G.R. No. 78994 March 11, 1988 JOSE ACUNA BAUTISTA, ALSO KNOWN AS "RAMON REVILLA", vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS. Petitioner, an independent candidate for Senator in the May 11, 1987 elections, alleges in this petition for mandamus and prohibition that after his certificate of candidacy was given due course by respondent Commission on Elections, he filed a petition praying that his screen name "Ramon Revilla" by which he is more popularly known be printed ahead of his real name. The COMELEC denied his petition in a resolution dated April 1, 1987 on the ground that to grant the same would confer on petitioner an advantage not enjoyed by the other candidates and is tantamount to promoting his candidacy. In any event, the resolution notes that the COMELEC is required to post inside the polling booth, pursuant to Section 158 of the Omnibus Election Code, the certified list of candidates including the nicknames or stage names of candidates appearing opposite their respective names as contained in their certificates of candidacy. In his campaign posters and campaign materials, petitioner made use of his screen name "Ramon Revilla" in order that the votes for Ramon Revilla will be credited in his favor. According to petitioner, he discovered on election day that his stage name was not included in all election forms issued by respondent COMELEC, thus causing confusion to the voters and Boards of Election Inspectors and that nevertheless, millions of voters voted for "Ramon Revilla" but all those votes for Ramon Revilla were not validated by the Boards of Election Inspectors and considered as stray to his damage and prejudice. On May 29, 1987, petitioner filed another petition with respondent COMELEC (Comelec Spc No. 87-445) for a recount of his votes and to hold in abeyance the proclamation of the senators-elect particularly the two remaining slots but the COMELEC did not act upon his petition nor set it for hearing notwithstanding his allegation that if a recount were ordered, he may still come out one of the winners. Petitioner prayed for issuance of a restraining order enjoining the COMELEC from proclaiming the last two winning senatorial candidates and that the COMELEC be ordered to recount the votes cast for him throughout the country. The Solicitor General, in his comment on behalf of the COMELEC, replied inter alia that the alleged nonvalidation of the votes cast for "Ramon Revilla" or "Revilla" claimed by petitioner is not proper for a preproclamation controversy but may be invoked as possible ground for an election protest which is within the sole jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and that the petitioner has not shown by competent evidence that a recount of the ballots would materially affect the result of the election such that he could claim to obtain at least the 24th highest number of votes. In the COMELEC tally as of July 17, 1987, petitioner was ranked No. 33 with total votes of 204,808 while the 24th ranking candidate Juan Ponce Enrile had a total of 7,963,353 votes or 2,758,545 votes above petitioner. We find no merit in the petition. The grounds invoked by petitioner for a recount involve appreciation of the ballots cast, i.e., whether votes for 'Ramon Revilla' should be credited to him pursuant to Section 211, No. 13 of the Omnibus Election Code- Assuming there were errors in the appreciation as alleged by petitioner, these should have been raised and threshed out at the precinct level before the Boards of Election Inspectors. They are not grounds for recount or re-appreciation of the ballots cast. In Augusto S. Sanchez vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 78461 and companion cases, promulgated August 12, 1987), which is fully applicable here mutatis mutandis, the Court held once again that errors in the appreciation of ballots by the board of inspectors are proper subjects for election protest and not for recount or re-appreciation of the ballots. Thus: . . . the Court rules that Sanchez' petition for recount and/or reappreciation of the ballots cast in the senatorial elections does not present a proper issue for a summary preproclamation controversy. Considerations of definition, usage, doctrinal jurisprudence

and public policy demand such a ruling, 1. Sanchez anchors his petition for recount and/or re-appreciation on Section 243, paragraph (b) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 234 thereof with regard to material defects in canvassed election returns. . . . . . . The fact that some votes written solely as 'Sanchez' were declared stray votes because of the inspectors' erroneous belief that Gil Sanches had not been disqualified as a candidate, it involves an erroneous appreciation of the ballots. It is established by the law as well as jurisprudence (the cited section being a substantial reproduction of Section 172 of the 1978 Election Code and previous election laws) that errors in the appreciation of ballots by the board of inspectors are proper subject for election protest and not for recount or re-appreciation of the ballots. 2. The appreciation of the ballots cast in the precincts is not a .proceeding of the board of canvassers' for purposes of pre-proclamation proceedings under Section 241, Omnibus Election Code, but of the boards of election inspectors who are called upon to count and appreciate the votes in accordance with the rules of appreciation provided in Section 211, Omnibus Election Code. Otherwise stated, the appreciation of ballots is not part of the proceedings of the board of canvassers. The function of ballots appreciation is performed by the boards of election inspectors at the precinct level. 3. The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under Sec. 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. The enumeration therein of the issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy, is restrictive and exclusive. In the absence of any clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain material defects (Sec. 234), appear to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress (Sec. 235) and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the difference of which affects the result of the election (Sec. 236), which are the only instances where a pre-proclamation recount may be resorted to, granted the preservation of the integrity of the ballot box and its contents, Sanchez' petition must fail. The complete election returns whose authenticity is not in question, must be prima facie considered, valid for the purpose of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates. 4. To expand the issues beyond those enumerated under Sec. 243 and allow a recount/re-appreciation of votes in every instance where a claim of misdeclaration of stray votes is made would open the floodgates to such claims and paralyze canvass and proclamation proceedings, given the propensity of the losers to demand a recount. The law and public policy mandate that all pre-proclamation controversies shall be heard summarily by the Commission after due notice and hearing and just as summarily decided. (Sec. 246, Omnibus Election Code). 5. The Court has always stressed as in Alonto vs. Comelec (22 SCRA 878, 884, per Reyes, J.B.L.) that "the policy of the election law is that pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided, consistent with the law's desire that the canvass and proclamation be delayed as little as possible. ... To allow the recount here notwithstanding the multifarious administrative and financial problems of conducting such a recount, as enumerated by the Comelec in its two decision when now three months after the elections the question of who is entitled to the 24th seat of the Senate would remain unresolved for how long no one can tell - unthinkable and certainly contrary to public policy and the mandate of the law that the results of the election be canvassed and reported immediately on the basis of the authentic returns which must be- accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports of the votes cast for and obtained by the candidates (Bashier vs. Comelec, 43 SCRA 238; Anni vs. Izquierdo, 57 SCRA 692).

6. Election cases involve not only the adjudication of the private interest of rival candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the offices within their gift. They are imbued with public interest. (Vda. de Mesa vs. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533, 538). 7. The ground for recount relied upon by Sanchez is clearly not among the issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy. His allegation of invalidation of "Sanchez" votes intended for him bear no relation to the correctness and authenticity of the election return canvassed. Neither the Constitution nor statute has granted the Comelec or the board of canvassers the power in the canvass of election returns to look beyond the face thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity (Abes vs. Comelec, 21 SCRA 1252,1256). We make the same ruling here. The ground for recount relied upon by petitioner Bautista is not among the issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy. His allegation of invalidation by the board of election inspectors of "Ramon Revilla" votes intended for him bears no relation to the correctness and authenticity of the election returns canvassed. Hence, the said votes may not be recounted and/or re-appreciated in a pre-proclamation controversy because the appreciation of ballots is not part of the proceedings of respondent COMELEC acting as a national board of canvassers but is a proper subject for election protest which pertains to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The proclamation of the winning Senators in the May 11, 1987 Congressional Elections has long been completed since last year with the Court's determination of the Sanchez-Enrile contest for the 24th seat of the Senate, supra. Hence, the petition should be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED."

1. FRANCIS PANCRATIUS N. PANGILINAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF QUEZON CITY, 4TH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT, and FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR G.R. No. 105278 November 18, 1993 FRANCIS PANCRATIUS N. PANGILINAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF QUEZON CITY, 4TH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT, and FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondents. Robles, Ricafrente & Aguirre Law Firm for petitioner. Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro & Arcilla for private respondent. PADILLA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to: (1) compel the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hear and decide the petition for disqualification of private respondent in SPA No. 92-127; (2) declare unconstitutional Section 15 of R.A. No. 7166 disallowing pre-proclamation controversies in the election of members of the House of Representatives; (3) compel the Board of Canvassers in the fourth legislative district of Quezon City to give due course to petitioner's objections to 120 election returns; and (3) prohibit and enjoin said Board of Canvassers from making further canvass of the returns and to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate or to nullify the canvass and set aside said proclamation. The antecedents are as follows:

The petitioner Francis Pancratius N. Pangilinan and private respondent Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. were both candidates for congressman in the fourth legislative district of Quezon City in the 11 May 1992 elections. On 23 April 1992, Elmer Candano and Jose Umali, Jr. as registered voters of the fourth legislative district 1 of Quezon City, filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against the private respondent for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B. P. Blg. 881), docketed therein as SPA Case No. 92-127, alleging inter alia that: (a) during a rally held on 1 April 1992 at Agno Street, Barangay Tatalon, Quezon City, private respondent boasted and acknowledged that he gave one (1) sack of rice, P5,000.00 and medicines to the community and had made available to them the services of a lawyer, (b) similarly, in Barangay San Vicente, during the coronation night of 4 April 1992 of the winner of the Miss San Vicente pageant, private respondent gave tickets for two to Hongkong to the winner, Miss 2 Ana Marie Debil. Acting upon said petition, the respondent COMELEC referred the same to its Law Department 3 (Investigation and Prosecution Division) for preliminary investigation. On 20 May 1992, the petitioner herein together with the petitioners/complainants in SPA Case No. 92-127 4 filed in the said case an Urgent Motion to Suspend Canvass and/or Proclamation, alleging therein that the election returns for the fourth district of Quezon City were being canvassed by the City Board of Canvassers and that in order that the petition for disqualification against private respondent may not become moot and academic, there was need for an immediate order directing the City Board of Canvassers of Quezon City to suspend at once the canvassing of the election returns and the proclamation of the winning candidate for Representative of the fourth district of Quezon City. The COMELEC, however, failed to act on the said motion. On 22 May 1992, five (5) other petitions for disqualification against private respondent were filed with the 5 COMELEC, for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code outlawing the giving of money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters and Section 261(k) of the same Code making it unlawful to solicit votes during the day of the election. During the canvass of the returns, the petitioner, thru his counsel, objected to over 120 election returns being canvassed by the City Board of Canvassers on the ground that they were tampered, altered or spurious. The City Board of Canvassers, however, overruled petitioner's objections on the ground that under Section 15 of R.A. No. 7166 and Section 23 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2413, entitled "General Instructions for the Provincial/City/District and Municipal Board of Canvassers" pre-proclamation controversies are not allowed in the election of members of the House of Representatives. On 21 May 1992, the Board of Canvassers created canvassing committees to canvass the returns. The petitioner objected to the creation of such committees on the ground that he was not duly informed thereof and was not given the opportunity to appoint watchers and/or counsel before the said committees. The Board of Canvassers, however, ignored the petitioner's objections and proceeded to canvass the returns. The petitioner, therefore, filed the present petition, claiming that public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or exceeded their respective jurisdictions and/or unlawfully neglected to perform acts that the law requires them to do, and that there was no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the present petition, and in support thereof, the petitioner argues that: 1. Private respondent violated the penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code, which is a ground for his disqualification to run for Congressman in accordance with Sec. 68 of the said Code and which

justifies the suspension of the canvass and proclamation of private respondent pursuant to Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646. 2. Section 15 of R.A. No. 7166 and Section 23 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2413 disallowing preproclamation controversies in the election of members of the House of Representatives are unconstitutional. 3. Petitioner was denied his right to due process when canvass committees were formed without prior notice to him and without affording him the opportunity to appoint watchers therein. We will first discuss the constitutional issue raised in the petition. Section 15 of R.A. 7166 provides: Sec. 15. Pre-Proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and Members of the House of Representatives. For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Members of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu proprio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it. Petitioner contends that the above-quoted provision is unconstitutional, insofar as it disallows preproclamation controversies in the election of members of the House of Representatives because it violates Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: Sec. 3. The Commission on elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules or procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. The petitioner claims that the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to hear and decide preproclamation controversies without distinction as to whether the pre-proclamation controversy involves the election of Members of the House of Representatives or provincial or local elective officials. Hence, the petitioner concludes, the phrase "pre-proclamation controversies" in Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution embraces all pre-proclamation controversies, including pre-proclamation controversies involving the election of Members of the House of Representatives. We do not accept petitioner's contention, Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution should be read in relation to Sec. 2, Article IX-C of the same Constitution which provides, among others, as follows: Sec. 2 The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: xxx xxx xxx (2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contest relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. xxx xxx xxx

It will be noted that the aforequoted provision of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC "exclusive original jurisdiction over all contest relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials." It has no jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. On the other hand, under Sec. 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives is the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications" of its members. Consequently, the phrase "including pre-proclamation controversies" used in Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution should be construed as referring only to "pre-proclamation controversies" in election cases that fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., election cases pertaining to the election of regional, provincial and city officials. The petitioner's reliance on the case of Olfato, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al., wherein this Court held that the word "all" in Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code covers all pre-proclamation controversies involving elections of Batasan, provincial, city and municipal officials, is misplaced. The Olfato case was decided under the regime of the 1973 Constitution. Under the said Constitution, the Commission on Elections was "the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all 7 Members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials." Since the COMELEC had jurisdiction over election contest pertaining to the election of Members of the Batasang Pambansa, it had, likewise, as held in the Olfato case, the power and authority to hear and decide pre-proclamation controversies involving the election of Members of the Batasang Pambansa. Since the 1973 Constitution has been replaced by the 1987 Constitution, the Batasang Pambansa stands abolished and the legislative power is now vested in the Congress of the Philippines consisting of the 8 Senate and the House of Representatives. The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals which are the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, 9 returns, and qualifications of their respective Members," thereby divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution over election cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress). It follows that the COMELEC is now bereft of jurisdiction to hear and decide pre-proclamation controversies against members of the House of Representatives as well as of the Senate. Sec. 15 of R.A. 7166 is not, therefore, unconstitutional. On the contrary, it is in harmony with the 1987 Constitution. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his Comment The petitioner's arguments are totally misplaced. In fact, Section 15, R.A. 7166 is consistent with Section 17, Article VI which makes the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate and the House of Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. Petitioner's objection relating to the preparation, transmission and appreciation of the election returns or certificates of canvass falls within the sole jurisdiction of the (House) Electoral Tribunal. 10 Finally, the private respondent Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. has already been proclaimed as the winner in the fourth district of Quezon City. He has taken his oath of office and assumed his duties as representative; hence, the remedy open to the petitioner was to have filed an electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives. Having arrived at the above conclusion, We find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised in the petition. WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is, hereby DISMISSED.
6

SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur. Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
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Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 29. 2 Rollo, pp. 30-33. 3 Ibid., p. 122. 4 Ibid., p. 91. 5 Ibid., pp. 49, 59, 65, 73, 78. 6 103 SCRA 741. 7 Sec. 2(2), Article XII-C, 1973 Constitution. 8 Sec. 1, Article VI, 1987 Constitution. 9 Sec. 17, Article VI, 1987 Constitution. 10 Rollo, p. 135.