PRIMARY QUESTIONS FOR

PANEL Two: STATES AND TERRORISM

Designated Commissioners: Ben-Veniste, Lehman, Thompson

Panel Two will address the role and actions of states in the emergence and strength of terrorist
entities. It will identify factors that distinguish: (1) those states that actively sponsor terrorist
organizations for their own objectives; (2) states that, while not providing explicit material or
financial support, do nonetheless openly permit their territories to be employed for bases,
logistics and deployment channels; and (3) states that in effect tolerate refuge of terrorist groups
in their national territories so long as the terrorists carry out their attacks elsewhere.

Questions for Panelists

1. What is the nature of al Qaeda's relationship with sovereign states in the Arab and Muslim
world? Li particular, do you see these as relationships of sponsorship, collaboration, or
toleration?

2. To what extent is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia pursuing a policy that seeks to have it both
ways? On the one hand, the Kingdom insists that it is supporting the war on terrorism, while
on the other hand it is supporting and in fact financing the centers of Islamic extremism that
serve as recruiting grounds for the foot soldiers of terrorism. Do you agree with this
description?

3. What do you see as the salient points that argue for or against an Iraqi relationship with al
Qaeda prior to 9/11 ? Is this a question where we can make a useful judgment from open
sources?

4. Non-Iraqis appear to be an important element in the mounting resistance US forces face

there. What is your sense of al Qaeda's involvement, if any, in the inflow of foreign fighters.
Beyond the opportunity to hit Americans, does al Qaeda have broader goals that would
motivate Al Qaeda involvement in Iraq?

5. Some observers have noted that Al Qaeda's extremist Sunni views are openly hostile towards
the Shia, whose protection Iran regards as a fundamental national interest. How significant
are these fundamental religious differences in determining Iranian policy towards al Qaeda?
Are these differences subservient to the principle of collaboration against a perceived
common enemy?

6. How would you assess the periodic reports of al Qaeda personnel in Iran? Do these reports
indicate to you that Iranian policy is shifting? A split within Iran's leadership? Are there
other plausible explanations?

7. What is the current relationship between al Qaeda and Iran? Al Qaeda and Hezbollah?
 Are there in fact any circumstances that would lead Iran to cooperate with al Qaeda? Would
increasing US pressure on Iran produce such a reassessment?

8. Would anything bring Damascus to seek cooperation with Al Qaeda? Would such
cooperation pose problems for Syria's relationship with Hizbollah?
 SELECTED READINGS FOR
PANEL Two: STATES AND TERRORISM
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, "Overview of State-Sponsored
Terrorism," pages 76-81.

Byman, Daniel L. "Terrorism and the War with Iraq," Iraq Memo #12 (The Brookings
Institution, March 3, 2003).

Pincus, Walter. "Report Cast Doubt on Iraq-Al Qaeda Connection," Washington Post (June 22,
2003).

Mylroie, Laurie. "The Circle of Terror," National Review Online (February 19, 2003).

Benjamin, Daniel. "Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda Are Not Allies," New York Times (September
30, 2002).

Isikoff, Michael and Mark Hosenball, "Distorted Intelligence?" Newsweek (June 25, 2003).