 'multiplier effect' For the past 20 years since the open-door policy and reforms began, an army of several hundred thousand Chinese have been graduating from universities every year to join the country's more advanced workforce. Also, intellectuals who fled in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen incident have acquired business and engineering expertise on the international market and are returning home. Add to these factors the low cost of labor, and it is evident that few countries can compete successfully with China. But there is a problem. China's neighbors are concerned about its high economic growth, which they see as damaging, instead of beneficial, to their own
The increase in China's economic might also mean the flight of investment funds away from Japan, Taiwan and Singapore, causing their own industries to suffer. Of course, no business deal takes place without both parties profiting. But even then, the degree to which a country ultimately benefits from such a deal is governed by the so-called multiplier effect--the degree to which business profits raise gross domestic product. The multiplier effect varies greatly depending on who receives the initial investment.
interests. Indeed, for Southeast Asian nations, Chinese manufacturers are their direct competitors. Moreover, the higher the growth rate of a country, the larger its multiplier effect. Let's say a Japanese company invests in China and both the Japanese and its Chinese partners make 1 million dollars from the venture. While the growth in gross domestic product on the part of the investor's country, Japan, is limited to 1 million dollars in the deal, the GDP of China, with a large multiplier effect, stands to gain much more. No way of reversing
. If Japanese companies operating in China are obliged by Chinese policy to channel their profits into new investments in China, this will result in a net flow of cash to China. Furthermore, as more Japanese companies shift their production bases to China and close plants in Japan, the multiplier effect in Japan on the firms' profits will be on the minus side. In this way, Japanese industry is becoming hollowed out. Furthermore, foreign companies in China have encountered an endless list of troubles, such as Chinese authorities' fickle interpretation of economic regulations, arbitrary commissions charged on foreign companies' profits, noncompliance with contract provisions, copyright violations and failure to make payments. However irrational Chinese business practices may seem to outsiders, I have noticed these
trend irregularities may be fairly rational when seen from the point of view of the Chinese. China understandably wants to obtain technical know-how from abroad. It is also understandable that, once the Chinese acquire the relevant expertise, they will not want foreign companies continuing to profit from the Chinese market. This is just what such countries as Japan and South Korea have done in the past. In the postwar era, Japan imported a wide range of manufacturing technologies from the United States, but hardly any U.S. manufacturing companies are making money in Japan today. Like many other countries, China strives for independence in all but a
China may have been fascinated by the Japanese style of running department stores. However, if they became familiar with the system, they may no longer be willing to allow Japanese department store chain operators to continue making profits in China. There is no way to halt the expansion of the Chinese economy, just as there was no way for the United States to reverse Japan's growing economic strength from the 1960s to the 1980s--a trend the United States accurately anticipated, but could not prevent. Ensure balance of power. There can be no doubt that China's military spending will inevitably be boosted. In any country, the allocation of the budget is a hard-fought battle between government organizations, with the spoils going to the most powerful bodies. In China, this means the military, having an overwhelming say in the government, will continue to receive the lion's share of the budget. Military spending in China will probably double before the next decade, quadruple in the next 15 years, and balloon 10-fold 30 years from now. It is worth recalling former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's brilliant analysis of the situation in Europe just before World War I.
handful of specialized fields for which it has to depend on foreign countries. For example, Kissinger says peace in Europe in the 19th century was maintained by a balance of power between the region's five major nations, none of which had any clear military advantage. However, Germany proceeded to make remarkable gains in economic strength, upsetting the balance of power without changing national boundaries, he notes. In much the same way, China will continue to make drastic increases in its national strength, and this
Strengthening Japan's alliance with the United States is the only way in which Washington and Tokyo can cope with this situation. Suppose that Japan resolves the impasse over its right to exercise collective self-defense, allowing itself to fully commit militarily to achieving goals common to Japan and the United States under the bilateral alliance. This would enable a balance of power effective enough to facilitate peaceful conflict resolution in the Asian region for at least the next 20 to 30 years. It is, of course, meaningless to try to reverse a predominant economic trend by economic measures. Japan should be gratified to see improvements in the living standards of our neighbor, China, after it suffered miseries for so many years as it lagged behind the mainstream of modernization in the 19th century . It would therefore be adequate for Japan if it is able to maintain peace in Asia by paying due attention to changes in the regional balance of power that are bound to result from China's economic progress.
will gradually but inevitably upset the balance of power in Asia.
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Japan Soft Power DA
China wants a strong alliance because it keeps Japanese militarism in check, they don't perceive alliance as hostile Zagoria& Rivlin, 97 -- *Professor of government and Director of the National Committee on American Foreign Policys Project ** Director of the Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations and Professor Emeritus of Political Science (Donald, Benjamin, Revitalizing the USJapan Alliance, May 1997, www.ciaonet.org/conf/bun03/bun03d.html) //HBG No matter what the United States and Japan claim to have had in mind in strengthening the alliance, it is critically important to understand how the alliance, and especially the recent moves to revitalize it, is perceived by other countries. While the United States and Japan are in no way beholden to the views of other countries, it is necessary to be aware of the impact these changes will have on specific countries and the region as a whole. It is obviously necessary, but far from easy, to distinguish between a countrys rhetorical criticism that changes in the alliance will inevitably engender, and a countrys perception that such changes are inimical to its national security interests. To provide a deeper understanding of regional views on the USJapan alliance, the organizers of the conference invited representatives from several East Asian countries to participate as well as several American and Japanese scholars familiar with attitudes in East Asia. China: Of all East Asian countries, China has the most at stake with respect to any changes in the US Japan relationship. For many years, Chinese leaders viewed the alliance as a bulwark against the Soviet Union and also as a major impediment to the possible resurgence of Japanese militarism. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Chinese analysts now believe that the security alliance will be directed against China. This view was strengthened due to the timing of the USJapan Joint Security Declaration which was in announced in April 1996, within a few weeks of the Taiwan Strait crisis. The original plan was for the Declaration to be issued in the fall of 1995, but it was delayed because President Clinton was forced to postpone his visit. The timing of the Declaration probably led to a considerable Chinese overstatement of the Declarations alleged anti-Chinese intent. A Chinese commentator at the meeting analyzed Chinas thinking about the USJapan alliance. Chinese academics, he said, can be divided into two groups. The majority believe that the USJapan alliance is "in part" directed against China because the basic US policy toward China is "engagement" with an "element of containment." But a "growing minority" believes that the USJapan alliance is directed mainly against China. Officially, the Chinese scholar said, the Chinese government has adopted a wait-and-see attitude and the future of the debate will depend on US policies and actions. He added that his own conclusion from recent developments was that there had been no basic change in the Chinese position on the alliance. China accepts the alliance if it checks Japan from going it alone and from becoming militaristic, and if the alliance contributes to peace and stability, and if it is not directed against China. Chinese leaders face a dilemma. If the United States were to end the alliance and withdraw from East Asia, then China would lose the buffer between itself and Japan. Without this buffer, Japan might well decide to increase the size and capabilities of its military. Sooner or later, the two East Asian powers could confront one another. Given the technological superiority of Japanese industry and the massive revenues on which it can draw, the Chinese would be hard put to compete with Japan in a regional arms race and it would divert resources away from economic modernization. Such a scenario is clearly not in Chinas interest. China could, on the other hand, acquiesce and allow Japan to take on more responsibility within the alliance framework. But this choice could also work against Chinese interests in the long term. While the current talks on revising the Guidelines on USJapan Defense Cooperation involve only limited changes in Japans responsibilities, it is possible that this is only the first step in what could be an ongoing effort to expand Japans capabilities within the alliance framework. If so, China faces the prospect of confronting an alliance in which Japans role is gradually expanding. This scenario was lent greater credence during the Taiwan Strait crisis, when two US aircraft carriers anchored off Taiwan while Japanese Maritime Security Agency patrol boats were sent to the region south of Okinawa. Given its desire to focus on economic growth and modernization, China has no wish to antagonize the United States or Japan. If China is to develop, access to US and Japanese markets, technology and capital are essential. Access, in turn, depends on the perception that China is not a threat to East Asian stability and prosperity. Should that perception be altered by sufficiently egregious actions, China could be the target of serious economic retaliation. But the influence of nationalistic attitudes cannot either be discounted. Given Chinas recent history, no leader can afford to vacillate on territorial or other issues that have a deep emotional component. If the United States and Japan were to take action to claim the disputed Senkaku Islands, or to defend the claims of Southeast Asian countries in the South China Sea or to support separatist trends on Taiwan, Chinese leaders would find it difficult not to act. At present, Chinas interests are best served by a peaceful regional environment and it would prefer that all potentially explosive issues, such as territorial disputes, are shelved until it has the power and influence to gain a favorable outcome. In the meantime, Chinese leaders would prefer to see a trilateral regional security system emerge in which they are accorded the status and respect that the United States and Japan enjoy.
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Japan Soft Power DA
East Asia is stretched thin. Keeping relations strong is critical to stop another world war. Telegraph, 05 (Anton La Guardia, The clouds of nuclear war are still hanging over Hiroshima, 03/08/05, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2005/08/03/do0301.xml, AG) In Asia, however, wartime resentments of Japan are still acute. Several anti-Japanese riots broke out in China last spring, tolerated by the authorities, after the publication of new textbooks seen as playing down Japanese atrocities. Even a democratic country such as South Korea harbours a deep resentment of Japan, and there have been protests in Seoul over the status of islands claimed by the two countries. It is difficult to see Asia's leaders standing side by side any time soon to remember the fallen as Europe's leaders do for joint commemorations of the Second World War. The idea of a major new war, seen as unthinkable in Europe, is far from outlandish in Asia. Academics now compare the growing Sino-Japanese competition for natural resources and economic dominance to the contest between Germany and Britain at the start of the war-blighted 20th century. North Korea test-fired ballistic missiles over Japanese territory in 1998. Three years later, the Japanese coastguard chased and sank a North Korean spy ship. Last year Japanese ships and planes tracked a Chinese submarine snooping in territorial waters. As China devotes much of its new wealth to modernising its armed forces, the likeliest flashpoint is Taiwan, a former Japanese colony. China has made no secret of its readiness to resort to force to stop the island from seceding formally, and the US is committed to defending Taiwan. It is unlikely that Japan could escape involvement. Indeed, one scenario is that China could emulate Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor with a pre-emptive strike on US forces in Okinawa. Japan has started to flex military muscles atrophied by decades of pacifism. Its forces are developing the ability to operate at greater distances and the war-renouncing constitution has been stretched to the limit with deployments in East Timor, the Indian Ocean and now the "reconstruction" mission in southern Iraq. Japan is demanding a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council alongside the victors of the Second World War. Even in Hiroshima, some Japanese have started to talk of the ultimate taboo: developing a nuclear deterrent. Strong relations are key to continued Chinese growth. IIPS, 8 (Institute for International Policy Studies, A New Chapter in JapanChina Relations, 4/23/08, http://www.iips.org/jcr/jcre.pdf, AG) Although China is currently flourishing as a state (with the Olympic Games and the World Expo imminent), it faces a number of intractable problems, in relation to internal politics, the environment, water resources, and energy, among other issues. How well China handles these problems will affect the nations fate in the long term and will also have important implications globally. As Chinas neighbor, Japan should strongly encourage China to actively address these problems, and shouldif China so requestsfully cooperate with China to resolve them, chiefly through the provision of soft assistance, such as technology and expertise. In particular, given that natural resources and conservation of energy are national issues for China, it would be desirable for Japan to make full use of its relevant technology and its experience in these spheres in China as well.
42
Japan Soft Power DA
Aff- Japanese SoPo key

Japanese SoPo is indeterminate for its effect it has on the globe just like American sopo David Leheny 6 Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Beyond Japan: The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism, Ed. Peter J.Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi. Chapter: A Narrow Place to Cross Swords <This means. that Gross National Cool and soft power are almost, certainly going to be politically consequential, though perhaps not in the way that the terms' users might suppose. If we think of soft power not as a category of power resources but rather as an idea-a component of a cultural and ideographical structure of governance-it can affect Japanese policy even if Japan does not really have soft power. Of course, whether Japan has soft power or not is almost certainly impossible to tell, and is not in itself germane to policy. After all, the term "soft power" became popular in the United States not only because of Nye's writings and his important position in international relations theory but also because it sat well with Americans' views of themselves. Because American culture and values are constitutive of Americans, it is practically impossible for Americans to determine effectively whether their values are really shared or not. The same is likely true for Japanese.>
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Japan Soft Power DA
Aff AT: Soft Power NB Alt Causes

Too many other barriers stop solvency for soft power like relations, the UN, the war on terror, promoting peace, and Gitmo. IHT, 7-21-08 (Stanley Weiss founding chairman of Business Executives for National Security, a nonpartisan organization based in Washington, AMERICA'S IMAGE: How to electrify the world, 7-21-08, http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/07/21/opinion/edweiss.php, AG) There were familiar appeals: Don't attack Iran; improve relations with Russia and reduce nuclear weapons; embrace China and India as true partners; reform the United Nations with a more inclusive Security Council. Many called for a smarter approach to terrorism, like Dr. Zulkieflimansyah, an Indonesian parliamentarian (who, like many Indonesians, uses one name and is more commonly known as Zul). He said the next president should build a "bridge of reason and understanding with the Islamic world." One person suggested a presidential visit to a mosque outside the U.S. "He should use speeches and visits to emphasize the values that Muslims and Americans have in common," said Bijan Khajehpour, a Tehran-based analyst, "especially compassion, a core value in Islam." There were the expected calls for a U.S. exit from Iraq, which Obama supports and McCain opposes, suggesting a McCain presidency could have a harder time burnishing America's image. Likewise, many urged the next president to meet foreign adversaries, as Obama has expressed a willingness to do. "If Nixon could go to China and Reagan to the Soviet Union," a European diplomat asked, "why can't the American president go to Iran?" Others called for a more aggressive push for Arab-Israeli peace, including a more "even-handed" approach by Washington and stronger opposition to expanded Israeli settlements. But the one piece of advice offered most often was something more basic: a return to multilateral diplomacy, including a new attitude by the president himself. "The next president should take more account of the sentiments of other people, not just Americans," said Masaki Orita, a former Japanese diplomat, echoing the sentiments of many. "Restore global trust and confidence by working with and listening to others," said Gurdist Chansrichawla, a Thai venture capitalist, "and everything else will follow." In other words, the next president will give America a public relations boost simply by not being George W. Bush. Beyond that, the leaders I surveyed highlighted several areas where American action could win back hearts and minds. Human rights. No U.S. president is likely to "cease support for all dictators," as urged by Syed Abida Hussain of Pakistan's Peoples Party. But closing the military prison at Guantnamo Bay and foreswearing torture would generate enormous international goodwill. America would again be seen as the "shield of freedoms, not their masked trampler," said Carlos Fuentes, the Mexican novelist.
44
Japan Soft Power DA
Aff- U.S. Action key to U.S. SoPo

US action on environmental issues solves for soft power. IHT, 7-21-08 (Stanley Weiss founding chairman of Business Executives for National Security, a nonpartisan organization based in Washington, AMERICA'S IMAGE: How to electrify the world, 7-21-08, http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/07/21/opinion/edweiss.php, AG) The environment and energy. With Americans consuming more oil, and spewing more greenhouse gases, than any other nation, U.S. leadership on energy and climate change is seen as indispensable. A European-style cap-and trade system to reduce carbon emissions which both Obama and McCain favor - would be a start, as would embracing the conventions of the Kyoto protocol. Shyam Saran, India's special envoy for climate change, suggests going further with "an American-led global effort on renewable energy along the lines of the 1950s Atoms for Peace program" to share new technologies with other countries.
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Japan Soft Power DA
Aff AT: Japan Economy NB

No Impact Japans Economy is one of the most preparred for oil shocks in the world. Lee 8 LA times Staff Writer (July 7, 2008 G-8 summit gives Japan a green spotlight)//CP RUSUTSU, JAPAN Even as most of the world struggles with soaring fuel and food prices, two major issues facing President Bush and seven other leaders meeting here this week, many in Japan see an opportunity to shine during these tough economic times because of this nation's long-running conservation programs. Since the oil embargo crisis in 1973, Japan has done more than most nations to reduce its heavy reliance on crude oil and develop green technologies, whether battery-powered cars or solar panels. That means the world's second-largest economy is better able than many to withstand the latest oil shock. Japan's efforts to go green also give its leaders, hosts of the Group of 8 major industrial nations summit beginning today, greater standing to push their agenda on global warming. As chairman of this year's G-8 summit, Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda has urged the group to agree to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by half by 2050. But at a news conference Sunday after bilateral meetings between leaders, Fukuda appeared to lower expectations that an agreement would be won, while Bush again said that China and India, two major polluters, needed to be involved in any such accord. China and India are not members of the G-8, although they are invited as guests at the summit. The G-8 group comprises the U.S., Japan, Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Canada and Russia. The summit is being held in a remote mountaintop hotel on the island of Hokkaido, away from thousands of protesters gathered in Hokkaido prefecture's capital, Sapporo. At the news conference, Bush defended his decision to attend the opening ceremony of the Olympics next month in Beijing, saying that it would be an "affront to the Chinese people" if he didn't. Some in Congress have called on Bush to boycott the Games because of China's human rights record. The Japanese prime minister said for the first time that he would go to the opening event as well, noting that "there certainly may be problems with China, but even so, they are striving to improve things." Although Japan, like other nations, is facing inflation from higher fuel prices and is struggling with weak consumer spending and slowing exports, its corporations have long benefited from their heavy investment in energy-saving technologies. By some measures, Japanese companies use half as much energy per dollar of economic activity compared with the United States.
Even though Japan is decreasing incentives, the market is growing and the cost of electricity is cheap. Lynch, 8 Financial Consultant (J. Peter, What America Needs Now 2008, 7-2-08, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/recolumnists/story?id=52929, AG) In Japan, there is a similar set of government guarantees and incentives that have been in effect for a number of years (since 1992). They were dropped each year to reflect technical advancements and were eliminated in 2005. Despite the annual drops in incentives, the market is still growing at 20% plus per year and as a result, on-grid solar electricity in Japan is now CHEAPER than retail fossil fuel electricity. In short, Japan has moved forward quickly with a well-planned program, including incentives and widespread consumer education and in less than 10 years has made solar electricity a success in Japan and has made Japan the worldwide solar electricity leader.
46
Japan Soft Power DA
Aff AT: Japan NB

Non- Unique Japan investing an Carbon-Capture technology now Shigeru 8 Bloomberg Staff Writer
(Shigeru Sato Japan Energy Companies Form Carbon-Capture-and-Storage Venture ) // CP

Tokyo Electric Power Co., Asia's biggest utility, and a unit of Inpex Holdings Inc. have joined 22 Japanese companies in forming a venture to research carbon- capture technology to be used in government-backed projects. Japan CCS Co. will also seek contracts to do research for private enterprises considering using the technology, in which carbon dioxide is collected in the air and stored underground, the venture said in a statement released in Tokyo today. The move follows an agreement this month by energy ministers of the Group of Eight industrialized nations to jointly develop the technologies by 2020 and launch 20 large-scale demonstration projects by 2010 in a bid to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases blamed for global warming. The 24 investors include Japan's 10 regional power utilities and two oil refiners, Nippon Oil Corp. and Idemitsu Kosan Co., according to the statement. The venture is capitalized at 36 million yen ($341,653) and was formed last month. The International Energy Agency, the adviser to the U.S., the U.K. and 25 other rich nations, has also encouraged world leaders to develop the carbon-reducing technology. Last month, environment ministers of the eight rich nations pledged to cut emissions of the harmful gases by half by 2050, as a prelude to the leaders' summit next week in Japan's northern island of Hokkaido. ``A target of 50 percent global reduction is about right,'' Elliot Morley, chairman of environmental lobby group Globe International, said in an interview with Bloomberg TV today in Tokyo. ``Developed countries have to take a larger share of that to allow economic growth in developing countries.''
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Japan Soft Power DA
Aff: Climate not key to SoPo

Alt cause Japan Soft Power is low and premised of off education and language , not climate change The Straits Times, 7 (Tokyo wants to have over 100 approved schools worldwide teaching Japanese language, 1/9/07 http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do? docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T4235901222&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T4235901225& cisb=22_T4235901224&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=144965&docNo=6) //HBG TOKYO - TO CATCH up with other world powers, especially China, Japan plans to have more than 100 approved schools worldwide teaching the Japanese language within the next few years. There are now only 10 approved schools in 10 countries, all run by the Japan Foundation - a largely government-funded entity that promotes international exchange and the Japanese language abroad. The 10 schools can take about 3,000 students in all. In comparison, foreigners around the world said to be studying Japanese number some 2.4 million, with 70 per cent of them in Asia. And the number is increasing each year. Japan's latest move, which was reported by the Tokyo Shimbun daily, is aimed at not only raising the quality of teaching but also increasing the number of foreigners studying Japanese. The move comes nearly three years after China embarked on a major project to establish a string of Confucius Institutes around the world to spread the teaching of the Chinese language. The Confucius Institute, which aims to have 100 schools, has reportedly set up 78 so far, many of them in the form of courses launched jointly with local universities, as in the case of its four 'schools' in Japan. For Japan, it may be a case of too little, too late. Former European colonial powers, such as Britain, France and Germany, have long considered the teaching of their respective languages to foreigners an important part of their soft power diplomacy and have set aside huge budgets for the purpose. Germany's Goethe-Institut has schools in some 70 countries, while France's Alliance Francaise is present in 130 countries. In terms of budget, the Japanese government's commitment to pursuing soft power diplomacy is still not convincing. The Japan Foundation has a budget of about 3.5 billion yen ($45S million) a year for its Japanese language programmes, compared to 30 billion yen for the Goethe-Institut, for example. The Japanese government has only now begun to recognise that soft power diplomacy could help it to spread its influence abroad, even though Japanese pop culture movies, music, fashion, computer games and so on - already has a well-established foothold in many countries. The Japanese Foreign Ministry, which has jurisdiction over the Japan Foundation, signalled its intention to focus on soft power diplomacy last April, in a speech by its minister Taro Aso, a diehard fan of Japanese comics. Speaking at a school in Tokyo specialising in teaching digital content, Mr Aso noted the dramatic increase in the number of foreigners studying Japanese in recent years. 'I got to thinking about what might account for that, and it occurred to me that the theme songs of anime shows on TV are in Japanese. Naturally, there would be an increase in children with an interest in the Japanese language as a result,' he said. 'This is where we need the Japan Foundation to step up to the plate.' Instead of setting up more of its own schools, however, the Japan Foundation will reportedly help foreign schools by training their teachers and developing curricula. Schools that satisfy the standards set by the foundation will be designated approved institutions for teaching Japanese. The foundation's latest move also comes amid reports that the Japanese language is losing out in popularity to Chinese in some countries, such as Australia, as a second language in schools.
48
Japan Soft Power DA
Aff- SoPo Low Now

Japanese Soft Power is low Yasukini war trial proves China Daily, 05 (China continues with steady foreign policy, November 8, 2005, P: Access World News) China has been successful in the past two to three weeks in the diplomatic stabilization of its ties, except with Japan, following Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's October 17 visit to the Yasukuni Shrine - his fifth visit since taking office and the appointment two weeks later of a more conservative and hawkish cabinet than expected.Indeed, Beijing has actively sought diplomatic stabilization with its major partners and projected an active posture in its diplomacy, as befits a large nation. This was particularly and symbolically heralded by the successful return of Shenzhou VI to Earth on October 17, which, though called an "immense success and pride for all Chinese people," was also stressed by Premier Wen Jiabao as a "peaceful development and contribution of China to the world," whilst promising not to accelerate a military race in space. Japanese Soft Power lost- Past proves China Daily, 07 (Old history stymies new regional cooperation, March 23, 2007, P: Access World News) The modern history of East Asia can be seen as having two core components: first, from the 1894 China-Japan war to the end of World War II in 1945, the half-century is dominated by Japan's aggression with extreme violence, brutality and ferocity; second, the emergence and growth of other East Asian nations' modern nationalism, in which the experiences of opposing and resisting Japanese aggression and colonization more or less played the decisive role.As far as the first component is concerned, the basic problem today is that the majority of Japanese are inclined to forget, trivialize or even deny the country's history of aggression and brutality. This attitude has helped strengthen the mentality among at least the Chinese and Koreans to keep this chapter of history firmly in their hearts, repeatedly bringing it up.
49

2008 Japan Soft Power

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Japan Soft Power DA

Heidt, Silber, Petersen, and Clark 7 Week Juniors Lab

Japan Soft Power DA

Japan Soft Power DA

Heidt, Silber, Petersen, and Clark 7 Week Juniors Lab

Japan Soft Power DA

Heidt, Silber, Petersen, and Clark 7 Week Juniors Lab

Japanese Soft Power- 1NC

Japan Soft Power DA

Heidt, Silber, Petersen, and Clark 7 Week Juniors Lab

Japanese Soft Power- 1NC

Japan Soft Power DA

Heidt, Silber, Petersen, and Clark 7 Week Juniors Lab

Uniqueness- SoPo high- perception

Japan Soft Power DA

Heidt, Silber, Petersen, and Clark 7 Week Juniors Lab

Uniqueness- SoPo high- economy proves

Japan Soft Power DA

Heidt, Silber, Petersen, and Clark 7 Week Juniors Lab

Uniqueness- SoPo high- Enviro

Japan Soft Power DA

Heidt, Silber, Petersen, and Clark 7 Week Juniors Lab

AT- Soft Power Alt Cause

Japan Soft Power DA

Heidt, Silber, Petersen, and Clark 7 Week Juniors Lab

Uniqueness- SoPo high- diverse markets

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Uniqueness- SoPo high- multilateral coop

Japan Soft Power DA

Heidt, Silber, Petersen, and Clark 7 Week Juniors Lab

Uniqueness- SoPo high- culture

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A2: Environmental Soft Power

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Uniqueness/Link- Japan tech= soft power

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Uniqueness- Japan SoPo high now

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Link- environmental leadership key soft power

Japan Soft Power DA

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Link- Alternative Energy key to SoPo

Japan Soft Power DA

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Link- Commitment key to Enviro Leadership

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Link- Japan Backlash

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Link- U.S.-Japan Zero Sum

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Impact- Internal Link- Japan Solo Action key to Relations

Japan Soft Power DA

Heidt, Silber, Petersen, and Clark 7 Week Juniors Lab

Impact- U.S.-Japan Relations

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Heidt, Silber, Petersen, and Clark 7 Week Juniors Lab