REOPENING THE WOUND: AGAINST GOD AND BHASKAR

Garry Potter
This paper revisits the controversy surrounding Bhaskars spiritualisation of critical realism (CR), formally introduced with the publication of From East to West. It describes the principal divisions amongst realists with respect to the five moments of CR theoretical development signified by Bhaskar in terms of his own publications. The article critiques some of his later arguments, such as that for reincarnation; but it also locates and identifies a much earlier error as being consistent with, and fundamental to, the later ideas that so many realists had problems with. The principal error is to be found in the concept of ontological truth. Keywords: intentionality, generative mechanism, alethic truth, God, reincarnation, love

INTRODUCTION ONE. HARD ARGUMENTS A unity that embraces critical difference, whether with respect to a political party, a social movement or even a school of thought, seems so obviously desirable that it is hard to speak against it. However, it is sometimes necessary in both politics and in life to draw attention to divisions that neither intellectual nor political goodwill can go beyond. In that spirit, I wish to make a hard political/philosophical argument in this article. It is hard in two respects. First, it is philosophically/politically hard in the first sense suggested here by Althusser:
On the one side, then, we have idealist philosophical theses, which have theoretically retrograde effects on the science of history. On the other side we have materialist philosophical theses which have theoretically progressive effects in the existing fields of the Marxist science of history, and which can have revolutionary effects in those fields which have not really been grappled with by the science of history (for example, in the history of the sciences, of art, of philosophy etc.) This is what is at stake as far as the class struggle in the theoretical fields is concerned. 1

I wish to offer not only a philosophical critique of the later work of Roy Bhaskar, but also a socio-political critique of it. That is, I intend not only to show logical error in, for example, his argument concerning reincarnation, but also to show that such argument is damaging in the sense of having retrograde effects on the sciences of history, anthropology, sociology, economics, cultural studies and the humanities more generally. It particularly damages critical realism. The argument I wish to make is hard in another very different sense. It is not hard to make, I believe, in terms of substantiating the critical attack upon its principal target, the later work of Roy Bhaskar though, of course, the readers shall be able to judge that for themselves. Rather, it is hard to separate this critical attack from what might be perceived as a more general critical attack upon religious belief in relation to critical realism. There are any number of religious individuals within the CR school of thought. Their religiosity does not usually, however, directly dictate their philosophical or social scientific reasoning and conclusions. There are others who directly engage sociologically or philosophically with religious issues. However, these engagements do not have the retrograde consequences I referred to above in relation to Bhaskars later work. However, to repeat myself, this is a hard distinction to make. Thus it is that before engaging with the conclusions of that work, I wish to comment briefly on the sociological fracture lines of thinking within CR. These go beyond mere social scientific or philosophical debate. INTRODUCTION TWO. SOME SOCIOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS UPON A DIVIDED SCHOOL OF THOUGHT In the introduction to From East to West,2 Bhaskar identifies five moments in the history of the development of CR philosophy, each of these in turn identified with a seminal text of his
1 2

Louis Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1976, p. 2. Roy Bhaskar, From East to West: Odyssey of a Soul, London: Routledge, 2000.

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own authorship. The first is transcendental realism, identified with A Realist Theory of Science (RTS).3 The second is critical naturalism, identified with The Possibility of Naturalism (PON).4 These two books truly are seminal texts among critical realists. They are for most, I suspect, the reason they came to CR in the first place. RTS provides a necessarily thorough critique of positivism and its Popperian variations. It properly circumscribes the constructivist aspects of scientific endeavor. It establishes a sound understanding of ontological realism and epistemological relativism. Above all, it clarifies the difference between epistemological relativism and judgmental relativism and establishes the manner in which a rational judgmentalism might be exercised. The achievements of PON are no less impressive. PON achieves the promise of its title: the possibility of naturalism in social science is established. The conditions for the possibility of social science are to be found in the conditions of possibility of everyday life. PON offers a telling critique of the case stemming chiefly from the hermeneutic tradition that the uniqueness of our human relation to the subject matter of the social sciences make the latter enterprise impossible. That case is turned on its head: it is just that uniqueness, that humanness to be found in social science and its subject matter, which make its scientificity possible. These two books, I would argue with some necessary supplementary work (fairly brilliant work!) done by scores of others essentially complete the work of the philosophy of science and social science. They also form the basis of a near complete consensus to be found among CR thinkers concerning the fundamentals of these two areas of inquiry. Again, along with the supplementary work of some pretty impressive thinkers in their own right, these two books form, as Bhaskar argues, two of the five moments of CRs history of development. I would argue that it is the potential of these two moments to benefit scientific practice, most particularly social scientific practice, wherein CRs primary value lies. Notwithstanding the widespread agreement among critical realists concerning the central conclusions of these two moments, it is here that we must note the first, tiny, hair line fracture of disagreement among them. I refer here to what I will call the anti-humanist objection. This disagreement between variants of realism shall perhaps highlight the different sorts of consequences of the serious disagreements we shall look at in a moment. That is, I would regard it as a socio-politically undamaging sort of debate to have within a school of thought; indeed, even one which could potentially be intellectually beneficial. It is not that the debate here is not important or in its own way fundamental. It cuts to the heart of our understanding of determination and agency. This anti-humanist line of thinking within CR is very much influenced by Michel Foucaults Archaeology of Knowledge and Durkheim.5 It emphasises the intransitive nature of discursive structures.6 However, it is worth considering the extent to which Bhaskar would disagree with this line of thinking. I mean here the Bhaskar that conceived and authored the two previously referred to seminal texts of CRs early moments (as the later Bhaskar, or so I would argue, is a different kettle of fish altogether). Though the early Bhaskar would disagree, this would reflect matters of degree and of emphasis concerning the possibilities of human agency. It would not be because he did not recognise an intransitive dimension to discourse as well. My own position on this issue reflects the kind of deliberate fence-sitting adopted by Bourdieu:
The degree to which the social world seems to us to be determined depends on the knowledge we have of it. On the other hand, the degree to which the world is really determined is not a question
3 4

Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, London: Verso, 1997/1975. Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences , 3rd edition, London: Routledge, 1997/1978. 5 See Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, London and New York: Routledge, 1990, and (e.g.) Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, New York: Free Press, 1964. 6 See for example Jos Lpez, Society and its Metaphors: Language, Social Theory and Social Structure , London and New York: Continuum, 2003. Journal of Critical Realism Vol. 5, No. 1, May 2006, Page 92 109.

of opinion; as a sociologist it is not for me to be for determinism or for freedom but to discover necessity if it exists, in the places where it is.7

No matter: the point I would make here is that this issue can be happily and productively debated within the CR school of thought, without any socio-political negative consequences for that school of thought. My contention is that the later critical fault lines are of a different order. CRs third moment is that of explanatory critique and is marked by the book Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation. Or rather, it is for some. This leads us to the second sociological fracture line. That is, it brings us to the next significant issue upon which critical realists are in dispute. It brings us to the question of Marxisms relation to CR. This question has been debated at considerably greater length amongst critical realists 8 than the first issue. Personally, I would mark the moment of explanatory critique as occurring long before CR. Explanatory critique moves us beyond merely logical or evidential grounds for evaluating theories or beliefs about the world it directs us to the conditions that give rise to the beliefs. It is marked by that moment wherein Marx asserts that Feuerbach has effectively completed the critique of religion, but then insists that we move beyond the critique of the religious notions of soul to the critique of a soulless world in other words, to the critique of political economy. 9 (We can pause here to note a point about which much will be made later on: Bhaskar reverses the direction of the critical trajectory of Feuerbach and religion, and Marx and political economy, with a return to religion). However, the debates within CR concerning Marxism and CRs ethical-political turn can only be seen as a good thing. While critical realists may well be divided upon a number of political and political philosophical issues, they concur that we should be engaged with the world, with both practical politics and political economy. And Bhaskar would certainly support this engagement. The fourth moment of CRs history has been labeled dialectical critical realism and is marked by Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom.10 We can also find much of the critical emphasis of this moment in another of Bhaskars works: Plato Etc.: The Problems of Philosophy and their Resolution.11 We find here Bhaskars assertion of the importance of ontological monovalence as a, if not the, crucial error in the history of philosophy. We find here his continuing stress upon the importance of absence. It is at this moment that, from the political sociology standpoint of this article, we find some considerable irony. Most Bhaskar critics of the turn to the East deeply embraced this moment. Many who were politically and philosophically disturbed by From East to West saw Dialectic as a brilliantly insightful book and there was little criticism of it when it first came out.12 CRs fifth moment is transcendental dialectical critical realism and is marked by From East to West: Odyssey of a Soul. Some of the collective unease felt by critical realists upon publication of this work is indicated by the sub-title of a critical review Gary MacLennan wrote: a book too far?.13 However, I wish to make two strong contentions here: (i) that for most critical realists Dialectic and Plato Etc. were already bridges too far; and (ii) that while most of the philosophical critique directed at From East to West has stood upon the mistaken notion that the foundations provided by the fourth moment were sound; actually the truly serious philosophical errors (see below) occurred much earlier and most of the socio-politically
7 8

Pierre Bourdieu, Sociology in Question, London: Sage, 1993, p. 25. See for example A. Brown, S. Fleetwood, and J. M. Roberts, eds., Critical Realism and Marxism, London and New York: Routledge, 2002. 9 See Karl Marx, Contribution to the critique of Hegels Philosophy of Right: an introduction, in Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, New York: Norton 1978. 10 Roy Bhaskar, Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom, London: Verso, 1993. 11 Roy Bhaskar, Plato Etc.: The Problems of Philosophy and their Resolution, London: Verso, 1994. 12 Though there was, of course, significant criticism of it later on. See for example Nick Hostettler and Alan Norrie, Are critical realist ethics foundationalist? in Justin Cruickshank, ed., Critical Realism: The Difference That It Makes, London and New York: Routledge, 2003. 13 Gary MacLennan, From East to West: a book too far?, http://www.raggedclaws.com/criticalrealism/archive/gmac_abtf.html . Journal of Critical Realism Vol. 5, No. 1, May 2006, Page 92 109.

objectionable contents of From East to West occur at the earlier moment as well.14 On one level, this is not too surprising a contention. Bhaskar did not suddenly spring his Eastern religious ideas upon us in a single work. SOCIO-POLITICALLY OBJECTIONABLE CONTENTS I cannot but feel a little unease in regard to my section title. It might connote the moral intolerance of some uptight conservative concerning sexuality or perhaps as is more directly relevant here: the socialist atheistic intolerance of religious belief. But as I said earlier, the critical line I wish to pursue here is a hard one to make, even while some of the philosophical points are rather easy. Philosophers, even great ones, can make rather elementary errors. My general respect for Roy Bhaskar is not diminished by the extreme weakness of his argument for reincarnation. Instead, I will make the remark that it indicates something socially and politically retrograde, that among critical realists so little has been said about it. His argument is relatively simple:
Deduction of the necessity for reincarnation turns essentially on three features: first, that of universal causality; second, that of the emergence, i.e. causal and taxonomic irreducibility, of intentional states to the physical states through which they are manifest; and third, following on from the first and second, (a) the causal explicability of intentional phenomena, presupposing the pre-existence and (b) the causal aefficacy of intentional states implying the post-existence of the being who is the subject of the intentional state. The continuant in question is commonly called the soul.15

The error occurs at 3b. For an intention to be causally efficacious, it is indeed necessary for the subject of the intention to continue to exist after the initial formation of the intention, so as to be able actively to make the intended event (effect) come into being. It is true that intentions may be causally efficacious. But intentions are certainly not necessarily always efficacious. That intentionality may be causally efficacious is a real characteristic of it that may not be actualised in the form of an event in the future. There is thus no necessity for the subject of the intention to continue to exist. There need be no continuant. As the argument for reincarnation stands as a subset of this broader argument concerning intentionality and continuity, it too is refuted. There is thus no necessity for a continuant (soul) to continue to exist after death, regardless of the fact that human beings are the subjects of intentionality. There may indeed be souls but their existence (not to mention reincarnation) cannot be proved in this manner. Fine. He made a mistake. So what? I presume that there are quite a few Catholic critical realists. I am also reasonably confident that were they to provide as a part of the development of CR philosophy an ontologically grounded argument for the doctrine of transubstantiation, that I could refute that also. The point is that they dont offer such arguments. Because it is thus kept at a distance, their theology does not impinge upon my and other peoples credibility as social scientists working in different fields. The contentions about souls and reincarnation, on the other hand, damage CR. I am hoping an anecdote already published in a book review in the Journal of Critical Realism16 will make clear what I am getting at here. It is worth reiterating. Gary MacLennan and Peter Thomas wrote a piece assessing the present day state of influence CR has upon cultural studies in Australia.17 They concluded that it had thus far little effect. I could make the same assessment with respect to Canada, the US and any number of countries. I would also concur with their belief that CR could be of great benefit to this broad and rapidly developing field of study. As I read through their chapter, I grew excited at the thought of showing their article to
14

Much critique of From East to West tends to see it as a divergence from Dialectic. See for example Hostettler and Norrie, Critical realist ethics (Note 12, above) or Mervyn Hartwig, New Left, New Age, New Paradigm? Roy Bhaskars From East to West, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, vol. 31, no. 2, 2001, pp. 139-66. 15 Bhaskar, From East to West, p. 60; emphasis added. 16 Garry Potter, Critical realist strengths and weaknesses, Journal of Critical Realism, vol. 2, no. 1, 2003. 17 Gary MacLennan and Peter Thomas, Cultural studies: towards a realist intervention, in Justin Cruickshank, ed., Critical Realism (Note 12, above). Journal of Critical Realism Vol. 5, No. 1, May 2006, Page 92 109.

colleagues in Cultural Studies for just this reason. And then I came across the following sentence: Bhaskar asserts categorically that this conatus to self-fulfillment will be eventually realised through the process of karmically determined reincarnations [my italics]. The reason I then decided not to show my colleagues this piece was not because either they or I are Eurocentricly prejudiced against Eastern thought though I am fairly sure that they would have little interest in either Bhaskars arguments for reincarnation or my critique of them. Rather, they are reasonably tolerant social scientists who are too busy to spend time engaging in theological dispute with the Jehovahs Witnesses who knock upon their door and who would deem reincarnation and Armageddon as, though sourced in different traditions of thought, equally noncrucial notions in terms of their own intellectual endeavours. It would seem counterproductive, and misleading, to show them such any such piece as somehow representative of CR as an approach. CRs initial role was as underlabourer for science and social science. This is, I still believe, its most important role. I also believe that not only critical realists but all intellectuals should engage politically with the world. However, propounding unconditional love, karma, God, universal self-realization and reincarnation does not in fact facilitate such roles. What has been accomplished by Bhaskars later work, in fact, is a wholesale redefinition of what realism is. We began with a realism that was more sophisticated perhaps, but nonetheless in some kind of accord with materialism. Its philosophical and political opposite was idealism. The word used now is irrealism. This, on one level, is merely a semantic tweak; equally, the new term is obviously accurate, albeit in a tautological fashion. However, on another level this subtle semantic shift has enormous philosophical and political consequences. As Bhaskar puts it: Realism in philosophy asserts the existence of some disputed entity; irrealism denies it. Thus, one can be realist about causal laws and irrealist about God.18 We now have a definition of realism that hangs crucially upon the question of whether or not God exists. But this is incorrect or at least, it is certainly not the definition that I and countless others have been using. Realism in philosophy does not assert the existence of a disputed entity. Realism asserts the nature of our relationship to reality. Ontologically, it asserts that existence is not dependent upon human perception, belief or knowledge. Reality exists independently of our perceptions of it. Ontological realism implies epistemological relativism (which as the early Bhaskar showed, does not entail judgmental relativism.). Realism in philosophy rests on the combination of ontological realism and epistemological relativism with judgmental rationalism the latter understood variously as the capacity of human beings to rank competing knowledge claims in terms of relative truth value, and/or the fact of having already done so successfully in many cases i.e. much of our alleged scientific knowledge claims really are relatively true. Realism asserts the existence of causal mechanisms in general and the confidence that science has at least partially successfully identified some of them. Realism does not assert the existence of any particular causal mechanism (beyond assenting to sciences conclusions); such would be beyond the bounds of philosophy (and realism is only a philosophy) and within the terrain of substantive scientific practice and conclusion. Realism thus does not speak directly to the existence or not of God. There would be two levels, upon which it would speak to this question indirectly. First, realists could possibly see the question of Gods existence (depending upon how God was defined) as a substantive matter to be resolved by science, and upon which science has given us no evidence in favour of the proposition that God exists. From this angle, in the absence of such evidence, atheism is at least provisionally vindicated. Or secondly, realism might be philosophically affiliated with materialism. In that case, the effective relevant contrast with respect to the existence of God would be that between realism and irrealism, as Bhaskar puts it, but instead, once again, that between materialism and idealism. God being understood somehow as spirit or mind, or anyway as a non-material reality, would make the position idealist. It may be possible to define God in a materialist manner. However, Bhaskar does not do
18

Bhaskar, Plato Etc., p. 257.

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this at least not consistently. Hence, he is an idealist propagating errors about the nature of realism. I hope in this section to have put across my hard in two senses arguments concerning the socio-political effects of Bhaskars later work. I have two further tasks to undertake in this article. First, I wish to specify precisely the intellectual moment in which Bhaskar begins his erroneous journey to the East. It is within the concept of alethic truth. Secondly, I wish to offer a philosophical grounding for political action. Bhaskar is not mistaken when he argues against a long philosophical tradition that says we cannot derive ought from is. Rather, he makes some errors concerning the is and thus arrives at a mistaken ought. REALITY CORRESPONDENCE, TRUTH AND GOD It is arguable that it is alethic truth that is the distinctive concept that sets CR apart from other variants of realism. What is now the Journal of Critical Realism was, after all, called Alethia for a couple of years prior to its current incarnation. In any case, to reiterate a basic point about the intellectual history of the CR school of thought: many critical realists never fully took on board the notion of alethic truth. Alethic truth is the cornerstone of Bhaskars truth tetrapolity. The truth tetrapolity allegedly expresses the relationship between the different senses and categories of truth. First, there is the intentional aspect of truth: what Bhaskar calls the normative-fiduciary. Assertions are (or should be, to be truthful in this sense) made with a sincere belief in their truthfulness a kind of individually subjective aspect of truth. Then there is the epistemological inter-subjective aspect. This is most importantly found in the various instances of consensus among the scientific community most significantly with respect to the production of scientific objects of knowledge and their agreed-upon identifications with real objects (this can simply be some level of agreement as to how the objects of research questions in relation to empirical indicators should be theoretically specified). Then there is objective truth, an ontological aspect wherein truth lies in the intransitive dimension of reality itself. Finally, there is alethic truth. It is a special kind of ontological truth the most important such kind. It is in fact (allegedly) that which forms the dialectical ground of the truth tetrapolity it holds it all together, so to speak. We shall examine this claim in a moment. First, let us look at Bhaskars definition of alethic truth. It is:
a species of ontological truth constituting and following on the truth of, or real reason(s) for, or dialectical ground of, things, as distinct from propositions, possible in virtue of the ontological stratification of the world and attainable in virtue of the dynamic character of science. 19

Ruth Groff expresses for us the implications of such a definition:

Alethic truths, then, are the underlying processes that both natural and social scientists seek to identify. To be the alethic truth (y) of x is to be the generative mechanism that gives rise to x. Moreover, just as, for any given alethic truth (y) of x, y is the underlying generative mechanism that causes x to be, alethic truth in general is the totality of real, causal powers that give rise to both actual and empirical events.20

Just as the truth tetrapolity has various levels, so too does our critique of his understanding of truth. Alethic truth is ontological truth and as such we can thus assert that this notion of truth is itself simply a category mistake. Truth is inescapably epistemological by practical and common usage definition. Things, powers, causal mechanisms etc. are neither true nor false; they simply are. The manners in which we describe, explain or identify them, are what is true or false. To simplify both Bhaskar and Groffs quotations above we can say that alethic truths simply are generative mechanisms. When stated so baldly the claim simply seems silly. We have a variety of possible truth-claims about generative mechanisms. It is the claims that are relatively true or false, not the mechanisms themselves. The mechanisms in question and their
19 20

Bhaskar, Plato Etc., p. 251. Ruth Groff, Critical Realism, Post-Positivism, and the Possibility of Knowledge , London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p. 73. The whole of this section is significantly indebted to the clarity of Groffs analysis. Journal of Critical Realism Vol. 5, No. 1, May 2006, Page 92 109.

nature (provided that we have at least minimally established even their very existence) simply are the way they are. However, the above is (on one level) only a semantic technicality. One can, I suppose, define the word/concept truth however one wishes. The real question is why we should wish to define it one way as opposed to another. What does it accomplish analytically by defining it in a certain way? There are two rather different answers to this question in the case of alethic truth. First, it appears to solve a very old philosophical problem associated with other versions of realism. Most versions of realism are associated with a correspondence theory of truth, a theory with long standing and seemingly intractable problems associated with it no matter what its strengths. The differences between propositions (linguistic phenomena) and beliefs (mental phenomena) on the one hand, and reality (material and ideal phenomena) on the other, are rather fundamental. So what is meant by asserting that a belief or proposition corresponds with reality? This problem has been raised in a number of ways, and in spite of a number of alleged resolutions of it (my own included) 21 the issue remains controversial. The notion of ontological truth circumvents this problem. The correspondence theory of truth needs to clearly explain just what exactly is meant by perception x corresponding in some fashion to some thing-in-itself that the perception is a perception of (the surface of). The correspondence theory of truth needs to clearly explain what it means to say statement y or belief z corresponds to the underlying reality of a phenomena that we wish to explain. This takes us into the terrain of intentionality, the philosophy of language and much else that has been significantly problematic in the history of thought. This is the principle strength of, and the overt justification for, Bhaskars truth tetrapolity. Ontological truth seemingly avoids these problems. Aspects of the thing-in-itself, whether merely its surface or its deeper realities of generative mechanisms and fundamental characteristics, simply are the ontological truths (and in the latter case alethic truths) of things-inthemselves. There is no correspondence problem because the truths and the things are of the same order of existence. However, we shall demonstrate that this does not actually solve the problem. In order for ontological truth to be able indeed to resolve the epistemological issues raised by realism generally, and rendered quite starkly by the correspondence notion of truth, alethic truth must really be capable of its alleged capacities in relation to the truth tetrapolity. It must bridge the gap between (on the one hand) objectivity and the intransitive domain and (on the other) the fallible propositions and beliefs found in the transitive domain. If, with some fairly extreme strain upon our use of language,22 we re-define truth as falling within the former, we are still left with the problem of how one can move, problem-free, from one level of truth to another. That is, if the alethic truth is to put it baldly the real generative mechanism of a phenomenon, we still have to ask how our beliefs and/or propositions about that mechanism and phenomenon correspond. The correspondence problem is not solved; it is merely shifted from the question of the correspondence between words and things, to that between one set of words and another set of words, which conceals the fallibility of the alleged relationship to the things to which they refer. In essence, we have compounded, as well as mystified, the correspondence problem. Although the justification for alethic truth on the preceding grounds does not hold up, alethic truth does solve another problem. It is the first step in an argumentative chain that leads all the way to God. THREE DEFINITIONS OF GOD Bhaskar offers us three definitions of God, each of which connects up with the others in an interesting way. This in turn leads us to certain other conclusions about the nature of human existence, as well as how we ought to live our lives. With respect to the latter, he presents us
21 22

See Potter, The Bet: Truth in Science, Literature and Everyday Knowledges, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999. Groff, Critical Realism (Note 20, above), p. 77, gives us the following example of such a strain. She correctly asserts that the propositions Planetary orbit is the result of gravity and The relationship between planetary orbit and gravity is a truthful one are not equivalent in any meaningful way. Journal of Critical Realism Vol. 5, No. 1, May 2006, Page 92 109.

with an interesting linkage between individual enlightenment and what he calls universal selfrealisation. Universal self-realisation politically replaces the Marxist materialist notion of revolution. The first definition of God he offers is essentially irrefutable. It is, as it were, one of those atheistic (so would say any Christian or Islamic or Hindu fundamentalist anyway) scientific notions of God. God is the existentially constitutive ultimate categorial structure of the universe.23 How could one possibly argue against the existence of this sort of God? Well, one could, of course, if one was not a certain kind of realist. That is, one could argue that categorial structures do not exist in this sense. However, critical realists do understand that we tend to cut reality at its joints, so to speak, and that category in this sense is not simply epistemology but precisely where our knowledge of the structure of things coincides with the independent existence of that structure. The definition of God offered here is similar to such definitions as the sum total of the natural laws of the universe only it is better because it points out some real features of the universe. In short, it is a definition of God that I as an atheist have only one reservation concerning. Why do we want to call the most crucially important features of reality God? The answer lies in how this first definition connects up with the second. The second is this: God is the ultimate ground or deepest categorial truth of all other things.24 This is very similar to the previous definition except that what was existence there, is truth here. This is where ontological, and most particularly alethic truth, enter the picture. Let us repeat here Bhaskars definition of alethic truth; it is: a species of ontological truth constituting and following on the truth of, or real reason(s) for, or dialectical ground of, things, as distinct from propositions.25 We can clearly see how this notion of truth connects directly into our previously defined notion of God. God is the alethic truth of all things. As there are generative mechanisms and causes of things, there is a truth of things; and as there is, of course, a truth of things in this sense, then there is a God with a very interesting sort of logical slippage taking Him Her or It from the realm of faith into the realm of philosophy and science. We have a third definition: God is unconditional love.26 As such, God is the unifying, totalising, liberating power of the universe: the fundamental generative mechanism of our humanity. Unconditional love is our alethic truth, so to speak. We can thus speak of realising what we already are, of acting in accord with our most fundamental nature. This realisation, which amounts to enlightenment, has as well a collective aspect, insofar as our unconditional love is the core of our social being (to give a Marxist political tinge to it) and thus we have a conatus not only to individual freedom but to universal self-realisation and eudaimonia. It is (though rather abbreviated here) a rather nifty piece of reasoning. It seemingly retains for CR a morally grounded political project, while having shifted the terrain from the material to the ideal and yet recognising both science and materiality. The only problem with the argument is, of course, that it stands upon a notion of truth that as we have demonstrated is unsound to begin with. OF POLITICS, MORALITY, OUGHT AND IS Let us briefly return to the sociology of CR. Nearly all, if not all, critical realists have the desire to make both social science and philosophy matter. A good many critical realists are, if not still Marxist (or some neo/post variant), of some (in this life) past Marxist political background. And even those who do not fit the preceding description nonetheless would agree with Marxs eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: that the point is to change the world, rather than simply interpret it. Critical realists want a science and philosophy that is moral and political. They also or they would not be critical realists want their politics and morality to be philosophically grounded and justified. This is one area where Marx, and a good deal of later
23 24

Bhaskar, From East to West, p. 33. Ibid., p. 41. 25 Bhaskar, Plato Etc., p. 251. 26 Bhaskar, From East to West, p. 44. This definition is invoked elsewhere, less directly. Journal of Critical Realism Vol. 5, No. 1, May 2006, Page 92 109.

Marxism, has been found unsatisfactory. Marxism is laden with ethical judgment. But its morality is largely implicit. Marxists, beginning with Marx, have possessed a certain contempt for bourgeois morality and allowed that to overflow into both suspicion of and disdain for the whole project of moral philosophy. Bhaskars moral/political philosophy thus accomplishes (apparently) two crucially important things for critical realists. First, he directly overturns a longstanding, all-too influential assumption in moral philosophy: that one cannot derive ought from is. Secondly, the politics that come from his deriving ought from is, seemingly link up well enough with the CR framing of Marxs eleventh thesis. I am very much in sympathy with the intent of Bhaskars moral/political philosophy. I too wish to derive ought from is. The problem is that his derivation of ought from is depends upon just that logical slippage that we analysed in the previous section. Here is the essence of his argument, gleaned from the range of Bhaskars works since Plato, Etc. First, we answer the question: what is the alethic truth of the human condition? Next we observe that the alethic truth of the human condition can be and usually is occluded by structural constraints to both knowledge and action. The philosophers task is to overcome such occlusion and constraint. Our knowledge of the alethic truth of the human condition tells us what is implicit in each and every action we undertake.27 The philosopher will make explicit what is only implicit in our actions; that is, the philosopher, will articulate the truths within us and this is what we should live by. And what is this explicitly then? The alethic truth of each human being is God. God is unconditional love. Implicit in every action is the desire to absent constraints a conatus to freedom and through our connections to others, to universal self-realisation and the eudaimonistic society. Because we (on some level) know this already (except for the occlusions of structural constraints) we then have spontaneous right action carefree, thoughtful and loving. [Rosseau...!AG] Let us point out the flaws in this chain of reasoning. First, it begins with ontological (alethic) truth, which we have already argued is a category mistake. Second, there is the assertion (carefully argued for by Bhaskar elsewhere and with which I would be in full agreement if he did not call it alethic truth) that structural constraints occlude our knowledge of the human condition. Third comes an essentially religious notion supported only by faith as to what that alethic truth is: that we are essentially God-like (or actually manifestations of God) and that God is unconditional love. I would agree that we have a desire to absent constraints; though I would not accept that this is the best way of articulating it or that it is necessarily implicit in each and every action. The latter I believe is an unsupported empirical assertion about human motivation (though I doubt Bhaskar intends this meaning exactly). The conatus to freedom and our connections to others could, of course, be articulated by a Marxist as residing in our species being and fulminating some impulse toward revolutionary social change. Perhaps this is little different except for the religiosity and New Age psychologism of Bhaskars language: universal self-realisation. However, referring to all this as something we all already know, is a kind of mystical Platonism, and to speak of spontaneous right action, whether it be carefree, thoughtful and loving or not, is simply a mystical assertion without empirical support. I should apologise: the above is a facile dismissal of what is an argument that in fact has some ethical merits. Ethical merits, but not logical merits. There is a kind of aesthetic beauty to the notion that the correct attitude toward all living things is one of unconditional love. Again, calling God unconditional love is one of those atheistic assertions of theism. Unconditional love undoubtedly exists among the human species. If God is unconditional love, then God exists. So what? We can call God whatever we like if the concept is devoid of any content or reality outside of an aesthetic beauty, if it is simply a nice way of putting a nice idea. But apart from its aesthetic virtues it is logically riddled with holes. I fear for the accusations of being a Philistine, for even pointing out the most obvious of them. I am referring to that famous moment
27

There is a logical parallel here to Habermass ideal speech situation argument. See Hostettler and Norrie, Critical realist ethics (Note 12, above). Journal of Critical Realism Vol. 5, No. 1, May 2006, Page 92 109.

of CRs history at which Mervyn Hartwig asked Roy Bhaskar if he should love the fleas that bite us, and perhaps give us the plague. Bhaskar replied that yes, unconditional love of their higher natures, apart from the fleas biting, and their disease-carrying causal powers, would indeed be the correct attitude toward them.28 But to bracket off such powers seems to me to be putting conditions upon our unconditional love. As theology this perhaps has a certain charm; but as philosophy this is very bad workmanship (recalling the underlabourer idea of philosophy once again). Many critical realists, I believe, are attempting to retain the morality, without the theology. They wish to retain the derivation of a clear political and moral ought from the is of the world. I think this desire is what has led to a good deal of confusion. We have a respect for Bhaskars excellent earlier work, combined with a worthy ethical and political desire. However, we need not follow Bhaskars trajectory, if we only wish to derive ought from is. Let us return to the Marxist perspective. HOW TO DERIVE OUGHT FROM IS Let us begin with one of the expressions of the contrary argument. It has been expressed any number of times in philosophys history but Lyotards appeal to discrete language games is among the more concise.29 On this account we have descriptive propositions, concerning the is and then, on the other hand, we have the language game of imperatives. These two modes the descriptive and the imperative are incommensurable. He gives us the following example. Proposition 1 (description): the door is open. Proposition 2 (imperative): shut the door. We cannot logically derive proposition 2 from proposition 1; they are linguistic propositions of different orders. But let us explore the logical connection between these two sorts of propositions with a real world example which a Marxist might favour. Proposition 1 (description): people are starving. Proposition 2 (imperative): feed them! The connection between the two propositions is so direct and immediate that proposition 2 need not even be said. Proposition 1 is an imperative on its own (to a Marxist, if not to many politicians). The imperative is indeed connected to the descriptive proposition because first of all the imperative results from some facts (descriptive propositions if they were articulated) about the human condition and the roots of morality. One could say that we are normative creatures all the way down. Moral impulses, including some degree of altruism, are built into the human condition. Human beings are social beings. As highly evolved complex creatures that social being is very complex. But nonetheless in evolutionary terms it can be said that our social being temporally preceded our human being. Our evolutionary predecessors were social (herd) animals. While, of course, morality has culturally evolved and is to some degree controlled by human agency the impulse derives from our evolutionary heritage. If one were to imagine a life form of equal or greater intelligence to humanity that had evolved from a line of solitary predators, it is quite reasonable to speculate that in spite of their intelligence such creatures would be devoid of anything we could recognise as morality. Regardless of such speculation, all that we know of advanced intelligence has a clear connection with sociality. Morality and the concern for others is a fundamental feature of the human condition. Marxs eleventh thesis is itself rooted in the human condition. To properly understand the world is an imperative to change it. We need no Gods to philosophically ground this moral imperative. It is grounded in us, in our common human condition. It is not implicit necessarily in each and every action we take. A good deal of human action is thoughtless and cruel. But it is
28

Exchange between Mervyn Hartwig and Roy Bhaskar, Critical realist symposium, University of London, November 1999, recorded in Alethia, vol. 3, no. 2, April 2000, p. 21. ( Editors note. Since this is not included in the published transcript, it should be recorded that Mervyn Hartwig accepted Bhaskars point.) 29 Jean-Franois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984, p. 40. Journal of Critical Realism Vol. 5, No. 1, May 2006, Page 92 109.

implicit in each and every human beings identity as a social being and in the fact that meaning itself derives from that sociality. Thus, I will conclude this article with a reiteration of Marx. The philosophical critique of religion was essentially completed with Feuerbach. We must move on from notions of the soul, from the critique of illusions, to the critique of conditions which require illusions: that is to say, to the critique of political economy.

Journal of Critical Realism Vol. 5, No. 1, May 2006, Page 92 109.