Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Cases:
Cross-examination, and thus confrontation, has been accomplished, in context of determining admissibility at trial of an unavailable witness's preliminary hearing testimony, where
the defendant has had the opportunity to cross-examine witness at preliminary hearing, probing into areas such as bias and testing the veracity of the testimony, and this is particularly
so in cases where the defendant was represented by the same counsel at the preliminary hearing and at trial. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. Com. v. Wholaver, 989 A.2d 883 (Pa. 2010).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[FN1] Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1); Uniform Rules of Evidence 804(b)(1).
[FN2] U.S. v. Pizarro, 717 F.2d 336, 14 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1 (7th Cir. 1983).
[FN3] Skyers v. U.S., 619 A.2d 931 (D.C. 1993).
[FN4] U.S. v. Feldman, 761 F.2d 380, 18 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1, 84 A.L.R. Fed. 649 (7th Cir. 1985); Hewitt v. Hutter, 432 F. Supp. 795, 1 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 916 (W.D. Va. 1977),
judgment aff'd, 574 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1978).
[FN5] U.S. v. Feldman, 761 F.2d 380, 18 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1, 84 A.L.R. Fed. 649 (7th Cir. 1985).
[FN6] Dykes v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 801 F.2d 810, 21 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 953 (6th Cir. 1986); Clay v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 722 F.2d 1289, 14 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1205
(6th Cir. 1983); Murray v. Toyota Motor Distributors, Inc., 664 F.2d 1377, 9 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1128 (9th Cir. 1982); Matter of Johns-Manville/Asbestosis Cases, 93 F.R.D. 853, 10
Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 961 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
[FN7] U.S. v. Feldman, 761 F.2d 380, 18 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1, 84 A.L.R. Fed. 649 (7th Cir. 1985); Baylor v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 733 F.2d 1527, 17 Ed. Law Rep. 500, 15
Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1324 (11th Cir. 1984); Matter of Sterling Nav. Co.,
Ltd., 444 F. Supp. 1043 (S.D. N.Y. 1977).
[FN8] DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories, a Div. of Sterling Drug, Inc., 697 F.2d 222, 12 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 515 (8th Cir. 1983); Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,
776 F.2d 1492, 19 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 903, 3 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1169 (11th Cir. 1985).
[FN9] People v. Nucci, 162 A.D.2d 725, 557 N.Y.S.2d 422 (2d Dep't 1990).
[FN10] DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories, a Div. of Sterling Drug, Inc., 697 F.2d 222, 12 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 515 (8th Cir. 1983); Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,
776 F.2d 1492, 19 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 903, 3 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1169 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1142, 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 889 (N.D.
Cal. 1982); Com. v. Canon, 373 Mass. 494, 368 N.E.2d 1181 (1977); People v. Nucci, 162 A.D.2d 725, 557 N.Y.S.2d 422 (2d Dep't 1990).
An exception to the rule against hearsay permitting the admission of prior testimony when a witness is unavailable does not require the defendant to have actually
conducted a cross-examination; instead, it only requires that he or she be given an opportunity to question the witness, and, by requiring an opportunity to cross-examine,
the exception affords protection to the defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses. Stouffer v. State, 2006 OKCR 46, 147 P.3d245 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2060, 167 L. Ed. 2d 787 (U.S. 2007).
[FN11] U.S. v. Feldman, 761 F.2d 380, 18 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1, 84 A.L.R. Fed. 649 (7th Cir. 1985).
Cases:
A defendant's interest and motive in impeaching a witness's testimony at a second proceeding need only be similar, not identical, to his interest at a first proceeding for the testimony
from the first proceeding to be admissible in the second upon the witness's unavailability under exception to the defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right of confrontation. People
v. Valencia, 43 Cal. 4th 268, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 605, 180 P.3d 351 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 198, 172 L. Ed. 2d 158 (2008).
A defendant's interest and motive at a second proceeding is not dissimilar to his interest at a first proceeding, within meaning of statute governing admission of prior testimony of
unavailable witnesses under exception to a defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right of confrontation, simply because events occurring after the first proceeding might have led
counsel to alter the nature and scope of cross-examination of the witness in certain particulars. People
v. Valencia, 43 Cal. 4th 268, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 605, 180 P.3d 351 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 198, 172 L. Ed. 2d 158 (2008).
Defendant on trial for felony murder had an opportunity and similar motive to cross examine at the preliminary hearing a witness who was unavailable for trial, such that admission of
witness's preliminary-hearing testimony was admissible at trial under the exception to the hearsay rule for a statement of an unavailable witness; purpose of the preliminary hearing
was to determine whether there was probable cause to believe that defendant committed an offense, defendant's motive for cross examining witness was to show that defendant did not
rape and murder victim, and defendant's motive at trial likewise to show that he was not guilty of raping and murdering victim. NMRA, Rules 5302(C), 11804(A)(5), (B)(1).
State v. Lopez, 2011-NMSC-035, 258 P.3d 458 (N.M. 2011).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[FN1] U.S. v. Feldman, 761 F.2d 380, 18 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1, 84 A.L.R. Fed. 649 (7th Cir. 1985).
Both the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause and the rules of evidence bar admission of previous testimony of an unavailable witness, unless the defendant had a prior
opportunity and similar motive to cross-examine the witness. State v. Benn, 161 Wash. 2d 256, 165 P.3d 1232 (2007), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Jan. 7, 2008).
[FN2] U.S. v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 38 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 277, 138 A.L.R. Fed. 739
(2d Cir. 1993); People v. Seijas, 36 Cal. 4th 291, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 493, 114 P.3d 742 (2005).
The preliminary hearing testimony of an attempted murder victim, who died in an unrelated homicide before trial, was admissible; the defendant had a similar interest and
similar motives for cross-examining the victim at the preliminary hearing, that is, challenging the witness's credibility and discrediting his account of shooting, even if
counsel was not then aware of the victim's illegal drug activities. People v. Harris, 37 Cal. 4th 310, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 509, 118 P.3d 545 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1065,
126 S. Ct. 1655, 164 L. Ed. 2d 411 (2006).
[FN3] U.S. v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 38 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 277, 138 A.L.R. Fed. 739 (2d Cir. 1993).
[FN4] U.S. v. Feldman, 761 F.2d 380, 18 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1, 84 A.L.R. Fed. 649 (7th Cir. 1985).
As to the use, in civil case, of former testimony in criminal case, see 908.
As to the right of accused to reproduce former testimony, see 907.
[FN5] People v. Harris, 37 Cal. 4th 310, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 509, 118 P.3d 545 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1065, 126 S. Ct. 1655, 164 L. Ed. 2d 411 (2006).
[FN6] People v. Harris, 37 Cal. 4th 310, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 509, 118 P.3d 545 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1065, 126 S. Ct. 1655, 164 L. Ed. 2d 411 (2006);State v.
DeSantiago, 149 Wash. 2d 402, 68 P.3d 1065 (2003).
[FN7] Rodriguez v. State, 711 P.2d 410 (Wyo. 1985).
[FN8] State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981).
Cases:
Defendant's right to confront witnesses at trial in capital murder prosecution was not violated simply because prosecution witness, at in limine hearing to determine
whether he could invoke privilege against self-incrimination for purposes of trial, testified on both direct and cross-examination that he had told the truth at preliminary
hearing, though witness's preliminary hearing testimony was admitted at trial because of his unavailability as result of asserting the privilege; witness's answer to general
question calling for his ratification of his preliminary hearing testimony had no impact on defendant's confrontation rights. People v. Williams, 43 Cal. 4th 584, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 691, 181 P.3d 1035 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1000, 173 L. Ed. 2d 298 (2009).
Testimony of witness, who lived two miles from victim's house, from prior capital murder trial was admissible at fourth trial, since witness was unavailable for trial, issues
were unchanged, defendant had prior opportunity to cross-examine her, and her testimony revealed probative and relevant facts for jury. Murray v. State, 3 So. 3d 1108
(Fla. 2009).
Defendant on trial for felony murder had an opportunity and similar motive to cross examine at the preliminary hearing a witness who was unavailable for trial, such that
admission of witness's preliminary-hearing testimony was admissible at trial under the exception to the hearsay rule for a statement of an unavailable witness; purpose of
the preliminary hearing was to determine whether there was probable cause to believe that defendant committed an offense, defendant's motive for cross examining
witness was to show that defendant did not rape and murder victim, and defendant's motive at trial likewise to show that he was not guilty of raping and murdering victim.
NMRA, Rules 5302(C), 11804(A)(5), (B)(1). State v. Lopez, 2011-NMSC-035, 258 P.3d 458 (N.M. 2011).
Cross-examination, and thus confrontation, has been accomplished, in context of determining admissibility at trial of an unavailable witness's preliminary hearing
testimony, where the defendant has had the opportunity to cross-examine witness at preliminary hearing, probing into areas such as bias and testing the veracity of the
testimony, and this is particularly so in cases where the defendant was represented by the same counsel at the preliminary hearing and at trial. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
Com. v. Wholaver, 989 A.2d 883 (Pa. 2010).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[FN1] U.S. v. Davis, 551 F.2d 233, 1 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 833 (8th Cir. 1977); State v. Browder, 507 So. 2d 1040 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987); People v. Brock, 38 Cal. 3d 180,
211 Cal. Rptr. 122, 695 P.2d 209 (1985); Alston v. U. S., 383 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1978); Stearsman v. State, 237 Ind. 149, 143 N.E.2d 81 (1957); State v. Brown, 181 Kan.
375, 312 P.2d 832 (1957); Com. v. Siegfriedt, 402 Mass. 424, 522 N.E.2d 970 (1988); People v. Sinclair, 327 Mich. 686, 42 N.W.2d 786 (1950); Meyers v. State, 112 Neb.
149, 198 N.W. 871 (1924); Aesoph v. State, 102 Nev. 316, 721 P.2d 379 (1986); People v. Hayes, 110 A.D.2d 1035, 489 N.Y.S.2d 19 (4th Dep't 1985); State v. Prince, 270
N.C. 769, 154 S.E.2d 897 (1967); State v. Swiden, 62 S.D. 208, 252 N.W. 628 (1934); Fisher v. Com., 217 Va. 808, 232 S.E.2d 798 (1977); Pettit v. Rhay, 62 Wash. 2d
515, 383 P.2d 889 (1963).
[FN2] U.S. v. Deeb, 13 F.3d 1532, 38 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1087 (11th Cir. 1994).
[FN3] U.S. v. Henry, 448 F. Supp. 819, 3 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 340 (D.N.J. 1978).
[FN4] U.S. v. Pizarro, 717 F.2d 336, 14 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1 (7th Cir. 1983); U.S. v. Davis, 551 F.2d 233, 1 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 833 (8th Cir. 1977).
A defendant had an adequate opportunity and similar motive, in a first trial, to develop a witness's testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination, as would warrant
the admission of that prior testimony at retrial in which the witness was unavailable; cross-examination in the first trial made a serious effort to undermine and discredit
the witness's testimony, matters in dispute at the first trial were essentially identical to those in dispute at retrial, and the importance of those matters to the outcome of
both proceedings was the same. U.S. v. Mejia, 376 F. Supp. 2d 460 (S.D. N.Y. 2005).
[FN5] California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970).
The testimony of a witness at a suppression hearing, at which a capital murder defendant sought to suppress a witness's pre-trial identification of him and any resulting in-
court identifications, was admissible at trial under the exception to the rule against hearsay for former testimony when the declarant is unavailable, as defense counsel had
a similar motive at both proceedings in his cross-examination of the witness, that is, he needed to show either that the witness was mistaken in her identification, or that
she was biased in some way, and the suppression hearing was a full-fledged hearing, in that the prosecutor presented the witness's testimony at the suppression hearing to
place the defendant at the murder scene, and he used her testimony to accomplish the same objective at trial. Bertrand v. State, 363 Ark. 422, 214 S.W.3d 822 (2005).
[FN6] U.S. v. Barrett, 766 F.2d 609, 18 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1170 (1st Cir. 1985).
[FN7] Com. v. Siegfriedt, 402 Mass. 424, 522 N.E.2d 970 (1988).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a capital murder defendant's motion to bar from admission prior testimony of a crime scene technician in the
defendant's re-trial, as the defendant had an opportunity at the first trial to cross-examine the
technician, the motive and focus of that cross-examination was the same as that which would have guided the cross-examination at his re-trial, the fact that the defendant's
convictions were reversed based on prior counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to investigate certain evidence did not provide a basis for concluding that counsel's cross-
examination of the technician at the first trial was necessarily deficient, and the technician's testimony was necessary to state's case. People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187,
307 Ill. Dec. 524, 860 N.E.2d 178 (2006), as modified on denial of reh'g, (Dec. 4, 2006) and cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 70, 169 L. Ed. 2d 55 (U.S. 2007).
[FN8] U.S. v. Pizarro, 717 F.2d 336, 14 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1 (7th Cir. 1983).
For the purpose of admitting prior testimony of an unavailable witness, the defendant's interest and motive for cross-examination at a second proceeding is
not dissimilar to his or her interest at a first proceeding, simply because events occurring after the first proceeding might have led counsel to alter the nature
and scope of cross-examination of the witness in certain particulars. People v. Harris, 37 Cal. 4th 310, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 509, 118 P.3d 545 (2005), cert. denied,
547 U.S. 1065, 126 S. Ct. 1655, 164 L. Ed. 2d 411 (2006).
For discussion of the accused's right to confront witnesses, generally, see Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law 1072.
[FN9] Scott v. State, 272 Ark. 88, 612 S.W.2d 110 (1981); Rodriguez v. State, 711 P.2d 410 (Wyo. 1985).
even an interested one, without some reason to do so that is apparent from the record.[FN5] It has sometimes been stated that a jury is not permitted to disbelieve testimony unless
there is good reason for questioning the credibility of the witnesses.[FN6]
Observation:
Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of
the evidence, not its sufficiency.[FN7] In other words, attacks on witness credibility are simple challenges to the quality and not to the sufficiency of the evidence.[FN8]
A jury is free to reject the testimony of a defendant where that testimony is inconsistent with other direct or circumstantial evidence.[FN9] The trier of fact may take into consideration
all the circumstances of the case,[FN10] such as whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other evidence; the witness's appearance, conduct, memory and knowledge of
the facts; the witness's interest in the trial;[FN11] and the witness's emotional or mental state.[FN12] The trier of fact may also consider the relationship of the witnesses to the party
involved and their feelings towards the party.[FN13] A family relationship between a witness and a party, for example, may bear upon the witness's bias; the fact of the relationship
does not establish bias, but is simply a circumstance considered by the fact-finder in appraising credibility.[FN14]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
When evidence is merely potentially exculpatory, the failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law unless the defendant can show
bad faith on the part of the police. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. State v. Lehr, 254 P.3d 379 (Ariz. 2011), petition for cert. filed (U.S. July 27, 2011).
Jury alone determines what weight to give evidence and may reject it or accept all or any part of it that the jurors believe to be true. Smith v. State, 2010 Ark. 75, 2010 WL565246
(2010).
The trier of fact may credit part of a witness's testimony and reject other parts. State v. Michael H., 291 Conn. 754, 970 A.2d 113 (2009).
Trier of fact may credit part of a witness's testimony and reject other parts. Hicks v. State, 287 Conn. 421, 948 A.2d 982 (2008).
The trier of fact has the right to accept part and disregard part of the testimony of a witness. Costanzo v. Gray, 112 Conn. App. 614, 963 A.2d 1039 (2009), certification denied, 291
Conn. 905, 967 A.2d 1220 (2009).
A trier of fact is the sole arbiter of credibility, and thus is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony offered by either party. Somers v. Chan, 110 Conn. App. 511, 955
A.2d 667 (2008).
Jurors may consider the tenor of a witness's testimony in deciding whether to believe the words that witness has spoken on the stand, but jurors cannot find in those mannerisms words
and entire sentences unspoken in court and use such constructs to supplement the actual evid
ence to render a verdict that suits their sense of fairness notwithstanding the law. State v. Brooks, 263 P.3d 161 (Kan. 2011).
The trier of fact has the right to believe the evidence presented by one litigant in preference to another. Miller v. Com., 283 S.W.3d 690 (Ky. 2009).
The trier of fact may believe any witness in whole or in part. Miller v. Com., 283 S.W.3d 690 (Ky. 2009).
The trier of fact may take into consideration all the circumstances of the case, including the credibility of the witness. Miller v. Com., 283 S.W.3d 690 (Ky. 2009).
Conflicting expert testimonyoften called a "battle of the experts"requires the fact-finder to assign credibility, and the fact-finder is free to accept or reject any of the expert
opinions. Estate ex rel. Campbell v. Calhoun Health Services, 66 So. 3d 129 (Miss. 2011).
Jury is free to believe or disbelieve any of the witness testimony. State v. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d 150 (Mo. 2011).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[FN1] Com. v. Cousar, 593 Pa. 204, 928 A.2d 1025 (2007), petition for cert. filed
(U.S. Jan. 22, 2008).
Credibility determinations are within the sole province of the jury. Com., Dept. of General Services v. U.S. Mineral Products Co., 927 A.2d 717 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007).
[FN2] Jeffers v. State, 934 A.2d 908 (Del. 2007); Taylor v. Taylor, 288 Ga. App. 334, 654 S.E.2d 146 (2007); Porter v. Hu, 116 Haw. 42, 169 P.3d 994 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Ware,
959 So. 2d 459 (La. 2007); People v. Schumacher, 276 Mich. App. 165, 740 N.W.2d 534 (2007), appeal denied, 480 Mich. 1043, 743 N.W.2d 876 (2008); Conrad v. Michelle & John,
Inc., 394 N.J. Super. 1, 925 A.2d 54 (App. Div. 2007); Com. v. Faulk, 2007 PA Super 185, 928 A.2d 1061 (2007); Russo v. State, 228 S.W.3d 779 (Tex. App. Austin 2007), petition
for discretionary review refused, (Dec. 5, 2007).
[FN3] Lubetzky v. Friedman, 228 Cal. App. 3d 35, 278 Cal. Rptr. 706 (2d Dist. 1991), opinion modified, (Mar. 19, 1991); Mather v. Griffin Hosp., 207 Conn. 125, 540 A.2d666
(1988); Sims v. Dibler, 172 Ohio App. 3d 486, 2007-Ohio-3035, 875 N.E.2d 965 (7th Dist. Jefferson County 2007).
Weight of expert opinion and insanity defense, see 1420.
[FN4] Evans-Reid v. District of Columbia, 930 A.2d 930 (D.C. 2007).
[FN5] White v. Greater Arizona Bicycling Ass'n, 216 Ariz. 133, 163 P.3d 1083 (Ct. App. Div. 2 2007).
[FN6] Page v. Crisp, 303 S.C. 117, 399 S.E.2d 161 (Ct. App. 1990).
[FN7] State v. Wilhite, 961 So. 2d 565 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2007), writ denied, 973 So. 2d 755 (La. 2008).
Assessing weight and sufficiency generally, see 1357. [FN8] U.S. v. Lee, 991 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1993). [FN9] Alvin v. State, 287 Ga. App. 350, 651 S.E.2d 489
(2007). Circumstantial evidence, generally, see 1361. [FN10] Bissell v. Baumgardner, 236 S.W.3d 24 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007). [FN11] State v. Frake, 450 N.W.2d 817
(Iowa 1990). Inconsistent or conflicting evidence, generally, see 1371, 1372. The factfinder may treat an interested witness's testimony as conclusive if it is clear,
direct, and positive and there are no circumstances tending to discredit or impeach the
same. Wilz v. Flournoy, 228 S.W.3d 674 (Tex. 2007).
[FN12] U.S. v. Martinez, 877 F.2d 1480 (10th Cir. 1989), stating that the fact that a
witness was a teenager with a history of emotional problems and that another was a
drug addict were impeaching facts which posed a credibility issue to be resolved by the
factfinder and were properly left for the jury to consider.
A witness's paranoia and psychiatric treatment does not necessarily make his testimony
Subject: request to meet, confer, and prepare for trial LITIGATION HOLD NOTI!
"ac# ou$#lin %&ac#cou$#lin'#otmail(com) *+,-+,.
To: jleslie'/as#oecount0(us, bdo$an'/as#oecount0(us, jbosler'/as#oecount0(us,
eno1a2'/as#oecount0(us, s#eriff/eb'/as#oecount0(us, lstuc#ell'/as#oecount0(us, ormaasa'reno($o1,
dra2ej'reno($o1, &0oun$'da(/as#oecount0(us, #sotelo'tmcc(edu, aclun1'aclun1(or$,
/illiam'#ornela/firm(com, jfrierson'asm(state(n1(us, tse$erblom'asm(state(n1(us, jlunt'/as#oecount0(us,
lcarlson'/as#oecount0(us, emartin'/as#oecount0(us, mpic2esq'msn(com, f(forsman'co3(net
4rom: "ac# ou$#lin %&ac#cou$#lin'#otmail(com)
Sent: T#u *+,-+,. 5:,6 A7
To: jleslie'/as#oecount0(us8 bdo$an'/as#oecount0(us8 jbosler'/as#oecount0(us8
eno1a2'/as#oecount0(us8 s#eriff/eb'/as#oecount0(us8 lstuc#ell'/as#oecount0(us8 ormaasa'reno($o18
dra2ej'reno($o18 &0oun$'da(/as#oecount0(us8 #sotelo'tmcc(edu8 aclun1'aclun1(or$8
/illiam'#ornela/firm(com8 jfrierson'asm(state(n1(us8 tse$erblom'asm(state(n1(us8 jlunt'/as#oecount0(us8
lcarlson'/as#oecount0(us8 emartin'/as#oecount0(us8 mpic2esq'msn(com8 f(forsman'co3(net
Dear 7r( Leslie and 7r( Do$an AND 9A:IO;S <:OS!;TO:S AND LA= !N4O:!7!NT AG!NI!S,
ATT!NTION, THIS IS A LITIGATION HOLD NOTI!( <L!AS! >NO= THAT ?O; A:! NO=
:!@;I:!D TO 7AINTAIN AN? 7!DIA AND :!O:DS IN ?O;: <OSS!SSION, O: TO =HIH ?O;
O;LD A! :!ASONAAL? !B<!T!D TO A@;I:! O: 7AINTAIN, THAT :!LAT! IN AN? =A? TO
TH! 9A:IO;S =:ONG4;L A::!STS O4 "AHA:? A( O;GHLIN THAT ?O;: AG!NI!S HA9!
!NGAG!D IN O9!: TH! <AST ,C 7ONTHS( :!NO IT? O:7AAS, TH! LAST TI7! I DIS;SS!D
SO7!THING =ITH ?O; THAT ?O; A:G;AAL? HAD A D;T? TO DO;7!NT AND 4OLLO= ;<
ON, I =O;ND ;< A!ING >IDNA<<!D AND HAD 7? S7A:T<HON! !BT:AT!D 4:O7 7?
L;TH!S, ONL? TO HA9! IT AND A 7I:O SD A:D :!T;:N!D =I<!D O4 DATA, DATA
=HIH ?O; A<<A:!NTL? =!:! 4!A:4;L 7IGHT SO7!HO= S;GG!ST A <;:<OS!4;L TAT
ON ?O;: <A:T TO A9OID DO;7!NTING AN? 7ISOND;T A? TH! LA= !N4O:!7!NT
AG!NI!S ?O; =O:> =ITH AND =HIH ?O;: I9IL DI9ISION D!4!NDS IN =:ONG4;L
A::!ST LA=S;ITS( THIS IS SI7ILA: TO TH! SIT;ATION DDA ?O;NG 4INDS HI7S!L4 IN
;::!NTL? IN <:OS!;TING O;GHLIN 4O: D7IS;S! O4 *,,D =H!:! O;GHLIN
ALL!G!DL? ALL!D *,, TO :!<O:T 7ISOND;T A;SING HI7 S!:IO;S 4!A: A? LOAL
LA= !N4O:!7!NT( >IND O4 A T:I>? THING TO <:OS!;T!, SO7! 7IGHT SA?(
AN?=A?S(((
I #a1e been callin$ and or /ritin$ bot# of 0ou on a dail0 basis and #a1e not recei1ed an0 response from eit#er
of 0ou( T#is is interestin$ considerin$ 7r( LeslieEs statements in #is email belo/ from * C .F,.( <lease
indicate a list of dates and time /#en I can meet /it# eit#er of 0ou %and #opefull0 not some Din1esti$atorD li2e
Larr0 arlsen /#o just sits t#ere all empt0 #eaded and carefree, onl0 to later admit #e #ad done absolutel0 no
/or2 on m0 case, despite sittin$ in on t/o meetin$s, and t#at #e #ad no plans to do an0 /or2 or in1esti$ation on
m0 case((((
Gim, t#e ::.F,,HF6--C, Trial resumes on October ,5t#, .F,.( Despite 0our indication to t#e court on
September 5t#, .F,., t#e conclusion of t#e Trial /ill ta2e more t#an an #our( I donEt t#in2 0ou $et it( I reall0
donEt t#in2 0ou $et it, Gim( T#ere is a lot of /or2 to do, and since t#e ourt #as ruled t#at I am stuc2 /it# 0ou
%until at least t#e competenc0 e1aluation is complete), 0ou are still attorne0 of record, and #a1e a dut0 to
prepare for trial( Also, c#ec2 out Goodni$#tEs :equest for Submission on 7a0 5t#, .F,.( Notice t#at it as2s for
somet#in$ t#erein( =#0 didnEt 0ou or Goe e1er follo/ up on t#atI T#at is prejudicial to m0 interests(
,+,F
Aira0, I am still /aitin$ to #ear bac2 from 0ou re$ardin$ /#0 0ou #a1e failed to pro1ide me a cop0 of m0 file in
::.F,.HF656-F( On Gul0 .6t#, .F,. at .:,6pm 0ou indicated t#at 0ou personall0 #ad pro1ided me t#e file
durin$ m0 pre1ious 1isit to t#e office( A0 .:,J 0ou #ad c#an$ed t#at stor0 to one /#ere 0ou sa/ Gim Leslie
$i1e me t#e file( A0 .:,* pm 0ou indicated t#at it /as not true t#at a manilla folder containin$ m0 file #ad
been placed for me at t#e front des2 for a fe/ da0s, t#en returned bac2 to t#e office, despite 0our receptionist
confirmin$ t#is( =e donEt need to $et into /#at Leslie T#ibault #as to sa0 about 0ou, eit#er of 0ou, do /eI
I /ant 0ou to fa3 or email me m0 file, preferabl0 email( T#at /a0, t#ere is no debate, 0ou #a1e proof 0ou sent
it, and I /ill #a1e it( If 0ou must fa3 it fine, m0 fa3 is *C* 66K KCF.( If 0ou /ant to continue moti1atin$ me,
t#en $o a#ead and be a pain and tell me I #a1e to pic2 it up, or t#at 0ou alread0 t#in2 0ou or Gim pro1ided it and
Dare /e $oin$ to just 2eep doin$ t#is o1er and o1er /#ere /e pro1ide 0ou copies and copies of t#e same t#in$D
bla#, bla#( Go a#ead, Aira0( Go a#ead(
No/, surel0, 0ou #a1e documentation of /#at 0ou #a1e pro1ided me alread0, Airar0( Good( No/, c#ec2 to see
if an0 DDisco1er0D 0ou #a1e pro1ided me includes t#e dispatc# reports from t#e ni$#t of t#e Ganuar0 ,Ct#, .F,.
arrest, or if it just contains Sc#aurEs Narrati1e and dispatc# reports from t#e /ee small #ours of Ganuar0 ,.t#H
,-t#, /#en :<D Duralde %/#om 7r( Leslie cross e3amined t#e ot#er da0 /#ile ma2in$ ar$ument to t#e ourt
t#at Dnobod0 did an0t#in$ /ron$ in t#is case, certainl0 not t#e :<D)( Actuall0, 7r( Leslie, I filed a complaint
/it# t#e :<D %or attempted to, sometimes t#e0 refuse to accept suc# t#in$s) on or about September Kt#, .F,,,
and Officer :osa clearl0 did some t#in$s /ron$ on t#e 1ideo of t#e arrest, so(((
Airar0, please ser1e a subpoena duces tecum on t#e =DA and t#e :<D, and t#e emer$enc0 ser1ices di1ision
$at#erin$ t#e media recordin$s made b0 emer$enc0 ser1ices of t#e arrest on Ganuar0 ,Ct#, .F,. and t#e e1ents
leadin$ up to t#at arrest, includin$ t#e man0 *,, calls and responses b0 t#e :<D in relation to t#e domestic
1iolence I /as a 1ictim of at ,C.. !( *t# St(, :eno, N9 J*5,., and for /#ic# I recei1ed t/o <rotection Orders
in 49,.HFF,JK and 49,.HFF,JJ %see attac#ed)( <lease subpoena and inter1ie/ prior to Trial, and disclose as a
/itness I intend to call at trial %I #a1e an in1iolable :i$#t to Subpoena =itnesses, and no Dmeans and
objecti1esD 1ersus DtacticsD claptrap out of 0ou or Leslie is c#an$in$ t#at( bot# Sar$ent <aul Sifre %/#om
directed bot# t#e arrest on Ganuar0 ,.t#, .F,. for Dja0/al2in$D /#erein e3cessi1e force /as used on me b0
:<D Officer Loo2 and Leed0), /#ile Sifre obstructed justice b0 turnin$ off m0 1ideo camera, and Sar$ent "ac#
T#e/, /#om #ad in t#e da0s pre1ious to t#e Ganuar0 ,Ct#, .F,. arrest at ,C.. !( *t# St( %I returned #ome t#at
e1enin$ to find m0 do$ missin$ and m0 1iolent abusi1e roomates ma2in$ menacin$ statements in t#at re$ard)
#ad $i1en me permission to call #im and pro1ided t/o numbers at /#ic# to do so, one of /#ic# /as t#e *,,,
and t#e ot#er /as a --CH number( Sifre directed t#e arrest b0 Sc#aur on Ganuar0 ,Ct#, .F,., and I #a1e
pro1ided 0ou a 1ideo of Sifre c#idin$ me immediatel0 prior to t#e arrest for Dplacin$ 0ourself in situations
/#ere 0ou are t#e 1ictimD( 4rom m0 time in t#e domestic 1iolence ad1ocac0 sp#ere I 2no/ suc# a 1ie/point is
common to an abuser, and t#at is /#at Sifre is( 4urt#er, please subpoena t#e records related to Sar$ent Sifre
detainin$ me for an #our outside of m0 sisterEs #ouse and allo/in$ m0 do$ to escape and be lost %for /#ic# t#e
ount0 is still impermissibl0 see2in$ to bill me)(
If 0ou donEt /ant to do t#ese t#in$s, please pro1ide a response in /ritin$ t#at I can cop0 and past into m0
omplaint and $rei1ance a$ainst 0ou s#ould 0our response be as tepid and transparent as t#e ones 0ou #a1e
pro1ided in t#e past( 4urt#er, I demand t#at 0ou file %after presentin$ a Draft for m0 appro1al) a 7otion to
Dismiss based upon t#e insufficienc0 of t#e information in t#e complaint and upon t#e fact t#at t#e arrest /as
for alle$ed conduct t#at did not occur in t#e presence of t#e officer %does t#e disco1er0 0ou #a1e, or /#ic# ma0
be in t#e courtEs file spea2 to conduct on t#e da0s pre1iousI)( I also /ant 0ou to de1elop a defense t#at points to
t#e comparable misue of *,, b0 m0 sister and or ore0 Goble, and t#e retalitator0 nature of t#is arrest and
.+,F
prosecution, especiall0 1is a 1is t#e pullo1er b0 Duralde and CH5 ot#er officers later at ni$#t on Ganuar0 ,.t#,
.F,., and t#e suspicious and coerci1e attempts to dissuade m0 testimon0 b0 :<D Sar$ent D0e and =ea1er on
September Ct#, .F,. for t#e Trial of t#at da0 in ,. : ,.C.F %/#ic# in1ol1es t#e Nort#/ind Apartments
situation t#at 7r( Leslie is acti1e /it#in, or s#ould be, in ::.F,.HF6K*JF)( Sar$ent D0e just #appened to roll
up into an empt0 par2in$ lot I /as in at ,.:,5 am on September Ct#, .F,. /antin$ ot discuss t#e Trial in ,. :
,.C.F t#at /as to ta2e place #ours later in t#e :7( =e tal2ed about cell p#one pro1iders sellin$ G<S data to
la/ enforcement and t#e potential for abuse t#ereof b0 retaliator0 policin$ ent#usiasts, /#ic# Dane laussen
and t#e Ne1ada c#apter of t#e AL; are doin$ suc# find ad1ocac0 a$ainst:
#ttps:++ssl(cap/i&(com+aclu+issues+alert+IalertidL6,F.*5J,Mt0peLOI
sNsrcL;N=,.FFF,FFMmsL/ebNactionN$psact.N#omepa$e
#ttp:++///(aclu(or$+node+-C*F.
Spea2in$ of t#e use of force reportin$ requirements, I /onder if t#e =as#oe ount0 Gail c#arted t#e beatin$s I
endured t#ere /#ile ser1in$ ,J da0s in jail on a Soldal 1( oo2 ount0 1iolatin$ Ddisturbin$ t#e peaceD arrest b0
:<D Sar$ent =ea1er and Officer D0e after I pointed out t#at unaut#ori&ed practitionerEs of la/ %t#e0 ad1ertise
as a Dfull ser1ice e1iction consultin$ firmD) Ne1ada ourt Ser1ices and :<D Lieutenant Aro/n /#ere actuall0
/ron$ in su$$estin$ t#at one could be arrested for criminal trespass /#ere #e still #as a 1alid lease to a rental in
t#e Nort#/ind Apartments comple3, and t#at :<D Sar$ent 7iller et al /ould be un/ise to follo/ t#e tact of
Geff #andler and Ne1ada ourt Ser1ices(((?es Sar$ent 7iller et al persisted in t#reatenin$ a lease #older off t#e
propert0 /it# criminal trespass c#ar$es, on to clean it up a little a fe/ da0s later and decide to #ed$e t#eir bets a
bit more /it# a Ddisturbin$ t#e peaceD c#ar$e, /#ereupon Sar$ent D0e and Officer =ea1er s#o/ed up to an
unnoticed bail #earin$ da0s later and succeeded in $ettin$ Gill Dra2e, !sq( to 1iolate :< -(J and Ne1ada La/
in ad1ocatin$ for a bail increase %from a bondable O,,C,5 to a cas# onl0 O-,FFF) based upon Dpublic #ealt# and
safet0D rationale, /#ere Ne1ada la/ onl0 allo/s for bail to be set based upon one purpose, insurin$ t#e
defendantEs appearance at Trial(
T#en, in court t#at mornin$ /#ile a/aitin$ Trial, :<D Officer D0e $a1e ou$#lin t#e old menacin$
e3a$$erated e0e /in2 mo1e( Nice( Spea2in$ of t#at, 7r( Leslie, I am demandin$ t#at 0ou draft for m0
appro1al for filin$ a 7otion to Dismiss similar to t#e one abo1e in t#at DDA ?oun$Es omplaint lac2 a
sufficientl0 detailed specification of t#e facts support t#e elements of t#e crime c#ar$e, etc( <lease also draft a
7otion to Suppresss based upon t#e lac2 of reasonableness in ma2in$ suc# an arrest, especiall0 in t#e manner
in /#ic# it /as made, $i1en t#e ad1ance notice t#at /as pro1ided to t#e :G, =SO and :<D /it# respect to
t#e insufficienc0 of t#e 5 da0 unla/ful detainer notice in li$#t of AA ..K and t#e dictates of N:S CF(.5-, /#ic#
require t#e appropriate court to file a TenantEs Ans/er be listed on suc# an ;nla/ful Detainer Notice to @uit(
T#e Notice, /#ic# /as drafted b0 a nonHattorne0 for Ne1ada ourt Ser1ices, /#ic# commits t#e unaut#ori&ed
practice of la/, /#ic# DDA ?oun$ is enablin$) listed Spar2s Gustice ourt, rat#er t#an :eno Gustice ourt( 7r(
Leslie, I demand t#at 0ou procure and pro1ide a cop0 to me of t#e Hearin$ on t#at e1iction :G :e1.F,.H
FF,FCJ and in t#e T<O Hearin$ in :G :<.F,.HFF.JK, /#erein t#e testimon0 of 7ilan >rebs and D/a0ne
Ga2ob relates to t#eir percipient 2no/led$e of t#e facts and e1ents immediatel0 in1ol1ed in t#e arrest in
::.F,.HF6K*JF( I #a1e c#ec2ed t#e ourt records and 0ou #a1e so far failed to Order an0 of t#ese( <lease
do(
I still #a1e not #eard from eit#er of 0ou /it# re$ard to /#et#er t#e Trial in ::.F,.HF656-F at * am is 1acated
due to t#e Order for ompetenc0 !1aluation 7r( Leslie procured in ::.F,,HF6--C, on September 5t#, .F,.,
and /#et#er t#e same is true for t#e #earin$ t#at I belie1e is set for October .nd %please confirm t#is to me in
/ritin$ and pro1ide a time, in addition to a time to meet to prepare for t#at #earin$, /#ic# see2s to amend t#e
-+,F
c#ar$e to one t#at is not onl0 lac2in$ in probable cause and indicati1e of a retaliator0 prosecution, but /#ic#
/ill #a1e /orse consequences for me under S: ,,,%6), t#an /ould a $ross misdemeanor( 7r( Do$an and 7r(
Leslie, <lease repl0 in /ritin$ /it# a a citation to t#e N:S t#at pre1ents a police officer from ma2in$ a
custodial arrest after Kpm, suc# as t#e one on Ganuar0 ,Ct#, .F,., for a nonHfelon0 not committed in #is
presence( 7r( Leslie, 0ou failed to cite to t#at statute in Trial in ::.F,,HF6--C,, and seein$ as #o/ 0ou
#a1enEt filed a sin$le pa$e of an0 le$al /or2 in t#at case(((Spea2in$ of people /#o are luc20 enou$# to $et paid
for not doin$ an0 /or2:
Name !1o No1a2
<osition HI!4 IN9!STIGATO: %<D)
=as#oe ount0
Notice
4or =as#oe ount0, DTotal <a0D fi$ures include man0 pa0 cate$ories not included in t#e DAase <a0D or
DO1ertimeD fi$ures, includin$: lon$e1it0, bonus pa0, premium pa0s, allo/ances and milea$e reimbursement(
?ear .FF*
Aase <a0 OK*,5J,(6F
O1ertime and
allbac2 ollected OF(FF
Total <a0 OJF,6-,(6F
Aenefits AccumulatedO.K,*6J(KC
Total <a0 M Aenefits O,FJ,6FF(-C
7r( Leslie, I bet Larr0 arlson is $lad 0ou as2ed #im to sit in on t/o client meetin$s /it# ou$#lin /#en 0ou
m0steriousl0 decided to replace Goe Goodni$#t, !sq( after #is Ds#ado/0D remo1al from t#e case just minutes
before Trial on Gul0 ,6t#, .F,. in :G ::.F,.HF6--C,( I /ill remind 0ou, 7r( Leslie, t#at if I belie1e 0ou
are or are about to commit perjur0 upon t#e ourt I #a1e a dut0 to ta2e certain steps to address an0 suc#
malfeasance on 0our part( So,please #a1e 0our le$al assistant Linda Gra0 under subpoena and read0 to testif0 at
t#e resumption of t#e Trial on October ,5t#, .F,.(
arlson La/rence = <ublic Defender H IN9!STIGATO: II %<D)O65,K,,(CC OF(FF O,,55F(FF
O.6,**.(FK O*C,.5-(5, =as#oe ount0 .F,,
!mail:
jlunt'/as#oecount0(us
:i$#t of indi$ent defendant in state criminal case to assistance of in1esti$ators( J, A(L(:(Ct# .5* %Ori$inall0
publis#ed in ,**F)(
I am tr0in$ to t#in2 of e1en one t#in$ 7r( No1a2 or 7r( arlson, or an0 =<D In1esti$ator did on an0 of t#e
t#ree case in /#ic# 0our offices #as represented me t#is 0ear t#at /ould, 0ou 2no/, tend to furt#er t#e
Dad1ocac0D t#e 1arious public defenders #a1e put fort#(((((?ea#, I $ot not#in$( an 0ou #elp me out #ere, !1oI
an 0ou name somet#in$ besides sa0in$, a$ain: DI called t#e /itnesses and as2ed t#em if t#eir stories /ere true
and t#e0 said D0esD and so I said Dt#an2sD and t#at concluded m0 in1esti$ation, donEt tell me #o/ to do m0 job,
0ouEre not t#e boss of me(D
I li2e t#at Gerem0 Aosler, !sq( I #a1e seen some real c#an$es in #im latel0( GT loo2inE s#arp t#ese da0s( Not
man0 people 2no/ t#is, but most people 2ne/ #im as DGatorD in colle$e, and it /asnEt uncommon to #ear #im
C+,F
sa0 t#in$s li2e: DGator donEt pla0 no s#Pt( Gator ainEt ne1er been about pla0inE no s#Pt((((D( :umor is #e $ettinE
tired of tr0in$ ot ma2e c#ic2en salad out of c#ic2en s#((((/ell, 0ou $et t#e idea( Sure /ould be nice to see #is
people do a little bit better b0 #im( After all, #e #as come so far from bein$ 2no/n as t#e =as#oe ount0
District Attorne0Es D#andHpic2edD <ublic Defender, $oin$ to far as to pull #is la/0ers out of t#e Si3t#
Amendment questionable !arl0 ase :esolution pro$ram %!:) in 4ebuar0 of .FFJ(
#ttp:++///(aclun1(or$+press+acluHne1adaHpetitionsHne1adaHsupremeHcourtHpro1ideHamicusHsupportH!:H
c#allen$e
Aut, a lot of #is accomplis#ments do sound 2ind of Dsocial /or2DHesque, rat#er t#an s#orin$ up, sa0, t#e offices
practices to counter retaliator0 prosecutions and arrests, prosecutor misconduct, protectin$ defendantEs pri1ac0
ri$#ts %no sa0in$ an0 names no/((((but Aira0 Do$an li2es to read 7ental Healt# ourt patients prescriptions
into t#e open record in a public courtroom full of fort0 members of t#e public after /ee2s of tal2inE up t#e
e3treme pri1ac0 safe$uards and HI<AA t#isEnEt#at of t#e 7H pro$ram, t#en Aosler and Do$an refuse to see2
to sri2e or ot#er/ise ameliorate Do$anEs bone #ead mo1e(((unless, it /as a retaliator0 mo1e t#at /as actuall0
rat#er premeditated((((#mmmn(((()( 7r( AoslerEs social /or2 includes a len$t#0 list of ac#ie1ements, its just t#at
not man0 of t#em #a1e an0t#in$ to do /it# sa0, e3pandin$ t#e scope of, sa0 Terr0, or utili&in$ t#e import of
Soldal 1( oo2 ount0, or de1elopin$ approac#es to combat all t#e preHte3tual police /or2 $oin$ on amon$st
local la/ enforcement( :at#er, most of #is Daccomplis#mentsD seem to stem from a place of 1ie/in$ t#e
defendant as $uilt0 and un#ealt#0 and, if #e is reall0 luc20, $ettin$ into some Dalternati1eD forum to a1oid t#e
clobberin$ t#e defendant /ould face upon facin$ attorne0s /it# t#e =DA /#o #a1e Dbrief ban2sD and stuff:
;nder 7r( AoslerQs direction, t#e =as#oe ount0 <ublic DefenderEs Office #as #ad man0 accomplis#ments
includin$:
:ene$otiatin$ a dru$ e1aluation contract to maintain uniform qualit0 of e1aluations produced and create cost
certaint0
Installed Lan$ua$e Line in office to pro1ide immediate telep#onic access for clients and t#e public to ,5F
different lan$ua$e interpreters
!stablis#ed a formal Interns#ip <ro$ram /it#Ao0dLa/Sc#ool to attract and retain Ne1ada students in <ublic
Interest la/
reated a ount0 Ser1ices+ommunit0 Information 2ios2 in office to assist clients and public
<ro1ided speciali&ed trainin$ to t#e :eno <olice DepartmentQs risis Inter1ention Team on identif0in$ mental
#ealt# issues and accessin$ mental #ealt# ser1ices to reduce jail o1ercro/din$
Accepted appointment to t#e Supreme ourt Aenc# Aar ommittee to e1aluate and impro1e appellate court
processes and practice
Assisted in de1elopment of standardi&ed pleadin$s and procedures in criminal competenc0 e1aluations to
en#ance an accused personRs abilit0 to recei1e treatment to/ards competenc0
Initiated participation in t#e Gu1enile Detention Alternati1es Initiati1e %GDAI) /it# t#e =as#oe ount0
Department of Gu1enile Ser1ices
!stablis#ed ,HJFF line for toll free communication b0 outHofHstate clients and /itnesses
Our future $oals include:
Arin$ attorne0 caseloads into compliance /it# nationall0 recommended standards
Implement projects to compl0 /it# t#e Adoption and Safe 4amilies Act %AS4A)
Institute an effecti1e le$islati1e ad1ocac0 pro$ram /it# <ublic DefenderEs Offices state/ide
De1elop a La/ :elated !ducation %L:!) pro$ram for local ju1enile population
<articipate in electronic data s#arin$ t#rou$# eHfilin$ and a 7ultiHount0 Inte$rated Gustice Information S0stem
%7IGIS)
<ro1ide communit0 outreac# pro$rams to e3plain t#e mission and ser1ices of t#e =as#oe ount0 <ublic
5+,F
DefenderEs Office
To /it, =<D Goe Goodni$#t, !sq( li2es to tout t#e SOLA! <ro$ram and a D#olisticD approac#, just as lon$
as t#e actual criminal defense t0pe stuff %0ou 2no/ le$al resarc#, fact $at#erin$, spinnin$ on a le1el some/#at
commensurate to /#at 0ou 2no/ t#e DA is /illin$ to do) is t#e Ddonut #oleD part of t#e D#olisticD banquet of
social /or2 t#e public defender currentl0 pro1ides( =#0, I t#in2 it /as Gennifer :ains, !sq( /#o announced at
t#e 7ental Healt# ourt orientation t#at Dt#e Gud$e doesnEt /ant to #ear an0t#in$ I #a1e to sa0, #e /ants to #ear
from 0ouSD( Great( So t#at e3plains /#0 t#e0 are $i1in$ 0ou OJF> and bennies( T#en Goodni$#t admits t#at,
despite bein$ at t#e =<D for J 0ears defendin$ misdemeanors, #e /as una/are of t#e deadline to file an
appeal upon a con1ictio of suc# a c#ar$e, under N:S ,J*(F,F( O#( He also admitted #e /as una/are t#at t#e
=as#oe ount0 La/ Librar0 #ad free =estla/ access( I mean, Le3is is just so solid, 0ou 2no/(
T#en t#ere is Aira0 Do$anEs commentar0 on t#e prospect of actuall0 filin$ some le$al /or2 to c#allen$e t#e
sufficienc0 of a omplaint b0 Dlets t#ro/ some mud up and see /#at stic2sD DDA "ac# DNorman Nifon$D
?oun$, !sq(, /#om li2es to brin$ up t#e accusedEs Dcustod0 statusD out of t#e blue for no discernible reason
ot#er t#an it sure is a lot easier for #im to compete a$ainst someone /#en t#e0 are loc2ed up, and subject to all
t#e depri1ations of oneEs access to justice t#at t#e =as#oe ount0 Detention enter so, so 1er0 $ood at(
Do$anEs comments /ere: DcanEt t#e DA just prett0 muc# sa0 /#ate1er in t#e omplaint and c#an$e it /#ene1er,
and not #a1e to meet an0 sort of pleadin$ standard or notice requirements li2e t#ose I /ent to la/ sc#ool to
learn aboutID(
On t#at note, Aira0:
T ,,F( #ar$in$ particular mode of commission
=estEs >e0 Number Di$est
=estEs >e0 Number Di$est, Larcen0 2.J%,), -C, -5 to -*
A $eneral rule of criminal pleadin$ is t#at if an offense ma0 be committed in 1arious modes, t#e part0 c#ar$ed
is entitled to #a1e t#at mode stated in t#e indictment /#ic# is to be pro1ed on t#e trial,U4N,V and t#is rule #as
been applied in larcen0 prosecutions(U4N.V T#e 7odel <enal ode states t#at an accusation of t#eft ma0 be
supported b0 e1idence t#at it /as committed in an0 manner t#at /ould be t#eft under t#e ode Article on t#eft,
not/it#standin$ t#e specification of a different manner in t#e indictment or information, subject onl0 to t#e
po/er of t#e court to ensure fair trial b0 $rantin$ a continuance or ot#er appropriate relief /#ere t#e conduct of
t#e defense /ould be prejudiced b0 lac2 of fair notice or b0 surprise(U4N-V
=#ere an act /#ic# /as not larcen0 at common la/ is made larcen0 b0 statute, it is not sufficient to c#ar$e t#e
commission of larcen0 merel08 rat#er, t#e indictment s#ould state t#e particular act specified b0 statute as
constitutin$ t#e crime(U4NCV Similarl0, an indictment in t#e commonHla/ form is $enerall0 insufficient in a
prosecution for t#e larcen0 under a statute(U4N5V
On t#e ot#er #and, it #as been #eld t#at in a prosecution for larcen0 it is not necessar0 t#at t#e manner in /#ic#
stolen propert0 /as ta2en and carried a/a0 be alle$ed, and t#e /ords Db0 tric2D are not required in an
indictment c#ar$in$ larcen0 /#en propert0 /as obtained b0 tric2 or fraud(U4N6V A statute ma0 e3pressl0
remo1e t#e requirement t#at a larcen0 indictment specif0 t#at t#e defendant committed larcen0 in an0 particular
manner, e3cept in certain stated cases(U4NKV
<ractice Guide:
=#en t#e manner of t#eft is not an element of t#e offense, and t#e information does not so specif0, t#e
information and disco1er0 materials presented to t#e defendant ma0 adequatel0
place #im or #er on notice of t#e manner of t#eft(U4NJV
6+,F
T#e rule t#at, /#en a statute c#aracteri&es an offense in $eneric terms merel0, an information c#ar$in$ t#e
offense must state t#e specific acts on /#ic# t#e c#ar$e is based applies to larcen0 prosecutions(U4N*V
Ho/e1er, in prosecutions under suc# a statute, t#ere is no necessit0 of a detailed specification in c#ar$in$ an
ordinar0 t#eft of propert0(U4N,FV
U4N,V Am( Gur( .d, Indictments and Informations T ,,-(
U4N.V 7iller 1( State, 65C S(=(.d KC, %Te3( App( Houston ,Ct# Dist( ,*J-)(
U4N-V 7odel <enal ode T ..-(,%,) %.FF,)(
U4NCV ;(S( 1( Nort#/a0, ,.F ;(S( -.K, K S( t( 5JF, -F L( !d( 66C %,JJK)(
U4N5V State 1( Gac2son, .,J N(( -K-, ,, S(!(.d ,C*, ,-, A(L(:( ,C- %,*CF)(
U4N6V State 1( Aarbour, ,5- N(( App( 5FF, 5KF S(!(.d ,.6 %.FF.)(
U4NKV <eople 1( Norman, 6 7isc( -d -,K, KJ* N(?(S(.d 6,- %Sup .FFC)(
U4NJV om( 1( S#amber$er, .FF, <A Super -5,, KJJ A(.d CFJ %.FF,)(
U4N*V State 1( >esterson, CF- S(=(.d 6F6 %7o( ,*66)(
U4N,FV State 1( 7iles, C,. S(=(.d CK- %7o( ,*6K)( 1( Ganuar0, ,K6 S(=(-d ,JK %7o( t( App( =(D( .FF5)(
U4NKV 7odel <enal ode T ..-(,%-) %.FF,)(
So, DDA Norman Nifon$ is c#ar$in$ ou$#lin /it# Dpett0 larcen0D, and, on t#e same set of facts %not t#at
Norman actuall0 set fort# in an0 specificit0 /#atsoe1er in #is omplaint an0 actual facts) /it# recei1in$ stolen
propert0:
T ,,,( Goinder of ot#er offenses8 election
=estEs >e0 Number Di$est
=estEs >e0 Number Di$est, Larcen0 2.J%,), .J%C)
A(L(:( Librar0
<articipation in larcen0 or t#eft as precludin$ con1iction for recei1in$ or concealin$ t#e stolen propert0, .*
A(L(:(5t# 5*(
No/, 0ou can lead a Gim Leslie, !sq( to precedent and le$al ar$ument, but 0ou canEt ma2e #im ad1ocate
&ealousl0 on a defendantEs be#alf, can 0ouI 7r( 7ar1ic2 2no/s /#at IEm tal2inE Ebout(
ou$#lin /as represented b0 Le/ Taitel, !sq( in a criminal trespass matter in :eno 7uni ourt, ,, : .6CF5,
/#ere ou$#lin /as con1icted of trespass at #is former #ome la/ office despite t#e :G impermissibl0 ta2in$
O.,.K5 Drent escro/D from ou$#lin %t#ere is no L9G: CC in :eno Gustice ourt) durin$ t#e pendec0 of a
summar0 e1iction proceedi$n of a commercial tenant /#ere t#e nonHpa0ment of rent /as neit#er pled nor
alle$ed, in 1iolation of N:S CF(.5-, and /#ere Taitel %/#om is no/ emplo0ed in t#e !: pro$ram b0 =as#oe
Le$al Ser1ices, /#om ou$#lin is suin$ for /ron$ful termination after =LS fired domestic 1iolence attorne0
ou$#lin, <aul !lcano, !3ecuti1e DirectorEs /ords, based sole0 on a O,,FFF attorne0Es fee sanction 4amil0
ourt Gud$e Linda Gardner sanctioned ou$#lin /it# personall0 in a di1orce Trial, /#ereupon ou$#lin filed a
<etition for =rit of 7andamus to c#allen$e t#e sanction:
#ttp:++caseinfo(n1supremecourt(us+public+case9ie/(doIcsIIDL..KC6
Aut, despite t#e fact t#at #e is #er brot#er, :eno 7unic( ourt Gud$e =illiam Gardner refused to recuse #imself
from t#e criminal trespass matter a$ainst ou$#lin( 4urt#er, Gud$e =( Gardner admitted t#at #e #ad just da0s
prior passed alon$ #is sisterEs April .FF* sanction Order to :7 Gud$e Nas# Holmes %/#om, li2e all Gud$es
/it# t#e :7 and all court appointed defenders /it# t#e :7, is a former prosecutor), /#o promptl0 struc2
ou$#linEs Notice of Appeal of a summar0 contempt Order b0 Gud$e Nas# Holmes stemmin$ from a traffic
citation in connection /it# ou$#linEs e1iction b0 :ic#ard G( Hill, !sq( from #is former #ome la/ office %at
/#ic# TaitelEs business partners, Dprocess ser1in$, full ser1ice e1iction consultin$ firmD
K+,F
;#, so, $i1en t#at t#at sort of en1ironment is /#at indi$ent criminal defendants %e1en t#ose /it# a la/ de$ree,
and, sometimes, a la/ license, dependin$) are deali$n /it#, per#aps t#e qualifications t#at Gim Leslie, !sq(
touted as e1inced b0 Gerem0 Aosler in #is impressions of #im, are not all t#at useful( Leslie /rote in .FF5: DI
belie1e #e #as in mind t#e truest interests of t#e <ublic DefenderEs Office and t#e public at lar$e, and t#at #e
possesses a mature, realistic 1ie/ of t#e role in our societ0 of a <ublic Defender and a <ublic DefenderEs
OfficeD(
=#en 0ou are $oin$ up a$ainst a bloodsportinE, adrenaline jun20, DNorman Nifon$D %/#om tac2il0 sa0s t#in$s
at Trial li2e D?our Honor, I donEt #a1e a do$ in t#at fi$#t, so /it# respect to t#at 7otion I /ill refrain from((((D
A Ddo$ in t#at fi$#tDI Li2e a criminal prosecution is a do$fi$#t, li2e a Dbad ne/& 2ennel&D ille$al do$ fi$#t to
t#e deat# t0pe t#in$(((() /#o /ill $lad0 de1ote at least ,C mont#s of public resources in see2in$ a pett0
larcen0+recei1in$ stolen propert0 con1iction of an attorne0 % in :G ::.F,,HF6--C,, State 1 ou$#lin) /#o
is accused of retrie1in$ a p#one from someone /#om found it lost, mislaid, or abandoned on t#e $round at a
s2ate pla&a at ,, pm in do/nto/n :eno and #eld it aloft and loudl0 e3claimed to all present t#at #e /ould
Dt#ro/ t#is p#one in t#e ri1er if someoneD did not claim it ri$#t a/a0 %testimon0 alread0 admitted to at t#e still
on$oin$ Trial b0 t#e prosecutionEs o/n /itness)( T#is, e1en /#ere t#ere e3ists, and /as pro1ided to t#e
prosecutor, an e3culpator0 1ideo of t#e e1ents prior to and t#e arrest itself, /#erein :<D Officers are clearl0
depicted be#a1in$ in a retaliator0, preHte3tual manner, and /#ere t#ere is more t#an a stron$ su$$estion t#at
some Dcreati1e remi3in$D of t#e facts and timelines is bein$ put for/ard b0 t#e :<D %suc# as o1er1aluin$ a
t#ree 0ear old i<#one sufficient to c#ar$e ou$#lin /it# felon0 $rand larcen0 and t#erefore $et around t#e
statutor0 dictates of No Norman Nifon$( T#atEs a bad Norman Nifon$( I /is# somebod0 /ould tell me /#en
m0 friend "? comes bac2, because I donEt 2no/ #o/ muc# more of t#is Norman Nifon$ cat I can stomac#( 7r(
Leslie, I donEt 2no/ #o/ useful #a1in$ a mature, measured indi1idual as <ublic Defender /ould be under t#ose
conditions( ?ou mi$#t need to #a1e someone /#o is more t#an /illin$ to $et do/n in t#e sandbo3 and pla0
patt0 ca2e /it# /#oe1er /ant it( Oran$e /ed$e( Guicebo3( 4ruit :ollH;p( 7otion to Suppress(
N:S ,K,(,.C Arrest b0 peace officer (
,( ((( a peace officer ma0 ma2e an arrest in obedience to a /arrant deli1ered to #im or #er, or ma0, /it#out a
/arrant, arrest a person:
%a) 4or a public offense committed or attempted in t#e officerEs presence(
%b) =#en a person arrested #as committed a felon0 or $ross misdemeanor, alt#ou$# not in t#e officerEs presence(
%c) =#en a felon0 or $ross misdemeanor #as in fact been committed, and t#e officer #as reasonable cause for
belie1in$ t#e person arrested to #a1e committed it(
%d) On a c#ar$e made, upon a reasonable cause, of t#e commission of a felon0 or $ross misdemeanor b0 t#e
person arrested(D
?es, Aira0, 0ou s#ould still ar$uin$ t#at statute e1en t#ou$# t#e DA c#ar$ed ou$#lin /it# t#e $ross
misdemeanor of D7isue of *,,D as ou$#linEs alle$ed callin$ *,, to report #is fear re$ardin$ retaliaton b0 :eno
<olice Department Officers for ou$#linEs complainin$ about t#eir earlier misconduct 1itiates an0 Dreasonable
causeD findin$, clearl0, especiall0 $i1en t#e 1oluminous e1idence of retaliation and misconduct b0 just a couple
members of t#e :<D to/ards ou$#lin since Au$ust .F,,(
T/o offenses committed b0 t#e same person ma0 be included in t#e same indictment, in different courts, /#ere
t#e0 are of t#e same $eneral nature and belon$ to t#e same famil0 of crimes and /#ere t#e mode of trial and
nature of t#e punis#ment are also t#e same, alt#ou$# t#e0 ma0 be punis#ed /it# different de$rees of se1erit0(
U4N,V T#us, indictments c#ar$in$ one count of $rand larcen0 in t#e second de$ree and multiple counts of
J+,F
commercial bribeHrecei1in$,U4N.V or t#e offenses of larcen0 and of recei1in$ stolen $oods,U4N-V ma0 be
proper(
aution:
Since t#e crimes of larcen0, recei1in$, and possession of stolen propert0 are separate and distinct offenses,
$enerall0 le$islatures do not intend to punis# a defendant for recei1in$ or possessin$ t#e same $oods t#at #e or
s#e stole( T#erefore, t#ou$# a defendant ma0 be indicted and tried on c#ar$es of larcen0, recei1in$, and
possession of t#e same propert0, t#e defendant ma0 be con1icted of onl0 one of t#ose offenses(U4NCV
U4N,V Am( Gur( .d, Indictments and Informations TT .FF to .FC( U4N.V <eople 1( Sil1erman, ,F6 7isc( .d C6J,
C-C N(?(S(.d -,* %Sup ,*JF)( U4N-V Lo$an 1( om(, -,* S(=(.d C65 %>0( ,*5J)(
U4NCV State 1( <err0, -F5 N(( ..5, .JK S(!(.d J,F %,*J.)(
A( Indictment, Information, or omplaint
.( <articular Alle$ations
a( In General
Topic Summar0 orrelation Table :eferences
T ,,-( Generall0
=estEs >e0 Number Di$est
=estEs >e0 Number Di$est, Larcen0 2.J%,), .J%.)
An indictment for t#eft must disclose t#at propert0 alle$ed to #a1e been stolen /as subject to t#eft8 t#e
indictment is defecti1e if it s#o/s on its face t#at t#in$ alle$ed to #a1e been stolen /as propert0 not subject to
t#eft(U4N,V
An indictment t#at insufficientl0 alle$es t#e identit0 of t#e 1ictim in a c#ar$e for larcen0 is fatall0 defecti1e and
cannot support a con1iction of eit#er a misdemeanor or a felon0(U4N.V
U4N,V Aourland 1( State, ,-- Te3( rim( 5CC, ,,. S(=(.d K.F %,*-K)( As to t#e sufficienc0 of an indictment in
commonHla/ form /#ere prosecution is for
larcen0 of a t#in$ /#ic# is t#e subject of larcen0 onl0 b0 1irtue of a statute, and not at common la/, see T *6(
U4N.V State 1( Norman, ,C* N(( App( 5JJ, 56. S(!(.d C5- %.FF.)(
;ntil t#e0 stop me, bur0, murder me, or drop me,
"ac# ou$#lin, !sq(
To "ac# ou$#lin
4rom: Leslie, Gim %Gleslie'/as#oecount0(us)
Sent: Tue *+FC+,. C:55 <7
To: "ac# ou$#lin %&ac#cou$#lin'#otmail(com)
7r( ou$#lin:
I #ad e3pected to #ear from 0ou after last =ednesda0Qs close of proceedin$s, so /e could /or2 on trial issues
and prepare 0ou in case 0ou testif0 at t#e trial, but t#is email from 0ou is t#e first communication since last
=ednesda0( Aased on 0our acrimonious temperament to/ard 0our assi$ned counsel, includin$ me, I doubt 0ou
/ould #a1e participated meanin$full0 in an0 suc# preparation efforts, but I /ould #a1e been /illin$ to tr0, as I
*+,F
#a1e done before( I /is# 0ou /ould #a1e communicated /it# me earlier(
Games A( Leslie, !sq
"ac# ou$#lin
<O AOB -*6,
:eno, N9 J*5F5
Tel KK5 --J J,,J
4a3 *C* 66K KCF.
"ac#ou$#lin'#otmail(com
,F+,F
LITIGATION HOLD NOTICE AND SUBPOENAyour 11 7 11 response to discovery request in rjc rcr2011-063341
unbelievable. U.S. v. Gatto, 727 F. Supp. 903 (D.N.J. 1989). Even if a witness testifies as to a period during which he was under the influence of drugs, a jury is entitled to
believe the witness and can discount the testimony as it sees fit. U.S. v. Bailey, 510 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2007).
[FN13] Patterson v. State, 181 Ga. App. 68, 351 S.E.2d 503 (1986).
[FN14] Crewe v. Blackmon, 289 S.C. 229, 345 S.E.2d 754 (Ct. App. 1986).
The trial court has the discretion to reject testimony of biased witnesses. State v. Rus
sell, 92 N.C. App. 639, 376 S.E.2d 458 (1989).
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 9/21/12 12:02 AM
To: newmanp@reno.gov; renodirect@reno.gov
ATTENTION, THIS IS A LITIGATION HOLD NOTICE; YOU MAY BE REQUIRED TO HOLD ANY AND ALL DOCUMENTATION, RECORDINGS,
REPORTS, 911 AND OR DISPATCH CALLS, VIDEOS, ETC. INVOLVING ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN IN ANY WAY IN LIGHT ON
ANTICIPATED FUTURE LITIGATION IN CONNECTION WITH ANY INVOLVEMENT WITH ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN AND LOCAL AND
STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, INCLUDING THE RENO POLICE DEPARTMENT, WASHOE COUNTY SHERIFF, WCDA, CITY OF RENO
CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, ETC. PLEASE RETAIN AND FORWARD A COPY OF ANY SUCH MATERIALS ON TO THIS EMAIL ADDRESS OR
THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS FOR ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN:
PO BOX 3961
RENO, NV 89505
TEL:775 338 8118
FAX:949 667 7402
Dear Ms. Newman,
Please respond fully, and as required under the law to the Request for Discovery and subpoenas you were served, not merely asking the officers if they recorded anything and checking
to "see if something was booked into evidence". Read the Request for Discovery very, very carefully, Ms. Newman, and the subpoenas.
If your case then involves a 911 call you may have to trace the source.
Example:
A driver calls in an injury accident on her cell phone from a city street in San Mateo.
The call will be routed to the CHP dispatch center in Vallejo and put on hold. Once answered and recorded by CHP dispatchers, the call will be transferred to the San Mateo
Police Department.
Only then will San Mateo Police dispatch determine the nature of the call to dispatch a San Mateo Police officer to the scene.
The call may also be transferred again to Fire Department response and Ambulance.
Result for the Lawyer:
Given this present circumstance the record keeping for the call may be in a variety of locations. The CHP dispatch may have the only record of the original call. Frequently this
original caller is a witness to the accident but is not necessarily a witness who is later identified in the subsequent police report.
2. Distinctions between local land line 911 system and CHP 911 system
Keep in mind that the local 911 system is generally superior to the wireless CHP 911 system on a variety of fronts.
Local System
a. The land-line is rarely overloaded for call delays.
b. The system has a direct link to the address source of the call. This is usually one of the methods a dispatcher/supervisor can use to run a search related to calls generated from a
particular residence over a historical period of time or phone number to answer an inquiry or subpoena.
c. Rarely does the system pass the call on to another agency outside the city from which the call is generated so tracking is less of an issue.
CHP System
a. The single advantage is that by nature it is wireless.
b. System is seriously overloaded.
c. The content and quality of materials contained within the call log is likely to be far more limited than that of a local 911 system.
d. If the CHP dispatcher was not successful in obtaining the name and contact information from the original caller the lawyer will be gifted with another layer of red tape and
subpoenas to obtain the personal information of the caller.
e. CHP is likely to be a by the book organization whereas you may find that local agencies may be somewhat more relaxed in following strict guidelines related to the release of call-
log information.
C. State Requirements for Record keeping: the voice-call and the log-entry
1. Audio voice 911 call:
California Government Code 26202.6 and 34090.6 audio recordings including the 911 system may be destroyed after 100 days.
2. 911 Call Log:
34090.6 of the Government Code appears to be interpreted by local law enforcement as authority to destroy 911 logs after 2 years.
Result for the lawyer:
Each agency is functioning by their own standard operating procedure. Therefore it must be addressed on a case-by-case basis and one must presume the records must be obtained
immediately.
Examples of local law enforcement record retention:
San Francisco Police Department
Voice call 3 years (but started in March of 2005)
Call Log 3 years
San Rafael Police Department
Voice call 180 days
Call Log Permanent (they retain records indefinitely)
San Jose Police Department
Voice call 14 months
Call Log 7 years
Lessons Learned:
a. Value Immediately determine value of the voice call and call log(s).
b. Notice Put the agency on notice by letter and phone call that both the voice call(s) and call log(s) are maters of present or future litigation and they are required to retain those
records for the entirety of the litigation process per. California Government Code Sections 26202.6 and 34090.6.
b. Preservation Get those records in hand as quickly as possible to ensure their preservation.
D. The law and privacy / confidentiality considerations
1. The subpoena request
Generally, I have found that law enforcement agencies will not contest the request for records from an interested party in a filed case when the record request addresses the specific
instances of the litigation in question. However, if you are asking the agency to produce records for a range of dates or calls privacy issues could arise.
Example of Subpoena Language:
Please provide copies of all 911 logs generated from the address of 13 Satan Way, Fontana, CA 92335 from May 4, 2004 to the present.
wrongful arrests, malicious/retaliatory prosecutions FW: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice Court
2. The mixed results
Making an all inclusive broad brush request can potentially get complicated if the source address has residents who are not named parties to the litigation; such as a nursing home with
multiple residents. Other residents who are non-parties may be calling the 911 for reasons that are completely unrelated to your case. Again, this is a case by case basis and the product
you receive will largely be based on the systems being used, the skill of the person making the search and what internal protocols they may be following before they release the
documents requested.
Sit back and wait for the result.
3. Statutory considerations
In enacting this chapter, the Legislature, mindful of the right of individuals to privacy, finds and declares that access to information concerning the conduct of the peoples
business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state Government Code Section 6250.
4. California Public Records Act and the balance between public need and confidentiality
Judicial decisions interpreting the California Public Records Act (CPRA) seek to balance the public right to access to information, the governments need, or lack of need, to
preserve confidentiality, and the individuals right to privacy. Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 183, 39 Cal.4th 1272, 141 P.3d 288, on remand 2006 WL
3190280, unpublished.
5. Burden is on the Agency
California Public Records Act (CPRA) exemptions are to be narrowly construed, and the government agency opposing disclosure bears the burden of proving that one or more apply
in a particular case. County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Axelrad) (App. 2 Dist. 2000) 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 82 Cal.App.4th 819, review denied.
E. Approach to Subpoena 911 call logs
The basics
1. What am I after and why do I want it?
2. Call the dispatch center, ask for the custodian of records and follow the procedures outlined above.
a. I am not on the dark side (sound familiar?)
b. We have a common interest to get the bad guy.
c. Get them emotionally involved.
d. Can you please help me?
e. I know I need to write a subpoena can you tell me how you want it to read to make it easier on you and make sure that I am getting what I need.
f. Tell them it is going in the mail today.
g. Address it to that person.
h. You will get what you want because the person on the other end likes to hammer bad guys too.
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Tue 9/11/12 1:30 PM
To: jleslie@washoecounty.us; bdogan@washoecounty.us; zyoung@da.washoecounty.us; mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us; bsooudi@reno.gov; sooudib@reno.gov;
drakej@reno.gov
2 attachments
coughlin v northwind 16_TenantsAffidavit_DeclarationOther_PrivateHousing other than nonpayment of rent.pdf (76.3 KB) , combined northwind v coughlin eviction
filings.pdf (1058.4 KB)
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: kbrown@nvbar.org; milllerr@reno.gov; millerr@reno.gov; stuttle@washoecounty.gov; rsilva@washoecounty.us; stuttle@washoecounty.us; jamchen@washoecounty.us;
037nor4@acg.com; info@acg-apmi.com; rjcweb@wasoecounty.us; jboles@callatg.com; apminfo@acg.com
Subject: FW: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice Court
Date: Mon, 2 Jul 2012 17:21:54 -0700
NOrthwind and Nevada Court Services served and "amended 5 day notice of unlawful detainer on July 29th, 2012"...giving me five days to get my stuff out of
unit 29 (the one the subject of Judge Schroeer's Eviction Order, which was effectively rescinded by their serving a new 5 day unlawful detainer notice....) as well
as units 71 and 45...whicih are two units to which i still have valide lease agreements, ie, I cannot be trespassing for accessing them (the Reno PD has indicated
they will arrest me for criminal trespass for accessing any units in the complex, including those to which I still have a valid possessory or property interest, in
violation of 42 usc 1983).
why does Sargent Miller have to give me a hard time? Isn't it enough for him to have his "Denzel" good looks and a much higher paying job than I will ever
have? What up wit that?
Northwind and Nevada Court Services (which is practicing eviction law without a license) screwed up and put "Sparks Justice Court on Greenbrae" as the place
for the tenant to file a Tenan'ts Answer or Affidavit. Doing so will make the RJC Order by Judge Schroeder null and void (Karen Stancil, Chief Civil Clerk at
RJC admits this, but really, the fault lies with NCS and Northwind, not the committed professional at the RJC).
The Notice must identify the Court with jurisdiction. NRS 40.253(3)(a). ONe cannot be trespassing in a placwe where they have a valid reason for being or a lawful right to be.
NRS 207.200, RMC 8.10.040.
In Aikins v. Andrews, 91 Nev. 746, 542 P.2d 734 (1975), the Supreme COUli construed the
predecessor statute to NRS 40.2516 to mean that the alternative five (5) day notice must be given
6
before the tenants can be dispossed and a lease can be validly terminated. The court stated that this
five (5) day notice requirement " ... neither can be waved nor neglected." 91 Nev. at 748.
ttp://www.constitution.org/ussc/506-056a.htm
U.S. Supreme Court
SOLDAL v. COOK COUNTY, 506 U.S. 56 (1992)
506 U.S. 56 SOLDAL, ET UX. v. COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 91-6516
Argued October 5, 1992
Decided December 8, 1992
While eviction proceedings were pending, Terrace Properties and Margaret Hale forcibly evicted petitioners, the Soldal family, and their mobile home from a
Terrace Properties' mobile home park. At Hale's request, Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff's Department deputies were present at the eviction. Although they knew
that there was no eviction order and that Terrace Properties' actions were illegal, the deputies refused to take Mr. Soldal's complaint for criminal trespass or
otherwise interfere with the eviction. Subsequently, the state judge assigned to the pending eviction proceedings ruled that the eviction had been unauthorized, and
the trailer, badly damaged during the eviction, was returned to the lot. Petitioners brought an action in the Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming
that Terrace Properties and Hale had conspired with the deputy sheriffs to unreasonably seize and remove their home in violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Acknowledging that what had occurred was
a "seizure" in the literal sense of the word, the court reasoned that it was not a seizure as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment because, inter alia, it did not
invade petitioners' privacy.
Held:
The seizure and removal of the trailer home implicated petitioners' Fourth Amendment rights. Pp. 61-72.
(a) A "seizure" of property occurs when "there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property." United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 . The language of the Fourth Amendment - which protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures of
"their persons, houses, papers, and effects" - cuts against the novel holding below, and this Court's cases unmistakably hold that the Amendment
protects property even where privacy or liberty is not implicated. See, e.g., ibid.; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 . This Court's "plain view"
decisions also make untenable the lower court's construction of the Amendment. If the Amendment's boundaries were defined exclusively by rights of
privacy, "plain view" seizures, rather than being scrupulously subjected to Fourth Amendment inquiry, Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 -327,
would not implicate that constitutional provision at all. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' [506 U.S. 56, 57] position, the Amendment protects seizure even
though no search within its meaning has taken place. See, e.g., Jacobsen, supra, at 120-125. Also contrary to that court's view, Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386 , does not require a court, when it finds that a wrong implicates more than one constitutional command, to look at the dominant character of
the challenged conduct to determine under which constitutional standard it should be evaluated. Rather, each constitutional provision is examined in
turn. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 . Pp. 61-71.
(b) The instant decision should not foment a wave of new litigation in the federal courts. Activities such as repossessions or attachments, if they
involve entering a home, intruding on individuals' privacy, or interfering with their liberty, would implicate the Fourth Amendment even on the Court
of Appeals' own terms. And numerous seizures of this type will survive constitutional scrutiny on "reasonableness" grounds. Moreover, it is unlikely
that the police will often choose to further an enterprise knowing that it is contrary to the law, or proceed to seize property in the absence of
objectively reasonable grounds for doing so. Pp. 71-72.
942 F.2d 1073, reversed and remanded.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
John L. Stainthorp argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners.
Kenneth L. Gillis argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Jack O'Malley, Renee G. Goldfarb, and Kenneth T. McCurry. [*]
[ Footnote *] James D. Holzhauer, Timothy S. Bishop, John A. Powell, Steven R. Shapiro, Harvey M. Grossman, and Alan K. Chen filed a brief for the
American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Richard Ruda, Carter G. Phillips, Mark D. Hopson, and Mark E. Haddad filed a brief for the National League of Cities et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
I
Edward Soldal and his family resided in their trailer home, which was located on a rented lot in the Willoway Terrace mobile [506 U.S. 56, 58] home park in Elk
Grove, Illinois. In May 1987, Terrace Properties, the owner of the park, and Margaret Hale, its manager, filed an eviction proceeding against the Soldals in an
Illinois state court. Under the Illinois Forcible Entry and Detainer Act, Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 110, 9-101 et seq. (1991), a tenant cannot be dispossessed absent a
judgment of eviction. The suit was dismissed on June 2, 1987. A few months later, in August 1987, the owner brought a second proceeding of eviction, claiming
nonpayment of rent. The case was set for trial on September 22, 1987.
Rather than await judgment in their favor, Terrace Properties and Hale, contrary to Illinois law, chose to evict the Soldals forcibly two weeks prior to the
scheduled hearing. On September 4, Hale notified the Cook County's Sheriff's Department that she was going to remove the trailer home from the park, and
requested the presence of sheriff deputies to forestall any possible resistance. Later that day, two Terrace Properties employees arrived at the Soldals' home
accompanied by Cook County Deputy Sheriff O'Neil. The employees proceeded to wrench the sewer and water connections off the side of the trailer home,
disconnect the phone, tear off the trailer's canopy and skirting, and hook the home to a tractor. Meanwhile, O'Neil explained to Edward Soldal that "`he was there
to see that [Soldal] didn't interfere with [Willoway's] work.'" Brief for Petitioner 6.
By this time, two more deputy sheriffs had arrived at the scene, and Soldal told them that he wished to file a complaint for criminal trespass. They referred him to
deputy Lieutenant Jones, who was in Hale's office. Jones asked Soldal to wait outside while he remained closeted with Hale and other Terrace Properties
employees for over 20 minutes. After talking to a district attorney and making Soldal wait another half hour, Jones told Soldal that he would not accept a
complaint because "`it was between the landlord and the tenant ... [and] they were going to go ahead and continue to move [506 U.S. 56, 59] out the trailer.'" Id., at 8.
1 Throughout this period, the deputy sheriffs knew that Terrace Properties did not have an eviction order and that its actions were unlawful. Eventually, and in the
presence of an additional two deputy sheriffs, the Willoway workers pulled the trailer free of its moorings and towed it onto the street. Later, it was hauled to a
neighboring property.
On September 9, the state judge assigned to the pending eviction proceedings ruled that the eviction had been unauthorized, and ordered Terrace Properties to
return the Soldals' home to the lot. The home, however, was badly damaged.
[2]
The Soldals brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a violation of
their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. They claimed that Terrace Properties and Hale had conspired with Cook County deputy sheriffs to
unreasonably seize and remove the Soldals' trailer home. The District Judge granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the Soldals
had failed to adduce any evidence to support their conspiracy theory and, therefore, the existence of state action necessary under 1983.
[3]
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, construing the facts in petitioners' favor, accepted their contention that there was state action. However, it went on
to hold that [506 U.S. 56, 60] the removal of the Soldals' trailer did not constitute a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment or a deprivation of due process for
purposes of the Fourteenth.
On rehearing, a majority of the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, reaffirmed the panel decision.
[4]
Acknowledging that what had occurred was a "seizure" in the
literal sense of the word, the court reasoned that, because it was not made in the course of public law enforcement, and because it did not invade the Soldals'
privacy, it was not a seizure as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment. 942 F.2d 1073, 1076 (1991). Interpreting prior cases of this Court, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that, absent interference with privacy or liberty, a "pure deprivation of property" is not cognizable under the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 1078-1079.
Rather, petitioners' property interests were protected only by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
[5]
We granted certiorari to consider whether the seizure and removal of the Soldals' trailer home implicated their Fourth Amendment rights, 503 U.S. 918 (1992),
and now reverse.
[6]
[506 U.S. 56, 61]
II
The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963), provides in pertinent part that the "right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated... ."
A "seizure" of property, we have explained, occurs when "there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property." United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). In addition, we have emphasized that "at the very core" of the Fourth Amendment "stands the right of a man to
retreat into his own home." Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). See also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 -179 (1984); Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309, 316 (1971); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980).
As a result of the state action in this case, the Soldals' domicile was not only seized, it literally was carried away, giving new meaning to the term "mobile
home." We fail to see how being unceremoniously dispossessed of one's home in the manner alleged to have occurred here can be viewed as anything but a
seizure invoking the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Whether the Amendment was in fact [506 U.S. 56, 62] violated is, of course, a different question that
requires determining if the seizure was reasonable. That inquiry entails the weighing of various factors, and is not before us.
The Court if Appeals recognized that there had been a seizure, but concluded that it was a seizure only in a "technical" sense, not within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. This conclusion followed from a narrow reading of the Amendment, which the court construed to safeguard only privacy and liberty
interests, while leaving unprotected possessory interests where neither privacy nor liberty was at stake. Otherwise, the court said,
"a constitutional provision enacted two centuries ago [would] make every repossession and eviction with police assistance actionable under - of all
things - the Fourth Amendment[, which] would both trivialize the amendment and gratuitously shift a large body of routine commercial litigation from
the state courts to the federal courts. That trivializing, this shift, can be prevented by recognizing the difference between possessory and privacy
interests." 942 F.2d, at 1077.
Because the officers had not entered Soldal's house, rummaged through his possessions, or, in the Court of Appeals' view, interfered with his liberty in the course
of the eviction, the Fourth Amendment offered no protection against the "grave deprivation" of property that had occurred. Ibid.
We do not agree with this interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment protects the people from unreasonable searches and seizures of "their
persons, houses, papers, and effects." This language surely cuts against the novel holding below, and our cases unmistakably hold that the Amendment protects
property as well as privacy.
[7]
This much [506 U.S. 56, 63] was made clear in Jacobsen, supra, where we explained that the first Clause of the Fourth Amendment
"protects two types of expectations, one involving "searches," the other "seizures." A "search" occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. A "seizure" of property occurs where there is some meaningful interference with an individual's
possessory interests in that property." 466 U.S., at 113 (footnote omitted).
See also id., at 120; Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985);
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747 -748 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 , n. 6 (1980). Thus, having
concluded that chemical testing of powder found in a package did not compromise its owner's privacy, the Court in Jacobsen did not put an end to its inquiry, as
would be required under the view adopted by the Court of Appeals and advocated by respondents. Instead, adhering to the teachings of United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696 (1983), it went on to determine whether the invasion of the owners' "possessory interests" occasioned by the destruction of the powder was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. Jacobsen, supra, at 124-125. In Place, although we found that subjecting luggage to a "dog sniff" did not constitute a search for
Fourth Amendment purposes because it did not compromise any privacy interest, taking custody of Place's suitcase was deemed an unlawful seizure, for it
unreasonably infringed "the suspect's possessory interest in his luggage." 462 U.S., at 708 . 8 Although lacking a privacy component, the property rights in both
instances nonetheless were not [506 U.S. 56, 64] disregarded, but rather were afforded Fourth Amendment protection.
Respondents rely principally on precedents such as Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967),
and Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), to demonstrate that the Fourth Amendment is only marginally concerned with property rights. But the message of
those cases is that property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations. The Warden opinion thus observed, citing Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257 (1960), and Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), that the "principal" object of the Amendment is the protection of privacy, rather than
property, and that "this shift in emphasis from property to privacy has come about through a subtle interplay of substantive and procedural reform." 387 U.S., at
304 . There was no suggestion that this shift in emphasis had snuffed out the previously recognized protection for property under the Fourth Amendment. Katz, in
declaring violative of the Fourth Amendment the unwarranted overhearing of a telephone booth conversation, effectively ended any lingering notions that the
protection of privacy depended on trespass into a protected area. In the course of its decision, the Katz Court stated that the Fourth Amendment can neither be
translated into a provision dealing with constitutionally protected areas nor into a general constitutional right to privacy. The Amendment, the Court said, protects
individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, "but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all." 389 U.S., at
350 .
As for Cardwell, a plurality of this Court held in that case that the Fourth Amendment did not bar the use in evidence of paint scrapings taken from and tire
treads observed on the defendant's automobile, which had been seized in a parking lot and towed to a police lockup. Gathering this evidence was not deemed to
be a search, for nothing from the [506 U.S. 56, 65] interior of the car and "no personal effects, which the Fourth Amendment traditionally has been deemed to protect"
were searched or seized. 417 U.S., at 591 (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.). No meaningful privacy rights were invaded. But this left the argument, pressed by the
dissent, that the evidence gathered was the product of a warrantless, and hence illegal, seizure of the car from the parking lot where the defendant had left it.
However, the plurality was of the view that, because, under the circumstances of the case, there was probable cause to seize the car as an instrumentality of the
crime, Fourth Amendment precedent permitted the seizure without a warrant. Id., at 593. Thus, both the plurality and dissenting Justices considered the
defendant's auto deserving of Fourth Amendment protection even though privacy interests were not at stake. They differed only in the degree of protection that
the Amendment demanded.
The Court of Appeals appeared to find more specific support for confining the protection of the Fourth Amendment to privacy interests in our decision in Hudson
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). There, a state prison inmate sued, claiming that prison guards had entered his cell without consent and had seized and destroyed
some of his personal effects. We ruled that an inmate, because of his status, enjoyed neither a right to privacy in his cell nor protection against unreasonable
seizures of his personal effects. Id., at 526-528, and n. 8; id., at 538 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). Whatever else the case held, it is of limited usefulness outside
the prison context with respect to the coverage of the Fourth Amendment.
We thus are unconvinced that any of the Court's prior cases supports the view that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures of property only
where privacy or liberty is also implicated. What is more, our "plain view" decisions make untenable such a construction of the Amendment. Suppose, for
example, that police officers lawfully enter a house, by either complying with the warrant requirement or satisfying one of its recognized exceptions - [506 U.S. 56,
66] e.g., through a valid consent or a showing of exigent circumstances. If they come across some item in plain view and seize it, no invasion of personal privacy
has occurred. Horton, 496 U.S., at 133 -134; Brown, supra, at 739 (opinion of REHNQUIST, J.). If the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment were defined
exclusively by rights of privacy, "plain view" seizures would not implicate that constitutional provision at all. Yet, far from being automatically upheld, "plain
view" seizures have been scrupulously subjected to Fourth Amendment inquiry. Thus, in the absence of consent or a warrant permitting the seizure of the items in
question, such seizures can be justified only if they meet the probable-cause standard, Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 -327 (1987), 9 and if they are
unaccompanied by unlawful trespass, Horton, 496 U.S., at 136 -137. 10 That is because, the absence of a privacy interest notwithstanding, "[a] seizure of the
article ... would obviously invade the owner's possessory interest." Id., at 134; see also Brown, 460 U.S., at 739 (opinion of REHNQUIST, J.). The plain-view
doctrine "merely reflects an application of the Fourth Amendment's central requirement of reasonableness to the law governing seizures of property." Ibid.;
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971); id., at 516 (WHITE, J., concurring and dissenting).
The Court of Appeals understandably found it necessary to reconcile its holding with our recognition in the plain-view cases that the Fourth Amendment protects
property as such. In so doing, the court did not distinguish this case on the ground that the seizure of the Soldals' home took place in a [506 U.S. 56, 67] noncriminal
context. Indeed, it acknowledged what is evident from our precedents - that the Amendment's protection applies in the civil context as well. See O'Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 -335 (1985); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504 -506 (1978); Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 -313 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). 11
Nor did the Court of Appeals suggest that the Fourth Amendment applied exclusively to law enforcement activities. It observed, for example, that the
Amendment's protection would be triggered "by a search or other entry into the home incident to an eviction or repossession," 942 F.2d, at 1077. 12 Instead, the
court sought to explain why the Fourth Amendment protects against seizures of property in the plain-view context, but not in this case, as follows:
"[S]eizures made in the course of investigations by police or other law enforcement officers are almost always, as in the plain view cases, the
culmination of searches. The police search in order to seize, and it is the search [506 U.S. 56, 68] and ensuing seizure that the Fourth Amendment, by its
reference to "searches and seizures," seeks to regulate. Seizure means one thing when it is the outcome of a search; it may mean something else when
it stands apart from a search or any other investigative activity. The Fourth Amendment may still nominally apply, but, precisely because there is no
invasion of privacy, the usual rules do not apply." Id., at 1079 (emphasis in original).
We have difficulty with this passage. The court seemingly construes the Amendment to protect only against seizures that are the outcome of a search. But our
cases are to the contrary, and hold that seizures of property are subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny even though no search within the meaning of the
Amendment has taken place. See, e.g., Jacobsen, 466 U.S., at 120 -125; Place, 462 U.S., at 706 -707; Cardwell, 417 U.S., at 588 -589. 13 More generally, an
officer who happens to come across an individual's property in a public area could seize it only if Fourth Amendment standards are satisfied - for example, if the
items are evidence of a crime or contraband. Cf. Payton v. New York, [506 U.S. 56, 69] 445 U.S., at 587 . We are also puzzled by the last sentence of the excerpt,
where the court announces that the "usual rules" of the Fourth Amendment are inapplicable if the seizure is not the result of a search or any other investigative
activity "precisely because there is no invasion of privacy." For the plain-view cases clearly state that, notwithstanding the absence of any interference with
privacy, seizures of effects that are not authorized by a warrant are reasonable only because there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal
activity. The seizure of the weapons in Horton, for example, occurred in the midst of a search, yet we emphasized that it did not "involve any invasion of
privacy." 496 U.S., at 133 . In short, our statement that such seizures must satisfy the Fourth Amendment and will be deemed reasonable only if the item's
incriminating character is "immediately apparent," id., at 136-137, is at odds with the Court of Appeals' approach.
The Court of Appeals' effort is both interesting and creative, but, at bottom, it simply reasserts the earlier thesis that the Fourth Amendment protects privacy, but
not property. We remain unconvinced, and see no justification for departing from our prior cases. In our view, the reason why an officer might enter a house or
effectuate a seizure is wholly irrelevant to the threshold question whether the Amendment applies. What matters is the intrusion on the people's security from
governmental interference. Therefore, the right against unreasonable seizures would be no less transgressed if the seizure of the house was undertaken to collect
evidence, verify compliance with a housing regulation, effect an eviction by the police, or on a whim, for no reason at all. As we have observed on more than one
occasion, it would be "anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is
suspected of criminal behavior." Camara 387 U.S., at 530 ; see also O'Connor, 480 U.S., at 715 ; T.L.O., 469 U.S., at 335 . [506 U.S. 56, 70]
The Court of Appeals also stated that, even if, contrary to its previous rulings, "there is some element or tincture of a Fourth Amendment seizure, it cannot carry
the day for the Soldals." 942 F.2d, at 1080. Relying on our decision in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the court reasoned that it should look at the
"dominant character of the conduct challenged in a section 1983 case [to] determine the constitutional standard under which it is evaluated." 942 F.2d, at 1080.
Believing that the Soldals' claim was more akin to a challenge against the deprivation of property without due process of law than against an unreasonable seizure,
the court concluded that they should not be allowed to bring their suit under the guise of the Fourth Amendment.
But we see no basis for doling out constitutional protections in such fashion. Certain wrongs affect more than a single right, and, accordingly, can implicate more
than one of the Constitution's commands. Where such multiple violations are alleged, we are not in the habit of identifying, as a preliminary matter, the claim's
"dominant" character. Rather, we examine each constitutional provision in turn. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (Fourth Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause).
Graham is not to the contrary. Its holding was that claims of excessive use of force should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard,
rather than the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process test. We were guided by the fact that, in that case, both provisions targeted the same sort of
governmental conduct and, as a result, we chose the more "explicit textual source of constitutional protection" over the "more generalized notion of `substantive
due process.'" 490 U.S., at 394 -395. Surely, Graham does not bar resort in this case to the Fourth Amendment's specific protection for "houses, papers, [506 U.S. 56,
71] and effects," rather than the general protection of property in the Due Process Clause.
III
Respondents are fearful, as was the Court of Appeals, that applying the Fourth Amendment in this context inevitably will carry it into territory unknown and
unforeseen: routine repossessions, negligent actions of public employees that interfere with individuals' right to enjoy their homes, and the like, thereby
federalizing areas of law traditionally the concern of the States. For several reasons, we think the risk is exaggerated. To begin, our decision will have no impact
on activities such as repossessions or attachments if they involve entry into the home, intrusion on individuals' privacy, or interference with their liberty, because
they would implicate the Fourth Amendment even on the Court of Appeals' own terms. This was true of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Specht, with which, as we
previously noted, the Court of Appeals expressed agreement.
More significantly, "reasonableness is still the ultimate standard" under the Fourth Amendment, Camara, supra, at 539, which means that numerous seizures of
this type will survive constitutional scrutiny. As is true in other circumstances, the reasonableness determination will reflect a "careful balancing of governmental
and private interests." T.L.O., supra, at 341. Assuming, for example, that the officers were acting pursuant to a court order, as in Specht v. Jensen, 832 F.2d 1516
(CA10 1987), or Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 , (1972), and, as often would be the case, a showing of unreasonableness on these facts would be a laborious task
indeed. Cf. Simms v. Slacum, 3 Cranch 300, 301 (1806). Hence, while there is no guarantee against the filing of frivolous suits, had the ejection in this case
properly awaited the state court's judgment, it is quite unlikely that the federal court would have been bothered with a 1983 action alleging a Fourth Amendment
violation. [506 U.S. 56, 72]
Moreover, we doubt that the police will often choose to further an enterprise knowing that it is contrary to the law, or proceed to seize property in the absence of
objectively reasonable grounds for doing so. In short, our reaffirmance of Fourth Amendment principles today should not foment a wave of new litigation in the
federal courts.
IV
The complaint here alleges that respondents, acting under color of state law, dispossessed the Soldals of their trailer home by physically tearing it from its
foundation and towing it to another lot. Taking these allegations as true, this was no "garden variety" landlord-tenant or commercial dispute. The facts alleged
suffice to constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, for they plainly implicate the interests protected by that provision. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is, accordingly, reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Footnotes
[1] Jones' statement was prompted by a district attorney's advice that no criminal charges could be brought because, under Illinois law, a criminal action cannot be
used to determine the right of possession. See Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, 9-101 et seq. (1991); People v. Evans, 163 Ill.App. 3d 561, 114 Ill.Dec. 662, 516 N.E.2d 817
(1st Dist. 1987).
[2] The Soldals ultimately were evicted per court order in December 1987.
[3] Title 42 U.S.C. 1983 provides that:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
[4] The court reiterated the panel's conclusion that a conspiracy must be assumed on the state of the record and, therefore, that the case must be treated in its
current posture "as if the deputy sheriffs themselves seized the trailer, disconnected it from the utilities, and towed it away." 942 F.2d 1073, 1075 (CA7 1991) (en
banc).
[5] The court noted that, in light of the existence of adequate judicial remedies under state law, a claim for deprivation of property without due process of law was
unlikely to succeed. Id., at 1075-1076. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). In any event, the Soldals did not claim a violation of their procedural rights.
As noted, the Seventh Circuit also held that respondents had not violated the Soldals' substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners
assert that this was error, but, in view of our disposition of the case, we need not address the question at this time.
[6] Under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Soldals were required to establish that the respondents, acting under color of state law, deprived them of a constitutional right, in
this instance, their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment freedom from unreasonable seizures by the State. See Monroe v. Pape, [506 U.S. 56, 61] 365 U.S. 167, 184
(1961). Respondents request that we affirm on the ground that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that there was sufficient state action to support a 1983 action.
The alleged injury to the Soldals, it is urged, was inflicted by private parties for whom the county is not responsible. Although respondents did not cross-petition,
they are entitled to ask us to affirm on that ground if such action would not enlarge the judgment of the Court of Appeals in their favor. The Court of Appeals
found that, because the police prevented Soldal from using reasonable force to protect his home from private action that the officers knew was illegal, there was
sufficient evidence of conspiracy between the private parties and the officers to foreclose summary judgment for respondents. We are not inclined to review that
holding. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 -161 (1970).
[7] In holding that the Fourth Amendment's reach extends to property as such, we are mindful that the Amendment does not protect possessory interests in all
kinds of property. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176 -177 (1984). This case, however, concerns a house, which the Amendment's language
explicitly includes, as it does a person's effects.
[8] Place also found that to detain luggage for 90 minutes was an unreasonable deprivation of the individual's "liberty interest in proceeding with his itinerary,"
which also is protected by the Fourth Amendment. 462 U.S., at 708 -710.
[9] When "operational necessities" exist, seizures can be justified on less than probable cause. 480 U.S., at 327 . That in no way affects our analysis, for even then
it is clear that the Fourth Amendment applies. Ibid; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 , at 703 (1983).
[10] Of course, if the police officers' presence in the home itself entailed a violation of the Fourth Amendment, no amount of probable cause to believe that an
item in plain view constitutes incriminating evidence will justify its seizure. Horton, 496 U.S., at 136 -137.
[11] It is true that Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272 (1856), cast some doubt on the applicability of the Amendment to
noncriminal encounters such as this. Id., 18 How. at 285. But cases since that time have shed a different light, making clear that Fourth Amendment guarantees
are triggered by governmental searches and seizures "without regard to the use to which [houses, papers, and effects] are applied." Warden, Maryland Penitentiary
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967). Murray's Lessee's broad statement that the Fourth Amendment "has no reference to civil proceedings for the recovery of
debt" arguably only meant that the warrant requirement did not apply, as was suggested in G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352 (1977).
Whatever its proper reading, we reaffirm today our basic understanding that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures fully applies in the civil
context.
[12] This was the view expressed by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Specht v. Jensen, 832 F.2d 1516 (1987), remanded on unrelated grounds, 853
F.2d 805 (1988) (en banc), with which the Seventh Circuit expressly agreed. 942 F.2d, at 1076.
[13] The officers in these cases were engaged in law enforcement, and were looking for something that was found and seized. In this broad sense, the seizures
were the result of "searches," but not in the Fourth Amendment sense. That the Court of Appeals might have been suggesting that the plain-view cases are
explainable because they almost always occur in the course of law enforcement activities receives some support from the penultimate sentence of the quoted
passage, where the court states that the word "seizure" might lose its usual meaning "when it stands apart from a search or any other investigative activity." Id., at
1079 (emphasis added). And, in the following paragraph, it observes that, "[o]utside of the law enforcement area, the Fourth Amendment retains its force as a
protection against searches, because they invade privacy. That is why we decline to confine the amendment to the law enforcement setting." Id., at 1079-1080.
Even if the court meant that seizures of property in the course of law enforcement activities, whether civil or criminal, implicate interests safeguarded by the
Fourth Amendment, but that pure property interests are unprotected in the non-law-enforcement setting, we are not in accord, as indicated in the body of this
opinion. [506 U.S. 56, 73]
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: chansen@washoecounty.us
Subject: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice Court
Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 09:10:14 -0700
Dear Civil Supervisor Hansen
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Dear Sparks Justice Court,
I called and received permission to file this by fax...I am indigent and request a fee waiver, and failing that, an opportunity to cure any filing fee deficiency.
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: sheriffweb@washoecounty.us; lstuchell@washoecounty.us; kstancil@washoecounty.us; chansen@washoecounty.us; milllerr@reno.gov
Subject: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice Court
Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 07:58:36 -0700
Dear Sparks Justice Court, WCSO, RPD, and Reno Justice Court.
I have received (though not personally served) what appears to be an eviction notice (5 day unlawful detainer?) for rentals located at 1680 Sky Mountain Drive, Reno, 89523, but the
notice indicates that I must file a Tenant's Answer with the Sparks Justice Court.
Am I mistaken in viewing this matter to be outside the jurisdiction of the Sparks Justice Court, and rather, a matter to be handled in Reno Justice Court?
Given Sparks Justice Court is open 5 days a week (closes at noon on Fridays) and Reno Justice Court has 4 judicial days a week, the deadline for filing a special appearance (to
contest jurisdiction) and or a Tenant's Answer of Affidavit is difficult to measure.
I spoke with a Reno Police Department who identified himself as Sargent Miller last week and he indicated the WCSO planned to come effectuate an eviction on this date, June 26,
2012. I believe that would be premature, as Nevada Landlord Tenant law provides for filing a Tenant's Answer or Affidavit by noon after the fifth full day (judicial days) and
Fridays in Sparks Justice Court are not full days in that sense, and regardless, Sparks Justice Court, I believe, is not the appropriate forum where, as here, the situs is located in Reno
(Ward 1-nap?)
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
tel 775 338 8118
fax 949 667 7403
Civil Division
630 Greenbrae Drive
Sparks, Nevada 89431
please note my new address if it has not already been noted
motion for preparation of transcript at public expense etc
(775)353.7603 Phone
(775)352.3004 Fax
Civil Department Supervisor
Chris Hansen
chansen@washoecounty.us
The Civil Division of Sparks Justice Court is made up of three major functions:
Civil
Civil Complaints for damages in excess of $5000 or if a suit involves a breach of contract, punitive damages, an action to obtain possession of property, a writ of restitution, or other
like actions, legal counsel is suggested for these types of actions.
Evictions
An act or process of legally dispossessing a person of land or rental property.
Small Claims
An action filed in order to obtain a monetary judgment. Claims must not exceed $5000. A small claims action may be filed with the Sparks Justice Court if one of the following
applies to the defendant:
1. They reside within the boundaries of the Sparks Township;
2. They are employed within the boundaries of the Sparks Township; and/or,
3. They do business within the boundaries of the Sparks Township.
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Sat 9/08/12 2:00 PM
To: renomunirecords@reno.gov
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Tue 8/07/12 11:42 PM
To: hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov; drakej@reno.gov
1 attachment
FW: respectfully submitted
IMAG0569 motion for preparation of transcript at public expense and opposition to motion to dismiss rmc 11cr26405.jpg (2.8 MB)
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Tue 8/07/12 11:01 PM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net; jleslie@washoecounty.us; zyoung@da.washoecounty.us; drakej@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov
6 attachments
20120605_101513 Northwind manager handy man attacks from golf cart 6 5 12.mp4 (3.1 MB) , landlord tenant law manual for police in minnesota.pdf (735.1 KB) ,
Police_manual_-_final_as_adopted_by_State's_Attorney.pdf (263.7 KB) , trespass criminal civil evictdion.pdf (69.8 KB) , 6 8 12 fax to northwind with page numbers.pdf
(50.7 KB) , northwind fax 6 4 12 habitability retaliation etc.pdf (45.8 KB)
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: weavera@reno.gov; barnesm@reno.gov
global resolution
Subject: respectfully submitted
Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2012 16:41:49 -0700
Dear Officer Weaver and Officer Barnes,
I am respectfully submitting this supplementary material to the police report I submitted to you in person on June 6, 2012 regarding the
assault I was the victim of at the hands of maintenance staff member Luke of Northwind Apartments on June 5th, 2012, and the attempts at
unlawful entry committed by Northwind Manager Dwayne Jakob on or about June 4, 2012.
I am attaching an article you may find of interest regarding the intersection of landlord tenant law and police work, vis a vis criminal/civil
matters and the fine distinctions that sometimes arise. I didn't see anything in there on Officer Weavers fine hypothetical regarding entry
without permission when a burglary may be occurring. That situation probably does not come up that often because hardly anybody but
the police would be brave enough to enter such a dangerous situation.
I appreciate the brave service both of you provide. I am attaching this materials just because they are interesting to me and may be to you
and in no way wish for so attachign these to be interpreted as a criticism of either of your police work.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Mon 8/06/12 4:45 PM
To: jleslie@washoecounty.us; zyoung@da.washoecounty.us; mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us; kadlicj@reno.gov; christensend@reno.gov
Dear Mr. Leslie, DDA Young, DDA Kandaras, and City Attorney Kadlic, and Deputy City Attorney Christensen,
Will you please confer with DDA Young and, perhaps, DDA Kandaras (I believe she is the appropriate attorney to discuss
resolution of any potential civil claims with, as well as, perhaps, City Attorney Kadlic or Deputy City Attorney Christensen given the
August 20th, 2011 arrest in RCR 201-063341 was made by a RPD Officer and that there is potentially an issue of misconduct/a Fourth
Amendment Violation that could arise at trial if the issue of whether the officer reached into the accused's pocket, prior to the technical point
of arrest, to turn on the cell phone, for the purpose of calling it an applying a "plain sight or feel or sound" approach to finding probable
cause to arrest for a misdemeanor allegedly occurring outside the officer's presence, after 7 p.m., and to therefore conduct a search
incident to arrest. I would greatly appreciate an opportunity to avoid having those issues come up on the record at Trial, or ever....
Mr. Leslie, I would appreciate it if you would confer with the above listed attorney's as to whether the proposed plea agreement I wrote of
recently is acceptable (it basically amends the previous plea agreement by including a waiver on my part of any civil causes of action that I
may have against the various governmental entities potentially liable in connection with any of those three arrests in exchange for excising
from the previously proposed plea agreement those portions suspending a sentence and requiring the defendant to "obey all laws". I wrote
previously:
"I am fairly opposed to resolutions of the criminal matters that include any "obey all laws" and "180 days suspended sentence" types of
conditions, not because I think the prosecutors or the system is unreasonable, but...well, I have upset a good number of members of law
enforcement and I may wish to leave the area for an extended time (only if legally allowed to do so), and for the same reasons (and because
I already have two convictions) I would prefer not to go into Mental Health Court (though I greatly respect Judge Breen), in addition to
some other more personal reasons that relate to my father, whom I love. However, my whole life has been somewhat of a Mental Health
Court or diversion program with my Dad in it, as he has been involved in physician diversion programs for those with mental health
problems and substance abuse issues, and that has resulted in a tough love approach for years, taken to an extreme, which, at times, has
seemed to complicate, if not derail entirely, my attempts to address the various issues that I face."
I would prefer not to get too into it, but the situation with my Dad is somewhat like that seen in Christian Scientist families. When I say
"tough love", I am not referring to, lets say, hypothetically, a physician parent not giving one a temporary loan when one's girlfriend of five
years steals a couple months rent from him. I am referring to such a parent harassing one for years, pulling prescription records in
violation of privacy laws, demanding to commandeer one's approach to treating ADHD and/or depression or treatement resistant depression,
calling up State Bars and Dean of Law Schools with his "diagnosis", criticizing anyone and everyone who drinks alcohol ever as a "drunk",
implementing manipulative tactics reminiscent of the Duluth Model of the "Power and Control Wheel" commonly found in the domestic
violence literature, Munchausen by Proxy, just generally being a control freak as most all physicians are, bad mouthing one professionally
for years from a bully pulpit, calling up one's domestic partners and convincing them to leave one while unduly influencing them via the
"MD effect", alienating one from all other family members by means of financial control incident to a punishment reward apparatus applied
to the family on a large scale, etc., etc., and just basically viewing one's offspring in narcissistic personality disorder style that sees them as
an extension of one's ego rather than separate, distinct human beings capable of and entitled to makes their own choices about things, ("oh,
you take that medication for ADHD, well, I am an AA bleeding deacon and don't care if you haven't had a drink or drug in 6 years, I am
going to systematically and proactively-"letting you have your pain"- destroy your life in any and every way I can until I bring you the
"incomprehensible demoralization" cited in the Big Book of Alcoholics Anonymous so necessary, in my opinion to rebuilding you in my
own image, er, I mean, to your recovery")... etc., etc...
I am going to have plenty of mental health oversight regardless of whether I go into Mental Health Court or whether I have a suspended
sentence hanging over my head, and I have a great many reasons to obey all laws. Please consider that the August 20th, 2011 arrest
occurred just days after I was first threatened with a summary eviction from my former home law office by a veteran commercial litigator,
that I spent nearly 7 days in jail in connection with it, and lost some money and clients while in jail in addition to sustaining some other
significant financial damages. Then, just some 13 days after being release from jail on August 26th, 2011, I was arrested and subsequently
convicted of petty larceny in RMC 11 CR 22176, which I reported to the State Bar of Nevada under SCR 111 and the United States Patent
11 CR 26405 and appeal in CR12-1262: Notice of RMC's failure to file timely filed Notice of Appeal resulted in
dismissal of Appeal in CR12-1262
and Trademark Office under 37 CFR 11.24 and 11.25, resulting in the suspension of my law license and reports of that conviction and
suspension running in numerous newspapers and television news reports in light of an Associated Press article on it. I realize many would
consider the chances of any civil claims I may bring to be very thin, but please consider any benefit that would inure to your organizations
and or law enforcement as a whole incident to my waiver of any such claims in exchange for this amended plea agreement as well as
whether you might, per chance, take some pity on me and forgive me for my inappropriate behavior this past year.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Mon 8/27/12 4:49 PM
To: hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov; drakej@reno.gov
3 attachments
cr12-1262 motion to set aside order dismissing appeal.pdf (141.2 KB) , notice filing in 11 cr 26405 complete to file on 8 27 12.pdf (198.6 KB) , ex 1 to motion to set
aside dismissal cr12-1262 bw.pdf (2.7 MB)
11 CR 26405 and appeal in CR12-1262: Notice of RMC's failure to file timely filed Notice of Appeal resulted in dismissal of Appeal in CR12-1262
also please find motion to reconsider, alter, amend, set aside, etc. the recent order dismissing the appeal in cr12-1262.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Close Print
FW: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks J ustice Court
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Mon 8/06/12 3:55 PM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net; kadlicj@reno.gov; drakej@reno.gov
2 attachments
coughlin v northwind 16_TenantsAffidavit_DeclarationOther_PrivateHousing other than nonpayment of rent.pdf (76.3
KB) , combined northwind v coughlin eviction filings.pdf (1058.4 KB)
please view this in conjunction with the email I just sent.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: kbrown@nvbar.org; milllerr@reno.gov; millerr@reno.gov; stuttle@washoecounty.gov; rsilva@washoecounty.us;
stuttle@washoecounty.us; jamchen@washoecounty.us; 037nor4@acg.com; info@acg-apmi.com; rjcweb@wasoecounty.us;
jboles@callatg.com; apminfo@acg.com
Subject: FW: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks J ustice Court
Date: Mon, 2 J ul 2012 17:21:54 -0700
NOrthwind and Nevada Court Services served and "amended 5 day notice of unlawful detainer on J uly 29th, 2012"...giving
me five days to get my stuff out of unit 29 (the one the subject of J udge Schroeer's Eviction Order, which was effectively
rescinded by their serving a new 5 day unlawful detainer notice....) as well as units 71 and 45...whicih are two units to which i
still have valide lease agreements, ie, I cannot be trespassing for accessing them (the Reno PD has indicated they will arrest
me for criminal trespass for accessing any units in the complex, including those to which I still have a valid possessory or
property interest, in violation of 42 usc 1983).
why does Sargent Miller have to give me a hard time? Isn't it enough for him to have his "Denzel" good looks and a much
higher paying job than I will ever have? What up wit that?
Northwind and Nevada Court Services (which is practicing eviction law without a license) screwed up and put "Sparks J ustice
Court on Greenbrae" as the place for the tenant to file a Tenan'ts Answer or Affidavit. Doing so will make the RJ C Order by
J udge Schroeder null and void (Karen Stancil, Chief Civil Clerk at RJ C admits this, but really, the fault lies with NCS and
Northwind, not the committed professional at the RJ C).
The Notice must identify the Court with jurisdiction. NRS 40.253(3)(a). ONe cannot be trespassing in a placwe where they have a valid
reason for being or a lawful right to be. NRS 207.200, RMC 8.10.040.
In Aikins v. Andrews, 91 Nev. 746, 542 P.2d 734 (1975), the Supreme COUli construed the
predecessor statute to NRS 40.2516 to mean that the alternative five (5) day notice must be given
6
before the tenants can be dispossed and a lease can be validly terminated. The court stated that this
five (5) day notice requirement " ... neither can be waved nor neglected." 91 Nev. at 748.
ttp://www.constitution.org/ussc/506-056a.htm
U.S. Supreme Court
SOLDAL v. COOK COUNTY, 506 U.S. 56 (1992)
506 U.S. 56 SOLDAL, ET UX. v. COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 91-6516
Argued October 5, 1992
Decided December 8, 1992
While eviction proceedings were pending, Terrace Properties and Margaret Hale forcibly evicted petitioners, the Soldal
family, and their mobile home from a Terrace Properties' mobile home park. At Hale's request, Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff's
Department deputies were present at the eviction. Although they knew that there was no eviction order and that Terrace
Properties' actions were illegal, the deputies refused to take Mr. Soldal's complaint for criminal trespass or otherwise interfere
with the eviction. Subsequently, the state judge assigned to the pending eviction proceedings ruled that the eviction had been
unauthorized, and the trailer, badly damaged during the eviction, was returned to the lot. Petitioners brought an action in the
Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that Terrace Properties and Hale had conspired with the deputy sheriffs
to unreasonably seize and remove their home in violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Acknowledging that what had occurred was a
"seizure" in the literal sense of the word, the court reasoned that it was not a seizure as contemplated by the Fourth
Amendment because, inter alia, it did not invade petitioners' privacy.
Held:
The seizure and removal of the trailer home implicated petitioners' Fourth Amendment rights. Pp. 61-72.
(a) A "seizure" of property occurs when "there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory
interests in that property." United States v. J acobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 . The language of the Fourth Amendment -
which protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures of "their persons, houses, papers, and effects" - cuts
against the novel holding below, and this Court's cases unmistakably hold that the Amendment protects property
even where privacy or liberty is not implicated. See, e.g., ibid.; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 . This
Court's "plain view" decisions also make untenable the lower court's construction of the Amendment. If the
Amendment's boundaries were defined exclusively by rights of privacy, "plain view" seizures, rather than being
scrupulously subjected to Fourth Amendment inquiry, Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 -327, would not
implicate that constitutional provision at all. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' [506 U.S. 56, 57] position, the
Amendment protects seizure even though no search within its meaning has taken place. See, e.g., J acobsen, supra,
at 120-125. Also contrary to that court's view, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 , does not require a court, when it
finds that a wrong implicates more than one constitutional command, to look at the dominant character of the
challenged conduct to determine under which constitutional standard it should be evaluated. Rather, each
constitutional provision is examined in turn. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 . Pp. 61-71.
(b) The instant decision should not foment a wave of new litigation in the federal courts. Activities such as
repossessions or attachments, if they involve entering a home, intruding on individuals' privacy, or interfering with
their liberty, would implicate the Fourth Amendment even on the Court of Appeals' own terms. And numerous
seizures of this type will survive constitutional scrutiny on "reasonableness" grounds. Moreover, it is unlikely that
the police will often choose to further an enterprise knowing that it is contrary to the law, or proceed to seize
property in the absence of objectively reasonable grounds for doing so. Pp. 71-72.
942 F.2d 1073, reversed and remanded.
WHITE, J ., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
J ohn L. Stainthorp argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners.
Kenneth L. Gillis argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were J ack O'Malley, Renee G. Goldfarb, and
Kenneth T. McCurry. [*]
[ Footnote *] J ames D. Holzhauer, Timothy S. Bishop, J ohn A. Powell, Steven R. Shapiro, Harvey M. Grossman, and Alan K.
Chen filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Richard Ruda, Carter G. Phillips, Mark D. Hopson, and Mark E. Haddad filed a brief for the National League of Cities et al.
as amici curiae urging affirmance.
J USTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
I
Edward Soldal and his family resided in their trailer home, which was located on a rented lot in the Willoway Terrace mobile
[506 U.S. 56, 58] home park in Elk Grove, Illinois. In May 1987, Terrace Properties, the owner of the park, and Margaret Hale, its
manager, filed an eviction proceeding against the Soldals in an Illinois state court. Under the Illinois Forcible Entry and
Detainer Act, Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 110, 9-101 et seq. (1991), a tenant cannot be dispossessed absent a judgment of eviction. The
suit was dismissed on J une 2, 1987. A few months later, in August 1987, the owner brought a second proceeding of eviction,
claiming nonpayment of rent. The case was set for trial on September 22, 1987.
Rather than await judgment in their favor, Terrace Properties and Hale, contrary to Illinois law, chose to evict the Soldals
forcibly two weeks prior to the scheduled hearing. On September 4, Hale notified the Cook County's Sheriff's Department that
she was going to remove the trailer home from the park, and requested the presence of sheriff deputies to forestall any
possible resistance. Later that day, two Terrace Properties employees arrived at the Soldals' home accompanied by Cook
County Deputy Sheriff O'Neil. The employees proceeded to wrench the sewer and water connections off the side of the trailer
home, disconnect the phone, tear off the trailer's canopy and skirting, and hook the home to a tractor. Meanwhile, O'Neil
explained to Edward Soldal that "`he was there to see that [Soldal] didn't interfere with [Willoway's] work.'" Brief for
Petitioner 6.
By this time, two more deputy sheriffs had arrived at the scene, and Soldal told them that he wished to file a complaint for
criminal trespass. They referred him to deputy Lieutenant J ones, who was in Hale's office. J ones asked Soldal to wait outside
while he remained closeted with Hale and other Terrace Properties employees for over 20 minutes. After talking to a district
attorney and making Soldal wait another half hour, J ones told Soldal that he would not accept a complaint because "`it was
between the landlord and the tenant ... [and] they were going to go ahead and continue to move [506 U.S. 56, 59] out the trailer.'"
Id., at 8. 1 Throughout this period, the deputy sheriffs knew that Terrace Properties did not have an eviction order and that its
actions were unlawful. Eventually, and in the presence of an additional two deputy sheriffs, the Willoway workers pulled the
trailer free of its moorings and towed it onto the street. Later, it was hauled to a neighboring property.
On September 9, the state judge assigned to the pending eviction proceedings ruled that the eviction had been unauthorized,
and ordered Terrace Properties to return the Soldals' home to the lot. The home, however, was badly damaged.
[2]
The Soldals
brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a violation of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
They claimed that Terrace Properties and Hale had conspired with Cook County deputy sheriffs to unreasonably seize and
remove the Soldals' trailer home. The District J udge granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the
Soldals had failed to adduce any evidence to support their conspiracy theory and, therefore, the existence of state action
necessary under 1983.
[3]
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, construing the facts in petitioners' favor, accepted their contention that there was
state action. However, it went on to hold that [506 U.S. 56, 60] the removal of the Soldals' trailer did not constitute a seizure for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment or a deprivation of due process for purposes of the Fourteenth.
On rehearing, a majority of the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, reaffirmed the panel decision.
[4]
Acknowledging that what
had occurred was a "seizure" in the literal sense of the word, the court reasoned that, because it was not made in the course of
public law enforcement, and because it did not invade the Soldals' privacy, it was not a seizure as contemplated by the Fourth
Amendment. 942 F.2d 1073, 1076 (1991). Interpreting prior cases of this Court, the Seventh Circuit concluded that, absent
interference with privacy or liberty, a "pure deprivation of property" is not cognizable under the Fourth Amendment. Id., at
1078-1079. Rather, petitioners' property interests were protected only by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
[5]
We granted certiorari to consider whether the seizure and removal of the Soldals' trailer home implicated their Fourth
Amendment rights, 503 U.S. 918 (1992), and now reverse.
[6]
[506 U.S. 56, 61]
II
The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963), provides
in pertinent part that the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated... ."
A "seizure" of property, we have explained, occurs when "there is some meaningful interference with an individual's
possessory interests in that property." United States v. J acobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). In addition, we have emphasized
that "at the very core" of the Fourth Amendment "stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home." Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). See also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 -179 (1984); Wyman v. J ames, 400 U.S.
309, 316 (1971); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980).
As a result of the state action in this case, the Soldals' domicile was not only seized, it literally was carried away, giving new
meaning to the term "mobile home." We fail to see how being unceremoniously dispossessed of one's home in the manner
alleged to have occurred here can be viewed as anything but a seizure invoking the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
Whether the Amendment was in fact [506 U.S. 56, 62] violated is, of course, a different question that requires determining if the
seizure was reasonable. That inquiry entails the weighing of various factors, and is not before us.
The Court if Appeals recognized that there had been a seizure, but concluded that it was a seizure only in a "technical" sense,
not within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This conclusion followed from a narrow reading of the Amendment, which
the court construed to safeguard only privacy and liberty interests, while leaving unprotected possessory interests where
neither privacy nor liberty was at stake. Otherwise, the court said,
"a constitutional provision enacted two centuries ago [would] make every repossession and eviction with police
assistance actionable under - of all things - the Fourth Amendment[, which] would both trivialize the amendment
and gratuitously shift a large body of routine commercial litigation from the state courts to the federal courts. That
trivializing, this shift, can be prevented by recognizing the difference between possessory and privacy interests."
942 F.2d, at 1077.
Because the officers had not entered Soldal's house, rummaged through his possessions, or, in the Court of Appeals' view,
interfered with his liberty in the course of the eviction, the Fourth Amendment offered no protection against the "grave
deprivation" of property that had occurred. Ibid.
We do not agree with this interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment protects the people from unreasonable
searches and seizures of "their persons, houses, papers, and effects." This language surely cuts against the novel holding
below, and our cases unmistakably hold that the Amendment protects property as well as privacy.
[7]
This much [506 U.S. 56, 63]
was made clear in J acobsen, supra, where we explained that the first Clause of the Fourth Amendment
"protects two types of expectations, one involving "searches," the other "seizures." A "search" occurs when an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. A "seizure" of property occurs
where there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property." 466 U.S., at
113 (footnote omitted).
See also id., at 120; Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987); Maryland v.
Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747 -748 (1983) (STEVENS, J ., concurring in judgment);
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 , n. 6 (1980). Thus, having concluded that chemical testing of powder found in a
package did not compromise its owner's privacy, the Court in J acobsen did not put an end to its inquiry, as would be required
under the view adopted by the Court of Appeals and advocated by respondents. Instead, adhering to the teachings of United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), it went on to determine whether the invasion of the owners' "possessory interests"
occasioned by the destruction of the powder was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. J acobsen, supra, at 124-125. In
Place, although we found that subjecting luggage to a "dog sniff" did not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes
because it did not compromise any privacy interest, taking custody of Place's suitcase was deemed an unlawful seizure, for it
unreasonably infringed "the suspect's possessory interest in his luggage." 462 U.S., at 708 . 8 Although lacking a privacy
component, the property rights in both instances nonetheless were not [506 U.S. 56, 64] disregarded, but rather were afforded
Fourth Amendment protection.
Respondents rely principally on precedents such as Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), Warden, Maryland
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), and Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), to demonstrate that the Fourth
Amendment is only marginally concerned with property rights. But the message of those cases is that property rights are not
the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations. The Warden opinion thus observed, citing J ones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257 (1960), and Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), that the "principal" object of the Amendment is the
protection of privacy, rather than property, and that "this shift in emphasis from property to privacy has come about through a
subtle interplay of substantive and procedural reform." 387 U.S., at 304 . There was no suggestion that this shift in emphasis
had snuffed out the previously recognized protection for property under the Fourth Amendment. Katz, in declaring violative of
the Fourth Amendment the unwarranted overhearing of a telephone booth conversation, effectively ended any lingering
notions that the protection of privacy depended on trespass into a protected area. In the course of its decision, the Katz Court
stated that the Fourth Amendment can neither be translated into a provision dealing with constitutionally protected areas nor
into a general constitutional right to privacy. The Amendment, the Court said, protects individual privacy against certain kinds
of governmental intrusion, "but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all." 389 U.S., at 350 .
As for Cardwell, a plurality of this Court held in that case that the Fourth Amendment did not bar the use in evidence of paint
scrapings taken from and tire treads observed on the defendant's automobile, which had been seized in a parking lot and towed
to a police lockup. Gathering this evidence was not deemed to be a search, for nothing from the [506 U.S. 56, 65] interior of the
car and "no personal effects, which the Fourth Amendment traditionally has been deemed to protect" were searched or seized.
417 U.S., at 591 (opinion of BLACKMUN, J .). No meaningful privacy rights were invaded. But this left the argument,
pressed by the dissent, that the evidence gathered was the product of a warrantless, and hence illegal, seizure of the car from
the parking lot where the defendant had left it. However, the plurality was of the view that, because, under the circumstances
of the case, there was probable cause to seize the car as an instrumentality of the crime, Fourth Amendment precedent
permitted the seizure without a warrant. Id., at 593. Thus, both the plurality and dissenting J ustices considered the defendant's
auto deserving of Fourth Amendment protection even though privacy interests were not at stake. They differed only in the
degree of protection that the Amendment demanded.
The Court of Appeals appeared to find more specific support for confining the protection of the Fourth Amendment to privacy
interests in our decision in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). There, a state prison inmate sued, claiming that prison
guards had entered his cell without consent and had seized and destroyed some of his personal effects. We ruled that an
inmate, because of his status, enjoyed neither a right to privacy in his cell nor protection against unreasonable seizures of his
personal effects. Id., at 526-528, and n. 8; id., at 538 (O'CONNOR, J ., concurring). Whatever else the case held, it is of
limited usefulness outside the prison context with respect to the coverage of the Fourth Amendment.
We thus are unconvinced that any of the Court's prior cases supports the view that the Fourth Amendment protects against
unreasonable seizures of property only where privacy or liberty is also implicated. What is more, our "plain view" decisions
make untenable such a construction of the Amendment. Suppose, for example, that police officers lawfully enter a house, by
either complying with the warrant requirement or satisfying one of its recognized exceptions - [506 U.S. 56, 66] e.g., through a
valid consent or a showing of exigent circumstances. If they come across some item in plain view and seize it, no invasion of
personal privacy has occurred. Horton, 496 U.S., at 133 -134; Brown, supra, at 739 (opinion of REHNQUIST, J .). If the
boundaries of the Fourth Amendment were defined exclusively by rights of privacy, "plain view" seizures would not implicate
that constitutional provision at all. Yet, far from being automatically upheld, "plain view" seizures have been scrupulously
subjected to Fourth Amendment inquiry. Thus, in the absence of consent or a warrant permitting the seizure of the items in
question, such seizures can be justified only if they meet the probable-cause standard, Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 -
327 (1987), 9 and if they are unaccompanied by unlawful trespass, Horton, 496 U.S., at 136 -137. 10 That is because, the
absence of a privacy interest notwithstanding, "[a] seizure of the article ... would obviously invade the owner's possessory
interest." Id., at 134; see also Brown, 460 U.S., at 739 (opinion of REHNQUIST, J .). The plain-view doctrine "merely reflects
an application of the Fourth Amendment's central requirement of reasonableness to the law governing seizures of property."
Ibid.; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971); id., at 516 (WHITE, J ., concurring and dissenting).
The Court of Appeals understandably found it necessary to reconcile its holding with our recognition in the plain-view cases
that the Fourth Amendment protects property as such. In so doing, the court did not distinguish this case on the ground that
the seizure of the Soldals' home took place in a [506 U.S. 56, 67] noncriminal context. Indeed, it acknowledged what is evident
from our precedents - that the Amendment's protection applies in the civil context as well. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709 (1987); New J ersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 -335 (1985); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504 -506 (1978);
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 -313 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528
(1967). 11
Nor did the Court of Appeals suggest that the Fourth Amendment applied exclusively to law enforcement activities. It
observed, for example, that the Amendment's protection would be triggered "by a search or other entry into the home incident
to an eviction or repossession," 942 F.2d, at 1077. 12 Instead, the court sought to explain why the Fourth Amendment protects
against seizures of property in the plain-view context, but not in this case, as follows:
"[S]eizures made in the course of investigations by police or other law enforcement officers are almost always, as
in the plain view cases, the culmination of searches. The police search in order to seize, and it is the search [506 U.S.
56, 68] and ensuing seizure that the Fourth Amendment, by its reference to "searches and seizures," seeks to regulate.
Seizure means one thing when it is the outcome of a search; it may mean something else when it stands apart from
a search or any other investigative activity. The Fourth Amendment may still nominally apply, but, precisely
because there is no invasion of privacy, the usual rules do not apply." Id., at 1079 (emphasis in original).
We have difficulty with this passage. The court seemingly construes the Amendment to protect only against seizures that are
the outcome of a search. But our cases are to the contrary, and hold that seizures of property are subject to Fourth Amendment
scrutiny even though no search within the meaning of the Amendment has taken place. See, e.g., J acobsen, 466 U.S., at 120 -
125; Place, 462 U.S., at 706 -707; Cardwell, 417 U.S., at 588 -589. 13 More generally, an officer who happens to come across
an individual's property in a public area could seize it only if Fourth Amendment standards are satisfied - for example, if the
items are evidence of a crime or contraband. Cf. Payton v. New York, [506 U.S. 56, 69] 445 U.S., at 587 . We are also puzzled by
the last sentence of the excerpt, where the court announces that the "usual rules" of the Fourth Amendment are inapplicable if
the seizure is not the result of a search or any other investigative activity "precisely because there is no invasion of privacy."
For the plain-view cases clearly state that, notwithstanding the absence of any interference with privacy, seizures of effects
that are not authorized by a warrant are reasonable only because there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal
activity. The seizure of the weapons in Horton, for example, occurred in the midst of a search, yet we emphasized that it did
not "involve any invasion of privacy." 496 U.S., at 133 . In short, our statement that such seizures must satisfy the Fourth
Amendment and will be deemed reasonable only if the item's incriminating character is "immediately apparent," id., at 136-
137, is at odds with the Court of Appeals' approach.
The Court of Appeals' effort is both interesting and creative, but, at bottom, it simply reasserts the earlier thesis that the
Fourth Amendment protects privacy, but not property. We remain unconvinced, and see no justification for departing from our
prior cases. In our view, the reason why an officer might enter a house or effectuate a seizure is wholly irrelevant to the
threshold question whether the Amendment applies. What matters is the intrusion on the people's security from governmental
interference. Therefore, the right against unreasonable seizures would be no less transgressed if the seizure of the house was
undertaken to collect evidence, verify compliance with a housing regulation, effect an eviction by the police, or on a whim, for
no reason at all. As we have observed on more than one occasion, it would be "anomalous to say that the individual and his
private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior."
Camara 387 U.S., at 530 ; see also O'Connor, 480 U.S., at 715 ; T.L.O., 469 U.S., at 335 . [506 U.S. 56, 70]
The Court of Appeals also stated that, even if, contrary to its previous rulings, "there is some element or tincture of a Fourth
Amendment seizure, it cannot carry the day for the Soldals." 942 F.2d, at 1080. Relying on our decision in Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386 (1989), the court reasoned that it should look at the "dominant character of the conduct challenged in a section
1983 case [to] determine the constitutional standard under which it is evaluated." 942 F.2d, at 1080. Believing that the Soldals'
claim was more akin to a challenge against the deprivation of property without due process of law than against an
unreasonable seizure, the court concluded that they should not be allowed to bring their suit under the guise of the Fourth
Amendment.
But we see no basis for doling out constitutional protections in such fashion. Certain wrongs affect more than a single right,
and, accordingly, can implicate more than one of the Constitution's commands. Where such multiple violations are alleged, we
are not in the habit of identifying, as a preliminary matter, the claim's "dominant" character. Rather, we examine each
constitutional provision in turn. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause). Graham is not to the contrary. Its holding was that claims of excessive use of force should be analyzed
under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process test.
We were guided by the fact that, in that case, both provisions targeted the same sort of governmental conduct and, as a result,
we chose the more "explicit textual source of constitutional protection" over the "more generalized notion of `substantive due
process.'" 490 U.S., at 394 -395. Surely, Graham does not bar resort in this case to the Fourth Amendment's specific
protection for "houses, papers, [506 U.S. 56, 71] and effects," rather than the general protection of property in the Due Process
Clause.
III
Respondents are fearful, as was the Court of Appeals, that applying the Fourth Amendment in this context inevitably will
carry it into territory unknown and unforeseen: routine repossessions, negligent actions of public employees that interfere with
individuals' right to enjoy their homes, and the like, thereby federalizing areas of law traditionally the concern of the States.
For several reasons, we think the risk is exaggerated. To begin, our decision will have no impact on activities such as
repossessions or attachments if they involve entry into the home, intrusion on individuals' privacy, or interference with their
liberty, because they would implicate the Fourth Amendment even on the Court of Appeals' own terms. This was true of the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Specht, with which, as we previously noted, the Court of Appeals expressed agreement.
More significantly, "reasonableness is still the ultimate standard" under the Fourth Amendment, Camara, supra, at 539, which
means that numerous seizures of this type will survive constitutional scrutiny. As is true in other circumstances, the
reasonableness determination will reflect a "careful balancing of governmental and private interests." T.L.O., supra, at 341.
Assuming, for example, that the officers were acting pursuant to a court order, as in Specht v. J ensen, 832 F.2d 1516 (CA10
1987), or Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 , (1972), and, as often would be the case, a showing of unreasonableness on these
facts would be a laborious task indeed. Cf. Simms v. Slacum, 3 Cranch 300, 301 (1806). Hence, while there is no guarantee
against the filing of frivolous suits, had the ejection in this case properly awaited the state court's judgment, it is quite unlikely
that the federal court would have been bothered with a 1983 action alleging a Fourth Amendment violation. [506 U.S. 56, 72]
Moreover, we doubt that the police will often choose to further an enterprise knowing that it is contrary to the law, or proceed
to seize property in the absence of objectively reasonable grounds for doing so. In short, our reaffirmance of Fourth
Amendment principles today should not foment a wave of new litigation in the federal courts.
IV
The complaint here alleges that respondents, acting under color of state law, dispossessed the Soldals of their trailer home by
physically tearing it from its foundation and towing it to another lot. Taking these allegations as true, this was no "garden
variety" landlord-tenant or commercial dispute. The facts alleged suffice to constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, for they plainly implicate the interests protected by that provision. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
is, accordingly, reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Footnotes
[1] J ones' statement was prompted by a district attorney's advice that no criminal charges could be brought because, under
Illinois law, a criminal action cannot be used to determine the right of possession. See Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, 9-101 et seq.
(1991); People v. Evans, 163 Ill.App. 3d 561, 114 Ill.Dec. 662, 516 N.E.2d 817 (1st Dist. 1987).
[2] The Soldals ultimately were evicted per court order in December 1987.
[3] Title 42 U.S.C. 1983 provides that:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State ... subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress."
[4] The court reiterated the panel's conclusion that a conspiracy must be assumed on the state of the record and, therefore, that
the case must be treated in its current posture "as if the deputy sheriffs themselves seized the trailer, disconnected it from the
utilities, and towed it away." 942 F.2d 1073, 1075 (CA7 1991) (en banc).
[5] The court noted that, in light of the existence of adequate judicial remedies under state law, a claim for deprivation of
property without due process of law was unlikely to succeed. Id., at 1075-1076. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). In
any event, the Soldals did not claim a violation of their procedural rights. As noted, the Seventh Circuit also held that
respondents had not violated the Soldals' substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners assert
that this was error, but, in view of our disposition of the case, we need not address the question at this time.
[6] Under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Soldals were required to establish that the respondents, acting under color of state law, deprived
them of a constitutional right, in this instance, their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment freedom from unreasonable seizures by
the State. See Monroe v. Pape, [506 U.S. 56, 61] 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961). Respondents request that we affirm on the ground that
the Court of Appeals erred in holding that there was sufficient state action to support a 1983 action. The alleged injury to the
Soldals, it is urged, was inflicted by private parties for whom the county is not responsible. Although respondents did not
cross-petition, they are entitled to ask us to affirm on that ground if such action would not enlarge the judgment of the Court
of Appeals in their favor. The Court of Appeals found that, because the police prevented Soldal from using reasonable force to
protect his home from private action that the officers knew was illegal, there was sufficient evidence of conspiracy between the
private parties and the officers to foreclose summary judgment for respondents. We are not inclined to review that holding.
See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 -161 (1970).
[7] In holding that the Fourth Amendment's reach extends to property as such, we are mindful that the Amendment does not
protect possessory interests in all kinds of property. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176 -177 (1984). This
case, however, concerns a house, which the Amendment's language explicitly includes, as it does a person's effects.
[8] Place also found that to detain luggage for 90 minutes was an unreasonable deprivation of the individual's "liberty interest
in proceeding with his itinerary," which also is protected by the Fourth Amendment. 462 U.S., at 708 -710.
[9] When "operational necessities" exist, seizures can be justified on less than probable cause. 480 U.S., at 327 . That in no
way affects our analysis, for even then it is clear that the Fourth Amendment applies. Ibid; see also United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696 , at 703 (1983).
[10] Of course, if the police officers' presence in the home itself entailed a violation of the Fourth Amendment, no amount of
probable cause to believe that an item in plain view constitutes incriminating evidence will justify its seizure. Horton, 496
U.S., at 136 -137.
[11] It is true that Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272 (1856), cast some doubt on the
applicability of the Amendment to noncriminal encounters such as this. Id., 18 How. at 285. But cases since that time have
shed a different light, making clear that Fourth Amendment guarantees are triggered by governmental searches and seizures
"without regard to the use to which [houses, papers, and effects] are applied." Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 301 (1967). Murray's Lessee's broad statement that the Fourth Amendment "has no reference to civil proceedings
for the recovery of debt" arguably only meant that the warrant requirement did not apply, as was suggested in G.M. Leasing
Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352 (1977). Whatever its proper reading, we reaffirm today our basic understanding that
the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures fully applies in the civil context.
[12] This was the view expressed by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Specht v. J ensen, 832 F.2d 1516 (1987),
remanded on unrelated grounds, 853 F.2d 805 (1988) (en banc), with which the Seventh Circuit expressly agreed. 942 F.2d, at
1076.
[13] The officers in these cases were engaged in law enforcement, and were looking for something that was found and seized.
In this broad sense, the seizures were the result of "searches," but not in the Fourth Amendment sense. That the Court of
Appeals might have been suggesting that the plain-view cases are explainable because they almost always occur in the course
of law enforcement activities receives some support from the penultimate sentence of the quoted passage, where the court
states that the word "seizure" might lose its usual meaning "when it stands apart from a search or any other investigative
activity." Id., at 1079 (emphasis added). And, in the following paragraph, it observes that, "[o]utside of the law enforcement
area, the Fourth Amendment retains its force as a protection against searches, because they invade privacy. That is why we
decline to confine the amendment to the law enforcement setting." Id., at 1079-1080. Even if the court meant that seizures of
property in the course of law enforcement activities, whether civil or criminal, implicate interests safeguarded by the Fourth
Amendment, but that pure property interests are unprotected in the non-law-enforcement setting, we are not in accord, as
indicated in the body of this opinion. [506 U.S. 56, 73]
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: chansen@washoecounty.us
Subject: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks J ustice Court
Date: Tue, 26 J un 2012 09:10:14 -0700
Dear Civil Supervisor Hansen
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Dear Sparks J ustice Court,
I called and received permission to file this by fax...I am indigent and request a fee waiver, and failing that, an opportunity to cure any filing
fee deficiency.
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: sheriffweb@washoecounty.us; lstuchell@washoecounty.us; kstancil@washoecounty.us; chansen@washoecounty.us;
milllerr@reno.gov
Subject: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks J ustice Court
Date: Tue, 26 J un 2012 07:58:36 -0700
Dear Sparks J ustice Court, WCSO, RPD, and Reno J ustice Court.
I have received (though not personally served) what appears to be an eviction notice (5 day unlawful detainer?) for rentals
located at 1680 Sky Mountain Drive, Reno, 89523, but the notice indicates that I must file a Tenant's Answer with the Sparks
J ustice Court.
Am I mistaken in viewing this matter to be outside the jurisdiction of the Sparks J ustice Court, and rather, a matter to be
handled in Reno J ustice Court?
Given Sparks J ustice Court is open 5 days a week (closes at noon on Fridays) and Reno J ustice Court has 4 judicial days a week,
the deadline for filing a special appearance (to contest jurisdiction) and or a Tenant's Answer of Affidavit is difficult to measure.
I spoke with a Reno Police Department who identified himself as Sargent Miller last week and he indicated the WCSO planned to
come effectuate an eviction on this date, J une 26, 2012. I believe that would be premature, as Nevada Landlord Tenant law
provides for filing a Tenant's Answer or Affidavit by noon after the fifth full day (judicial days) and Fridays in Sparks J ustice
Court are not full days in that sense, and regardless, Sparks J ustice Court, I believe, is not the appropriate forum where, as
here, the situs is located in Reno (Ward 1-nap?)
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
tel 775 338 8118
fax 949 667 7403
Civil Division
630 Greenbrae Drive
Sparks, Nevada 89431
(775)353.7603 Phone
(775)352.3004 Fax
Civil Department Supervisor
Chris Hansen
chansen@washoecounty.us
The Civil Division of Sparks J ustice Court is made up of three major functions:
Civil
Civil Complaints for damages in excess of $5000 or if a suit involves a breach of contract, punitive damages, an action to obtain
possession of property, a writ of restitution, or other like actions, legal counsel is suggested for these types of actions.
Evictions
An act or process of legally dispossessing a person of land or rental property.
request for a pre trial motion and bail motion
Small Claims
An action filed in order to obtain a monetary judgment. Claims must not exceed $5000. A small claims action may be filed with
the Sparks J ustice Court if one of the following applies to the defendant:
1. They reside within the boundaries of the Sparks Township;
2. They are employed within the boundaries of the Sparks Township; and/or,
3. They do business within the boundaries of the Sparks Township.
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Mon 8/06/12 3:54 PM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net; drakej@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov
7 attachments
20120605_101458 admitting dwayne tried to lift door up 6 5 12.mp4 (498.1 KB) , 20120605_101513 Northwind
manager handy man attacks from golf cart 6 5 12.mp4 (3.1 MB) , northwind v coughjlin combined for rjc judges
chamers vacate summary eviction motion affidavit, amended motion and proposed order.pdf (130.9 KB) , supplement
to tenants motion to dismiss northwind in sparks justice court.pdf (98.3 KB) , 6 8 12 fax to northwind with page
numbers.pdf (50.7 KB) , northwind fax 6 4 12 habitability retaliation etc.pdf (45.8 KB) , emails to
weavera@reno.gov.pdf (32.5 KB)
Dear Mr. Loomis and City Attorney Kadlic and Deputy City Attorney Drake,
I am writing to request that you file some motion to alter, amend, reconsider, set aside, or modify my bail in the case stemming
from my J Uly 3, 2012 arrest for distrubing the peace, failure to provide proof of insurance, and failure to secure a load. I am
writing to request that you file a pre trial motion (Motion to Dismiss, request for a pre trial motion and bail motion, and motion to
supress police report based upon the DTP arrest occuring for alleged conduct outside the officer's presence). If you will not file
these motion (and please provide me a draft of such motions for my review prior to filing them as well as prior to making any
communication on my behalf to either the RMC or the City of Reno Prosecutor), please provide me a written indication of your
rationale for so refusing, and then please file a Motion to Withdrawal as soon as practicable. I ask this respectfully.
The police showed up to the hearing, yet I was not noticed of that fact in advance, or of the hearing itself. Further, J udge
Gardner explicilty indicated he was basing his decision to raise the bail based upon "public safety" and "concern for the
defendant's safety", which are impermissible rationale for so increasin one's bail.
NRS
178.498. Many courts use a bail schedule to determine the amount, but note the
initial amount can be increased if good cause is shown. NRS 178.499. Additionally, in
determining the amount of bail, the judge should look at the following factors (NRS
178.498):
The nature and circumstances of the offense charged
The defendants financial ability to post bail
The defendants character; and
The factors listed in NRS 178.4853.
Bail can not be excessive. U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. It should be limited to a
reasonable amount designed to ensure the defendants presence in court. It should not
be a corrective or preventative detention device.
NRS 178.484. The Court should take care in imposing any restrictions on a defendants constitutional rights (i.e.,
search and seizure) and only imply such restrictions if warranted by the underlying facts
of the alleged crime. Section 11 of NRS 178.484 describes the document that must
be signed by the defendant before he/she can be released on bail.
My bail hearing contained what seems to be an impermissible coercive attempt to condition my release or the possibility thereof
upon my providing confidential medical records (Lake's Crossing etc) to the Reno Municipal Court, even where the same judge
presiding over the bail hearing found me competent enough to face a criminal trepass trial less than two weeks before teh bail
hearing in 11 CR 26405.
The friend of mine who posted my bail, J ared Swanson, has a serious form of cancer and a one year old baby. I request a
reduction of the bail for his benefit and for the proof of insurance charge to be dismissed, as (and I am trying to avoid this in any
way I can), if I am rearrested, such a proof of insurance charge may present another basis for imposing an unduly burdensome
bail upon me, as it did on J uly 5th, 2012 where, despite my having produced a legible pdf copy of my proof of insurance card on
my large screened zoomable smart phone, Officers Weaver and Dye still charged me with that violation, and the bail was
subsequently increase. Further, none of the events or accusations forming the basis of the distrubing the police charge occurred
in the officer's presence, and the police report contains no indication whatsoever that the arrest was made based upon NRS
171.1771. I provided Officer Weaver my driver's license prior to the arrest. I did not
refuses to give a written promise to appear in court as provided in NRS 171.1773.
When a person is believed to have committed a misdemeanor offense, the peace officer has the discretion to
either issue a citation or arrest and detain the person. NRS 171.1771 states that a person can be arrested if
his identity is questionable or if the peace officer does not believe the person will appear in court. A person
can also be arrested for a misdemeanor offense if a warrant has been issued.
Additionally, I am requesting that you file a Motion to Dismiss the Disturbing the Peace charge based upon a lack of evidence and or insufficiency of pleading in
that the allegations do not amount to a prima facie case of a DTP violation. Further, please subpoena and or collect the Protection Order application filed by
Milan Krebs on J uly 5th, 2012, and interview Krebs as to why he mentions Coughlin often carrying around a large knife in a menacing manner in that
protection order application, yet completely failed to mention that in his J uly 3rd, 2012 police report. Additionally, please determine why Kreb's TPO
appliication has a different style of handwriting on the caption compared to the descriptive sections, indicating someone pushed the filing of the TPO on Krebs,
perhaps his employer, Northwind Apartments or the RPD, which has in the days preceding the arrest threatend to arrest Coughlin for criminal trespass if he
returned to any part of the premises of Northwind Apartments, in consideration of Coughlin's eviction from unit 29, despite the fact Coughlin still had a valid
right to go to his other two rentals, units 45 and 71, in addition to the fact that Northwinds essentially withdrew or rescinded its J une 28th, 2012 eviction of
Coughlin by posting an Amended 5 Day Unlawful Detainer Notice on unit 29 on J une 28th, 2012 shortly after Coughlin pointed out to Northwinds and Nevada
Courts Services that the J uly 14th, 2012 5 Day notice was not "personally served" (NCS's R. Wray lied about effecting personal service, as he could not
possibly have verified someone of "suitable age and discretion" was within the windowless room with a metal door closed and locked and where no Wray
admits that he received no verbal response from the unit or anyone therein upon his knocking on the door and or attempting to break into the unit, please see
Soldal v. Cook County in that regard, a US S. Ct case) and therefore Coughlin would have had until at least noon on J uly 28th, 2012 to file a Tenant's Answer,
whereas the eviction/lockout/arrest of J une 28th, 2012 took place two hours before noon at 10 am).
Additionally, RPD Officer Weaver had previously attempted to break into one of my rentals at Northwind at a time when he lacked a warrant and or an exigent
rationale for doing so, much less an eviction Order. I just want this case to be dismissed and to try to move on in life, and difuse the tensions incident to this
case.
I did not disturb the peace at Northwinds as alleged, nor did I make the threats Kreb's accuses me of or stalk him or follow him in a threatening manner at any
time. Additionaly, I never broke into nor did I ever attempt to break into Krebs' truck, and in fact, I filed a police report in J une 2012 reporting extortionate
threats by another maintenance man at Northwinds ("Luke" is his name, I believe) and Northwind's Manage Dwayne J akob, wherein they threatened to make
such a spurious allegation, but subsuquently refrained from doign so when it apparently occurred to them that I may have excuplatory video evidence
disproving such an allegation as well as capturing their baseless and extortionate threats and accusations. Additionally, please subpoene the police reports I
filed with the RPD and any emails I sent to any officers (including Weaver, Barnes, Sargent MIiller, LIeutenant Brown) and any reports of or recording of
phone conversations I had with any of those RPD personnel. Further, please see the attached june 26th, 2012 email to the RPD, WCSO, RJ C, Sparks J ustice
Court and others pointing out the insufficiency of the 5 day Notice drafted and posted by non-lawyers Nevada Court Services, in that under NRS 40.253 it
listed the wrong forum for the tenant to file a Tenant's Answer, and under the Aiken decision of the Nevada Supreme Court and NRCP 60(b)(4), any lockout
order stemming therefrom is void for lack of jurisdiction.
NRS 171.136 When arrest may be made.
1. If the offense charged is a felony or gross misdemeanor, the arrest may be made on any day, and at any time of day or night.
2. If it is a misdemeanor, the arrest cannot be made between the hours of 7 p.m. and 7 a.m., except:
(a) Upon the direction of a magistrate, endorsed upon the warrant;
(b) When the offense is committed in the presence of the arresting officer;
(c) When the person is found and the arrest is made in a public place or a place that is open to the public and:...
(2) The misdemeanor is discovered because there was probable cause for the arresting officer to stop, detain or arrest the person for another
alleged violation or offense;
(d) When the offense is committed in the presence of a private person and the person makes an arrest immediately after the offense is
committed;...
(g) When the person is already in custody as a result of another lawful arrest; or
Krebs did not immediately arrest me under NRS 171.136(2)(d), nor was the DTP arrest for an offense alleged to have occurred in the officer's presence.
the attached videos are of the incident on J une 5th, 2012, not from J uly 3rd, 2012, but they support my contentions and the relevancy of subpoening the
police incident reports and other documentation should this case not be dismissed, nolle prosequi, de minimis, etc....
I will forward to you my emails to the RPD et all from J une 26th, and J uly 2nd, 2012. I realize their tone was not a smart one to take or appropriate and am
only sending them in hopes of having this matter dismissed. I do not have any interest in pursuing anything like Wheeler v Cross 344 Fed Apps 420 ( (2008.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Cl ose Pr i nt
Ful l vi ew
|
|
Back t o messages
Your Online Police Report T12004553 Has Been Submitted
6/ 08/ 12
NvRenoPd@copl ogi c. com
To zachcoughl i n@hot mai l . com
Fr om: NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
Sent : Fr i 6/ 08/ 12 4: 39 PM
To: zachcoughl i n@hot mai l . com
****DO NOT RESPOND TO THI S E- MAI L****
****THI S I S AN UN- MONI TORED MAI L BOX****
Your onl i ne r epor t has been successf ul l y r ecei ved and t he
t r acki ng number i s T12004553.
You wi l l be not i f i ed vi a emai l of any pr obl ems wi t h your
r epor t . Once your r epor t i s appr oved, i t wi l l be i ssued
a case number and you wi l l r ecei ve a PDF copy as an at t achment
i n your emai l wi t hi n appr oxi mat el y t en busi ness days.
Thank you f or usi ng our onl i ne r epor t i ng syst emand pl ease
cont act us wi t h any suggest i ons you have f or i mpr ovi ng our
syst em.
Onl i ne Of f i cer
Reno Pol i ce Depar t ment
Ful l vi ew
|
|
Back t o messages
Your Online Police Report T12004554 Has Been Submitted
6/ 08/ 12
NvRenoPd@copl ogi c. com
To zachcoughl i n@hot mai l . com
Fr om: NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
Sent : Fr i 6/ 08/ 12 4: 45 PM
To: zachcoughl i n@hot mai l . com
****DO NOT RESPOND TO THI S E- MAI L****
****THI S I S AN UN- MONI TORED MAI L BOX****
Your onl i ne r epor t has been successf ul l y r ecei ved and t he
t r acki ng number i s T12004554.
You wi l l be not i f i ed vi a emai l of any pr obl ems wi t h your
r epor t . Once your r epor t i s appr oved, i t wi l l be i ssued
a case number and you wi l l r ecei ve a PDF copy as an at t achment
i n your emai l wi t hi n appr oxi mat el y t en busi ness days.
Thank you f or usi ng our onl i ne r epor t i ng syst emand pl ease
cont act us wi t h any suggest i ons you have f or i mpr ovi ng our
syst em.
Onl i ne Of f i cer
Reno Pol i ce Depar t ment
Ful l vi ew
|
|
Back t o messages
Your Online Police Report 120103420 Has Been Approved
6/ 11/ 12
NvRenoPd@copl ogi c. com
To zachcoughl i n@hot mai l . com
Fr om: NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
Sent : Mon 6/ 11/ 12 4: 10 PM
To: zachcoughl i n@hot mai l . com
1 at t achment
r epor t - 120103420- 0. pdf ( 71. 4 KB)
****DO NOT RESPOND TO THI S E- MAI L****
****THI S I S AN UN- MONI TORED MAI L BOX****
Your r epor t has been appr oved r epor t and t he per manent number of t he case i s
120103420.
t he del i cat e i nf or mat i on i n hi s r epor t has been r epl aced f or *** t o suppor t i sol at i on i n t hi s emai l .
Thank you f or usi ng our onl i ne r epor t i ng syst emand pl ease cont act us wi t h any suggest i ons you have f or i mpr ovi ng our
syst em.
Onl i ne Of f i cer
Reno Pol i ce Depar t ment
Ful l vi ew
|
|
Back t o messages
Your Online Police Report 120103420 Has Been Approved
6/ 11/ 12
NvRenoPd@copl ogi c. com
To zachcoughl i n@hot mai l . com
6 26 12 warning to wcso rpd, etc. Reno eviction noticed for Sparks J ustice
Court
Fr om: NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
Sent : Mon 6/ 11/ 12 4: 11 PM
To: zachcoughl i n@hot mai l . com
1 at t achment
r epor t - 120103420- 1. pdf ( 70. 9 KB)
****DO NOT RESPOND TO THI S E- MAI L****
****THI S I S AN UN- MONI TORED MAI L BOX****
Your r epor t has been appr oved suppl ement al r epor t and t he per manent number of t he case i s
120103420.
t he del i cat e i nf or mat i on i n hi s r epor t has been r epl aced f or *** t o suppor t i sol at i on i n t hi s emai l .
Thank you f or usi ng our onl i ne r epor t i ng syst emand pl ease cont act us wi t h any suggest i ons you have f or i mpr ovi ng our
syst em.
Onl i ne Of f i cer
Reno Pol i ce Depar t ment
Reno Pol i ce Depar t ment
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Wed 7/25/12 4:09 PM
To: kadlicj@reno.gov; zyoung@da.washoecounty.us; mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us; hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov
1 attachment
coughlin v northwind 16_TenantsAffidavit_DeclarationOther_PrivateHousing other than nonpayment of rent.pdf (76.3
KB)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B-xXtP3-yVU
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aKeIYy1CF_c&feature=channel&list=UL
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6SvV59vUJ wM&feature=channel&list=UL
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8-_USIE79kY&feature=channel&list=UL
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: chansen@washoecounty.us
Subject: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks J ustice Court
Date: Tue, 26 J un 2012 09:10:14 -0700
Dear Civil Supervisor Hansen
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Dear Sparks J ustice Court,
I called and received permission to file this by fax...I am indigent and request a fee waiver, and failing that, an opportunity to cure any filing
fee deficiency.
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: sheriffweb@washoecounty.us; lstuchell@washoecounty.us; kstancil@washoecounty.us; chansen@washoecounty.us;
milllerr@reno.gov
Subject: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks J ustice Court
Date: Tue, 26 J un 2012 07:58:36 -0700
Dear Sparks J ustice Court, WCSO, RPD, and Reno J ustice Court.
I have received (though not personally served) what appears to be an eviction notice (5 day unlawful detainer?) for rentals
located at 1680 Sky Mountain Drive, Reno, 89523, but the notice indicates that I must file a Tenant's Answer with the Sparks
J ustice Court.
Am I mistaken in viewing this matter to be outside the jurisdiction of the Sparks J ustice Court, and rather, a matter to be
handled in Reno J ustice Court?
Given Sparks J ustice Court is open 5 days a week (closes at noon on Fridays) and Reno J ustice Court has 4 judicial days a week,
the deadline for filing a special appearance (to contest jurisdiction) and or a Tenant's Answer of Affidavit is difficult to measure.
I spoke with a Reno Police Department who identified himself as Sargent Miller last week and he indicated the WCSO planned to
come effectuate an eviction on this date, J une 26, 2012. I believe that would be premature, as Nevada Landlord Tenant law
provides for filing a Tenant's Answer or Affidavit by noon after the fifth full day (judicial days) and Fridays in Sparks J ustice
Court are not full days in that sense, and regardless, Sparks J ustice Court, I believe, is not the appropriate forum where, as
here, the situs is located in Reno (Ward 1-nap?)
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
tel 775 338 8118
fax 949 667 7403
Civil Division
630 Greenbrae Drive
Sparks, Nevada 89431
(775)353.7603 Phone
(775)352.3004 Fax
Civil Department Supervisor
Chris Hansen
chansen@washoecounty.us
The Civil Division of Sparks J ustice Court is made up of three major functions:
Civil
Reno eviction noticed for Sparks J ustice Court
Civil Complaints for damages in excess of $5000 or if a suit involves a breach of contract, punitive damages, an action to obtain
possession of property, a writ of restitution, or other like actions, legal counsel is suggested for these types of actions.
Evictions
An act or process of legally dispossessing a person of land or rental property.
Small Claims
An action filed in order to obtain a monetary judgment. Claims must not exceed $5000. A small claims action may be filed with
the Sparks J ustice Court if one of the following applies to the defendant:
1. They reside within the boundaries of the Sparks Township;
2. They are employed within the boundaries of the Sparks Township; and/or,
3. They do business within the boundaries of the Sparks Township.
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Wed 7/25/12 4:02 PM
To: mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us; kadlicj@reno.gov
2 attachments
coughlin v northwind 16_TenantsAffidavit_DeclarationOther_PrivateHousing other than nonpayment of rent.pdf (76.3
KB) , combined northwind v coughlin eviction filings.pdf (1058.4 KB)
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: kbrown@nvbar.org; milllerr@reno.gov; millerr@reno.gov; stuttle@washoecounty.gov; rsilva@washoecounty.us;
stuttle@washoecounty.us; jamchen@washoecounty.us; 037nor4@acg.com; info@acg-apmi.com; rjcweb@wasoecounty.us;
jboles@callatg.com; apminfo@acg.com
Subject: FW: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks J ustice Court
Date: Mon, 2 J ul 2012 17:21:54 -0700
NOrthwind and Nevada Court Services served and "amended 5 day notice of unlawful detainer on J uly 29th, 2012"...giving
me five days to get my stuff out of unit 29 (the one the subject of J udge Schroeer's Eviction Order, which was effectively
rescinded by their serving a new 5 day unlawful detainer notice....) as well as units 71 and 45...whicih are two units to which i
still have valide lease agreements, ie, I cannot be trespassing for accessing them (the Reno PD has indicated they will arrest
me for criminal trespass for accessing any units in the complex, including those to which I still have a valid possessory or
property interest, in violation of 42 usc 1983).
why does Sargent Miller have to give me a hard time? Isn't it enough for him to have his "Denzel" good looks and a much
higher paying job than I will ever have? What up wit that?
Northwind and Nevada Court Services (which is practicing eviction law without a license) screwed up and put "Sparks J ustice
Court on Greenbrae" as the place for the tenant to file a Tenan'ts Answer or Affidavit. Doing so will make the RJ C Order by
J udge Schroeder null and void (Karen Stancil, Chief Civil Clerk at RJ C admits this, but really, the fault lies with NCS and
Northwind, not the committed professional at the RJ C).
The Notice must identify the Court with jurisdiction. NRS 40.253(3)(a). ONe cannot be trespassing in a placwe where they have a valid
reason for being or a lawful right to be. NRS 207.200, RMC 8.10.040.
In Aikins v. Andrews, 91 Nev. 746, 542 P.2d 734 (1975), the Supreme COUli construed the
predecessor statute to NRS 40.2516 to mean that the alternative five (5) day notice must be given
6
before the tenants can be dispossed and a lease can be validly terminated. The court stated that this
five (5) day notice requirement " ... neither can be waved nor neglected." 91 Nev. at 748.
ttp://www.constitution.org/ussc/506-056a.htm
U.S. Supreme Court
SOLDAL v. COOK COUNTY, 506 U.S. 56 (1992)
506 U.S. 56 SOLDAL, ET UX. v. COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 91-6516
Argued October 5, 1992
Decided December 8, 1992
While eviction proceedings were pending, Terrace Properties and Margaret Hale forcibly evicted petitioners, the Soldal
family, and their mobile home from a Terrace Properties' mobile home park. At Hale's request, Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff's
Department deputies were present at the eviction. Although they knew that there was no eviction order and that Terrace
Properties' actions were illegal, the deputies refused to take Mr. Soldal's complaint for criminal trespass or otherwise interfere
with the eviction. Subsequently, the state judge assigned to the pending eviction proceedings ruled that the eviction had been
unauthorized, and the trailer, badly damaged during the eviction, was returned to the lot. Petitioners brought an action in the
Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that Terrace Properties and Hale had conspired with the deputy sheriffs
to unreasonably seize and remove their home in violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Acknowledging that what had occurred was a
"seizure" in the literal sense of the word, the court reasoned that it was not a seizure as contemplated by the Fourth
Amendment because, inter alia, it did not invade petitioners' privacy.
Held:
The seizure and removal of the trailer home implicated petitioners' Fourth Amendment rights. Pp. 61-72.
(a) A "seizure" of property occurs when "there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory
interests in that property." United States v. J acobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 . The language of the Fourth Amendment -
which protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures of "their persons, houses, papers, and effects" - cuts
against the novel holding below, and this Court's cases unmistakably hold that the Amendment protects property
even where privacy or liberty is not implicated. See, e.g., ibid.; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 . This
Court's "plain view" decisions also make untenable the lower court's construction of the Amendment. If the
Amendment's boundaries were defined exclusively by rights of privacy, "plain view" seizures, rather than being
scrupulously subjected to Fourth Amendment inquiry, Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 -327, would not
implicate that constitutional provision at all. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' [506 U.S. 56, 57] position, the
Amendment protects seizure even though no search within its meaning has taken place. See, e.g., J acobsen, supra,
at 120-125. Also contrary to that court's view, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 , does not require a court, when it
finds that a wrong implicates more than one constitutional command, to look at the dominant character of the
challenged conduct to determine under which constitutional standard it should be evaluated. Rather, each
constitutional provision is examined in turn. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 . Pp. 61-71.
(b) The instant decision should not foment a wave of new litigation in the federal courts. Activities such as
repossessions or attachments, if they involve entering a home, intruding on individuals' privacy, or interfering with
their liberty, would implicate the Fourth Amendment even on the Court of Appeals' own terms. And numerous
seizures of this type will survive constitutional scrutiny on "reasonableness" grounds. Moreover, it is unlikely that
the police will often choose to further an enterprise knowing that it is contrary to the law, or proceed to seize
property in the absence of objectively reasonable grounds for doing so. Pp. 71-72.
942 F.2d 1073, reversed and remanded.
WHITE, J ., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
J ohn L. Stainthorp argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners.
Kenneth L. Gillis argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were J ack O'Malley, Renee G. Goldfarb, and
Kenneth T. McCurry. [*]
[ Footnote *] J ames D. Holzhauer, Timothy S. Bishop, J ohn A. Powell, Steven R. Shapiro, Harvey M. Grossman, and Alan K.
Chen filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Richard Ruda, Carter G. Phillips, Mark D. Hopson, and Mark E. Haddad filed a brief for the National League of Cities et al.
as amici curiae urging affirmance.
J USTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
I
Edward Soldal and his family resided in their trailer home, which was located on a rented lot in the Willoway Terrace mobile
[506 U.S. 56, 58] home park in Elk Grove, Illinois. In May 1987, Terrace Properties, the owner of the park, and Margaret Hale, its
manager, filed an eviction proceeding against the Soldals in an Illinois state court. Under the Illinois Forcible Entry and
Detainer Act, Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 110, 9-101 et seq. (1991), a tenant cannot be dispossessed absent a judgment of eviction. The
suit was dismissed on J une 2, 1987. A few months later, in August 1987, the owner brought a second proceeding of eviction,
claiming nonpayment of rent. The case was set for trial on September 22, 1987.
Rather than await judgment in their favor, Terrace Properties and Hale, contrary to Illinois law, chose to evict the Soldals
forcibly two weeks prior to the scheduled hearing. On September 4, Hale notified the Cook County's Sheriff's Department that
she was going to remove the trailer home from the park, and requested the presence of sheriff deputies to forestall any
possible resistance. Later that day, two Terrace Properties employees arrived at the Soldals' home accompanied by Cook
County Deputy Sheriff O'Neil. The employees proceeded to wrench the sewer and water connections off the side of the trailer
home, disconnect the phone, tear off the trailer's canopy and skirting, and hook the home to a tractor. Meanwhile, O'Neil
explained to Edward Soldal that "`he was there to see that [Soldal] didn't interfere with [Willoway's] work.'" Brief for
Petitioner 6.
By this time, two more deputy sheriffs had arrived at the scene, and Soldal told them that he wished to file a complaint for
criminal trespass. They referred him to deputy Lieutenant J ones, who was in Hale's office. J ones asked Soldal to wait outside
while he remained closeted with Hale and other Terrace Properties employees for over 20 minutes. After talking to a district
attorney and making Soldal wait another half hour, J ones told Soldal that he would not accept a complaint because "`it was
between the landlord and the tenant ... [and] they were going to go ahead and continue to move [506 U.S. 56, 59] out the trailer.'"
Id., at 8. 1 Throughout this period, the deputy sheriffs knew that Terrace Properties did not have an eviction order and that its
actions were unlawful. Eventually, and in the presence of an additional two deputy sheriffs, the Willoway workers pulled the
trailer free of its moorings and towed it onto the street. Later, it was hauled to a neighboring property.
On September 9, the state judge assigned to the pending eviction proceedings ruled that the eviction had been unauthorized,
and ordered Terrace Properties to return the Soldals' home to the lot. The home, however, was badly damaged.
[2]
The Soldals
brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a violation of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
They claimed that Terrace Properties and Hale had conspired with Cook County deputy sheriffs to unreasonably seize and
remove the Soldals' trailer home. The District J udge granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the
Soldals had failed to adduce any evidence to support their conspiracy theory and, therefore, the existence of state action
necessary under 1983.
[3]
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, construing the facts in petitioners' favor, accepted their contention that there was
state action. However, it went on to hold that [506 U.S. 56, 60] the removal of the Soldals' trailer did not constitute a seizure for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment or a deprivation of due process for purposes of the Fourteenth.
On rehearing, a majority of the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, reaffirmed the panel decision.
[4]
Acknowledging that what
had occurred was a "seizure" in the literal sense of the word, the court reasoned that, because it was not made in the course of
public law enforcement, and because it did not invade the Soldals' privacy, it was not a seizure as contemplated by the Fourth
Amendment. 942 F.2d 1073, 1076 (1991). Interpreting prior cases of this Court, the Seventh Circuit concluded that, absent
interference with privacy or liberty, a "pure deprivation of property" is not cognizable under the Fourth Amendment. Id., at
1078-1079. Rather, petitioners' property interests were protected only by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
[5]
We granted certiorari to consider whether the seizure and removal of the Soldals' trailer home implicated their Fourth
Amendment rights, 503 U.S. 918 (1992), and now reverse.
[6]
[506 U.S. 56, 61]
II
The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963), provides
in pertinent part that the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated... ."
A "seizure" of property, we have explained, occurs when "there is some meaningful interference with an individual's
possessory interests in that property." United States v. J acobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). In addition, we have emphasized
that "at the very core" of the Fourth Amendment "stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home." Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). See also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 -179 (1984); Wyman v. J ames, 400 U.S.
309, 316 (1971); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980).
As a result of the state action in this case, the Soldals' domicile was not only seized, it literally was carried away, giving new
meaning to the term "mobile home." We fail to see how being unceremoniously dispossessed of one's home in the manner
alleged to have occurred here can be viewed as anything but a seizure invoking the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
Whether the Amendment was in fact [506 U.S. 56, 62] violated is, of course, a different question that requires determining if the
seizure was reasonable. That inquiry entails the weighing of various factors, and is not before us.
The Court if Appeals recognized that there had been a seizure, but concluded that it was a seizure only in a "technical" sense,
not within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This conclusion followed from a narrow reading of the Amendment, which
the court construed to safeguard only privacy and liberty interests, while leaving unprotected possessory interests where
neither privacy nor liberty was at stake. Otherwise, the court said,
"a constitutional provision enacted two centuries ago [would] make every repossession and eviction with police
assistance actionable under - of all things - the Fourth Amendment[, which] would both trivialize the amendment
and gratuitously shift a large body of routine commercial litigation from the state courts to the federal courts. That
trivializing, this shift, can be prevented by recognizing the difference between possessory and privacy interests."
942 F.2d, at 1077.
Because the officers had not entered Soldal's house, rummaged through his possessions, or, in the Court of Appeals' view,
interfered with his liberty in the course of the eviction, the Fourth Amendment offered no protection against the "grave
deprivation" of property that had occurred. Ibid.
We do not agree with this interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment protects the people from unreasonable
searches and seizures of "their persons, houses, papers, and effects." This language surely cuts against the novel holding
below, and our cases unmistakably hold that the Amendment protects property as well as privacy.
[7]
This much [506 U.S. 56, 63]
was made clear in J acobsen, supra, where we explained that the first Clause of the Fourth Amendment
"protects two types of expectations, one involving "searches," the other "seizures." A "search" occurs when an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. A "seizure" of property occurs
where there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property." 466 U.S., at
113 (footnote omitted).
See also id., at 120; Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987); Maryland v.
Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747 -748 (1983) (STEVENS, J ., concurring in judgment);
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 , n. 6 (1980). Thus, having concluded that chemical testing of powder found in a
package did not compromise its owner's privacy, the Court in J acobsen did not put an end to its inquiry, as would be required
under the view adopted by the Court of Appeals and advocated by respondents. Instead, adhering to the teachings of United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), it went on to determine whether the invasion of the owners' "possessory interests"
occasioned by the destruction of the powder was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. J acobsen, supra, at 124-125. In
Place, although we found that subjecting luggage to a "dog sniff" did not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes
because it did not compromise any privacy interest, taking custody of Place's suitcase was deemed an unlawful seizure, for it
unreasonably infringed "the suspect's possessory interest in his luggage." 462 U.S., at 708 . 8 Although lacking a privacy
component, the property rights in both instances nonetheless were not [506 U.S. 56, 64] disregarded, but rather were afforded
Fourth Amendment protection.
Respondents rely principally on precedents such as Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), Warden, Maryland
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), and Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), to demonstrate that the Fourth
Amendment is only marginally concerned with property rights. But the message of those cases is that property rights are not
the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations. The Warden opinion thus observed, citing J ones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257 (1960), and Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), that the "principal" object of the Amendment is the
protection of privacy, rather than property, and that "this shift in emphasis from property to privacy has come about through a
subtle interplay of substantive and procedural reform." 387 U.S., at 304 . There was no suggestion that this shift in emphasis
had snuffed out the previously recognized protection for property under the Fourth Amendment. Katz, in declaring violative of
the Fourth Amendment the unwarranted overhearing of a telephone booth conversation, effectively ended any lingering
notions that the protection of privacy depended on trespass into a protected area. In the course of its decision, the Katz Court
stated that the Fourth Amendment can neither be translated into a provision dealing with constitutionally protected areas nor
into a general constitutional right to privacy. The Amendment, the Court said, protects individual privacy against certain kinds
of governmental intrusion, "but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all." 389 U.S., at 350 .
As for Cardwell, a plurality of this Court held in that case that the Fourth Amendment did not bar the use in evidence of paint
scrapings taken from and tire treads observed on the defendant's automobile, which had been seized in a parking lot and towed
to a police lockup. Gathering this evidence was not deemed to be a search, for nothing from the [506 U.S. 56, 65] interior of the
car and "no personal effects, which the Fourth Amendment traditionally has been deemed to protect" were searched or seized.
417 U.S., at 591 (opinion of BLACKMUN, J .). No meaningful privacy rights were invaded. But this left the argument,
pressed by the dissent, that the evidence gathered was the product of a warrantless, and hence illegal, seizure of the car from
the parking lot where the defendant had left it. However, the plurality was of the view that, because, under the circumstances
of the case, there was probable cause to seize the car as an instrumentality of the crime, Fourth Amendment precedent
permitted the seizure without a warrant. Id., at 593. Thus, both the plurality and dissenting J ustices considered the defendant's
auto deserving of Fourth Amendment protection even though privacy interests were not at stake. They differed only in the
degree of protection that the Amendment demanded.
The Court of Appeals appeared to find more specific support for confining the protection of the Fourth Amendment to privacy
interests in our decision in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). There, a state prison inmate sued, claiming that prison
guards had entered his cell without consent and had seized and destroyed some of his personal effects. We ruled that an
inmate, because of his status, enjoyed neither a right to privacy in his cell nor protection against unreasonable seizures of his
personal effects. Id., at 526-528, and n. 8; id., at 538 (O'CONNOR, J ., concurring). Whatever else the case held, it is of
limited usefulness outside the prison context with respect to the coverage of the Fourth Amendment.
We thus are unconvinced that any of the Court's prior cases supports the view that the Fourth Amendment protects against
unreasonable seizures of property only where privacy or liberty is also implicated. What is more, our "plain view" decisions
make untenable such a construction of the Amendment. Suppose, for example, that police officers lawfully enter a house, by
either complying with the warrant requirement or satisfying one of its recognized exceptions - [506 U.S. 56, 66] e.g., through a
valid consent or a showing of exigent circumstances. If they come across some item in plain view and seize it, no invasion of
personal privacy has occurred. Horton, 496 U.S., at 133 -134; Brown, supra, at 739 (opinion of REHNQUIST, J .). If the
boundaries of the Fourth Amendment were defined exclusively by rights of privacy, "plain view" seizures would not implicate
that constitutional provision at all. Yet, far from being automatically upheld, "plain view" seizures have been scrupulously
subjected to Fourth Amendment inquiry. Thus, in the absence of consent or a warrant permitting the seizure of the items in
question, such seizures can be justified only if they meet the probable-cause standard, Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 -
327 (1987), 9 and if they are unaccompanied by unlawful trespass, Horton, 496 U.S., at 136 -137. 10 That is because, the
absence of a privacy interest notwithstanding, "[a] seizure of the article ... would obviously invade the owner's possessory
interest." Id., at 134; see also Brown, 460 U.S., at 739 (opinion of REHNQUIST, J .). The plain-view doctrine "merely reflects
an application of the Fourth Amendment's central requirement of reasonableness to the law governing seizures of property."
Ibid.; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971); id., at 516 (WHITE, J ., concurring and dissenting).
The Court of Appeals understandably found it necessary to reconcile its holding with our recognition in the plain-view cases
that the Fourth Amendment protects property as such. In so doing, the court did not distinguish this case on the ground that
the seizure of the Soldals' home took place in a [506 U.S. 56, 67] noncriminal context. Indeed, it acknowledged what is evident
from our precedents - that the Amendment's protection applies in the civil context as well. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709 (1987); New J ersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 -335 (1985); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504 -506 (1978);
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 -313 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528
(1967). 11
Nor did the Court of Appeals suggest that the Fourth Amendment applied exclusively to law enforcement activities. It
observed, for example, that the Amendment's protection would be triggered "by a search or other entry into the home incident
to an eviction or repossession," 942 F.2d, at 1077. 12 Instead, the court sought to explain why the Fourth Amendment protects
against seizures of property in the plain-view context, but not in this case, as follows:
"[S]eizures made in the course of investigations by police or other law enforcement officers are almost always, as
in the plain view cases, the culmination of searches. The police search in order to seize, and it is the search [506 U.S.
56, 68] and ensuing seizure that the Fourth Amendment, by its reference to "searches and seizures," seeks to regulate.
Seizure means one thing when it is the outcome of a search; it may mean something else when it stands apart from
a search or any other investigative activity. The Fourth Amendment may still nominally apply, but, precisely
because there is no invasion of privacy, the usual rules do not apply." Id., at 1079 (emphasis in original).
We have difficulty with this passage. The court seemingly construes the Amendment to protect only against seizures that are
the outcome of a search. But our cases are to the contrary, and hold that seizures of property are subject to Fourth Amendment
scrutiny even though no search within the meaning of the Amendment has taken place. See, e.g., J acobsen, 466 U.S., at 120 -
125; Place, 462 U.S., at 706 -707; Cardwell, 417 U.S., at 588 -589. 13 More generally, an officer who happens to come across
an individual's property in a public area could seize it only if Fourth Amendment standards are satisfied - for example, if the
items are evidence of a crime or contraband. Cf. Payton v. New York, [506 U.S. 56, 69] 445 U.S., at 587 . We are also puzzled by
the last sentence of the excerpt, where the court announces that the "usual rules" of the Fourth Amendment are inapplicable if
the seizure is not the result of a search or any other investigative activity "precisely because there is no invasion of privacy."
For the plain-view cases clearly state that, notwithstanding the absence of any interference with privacy, seizures of effects
that are not authorized by a warrant are reasonable only because there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal
activity. The seizure of the weapons in Horton, for example, occurred in the midst of a search, yet we emphasized that it did
not "involve any invasion of privacy." 496 U.S., at 133 . In short, our statement that such seizures must satisfy the Fourth
Amendment and will be deemed reasonable only if the item's incriminating character is "immediately apparent," id., at 136-
137, is at odds with the Court of Appeals' approach.
The Court of Appeals' effort is both interesting and creative, but, at bottom, it simply reasserts the earlier thesis that the
Fourth Amendment protects privacy, but not property. We remain unconvinced, and see no justification for departing from our
prior cases. In our view, the reason why an officer might enter a house or effectuate a seizure is wholly irrelevant to the
threshold question whether the Amendment applies. What matters is the intrusion on the people's security from governmental
interference. Therefore, the right against unreasonable seizures would be no less transgressed if the seizure of the house was
undertaken to collect evidence, verify compliance with a housing regulation, effect an eviction by the police, or on a whim, for
no reason at all. As we have observed on more than one occasion, it would be "anomalous to say that the individual and his
private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior."
Camara 387 U.S., at 530 ; see also O'Connor, 480 U.S., at 715 ; T.L.O., 469 U.S., at 335 . [506 U.S. 56, 70]
The Court of Appeals also stated that, even if, contrary to its previous rulings, "there is some element or tincture of a Fourth
Amendment seizure, it cannot carry the day for the Soldals." 942 F.2d, at 1080. Relying on our decision in Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386 (1989), the court reasoned that it should look at the "dominant character of the conduct challenged in a section
1983 case [to] determine the constitutional standard under which it is evaluated." 942 F.2d, at 1080. Believing that the Soldals'
claim was more akin to a challenge against the deprivation of property without due process of law than against an
unreasonable seizure, the court concluded that they should not be allowed to bring their suit under the guise of the Fourth
Amendment.
But we see no basis for doling out constitutional protections in such fashion. Certain wrongs affect more than a single right,
and, accordingly, can implicate more than one of the Constitution's commands. Where such multiple violations are alleged, we
are not in the habit of identifying, as a preliminary matter, the claim's "dominant" character. Rather, we examine each
constitutional provision in turn. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause). Graham is not to the contrary. Its holding was that claims of excessive use of force should be analyzed
under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process test.
We were guided by the fact that, in that case, both provisions targeted the same sort of governmental conduct and, as a result,
we chose the more "explicit textual source of constitutional protection" over the "more generalized notion of `substantive due
process.'" 490 U.S., at 394 -395. Surely, Graham does not bar resort in this case to the Fourth Amendment's specific
protection for "houses, papers, [506 U.S. 56, 71] and effects," rather than the general protection of property in the Due Process
Clause.
III
Respondents are fearful, as was the Court of Appeals, that applying the Fourth Amendment in this context inevitably will
carry it into territory unknown and unforeseen: routine repossessions, negligent actions of public employees that interfere with
individuals' right to enjoy their homes, and the like, thereby federalizing areas of law traditionally the concern of the States.
For several reasons, we think the risk is exaggerated. To begin, our decision will have no impact on activities such as
repossessions or attachments if they involve entry into the home, intrusion on individuals' privacy, or interference with their
liberty, because they would implicate the Fourth Amendment even on the Court of Appeals' own terms. This was true of the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Specht, with which, as we previously noted, the Court of Appeals expressed agreement.
More significantly, "reasonableness is still the ultimate standard" under the Fourth Amendment, Camara, supra, at 539, which
means that numerous seizures of this type will survive constitutional scrutiny. As is true in other circumstances, the
reasonableness determination will reflect a "careful balancing of governmental and private interests." T.L.O., supra, at 341.
Assuming, for example, that the officers were acting pursuant to a court order, as in Specht v. J ensen, 832 F.2d 1516 (CA10
1987), or Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 , (1972), and, as often would be the case, a showing of unreasonableness on these
facts would be a laborious task indeed. Cf. Simms v. Slacum, 3 Cranch 300, 301 (1806). Hence, while there is no guarantee
against the filing of frivolous suits, had the ejection in this case properly awaited the state court's judgment, it is quite unlikely
that the federal court would have been bothered with a 1983 action alleging a Fourth Amendment violation. [506 U.S. 56, 72]
Moreover, we doubt that the police will often choose to further an enterprise knowing that it is contrary to the law, or proceed
to seize property in the absence of objectively reasonable grounds for doing so. In short, our reaffirmance of Fourth
Amendment principles today should not foment a wave of new litigation in the federal courts.
IV
The complaint here alleges that respondents, acting under color of state law, dispossessed the Soldals of their trailer home by
physically tearing it from its foundation and towing it to another lot. Taking these allegations as true, this was no "garden
variety" landlord-tenant or commercial dispute. The facts alleged suffice to constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, for they plainly implicate the interests protected by that provision. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
is, accordingly, reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Footnotes
[1] J ones' statement was prompted by a district attorney's advice that no criminal charges could be brought because, under
Illinois law, a criminal action cannot be used to determine the right of possession. See Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, 9-101 et seq.
(1991); People v. Evans, 163 Ill.App. 3d 561, 114 Ill.Dec. 662, 516 N.E.2d 817 (1st Dist. 1987).
[2] The Soldals ultimately were evicted per court order in December 1987.
[3] Title 42 U.S.C. 1983 provides that:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State ... subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress."
[4] The court reiterated the panel's conclusion that a conspiracy must be assumed on the state of the record and, therefore, that
the case must be treated in its current posture "as if the deputy sheriffs themselves seized the trailer, disconnected it from the
utilities, and towed it away." 942 F.2d 1073, 1075 (CA7 1991) (en banc).
[5] The court noted that, in light of the existence of adequate judicial remedies under state law, a claim for deprivation of
property without due process of law was unlikely to succeed. Id., at 1075-1076. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). In
any event, the Soldals did not claim a violation of their procedural rights. As noted, the Seventh Circuit also held that
respondents had not violated the Soldals' substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners assert
that this was error, but, in view of our disposition of the case, we need not address the question at this time.
[6] Under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Soldals were required to establish that the respondents, acting under color of state law, deprived
them of a constitutional right, in this instance, their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment freedom from unreasonable seizures by
the State. See Monroe v. Pape, [506 U.S. 56, 61] 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961). Respondents request that we affirm on the ground that
the Court of Appeals erred in holding that there was sufficient state action to support a 1983 action. The alleged injury to the
Soldals, it is urged, was inflicted by private parties for whom the county is not responsible. Although respondents did not
cross-petition, they are entitled to ask us to affirm on that ground if such action would not enlarge the judgment of the Court
of Appeals in their favor. The Court of Appeals found that, because the police prevented Soldal from using reasonable force to
protect his home from private action that the officers knew was illegal, there was sufficient evidence of conspiracy between the
private parties and the officers to foreclose summary judgment for respondents. We are not inclined to review that holding.
See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 -161 (1970).
[7] In holding that the Fourth Amendment's reach extends to property as such, we are mindful that the Amendment does not
protect possessory interests in all kinds of property. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176 -177 (1984). This
case, however, concerns a house, which the Amendment's language explicitly includes, as it does a person's effects.
[8] Place also found that to detain luggage for 90 minutes was an unreasonable deprivation of the individual's "liberty interest
in proceeding with his itinerary," which also is protected by the Fourth Amendment. 462 U.S., at 708 -710.
[9] When "operational necessities" exist, seizures can be justified on less than probable cause. 480 U.S., at 327 . That in no
way affects our analysis, for even then it is clear that the Fourth Amendment applies. Ibid; see also United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696 , at 703 (1983).
[10] Of course, if the police officers' presence in the home itself entailed a violation of the Fourth Amendment, no amount of
probable cause to believe that an item in plain view constitutes incriminating evidence will justify its seizure. Horton, 496
U.S., at 136 -137.
[11] It is true that Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272 (1856), cast some doubt on the
applicability of the Amendment to noncriminal encounters such as this. Id., 18 How. at 285. But cases since that time have
shed a different light, making clear that Fourth Amendment guarantees are triggered by governmental searches and seizures
"without regard to the use to which [houses, papers, and effects] are applied." Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 301 (1967). Murray's Lessee's broad statement that the Fourth Amendment "has no reference to civil proceedings
for the recovery of debt" arguably only meant that the warrant requirement did not apply, as was suggested in G.M. Leasing
Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352 (1977). Whatever its proper reading, we reaffirm today our basic understanding that
the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures fully applies in the civil context.
[12] This was the view expressed by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Specht v. J ensen, 832 F.2d 1516 (1987),
remanded on unrelated grounds, 853 F.2d 805 (1988) (en banc), with which the Seventh Circuit expressly agreed. 942 F.2d, at
1076.
[13] The officers in these cases were engaged in law enforcement, and were looking for something that was found and seized.
In this broad sense, the seizures were the result of "searches," but not in the Fourth Amendment sense. That the Court of
Appeals might have been suggesting that the plain-view cases are explainable because they almost always occur in the course
of law enforcement activities receives some support from the penultimate sentence of the quoted passage, where the court
states that the word "seizure" might lose its usual meaning "when it stands apart from a search or any other investigative
activity." Id., at 1079 (emphasis added). And, in the following paragraph, it observes that, "[o]utside of the law enforcement
area, the Fourth Amendment retains its force as a protection against searches, because they invade privacy. That is why we
decline to confine the amendment to the law enforcement setting." Id., at 1079-1080. Even if the court meant that seizures of
property in the course of law enforcement activities, whether civil or criminal, implicate interests safeguarded by the Fourth
Amendment, but that pure property interests are unprotected in the non-law-enforcement setting, we are not in accord, as
indicated in the body of this opinion. [506 U.S. 56, 73]
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: chansen@washoecounty.us
Subject: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks J ustice Court
Date: Tue, 26 J un 2012 09:10:14 -0700
Dear Civil Supervisor Hansen
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Dear Sparks J ustice Court,
I called and received permission to file this by fax...I am indigent and request a fee waiver, and failing that, an opportunity to cure any filing
fee deficiency.
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: sheriffweb@washoecounty.us; lstuchell@washoecounty.us; kstancil@washoecounty.us; chansen@washoecounty.us;
milllerr@reno.gov
Subject: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks J ustice Court
Date: Tue, 26 J un 2012 07:58:36 -0700
Dear Sparks J ustice Court, WCSO, RPD, and Reno J ustice Court.
I have received (though not personally served) what appears to be an eviction notice (5 day unlawful detainer?) for rentals
located at 1680 Sky Mountain Drive, Reno, 89523, but the notice indicates that I must file a Tenant's Answer with the Sparks
J ustice Court.
Am I mistaken in viewing this matter to be outside the jurisdiction of the Sparks J ustice Court, and rather, a matter to be
handled in Reno J ustice Court?
Given Sparks J ustice Court is open 5 days a week (closes at noon on Fridays) and Reno J ustice Court has 4 judicial days a week,
the deadline for filing a special appearance (to contest jurisdiction) and or a Tenant's Answer of Affidavit is difficult to measure.
I spoke with a Reno Police Department who identified himself as Sargent Miller last week and he indicated the WCSO planned to
come effectuate an eviction on this date, J une 26, 2012. I believe that would be premature, as Nevada Landlord Tenant law
provides for filing a Tenant's Answer or Affidavit by noon after the fifth full day (judicial days) and Fridays in Sparks J ustice
Court are not full days in that sense, and regardless, Sparks J ustice Court, I believe, is not the appropriate forum where, as
here, the situs is located in Reno (Ward 1-nap?)
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
tel 775 338 8118
fax 949 667 7403
Civil Division
630 Greenbrae Drive
Sparks, Nevada 89431
(775)353.7603 Phone
(775)352.3004 Fax
Civil Department Supervisor
Chris Hansen
chansen@washoecounty.us
Fwd: Wheeler v cross 344 fed apps 420
Wheeler v cross 344 fed apps 420
please provide to J udge Gardner, seeking permission to file
The Civil Division of Sparks J ustice Court is made up of three major functions:
Civil
Civil Complaints for damages in excess of $5000 or if a suit involves a breach of contract, punitive damages, an action to obtain
possession of property, a writ of restitution, or other like actions, legal counsel is suggested for these types of actions.
Evictions
An act or process of legally dispossessing a person of land or rental property.
Small Claims
An action filed in order to obtain a monetary judgment. Claims must not exceed $5000. A small claims action may be filed with
the Sparks J ustice Court if one of the following applies to the defendant:
1. They reside within the boundaries of the Sparks Township;
2. They are employed within the boundaries of the Sparks Township; and/or,
3. They do business within the boundaries of the Sparks Township.
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Wed 7/25/12 1:43 PM
To: kadlicj@reno.gov
My J uly 3 disturbing the peace arrest was for conduct allegedly outside officers presence...impermissible Search of vehicle....I
don't want much....
-------- Original message --------
Subject: Wheeler v cross 344 fed apps 420
From: Zach Coughlin <zachcoughlin@hotmail.com>
To: kadlicj@reno.gov
CC:
is a lot like the arrest Rpd did on me J uly 3 2012. Doing 17 days in jail....Rpd ignored the video and police report I filed J une 5
2012 showing an assault and admission of attempted Break in and trespass by northerns apt staff, one of whom signed the
criminal complaint in my d
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Wed 7/25/12 1:39 PM
To: kadlicj@reno.gov
is a lot like the arrest Rpd did on me J uly 3 2012. Doing 17 days in jail....Rpd ignored the video and police report I filed J une 5
2012 showing an assault and admission of attempted Break in and trespass by northerns apt staff, one of whom signed the
criminal complaint in my d
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Tue 7/24/12 6:40 PM
To: renomunirecords@reno.gov; ballardd@reno.gov
1 attachment
11 cr 25405 soldal version final[1].pdf (129.0 KB)
Dear RMC,
I am unable to print this document (I have no money and much of my property is being illegally withheld by a landlord...) that
I attempted to filed on or about 6/25/12...i did serve it to C. Hazlett-Stevens of the City Attorney's Office and I attempted to
file it in person...near 5pm...I have been told by Mr. Tuttle of the RJ C that the doors lock on a timer at 5pm...Well, I was not
locked out...but the Deputy at the metal detector turned me away, citing that it was closing time....I was arrested twice in the
motion for new trial
next few days, though I believe I tried to fax this to the RMC (as an emergency measure and hopefully not in violation of
J udge Gardners earlier Order regarding faxing....) on or about 6/30/12...
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Thu 6/28/12 2:13 AM
To: hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov
1 attachment
11 cr 25405 soldal version final.pdf (154.9 KB)
Zach Coughlin,Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473 (currently suspended)
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
Pro Se Defendant
regardin 11 cr 22176: Motion for New Trial, etc. (14 pages)
also sent to Hon. J udge William Gardner
1 South Sierra Street, P.O. Box 1900 reno nv
* Fax number:
7753343859
Christopher P. Hazlett-Stevens Company: Reno City Attorney's Office Address: P. O. Box 1900 ~Reno , NV 89505 Phone Number: 775-326-
6628 Fax number: 775-334-4226 Email: hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov
Dear J udge Gardner and Mr. Hazlett-Stevens,
I attempted to file a tolling motion on J une 25th and again on J une 26th, 2012. on the 25th Filing office supervisor Donna Ballard and Court
Administrator Cassandra J ackson decided to refuse to accept my filing, apparently. Then on J une 26th, 2012, I ented the court prior to the
"timed lockign of the doors" that I have been educated on previously by court adminstration in relation to seekign to file documents close to
closing time, however, I was again refused in my attempt to file another such tolling motion and to access justice. I am fax this filing to both
of you, with the caveat that I do not wish to violate any dicate against fax filign that J udge Gardner may have in effect (I am a bit unclear
FW: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice Court
Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmailcom!"#$%#&%
'o: k(ro)n@nv(arorg* milllerr@renogov* millerr@renogov* stuttle@)ashoecount+gov*
rsilva@)ashoecount+us* stuttle@)ashoecount+us* ,amchen@)ashoecount+us* $-"nor.@acgcom*
info@acg/apmicom* r,c)e(@)asoecount+us* ,(oles@callatgcom* apminfo@acgcom
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmailcom!
Sent: 0on "#$%#&% 1:%& 20
'o: k(ro)n@nv(arorg3 milllerr@renogov3 millerr@renogov3 stuttle@)ashoecount+gov3
rsilva@)ashoecount+us3 stuttle@)ashoecount+us3 ,amchen@)ashoecount+us3 $-"nor.@acgcom3
info@acg/apmicom3 r,c)e(@)asoecount+us3 ,(oles@callatgcom3 apminfo@acgcom
4utlook 5ctive 6ie)
% attachments (total &&7.7 89!
coughlin v north)ind &7:'enants5ffidavit:;eclaration4ther:2rivate<ousing other than nonpa+ment
of rentpdf;o)nload
com(ined north)ind v coughlin eviction filingspdf;o)nload
;o)nload all as zip
=4rth)ind and =evada Court Services served and >amended 1 da+ notice of unla)ful detainer on Jul+
%?th* %$&%>giving me five da+s to get m+ stuff out of unit %? (the one the su(,ect of Judge Schroeer@s
Aviction 4rder* )hich )as effectivel+ rescinded (+ their serving a ne) 1 da+ unla)ful detainer
notice! as )ell as units "& and .1)hicih are t)o units to )hich i still have valide lease agreements*
ie* B cannot (e trespassing for accessing them (the Reno 2; has indicated the+ )ill arrest me for
criminal trespass for accessing an+ units in the compleC* including those to )hich B still have a valid
possessor+ or propert+ interest* in violation of .% usc &?D-!
)h+ does Sargent 0iller have to give me a hard timeE Bsn@t it enough for him to have his >;enzel>
good looks and a much higher pa+ing ,o( than B )ill ever haveE What up )it thatE
=orth)ind and =evada Court Services ()hich is practicing eviction la) )ithout a license! scre)ed up
and put >Sparks Justice Court on Freen(rae> as the place for the tenant to file a 'enan@ts 5ns)er or
5ffidavit ;oing so )ill make the RJC 4rder (+ Judge Schroeder null and void (8aren Stancil* Chief
Civil Clerk at RJC admits this* (ut reall+* the fault lies )ith =CS and =orth)ind* not the committed
professional at the RJC!
'he =otice must identif+ the Court )ith ,urisdiction =RS .$%1-(-!(a! 4=e cannot (e trespassing in
a plac)e )here the+ have a valid reason for (eing or a la)ful right to (e =RS %$"%$$* R0C
D&$$.$
Bn 5ikins v 5ndre)s* ?& =ev ".7* 1.% 2%d "-. (&?"1!* the Supreme C4Gli construed the
predecessor statute to =RS .$%1&7 to mean that the alternative five (1! da+ notice must (e given
&#&%
7
(efore the tenants can (e dispossed and a lease can (e validl+ terminated 'he court stated that this
five (1! da+ notice reHuirement > neither can (e )aved nor neglected> ?& =ev at ".D
ttp:##)))constitutionorg#ussc#1$7/$17ahtm
GS Supreme Court
S4I;5I v C448 C4G='J* 1$7 GS 17 (&??%!
1$7 GS 17 S4I;5I* A' GK v C448 C4G='J* BIIB=4BS A' 5I
CAR'B4R5RB '4 '<A G=B'A; S'5'AS C4GR' 4F 522A5IS F4R '<A
SA6A='< CBRCGB'
=o ?&/71&7
5rgued 4cto(er 1* &??%
;ecided ;ecem(er D* &??%
While eviction proceedings )ere pending* 'errace 2roperties and 0argaret <ale forci(l+ evicted
petitioners* the Soldal famil+* and their mo(ile home from a 'errace 2roperties@ mo(ile home park 5t
<ale@s reHuest* Cook Count+* Bllinois* Sheriff@s ;epartment deputies )ere present at the eviction
5lthough the+ kne) that there )as no eviction order and that 'errace 2roperties@ actions )ere illegal*
the deputies refused to take 0r Soldal@s complaint for criminal trespass or other)ise interfere )ith the
eviction Su(seHuentl+* the state ,udge assigned to the pending eviction proceedings ruled that the
eviction had (een unauthorized* and the trailer* (adl+ damaged during the eviction* )as returned to the
lot 2etitioners (rought an action in the Federal ;istrict Court under .% GSC &?D-* claiming that
'errace 2roperties and <ale had conspired )ith the deput+ sheriffs to unreasona(l+ seize and remove
their home in violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth 5mendment rights 'he court granted defendants@
motion for summar+ ,udgment* and the Court of 5ppeals affirmed 5ckno)ledging that )hat had
occurred )as a >seizure> in the literal sense of the )ord* the court reasoned that it )as not a seizure as
contemplated (+ the Fourth 5mendment (ecause* inter alia* it did not invade petitioners@ privac+
<eld:
'he seizure and removal of the trailer home implicated petitioners@ Fourth 5mendment rights 2p 7&/
"%
(a! 5 >seizure> of propert+ occurs )hen >there is some meaningful interference )ith an individual@s
possessor+ interests in that propert+> Gnited States v Jaco(sen* .77 GS &$?* &&- 'he language of
the Fourth 5mendment / )hich protects people from unreasona(le searches and seizures of >their
persons* houses* papers* and effects> / cuts against the novel holding (elo)* and this Court@s cases
unmistaka(l+ hold that the 5mendment protects propert+ even )here privac+ or li(ert+ is not
implicated See* eg* i(id3 8atz v Gnited States* -D? GS -."* -1$ 'his Court@s >plain vie)>
decisions also make untena(le the lo)er court@s construction of the 5mendment Bf the 5mendment@s
(oundaries )ere defined eCclusivel+ (+ rights of privac+* >plain vie)> seizures* rather than (eing
scrupulousl+ su(,ected to Fourth 5mendment inHuir+* 5rizona v <icks* .D$ GS -%&* -%7 /-%"* )ould
not implicate that constitutional provision at all Contrar+ to the Court of 5ppeals@ L1$7 GS 17* 1"M
position* the 5mendment protects seizure even though no search )ithin its meaning has taken place
See* eg* Jaco(sen* supra* at &%$/&%1 5lso contrar+ to that court@s vie)* Fraham v Connor* .?$ GS
-D7 * does not reHuire a court* )hen it finds that a )rong implicates more than one constitutional
command* to look at the dominant character of the challenged conduct to determine under )hich
%#&%
constitutional standard it should (e evaluated Rather* each constitutional provision is eCamined in turn
See* eg* <udson v 2almer* .7D GS 1&" 2p 7&/"&
((! 'he instant decision should not foment a )ave of ne) litigation in the federal courts 5ctivities such
as repossessions or attachments* if the+ involve entering a home* intruding on individuals@ privac+* or
interfering )ith their li(ert+* )ould implicate the Fourth 5mendment even on the Court of 5ppeals@
o)n terms 5nd numerous seizures of this t+pe )ill survive constitutional scrutin+ on >reasona(leness>
grounds 0oreover* it is unlikel+ that the police )ill often choose to further an enterprise kno)ing that
it is contrar+ to the la)* or proceed to seize propert+ in the a(sence of o(,ectivel+ reasona(le grounds
for doing so 2p "&/"%
?.% F%d &$"-* reversed and remanded
W<B'A* J* delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court
John I Stainthorp argued the cause and filed (riefs for petitioners
8enneth I Fillis argued the cause for respondents With him on the (rief )ere Jack 4@0alle+* Renee
F Foldfar(* and 8enneth ' 0cCurr+ LNM
L Footnote NM James ; <olzhauer* 'imoth+ S 9ishop* John 5 2o)ell* Steven R Shapiro* <arve+ 0
Frossman* and 5lan 8 Chen filed a (rief for the 5merican Civil Ii(erties Gnion et al as amici curiae
urging reversal
Richard Ruda* Carter F 2hillips* 0ark ; <opson* and 0ark A <addad filed a (rief for the =ational
Ieague of Cities et al as amici curiae urging affirmance
JGS'BCA W<B'A delivered the opinion of the Court
B
Ad)ard Soldal and his famil+ resided in their trailer home* )hich )as located on a rented lot in the
Willo)a+ 'errace mo(ile L1$7 GS 17* 1DM home park in Alk Frove* Bllinois Bn 0a+ &?D"* 'errace
2roperties* the o)ner of the park* and 0argaret <ale* its manager* filed an eviction proceeding against
the Soldals in an Bllinois state court Gnder the Bllinois Forci(le Antr+ and ;etainer 5ct* BllRevStat*
ch &&$* O ?/&$& et seH (&??&!* a tenant cannot (e dispossessed a(sent a ,udgment of eviction 'he suit
)as dismissed on June %* &?D" 5 fe) months later* in 5ugust &?D"* the o)ner (rought a second
proceeding of eviction* claiming nonpa+ment of rent 'he case )as set for trial on Septem(er %%* &?D"
Rather than a)ait ,udgment in their favor* 'errace 2roperties and <ale* contrar+ to Bllinois la)* chose to
evict the Soldals forci(l+ t)o )eeks prior to the scheduled hearing 4n Septem(er .* <ale notified the
Cook Count+@s Sheriff@s ;epartment that she )as going to remove the trailer home from the park* and
reHuested the presence of sheriff deputies to forestall an+ possi(le resistance Iater that da+* t)o
'errace 2roperties emplo+ees arrived at the Soldals@ home accompanied (+ Cook Count+ ;eput+
Sheriff 4@=eil 'he emplo+ees proceeded to )rench the se)er and )ater connections off the side of the
trailer home* disconnect the phone* tear off the trailer@s canop+ and skirting* and hook the home to a
tractor 0ean)hile* 4@=eil eCplained to Ad)ard Soldal that >Phe )as there to see that LSoldalM didn@t
interfere )ith LWillo)a+@sM )ork@> 9rief for 2etitioner 7
9+ this time* t)o more deput+ sheriffs had arrived at the scene* and Soldal told them that he )ished to
file a complaint for criminal trespass 'he+ referred him to deput+ Iieutenant Jones* )ho )as in <ale@s
office Jones asked Soldal to )ait outside )hile he remained closeted )ith <ale and other 'errace
2roperties emplo+ees for over %$ minutes 5fter talking to a district attorne+ and making Soldal )ait
another half hour* Jones told Soldal that he )ould not accept a complaint (ecause >Pit )as (et)een the
landlord and the tenant LandM the+ )ere going to go ahead and continue to move L1$7 GS 17* 1?M
out the trailer@> Bd* at D & 'hroughout this period* the deput+ sheriffs kne) that 'errace 2roperties did
not have an eviction order and that its actions )ere unla)ful Aventuall+* and in the presence of an
additional t)o deput+ sheriffs* the Willo)a+ )orkers pulled the trailer free of its moorings and to)ed it
onto the street Iater* it )as hauled to a neigh(oring propert+
-#&%
4n Septem(er ?* the state ,udge assigned to the pending eviction proceedings ruled that the eviction
had (een unauthorized* and ordered 'errace 2roperties to return the Soldals@ home to the lot 'he home*
ho)ever* )as (adl+ damaged L%M 'he Soldals (rought this action under .% GSC &?D-* alleging a
violation of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth 5mendments 'he+ claimed that 'errace
2roperties and <ale had conspired )ith Cook Count+ deput+ sheriffs to unreasona(l+ seize and remove
the Soldals@ trailer home 'he ;istrict Judge granted defendants@ motion for summar+ ,udgment on the
grounds that the Soldals had failed to adduce an+ evidence to support their conspirac+ theor+ and*
therefore* the eCistence of state action necessar+ under &?D- L-M
'he Court of 5ppeals for the Seventh Circuit* construing the facts in petitioners@ favor* accepted their
contention that there )as state action <o)ever* it )ent on to hold that L1$7 GS 17* 7$M the removal of
the Soldals@ trailer did not constitute a seizure for purposes of the Fourth 5mendment or a deprivation
of due process for purposes of the Fourteenth
4n rehearing* a ma,orit+ of the Seventh Circuit* sitting en (anc* reaffirmed the panel decision L.M
5ckno)ledging that )hat had occurred )as a >seizure> in the literal sense of the )ord* the court
reasoned that* (ecause it )as not made in the course of pu(lic la) enforcement* and (ecause it did not
invade the Soldals@ privac+* it )as not a seizure as contemplated (+ the Fourth 5mendment ?.% F%d
&$"-* &$"7 (&??&! Bnterpreting prior cases of this Court* the Seventh Circuit concluded that* a(sent
interference )ith privac+ or li(ert+* a >pure deprivation of propert+> is not cogniza(le under the Fourth
5mendment Bd* at &$"D/&$"? Rather* petitioners@ propert+ interests )ere protected onl+ (+ the ;ue
2rocess Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 5mendments L1M
We granted certiorari to consider )hether the seizure and removal of the Soldals@ trailer home
implicated their Fourth 5mendment rights* 1$- GS ?&D (&??%!* and no) reverse L7M L1$7 GS 17*
7&M
BB
'he Fourth 5mendment* made applica(le to the States (+ the Fourteenth* 8er v California* -". GS
%-* -$ (&?7-!* provides in pertinent part that the >right of the people to (e secure in their persons*
houses* papers* and effects* against unreasona(le searches and seizures* shall not (e violated >
5 >seizure> of propert+* )e have eCplained* occurs )hen >there is some meaningful interference )ith
an individual@s possessor+ interests in that propert+> Gnited States v Jaco(sen* .77 GS &$?* &&-
(&?D.! Bn addition* )e have emphasized that >at the ver+ core> of the Fourth 5mendment >stands the
right of a man to retreat into his o)n home> Silverman v Gnited States* -71 GS 1$1* 1&& (&?7&! See
also 4liver v Gnited States* .77 GS &"$* &"D /&"? (&?D.!3 W+man v James* .$$ GS -$?* -&7
(&?"&!3 2a+ton v =e) Jork* ..1 GS 1"-* 7$& (&?D$!
5s a result of the state action in this case* the Soldals@ domicile )as not onl+ seized* it literall+ )as
carried a)a+* giving ne) meaning to the term >mo(ile home> We fail to see ho) (eing
unceremoniousl+ dispossessed of one@s home in the manner alleged to have occurred here can (e
vie)ed as an+thing (ut a seizure invoking the protection of the Fourth 5mendment Whether the
5mendment )as in fact L1$7 GS 17* 7%M violated is* of course* a different Huestion that reHuires
determining if the seizure )as reasona(le 'hat inHuir+ entails the )eighing of various factors* and is
not (efore us
'he Court if 5ppeals recognized that there had (een a seizure* (ut concluded that it )as a seizure onl+
in a >technical> sense* not )ithin the meaning of the Fourth 5mendment 'his conclusion follo)ed
from a narro) reading of the 5mendment* )hich the court construed to safeguard onl+ privac+ and
li(ert+ interests* )hile leaving unprotected possessor+ interests )here neither privac+ nor li(ert+ )as at
stake 4ther)ise* the court said*
>a constitutional provision enacted t)o centuries ago L)ouldM make ever+ repossession and eviction
)ith police assistance actiona(le under / of all things / the Fourth 5mendmentL* )hichM )ould (oth
.#&%
trivialize the amendment and gratuitousl+ shift a large (od+ of routine commercial litigation from the
state courts to the federal courts 'hat trivializing* this shift* can (e prevented (+ recognizing the
difference (et)een possessor+ and privac+ interests> ?.% F%d* at &$""
9ecause the officers had not entered Soldal@s house* rummaged through his possessions* or* in the Court
of 5ppeals@ vie)* interfered )ith his li(ert+ in the course of the eviction* the Fourth 5mendment
offered no protection against the >grave deprivation> of propert+ that had occurred B(id
We do not agree )ith this interpretation of the Fourth 5mendment 'he 5mendment protects the people
from unreasona(le searches and seizures of >their persons* houses* papers* and effects> 'his language
surel+ cuts against the novel holding (elo)* and our cases unmistaka(l+ hold that the 5mendment
protects propert+ as )ell as privac+ L"M 'his much L1$7 GS 17* 7-M )as made clear in Jaco(sen*
supra* )here )e eCplained that the first Clause of the Fourth 5mendment
>protects t)o t+pes of eCpectations* one involving >searches*> the other >seizures> 5 >search> occurs
)hen an eCpectation of privac+ that societ+ is prepared to consider reasona(le is infringed 5 >seizure>
of propert+ occurs )here there is some meaningful interference )ith an individual@s possessor+
interests in that propert+> .77 GS* at &&- (footnote omitted!
See also id* at &%$3 <orton v California* .?7 GS &%D* &-- (&??$!3 5rizona v <icks* .D$ GS -%&*
-%D (&?D"!3 0ar+land v 0acon* ."% GS .7-* .7? (&?D1!3 'eCas v 9ro)n* .7$ GS "-$* "." /".D
(&?D-! (S'A6A=S* J* concurring in ,udgment!3 Gnited States v Salvucci* ..D GS D-* ?& * n 7
(&?D$! 'hus* having concluded that chemical testing of po)der found in a package did not
compromise its o)ner@s privac+* the Court in Jaco(sen did not put an end to its inHuir+* as )ould (e
reHuired under the vie) adopted (+ the Court of 5ppeals and advocated (+ respondents Bnstead*
adhering to the teachings of Gnited States v 2lace* .7% GS 7?7 (&?D-!* it )ent on to determine
)hether the invasion of the o)ners@ >possessor+ interests> occasioned (+ the destruction of the po)der
)as reasona(le under the Fourth 5mendment Jaco(sen* supra* at &%./&%1 Bn 2lace* although )e found
that su(,ecting luggage to a >dog sniff> did not constitute a search for Fourth 5mendment purposes
(ecause it did not compromise an+ privac+ interest* taking custod+ of 2lace@s suitcase )as deemed an
unla)ful seizure* for it unreasona(l+ infringed >the suspect@s possessor+ interest in his luggage> .7%
GS* at "$D D 5lthough lacking a privac+ component* the propert+ rights in (oth instances
nonetheless )ere not L1$7 GS 17* 7.M disregarded* (ut rather )ere afforded Fourth 5mendment
protection
Respondents rel+ principall+ on precedents such as 8atz v Gnited States* -D? GS -." (&?7"!*
Warden* 0ar+land 2enitentiar+ v <a+den* -D" GS %?. (&?7"!* and Card)ell v Ie)is* .&" GS 1D-
(&?".!* to demonstrate that the Fourth 5mendment is onl+ marginall+ concerned )ith propert+ rights
9ut the message of those cases is that propert+ rights are not the sole measure of Fourth 5mendment
violations 'he Warden opinion thus o(served* citing Jones v Gnited States* -7% GS %1" (&?7$!* and
Silverman v Gnited States* -71 GS 1$1 (&?7&!* that the >principal> o(,ect of the 5mendment is the
protection of privac+* rather than propert+* and that >this shift in emphasis from propert+ to privac+ has
come a(out through a su(tle interpla+ of su(stantive and procedural reform> -D" GS* at -$. 'here
)as no suggestion that this shift in emphasis had snuffed out the previousl+ recognized protection for
propert+ under the Fourth 5mendment 8atz* in declaring violative of the Fourth 5mendment the
un)arranted overhearing of a telephone (ooth conversation* effectivel+ ended an+ lingering notions
that the protection of privac+ depended on trespass into a protected area Bn the course of its decision*
the 8atz Court stated that the Fourth 5mendment can neither (e translated into a provision dealing )ith
constitutionall+ protected areas nor into a general constitutional right to privac+ 'he 5mendment* the
Court said* protects individual privac+ against certain kinds of governmental intrusion* >(ut its
protections go further* and often have nothing to do )ith privac+ at all> -D? GS* at -1$
5s for Card)ell* a pluralit+ of this Court held in that case that the Fourth 5mendment did not (ar the
1#&%
use in evidence of paint scrapings taken from and tire treads o(served on the defendant@s automo(ile*
)hich had (een seized in a parking lot and to)ed to a police lockup Fathering this evidence )as not
deemed to (e a search* for nothing from the L1$7 GS 17* 71M interior of the car and >no personal
effects* )hich the Fourth 5mendment traditionall+ has (een deemed to protect> )ere searched or
seized .&" GS* at 1?& (opinion of 9I5C80G=* J! =o meaningful privac+ rights )ere invaded 9ut
this left the argument* pressed (+ the dissent* that the evidence gathered )as the product of a
)arrantless* and hence illegal* seizure of the car from the parking lot )here the defendant had left it
<o)ever* the pluralit+ )as of the vie) that* (ecause* under the circumstances of the case* there )as
pro(a(le cause to seize the car as an instrumentalit+ of the crime* Fourth 5mendment precedent
permitted the seizure )ithout a )arrant Bd* at 1?- 'hus* (oth the pluralit+ and dissenting Justices
considered the defendant@s auto deserving of Fourth 5mendment protection even though privac+
interests )ere not at stake 'he+ differed onl+ in the degree of protection that the 5mendment
demanded
'he Court of 5ppeals appeared to find more specific support for confining the protection of the Fourth
5mendment to privac+ interests in our decision in <udson v 2almer* .7D GS 1&" (&?D.! 'here* a
state prison inmate sued* claiming that prison guards had entered his cell )ithout consent and had
seized and destro+ed some of his personal effects We ruled that an inmate* (ecause of his status*
en,o+ed neither a right to privac+ in his cell nor protection against unreasona(le seizures of his personal
effects Bd* at 1%7/1%D* and n D3 id* at 1-D (4@C4==4R* J* concurring! Whatever else the case held*
it is of limited usefulness outside the prison conteCt )ith respect to the coverage of the Fourth
5mendment
We thus are unconvinced that an+ of the Court@s prior cases supports the vie) that the Fourth
5mendment protects against unreasona(le seizures of propert+ onl+ )here privac+ or li(ert+ is also
implicated What is more* our >plain vie)> decisions make untena(le such a construction of the
5mendment Suppose* for eCample* that police officers la)full+ enter a house* (+ either compl+ing
)ith the )arrant reHuirement or satisf+ing one of its recognized eCceptions / L1$7 GS 17* 77M eg*
through a valid consent or a sho)ing of eCigent circumstances Bf the+ come across some item in plain
vie) and seize it* no invasion of personal privac+ has occurred <orton* .?7 GS* at &-- /&-.3 9ro)n*
supra* at "-? (opinion of RA<=QGBS'* J! Bf the (oundaries of the Fourth 5mendment )ere defined
eCclusivel+ (+ rights of privac+* >plain vie)> seizures )ould not implicate that constitutional provision
at all Jet* far from (eing automaticall+ upheld* >plain vie)> seizures have (een scrupulousl+ su(,ected
to Fourth 5mendment inHuir+ 'hus* in the a(sence of consent or a )arrant permitting the seizure of the
items in Huestion* such seizures can (e ,ustified onl+ if the+ meet the pro(a(le/cause standard* 5rizona
v <icks* .D$ GS -%&* -%7 /-%" (&?D"!* ? and if the+ are unaccompanied (+ unla)ful trespass*
<orton* .?7 GS* at &-7 /&-" &$ 'hat is (ecause* the a(sence of a privac+ interest not)ithstanding*
>LaM seizure of the article )ould o(viousl+ invade the o)ner@s possessor+ interest> Bd* at &-.3 see
also 9ro)n* .7$ GS* at "-? (opinion of RA<=QGBS'* J! 'he plain/vie) doctrine >merel+ reflects an
application of the Fourth 5mendment@s central reHuirement of reasona(leness to the la) governing
seizures of propert+> B(id3 Coolidge v =e) <ampshire* .$- GS ..-* .7D (&?"&!3 id* at 1&7
(W<B'A* J* concurring and dissenting!
'he Court of 5ppeals understanda(l+ found it necessar+ to reconcile its holding )ith our recognition in
the plain/vie) cases that the Fourth 5mendment protects propert+ as such Bn so doing* the court did
not distinguish this case on the ground that the seizure of the Soldals@ home took place in a L1$7 GS
17* 7"M noncriminal conteCt Bndeed* it ackno)ledged )hat is evident from our precedents / that the
5mendment@s protection applies in the civil conteCt as )ell See 4@Connor v 4rtega* .D$ GS "$?
(&?D"!3 =e) Jerse+ v 'I4* .7? GS -%1* --. /--1 (&?D1!3 0ichigan v '+ler* .-7 GS .??* 1$.
/1$7 (&?"D!3 0arshall v 9arlo)@s* Bnc* .-7 GS -$"* -&% /-&- (&?"D!3 Camara v 0unicipal Court of
7#&%
San Francisco* -D" GS 1%-* 1%D (&?7"! &&
=or did the Court of 5ppeals suggest that the Fourth 5mendment applied eCclusivel+ to la)
enforcement activities Bt o(served* for eCample* that the 5mendment@s protection )ould (e triggered
>(+ a search or other entr+ into the home incident to an eviction or repossession*> ?.% F%d* at &$"" &%
Bnstead* the court sought to eCplain )h+ the Fourth 5mendment protects against seizures of propert+ in
the plain/vie) conteCt* (ut not in this case* as follo)s:
>LSMeizures made in the course of investigations (+ police or other la) enforcement officers are almost
al)a+s* as in the plain vie) cases* the culmination of searches 'he police search in order to seize* and
it is the search L1$7 GS 17* 7DM and ensuing seizure that the Fourth 5mendment* (+ its reference to
>searches and seizures*> seeks to regulate Seizure means one thing )hen it is the outcome of a search3
it ma+ mean something else )hen it stands apart from a search or an+ other investigative activit+ 'he
Fourth 5mendment ma+ still nominall+ appl+* (ut* precisel+ (ecause there is no invasion of privac+*
the usual rules do not appl+> Bd* at &$"? (emphasis in original!
We have difficult+ )ith this passage 'he court seemingl+ construes the 5mendment to protect onl+
against seizures that are the outcome of a search 9ut our cases are to the contrar+* and hold that
seizures of propert+ are su(,ect to Fourth 5mendment scrutin+ even though no search )ithin the
meaning of the 5mendment has taken place See* eg* Jaco(sen* .77 GS* at &%$ /&%13 2lace* .7% GS*
at "$7 /"$"3 Card)ell* .&" GS* at 1DD /1D? &- 0ore generall+* an officer )ho happens to come
across an individual@s propert+ in a pu(lic area could seize it onl+ if Fourth 5mendment standards are
satisfied / for eCample* if the items are evidence of a crime or contra(and Cf 2a+ton v =e) Jork*
L1$7 GS 17* 7?M ..1 GS* at 1D" We are also puzzled (+ the last sentence of the eCcerpt* )here the
court announces that the >usual rules> of the Fourth 5mendment are inapplica(le if the seizure is not
the result of a search or an+ other investigative activit+ >precisel+ (ecause there is no invasion of
privac+> For the plain/vie) cases clearl+ state that* not)ithstanding the a(sence of an+ interference
)ith privac+* seizures of effects that are not authorized (+ a )arrant are reasona(le onl+ (ecause there
is pro(a(le cause to associate the propert+ )ith criminal activit+ 'he seizure of the )eapons in <orton*
for eCample* occurred in the midst of a search* +et )e emphasized that it did not >involve an+ invasion
of privac+> .?7 GS* at &-- Bn short* our statement that such seizures must satisf+ the Fourth
5mendment and )ill (e deemed reasona(le onl+ if the item@s incriminating character is >immediatel+
apparent*> id* at &-7/&-"* is at odds )ith the Court of 5ppeals@ approach
'he Court of 5ppeals@ effort is (oth interesting and creative* (ut* at (ottom* it simpl+ reasserts the
earlier thesis that the Fourth 5mendment protects privac+* (ut not propert+ We remain unconvinced*
and see no ,ustification for departing from our prior cases Bn our vie)* the reason )h+ an officer might
enter a house or effectuate a seizure is )holl+ irrelevant to the threshold Huestion )hether the
5mendment applies What matters is the intrusion on the people@s securit+ from governmental
interference 'herefore* the right against unreasona(le seizures )ould (e no less transgressed if the
seizure of the house )as undertaken to collect evidence* verif+ compliance )ith a housing regulation*
effect an eviction (+ the police* or on a )him* for no reason at all 5s )e have o(served on more than
one occasion* it )ould (e >anomalous to sa+ that the individual and his private propert+ are full+
protected (+ the Fourth 5mendment onl+ )hen the individual is suspected of criminal (ehavior>
Camara -D" GS* at 1-$ 3 see also 4@Connor* .D$ GS* at "&1 3 'I4* .7? GS* at --1 L1$7 GS 17*
"$M
'he Court of 5ppeals also stated that* even if* contrar+ to its previous rulings* >there is some element or
tincture of a Fourth 5mendment seizure* it cannot carr+ the da+ for the Soldals> ?.% F%d* at &$D$
Rel+ing on our decision in Fraham v Connor* .?$ GS -D7 (&?D?!* the court reasoned that it should
look at the >dominant character of the conduct challenged in a section &?D- case LtoM determine the
constitutional standard under )hich it is evaluated> ?.% F%d* at &$D$ 9elieving that the Soldals@ claim
"#&%
)as more akin to a challenge against the deprivation of propert+ )ithout due process of la) than
against an unreasona(le seizure* the court concluded that the+ should not (e allo)ed to (ring their suit
under the guise of the Fourth 5mendment
9ut )e see no (asis for doling out constitutional protections in such fashion Certain )rongs affect
more than a single right* and* accordingl+* can implicate more than one of the Constitution@s
commands Where such multiple violations are alleged* )e are not in the ha(it of identif+ing* as a
preliminar+ matter* the claim@s >dominant> character Rather* )e eCamine each constitutional provision
in turn See* eg* <udson v 2almer* .7D GS 1&" (&?D.! (Fourth 5mendment and Fourteenth
5mendment ;ue 2rocess Clause!3 Bngraham v Wright* .-$ GS 71& (&?""! (Aighth 5mendment and
Fourteenth 5mendment ;ue 2rocess Clause! Fraham is not to the contrar+ Bts holding )as that claims
of eCcessive use of force should (e anal+zed under the Fourth 5mendment@s reasona(leness standard*
rather than the Fourteenth 5mendment@s su(stantive due process test We )ere guided (+ the fact that*
in that case* (oth provisions targeted the same sort of governmental conduct and* as a result* )e chose
the more >eCplicit teCtual source of constitutional protection> over the >more generalized notion of
Psu(stantive due process@> .?$ GS* at -?. /-?1 Surel+* Fraham does not (ar resort in this case to the
Fourth 5mendment@s specific protection for >houses* papers* L1$7 GS 17* "&M and effects*> rather than
the general protection of propert+ in the ;ue 2rocess Clause
BBB
Respondents are fearful* as )as the Court of 5ppeals* that appl+ing the Fourth 5mendment in this
conteCt inevita(l+ )ill carr+ it into territor+ unkno)n and unforeseen: routine repossessions* negligent
actions of pu(lic emplo+ees that interfere )ith individuals@ right to en,o+ their homes* and the like*
there(+ federalizing areas of la) traditionall+ the concern of the States For several reasons* )e think
the risk is eCaggerated 'o (egin* our decision )ill have no impact on activities such as repossessions
or attachments if the+ involve entr+ into the home* intrusion on individuals@ privac+* or interference
)ith their li(ert+* (ecause the+ )ould implicate the Fourth 5mendment even on the Court of 5ppeals@
o)n terms 'his )as true of the 'enth Circuit@s decision in Specht* )ith )hich* as )e previousl+ noted*
the Court of 5ppeals eCpressed agreement
0ore significantl+* >reasona(leness is still the ultimate standard> under the Fourth 5mendment*
Camara* supra* at 1-?* )hich means that numerous seizures of this t+pe )ill survive constitutional
scrutin+ 5s is true in other circumstances* the reasona(leness determination )ill reflect a >careful
(alancing of governmental and private interests> 'I4* supra* at -.& 5ssuming* for eCample* that the
officers )ere acting pursuant to a court order* as in Specht v Jensen* D-% F%d &1&7 (C5&$ &?D"!* or
Fuentes v Shevin* .$" GS 7" * (&?"%!* and* as often )ould (e the case* a sho)ing of
unreasona(leness on these facts )ould (e a la(orious task indeed Cf Simms v Slacum* - Cranch -$$*
-$& (&D$7! <ence* )hile there is no guarantee against the filing of frivolous suits* had the e,ection in
this case properl+ a)aited the state court@s ,udgment* it is Huite unlikel+ that the federal court )ould
have (een (othered )ith a &?D- action alleging a Fourth 5mendment violation L1$7 GS 17* "%M
0oreover* )e dou(t that the police )ill often choose to further an enterprise kno)ing that it is contrar+
to the la)* or proceed to seize propert+ in the a(sence of o(,ectivel+ reasona(le grounds for doing so
Bn short* our reaffirmance of Fourth 5mendment principles toda+ should not foment a )ave of ne)
litigation in the federal courts
B6
'he complaint here alleges that respondents* acting under color of state la)* dispossessed the Soldals of
their trailer home (+ ph+sicall+ tearing it from its foundation and to)ing it to another lot 'aking these
allegations as true* this )as no >garden variet+> landlord/tenant or commercial dispute 'he facts
alleged suffice to constitute a >seizure> )ithin the meaning of the Fourth 5mendment* for the+ plainl+
implicate the interests protected (+ that provision 'he ,udgment of the Court of 5ppeals is*
D#&%
accordingl+* reversed* and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent )ith this opinion
So ordered
Footnotes
L&M Jones@ statement )as prompted (+ a district attorne+@s advice that no criminal charges could (e
(rought (ecause* under Bllinois la)* a criminal action cannot (e used to determine the right of
possession See BllRevStat ch &&$* O ?/&$& et seH (&??&!3 2eople v Avans* &7- Bll5pp -d 17&* &&.
Bll;ec 77%* 1&7 =A%d D&" (&st ;ist &?D"!
L%M 'he Soldals ultimatel+ )ere evicted per court order in ;ecem(er &?D"
L-M 'itle .% GSC &?D- provides that:
>Aver+ person )ho* under color of an+ statute* ordinance* regulation* custom or usage* of an+ State
su(,ects* or causes to (e su(,ected* an+ citizen of the Gnited States to the deprivation of an+ rights*
privileges* or immunities secured (+ the Constitution and la)s* shall (e lia(le to the part+ in,ured in an
action at la)* suit in eHuit+* or other proper proceeding for redress>
L.M 'he court reiterated the panel@s conclusion that a conspirac+ must (e assumed on the state of the
record and* therefore* that the case must (e treated in its current posture >as if the deput+ sheriffs
themselves seized the trailer* disconnected it from the utilities* and to)ed it a)a+> ?.% F%d &$"-*
&$"1 (C5" &??&! (en (anc!
L1M 'he court noted that* in light of the eCistence of adeHuate ,udicial remedies under state la)* a claim
for deprivation of propert+ )ithout due process of la) )as unlikel+ to succeed Bd* at &$"1/&$"7 See
2arratt v 'a+lor* .1& GS 1%" (&?D&! Bn an+ event* the Soldals did not claim a violation of their
procedural rights 5s noted* the Seventh Circuit also held that respondents had not violated the Soldals@
su(stantive due process rights under the Fourteenth 5mendment 2etitioners assert that this )as error*
(ut* in vie) of our disposition of the case* )e need not address the Huestion at this time
L7M Gnder .% GSC &?D-* the Soldals )ere reHuired to esta(lish that the respondents* acting under
color of state la)* deprived them of a constitutional right* in this instance* their Fourth and Fourteenth
5mendment freedom from unreasona(le seizures (+ the State See 0onroe v 2ape* L1$7 GS 17* 7&M
-71 GS &7"* &D. (&?7&! Respondents reHuest that )e affirm on the ground that the Court of 5ppeals
erred in holding that there )as sufficient state action to support a &?D- action 'he alleged in,ur+ to the
Soldals* it is urged* )as inflicted (+ private parties for )hom the count+ is not responsi(le 5lthough
respondents did not cross/petition* the+ are entitled to ask us to affirm on that ground if such action
)ould not enlarge the ,udgment of the Court of 5ppeals in their favor 'he Court of 5ppeals found that*
(ecause the police prevented Soldal from using reasona(le force to protect his home from private
action that the officers kne) )as illegal* there )as sufficient evidence of conspirac+ (et)een the
private parties and the officers to foreclose summar+ ,udgment for respondents We are not inclined to
revie) that holding See 5dickes v S< 8ress R Co* -?D GS &..* &1% /&7& (&?"$!
L"M Bn holding that the Fourth 5mendment@s reach eCtends to propert+ as such* )e are mindful that the
5mendment does not protect possessor+ interests in all kinds of propert+ See* eg* 4liver v Gnited
States* .77 GS &"$* &"7 /&"" (&?D.! 'his case* ho)ever* concerns a house* )hich the 5mendment@s
language eCplicitl+ includes* as it does a person@s effects
LDM 2lace also found that to detain luggage for ?$ minutes )as an unreasona(le deprivation of the
individual@s >li(ert+ interest in proceeding )ith his itinerar+*> )hich also is protected (+ the Fourth
5mendment .7% GS* at "$D /"&$
L?M When >operational necessities> eCist* seizures can (e ,ustified on less than pro(a(le cause .D$
GS* at -%" 'hat in no )a+ affects our anal+sis* for even then it is clear that the Fourth 5mendment
applies B(id3 see also Gnited States v 2lace* .7% GS 7?7 * at "$- (&?D-!
L&$M 4f course* if the police officers@ presence in the home itself entailed a violation of the Fourth
5mendment* no amount of pro(a(le cause to (elieve that an item in plain vie) constitutes
?#&%
incriminating evidence )ill ,ustif+ its seizure <orton* .?7 GS* at &-7 /&-"
L&&M Bt is true that 0urra+@s Iessee v <o(oken Iand R Bmprovement Co* &D <o) %"% (&D17!* cast
some dou(t on the applica(ilit+ of the 5mendment to noncriminal encounters such as this Bd* &D <o)
at %D1 9ut cases since that time have shed a different light* making clear that Fourth 5mendment
guarantees are triggered (+ governmental searches and seizures >)ithout regard to the use to )hich
Lhouses* papers* and effectsM are applied> Warden* 0ar+land 2enitentiar+ v <a+den* -D" GS %?.* -$&
(&?7"! 0urra+@s Iessee@s (road statement that the Fourth 5mendment >has no reference to civil
proceedings for the recover+ of de(t> argua(l+ onl+ meant that the )arrant reHuirement did not appl+*
as )as suggested in F0 Ieasing Corp v Gnited States* .%? GS --D* -1% (&?""! Whatever its
proper reading* )e reaffirm toda+ our (asic understanding that the protection against unreasona(le
searches and seizures full+ applies in the civil conteCt
L&%M 'his )as the vie) eCpressed (+ the Court of 5ppeals for the 'enth Circuit in Specht v Jensen* D-%
F%d &1&7 (&?D"!* remanded on unrelated grounds* D1- F%d D$1 (&?DD! (en (anc!* )ith )hich the
Seventh Circuit eCpressl+ agreed ?.% F%d* at &$"7
L&-M 'he officers in these cases )ere engaged in la) enforcement* and )ere looking for something that
)as found and seized Bn this (road sense* the seizures )ere the result of >searches*> (ut not in the
Fourth 5mendment sense 'hat the Court of 5ppeals might have (een suggesting that the plain/vie)
cases are eCplaina(le (ecause the+ almost al)a+s occur in the course of la) enforcement activities
receives some support from the penultimate sentence of the Huoted passage* )here the court states that
the )ord >seizure> might lose its usual meaning >)hen it stands apart from a search or an+ other
investigative activit+> Bd* at &$"? (emphasis added! 5nd* in the follo)ing paragraph* it o(serves that*
>LoMutside of the la) enforcement area* the Fourth 5mendment retains its force as a protection against
searches* (ecause the+ invade privac+ 'hat is )h+ )e decline to confine the amendment to the la)
enforcement setting> Bd* at &$"?/&$D$ Aven if the court meant that seizures of propert+ in the course
of la) enforcement activities* )hether civil or criminal* implicate interests safeguarded (+ the Fourth
5mendment* (ut that pure propert+ interests are unprotected in the non/la)/enforcement setting* )e
are not in accord* as indicated in the (od+ of this opinion L1$7 GS 17* "-M
Zach Coughlin
24 94K -?7&
Reno* =6 D?1$1
'el ""1 --D D&&D
FaC ?.? 77" ".$%
ZachCoughlin@hotmailcom
From: zachcoughlin@hotmailcom
'o: chansen@)ashoecount+us
Su(,ect: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice Court
;ate: 'ue* %7 Jun %$&% $?:&$:&. /$"$$
;ear Civil Supervisor <ansen
&$#&%
Zach Coughlin
24 94K -?7&
Reno* =6 D?1$1
'el ""1 --D D&&D
FaC ?.? 77" ".$%
ZachCoughlin@hotmailcom
;ear Sparks Justice Court*
B called and received permission to file this (+ faCB am indigent and reHuest a fee )aiver* and failing
that* an opportunit+ to cure an+ filing fee deficienc+
From: zachcoughlin@hotmailcom
'o: sheriff)e(@)ashoecount+us3 lstuchell@)ashoecount+us3 kstancil@)ashoecount+us3
chansen@)ashoecount+us3 milllerr@renogov
Su(,ect: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice Court
;ate: 'ue* %7 Jun %$&% $":1D:-7 /$"$$
;ear Sparks Justice Court* WCS4* R2;* and Reno Justice Court
B have received (though not personall+ served! )hat appears to (e an eviction notice (1 da+ unla)ful
detainerE! for rentals located at &7D$ Sk+ 0ountain ;rive* Reno* D?1%-* (ut the notice indicates that B
must file a 'enant@s 5ns)er )ith the Sparks Justice Court
5m B mistaken in vie)ing this matter to (e outside the ,urisdiction of the Sparks Justice Court* and
rather* a matter to (e handled in Reno Justice CourtE
Fiven Sparks Justice Court is open 1 da+s a )eek (closes at noon on Frida+s! and Reno Justice Court
has . ,udicial da+s a )eek* the deadline for filing a special appearance (to contest ,urisdiction! and or a
'enant@s 5ns)er of 5ffidavit is difficult to measure
B spoke )ith a Reno 2olice ;epartment )ho identified himself as Sargent 0iller last )eek and he
indicated the WCS4 planned to come effectuate an eviction on this date* June %7* %$&% B (elieve that
)ould (e premature* as =evada Iandlord 'enant la) provides for filing a 'enant@s 5ns)er or 5ffidavit
(+ noon after the fifth full da+ (,udicial da+s! and Frida+s in Sparks Justice Court are not full da+s in
that sense* and regardless* Sparks Justice Court* B (elieve* is not the appropriate forum )here* as here*
the situs is located in Reno (Ward &/napE!
Sincerel+*
Zach Coughlin
24 94K -?7&
Reno* =6 D?1$1
tel ""1 --D D&&D
faC ?.? 77" ".$-
&&#&%
Civil ;ivision
7-$ Freen(rae ;rive
Sparks* =evada D?.-&
(""1!-1-"7$- 2hone
(""1!-1%-$$. FaC
Civil ;epartment Supervisor
Chris <ansen
chansen@)ashoecount+us
'he Civil ;ivision of Sparks Justice Court is made up of three ma,or functions:
Civil
Civil Complaints for damages in eCcess of S1$$$ or if a suit involves a (reach of contract* punitive
damages* an action to o(tain possession of propert+* a )rit of restitution* or other like actions* legal
counsel is suggested for these t+pes of actions
Avictions
5n act or process of legall+ dispossessing a person of land or rental propert+
Small Claims
5n action filed in order to o(tain a monetar+ ,udgment Claims must not eCceed S1$$$ 5 small claims
action ma+ (e filed )ith the Sparks Justice Court if one of the follo)ing applies to the defendant:
'he+ reside )ithin the (oundaries of the Sparks 'o)nship3
'he+ are emplo+ed )ithin the (oundaries of the Sparks 'o)nship3 and#or*
'he+ do (usiness )ithin the (oundaries of the Sparks 'o)nship
&%#&%
motion for new trial
next few days, though I believe I tried to fax this to the RMC (as an emergency measure and hopefully not in violation of
Judge Gardners earlier Order regarding faxing....) on or about 6/30/12...
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Thu 6/28/12 2:13 AM
To: hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov
1 attachment
11 cr 25405 soldal version final.pdf (154.9 KB)
Zach Coughlin,Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473 (currently suspended)
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
Pro Se Defendant
regardin 11 cr 22176: Motion for New Trial, etc. (14 pages)
also sent to Hon. Judge William Gardner
1 South Sierra Street, P.O. Box 1900 reno nv
* Fax number:
7753343859
Christopher P. Hazlett-Stevens Company: Reno City Attorney's Office Address: P. O. Box 1900 ~ Reno , NV 89505 Phone Number: 775-326-
6628 Fax number: 775-334-4226 Email: hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov
Dear Judge Gardner and Mr. Hazlett-Stevens,
I attempted to file a tolling motion on June 25th and again on June 26th, 2012. on the 25th Filing office supervisor Donna Ballard and Court
Administrator Cassandra Jackson decided to refuse to accept my filing, apparently. Then on June 26th, 2012, I ented the court prior to the
"timed lockign of the doors" that I have been educated on previously by court adminstration in relation to seekign to file documents close to
closing time, however, I was again refused in my attempt to file another such tolling motion and to access justice. I am fax this filing to both
of you, with the caveat that I do not wish to violate any dicate against fax filign that Judge Gardner may have in effect (I am a bit unclear
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration, motion to alter or amend
whether that only applied to pre-trial motions or to anything).
I believe the Whitman, Sullivan, Donoho, and other Nv S. Ct decisions forbid Ms. Ballard and J ackson from so rejecting my filings, in
addition to NRCP 5(e).
Sincerely,
zAch Coughlin
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Wed 6/27/12 1:53 PM
To: kadlicj@reno.gov; hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov
1 attachment
motion for new trial 11 cr 26405 4 pages submitted for filing 6 26 12 to rmc.pdf (4.3 MB)
Please find attached the tolling motions in the subject line
from Zach Coughlin
\(NV BAr No:9473, currently suspended)
PO BOX 3961
RENO, NV 89505
Tele: 775-338-8118
FAX: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
TO:
Reno City Attorney's Office
Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, Esq.
J ohn Kadlic, Esq.
Reno eviction noticed for Sparks J ustice Court
Email:
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Tue 6/26/12 7:58 AM
To: sheriffweb@washoecounty.us; lstuchell@washoecounty.us; kstancil@washoecounty.us; chansen@washoecounty.us;
milllerr@reno.gov
Dear Sparks J ustice Court, WCSO, RPD, and Reno J ustice Court.
I have received (though not personally served) what appears to be an eviction notice (5 day unlawful detainer?) for rentals
located at 1680 Sky Mountain Drive, Reno, 89523, but the notice indicates that I must file a Tenant's Answer with the Sparks
J ustice Court.
Am I mistaken in viewing this matter to be outside the jurisdiction of the Sparks J ustice Court, and rather, a matter to be
handled in Reno J ustice Court?
Given Sparks J ustice Court is open 5 days a week (closes at noon on Fridays) and Reno J ustice Court has 4 judicial days a week,
the deadline for filing a special appearance (to contest jurisdiction) and or a Tenant's Answer of Affidavit is difficult to measure.
I spoke with a Reno Police Department who identified himself as Sargent Miller last week and he indicated the WCSO planned to
come effectuate an eviction on this date, J une 26, 2012. I believe that would be premature, as Nevada Landlord Tenant law
provides for filing a Tenant's Answer or Affidavit by noon after the fifth full day (judicial days) and Fridays in Sparks J ustice
Court are not full days in that sense, and regardless, Sparks J ustice Court, I believe, is not the appropriate forum where, as
here, the situs is located in Reno (Ward 1-nap?)
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
tel 775 338 8118
fax 949 667 7403
Civil Division
630 Greenbrae Drive
Sparks, Nevada 89431
(775)353.7603 Phone
(775)352.3004 Fax
Civil Department Supervisor
Chris Hansen
chansen@washoecounty.us
The Civil Division of Sparks J ustice Court is made up of three major functions:
Civil
Civil Complaints for damages in excess of $5000 or if a suit involves a breach of contract, punitive damages, an action to obtain
possession of property, a writ of restitution, or other like actions, legal counsel is suggested for these types of actions.
Evictions
An act or process of legally dispossessing a person of land or rental property.
Small Claims
An action filed in order to obtain a monetary judgment. Claims must not exceed $5000. A small claims action may be filed with
the Sparks J ustice Court if one of the following applies to the defendant:
NCAA and Dwayne jakob
Nevada court services attack and attempted break in
respectfully submitted
1. They reside within the boundaries of the Sparks Township;
2. They are employed within the boundaries of the Sparks Township; and/or,
3. They do business within the boundaries of the Sparks Township.
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 6/22/12 9:36 AM
To: weavera@reno.gov
Keep turning light off attempting break in malicious abuse of process claiming color of law
From my Android phone on T-Mobile. The first nationwide 4G network.
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 6/22/12 9:34 AM
To: weavera@reno.gov
NCA and northerns mgmt tried to break again on J une 14th.
From my Android phone on T-Mobile. The first nationwide 4G network.
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 6/08/12 4:41 PM
To: weavera@reno.gov; barnesm@reno.gov
6 attachments
20120605_101513 Northwind manager handy man attacks from golf cart 6 5 12.mp4 (3.1 MB) , landlord tenant law
manual for police in minnesota.pdf (735.1 KB) , Police_manual_-_final_as_adopted_by_State's_Attorney.pdf (263.7
KB) , trespass criminal civil evictdion.pdf (69.8 KB) , 6 8 12 fax to northwind with page numbers.pdf (50.7 KB) ,
northwind fax 6 4 12 habitability retaliation etc.pdf (45.8 KB)
Dear Officer Weaver and Officer Barnes,
I am respectfully submitting this supplementary material to the police report I submitted to you in person on
J une 6, 2012 regarding the assault I was the victim of at the hands of maintenance staff member Luke of
Northwind Apartments on J une 5th, 2012, and the attempts at unlawful entry committed by Northwind
Manager Dwayne J akob on or about J une 4, 2012.
I am attaching an article you may find of interest regarding the intersection of landlord tenant law and police
work, vis a vis criminal/civil matters and the fine distinctions that sometimes arise. I didn't see anything in
there on Officer Weavers fine hypothetical regarding entry without permission when a burglary may be
occurring. That situation probably does not come up that often because hardly anybody but the police would
be brave enough to enter such a dangerous situation.
I appreciate the brave service both of you provide. I am attaching this materials just because they are
interesting to me and may be to you and in no way wish for so attachign these to be interpreted as a criticism
Cory Goble battery
of either of your police work.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Wed 6/06/12 1:36 AM
To: denneym@reno.gov; jgoodnight@washoecounty.us; zyoung@da.washoecounty.us
5 attachments
20120605_204307 cory goble flicks cigarette at coughlin hits coughlin's left shoulder.mp4 (5.5 MB) ,
20120605_210151 Pabst Blue Ribbon beer can beneath section of Lexus Goble was sitting in.jpg (1323.9 KB) ,
20120605_210154 the cigarette Goble flicked Coughlin.jpg (2.2 MB) , 20120605_204512 Goble's brunette female
friend taunting Coughlin over reputational damage done by Goble and Zarate's lying to RPD Officer Duralde.mp4 (3.9
MB) , Cory Goble address 5020 Las Brisas Blvd. Reno NV.pdf (188.2 KB)
denneym@reno.gov
Dear Officer Denney and the Reno Police Department, DDA Young, and DPD Goodnight,
This is the supplement to the report of the battery that Cory Goble committed upon me last night, J une 5th,
2012.
lexus rx300 brownish color license plate 073xyf brunette female early twenties behind the wheel, indicated
the lexus belonged to her early twenties blonde female friend. Cory Goble sat on the passenger side in the
back seat. Asian man early twenties in front passenger seat.
Reno Police Department case number 12-10761 for incident occurring at approximately 8:44pm in parking
lot of Imperial Lounge on Arlington and 2nd Street.
911 call made announcing Toyota Prius (license plate number provided during 911 call) was the getaway
vehicle for Goble and his three associates when Coughlin announced he was calling 911 to report the battery
by Cory Goble.
I was at the Washoe County Law Library until Nikki Britt, law librarian told me it was time to go at 7:30pm.
She let me stay after the usual 7:00pm closing time because she is nice and because the "Lawyer in the
Library" program was running late, so she was going to be there anyway. I left my car parked in the court
house's lot and decided to go for a walk in the entertainment corridor downtown between arlington and sierra
streets and First and Second Streets. I don't have much money right now and so I was more watching to big
screen television replays of the Heat Celtics game than anything else through the window in the imperial
parking lot. I didn't go in because I don't have much money to spend, the place looked kind of dead anyways,
and I was getting tired anyways after doing legal research for several hours. While watching the sports
highlights I heard a young man's voice kind of clowning me about my wearing a suit. Then the voice
exclaimed that I was "the guy who stole my phone". At that point I turned on my smart phone recorder and
that is where the tape starts, with Goble repeating that he was "over it" now and, apparently, no longer upset
about the situation, which was somewhat puzzling considering he did not lose the use of his phone for
anything more than a few minutes at the most back on August 20th, 2011, and also considering that the still
unidentified man that Nicole Watson admitted hearing say that he would throw the phone in question "in the
river" if it wasn't claimed immediately (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=to_UOFIccLw at the four minute
ten second mark of the video just linked to Nicole Watson admits to hearing and seeing this man exclaim that
he would throw the iPhone in the river...so Goble's own friend, Nicole Watson admits that Goble's phone
would have been in the river anyways....)
J oe Goodnight never watched that video linked to, despite the fact that it was provided to him and qualifies as
exculpatory evidence. Goodnights admits that he failed to utilize or watch that video. The other individual
providing a witness statement, Nate Zarate, is seen in the videos attempting to dissuade Nicole Watson from
providing any insight into what she actually eye witnessed the night of the grand larceny arrest of Coughlin
by the RPD, at the behest of Goble and Zarate on August 20th, 2011.
In the video from J une 5, 2012, Cory Goble is seen with the word "FUCK" tatooed on the knuckles of his left
hand in large font and black ink. He appears highly intoxicated. A Pabst Blue Ribbon beer can was seen
under the section of the Lexus RX300 that Goble was seated in.
The early twenty somethings appeared to feel it rather necessary to switch cars, and possibly drivers. The
excuse proferred later, apparently by a shaggy brown haired taller early twenty something male that the RPD
interviewed, and whom was very threatening to Coughlin in the parking lot, seems thin. The excuse, that
these four switched cars because Coughlin was blocking the egress of their Lexus seems particularly suspect
considering the merely switched to a Toyota Prius parked some 3 parking spaces away. Why, if Coughlin
was truly preventing them from leaving he couldnt' have just blocked the Prius, is unclear.
What is clear is that no forcible "citizen's arrest" was made by Coughlin. Coughlin made the decision to
allow Goble and his associates to leave peaceably (though they likely presented a danger to others on the
road considering they all seemed intoxicated). However, in the video of the August 20th, 2011 arrest of
Coughlin, wherein Goble signed a criminal complaint, RPD Officer Duralde cheerfully dismisses Coughlin's
protestations that Coughlin himself called 911 in light of the skater youth's violent and threatening behavior
(attemting to steal Coughlin's pekingnese puppy and Coughlin's bike, attempting to reach into Coughlin's
shorts pocket, gleefully exclaimign the lack of culpability one of their cohorts would face given he was "only
17 years old and still a minor". Officer Duralde is hear in the video dismissing Coughlin's account of the
assaults and batteries this gang of skater youth committed by deeming their behavior a "citizen's arrest".
Coughlin, however, chose not to utilize any of the force or threat utilized by the skater youth's in the video of
the August 20th, 2011 arrest of Coughlin for grand larceny (Duralde cheerfully explained to Coughlin that he
was purposefully charging it as a "felony" and went on to detail the advantages to Duralde in doing so and the
disadvantages to Coughlin that that decision by Duralde would present.
I am reporting this battery by Goble within 48 hours of it taking place. As such, he should be arrested. I
swear, under penalty of perjury, that Goble flicked his lit cigarette directly at me, from about 3 feet away and
that it hit me in the left should area of my suit jacket and the sparks and ash exloded from the tip of the lit
cigarette when it hit my left shoulder of my suit jacket.
Mental health court
FW: release of information to my attorney
The attached video reveal Goble flicking his lit cigarette at me and it hitting my left should at the 51 second
mark. For a couple seconds afterwards I was literally to shocked to say anything, as it was such a
phenomenally stupid thing for him to have done, especially considering that his female friend had only just a
few moments before made sure to announce that I, Coughlin, was obviously recording and or filming the
interaction. The group admits that Goble started the conversation with me and they also readily acknowledge
that his conduct invited the interaction.
I appreciate your attention to this matter.
If you choose to make an arrest, locating Goble should not be that difficult. Goble's parents are apparently
located at 2480 Montego Dr_ Pamela and Timothy Goble. The Criminal Complaing by DDA Young list
Cory Goble's address as 5020 Las Brisas Blvd in Reno, NV.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
From: Zach Coughlin,Esq. (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Wed 5/09/12 12:04 PM
To: kadlicj@reno.gov; Timothy D. Coughlin, MD (tcoughlinmd@hotmail.com); peter.breen@washoecourts.us
I got i n t o MHC by or der of J udge Sf er r azza yest er day f or t he RJ C case st emmi ng f r om t he August ar r est , but i n t he
RMC t r espassi ng case, t he Reno Ci t y At t or ney i s obj ect i ng t o t hat . That at t or ney, Hazl et t - St evens l i ed t o me i n
Sept ember 2011 about whet her t he Ci t y At t or ney' s of f i ce had r ecei ved anyt hi ng r egar di ng my 9 9 11 ar r est .
I was st ar t ed on ant i depr essant s as a boy by my physi ci an f at her and was of f t hem dur i ng t he t wo ar r est s bet ween
August and Sept ember 2009. I asked f or some t empor ar y hel p wi t h obt ai ni ng some ant i depr essant s, but my f at her
i ndi cat ed he need t o put t hat money t owar d payi ng f or act i ng l essons f or hi s 30 year ol d st epson. I n t he past he has
cal l ed t he Dean of t he l aw school and pr ovi ded hi s own di agnosi s of me, whi ch wound up becomi ng t he subj ect of
sever al poi nt ed quest i ons i n a deposi t i on conduct ed by bar counsel f or t he Cal i f or ni a St at e Bar , whi ch deni ed me a
l i cense i n l ar ge l par t due t o t hat cal l t o t he Dean.
My psychi at r i st conf i r ms I was of f my medi cat i ons dur i ng t hat per i od dur i ng whi ch t hese ar r est s occur ed.
My f at her has i nt er f er r ed wi t h my heal t h car e cont i nual l y and i n der ogat i on of my pr i vacy r i ght s, usi ng shame and
mani pul at i on t o cont r ol t hat t o whi ch he i s not ent i t l ed t o.
I was deni ed counsel i n RMC 11 CR 22176, whi ch r esul t ed i n a convi ct i on f or eat i ng a candybar and cough dr ops whi l e
shoppi ng and event ual l y payi ng f or $90 of mer chandi se. A pet i t i on t o suspend my l aw l i cense was f i l ed on May 3, 2012.
I wi l l be f i l i ng a mot i on t o pr event such a suspensi on.
My dad cal l ed my gi r l f r i end up i n May 2011 and she br oke up wi t h me days l at er , st eal i ng t wo mont hs of r ent t hat I
had gi ven her t o f or war d t o our l andl or d. Ci t y At t or ney Rober t s of f er ed t est i mony she knew t o be f al se, t he Wal mar t
associ at e l i ed, as di d t he I ndi an Col ony Pol i ce i n t he candybar case. I n t he appeal of t hat case, J udge El l i ot ci t ed
a ci vi l st at ut e i n excusi ng t he RMC' s f ai l ur e t o pr epar e a t r anscr i pt . I f eel t he convi ct i on i n 11 CR 22176 shoul d be
over t ur ned and t hat case shoul d be i n ment al heal t h cour t .
Dependi ng on how t hi s t ur ns out , my Dad and I may never speak agai n.
Si ncer el y,
Zach Coughl i n, Esq. PO BOX 3961, Reno, NV 89505 t el 775 338 8118 f ax 949 667 7402
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Wed 5/02/12 4:29 PM
To: jgoodnight@washoecounty.us; keithloomis@earthlink.net; keith@leelawoffice.net; patrickk@nvbar.org; coe@gbis.com;
zyoung@da.washoecounty.us; judgemcgee@msn.com; kadlicj@reno.gov; geofgiles@hotmail.com; hazlett-
stevensc@reno.gov; sooudib@reno.gov; robertsp@reno.gov; ormaasa@reno.gov
3 attachments
patrick o. king citations.pdf (1070.1 KB) , loomis allcases.pdf (624.7 KB) , giles allcases.pdf (1426.7 KB)
Dear Mr. Loomis and Mr. Goodnight, et al,
I am writing response to your putting for the idea of a global resolution. If any global resolution could be achieved it would
mean a great deal to me. I believe I am doing better now and this has been an enormously difficult time with a great deal of
damage done to my family relationships, reputation, finances, privacy rights, lost opportunities, etc.
I ask that you pursue, if possible including the conviction of 11 30 12 before J udge Howard on some Rule 60 relief from
judgment basis. I believe I filed a Rule 60 in that petit theft conviction in 11 TR 22176, however, I am not sure if the RMC filed
it, etc., etc. as sometimes there have been issues with having my filings accepted. I am just trying to move on with my life and
pick up the pieces. Of course, I wish I had handled some things better and am plenty willing to grovel for foregiveness before
whomever if it will help get these matters resolved without a conviction, and especially if it will get the conviction in 11 TR 22176
set aside or undone, etc. I did report that conviction to Bar Counsel (from RMC 11 TR 22176 before J udge Howard) under SCR
111, however, I believe a global resolution wherein that conviction is overturned would hel me retain my law license and avoid a
significant suspension. If that could be achieved it would be very easy for me to just move on and forget about seeking
recourse for the various things that have happened. Further, my main goal is to avoid a suspension of my law license or being
forced into a SCR 117 disability petition. I love the practice of law and take it very seriously. I have very few clients right now
because I know that is necessary to afford me that which I need to provide them services in a professional manner and to meet
all standards of care. I could be making more money right now, but I know the prudent thing is to not take on too many clients
and to do good work for those clients I do have. I attempt to mirror the approach of Geof Giles, whom could have a great deal
more foreclosure defense clients and clients in general than he currently does, but chooses to keep that roster relatively trim in
order to attempt to get the best precedent on the books as possible. Mr. Giles is doing work that is extremely important to
Nevadans right now in the foreclosure defense setting, including fighting the big removal and preemption fights. I have been
lucky to get to do a little research for him once in awhile, though I dont think I have found him any materials he did not already
have or otherwise get him anything useful, but at least
I get to see some of this exciting foreclosure battle up close.
Mr. Goodnight, please work with Mr. Loomis, he is the former District Attorney for Lyon County and is extremely well respected in
our profession. I am attaching a collection of his Westlaw profiler results. Mr. Loomis, J oe is a National Merit Finalist whom I
have known since I moved to Reno in 7th grade after sending 2 years in Dayton, Ohio before that I slit time between
Gardnerville 9 months a year with my mom and summers with my Dad in Reno. Also, if permissible, please work with
Bar Counsel Patrick King, whom Coe Swobe speaks highly of and who has been pretty patient with me throughout my recent
issues. I am attaching a collection of the signficant cases he has appeared on as well.
Coe Swobe, Esq. former state senator, and recipient of a commendation from President Reagan for his work in forming the TRPA,
and Keith Lee, Esq., whom started the Character and Fitness Committee, was student body president at UNR may be willing to
provide some insight into this situation. I will be attending Lawyers Concerned For Lawyers on Thursday nights, though an
extremely heavy deadline collection of late has been tough of late...
Basically, I was doing pretty well for some time, but creative differences at Washoe Legal Services resulted in our parting ways in
May 2009, though I still have an enormous deal of respect for Paul Elcano and the rest of Washoe Legal Services, and in some
ways owe him more than I am comfortable admitting for his insane decision to hire me in August 2007. After leaving WLS, the
economy turned sour, and the next 2 years were a combination of seeking employment and doing the scut work of preparing to
enter private practice. I can build a computer from the ground up and know what thermal paste is for a processor. I am
getting better with rules based calendaring software and the rest of all that is involved in practicing law these days.
However, my live-in girlfriend of four and a half years and I broke up in J une 2011. As confirmed by the landlord in RJ C
Rev2011-001708, my girlfriend took a couple months worth of my rent contributions and instead of forwarding it on to the
landlord, she secretly used it to get a new apartment, etc. She also took my beloved Pomeranian, Palin.
I was running low on money in early August 2011 and decided to take a 'medication holiday', which is an
accepted practice, especially considering the cost of the medication has skyrocketed somewhat in the last year or so. My
psychiatrist, Dr. Yassar's office will confirm that they have a record of my calling to cancel my August 2, 2011 appointment and
that I would have run out and did not refill my prescription by that date. I did not receive another prescription or otherwise fill
one until September 12, 2011.
I did not find out about the missing rent until mid August 2011 as the landlord had a practice of not even cashing rent checks for
months at a time....naturally, as he is a neurosurgeon who probably is not living paycheck to paycheck. Richard G. Hill, Esq.
entered the picture for the landlord on August 16th, 2011. I was arrested on the iphone in the skate plaza possession of lost or
mislaid property matter on August 20th, 2011 and the eviction Notice is dated August 22nd...and I sent 7 days in jail waiting for
an OR. Then, on September 9th, 2011 I was arrested on the eating a candy bar, etc, at WalMart while shopping for an paying
please file this with the RMC
for $90 worth of groceries. I do not believe I committed theft in either of the petit larceny cases, the arrests for which occurred
during a 19 day period wherein I had ceased taking a medication prescribed by my pscyhiatrist that I have been on for years and
years, mostly due to the cost of the medication skyrocketing lately, my girlfriend breaking up with me and making off with my
share of the rent, a tough economy, etc., etc. I believe my personality was made prickly from going off the medication abruptly
and that resulted in two arrests in situations where an arrest would not typically be made. I got back on one of my medications
immediately following my release from jail on September 12th, 2011. I still could not afford my other medication until I finally
filled it on April 28th, 2011. My dad is a physician and gave me this medication when I was a teenager.
The eviction Order by J udge Sferrazza (that Mr. Loomis made a brilliant argument against in the criminal trespass matter related
to the RJ C being divested of jurisdiction to enter that Order considering a Notice of Appeal was filed by me in the interim
between the two hearings) called for the lockout to take place on November 1, 2011. I was arrested for criminal trespass on
November 13th, 2011. Despite NRS 40.253 expressly forbidding it, J udge Sferrazza forced me to deposit my last $2,300 into the
RJ C's rent escrow account in order to preserve my right to litigate habitability. Even after the eviction Order was rendered on
October 27th, 2011 and for nearly 10 days thereafter, the RJ C continued to hold on to that $2,300 of mine. What was I
supposed to live on? Plus, the way the law is being applied currently, a tenant is forced to deposit such an escrow amount,
then, prepare for a hearing, then if the tenant loses, be ready for a Sheriff to be opening their door with his gun drawn after a
locksmith gained access to the rental just hours after the hearing itself. I do not get Section 8 housing benefits, do not get
welfare or food stamps, no medicaid, etc. Further, Richard G. Hill and Casey Baker actually got J udge Sferrazza to sign the Order
of 10/27/11 with a ruling wherein the $2,300 was awarded to the neurosurgeon, despite the Order as rendered in open court
having said no such thing. Simply put, they hand the court an Order that the court directed them to prepare based on what was
announced in open court, and rather than faithfully reproducing the same, they remix it to be what they had hoped the Order
would be in the first place, forcing J udge Sferrazza and I to correct their perfidy...just kidding, sort of... I had to file a J CRCP
Motion to Alter or Amend just to correct that and get that rent escrow deposit back. In Las Vegas, the J ustice Court had to get
Rule 44 passed off on by the Nevada Supreme Court just to be able to force such rent escrow deposits, as required by J CRCP
83. I think J udge Sferrazza just misread the statute, which is damn confusing and complex. Such forced rent escrow deposits in
the context of the speedy nature of these ultra quick summary eviction proceedings have a vast societal cost, as seen here. The
Reno Police Department has gotten a little disparage in this. Officer's have. My reputation will never be the same...the RJ C took
some lums.....and Richard G. Hill, Esq. got over $50,000 in fees to litigate a summary eviction from a commercial law office
where the only notice served failed to allege nonpayment of rent. NRS 40. 253 expressly forbids utilizing summary eviction
proceedings against commercial tenants unless non-payment of rent is alleged. My Lease Agreement allowed for the commercial
law office use for which the property was being utilized, in express, written terms. Richard G. Hill, Esq. committed a wrong site
surgery of a legal nature for his neurosurgeon client.
So, I was subject to a custodial arrest incident to Richard G. Hill, Esq. signing a criminal trespass complaint on November 13th,
2011. I spent three days in jail and more money on bail and got out on November 16th, 2011, then Thanksgiving week and
many deadlines in other cases took place... Then, on November 30th, 2011 the trial in RMC 11 TR 22176 in the candy bar case
took place and J udge Howard denied my request for a continuance, even where Richard G. Hill was subjecting exculpatory
materials to an unlawful rent distrain under NRS 118A.520 that I felt necessary to my defense of a matter for which a conviction
would require reporting under SCR 111. I was convicted and did report that to Bar Counsel. I was denied an attorney, yet
sentenced to 3 days in jail for summary contempt. It is my hope that there is some permissible manner for that conviction to be
overturned and to avoid a SCR 117 disability petition. I spent four years on the sidelines from 2001 to 2005 waiting to get a law
license. I have not had a relapse. Staying busy has always been the best thing for me, and a suspension, I believe, would have
a negative effect in that regard, and actually not benefit me or otherwise provide time for me to address any problems anyone
feels I might have. Simply put, I just want to practice law. I do not want to get into protracted wranglings and fighting city hall,
etc. while waiting out a suspension or worse. I know I have upset a good number of people and will be making amends for that
in the years to come.
I appreciate anything any of you can do to assist me here in achieving my stated goals and promise you I would pay it forward in
our profession in the future. There has been a silver lining in all this for me, however. I have been able to meet and watch
practice a number of fine attorneys and people, including Deputy City Attorneys Roberts, who had some very crafty moves in the
appeal of the candy bar case, Ormaas, Hazlett-Stevens, and Sooudi, as well as Deputy District Attorney Zach Young. And RJ C
Chief Bailiff Sexton and Bailiff English and I were able to joke the other day after a hearing wherein my arguments were roundly
smited about how I actually won the hearing because I did not have to go to jail at the conclusion of it, and how its those little
victories that one must build on in seeking to navigate in the legal profession while learning to practice law. And I may not have
ever received a license in the first place if it was not for Reno City Attorney J ohn Kadlic writing me a letter of recommendation to
the State Bar of Nevada and Nevada Supreme Court back in 2004 where I was languishing in Moral Character application
purgatory, or were it not for Keith Lee taking on my case pro bono when it seemed bleakest, or had J udge McGee and Coe not
been there to laugh with.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 3961, RENO, NV, 89505, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar
No: 9473
CHANGE OF ADDRESS ATTORNEY COUGHLIN
CORRECTION CHANGE OF ADDRESS ATTORNEY ZACH COUGHLIN, ESQ.
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Mon 4/16/12 4:30 PM
To: renodirect@reno.gov
1 attachment
4 16 12 rmc notice of non service.pdf (96.8 KB)
in 11 tr 26800
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 3961, RENO, NV, 89505, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar
No: 9473
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Mon 4/16/12 3:28 PM
To: tbeko@etsreno.com; bgonsalves@live.com; jgarin@lipsonneilson.com; jgoodnight@washoecounty.us;
bdogan@washoecounty.us; keithloomis@earthlink.net; renodirect@reno.gov; renopd@coplogic.com;
kcordisco@da.washoecounty.us; jleslie@washoecounty.us; kadlicj@reno.gov; gfuller@grgflaw.com;
rjcweb@washoecourts.us; robertsp@reno.gov; heidi.howden@washoecourts.us; hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov;
sooudib@reno.gov; ormaasa@reno.gov
Please note my new address for all correspondence and or mailings:
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 3961, RENO, NV, 89505, tel: 775 338 8118, fax:
949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Mon 4/16/12 2:38 PM
To: suzannew@nvbar.org; support@baralliance.com; renodirect@reno.gov; courtadmin@washoecourts.us;
courttech@washoecourts.us; joey.hastings@washoecourts.us; joey.orduna@washoecourts.us;
craig.franden@washoecourts.us; kstancil@washoecounty.us; stuttle@washoecounty.us; rbaker@washoecounty.us
Dear State Bar of Nevada, 2nd J udicial District Court, Reno J ustice Court, et al,
Please let me clarify and or change my recent communication. In my last correspondence I made a
misstatement based upon my misreading of SCR 79. Please allow me to correct that. My preferred mailing
address and my SCR 79 address should be the same, as listed directly below:
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel: 775 338 8118
Fax: 949 667 7402
email: ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
website: www.ZachCoughlinEsq.wordpress.com
please make all the above information my preferred mailing address and publicly available.
FW: Evidence
As for any alternate mailing address, please change that to:
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
945 W. 12th St.
Reno, NV 89503
I will attempt to make these changes myself at the "portal" found at www.nvbar.org in the
member section, however, I am contacting you now in an abundance of caution.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 3961, RENO, NV, 89505, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Wed 4/04/12 11:07 PM
To: nrickey@washoecounty.us; renodirect@reno.gov; mhaley@washoecounty.us; tvinger@washoecounty.us;
rromero@washoecounty.us; bberryman@washoecounty.us; mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us;
william.rempel@latimes.com
Dear Deputy District Attorney Kandaras and Sheriff Haley,
I respectfully request for the WCSO to answer my questions with regard to what exactly will be returned to
me, including, but not limited to, whether a micro sd card will be returned and whether such a card was free
standing (ie, not inserted into any other personal property) or not, and whether any copies of the data on any
of my personal property has been made or whether such data has been accessed. I claim law enforcement
misconduct, not unprofessional treatment, vis a vis the incident on 3/30/12. DDA Kandaras, you wrote: " I
am unsure as to your complaint about the District Attorney possessing your evidence." Please
try to become sure and find out whether or not the DA, or anyone connected with the DA
"possessed" this "evidence". Additionally, please indicate what this "evidence" is "evidence" of,
whether any crime will be charge, and whether any probable cause, reasonable suspicion or other basis exists
or existed sufficient to justify this seizure of an attorney's personal property, including a smart phone and a
micro sd card, as well as another smart phone and an expensive electric shaver for now over 35 days.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar
No: 9473
Subject: RE: Evidence
Date: Wed, 4 Apr 2012 16:29:03 -0700
From: mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us
To: BBerryman@washoecounty.us; zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
CC: NRickey@washoecounty.us; renodirect@reno.gov; MHaley@washoecounty.us; TVinger@washoecounty.us;
RRomero@washoecounty.us
Dear Mr. Coughlin:
In reviewing the emails below as well as others generated with respect to the Holmes order, it appears that the staff is trying to
work with you to release your items in a timely manner. It is my understanding that when you came to the detention facility on
Friday, March 30, 2011, it was after 5:00 p.m. Because the evidence custodian is open during regular business hours, your request
could not be processed at that time. I was informed that staff told you yesterday that you could make arrangements to come pick
up your items. I see no reason why there should be any problems with this release as I am confident that all parties will treat
each other with the utmost professionalism and courtesy.
I did not receive copy of the Holmes order until Monday, April 2, 2012, when you sent it to me via email at about 4:00 p.m. I
have never requested that the items taken into evidence be routed to the District Attorneys office, nor have I ever viewed them. I
am unsure as to your complaint about the District Attorney possessing your evidence.
Please be advised that your claims of unprofessional treatment on March 30, 2012 will be reviewed. Have a nice evening.
Mary Kandaras
Deputy District Attorney
Phone: (775) 337 - 5723
Fax: (775) 337 - 5732
From: Berryman, Brandi J
Sent: Wednesday, April 04, 2012 3:08 PM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
Cc: Rickey, Natasha; renodirect@reno.gov; Kandaras, Mary; Haley, Michael; Vinger, Todd; Romero, Renee L.
Subject: RE: Evidence
Mr. Coughlin,
Today will work just fine. Please give me a time before 5:00pm today that you are able to pick up your items.
Thank you,
Brandi Berryman
RE: Evidence
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, April 04, 2012 2:46 PM
To: Berryman, Brandi J ; Rickey, Natasha; renodirect@reno.gov; Kandaras, Mary; Haley, Michael; Vinger, Todd
Subject: RE: Evidence
Dear Ms. Kandaras, Berryman and Rickey,
Pleas answer my questions regarding the property that is to be released. The Order is dated 3/30/12, why does it take until 4/5/12 to have it available to me?
Am I going to be hassled and subject to abuse of process and threats of malicious prosecution and retaliatory arrest by unprofessional and malevolent
deputies like Deputy Beatson? Can I retrieve my items right now, today? Would an Order to Show Cause help you to follow the Order?
Thank You,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 60952, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
Subject: Evidence
Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2012 07:38:01 -0700
From: BBerryman@washoecounty.us
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
CC: NRickey@washoecounty.us
Hi Mr. Coughlin,
Please come to the front desk at the Sheriffs Office on Thursday, April 5
th
at 11:00am. Just let the person at the desk know you are here to pick up your evidence.
Be sure to have your ID as well.
Thank you,
Brandi Berryman
Washoe County Sheriff's Office
Crime Lab, Evidence
328-3060 (office)
328-2831 (fax)
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Wed 4/04/12 2:45 PM
To: bberryman@washoecounty.us; nrickey@washoecounty.us; renodirect@reno.gov; mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us;
mhaley@washoecounty.us; tvinger@washoecounty.us
Dear Ms. Kandaras, Berryman and Rickey,
Pleas answer my questions regarding the property that is to be released. The Order is dated 3/30/12, why does it take until
4/5/12 to have it available to me? Am I going to be hassled and subject to abuse of process and threats of malicious
prosecution and retaliatory arrest by unprofessional and malevolent deputies like Deputy Beatson? Can I retrieve my items right
now, today? Would an Order to Show Cause help you to follow the Order?
City of Reno Marshal Division Harrassment, hanging up phone on me, RMC
seizing Reno Attorney's smart phone and cell phone etc. in court after cross
examing RPD on bribery and retaliation
Thank You,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 60952, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
Subject: Evidence
Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2012 07:38:01 -0700
From: BBerryman@washoecounty.us
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
CC: NRickey@washoecounty.us
Hi Mr. Coughlin,
Please come to the front desk at the Sheriffs Office on Thursday, April 5
th
at 11:00am. Just let the person at the desk know you are here to
pick up your evidence.
Be sure to have your ID as well.
Thank you,
Brandi Berryman
Washoe County Sheriff's Office
Crime Lab, Evidence
328-3060 (office)
328-2831 (fax)
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Thu 3/29/12 2:39 PM
To: dgentile@gordonandsilver.com; renodirect@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov; rcornlaw@150.reno.nv.us;
stermitz@sbcglobal.net; office@bdjlaw.com; defense@freeman-law.com; ed@npri.org;
mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us; mark@markmausertlaw.com
20 attachments
11 TR 26800 NOTICE OF APPEAL AND MOTIONS 3 7 12 WITH EXHIBIT 1 ATTACHED.pdf (2.6 MB) , 2 24 20 fax to
rmc regarding deficiency in record on appeal - Copy.pdf (55.6 KB) , 3 19 12 fas to rmc marshals regarding property
wcso - Copy.pdf (40.0 KB) , 3 26 12 fax to rmc regarding address emails and car sleeping allegations - Copy.pdf
(51.9 KB) , J AMES MENZEL TransparentNevada rmc marshal menzel 2009 does not include health benefits.htm (3.6
KB) , J OEL HARLEY TransparentNevada RMC Marshal Harley.htm (3.3 KB) , J USTIN ROPER TransparentNevada
rmc chief marshal justin roper 2010 base pay 109K.htm (3.3 KB) , motion to set aside RMC 11 CR 22176 faxed 2 22
12 - Copy.pdf (196.5 KB) , Pages from mary barker rmc 11 tr 26800 order denying motion for return of bond -
Copy.pdf (508.2 KB) , cr11-2064 motion for extension fo tiem.pdf (133.2 KB) , CR11-2064-2676094 (Opposition to
Mtn ...).pdf (167.7 KB) , CR11-2064-2682479 (Supplemental ...).pdf (149.7 KB) , CR11-2064-2682487 (Supplemental
...).pdf (75.3 KB) , ex 44 pages all emails to renomunirecords@reno.gov from ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com.pdf (288.8
KB) , Motion_for_Continuance_to_Reno_City_Atty_Roberts_RMC.pdf (448.9 KB) , 2 24 20 fax to rmc regarding
deficiency in record on appeal.pdf (55.6 KB) , 3 19 12 fax to reno marshal division.pdf (193.0 KB) , chief marshal
justin roper roperj@reno.gov emails.pdf (155.9 KB) , complaint or grievance by J udge Dorothy Nash Holmes against
Reno attorney Coughlin with State Bar of Nevada 3 14 12.pdf (737.8 KB) , WCSO Beckman, Debi Campbell,
Cummings, Hodge Statements on property sezied from Reno Attorney by Reno Munic Court J udge Nash Holmes.pdf
(150.3 KB)
Dear City of Reno,
Please place a copy of this in Marshal Coppa's and the other Marshal who transported me to jail on 2/27/12's
employment/personnel file as he was the one who went into a backroom of the "Sally Bay" at the jail after
whispering in the WCSO Deputy Cheung's ear. Please ask him about the bag with the micro sd card, the
various contradictory statements made by RMC staff, Reno Marshals, and WCSO staff with respect to the
chain of custody of the seized property, with particular attention focused on Marshal Harley's statements
concerning any micro sd card, Debi Campbell's assertions in that regard, what Pam Willmore heard WCSO
Deputy Hodge admit with respect to the WCSO retention of the micro sd and other property, comparing that
with any recordigns of that conversation that may exist, and further referencing the statements of Ms.
Campbell, Cummings, and Beckman, while also reviewing any recordings made of telephone conversations
with WCSO Detention Facility Staff shortly after Coughlin was released from jail on
Please find new attachments herein including the emailed responses of WCSO agents Cummings, Debi
Campbell, and Trish Beckman.
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar
No: 9473
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: renodirect@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov; rcornlaw@150.reno.nv.us; stermitz@sbcglobal.net; office@bdjlaw.com;
defense@freeman-law.com
Subject: City of Reno Marshal Division hanging up phone on me, RMC seizing Reno Attorney's smart phone and cell phone etc. in
court after cross examing RPD on bribery and retaliation
Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2012 14:05:54 -0700
Dear City of Reno and Mr. J eanney,
I was told by the Washoe County Sheriff's Office to call the City of Reno Marshal's division to inquire about
the return of the personal property that was seized from me incident to a 2/27/12 arrest for summar contempt
during the traffic trial in 11 tr 26800 before J udge Nash Holmes. I called the number held out as the Marshals
Division contact number http://reno.gov/index.aspx?page=223
And a "Bill" answered the phone, was evasive, indicated he did not work for the Marshal's division, would
not give me any contact information for a Marshal, any Marshal, told me he wasn't going to answer me stupid
questions, and hung up on me.
I called back and I believe it was Marshal Harley who answered (though I am not sure) and he answere the
phone in an unprofessional manner, guessing as to my identity in some show of menace. Rather than tjust
answer the phone like a professional and provide me the number for Marshal Dayton, as I was requesting,
this individual refused to provide the number, answered the phone on a "gotcha" type way where there was
nothing to "gotcha", then hung up the phone on purpose after declaring that he would not give me Marshal
Dayton's number or take a message. Please place a copy of this correspondence/complaints in "Bill" of court
security for the Reno Munic Court, and Marshal Harley's file and follow up this grievance. I am available to
comment on this unprofessional conduct further. Please also find attached other recent complaints I have
submitted regarding the Marshal Division and place them in the individual's complained of
employment/personnel files. There will be no ability to allege a lack of knowledge of this conduct in any
future negligent hiring, training, and supervision lawsuit incident to any misconduct alleged. I a requesting
that a full scale investigation/inquiry be conducted pursuant to the various conflicting, and inconsistent
statement made with respect to the seized personal property (inlcuding my phones, etc.). You might want to
consider whether any Washoe County Sheriff's Deputies have made statements that will conflict with
anything the City of Reno may say from hear on out. Given problems associated with my recently being
adjudge a victim of domestic violence (my vulnerability in that regard made moreso by J udge Nash Holmes
seizing my cell phones and attempt to have my incomed reduced through jeopardizing my law license, etc.)
please correspond with my in writing only and only by email and or fax.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar
No: 9473
--Forwarded Message Attachment--
Detail page for J AMES MENZEL
Name J AMES MENZEL
Position
Marshal
Reno
Notice
The City of Reno failed to report the cost of employee health care benefits. Only the cost
of retirement benefits is included within the "Benefits" category for this jurisdiction.
Year 2009
Base Pay $60,609.42
Overtime and
Callback Collected
$622.67
Total Pay $63,750.96
Benefits Accumulated $22,425.49
Total Pay & Benefits $86,176.45
State Government: Salaries, CAFRS, Main Contracts Page, State Financial Documents
Education: CCSD Warrants, NSHE Budgets
Politicians: 2010 Transparency Survey, Congressional Disbursements
Connect: Facebook, Twitter
About Us: Contact Us, FAQ, Disclaimer
TransparentNevada is provided by the Nevada Policy Research Institute as a public service.
--Forwarded Message Attachment--
Detail page for J OEL HARLEY
Name J OEL HARLEY
Position
7821 - Marshal
Reno
Year 2010
Base Pay $85,323.07
Overtime and
Callback Collected
$6,755.56
Other Pay $478.65
Total Pay $92,557.28
Benefits AccumulatedN/A
Total Pay & Benefits $124,126.82
State Government: Salaries, CAFRS, Main Contracts Page, State Financial Documents
Education: CCSD Warrants, NSHE Budgets
Politicians: 2010 Transparency Survey, Congressional Disbursements
Connect: Facebook, Twitter
About Us: Contact Us, FAQ, Disclaimer
TransparentNevada is provided by the Nevada Policy Research Institute as a public service.
--Forwarded Message Attachment--
Detail page for J USTIN ROPER
Name J USTIN ROPER
Position
7819 Marshal Commander
Reno
Year 2010
Base Pay $107,914.00
Overtime and
Callback Collected
$0.00
Other Pay ($2,697.89)
Total Pay $105,216.11
Benefits AccumulatedN/A
Total Pay & Benefits $145,144.36
State Government: Salaries, CAFRS, Main Contracts Page, State Financial Documents
Education: CCSD Warrants, NSHE Budgets
Politicians: 2010 Transparency Survey, Congressional Disbursements
Connect: Facebook, Twitter
About Us: Contact Us, FAQ, Disclaimer
TransparentNevada is provided by the Nevada Policy Research Institute as a public service.
--Forwarded Message Attachment--
Detail page for J AMES MENZEL
Name J AMES MENZEL
Position
Marshal
Reno
Notice
The City of Reno failed to report the cost of employee health care benefits. Only the cost
of retirement benefits is included within the "Benefits" category for this jurisdiction.
Year 2009
Base Pay $60,609.42
Overtime and
Callback Collected
$622.67
Total Pay $63,750.96
Benefits Accumulated $22,425.49
Total Pay & Benefits $86,176.45
State Government: Salaries, CAFRS, Main Contracts Page, State Financial Documents
Education: CCSD Warrants, NSHE Budgets
Politicians: 2010 Transparency Survey, Congressional Disbursements
Connect: Facebook, Twitter
About Us: Contact Us, FAQ, Disclaimer
TransparentNevada is provided by the Nevada Policy Research Institute as a public service.
rpd sargent sifre loses Z coughlin's dog Jackson is gone voicemail from (775) 762-155 at !"27 #$
Zach %oughlin (&achcoughlin'hotmail(com) )*2*12
+o" renopd'coplogic(com, schult&t'cit-ofreno(com, kadlic.'reno(gov, renodirect'reno(gov,
cit-clerk'reno(gov, nvrenopd'coplogic(com, the/&'reno(gov, sifrep'reno(gov, ed'npri(org,
mar-0ark0ark'-ahoo(com, geofgiles'hotmail(com, carcoughster'gmail(com,
carl-(coughlincrc'gmail(com, melissa(l(ulloa'gmail(com, lori/'nv0ar(org
1utlook 2ctive 3ie/
4eno #olice 5epartment 6argent #aul 6ifre arrests 4eno 2ttorne- for misuse of 11
5ear %it- of 4eno 2nimal %ontrol, 6#%2, and 4eno #olice 5epartment, and 4eno %it- 2ttorne-'s
1ffice,
#lease help me find m- dog, and please place a cop- of this complaint in 4#5 6argent #aul 6ifre's
emplo-ment*personnel file( 2lso, dear cit- clerk, i /ould like a date to dispute all parking tickets or
traffic citations outstanding and 7 0elieve the parking ticket from 1*12*12 shoudl 0e rescinded given it
occured /hile i /as in custod- on the .a-/alking arrest 0- 4#5 6argent 6ifre, the one /ho .ust lost m-
dog, and /ho also arrested me for misues of 11 incident to a 1*1!*12 /herein i called to report further
domestic violence against me, including the m-sterious disappearance of m- dog and /here 6ifre made
sarcastic statements a0out me and m- dog(
t" Z coughlin's dog Jackson is gone8/d" 9e/ voicemail from (775) 762-155 at !"27 #$
7 received a call from someone claiming the found Jackson, 0ut that the- then took off his
collar*harness /hich had his dog tag on it /hich had m- phone num0er engraved in it 775 )): :11:(
+his )(5 -ear old #ekingnese has a micro chip identifier em0edded in it( #lease help me find him(
m- dog Jackson /as adopted from the spca /ith an adoption id of 1)1!2(
his microchip num0er of ;22261)1; /ith the dhpp of )*1;*11 and 00 of )*1;*11 he has all his
vaccinations and is a cream colored pekingnese /hose collar*harness /as removed 0- the people /ho
found them /hose phone num0er is included herein
7+he /a- the 4eno #5 treated the 11 call of )*27*12 and allo/ed m- dog, Jackson, to escape is
reminiscent of the 4#5 approach to situations /here 4ichard <( =ill, >s?( makes a report of some
criminal violation, in comparision to /hen someone reports a criminal violation 0- 4ichard <( =ill,
>s?( 6ome might sa- /hen =ill's files a report or signs a criminal complaint, the 4#5 treats it as a
@violation fo criminal la/, a police matter@, 0ut that /hen an-one points out =ill's attempts at eAtortion,
0ri0er-, a0use of process, larcen-, /ithholding one's state issued identification, per.ur-, etc(, etc(, the
4#5 simpl- /ashes their hands clean of the complainants re?uest, indicating, @sorr-, 0udd-, that's a
civil matter, -our remed- is /ith the courts(((@( 6o, /hen =ill /ants a +emporar- #rotection 1rder
against Zach %oughlin, 0ecause, gosh darn it, %oughlin is fimliming and collectding evidence of the
personal propert- that =ill's contractor, #hil 6te/art's cre/ is thro/ing a/a- from %oughlin's former
home la/ office, in anticipation of a /rongful eviction la/suit against =ill and his Beverl- =ill's =igh
6chool graduate %alifornia 9eurosurgeon landlord client, $att $erliss (no/ on appeal in %311-;)62:,
/herein Judge 8lanagan of 5epartment 7 recentl- denied one of =ill's @?uadruple .eopard-@ cheap
shots at %oughlin, 0- den-ing =ill's $otion for 1rder to 6ho/ %ause (no/ that .ust leaves the 0aseless
6tate Bar of 9evada grievance =ill filed on 0ehalf of individuals /hom are not even his clients,
/herein he cites unattri0uted hearsa- and for /hich he failed to attach an actual signature thereto, and
/hich consists chiefl- of innuendo and complaining that %oughlin dared to actuall- re?uest a fee
1*5
/aiver from the 5istrict %ourt to file a complaint, despite doing so 0eing an accepta0le practice as set
forth in statute in 946 12(;15)( 6o, /here %oughlins peacefull- filming on a side/alk, the 4#5
doesn't tell 4ichard =ill, >s?( that @its a civil matter, sorr- -our remed- is /ith the courts@, 0ut rather,
6argent #aul 6ifre orders a -oung trainee , 1fficer Ceed-, to /alk up to %oughlin unprovoked, gra0 the
video camera out of his hand prior to making an- sort of attempt to engage %oughlin or other/ise
eAplain /h- the 4#5 /ould 0e, in a matter of t/o seconds, appl-ing eAcessive force to %oughlin's 0ent
0ack /rists and o0structing .ustice 0- turning off his video camera despite %oughlin's eApress
insistance that 6argent #aul 6ifre refrain from doing so(
7ncidentall-, the 4#5 6argent /hom charged me /ith the @misuse of 11@ gross misdemeanor that 7 am
currentl- facing, plagued /tih the representation of one Bira- 5ogan in, actuall- managed to lose m-
dog on )*27*12, /hen 6argent 6ifre /as responding to a true instance of misuse of 11, /here Zach
%oughlin's @sister@ %arl- 9oel %oughlin, called 11 to report that $r( %oughlin had arrived at %arl-'s
house, /here she had invited him to drop of his pekingnese dog, Jackson #a/luck, if he ever /anted
$s( %oughlin's @friend@ to /atch Jackson again( $s( %oughlin indicated that @the peopel /ho /atched
him last time cried /hen 7 /ent to go get him, so 7 don't reall- /anna do this again@ despite her earlier
indication that she /ould( $s( %oughlin, gre/ anno-ed /ith $r( %oughlin's re?uest and renegged on
her offer to transport the dog to the disa0led /oman to /hom it 0rought so much .o-, and her daughter(
$r( %oughlin /alked 0ack to his car /ith his dog to leave, 0ut his car /as apparentl- to lo/ on gas to
start( $s( %oughlin continued to regale $r( %oughlin /ith her h-pocritical, saturnine approach to
human relations (this despite her /orking in the mental health care field, apparentl-, and perhaps, most
trou0ling)( $s( %oughlin threatened to call 11 if $r( %oughlin did not leave immediatel-, $r(
%oughlin said he /ould, asked /hat on earth she /ould 0e calling 11 a0out, and promptl- attempted
to start his car to leave( 7t /ould not, and $s( %oughlin drove off( $r( %oughlin, kno/ing full /ell that
his sister /ould in fact 0e calling 11, and that she /as /ell a/are of $r( %oughlin's recent trials and
tri0ulations /ith local la/ enforcement in light of $r( %oughlin's a0errant 0elief that people in this
count- actuall- do have rights and that /e do not live in a police state), and that she, in fact, sought to
further cause $r( %oughlin discord /ith la/ enforcement, somethign /hich should /ould, of course,
later @remiA@ as her @concern@ for his @/elfare@( 6argent 6ifre, /hom for some reason /as assigned to
ans/er this call 0- the 4#5, echoed these sentiments to $r( %oughlin and provided his professional
opinion that $s( %oughlin did @care so ver- deepl-@ a0out $r( %oughlin( 2pparentl-, this profound
concern /as also eAhi0ited in $s( %oughlin calling 11 a second time the night of )*27*12 /hen $r(
%oughlin returned some t/o hours laters to his vehicle, parked on Deele 6t(, on a pu0lic street, /ith a
gas can /ith half a gallon of gas, intending to place it in his care and drive of, hopefull- 0efore, once
again, 0eing a0used 0- local la/ enforcement, like 6argnet 6ifre, /hom /as laughing on 1*1!*12 /hen
he arrested %oughlin and charged him /ith a gross misdemeanor, @misuse of 11@( $s( %oughlin of
course sought to have $r( %oughlin arrested for nothing and to further involve $r( %oughlin /ith local
la/ enforcement, though that pro0a0l- has nothing to do /ith her various 0itter statements over the
-ears a0out ho/ 7t has not 0een found and ma- /ell 0e dead given the proAimit- of traffic and the
dog's ineAperience in dealing /ith it( =o/ 6argent 6ifre could possi0l- lecture $r( %oughlin for over
an hour, perhaps causing %oughlin to miss an electronic filing deadline in an important legal matter is
unclear, particularl- /here 6argent 6ifre admitted to %oughlin that $s( %oughlin admitted $r(
%oughlin did not touch her, harm her, or threaten her in an- /a-( =o/ it is that $s( %oughlin is not
guilt- of @misuse of 11@ /hereas $r( %oughlin /as su0.ect to a custodial arrest for the ver- same
charge, 0- the ver- same 4#5 6argent, #aul 6ifre, is .ust not ver- clear( (( 2n-/a-s, 6argent #aul 6ifre
had to admit to Zach %oughlin, on )*27*12, that he and his 4#5 associate had allo/ed $r( %oughlin's
dog Jackson, to escape from $s( %oughlins unlocked residence, /here $r( %oughlin had placed the
2*5
dog immediatel- 0efore attempting to go /alk to a gas station and get gas, given $r( %oughlin's
reasona0le 0elieve that if he left his dog in his parked car, outside $s( %oughlin's house, he /ould 0e
arrested 0- the 4#5 for @dog endangerment or neglect or animal cruelt-@((((2ma&ingl-, even after
letting $r( %oughlin's dog escape from $s( %oughlin's house, and perhaps 0e hit 0- a car, 6argent 6ifre
still sa/ fit to lecture $r( %oughlin and point out the 0enevolence of the police state 6argent 6ifre and
those like him currentl- have in place in Eashoe %ount- and the %it- of 4eno( But, 4#5 6argent 6ifre
/as sure to point out to attorne- %oughlin ho/ ver- profoundl- deep 5r( %oughlin and %arl- 9(
%oughlin's concern /as for attorne- %oughlin( =o/ever, their concern is apparentl- not so significant
as to allo/, sa-, attorne- to store a plastic gar0age 0ag full of eApensive suits under 5r( %oughlin's
%aughlin 4anch home, /hich has 5 empt- 0edrooms and a @mudroom@ the si&e of an aircraft hanger
under the home for storing things( 2fter the 0ag of suits 0eing 0eneath 5r( %oughlin's home for
approAimatel- a /eek the- out/ore their /elcome, prompting 5r( %oughlin and his /ife, $onica
$orelli %oughlin to in?uire as to /hen attorne- %oughlin might 0e a0le to remove such 0ag from the
@mudroom@ underneath their home, /hich, again, has 5 empt- 0edrooms( 5r( %oughlin previousl-
telephone the 5ean of the F9C3 Bo-d 6chool of la/ to defame his son, /hereupon 5ean 4ichard
$organ, ever the risk minimi&er middle managing, 0usiness attorne-, cutthroat, educator that is he,
promptl- called up the 6tate Bar to report as much( 2nd /ould %arl- 9oel %oughlin 0e alright /ith
allo/ing her 0rother, attorne- %oughlin to store, sa-, a guitar or a 0oA of papers at her home for a little
/hileG 1f course she /ouldn't( +hough, $iss %arl- sure /ill put on a sho/ of @concern@ for 6argent
6ifre /hen he sho/s up, t/ice(((((1h, 0ut ho/ ver- much the- /ant to @help@( Just onl- /ith
ps-cho0a00le and fauA concern and self serving po/er hungr-, manipulative ego trips, rather than an-
discerni0le, tangi0le 0enefit to the tasks at hand( 5r( %oughlin is 4eno %it- 2ttorne- John Dadlic's
personal ph-sician, and Dadlic is godfather to the daugther 5r( %oughlin had /ith $onica $orelli
%oughlin, of $orelli v( $orelli fame"
http"**///(leagle(com*Aml4esult(aspAG
AmldocH1:61!2!72;#2d7;!I11!1(AmlJdoc0aseH%6CE242-1:6-2;;6
7n $orelli v( $orelli, 9evada's first 7talian 9eurosurgeon /as sued 0- his no/ attorne- 1: -ear old
daugther for the cost of her college and la/ school tuition, /hich /as eApressl- set forth as a
stipulation in the marital settlement agreement in that matter( +he daughter /as a/arded the tution and
father and daughter never spoke again during 5r( $orelli's lifetime, some 2; more -ears(
7ronicall-, the @misuse of 11@ charged stemmed from m- calling a0out the m-sterious and menacing
disappearance of m- dog (/hom 7 appeared /ith in the 5ecem0er 2;12 issue of the 9evada Ca/-er),
/hich occured in the conteAt of a continuous 0arrage of domestic violence to /hich 7 /as eAposed,
thorugh the first siA /eeks of 2;12, 0- the actions of m- then housemates, and for /hich 7 attempted to
o0tain protection or .ustice from 0- contacting the 4#5, including 6argent Zach +he/ (allegedl-, 7 /as
arrested /hile allegedl- attempting to contact 6argent +he/, in accordance /ith 6argent +he/'s
eApress instructions that 7 do so
http"**///(-outu0e(com*/atchGvHoF)tIk44;42
)*5
((((/hich Bira- 5ogan kno/s, 0ut for /hich $r( 5ogan has refused to file an- $otion to 5ismiss or
other action on m- 0ehalf, rather, $r( 5ogan seeks to retaliate against me and to em0arass me /ith -et
another retaliator- @competenc-@ evaluation, despite the fact that 7 passed, /ith fl-ing colors, the one
administered 0- Ci00- =ei.ne after 5eput- Eashoe %ount- #u0lic 5efendenr %ar- =-lin ordered one
(su0se?uent filings 0- the E%#5 indicated that a @hearing@ took place /herein such an evaluation /as
re?uested 0- =-lin and orderd 0- Judge Jack 6chroeder, -et no such @hearing@ took place)K
4#5 6argent 6ifre (/hom actuall- makes more mone- through his pu0lic emplo-ment than most
5istrict %ourt Judges) arrested me another time, making it t/ice in t/o da-s, on Januar- 12th, 2;12 for
@.a-/alking, then he o0structed .ustice 0- turning off m- video camera /hile 4#5 1fficer Cook and
1fficer Ceed- /ere using eAcessive force (completel- out of the 0lue and /ith &ero .ustification for
doing so, as evinced 0- the video itself) on me(
http"**///(-outu0e(com*/atchGvHgBu&fl<2C>JfeatureHrelated
5eput- 5istrict 2ttorne- Zach 9ifong, er, Zach Loung, >s?(, has 0een eAtremel- resistant to an- sort of
plea 0argaining in either case, as he has 0een in the matter for /hich 5eput- #u0lic 5efender Joe
<oodnight, >s?( is @representing@ me as m- @attorne-@( +hat matter 4%4 also included police
misconduct 0- the 4eno #olice 5epartment, 0- 1fficers 4on 4osa and 9ick 5uralde( Ehere /ould
4eno attorne- Zach %oughlin, >s?( 0e if there /as not video tape of all of this police misconductG
http"**///(-outu0e(com*/atchGvH5#47?!1750;JfeatureHrelated
5espite having this video, 52 Zach Loung retaliated against %oughlin for %oughlin's filing a 94%# 11
$otion against 0oth <oodnight and Loung 0- amending the criminal complaint to overcharge some
more( 9o, rather 52 Zach Loung and the 4#5 see the /itness tampering and attempts to dissuade
9icole Eatson from offering an- insight into the /rongful arrest of :*2;*12 0- 9icholas 5uradle as @a
civil matter@, not a @criminal one@( =eck, the 4#5 doesn't even see 0atter-, assault, aggravated assault,
or domestic violence as @criminal in nature@ /hen these things happen to pesk- 8irst 2mendment
attorne- Zachar- Barker %oughlin, >s?(, (((no, rather, those are matters of a @civil nature@ and
%oughlin's @remed- is /ith the court's@, so sa-eth 4#5 1fficer 6tace- <ardner, 6argent $onica Cope&,
1fficer $c?uattr-, 1fficer Cook and Ceed- and 5elvecchio, 1fficer Earren, etc(, etc(,
7ncidentall-, it /ould 0e helpful if an entit- like Eashoe Cegal 6ervices took an aggresive approach to
advocating on 0ehalf of tenants'(((((Eashoe Cegal 6ervices >Aecutive 5irector #aul >lcano has
reportedl- call 5r( %oughlin in an attempt to influence attorne- %oughlin to close the case %oughlin
has against EC6 for /rongful termination(
!*5
7ts a good thing 9evada has so man- 0rave 8irst 2mendment attorne-'s like J$ 5evo- and his
associate $arc 4anda&&a, neither of /hom have an- association /ith $r( %oughlin( 7, $r( %oughlin
am a/are that it is slightl- a/k/ard to /rite this s/itching 0et/een the first and third person, ho/ever,
the eAigencies and economics of solo la/ practice /ere at pla- in doing so(
2t least there isn't much of a societal cost to the legall- ?uestiona0le manner in /hich evictions are
decided and carried out in Eashoe %ount-"
http"**///(-outu0e(com*/atchGvHss>;8E=89>L
http"**///(-outu0e(com*/atchGvHD.<2a>.slr!
Zach %oughlin, >s?(, #1 B1M 6;52, 4>91, 93, :5;6, tel" 775 )): :11:, faA" ! 667 7!;2K
Zach%oughlin'hotmail(com 9evada Bar 9o" !7)
5ate" +hu, 2 $ar 2;12 1:"2"1: -;7;;
6u0.ect" Z coughlin's dog Jackson is gone8/d" 9e/ voicemail from (775) 762-155 at !"27 #$
+o"
---------- 8or/arded message ----------
8rom" <oogle 3oice Nvoice-norepl-'google(comO
5ate" +hu, $ar 2, 2;12 at !")1 #$
6u0.ect" 9e/ voicemail from (775) 762-155 at !"27 #$
3oicemail from" (775) 762-155 at !"27 #$
+ranscript not availa0le
#la- message
5*5
City of Reno Marshal Division hanging up phone on me, RMC seizing Reno
Attorney's smart phone and cell phone etc. in court after cross examing RPD
on bribery and retaliation
--Forwarded Message Attachment--
Detail page for J OEL HARLEY
Name J OEL HARLEY
Position
7821 - Marshal
Reno
Year 2010
Base Pay $85,323.07
Overtime and
Callback Collected
$6,755.56
Other Pay $478.65
Total Pay $92,557.28
Benefits AccumulatedN/A
Total Pay & Benefits $124,126.82
State Government: Salaries, CAFRS, Main Contracts Page, State Financial Documents
Education: CCSD Warrants, NSHE Budgets
Politicians: 2010 Transparency Survey, Congressional Disbursements
Connect: Facebook, Twitter
About Us: Contact Us, FAQ, Disclaimer
TransparentNevada is provided by the Nevada Policy Research Institute as a public service.
--Forwarded Message Attachment--
Detail page for J USTIN ROPER
Name J USTIN ROPER
Position
7819 Marshal Commander
Reno
Year 2010
Base Pay $107,914.00
Overtime and
Callback Collected
$0.00
Other Pay ($2,697.89)
Total Pay $105,216.11
Benefits AccumulatedN/A
Total Pay & Benefits $145,144.36
State Government: Salaries, CAFRS, Main Contracts Page, State Financial Documents
Education: CCSD Warrants, NSHE Budgets
Politicians: 2010 Transparency Survey, Congressional Disbursements
Connect: Facebook, Twitter
About Us: Contact Us, FAQ, Disclaimer
TransparentNevada is provided by the Nevada Policy Research Institute as a public service.
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Thu 3/29/12 2:05 PM
To: renodirect@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov; rcornlaw@150.reno.nv.us; stermitz@sbcglobal.net; office@bdjlaw.com;
defense@freeman-law.com
19 attachments
11 TR 26800 NOTICE OF APPEAL AND MOTIONS 3 7 12 WITH EXHIBIT 1 ATTACHED.pdf (2.6 MB) , 2 24 20 fax to
rmc regarding deficiency in record on appeal - Copy.pdf (55.6 KB) , 3 19 12 fas to rmc marshals regarding property
wcso - Copy.pdf (40.0 KB) , 3 26 12 fax to rmc regarding address emails and car sleeping allegations - Copy.pdf
(51.9 KB) , J AMES MENZEL TransparentNevada rmc marshal menzel 2009 does not include health benefits.htm (3.6
KB) , J OEL HARLEY TransparentNevada RMC Marshal Harley.htm (3.3 KB) , J USTIN ROPER TransparentNevada
rmc chief marshal justin roper 2010 base pay 109K.htm (3.3 KB) , motion to set aside RMC 11 CR 22176 faxed 2 22
12 - Copy.pdf (196.5 KB) , Pages from mary barker rmc 11 tr 26800 order denying motion for return of bond -
Copy.pdf (508.2 KB) , cr11-2064 motion for extension fo tiem.pdf (133.2 KB) , CR11-2064-2676094 (Opposition to
Mtn ...).pdf (167.7 KB) , CR11-2064-2682479 (Supplemental ...).pdf (149.7 KB) , CR11-2064-2682487 (Supplemental
...).pdf (75.3 KB) , ex 44 pages all emails to renomunirecords@reno.gov from ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com.pdf (288.8
KB) , Motion_for_Continuance_to_Reno_City_Atty_Roberts_RMC.pdf (448.9 KB) , 2 24 20 fax to rmc regarding
deficiency in record on appeal.pdf (55.6 KB) , 3 19 12 fax to reno marshal division.pdf (193.0 KB) , chief marshal
justin roper roperj@reno.gov emails.pdf (155.9 KB) , complaint or grievance by J udge Dorothy Nash Holmes against
Reno attorney Coughlin with State Bar of Nevada 3 14 12.pdf (737.8 KB)
Dear City of Reno and Mr. J eanney,
I was told by the Washoe County Sheriff's Office to call the City of Reno Marshal's division to inquire about
the return of the personal property that was seized from me incident to a 2/27/12 arrest for summar contempt
during the traffic trial in 11 tr 26800 before J udge Nash Holmes. I called the number held out as the Marshals
Division contact number http://reno.gov/index.aspx?page=223
And a "Bill" answered the phone, was evasive, indicated he did not work for the Marshal's division, would
not give me any contact information for a Marshal, any Marshal, told me he wasn't going to answer me stupid
questions, and hung up on me.
I called back and I believe it was Marshal Harley who answered (though I am not sure) and he answere the
phone in an unprofessional manner, guessing as to my identity in some show of menace. Rather than tjust
answer the phone like a professional and provide me the number for Marshal Dayton, as I was requesting,
this individual refused to provide the number, answered the phone on a "gotcha" type way where there was
nothing to "gotcha", then hung up the phone on purpose after declaring that he would not give me Marshal
Dayton's number or take a message. Please place a copy of this correspondence/complaints in "Bill" of court
security for the Reno Munic Court, and Marshal Harley's file and follow up this grievance. I am available to
comment on this unprofessional conduct further. Please also find attached other recent complaints I have
submitted regarding the Marshal Division and place them in the individual's complained of
employment/personnel files. There will be no ability to allege a lack of knowledge of this conduct in any
future negligent hiring, training, and supervision lawsuit incident to any misconduct alleged. I a requesting
that a full scale investigation/inquiry be conducted pursuant to the various conflicting, and inconsistent
statement made with respect to the seized personal property (inlcuding my phones, etc.). You might want to
consider whether any Washoe County Sheriff's Deputies have made statements that will conflict with
anything the City of Reno may say from hear on out. Given problems associated with my recently being
adjudge a victim of domestic violence (my vulnerability in that regard made moreso by J udge Nash Holmes
seizing my cell phones and attempt to have my incomed reduced through jeopardizing my law license, etc.)
please correspond with my in writing only and only by email and or fax.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar
No: 9473
--Forwarded Message Attachment--
Detail page for J AMES MENZEL
Name J AMES MENZEL
Position
Marshal
Reno
Notice
The City of Reno failed to report the cost of employee health care benefits. Only the cost
of retirement benefits is included within the "Benefits" category for this jurisdiction.
Year 2009
Base Pay $60,609.42
Overtime and
Callback Collected
$622.67
Total Pay $63,750.96
Benefits Accumulated $22,425.49
Total Pay & Benefits $86,176.45
State Government: Salaries, CAFRS, Main Contracts Page, State Financial Documents
Education: CCSD Warrants, NSHE Budgets
Politicians: 2010 Transparency Survey, Congressional Disbursements
Connect: Facebook, Twitter
About Us: Contact Us, FAQ, Disclaimer
TransparentNevada is provided by the Nevada Policy Research Institute as a public service.
--Forwarded Message Attachment--
Detail page for J OEL HARLEY
Name J OEL HARLEY
Position
7821 - Marshal
Reno
Year 2010
Base Pay $85,323.07
Overtime and
Callback Collected
$6,755.56
Other Pay $478.65
Total Pay $92,557.28
Benefits AccumulatedN/A
Total Pay & Benefits $124,126.82
State Government: Salaries, CAFRS, Main Contracts Page, State Financial Documents
Education: CCSD Warrants, NSHE Budgets
Politicians: 2010 Transparency Survey, Congressional Disbursements
Connect: Facebook, Twitter
About Us: Contact Us, FAQ, Disclaimer
TransparentNevada is provided by the Nevada Policy Research Institute as a public service.
--Forwarded Message Attachment--
Detail page for J USTIN ROPER
Name J USTIN ROPER
i was evicted 3 15 12, i need a continuance
Position
7819 Marshal Commander
Reno
Year 2010
Base Pay $107,914.00
Overtime and
Callback Collected
$0.00
Other Pay ($2,697.89)
Total Pay $105,216.11
Benefits AccumulatedN/A
Total Pay & Benefits $145,144.36
State Government: Salaries, CAFRS, Main Contracts Page, State Financial Documents
Education: CCSD Warrants, NSHE Budgets
Politicians: 2010 Transparency Survey, Congressional Disbursements
Connect: Facebook, Twitter
About Us: Contact Us, FAQ, Disclaimer
TransparentNevada is provided by the Nevada Policy Research Institute as a public service.
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Mon 3/26/12 10:32 PM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net; stermitz@sbcglobal.net; jmd@randazza.com; jboles@callatg.com;
kristiemanning@yahoo.com; kadlicj@reno.gov
2 attachments
65-main.pdf (159.6 KB) , 65-1.pdf (248.3 KB)
Dear Mr. Loomis,
I was wrongfully evicted on 3 15 12, and I need a continuance in the criminal trespass matter that you set
overly quickly against my express wishes anyway. My ability to collect evidence necessary to my defense
and otherwise prepare has been adversely affected. Additionally, I don't feel as though you are performing in
an appropriate manner as defense counsel, but rather you seem stuck in your prosecutorial ways, too quick to
look for any excuse whatsoever to bury one's case, so I think you have forced a split here, which further
prejudices my case and augers towards a continuance. Please move for one immediately and copy me on my
entire file by email and fax please. Additionally, please seek clarification from the RMC as to whether I am
allowed to ever send an email to renomunicrecords@reno.gov. Please note, today, J udge Flanagan denied
Richard Hill's latest frivolous motion.
Did you know that Kevin Kelly, of the State Bar of Nevada's Character and Fitness Committee for at least the
last decade owns and runs the Spearmint Rhino strip club in Las Vegas:
http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2002/Mar-06-Wed-2002/news/18241452.html
I know I always like my three hour tours of heavy handed moralizing from someone who runs a monolithic
strip club in Las Vegas.
You are on the State Bar of Nevada's fee dispute committee, aren't you Mr. Loomis? Do you own any strip
clubs?
Mr. Loomis, which of the elements of the trespass charge RMC 8.10.040 do you feel are weakest
for Deputy City Attorney J ill Drake, whom I informed about the admission by Reno PD Officer
please note my new address, SOLACE PROGRAM REQUEST?
3/!/"
Reply ?
#a$% Co&'%l(n
To )do'an*was%oe$o&nty+&s, rw%omes*was%oe$o&nty+&s, ,)osler*was%oe$o&nty+&s,
sterm(t-*s)$'lo)al+net, .'*npr(+or', ed*npr(+or', ,md*randa--a+$om, m,r*randa--a+$om,
.adl($,*reno+'o/, .e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net, ,'oodn('%t*was%oe$o&nty+&s,
.stan$(l*was%oe$o&nty+&s, -yo&n'*da+was%oe$o&nty+&s, $arly+$o&'%l(n$r$*'ma(l+$om,
am*npr(+or', 'eo0'(les*%otma(l+$om, lor(w*n/)ar+or', e%e,ny*la.es+n/+'o/, (n0o*la.es+n/+'o/,
$o&'%l(n*ypl,+$om, r$ornlaw*"12+reno+n/+&s, /sane/ada*,&no+$om
3rom4
#a$% Co&'%l(n 5-a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om6
Sent4
7ed 3/!/" 1438 PM
To4
)do'an*was%oe$o&nty+&s9 rw%omes*was%oe$o&nty+&s9 ,)osler*was%oe$o&nty+&s9
sterm(t-*s)$'lo)al+net9 .'*npr(+or'9 ed*npr(+or'9 ,md*randa--a+$om9 m,r*randa--a+$om9
.adl($,*reno+'o/9 .e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net9 ,'oodn('%t*was%oe$o&nty+&s9
.stan$(l*was%oe$o&nty+&s9 -yo&n'*da+was%oe$o&nty+&s9 $arly+$o&'%l(n$r$*'ma(l+$om9
am*npr(+or'9 'eo0'(les*%otma(l+$om9 lor(w*n/)ar+or'9 e%e,ny*la.es+n/+'o/9 (n0o*la.es+n/+'o/9
$o&'%l(n*ypl,+$om9 r$ornlaw*"12+reno+n/+&s9 /sane/ada*,&no+$om
:otma(l A$t(/e ;(ew
" atta$%ments 5total <+3 M=6
>%tml?
>%ead?
>t(tle?Report 'enerated on 2"@"2@3 342!>/t(tle?
>/%ead?
>)ody?
>pre?
>)?A Ar$%(/e C4BPer0e$t 7orld Enterta(nmentBTemporary Cnternet
3(lesBContent+CE1BQTODAE<FBplease note my new address, SOLACE PROGRAM REQUEST+-(p>/)?
2"@"2@3 342< <2332 <2332 "" TR E!22 GOTCCE O3 APPEAL AGF MOTCOGS 3 <
" 7CT: EH:C=CT " ATTAC:EF+pd0
2"@"2@3 342< "I3!EI2 "I3!EI2 3 "E " 0aJ to w$so re e/($t(on par. terra$e %(ll et$
re/mar'(ns remo/ed+pd0
2"@"2@3 342< 13"8< 13"8< 3 E " 0aJ to rm$ re'ard(n' address ema(ls and $ar
sleep(n' alle'at(ons+pd0
2"@"2@3 342< 3<<<"2 3<<<"2 all ema(ls 0rom Patr($. K(n' =ar Co&nsel Ge/ada
Patr($.K*n/)ar+or'+pd0
2"@"2@3 342< ""E283" ""E283" Co&'%l(n wLeJ%()(tsL23"E" 3 "E " Letter 0rom =ar
Co&nsel Patr($. K(n' w(t% D&d'e Gas% :olmes 3ormal Compla(nt Atta$%ed+pd0
2"@"2@3 342< "<1<81 "<1<81 CR""@2E8@E<E2I8 5Oppos(t(on to Mtn +++6+pd0
2"@"2@3 342< "1<8 "1<8 CR""@2E8@E!8<I 5S&pplemental +++6+pd0
2"@"2@3 342< "33E1 "33E1 CR""@2E8@EI"3!E 5Open(n' =r(e06+pd0
2"@"2@3 342< "318E "318E CR""@2E8@EI"83" 5Mtn 0or EJtens(on o0 T(me6+pd0
2"@"2@3 342< E!3<3 E!3<3 C;""@23E! Co&'%l(n / Merl(ss 3 E 2" R($%ard G+ :(lMs
"/"
Mot(on 0or Order to S%ow Ca&se A'a(nst Co&'%l(n (s FEGCEF+pd0
2"@"2@3 342< 3E<12< 3E<12< C;""@23E!@EI2!"1 5Open(n' =r(e06+pd0
2"@"2@3 342< "8E318 "8E318 T:E "" " ema(l to 7CSO RPF Reno C(ty Attorney :(ll
GPUC :(ll et al+pd0
>)?A
A Total S(-e Pa$.ed 3(les
A <8"E1!2 <8"E1!2 "
>/)?>/pre?
>/)ody?
>/%tml?
C;""@23E+++pd0
Fownload5E!+1 K=6
Co&'%l(n +++pd0
Fownload5""E3+" K=6
Fownload all as -(p
Fear Fep&ty 7as%oe Co&nty P&)l($ Fe0ender =(ray Fo'an, EsN+, et al,
M&st C &se La.eMs Cross(n' 0or t%(s se$ond $ompeten$y e/al&at(on? Fo yo& %a/e some sort o0 0(nan$(al
arran'ment w(t% La.eMs Cross(n'? Please pro/(de a wr(tten answer as to w%om else C may &t(l(-e 0or
s&$% an e/al&at(on and t%e reN&(rements, $ert(0($at(ons, or standards, w%($% t%ey m&st meet (n order to
)e el('()el to per0orm s&$% an e/al&at(on+ Gonet%eless, C %a/e yet to re$e(/e anyt%(n' 0rom La.eMs
Cross(n', )&t C w(ll $all t%em now and $opy t%em on t%(s ema(l (n an attempt to $omply w(t% t%e
e/al&at(on reN&(rement+ Ms+ :e,ny o0 La.es Cross(n', C was a)le to $%e$. my /o($e ma(ls desp(te
0ormer pr(son warden or adm(n(strator RMC D&d'e Gas% :olmes s&mmar(ly se(-(n' my, an attorneyMs,
$ell&lar and smartp%one (n $o&rt on /</", and st(ll re0&s(n' to release t%em, desp(te :er :onor 0(l(n'
a 'r(e/an$e a'a(nst Co&'%l(n w(t% t%e State =ar o0 Ge/ada t%at ne'le$ts to ment(on t%at se(-&re at
all++++nonet%eless, a d(00($< to d(s$ern messa'e so&nd l(.e (t was 0rom a Fr+ =rown w(t% La.es
Cross(n'+++Ms+ :e,ny, wo&ld yo& 0orward t%(s on to %(m w(t% a messa'e t%at C am try(n' to meet %(m
and $omply w(t% all s$%ed&l(n' reN&(rements (mposed &pon me?
Please $opy me /(a ema(l and 0aJ on my ent(re 0(le+ T%e domest($ /(olen$e atta$.s a'a(nst me (n 3;"@
22"!! and 3;"@22"!< res<ed (n (nter0eren$e w(t% re$e(pt o0 my USPS ma(l+ C %a/e ta.en all
reasona)le steps to $o&ntera$t t%at, %owe/er, (n an a)&ndan$e o0 $a&t(on, C as. t%at yo& $opy me on
e/eryt%(n' /(a ema(l and 0aJ and %a/e La.es Cross(n' do so as well+ Add(t(onally, D&d'e Gas% :olmes
$on0(s$ated my p%ones on /</" and st(ll %as not released t%em or pro/(ded 5as 0ar as C .now6 any
(nd($at(on 0or %er )as(s 0or do(n' so, et$+
Mr+ Fo'an, please eJpla(n yo&r pos(t(on /(s a /(s yo&r m(ss(n' t%e Arra('nment (n my $ases, (n$l&d(n'
spe$(0($ re0eren$e to t%e approJ(mately I2 m(n&te meet(n' yo& and C %ad (n ad/an$e o0 t%at
arra('nment+ 3&rt%er, please pro/(de an (nd($at(on (n wr(t(n' as to w%y yo& 0elt t%(s more (n/as(/e,
more (n/ol/ed $ompeten$y e/al&at(on yo& mo/ed 0or was a reN&est )ased (n law or 0a$t, (n$l&d(n'
spe$(0($ deta(ls and do$&mentat(on (n s&pport t%ereo0+ O%, t%atMs r('%t, =(ray Fo'an and Doe Goodn('%t
o0 t%e 7CPF only )el(e/e t%at GRCP "" appl(es to $r(m(nal matters w%ere t%ey need to le/era'e (t as
an eJ$&se not to 0(le a Mot(on to F(sm(ss or some ot%er pre@tr(al mot(on++++Fo'an and Goodn('%tMs
pos(t(on on Ge/ada R&le o0 C(/(l Pro$ed&re "" (n a $r(m(nal $onteJt, t%o&'%, (n t%e $onteJt o0 0(l(n'
any Mot(on 0or San$t(ons a'a(nst Goodn('%tMs or'an($ 0ree trade $o00ee s%op )&ddy FA #a$% Oo&n' (s
t%at PGRCP "" does not apply (n a $r(m(nal $onteJtP+ Cts rem(n(s$ent o0 t%e RPF approa$% to s(t&at(ons
w%ere R($%ard G+ :(ll, EsN+ ma.es a report o0 some $r(m(nal /(olat(on, (n $ompar(s(on to w%en
someone reports a $r(m(nal /(olat(on )y R($%ard G+ :(ll, EsN+ Some m('%t say w%en :(llMs 0(les a report
or s('ns a $r(m(nal $ompla(nt, t%e RPF treats (t as a P/(olat(on 0o $r(m(nal law, a pol($e matterP, )&t t%at
/"
w%en anyone po(nts o&t :(llMs attempts at eJtort(on, )r()ery, a)&se o0 pro$ess, lar$eny, w(t%%old(n'
oneMs state (ss&ed (dent(0($at(on, per,&ry, et$+, et$+, t%e RPF s(mply was%es t%e(r %ands $lean o0 t%e
$ompla(nants reN&est, (nd($at(n', Psorry, )&ddy, t%atMs a $(/(l matter, yo&r remedy (s w(t% t%e $o&rts+++P+
So, w%en :(ll wants a Temporary Prote$t(on Order a'a(nst #a$% Co&'%l(n, )e$a&se, 'os% darn (t,
Co&'%l(n (s 0(ml(m(n' and $olle$td(n' e/(den$e o0 t%e personal property t%at :(llMs $ontra$tor, P%(l
StewartMs $rew (s t%row(n' away 0rom Co&'%l(nMs 0ormer %ome law o00($e, (n ant($(pat(on o0 a wron'0&l
e/($t(on laws&(t a'a(nst :(ll and %(s =e/erly :(llMs :('% S$%ool 'rad&ate Cal(0orn(a Ge&ros&r'eon
landlord $l(ent, Matt Merl(ss 5now on appeal (n C;""@23E!, w%ere(n D&d'e 3lana'an o0 Fepartment <
re$ently den(ed one o0 :(llMs PN&adr&ple ,eopardyP $%eap s%ots at Co&'%l(n, )y deny(n' :(llMs Mot(on
0or Order to S%ow Ca&se 5now t%at ,&st lea/es t%e )aseless State =ar o0 Ge/ada 'r(e/an$e :(ll 0(led on
)e%al0 o0 (nd(/(d&als w%om are not e/en %(s $l(ents, w%ere(n %e $(tes &nattr()&ted %earsay and 0or
w%($% %e 0a(led to atta$% an a$t&al s('nat&re t%ereto, and w%($% $ons(sts $%(e0ly o0 (nn&endo and
$ompla(n(n' t%at Co&'%l(n dared to a$t&ally reN&est a 0ee wa(/er 0rom t%e F(str($t Co&rt to 0(le a
$ompla(nt, desp(te do(n' so )e(n' an a$$epta)le pra$t($e as set 0ort% (n stat&te (n GRS "+2"16+ So,
w%ere Co&'%l(ns pea$e0&lly 0(lm(n' on a s(dewal., t%e RPF doesnMt tell R($%ard :(ll, EsN+ t%at P(ts a
$(/(l matter, sorry yo&r remedy (s w(t% t%e $o&rtsP, )&t rat%er, Sar'ent Pa&l S(0re orders a yo&n'
tra(nee , O00($er Leedy, to wal. &p to Co&'%l(n &npro/o.ed, 'ra) t%e /(deo $amera o&t o0 %(s %and pr(or
to ma.(n' any sort o0 attempt to en'a'e Co&'%l(n or ot%erw(se eJpla(n w%y t%e RPF wo&ld )e, (n a
matter o0 two se$onds, apply(n' eJ$ess(/e 0or$e to Co&'%l(nMs )ent )a$. wr(sts and o)str&$t(n' ,&st($e
)y t&rn(n' o00 %(s /(deo $amera desp(te Co&'%l(nMs eJpress (ns(stan$e t%at Sar'ent Pa&l S(0re re0ra(n
0rom do(n' so+
3&rt%er, please eJpla(n w%at eJa$tly yo& meant w%en yo& told me, a0ter we d(s$&ssed my pre/(o&s
wor. eJper(en$e at :ale Lane, t%at yo& $o&ld ne/er do $(/(l law (n t%e pr(/ate se$tor w%at w(t% all t%at
%ard wor. and t%e )(lla)le %o&rs reN&(rements )e(n' demand(n' o0 yo&r t(me and e00ort, and t%at yo&
0o&nd t%e p&)l($ de0ender l(0estyle m&$% more to yo&r l(.(n'+ Please also eJpla(n w%y yo& 0o&nd (t
ne$essary to po(nt o&t %ow )(tterly d(sappo(nted yo& were w(t% t%e la$. o0 d(/ers(ty (n RenoMs ,&d($(ary
and Reno (n 'eneral, and %ow m&$% yo& sympat%(-ed w(t% t%e pl('%t o0 poor D&d'e :oward 5w%om %as
ne/er de0eated anyone (n an ele$t(on desp(te )e(n' on t%e )en$% s(n$e "II!6 (n %a/(n' to deal w(t% me
(n "" $r "<E, w%ere(n %e senten$ed Reno attorney Co&'%l(n to 3 days (n ,a(l 0or a 0(nd(n' o0 s&mmary
$ontempt &nder GRS +2"2 0or -ealo&sly ad/o$at(n' on )e%al0 o0 a de0endant (n a $r(m(nal matter
w%ere pol($e m(s$ond&$t was alle'ed+ Mr+ =osler, C am %ere)y reN&est(n' t%at a $opy o0 t%(s and all
ot%er $orresponden$es )etween =(ray Fo'an and mysel0 and my $omplete 0(le (n t%e matter 0or w%($%
Mr+ Fo'an (s represent(n' me )e pla$ed (n Mr+ Fo'anMs 0(le and t%at a 0ormal $ompla(nt (n/est('at(on
a'a(nst Mr+ Fo'an 0or %(s ne'l('en$e (n represent(n' me so 0ar and %(s retal(atory approa$% 5%a/(n' a
psy$%e e/al&at(on ordered t%at (s d(splayed on t%e www+$$was%oe+$om $o&rt$onne$t do$.et (n $lose
proJ(m(ty to my $ompla(n(n' o0 Mr+ Fo'anMs 0a(l&re to appear at my arra(n'ment and %(s N&est(ona)le
statements to me, as well as t%e pra$t($e %e and Fep&ty PF Doe Goodn('%t attempted to employe
pre/(o&sly were t%ey (ns(sted &pon tal.(n' to me on t%e p%one as a pa(r, (n a s&rpr(se approa$% manner+
Cn$(dentally, t%e RPF Sar'ent w%om $%ar'ed me w(t% t%e Pm(s&se o0 I""P 'ross m(sdemeanor t%at C am
$&rrently 0a$(n', pla'&ed wt(% t%e representat(on o0 one =(ray Fo'an (n, a$t&ally mana'ed to lose my
do' last n('%t, w%en Sar'ent S(0re was respond(n' to a tr&e (nstan$e o0 m(s&es o0 I"", w%ere #a$%
Co&'%l(nMs Ps(sterP Carly Goel Co&'%l(n, $alled I"" to report t%at Mr+ Co&'%l(n %ad arr(/ed at CarlyMs
%o&se, w%ere s%e %ad (n/(ted %(m to drop o0 %(s pe.(n'nese do', Da$.son Pawl&$., (0 %e e/er wanted
Ms+ Co&'%l(nMs P0r(endP to wat$% Da$.son a'a(n+ Ms+ Co&'%l(n (nd($ated t%at Pt%e peopel w%o wat$%ed
%(m last t(me $r(ed w%en C went to 'o 'et %(m, so C donMt really wanna do t%(s a'a(nP desp(te %er earl(er
(nd($at(on t%at s%e wo&ld+ Ms+ Co&'%l(n, 'rew annoyed w(t% Mr+ Co&'%l(nMs reN&est and rene''ed on
%er o00er to transport t%e do' to t%e d(sa)led woman to w%om (t )ro&'%t so m&$% ,oy, and %er da&'%ter+
3/"
Mr+ Co&'%l(n wal.ed )a$. to %(s $ar w(t% %(s do' to lea/e, )&t %(s $ar was apparently to low on 'as to
start+ Ms+ Co&'%l(n $ont(n&ed to re'ale Mr+ Co&'%l(n w(t% %er %ypo$r(t($al, sat&rn(ne approa$% to
%&man relat(ons 5t%(s desp(te %er wor.(n' (n t%e mental %ealt% $are 0(eld, apparently, and per%aps, most
tro&)l(n'6+ Ms+ Co&'%l(n t%reatened to $all I"" (0 Mr+ Co&'%l(n d(d not lea/e (mmed(ately, Mr+
Co&'%l(n sa(d %e wo&ld, as.ed w%at on eart% s%e wo&ld )e $all(n' I"" a)o&t, and promptly attempted
to start %(s $ar to lea/e+ Ct wo&ld not, and Ms+ Co&'%l(n dro/e o00+ Mr+ Co&'%l(n, .now(n' 0&ll well t%at
%(s s(ster wo&ld (n 0a$t )e $all(n' I"", and t%at s%e was well aware o0 Mr+ Co&'%l(nMs re$ent tr(als and
tr()&lat(ons w(t% lo$al law en0or$ement (n l('%t o0 Mr+ Co&'%l(nMs a)errant )el(e0 t%at people (n t%(s
$o&nty a$t&ally do %a/e r('%ts and t%at we do not l(/e (n a pol($e state6, and t%at s%e, (n 0a$t, so&'%t to
0&rt%er $a&se Mr+ Co&'%l(n d(s$ord w(t% law en0or$ement, somet%('n w%($% s%o&ld wo&ld, o0 $o&rse,
later Prem(JP as %er P$on$ernP 0or %(s Pwel0areP+ Sar'ent S(0re, w%om 0or some reason was ass('ned to
answer t%(s $all )y t%e RPF, e$%oed t%ese sent(ments to Mr+ Co&'%l(n and pro/(ded %(s pro0ess(onal
op(n(on t%at Ms+ Co&'%l(n d(d P$are so /ery deeplyP a)o&t Mr+ Co&'%l(n+ Apparently, t%(s pro0o&nd
$on$ern was also eJ%()(ted (n Ms+ Co&'%l(n $all(n' I"" a se$ond t(me t%e n('%t o0 3/</" w%en Mr+
Co&'%l(n ret&rned some two %o&rs laters to %(s /e%($le, par.ed on Keele St+, on a p&)l($ street, w(t% a
'as $an w(t% %al0 a 'allon o0 'as, (ntend(n' to pla$e (t (n %(s $are and dr(/e o0, %ope0&lly )e0ore, on$e
a'a(n, )e(n' a)&sed )y lo$al law en0or$ement, l(.e Sar'net S(0re, w%om was la&'%(n' on "/"8/" w%en
%e arrested Co&'%l(n and $%ar'ed %(m w(t% a 'ross m(sdemeanor, Pm(s&se o0 I""P+ Ms+ Co&'%l(n o0
$o&rse so&'%t to %a/e Mr+ Co&'%l(n arrested 0or not%(n' and to 0&rt%er (n/ol/e Mr+ Co&'%l(n w(t% lo$al
law en0or$ement, t%o&'% t%at pro)a)ly %as not%(n' to do w(t% %er /ar(o&s )(tter statements o/er t%e
years a)o&t %ow Ct %as not )een 0o&nd and may well )e dead '(/en t%e proJ(m(ty o0 tra00($ and t%e
do'Ms (neJper(en$e (n deal(n' w(t% (t+ :ow Sar'ent S(0re $o&ld poss()ly le$t&re Mr+ Co&'%l(n 0or o/er
an %o&r, per%aps $a&s(n' Co&'%l(n to m(ss an ele$tron($ 0(l(n' deadl(ne (n an (mportant le'al matter (s
&n$lear, part($&larly w%ere Sar'ent S(0re adm(tted to Co&'%l(n t%at Ms+ Co&'%l(n adm(tted Mr+
Co&'%l(n d(d not to&$% %er, %arm %er, or t%reaten %er (n any way+ :ow (t (s t%at Ms+ Co&'%l(n (s not
'&(lty o0 Pm(s&se o0 I""P w%ereas Mr+ Co&'%l(n was s&),e$t to a $&stod(al arrest 0or t%e /ery same
$%ar'e, )y t%e /ery same RPF Sar'ent, Pa&l S(0re, (s ,&st not /ery $lear+ =&t, one s%o&ldnMt %old oneMs
)reat% wa(t(n' 0or any sort o0 -ealo&s ad/o$a$y )y one =(ray Fo'an, Fep&ty 7as%oe Co&nty P&)l($
Fe0ender, or any 'reat eJ%()(t(on o0 restra(nt )y Fep&ty F(str($t Attorney #a$% Oo&n'+ Mr+ Co&'%l(n
was a)le to 0(nally lea/e and $ont(n&e w(t% %(s le'al wor. w%en lo$al PD&d'e 7%(spererP Fr+ T(mot%y
F+ Co&'%l(n, MF arr(/ed w(t% a 'as $an at t%e s$ene and pla$e a 'allon o0 'as (n Mr+ Co&'%l(nMs
/e%($le+ T%at represented t%e 0(rst eJpend(t&re )y Fr+ Co&'%l(n towards P%elp(n'P %(s son t%at was not
$ond(t(oned &pon some )(-arre, M&n$%a&sen )y ProJy, Power and Control 7%eel 5F&l&t% Model6
em)ody(n' p%ys($(an $ontrol 0rea./lawyer en/y (ns(sten$e t%at Mr+ Co&'%l(n )e s&),e$t to some
eJper(emental treatment t%at Fr+ Co&'%l(n 0o&nd reN&(red '(/en Fr+ Co&'%l(nMs )el(e0 %(s son, Reno
Attorney (s a00l($ted w(t% a $ond(t(on w%ere(n a PdemonP res(des (ns(de o0 %(s son+ Fr+ Co&'%l(n le0t %(s
son, Reno Attorney #a$% Co&'%l(n as /o($e ma(l (n t%e last year w%ere(n %e state to %(s son, PC tr&ly
)el(e/e yo& %a/e a demon (ns(de o0 yo& P w%ere&pon Fr+ Co&'%l(n demanded &pon some sort o0
)a$.woods eJor$(sm )e(n' per0ormed &pon attorney Co&'%l(n, w%om re'&larly re0ers to %(s 0at%er as
PT(mP or PFr+ Co&'%l(nP, )&t only /ery rarely, anymore, as PFadP+ Fr+ Co&'%l(n (s re0erred to )y some
as t%e PD&d'e 7%(spererP '(/en %(s stat&s as t%e p%ys($(an o0 $%o($e to &t(l(-e (n t%e s%ame )ased
sled'%ammer role d&r(n' (nter/ent(ons w(t% mem)ers o0 t%e Ge/ada D&d($(ary w%om alle'edly %a/e
s&)stan$e a)&se pro)lems+++ And (ts not &n%eard o0 0or mem)ers o0 t%e ,&d($(ary to approa$% attorney
#a$% Co&'%l(n and as. w%ere t%ey may 0(nd Fr+ Co&'%l(n, as t%ey wo&ld l(.e to p&n$% %(m sN&are (n
t%e mo&t%+ Anyways, Sar'ent Pa&l S(0re %ad to adm(t to #a$% Co&'%l(n, on 3/</", t%at %e and %(s
RPF asso$(ate %ad allowed Mr+ Co&'%l(nMs do' Da$.son, to es$ape 0rom Ms+ Co&'%l(ns &nlo$.ed
res(den$e, w%ere Mr+ Co&'%l(n %ad pla$ed t%e do' (mmed(ately )e0ore attempt(n' to 'o wal. to a 'as
8/"
stat(on and 'et 'as, '(/en Mr+ Co&'%l(nMs reasona)le )el(e/e t%at (0 %e le0t %(s do' (n %(s par.ed $ar,
o&ts(de Ms+ Co&'%l(nMs %o&se, %e wo&ld )e arrested )y t%e RPF 0or Pdo' endan'erment or ne'le$t or
an(mal $r&eltyP++++Ama-(n'ly, e/en a0ter lett(n' Mr+ Co&'%l(nMs do' es$ape 0rom Ms+ Co&'%l(nMs %o&se,
and per%aps )e %(t )y a $ar, Sar'ent S(0re st(ll saw 0(t to le$t&re Mr+ Co&'%l(n and po(nt o&t t%e
)ene/olen$e o0 t%e pol($e state Sar'ent S(0re and t%ose l(.e %(m $&rrently %a/e (n pla$e (n 7as%oe
Co&nty and t%e C(ty o0 Reno+ =&t, RPF Sar'ent S(0re was s&re to po(nt o&t to attorney Co&'%l(n %ow
/ery pro0o&ndly deep Fr+ Co&'%l(n and Carly G+ Co&'%l(nMs $on$ern was 0or attorney Co&'%l(n+
:owe/er, t%e(r $on$ern (s apparently not so s('n(0($ant as to allow, say, attorney to store a plast($
'ar)a'e )a' 0&ll o0 eJpens(/e s&(ts &nder Fr+ Co&'%l(nMs Ca&'%l(n Ran$% %ome, w%($% %as 1 empty
)edrooms and a Pm&droomP t%e s(-e o0 an a(r$ra0t %an'er &nder t%e %ome 0or stor(n' t%(n's+ A0ter t%e
)a' o0 s&(ts )e(n' )eneat% Fr+ Co&'%l(nMs %ome 0or approJ(mately a wee. t%ey o&twore t%e(r wel$ome,
prompt(n' Fr+ Co&'%l(n and %(s w(0e, Mon($a Morell( Co&'%l(n to (nN&(re as to w%en attorney
Co&'%l(n m('%t )e a)le to remo/e s&$% )a' 0rom t%e Pm&droomP &nderneat% t%e(r %ome, w%($%, a'a(n,
%as 1 empty )edrooms+ Fr+ Co&'%l(n pre/(o&sly telep%one t%e Fean o0 t%e UGL; =oyd S$%ool o0 law
to de0ame %(s son, w%ere&pon Fean R($%ard Mor'an, e/er t%e r(s. m(n(m(-er m(ddle mana'(n',
)&s(ness attorney, $&tt%roat, ed&$ator t%at (s %e, promptly $alled &p t%e State =ar to report as m&$%+
And wo&ld Carly Goel Co&'%l(n )e alr('%t w(t% allow(n' %er )rot%er, attorney Co&'%l(n to store, say, a
'&(tar or a )oJ o0 papers at %er %ome 0or a l(ttle w%(le? O0 $o&rse s%e wo&ldnMt+ T%o&'%, M(ss Carly
s&re w(ll p&t on a s%ow o0 P$on$ernP 0or Sar'ent S(0re w%en %e s%ows &p, tw($e+++++O%, )&t %ow /ery
m&$% t%ey want to P%elpP+ D&st only w(t% psy$%o)a))le and 0a&J $on$ern and sel0 ser/(n' power
%&n'ry, man(p&lat(/e e'o tr(ps, rat%er t%an any d(s$ern()le, tan'()le )ene0(t to t%e tas.s at %and+ Fr+
Co&'%l(n (s Reno C(ty Attorney Do%n Kadl($Ms personal p%ys($(an, and Kadl($ (s 'od0at%er to t%e
da&'t%er Fr+ Co&'%l(n %ad w(t% Mon($a Morell( Co&'%l(n, o0 Morell( /+ Morell( 0ame4
%ttp4//www+lea'le+$om/JmlRes<+aspJ?
Jmldo$Q"I!E"88<2Pd<28L""8"I+JmlRdo$)aseQCSL7AR@"I!E@22E
Cn Morell( /+ Morell(, Ge/adaMs 0(rst Ctal(an Ge&ros&r'eon was s&ed )y %(s now attorney "! year old
da&'t%er 0or t%e $ost o0 %er $olle'e and law s$%ool t&(t(on, w%($% was eJpressly set 0ort% as a
st(p&lat(on (n t%e mar(tal settlement a'reement (n t%at matter+ T%e da&'%ter was awarded t%e t&t(on and
0at%er and da&'%ter ne/er spo.e a'a(n d&r(n' Fr+ Morell(Ms l(0et(me, some 2 more years+
Cron($ally, t%e Pm(s&se o0 I""P $%ar'ed stemmed 0rom my $all(n' a)o&t t%e myster(o&s and mena$(n'
d(sappearan$e o0 my do' 5w%om C appeared w(t% (n t%e Fe$em)er 2" (ss&e o0 t%e Ge/ada Lawyer6,
w%($% o$$&red (n t%e $onteJt o0 a $ont(n&o&s )arra'e o0 domest($ /(olen$e to w%($% C was eJposed,
t%or&'% t%e 0(rst s(J wee.s o0 2", )y t%e a$t(ons o0 my t%en %o&semates, and 0or w%($% C attempted to
o)ta(n prote$t(on or ,&st($e 0rom )y $onta$t(n' t%e RPF, (n$l&d(n' Sar'ent #a$% T%ew 5alle'edly, C was
arrested w%(le alle'edly attempt(n' to $onta$t Sar'ent T%ew, (n a$$ordan$e w(t% Sar'ent T%ewMs
eJpress (nstr&$t(ons t%at C do so
%ttp4//www+yo&t&)e+$om/wat$%?/QoU3tL.RR2RA
++++w%($% =(ray Fo'an .nows, )&t 0or w%($% Mr+ Fo'an %as re0&sed to 0(le any Mot(on to F(sm(ss or
ot%er a$t(on on my )e%al0, rat%er, Mr+ Fo'an see.s to retal(ate a'a(nst me and to em)arass me w(t% yet
anot%er retal(atory P$ompeten$yP e/al&at(on, desp(te t%e 0a$t t%at C passed, w(t% 0ly(n' $olors, t%e one
adm(n(stered )y L())y :e(,ne a0ter Fep&ty 7as%oe Co&nty P&)l($ Fe0endenr Cary :yl(n ordered one
5s&)seN&ent 0(l(n's )y t%e 7CPF (nd($ated t%at a P%ear(n'P too. pla$e w%ere(n s&$% an e/al&at(on was
reN&ested )y :yl(n and orderd )y D&d'e Da$. S$%roeder, yet no s&$% P%ear(n'P too. pla$e69
RPF Sar'ent S(0re 5w%om a$t&ally ma.es more money t%ro&'% %(s p&)l($ employment t%an most
F(str($t Co&rt D&d'es6 arrested me anot%er t(me, ma.(n' (t tw($e (n two days, on Dan&ary "t%, 2" 0or
P,aywal.(n', t%en %e o)str&$ted ,&st($e )y t&rn(n' o00 my /(deo $amera w%(le RPF O00($er Loo. and
O00($er Leedy were &s(n' eJ$ess(/e 0or$e 5$ompletely o&t o0 t%e )l&e and w(t% -ero ,&st(0($at(on 0or
1/"
do(n' so, as e/(n$ed )y t%e /(deo (tsel06 on me+
%ttp4//www+yo&t&)e+$om/wat$%?/Q'=&I-0lGALER0eat&reQrelated
Fep&ty F(str($t Attorney #a$% G(0on', er, #a$% Oo&n', EsN+, %as )een eJtremely res(stant to any sort o0
plea )ar'a(n(n' (n e(t%er $ase, as %e %as )een (n t%e matter 0or w%($% Fep&ty P&)l($ Fe0ender Doe
Goodn('%t, EsN+ (s Prepresent(n'P me as my PattorneyP+ T%at matter RCR also (n$l&ded pol($e
m(s$ond&$t )y t%e Reno Pol($e Fepartment, )y O00($ers Ron Rosa and G($. F&ralde+ 7%ere wo&ld
Reno attorney #a$% Co&'%l(n, EsN+ )e (0 t%ere was not /(deo tape o0 all o0 t%(s pol($e m(s$ond&$t?
%ttp4//www+yo&t&)e+$om/wat$%?/Q1PR<N8OC1)2R0eat&reQrelated
Fesp(te %a/(n' t%(s /(deo, FA #a$% Oo&n' retal(ated a'a(nst Co&'%l(n 0or Co&'%l(nMs 0(l(n' a GRCP ""
Mot(on a'a(nst )ot% Goodn('%t and Oo&n' )y amend(n' t%e $r(m(nal $ompla(nt to o/er$%ar'e some
more+ Go, rat%er FA #a$% Oo&n' and t%e RPF see t%e w(tness tamper(n' and attempts to d(ss&ade
G($ole 7atson 0rom o00er(n' any (ns('%t (nto t%e wron'0&l arrest o0 !/2/" )y G($%olas F&radle as Pa
$(/(l matterP, not a P$r(m(nal oneP+ :e$., t%e RPF doesnMt e/en see )attery, assa<, a''ra/ated assa<,
or domest($ /(olen$e as P$r(m(nal (n nat&reP w%en t%ese t%(n's %appen to pes.y 3(rst Amendment
attorney #a$%ary =ar.er Co&'%l(n, EsN+, +++no, rat%er, t%ose are matters o0 a P$(/(l nat&reP and
Co&'%l(nMs Premedy (s w(t% t%e $o&rtMsP, so sayet% RPF O00($er Sta$ey Gardner, Sar'ent Mon($a Lope-,
O00($er M$N&attry, O00($er Loo. and Leedy and Fel/e$$%(o, O00($er 7arren, et$+, et$+,
Cn$(dentally, (t wo&ld )e %elp0&l (0 an ent(ty l(.e 7as%oe Le'al Ser/($es too. an a''res(/e approa$% to
ad/o$at(n' on )e%al0 o0 tenantsM+++++7as%oe Le'al Ser/($es EJe$&t(/e F(re$tor Pa&l El$ano %as
reportedly $all Fr+ Co&'%l(n (n an attempt to (n0l&en$e attorney Co&'%l(n to $lose t%e $ase Co&'%l(n
%as a'a(nst 7LS 0or wron'0&l term(nat(on+
Cts a 'ood t%(n' Ge/ada %as so many )ra/e 3(rst Amendment attorneyMs l(.e DM Fe/oy and %(s
asso$(ate Mar$ Randa--a, ne(t%er o0 w%om %a/e any asso$(at(on w(t% Mr+ Co&'%l(n+ C, Mr+ Co&'%l(n
am aware t%at (t (s sl('%tly aw.ward to wr(te t%(s sw(t$%(n' )etween t%e 0(rst and t%(rd person, %owe/er,
t%e eJ('en$(es and e$onom($s o0 solo law pra$t($e were at play (n do(n' so+
At least t%ere (snMt m&$% o0 a so$(etal $ost to t%e le'ally N&est(ona)le manner (n w%($% e/($t(ons are
de$(ded and $arr(ed o&t (n 7as%oe Co&nty4
%ttp4//www+yo&t&)e+$om/wat$%?/QssE237:3GEO
%ttp4//www+yo&t&)e+$om/wat$%?/QK,GaE,slr8
7ell, Mr+ Loom(s, t%(n.s my ar'&ments a)o&t t%e (ns&00($(en$y o0 ser/($e o0 t%e S&mmary E/($t(on
OrderMs (s P0r(/olo&sP, )&t, %ey, %e (s ,&st 'ett(n' pa(d to -ealo&sly ad/o$ate on my )e%al0, so++++
And ,&st )e$a&se =ar Co&nsel Patr($. K(n', EsN+, 0eels t%e 're(/an$es C 0(led are not wort% p&rs&(n'
w%ereas t%ose 0(led )y R($%ard G+ :(ll, EsN+ are de0(nately wort%y o0 lots and lots o0 0ollow &p 5e/en
w%ere %e la$.s stand(n' to so 0(le or (s o00er(n' only &nattr()&ted %earsay (n s&pport o0 %(s $ontent(ons,
et$+6 does not mean =ar Co&nsel Patr($. K(n' (s a$t(n' as an atta$. do' 0or t%e r($%, t%at wo&ld not )e
an a$$&rate statement, (n all l(.el(%ood+
S(n$erely,
#a$% Co&'%l(n, EsN+, PO =OH E2I1, REGO, G;, !I12E, tel4 <<1 33! !""!, 0aJ4 I8I EE< <829
#a$%Co&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om Ge/ada =ar Go4 I8<3
Fear Mr+ Co&'%l(n4
T%(s messa'e (s sent to address (ss&es ra(sed (n t%e e@ma(l yo& sent on 3@E@"+
"+ Please note t%at yo& are 0ree to send t%e $omm&n($at(ons yo& send to me, to anyone else yo& des(re+
Oo& s%o&ld )e aware t%at send(n' yo&r $omm&n($at(ons to ot%er part(es w(ll $a&se yo&r
$omm&n($at(ons to me to lose t%e(r attorney@$l(ent $on0(dent(al(ty+
+ 3or w%at spe$(0($ p&rposes do yo& need a $ont(n&an$e? A $ont(n&an$e p&rely 0or t%e p&rpose o0
delay (s not a proper reason 0or a $ont(n&an$e+
3+ 7%et%er yo& are ent(tled to e@ma(l t%e Reno M&n($(pal Co&rt (s not my $on$ern+ T%at (s a pro)lem to
E/"
)e addressed )etween yo& and t%e Co&rt+
8+ Ms+ Fra.e (s no lon'er t%e attorney %andl(n' yo&r $ase 0or t%e Reno C(ty AttorneySs O00($e+ Oo&r
$ase (s now )e(n' %andled )y C%r(stop%er :a-lett@Ste/ens, EsN+
1+ Cn response to yo&r N&est(on re'ard(n' t%e wea.nesses o0 t%e trespass(n' $ase C o00er t%e 0ollow(n'4
a+ T%e $ompla(nt (s de0($(ent (n t%at (0 0a(ls to set 0ort% t%e elements o0 t%e $r(me o0 trespass+ Ct 0a(ls to
(dent(0y w%et%er yo&r presen$e on t%e prem(ses was 0or t%e p&rpose to /eJ or annoy t%e owner or
o$$&pant o0 t%e prem(ses or w%et%er (t was an entry onto t%e prem(ses a0ter a warn(n' not to so
trespass+ T%(s (s pro)a)ly eas(ly remed(ed )y an amendment at t%e t(me o0 tr(al+ Ge/ert%eless t%ese are
alternat(/e t%eor(es on w%($% a trespass $ase $an )e p&rs&ed and t%e de0endant (s ent(tled to .now on
w%($% t%eory or t%eor(es a $ase (s )e(n' prose$&ted (n ad/an$e o0 s%ow(n' &p 0or tr(al+
)+ Oo& 0(led an appeal on O$to)er "I, 2"", apparently, o0 t%e order made )y D&st($e o0 t%e Pea$e
S0erra--a on O$to)er "3, 2""+ T%at order den(ed yo&r reN&est 0or a $ont(n&an$e and 'ranted s&mmary
e/($t(on &nless yo& 0(led a depos(t w(t% t%e $o&rt+ Typ($ally t%e $o&rts lose ,&r(sd($t(on to r&le on ot%er
matters (n t%e $ase on$e an appeal (s ta.en+ Ct (s $lear 0rom t%e $o&rt re$ords t%at t%(s appeal was
pend(n' )e0ore t%e Se$ond D&d($(al F(str($t Co&rt at t%e t(me t%e $o&rt %eld a %ear(n' on t%e &nlaw0&l
deta(ner on O$to)er 1, 2""+ Ct may well )e t%at t%e D&st($e Co&rt lost ,&r(sd($t(on to %old t%e e/($t(on
%ear(n' w%(le t%e appeal was pend(n'+
$+ C am wor.(n' on some ot%er t%o&'%ts+
E+ C0 yo& are d(ssat(s0(ed w(t% t%e way C am represent(n' yo&, yo& rema(n 0ree to see. a new attorney+
<+ Anot%er $%&$.le re'ard(n' my owners%(p o0 str(p $l&)s+ C donSt own or %a/e any owners%(p (nterest
(n any str(p $l&)s, )rot%els, ad< )oo. stores or mo/(e %o&ses+ C '&ess t%at lea/es me 0ree to moral(-e+
!+ C st(ll donSt see t%e (mportan$e o0 Fr+ Merl(ss+ T%e reN&est 0or payment o0 an amo&nt eN&al to rent,
was 0or stora'e o0 yo&r personal property+ Oo& are ent(tled to $ontest t%e amo&nt o0 t%e stora'e 0ee,
w%($% yo& d(d+ T%ere (s no $red()le e/(den$e anyw%ere w%($% s&''ests t%at anyone (ntended to reopen
or $reate a new tenan$y allow(n' yo& to reta(n possess(on o0 t%e prem(ses+
I+ Fr+ Merl(ss (s an o&t o0 state w(tness+ Cn order to $ompel %(s appearan$e, %(s test(mony m&st )e
mater(al+ GRS "<8+815"6+ Ct does not appear t%at %(s test(mony (s mater(al &nder t%e (n0ormat(on yo&
%a/e pro/(ded 3&rt%er, &nder GRS "<8+8156 %e (s ent(tled to )e pa(d %(s s&)s(sten$e and tra/el
eJpenses (n$&rred (n $om(n' to Ge/ada+ Are yo& prepared to pay t%ose eJpenses (n ad/an$e o0 %(s
$om(n' to Ge/ada?
"2+ C donSt (ntend to 0aJ or e@ma(l to yo&, yo&r 0&ll 0(le (n t%(s $ase+ Oo& already %a/e e/eryt%(n' w(t%
t%e eJ$ept(on o0 a $o&ple o0 (tems w%($% C ma(led to yo&r old address+ C w(ll send t%em a'a(n to yo&r
new address+ C0 yo& want to re/(ew t%e 0(le yo& are wel$ome to do so at my o00($e+ C0 yo& want $op(es
o0 anyt%(n' (n t%e 0(le yo& may mar. t%e (tems+ A0ter '(/(n' yo& a $ost est(mate, 0or w%($% C reN&(re
payment (n ad/an$e, we w(ll pro/(de yo& w(t% $op(es o0 t%e mar.ed (tems+
Ke(t% Loom(s
3rom4 #a$% Co&'%l(n Tma(lto4-a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$omU
Sent4 Monday, Mar$% E, 2" "2433 PM
To4 .e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net9 sterm(t-*s)$'lo)al+net9 ,md*randa--a+$om9 ,)oles*$allat'+$om9
.r(st(emann(n'*ya%oo+$om9 .adl($,*reno+'o/
S&),e$t4 ( was e/($ted 3 "1 ", ( need a $ont(n&an$e
Fear Mr+ Loom(s,
C was wron'0&lly e/($ted on 3 "1 ", and C need a $ont(n&an$e (n t%e $r(m(nal trespass matter t%at yo&
set o/erly N&($.ly a'a(nst my eJpress w(s%es anyway+ My a)(l(ty to $olle$t e/(den$e ne$essary to my
de0ense and ot%erw(se prepare %as )een ad/ersely a00e$ted+ Add(t(onally, C donMt 0eel as t%o&'% yo& are
per0orm(n' (n an appropr(ate manner as de0ense $o&nsel, )&t rat%er yo& seem st&$. (n yo&r
prose$&tor(al ways, too N&($. to loo. 0or any eJ$&se w%atsoe/er to )&ry oneMs $ase, so C t%(n. yo& %a/e
</"
0or$ed a spl(t %ere, w%($% 0&rt%er pre,&d($es my $ase and a&'ers towards a $ont(n&an$e+ Please mo/e
0or one (mmed(ately and $opy me on my ent(re 0(le )y ema(l and 0aJ please+ Add(t(onally, please see.
$lar(0($at(on 0rom t%e RMC as to w%et%er C am allowed to e/er send an ema(l to
renom&n($re$ords*reno+'o/+ Please note, today, D&d'e 3lana'an den(ed R($%ard :(llMs latest 0r(/olo&s
mot(on+
F(d yo& .now t%at Ke/(n Kelly, o0 t%e State =ar o0 Ge/adaMs C%ara$ter and 3(tness Comm(ttee 0or at
least t%e last de$ade owns and r&ns t%e Spearm(nt R%(no str(p $l&) (n Las ;e'as4
%ttp4//www+re/(ew,o&rnal+$om/l/r,L%ome/22/Mar@2E@7ed@22/news/"!8"81+%tml
C .now C always l(.e my t%ree %o&r to&rs o0 %ea/y %anded moral(-(n' 0rom someone w%o r&ns a
monol(t%($ str(p $l&) (n Las ;e'as+
Oo& are on t%e State =ar o0 Ge/adaMs 0ee d(sp&te $omm(ttee, arenMt yo& Mr+ Loom(s? Fo yo& own any
str(p $l&)s?
Mr+ Loom(s, w%($% o0 t%e elements o0 t%e trespass $%ar'e RMC !+"2+282 do yo& 0eel are wea.est 0or
Fep&ty C(ty Attorney D(ll Fra.e, w%om C (n0ormed a)o&t t%e adm(ss(on )y Reno PF O00($er C%r(s
Carter t%at R($%ard G+ :(ll, EsN+ )r()es %(m, )&t 0or w%($% Ms+ Fra.e (nd($ated a $omplete la$. o0
(nterest and eJpressed t%at s%e wo&ld not )e 0ollow(n' &p on t%at report o0 )r()ery o0 a RPF O00($er+
Mr+ Kadl($, please pla$e a $opy o0 t%(s $orresponden$e (n D(ll Fra.eMs personnel 0(le+ Add(t(onally
please pla$e one (n All(son OrmaasMs personnel and employment 0(le too, (n add(t(on to Fep&ty C(ty
Attorney Fan 7on'Ms employment 0(le, as all t%ree o0 t%ose Fep&ty C(ty AttorneyMs were pro/(ded t%at
report and all t%ree (nd($ated t%ey d(d not $are and %ad no (ntent(on o0 0ollow(n' &p or ot%erw(se
(n/est('at(n' t%e adm(ss(on )y RPF O00($er C%r(s Carter t%at R($%ard G+ :(ll, EsN+ )r()ed %(m+ C t%(n.
t%e 0a(l&re to 0ollow &p )y any o0 t%ese 3 Fep&ty C(ty AttorneyMs relates to any 0&t&re ne'l('ent %(r(n',
tra(n(n', and s&per/(s(on $la(ms t%at t%e Reno C(ty Attorney may need to de0end a'a(nst w%en
represent(n' t%e Reno PF l(.e (t d(d (n t%e Eeo0 /+ P(tsno'le $ase4
%ttp4//www+l/r,+$om/news/reno@o00($(al@a$$&sed@o0@w(tness@tamper(n'@""E1!E1!+%tml
Oo& .now, Fep&ty C(ty Attorney OrmaasMs de$(s(on to p&s% on 0or t%at V<2 tra00($ t($.et (s loo.(n'
more and more (nterest(n'+ BB
O%, and, Mr+ Loom(s, Fr+ Merl(ss presen$e (s ne$essary )e$a&se %(s &nderstand(n' o0 t%e eJtent to
w%($% %(s attorney, R($%ard G+ :(ll, EsN+ %ad e00e$t(/ely res$(nded any e/($t(on Order )y send(n' a )(ll
0or t%e same amo&nt as 0&ll &se and o$$&pany o0 t%e lo$at(on at "" R(/er Ro$. St+ 'oes to t%e
s&)stan$e o0 t%e elements 0o&nd (n RMC !+"2+282 as well as t%e $red()(l(ty o0 )ot% Merl(ss and :(ll+
S(n$erely,
#a$% Co&'%l(n, EsN+, PO =OH E2I1, REGO, G;, !I12E, tel4 <<1 33! !""!, 0aJ4 I8I EE< <829
#a$%Co&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om Ge/ada =ar Go4 I8<3
#a$% Co&'%l(n, EsN+, PO =OH E2I1, REGO, G;, !I12E, tel4 <<1 33! !""!, 0aJ4 I8I EE< <829
#a$%Co&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om Ge/ada =ar Go4 I8<3
Close Pr(nt
3&ll /(ew
W
W
=a$. to messa'es
RE4 rm$ "" $r E821 yo& are appo(nted $o&nsel? 0or p&entes ne ta(tel??
/</"
Ke(t% Loom(s
To M#a$% Co&'%l(nM
3rom4 Ke(t% Loom(s 5.e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net6
Sent4 Mon /</" 34< PM
!/"
To4 M#a$% Co&'%l(nM 5-a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om6
Mr+ Co&'%l(n4
E@ma(l wor.s well 0or me+
Ke(t% Loom(s
3rom4 #a$% Co&'%l(n Tma(lto4-a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$omU
Sent4 Monday, 3e)r&ary <, 2" <41E AM
To4 .e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net
S&),e$t4 rm$ "" $r E821 yo& are appo(nted $o&nsel? 0or p&entes ne ta(tel?
%(, ( '&ess Mr+ Loom(s was appo(nted as my 3rd de0ense attorney (n RMC $ase "" $r E821+ C %a/e not
%eard anyt%(n' a)o&t t%(s $ase, and t%e RMC (nd($ated t%ey %ad not%(n' s$%ed&led+ Please
$omm&n($ate w(t% me only /(a ema(l or 0aJ please, %a/(n' (ss&es w(t% my ma(l (n$(dent to domest($
/(olen$e $omm(tted a'a(nst me my 0aJ (s I8I EE< <82+ t%an.s,
#a$% Co&'%l(n
3&ll /(ew
W
W
=a$. to messa'es
$o&rt date?
3/21/"
Ke(t% Loom(s
To M#a$% Co&'%l(nM
3rom4 Ke(t% Loom(s 5.e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net6
Sent4 Mon 3/21/" 842I PM
To4 M#a$% Co&'%l(nM 5-a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om6
Mr+ Co&'%l(n4
C %a/e reN&ested t%at $o&rt set yo&r trespass $ase 0or tr(al (n a)o&t 32 days+ C w(ll let yo& .now t%e date
and t(me as soon as C .now+
Ke(t% Loom(s
3&ll /(ew
W
W
=a$. to messa'es
RE4 $o&rt date?
3/2</"
Ke(t% Loom(s
To -a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om
3rom4 Ke(t% Loom(s 5.e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net6
Sent4 7ed 3/2</" 843E PM
To4 -a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om
Mr+ Co&'%l(n4
On w%at 'ro&nds, ot%er t%an t%ose already set 0ort% (n yo&r eJ(st(n' mot(on, do yo& )el(e/e a mot(on to
d(sm(ss s%o&ld )e 0(led?
Ke(t% Loom(s
3rom4 #a$% Co&'%l(n Tma(lto4-a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$omU
Sent4 7ednesday, Mar$% 2<, 2" "481 AM
To4 .e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net
S&),e$t4 RE4 $o&rt date
I/"
Mr+ Loom(s,
Please $opy me on any and all $orresponden$es, 0(l(n', or ot%er do$&mentat(on or /er)al reN&ests,
$orresponden$es, et$+ t%at yo& s&)m(t to t%e Co&rt, (n$l&d(n' t%e one yo& re0eren$e )elow+ Please do
not 0ollow Ta(telMs ta$t o0 a'ree(n' to reN&ests or 0a(l(n' to oppose mot(ons w(t%o&t e/en attempt(n' to
o)ta(n my perm(ss(on to (n ad/an$e t%ereo0+
C wo&ld l(.e 0or yo& to dra0t a Mot(on to F(sm(ss (n t%(s $ase 0or me re/(ew+
T%an.s,
#a$% Co&'%l(n, EsN+, "8 E+ It% St+ A, REGO, G; !I1", tel4 <<1 33! !""!, 0aJ4 I8I EE< <829
#a$%Co&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om Ge/ada =ar Go4 I8<3
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
3rom4 .e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net
To4 -a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om
S&),e$t4 $o&rt date
Fate4 Mon, 1 Mar 2" "E42I4"I @2!22
Mr+ Co&'%l(n4
C %a/e reN&ested t%at $o&rt set yo&r trespass $ase 0or tr(al (n a)o&t 32 days+ C w(ll let yo& .now t%e date
and t(me as soon as C .now+
Ke(t% Loom(s
3&ll /(ew
W
W
=a$. to messa'es
RE4 $o&rt date?
3/2I/"
Ke(t% Loom(s
To -a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om
3rom4 Ke(t% Loom(s 5.e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net6
Sent4 3r( 3/2I/" "24"8 AM
To4 -a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om
Go worr(es+ Made me la&'%+
Co&ple o0 N&est(ons4
F(d yo& 0(le an appeal 0rom D&st($e o0 t%e Pea$e S0erra--aSs e/($t(on order?
C0 yes, %as (t )een resol/ed?
F(d S0erra--a anno&n$e at t%e $lose o0 t%e %ear(n' on t%e 1t% t%at %e was 'rant(n' t%e e/($t(on and as.
:(ll/=a.er to pro/(de a wr(tten order?
F(d yo& e/er see t%e e/($t(on order posted )y 7CSO
C0 yes, w%en?
7%at (s rele/an$e o0 personnel 0(les o0 Carter or Lope-?
:ow (s Fr+ Merl(ssS test(mony mater(al to t%e de0ense o0 t%(s $ase?
Ke(t% Loom(s
3rom4 #a$% Co&'%l(n Tma(lto4-a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$omU
Sent4 T%&rsday, Mar$% 2!, 2" "48E AM
To4 .e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net
S&),e$t4 RE4 $o&rt date
Fear Mr+ Loom(s,
C apolo'(-e S(r 0or w%at C am s&re $omes a$ross as r&deness on my part+ Oo& seem l(.e a 'ood '&y, and
yo& %a/e 'reat %a(r+ C s(mply donMt %a/e t(me, money or ener'y to do any o0 t%(s t%e pol(te way '(/en
"2/"
t%e P&n(N&enessP o0 t%(s s(t&at(on++++Please ,&st .now C mean yo& no d(srespe$t+
7o&ld yo& please 0(le a reN&est or Mot(on 0or t%e Personnel 3(le o0 RPF O00($er C%r(s Carter and
Sar'ent Mon($a Lope- as well as s&p)oena 0rom t%e RPF all t%e /ol&mns o0 $rap R($%ard :(ll %as
'(/en t%em on t%(s (n add(t(on to not($(n' t%e $o&rt and C(ty Atty as to R($%ard :Cll )e(n' a w(tness,
s&)poena %(m 5t%o&'% t%e earl(er $ont(n&an$e wo&ld appear to (mply %e already (s6 AGF SU=POEGA
T:E OLF CALC3ORGCA GEUROSURGEOG 7:O CAG GET :CS OUT FO7G :ERE 3OR T:E
TRCAL AGF A FEPOSCTCOG PRCOR T:ERETO, ETSPECCALLO COGSCFERCGG T:AT T:E
;ARCOUS POLCCE REPORTS AGF MOTCOGS 3OR ORFERS TO S:O7 CAUSE QUOTE
MERLCSS AS SAOCGG :E 7AS AT T:E PROPERTO CG T:E P7EEKS PRECEEFCGGP T:E
ARREST, ETC+, ETC+ 5T:E STU33 =O==O PUEGTES GOT OOU 7:EG :E COPCEF OOU MO
3CLE, CE MO 3AHES TO =O==O, SET T:CS OUT CLEARLO6+ (3 T:ESE 3OOLS 7AGT TO
:A;E ME ARREST AGF ATTEMPT TO RUG A TRACG OG ME, T:EG T:EO CAG PUT T:E
TCME AGF 7ORK CG AGF GOT P:OGE CT CG 3ROM CALC AGF :A;E T:ECR REGT@A@
LOCAG rCC:ARF :CLL FO CT+
ALSO PLEASE 3CLE A MOTCOG TO d(sm(ss )ased &pon den(al o0 r('%t to a speedy tr(al, spol(at(on
o0 e/(den$e, et$++++
PEACE
#a$% Co&'%l(n, EsN+, "8 E+ It% St+ A, REGO, G; !I1", tel4 <<1 33! !""!, 0aJ4 I8I EE< <829
#a$%Co&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om Ge/ada =ar Go4 I8<3
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
3&ll /(ew
W
W
=a$. to messa'es
Tr(al Fate?
3/2I/"
Ke(t% Loom(s
To -a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om
3rom4 Ke(t% Loom(s 5.e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net6
Sent4 3r( 3/2I/" "2488 AM
To4 -a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om
" atta$%ment
Co&'%l(n Tr(al Sett(n'+pd0 5<<"+! K=6
See atta$%ed
3&ll /(ew
W
W
=a$. to messa'es
RE4 Tr(al Fate?
3/"/"
Ke(t% Loom(s
To -a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om
3rom4 Ke(t% Loom(s 5.e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net6
Sent4 Mon 3/"/" I4E AM
To4 -a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om
C $an do t%at (0 t%ere (s a 'ood reason to /a$ate t%e date+ 7%at (s t%e reason?
Ke(t%
""/"
3rom4 #a$% Co&'%l(n Tma(lto4-a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$omU
Sent4 3r(day, Mar$% 2I, 2" E4! PM
To4 .e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net
S&),e$t4 RE4 Tr(al Fate
Please 0(le somet%(n' w(t% t%e $o&rt see.(n' to /a$ate t%at tr(al date and eJpla(n(n' t%at yo& 0a(led to
e/en on$e $ons< w(t% yo&r $l(ent pr(or to sett(n' (t+
#a$% Co&'%l(n, EsN+, "8 E+ It% St+ A, REGO, G; !I1", tel4 <<1 33! !""!, 0aJ4 I8I EE< <829
#a$%Co&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om Ge/ada =ar Go4 I8<3
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
3rom4 .e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net
To4 -a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om
S&),e$t4 Tr(al Fate
Fate4 3r(, I Mar 2" "24884"< @2!22
See atta$%ed
3&ll /(ew
W
W
=a$. to messa'es
RE4 $o&rt date?
3/"/"
Ke(t% Loom(s
To -a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om
3rom4 Ke(t% Loom(s 5.e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net6
Sent4 Mon 3/"/" "242 AM
To4 -a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om
T%(s e@ma(l (s sent to address t%e 'ro&nds yo& (dent(0(ed as 0orm(n' t%e )as(s o0 a mot(on to d(sm(ss+ As
yo& .now t%ere (s )ot% a $onst(t&t(onal r('%t and a stat&tory r('%t to a speedy tr(al+ T%(s $ase (s now%ere
$lose to a /(olat(on o0 t%e $onst(t&t(onal r('%t to a speedy tr(al+ T%e stat&te does pro/(de 0or a r('%t to
tr(al w(t%(n E2 days o0 arra('nment (n m&n($(pal $o&rt+ GRS "<!+11E56+ Cn t%(s $(r$&mstan$e t%e $o&rt
XmayY d(sm(ss t%e $ompla(nt+ T%e stat&te reN&(res, %owe/er, t%at t%e tr(al not %a/e )een postponed at
t%e reN&est o0 t%e de0endant+ Ct (s my &nderstand(n' t%at t%e Dan&ary "2, 2", tr(al date, was postponed
at yo&r reN&est+ C0 t%at (s tr&e t%en t%ere are not 'ro&nds to d(sm(ss on t%e )as(s o0 a /(olat(on o0 a r('%t
to speedy tr(al+
F(sm(ssal )ased on spol(at(on (s a $(/(l $on$ept+ Ct %as not )een appl(ed to $r(m(nal $ases (n Ge/ada as
o0 yet+ See :(''s /+ State, "E Ge/+ Ad/+ Opn " 52"26+ Rat%er de0endants (n $r(m(nal $ases are
prote$ted 0rom t%e loss o0 e/(den$e (n t%e %ands o0 t%e prose$&t(on )y t%e do$tr(ne o0 d&e pro$ess+
ConseN&ently yo& m('%t %a/e a )as(s to reN&est d(sm(ssal (0 t%e C(ty AttorneySs O00($e lost e/(den$e, (n
(ts possess(on mater(al to t%e $ase+ Cn s&$% $ase (0 t%e C(ty a$ted (n )ad 0a(t% or w(t% $onn(/an$e or (0
yo& were pre,&d($ed )y t%e loss t%en t%ere may )e 'ro&nds on w%($% to )ase a d(sm(ssal+ Please ad/(se
as to w%at e/(den$e was lost and %ow (t was lost+
Oo& %a/e not (dent(0(ed any ot%er 'ro&nds as a )as(s 0or d(sm(ssal+ C0 yo& )el(e/e t%ere are ot%er
'ro&nds, let me .now+
T%an.s
Ke(t% Loom(s
3rom4 #a$% Co&'%l(n Tma(lto4-a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$omU
Sent4 T%&rsday, Mar$% 2!, 2" "48E AM
To4 .e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net
"/"
S&),e$t4 RE4 $o&rt date
Fear Mr+ Loom(s,
C apolo'(-e S(r 0or w%at C am s&re $omes a$ross as r&deness on my part+ Oo& seem l(.e a 'ood '&y, and
yo& %a/e 'reat %a(r+ C s(mply donMt %a/e t(me, money or ener'y to do any o0 t%(s t%e pol(te way '(/en
t%e P&n(N&enessP o0 t%(s s(t&at(on++++Please ,&st .now C mean yo& no d(srespe$t+
7o&ld yo& please 0(le a reN&est or Mot(on 0or t%e Personnel 3(le o0 RPF O00($er C%r(s Carter and
Sar'ent Mon($a Lope- as well as s&p)oena 0rom t%e RPF all t%e /ol&mns o0 $rap R($%ard :(ll %as
'(/en t%em on t%(s (n add(t(on to not($(n' t%e $o&rt and C(ty Atty as to R($%ard :Cll )e(n' a w(tness,
s&)poena %(m 5t%o&'% t%e earl(er $ont(n&an$e wo&ld appear to (mply %e already (s6 AGF SU=POEGA
T:E OLF CALC3ORGCA GEUROSURGEOG 7:O CAG GET :CS OUT FO7G :ERE 3OR T:E
TRCAL AGF A FEPOSCTCOG PRCOR T:ERETO, ETSPECCALLO COGSCFERCGG T:AT T:E
;ARCOUS POLCCE REPORTS AGF MOTCOGS 3OR ORFERS TO S:O7 CAUSE QUOTE
MERLCSS AS SAOCGG :E 7AS AT T:E PROPERTO CG T:E P7EEKS PRECEEFCGGP T:E
ARREST, ETC+, ETC+ 5T:E STU33 =O==O PUEGTES GOT OOU 7:EG :E COPCEF OOU MO
3CLE, CE MO 3AHES TO =O==O, SET T:CS OUT CLEARLO6+ (3 T:ESE 3OOLS 7AGT TO
:A;E ME ARREST AGF ATTEMPT TO RUG A TRACG OG ME, T:EG T:EO CAG PUT T:E
TCME AGF 7ORK CG AGF GOT P:OGE CT CG 3ROM CALC AGF :A;E T:ECR REGT@A@
LOCAG rCC:ARF :CLL FO CT+
ALSO PLEASE 3CLE A MOTCOG TO d(sm(ss )ased &pon den(al o0 r('%t to a speedy tr(al, spol(at(on
o0 e/(den$e, et$++++
PEACE
#a$% Co&'%l(n, EsN+, "8 E+ It% St+ A, REGO, G; !I1", tel4 <<1 33! !""!, 0aJ4 I8I EE< <829
#a$%Co&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om Ge/ada =ar Go4 I8<3
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
RE4 Tr(al Fate?
3/"8/"
Ke(t% Loom(s
To -a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om
3rom4 Ke(t% Loom(s 5.e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net6
Sent4 7ed 3/"8/" 431 PM
To4 -a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om
Fear Mr+ Co&'%l(n4
My o)l('at(on &nder Ge/ada R&le o0 Pro0ess(onal Cond&$t "+ (s to a)(de )y a $l(entSs de$(s(on
$on$ern(n' t%e o),e$t(/es o0 representat(on and, as reN&(red )y R&le "+8 to $ons< w(t% t%e $l(ent as to
t%e means )y w%($% t%e o),e$t(/es o0 representat(on are to )e p&rs&ed+ Z Cn a $r(m(nal $ase t%e lawyer
s%all a)(de )y t%e $l(ents de$(s(on, a0ter $ons<at(on w(t% t%e lawyer, as to plea to )e entered, w%et%er
to wa(/e ,&ry tr(al w%et%er t%e $l(ent w(ll test(0y+
Under R&le "+8 5a6516 a lawyer s%all $ons< w(t% t%e $l(ent a)o&t any rele/ant l(m(tat(ons on t%e
lawyers $ond&$t w%en t%e lawyer .nows t%at t%e $l(ent eJpe$ts ass(stan$e not perm(tted )y t%e R&les o0
Pro0ess(onal Cond&$t or ot%er law+
Under R&le +"+ Cn represent(n' a $l(ent, a lawyer s%all eJer$(se (ndependent pro0ess(onal ,&d'ment and
render $and(d ad/($e+ Cn render(n' ad/($e, a lawyer may re0er not only to law )&t to ot%er
$ons(derat(ons s&$% as moral e$onom($, so$(al and pol(t($al 0a$tors, t%at may )e rele/ant to t%e $l(entSs
s(t&at(on+
Under R&le 3+"+ A lawyer s%all not )r(n' or de0end a pro$eed(n', or assert or $ontro/ert an (ss&e
t%ere(n, &nless t%ere (s a )as(s (n law and 0a$t 0or do(n' so t%at (s not 0r(/olo&s, w%($% (n$l&des a 'ood
0a(t% ar'&ment 0or an eJtens(on, mod(0($at(on or re/ersal o0 eJ(st(n' law+ A lawyer 0or a de0endant (n a
"3/"
$r(m(nal pro$eed(n' t%at $o&ld res< (n (n$ar$erat(on, may ne/ert%eless so de0end t%e pro$eed(n' as to
reN&(re t%at e/ery element o0 t%e $ase )e esta)l(s%ed+
Under R&le 3+5a6 and 5)6+ A lawyer s%all ma.e reasona)le e00orts to eJped(te l(t('at(on $ons(stent w(t%
t%e (nterests o0 t%e $l(ent+
T%e d&ty stated (n para'rap% 5a6 does not pre$l&de a lawyer 0rom 'rant(n' a reasona)le reN&est 0rom
oppos(n' $o&nsel 0or an a$$ommodat(on, s&$% as an eJtens(on o0 t(me, or 0rom d(sa'ree(n' w(t% a
$l(entSs w(s%es on adm(n(strat(/e and ta$t($al matters, s&$% as s$%ed&l(n' depos(t(ons, t%e n&m)er o0
depos(t(ons to )e ta.en, and t%e 0reN&en$y and &se o0 wr(tten d(s$o/ery reN&ests+
Under R&le !+85d6 Ct (s m(s$ond&$t 0or a lawyer to en'a'e (n $ond&$t w%($% (s pre,&d($(al to t%e
adm(n(strat(on o0 ,&st($e+
T%ese, and ot%ers, are t%e pro0ess(onal r&les C operate &nder (n pro/(d(n' le'al representat(on to yo& (n
$ase n&m)er "" CR E821, a $ase (n w%($% yo& are $%ar'ed w(t% t%e $r(me o0 trespass+ Ct (s my
&nderstand(n' t%at yo&r o),e$t(/e (n t%(s $r(m(nal $ase (s t%at yo& )e a$N&(tted o0 t%e $r(me o0 trespass+
T%at (s my p&rpose (n represent(n' yo&+ C am %appy to wor. towards t%at o&t$ome to t%e )est o0 my
a)(l(ty+ Ct (s my op(n(on, %owe/er, t%at m&$% o0 w%at yo& as. to )e done (s not (n $ompl(an$e w(t% t%e
a)o/e r&les+ A$$ord(n'ly, C w(ll not )e 0(l(n' a mot(on to d(sm(ss )ased &pon GRCP E5a6 and 5)6, C see
t%at ar'&ment as 0r(/olo&s+ C w(ll not )e pro$eed(n' w(t% t%e s&mmon(n' o0 an o&t@o0@state w(tness
5Merl(ss6 &nless yo& $an esta)l(s% %(s mater(al(ty to t%e de0ense+ Gor w(ll C )e s&)poena(n' t%e
personnel re$ords o0 law en0or$ement personnel &nless yo& $an esta)l(s% to my sat(s0a$t(on w%y t%ey
are rele/ant to t%(s $ase+ C %a/e no (ntent(on at t%(s t(me o0 $ond&$t(n' any depos(t(ons (n t%e $ase or
send(n' reN&ests 0or prod&$t(on o0 do$&ments or (nterro'ator(es (n t%e $ase+ C see t%ese a$t(ons as
&nd&ly )&rdensome on t%e ,&d($(al system, and &nwarranted )y anyt%(n' yo& %a/e pro/(ded to t%(s
po(nt+ C also see t%em as 0r(/olo&s and an attempt to &t(l(-e t%e $r(m(nal ,&st($e system to a$$ompl(s%
o),e$t(/es not rele/ant to my p&rpose (n represent(n' yo&+
C0 yo& are d(ssat(s0(ed w(t% t%e l(m(tat(ons C per$e(/e to eJ(st re'ard(n' my representat(on o0 yo&, yo&
are wel$ome to term(nate my representat(on o0 yo&+ Oo& may t%en as. t%e Co&rt to appo(nt a new
lawyer to represent yo&+
Ct (s my &nderstand(n' t%at Fep&ty Ma$%em w(ll )e test(0y(n' (n t%e $ase alon' w(t% R($%ard :(ll and
Casey =a.er+
C do t%(n. t%at t%ere are some (nterest(n' an'les to t%e $ase &pon w%($% a de0ense $an )e )ased and C
w(ll )e p&rs&(n' t%ose an'les+ C %a/e as.ed yo& (n pre/(o&s e@ma(ls to pro/(de (n0ormat(on w%($% C
)el(e/e w(ll )e %elp0&l to t%e de0ense o0 yo&r $ase+
C ad/(se yo& t%at t%e C(ty %as o00ered to re$ommend t(me@ser/ed as a senten$e (0 yo& enter a no@$ontest
plea to trespass+ Ct (s also my &nderstand(n' t%at yo& %a/e ot%er $r(m(nal $ases pend(n' (n )ot% Reno
D&st($e Co&rt and (n t%e Se$ond D&d($(al F(str($t Co&rt o0 t%e State o0 Ge/ada+ Ct (s my &nderstand(n'
0&rt%er t%at all o0 t%e $r(m(nal $ases $an )e resol/ed (n a s(n'le plea to a m(sdemeanor o00ense (0 yo&
w(ll o)ta(n psy$%olo'($al $o&nsel(n'+ Ct (s my o)l('at(on to (n0orm yo& o0 t%e a/a(la)(l(ty o0 t%ese
resol&t(ons to t%e present $r(m(nal $ase (n w%($% C pro/(de representat(on+ C w(ll, o0 $o&rse, a)(de )y
yo&r de$(s(on as to w%et%er to a$$ept t%ese resol&t(ons or not+
C note t%at t%ere (s a psy$%(atr($ e/al&at(on s$%ed&led 0or yo& (n nd D&d($(al F(str($t Co&rt Case Go+
CR"@23<E on Apr(l 3, 2"+ T%e o&t$ome o0 t%at e/al&at(on $o&ld %a/e an (mportant (mpa$t on t%(s
$ase+ C am as.(n' t%at yo& a&t%or(-e a release o0 t%e (n0ormat(on $onta(ned (n t%e e/al&at(on to me so
t%at C may determ(ne w%at (mpa$t (t $o&ld %a/e on yo&r )e%al0 (n t%(s $ase+
C rema(n prepared to represent yo& (n t%e trespass $ase+ C t%(n. t%at a tr(al o0 t%e $ase w(ll )e (nterest(n'+
My representat(on, %owe/er, (s $(r$&ms$r()ed )y t%e Ge/ada R&les o0 Pro0ess(onal Cond&$t+
Ke(t% Loom(s
3rom4 #a$% Co&'%l(n Tma(lto4-a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$omU
"8/"
Sent4 T&esday, Mar$% "3, 2" 84I PM
To4 .e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net
S&),e$t4 RE4 Tr(al Fate
Fear Mr+ Loom(s,
Cn yo&r mot(on to d(sm(ss, C wo&ld l(.e yo& to really 0o$&s on and set 0ort% to t%e $o&rt t%e 0a$t t%at t%e
e/($t(on order needed to )e ser/ed (n $ompl(an$e w(t% GRCP E5a6 and E5e6+ GRS 82+822 R&les o0
pra$t($e+ T%e pro/(s(ons o0 GRS, Ge/ada R&les o0 C(/(l Pro$ed&re and Ge/ada R&les o0 Appellate
Pro$ed&re relat(/e to $(/(l a$t(ons, appeals and new tr(als, so 0ar as t%ey are not (n$ons(stent w(t% t%e
pro/(s(ons o0 GRS 82+2 to 82+82, (n$l&s(/e, apply to t%e pro$eed(n's ment(oned (n t%ose se$t(ons+
T%e lan'&a'e a)o&t Premo/(n' t%e tenant w(t% (n 8 %o&rs o0 re$e(pt o0 t%e orderP (s only appl($a)le to
t%ose s(t&at(ons w%ere t%e tenant does not 0(le a TenantMs Answer or TenantMs A00(da/(t+ C d(d 0(le s&$% a
TenanMts A00(da/(t, and l(t('ated t%e matter t%oro&'%ly+ Cn t%ose s(t&at(ons, GRS 82+822 reN&(res GRCP
to apply, spe$(0($ally GRCP E5a6 and E5e6, and $learly 7CSO Ma$%em 5please s&)poena and (dent(0y
as w(tnesses Mary Kandaras, EsN+ o0 t%e 7CFA C(/(l F(s/(s(on, 7CSO Fep&ty Ma$%em, and 7CSO
C(/(l F(/(s(on s&per/(sor L(- St&$%ell 0or t%e tr(al (n t%(s matter, and 0&rt%er send o&t a reN&est 0or
prod&$t(on and s&)poena d&$es te$&m to t%e 7CFA and t%e 7CSO as.('n t%em to spe$(0y, (n wr(t(n'
and (n deta(l, t%e eJa$t pro$ed&res and pol($(es (n pla$e w(t% respe$t to t%e ser/($e and $ond&$t(n' o0
s&$% lo$.o&ts 5(e, not de0a< lo$.o&ts w%ere t%ere (s not a s&mmary e/($t(on %ear(n', )&t oneMs l(.e t%e
present one, w%ere t%ere was a TenantMs Answer and %ear(n' %eld, et$++++6+ =e s&re to as. w%et%er t%e are
aware o0 w%at Ppersonally ser/edP means, and w%et%er t%ey ma(l t%e Orders on top o0 merely post(n'
t%em to t%e door+ 3&rt%er, C %a/e )een told t%at t%e 7CSO %as a pol($y or penatly system (n pla$e
w%ere)y t%e dep&t(es m&st 'et t%ese lo$.o&ts per0ormed Pw(t%(n 8 %o&rs o0 re$e(pt o0 t%e orderP t%e
re$e(pt )e(n' t%e 7CSOMs re$e(pt, and not t%e tenantMs re$e(pt+ C donMt n$essar(ly read t%e stat&te t%at
way, )&t++++t%e 7CSO pol($y and p&n(s%ment system wo&ld )e at least some (nd($at(on o0 w%at t%e
le'(slat&re meant 5C '&ess, )&t C dontM really t%(n. so, t%o&'%, yo& w(ll note t%at :(ll was le0t w(t%
not%(n' )&t $(t(n' to t%e P&s&al and $&stomary pra$t($e o0 t%e 7CSOP (n ser/(n' t%e E/($t(on ORders
and per0orm('n lo$.o&ts, C )el(e/e, )e$a&se t%e law does not $onta(n m&$% to s&pport :(llMs $ontent(on
and t%ere0ore %e w(s%es to see t%e 7CSO P$&stomary pra$t($esP )e(n' '(/en t%e we('%t o0 law+
Please see some spe$(0($ sele$t(ons atta$%ed 0rom t%e e/($t(on matter+ C .now, C .now, yo& want to
$&rta(l t%e s$ope o0 yo&r representat(on to an (mma$&late de'ree++++)&t :(ll $an $learly )e seen (n %(s
/ar(o&s Mot(on to S%ow Ca&se, State =ar Gr(e/an$es, Temproary Prote$t(on Order Appl($at(ons, et$+,
et$+, to )e a p&n. w%o doesnMt m&$% l(.e $ompet(n' on an e/en play(n' 0(eld, l(.e any 'ood pr(/ate
s$%ooler, %e wo&ld rat%er s($. an atta$. do' on some)ody t%an 'et (n t%e o$to'on and 'o toe to toe
mentally+ Re'ardless, :(ll s%ows a $ont(n&al des(re to s&)/ert GRCP E5e6, w%($% appl(es to ser/($e o0
do$&ments 0(led ele$ron($ally (n t%e Se$ond D&d($(al F(str($t Co&rt+ :e wo&ld rat%er w(t%%old oppos(n'
$o&nsels $omp&ters, laptops, $l(ent 0(les, dr(/erMs l($ense, et$+ T%e last t%(n' %e wants (s to 'o ar'&ment
0or ar'&ment, resear$% 0or resear$%, wr(t(n' 0or wr(t(n'+ Pr(/ate s$%ool and daddyMs plead(n' )an.+ :(ll
0(les a Mot(on to S%ow $a&e alle'e(n' Co&'%l(n s&)/reted an Order t%at was 0(led on Dan&ary ""t%,
2" w(t% Co&'l(nMs a$t(on o0 Dan&ary "t%, 2"+ Under GRCP E5e6, t%e Order Feny(n' t%e TRO %ad
not e/en )een ser/ed yet, and t%ere %as )een no (nd(d$at(on t%at :(ll 'a/e t%e Order at t%e town d&mp
to anyone ot%er t%an an RPF O00($er+
3&rt%er, (t (s not all t%at $lear w%y :(lls Mot(on 0or ORder to S%ow Ca&se deser/es a 0&ll )lown
%ear(n' w%en F< does not (nd($ate a %ear(n' w(ll )e a$$orded to t%e appeal+ T%(s (s part($&larly s&spe$t
'(/en t%at An/&( sets 0ort% t%at appeals (n s&mmary e/($t(on matters are done on a tr(al de no/o )as(s+
T%ere are a n&m)er, )&t %ow a)o&t yo&r $omplete la$. o0 $omm&n($at(on w(t% me pr(or to so sett(n'
t%at date+ :ow a)o&t Mr+ Ta(tel and Mr+ P&entesMs 0a(l&re (n t%(s matter and t%e pre,&d($e to my $ase so
$reated? :ow a)o&t yo&r 0a(l(n' to (dent(0y yo&rsel0 as t%e p&)l($ de0ender to a room 0&ll o0 de0endants
"1/"
(n ,a(l at t%e arra('nment?
T%ere are ot%er reasons as well, (n$l&d(n', )&t not l(m(ted to, yo&r res(stan$e to s&)poena t%e mater(als
C %a/e and am reN&est(n'+
C w(s% 0or yo& to s&)poena t%e personnel 0(les o0 )ot% RPF Sar'ent Mon($a Lope- and O00($er C%r(s
Carter+ C w(s% 0or yo& to l(st Fr+ Merl(ss as a w(tness and s&)poena %(s appearan$e and appropr(ately
not($e t%e C(ty o0 Reno (n t%at re'ard, same 'oes 0or R($%ard :(ll and Casey =a.er 5=a.er, )y letter
dated Go/em)er "2t%, 2"" demands t%e 0&ll rental /al&e 0or t%e property as Pstora'eP &nder GRS
82+13, w%(le also assert(n' %e w(ll 'o a0ter mo/(n' and (n/entory $osts, (n add(t(on to :(llMs $ontra$tor
P%(l Stewarts later r(d($&lo&s $%ar'es and per,&ry+ Please s&)poena Stewart as well+
Most (mportantly s&)poena 7as%oe Co&nty S%er(00Ms O00($e Fep&ty Ma$%em to test(0y and ser/e a
s&)poena d&e$es te$&m, reN&ests 0or prod&$t(on, and (nterro'ator(es see.(n' re$ords and responses
0rom t%e 7CSO as set 0ort% (n t%e letter C sent L(- St&$%ell 5see atta$%ed6 on or a)o&t 3e)r&ary "2t%,
2"+ Oo& see, t%e 7CSO and Fep&ty Ma$%em may )e $omm(tt(n' a 0ra&d &pon t%e p&)l($ )y
repeatedly 0(l(n' a00(da/(ts o0 ser/($e t%at attest to personal ser/($e w%ere L(- St&$%ell, o0 t%e 7CSO
adm(ts t%at t%ey $learly do not .now, or $%oose to Prem(JP t%e le'al mean(n' o0 Ppersonally ser/eP+
3&rt%er, please (n0orm t%e C(ty o0 Reno and appropr(ately not($e t%e same as to t%e eJ(sten$e and (ntent
to o00er (nto e/(den$e a /(deo o0 R($%ard :(ll, EsN+, adm(tt(n' t%at %e and %(s 0(rm, on )e%al0 o0 Fr+
Merl(ss, were w(t%%old(n' t%e a$$&sed personal property, (n add(t(on to t%e $l(entMs 0(les 0rom t%e
0ormer $ommer$(al lease %ome law o00($e o0 t%e a$$&sed and assert(n' a l(en, &nder GRS 82+13 0or
Pstora'eP, %owe/er, as t%e /(deo tape s%ows, :(ll adm(ts to $%ar'(n' t%e &nders('ned t%e same VI22 per
mont% rent as was $%ar'ed 0or t%e P0&ll &se and o$$&pan$yP o0 t%e prem(ses at "" R(/er Ro$. St+,
Reno, G; !I1"+ :(ll 0&rt%er demands t%at property )e remo/ed (n a $erta(n order, re'ardless o0
w%et%er %(s art($(0($ally (n0lated l(en was pa(d or not+ Add(t(onally, :(ll $omm(tted 0ra&d &pon t%e $o&rt
(n a n&m)er o0 (nstan$es and 0(led 0alse pol($e reports w%ere(n %e alle'es t%at %e a'reed to or ot%erw(se
made a/a(la)le to t%e a$$&sed (tems s&$% as t%e a$$&sedMs $l(ents 0(les 5and 0or a t(me wallet and state
(ss&ed dr(/erMs l($ense6 w%ere, $learly, w(t%o&t reN&(r(n' any payment )y t%e a$$&sed, %owe/er, $learly,
t%e 0a$ts s%ow t%at :(ll ne/er a$t&ally l(/ed &p to t%ose assert(ons and repeatedly 0a(led to s%ow
pro/(de s&$% (tems a)sent payment o0 %(s art(0($ally (n0lated l(en+
3&rt%er, C w(s% 0or yo& to d(/&l'e and pro/(de not($e t%at (t (s a/a(la)le 0or p($.&p and t%at we (ntent to
(ntrod&$e (nto e/(den$e a /(deo o0 RPF Sar'ent Mon($a Lope- adm(tt(n' t%at s%e and RPF O00($er
Carter d(d not (dent(0y t%emsel/es as pol($e o00($ers or ot%erw(se as. t%e a$$&sed to lea/e "" R(/er
Ro$. St+ on t%e date o0 t%e arrest pr(or to Merl(ss open(n' t%e door to t%e )asement+ T%(s (s apparently
(n d(re$t $ontrad($t(on to t%e sworn 0(l(n's made )y R($%ard :(ll, EsN+ (n %(s a00(da/(ts atta$%ed to %(s
/ar(o&s Mot(ons to S%ow Ca&se, t%e Reply to Oppos(t(on t%ereto, Oppos(t(on to TRO, et$+, et$+ 5(n RDC
Re/2""@22"<2! and t%e appeal (n C;""@23E!6+ 3or t%at reason alone Merl(ssM presen$e (s reN&(red+
:e was a pre$(p(ent w(tness and yo& are as.(n' me w%y %e s%o&ld )e t%ere? Oo& %a/e a d&ty to
-ealo&sly ad/o$ate on my )e%al0, Mr+ Loom(s+ Oo& are pa(d, )y t%e p&)l($, to do so+ Please d(/&l'e any
pr(or asso$(at(ons yo& %a/e w(t% anyone employed )y or wor.('n as an (ndependent $ontra$tor w(t% t%e
RMC and or t%e Reno C(ty Attorney, (n$l&d(n' anyone yo& went to law s$%ool w(t% or attended t%e
same law s$%ool as, w(t%(n a 1 year per(od+
3&rt%er, C w(s% 0or yo& to 0(le a mot(on see.(n' a m(str(al or ot%erw(se reN&(r(n' t%e re$&sal o0 t%e RMC
and 0&rt%er d(s$los(n' w%y (t (s t%at D&d'e Gardner seem(n'ly %as re$&sed D&d'e F(lwort% 5w%y
wo&ldnMt D&d'e F(lwort% re$&se D&d'e F(lwort%?6 (n one $ase, w(t%o&t deta(l(n' w%y eJa$tly, w%(le
D&d'e Gardner apparently (s (ntent on rema(n(n' on (n "" CR E821, desp(te t%e 0a$t t%at an apparent
$on0l($t eJ(sts, one w%($% %e only d(s$losed &pon prompt(n' 0rom t%e a$$&sed, w(t% respe$t to D&d'e
GardnerMs /ery re$ent employment w(t% t%e Reno C(ty AttorneyMs o00($e and t%e eJ(st(n' and or )rew(n'
l(t('at(on 5or, at least, poss()le l(t('at(on6 )etween t%e a$$&sed and t%e C(ty o0 Reno, Reno C(ty
"E/"
Attorney, and poss()ly, t%e RMC+
#a$% Co&'%l(n, EsN+, "8 E+ It% St+ A, REGO, G; !I1", tel4 <<1 33! !""!, 0aJ4 I8I EE< <829
#a$%Co&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om Ge/ada =ar Go4 I8<3
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
3rom4 .e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net
To4 -a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om
S&),e$t4 RE4 Tr(al Fate
Fate4 Mon, " Mar 2" 2I4E431 @2<22
C $an do t%at (0 t%ere (s a 'ood reason to /a$ate t%e date+ 7%at (s t%e reason?
Ke(t%
3rom4 #a$% Co&'%l(n Tma(lto4-a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$omU
Sent4 3r(day, Mar$% 2I, 2" E4! PM
To4 .e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net
S&),e$t4 RE4 Tr(al Fate
Please 0(le somet%(n' w(t% t%e $o&rt see.(n' to /a$ate t%at tr(al date and eJpla(n(n' t%at yo& 0a(led to
e/en on$e $ons< w(t% yo&r $l(ent pr(or to sett(n' (t+
#a$% Co&'%l(n, EsN+, "8 E+ It% St+ A, REGO, G; !I1", tel4 <<1 33! !""!, 0aJ4 I8I EE< <829
#a$%Co&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om Ge/ada =ar Go4 I8<3
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
3rom4 .e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net
To4 -a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om
S&),e$t4 Tr(al Fate
Fate4 3r(, I Mar 2" "24884"< @2!22
See atta$%ed
3&ll /(ew
W
W
=a$. to messa'es
RE4 ( was e/($ted 3 "1 ", ( need a $ont(n&an$e?
423 PM
Ke(t% Loom(s
To -a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om
3rom4 Ke(t% Loom(s 5.e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net6
Sent4 7ed 3/!/" 423 PM
To4 -a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om
Fear Mr+ Co&'%l(n4
T%(s messa'e (s sent to address (ss&es ra(sed (n t%e e@ma(l yo& sent on 3@E@"+
"+ Please note t%at yo& are 0ree to send t%e $omm&n($at(ons yo& send to me, to anyone else yo& des(re+
Oo& s%o&ld )e aware t%at send(n' yo&r $omm&n($at(ons to ot%er part(es w(ll $a&se yo&r
$omm&n($at(ons to me to lose t%e(r attorney@$l(ent $on0(dent(al(ty+
+ 3or w%at spe$(0($ p&rposes do yo& need a $ont(n&an$e? A $ont(n&an$e p&rely 0or t%e p&rpose o0
delay (s not a proper reason 0or a $ont(n&an$e+
3+ 7%et%er yo& are ent(tled to e@ma(l t%e Reno M&n($(pal Co&rt (s not my $on$ern+ T%at (s a pro)lem to
)e addressed )etween yo& and t%e Co&rt+
8+ Ms+ Fra.e (s no lon'er t%e attorney %andl(n' yo&r $ase 0or t%e Reno C(ty AttorneySs O00($e+ Oo&r
$ase (s now )e(n' %andled )y C%r(stop%er :a-lett@Ste/ens, EsN+
1+ Cn response to yo&r N&est(on re'ard(n' t%e wea.nesses o0 t%e trespass(n' $ase C o00er t%e 0ollow(n'4
"</"
a+ T%e $ompla(nt (s de0($(ent (n t%at (0 0a(ls to set 0ort% t%e elements o0 t%e $r(me o0 trespass+ Ct 0a(ls to
(dent(0y w%et%er yo&r presen$e on t%e prem(ses was 0or t%e p&rpose to /eJ or annoy t%e owner or
o$$&pant o0 t%e prem(ses or w%et%er (t was an entry onto t%e prem(ses a0ter a warn(n' not to so
trespass+ T%(s (s pro)a)ly eas(ly remed(ed )y an amendment at t%e t(me o0 tr(al+ Ge/ert%eless t%ese are
alternat(/e t%eor(es on w%($% a trespass $ase $an )e p&rs&ed and t%e de0endant (s ent(tled to .now on
w%($% t%eory or t%eor(es a $ase (s )e(n' prose$&ted (n ad/an$e o0 s%ow(n' &p 0or tr(al+
)+ Oo& 0(led an appeal on O$to)er "I, 2"", apparently, o0 t%e order made )y D&st($e o0 t%e Pea$e
S0erra--a on O$to)er "3, 2""+ T%at order den(ed yo&r reN&est 0or a $ont(n&an$e and 'ranted s&mmary
e/($t(on &nless yo& 0(led a depos(t w(t% t%e $o&rt+ Typ($ally t%e $o&rts lose ,&r(sd($t(on to r&le on ot%er
matters (n t%e $ase on$e an appeal (s ta.en+ Ct (s $lear 0rom t%e $o&rt re$ords t%at t%(s appeal was
pend(n' )e0ore t%e Se$ond D&d($(al F(str($t Co&rt at t%e t(me t%e $o&rt %eld a %ear(n' on t%e &nlaw0&l
deta(ner on O$to)er 1, 2""+ Ct may well )e t%at t%e D&st($e Co&rt lost ,&r(sd($t(on to %old t%e e/($t(on
%ear(n' w%(le t%e appeal was pend(n'+
$+ C am wor.(n' on some ot%er t%o&'%ts+
E+ C0 yo& are d(ssat(s0(ed w(t% t%e way C am represent(n' yo&, yo& rema(n 0ree to see. a new attorney+
<+ Anot%er $%&$.le re'ard(n' my owners%(p o0 str(p $l&)s+ C donSt own or %a/e any owners%(p (nterest
(n any str(p $l&)s, )rot%els, ad< )oo. stores or mo/(e %o&ses+ C '&ess t%at lea/es me 0ree to moral(-e+
!+ C st(ll donSt see t%e (mportan$e o0 Fr+ Merl(ss+ T%e reN&est 0or payment o0 an amo&nt eN&al to rent,
was 0or stora'e o0 yo&r personal property+ Oo& are ent(tled to $ontest t%e amo&nt o0 t%e stora'e 0ee,
w%($% yo& d(d+ T%ere (s no $red()le e/(den$e anyw%ere w%($% s&''ests t%at anyone (ntended to reopen
or $reate a new tenan$y allow(n' yo& to reta(n possess(on o0 t%e prem(ses+
I+ Fr+ Merl(ss (s an o&t o0 state w(tness+ Cn order to $ompel %(s appearan$e, %(s test(mony m&st )e
mater(al+ GRS "<8+815"6+ Ct does not appear t%at %(s test(mony (s mater(al &nder t%e (n0ormat(on yo&
%a/e pro/(ded 3&rt%er, &nder GRS "<8+8156 %e (s ent(tled to )e pa(d %(s s&)s(sten$e and tra/el
eJpenses (n$&rred (n $om(n' to Ge/ada+ Are yo& prepared to pay t%ose eJpenses (n ad/an$e o0 %(s
$om(n' to Ge/ada?
"2+ C donSt (ntend to 0aJ or e@ma(l to yo&, yo&r 0&ll 0(le (n t%(s $ase+ Oo& already %a/e e/eryt%(n' w(t%
t%e eJ$ept(on o0 a $o&ple o0 (tems w%($% C ma(led to yo&r old address+ C w(ll send t%em a'a(n to yo&r
new address+ C0 yo& want to re/(ew t%e 0(le yo& are wel$ome to do so at my o00($e+ C0 yo& want $op(es
o0 anyt%(n' (n t%e 0(le yo& may mar. t%e (tems+ A0ter '(/(n' yo& a $ost est(mate, 0or w%($% C reN&(re
payment (n ad/an$e, we w(ll pro/(de yo& w(t% $op(es o0 t%e mar.ed (tems+
Ke(t% Loom(s
3rom4 #a$% Co&'%l(n Tma(lto4-a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$omU
Sent4 Monday, Mar$% E, 2" "2433 PM
To4 .e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net9 sterm(t-*s)$'lo)al+net9 ,md*randa--a+$om9 ,)oles*$allat'+$om9
.r(st(emann(n'*ya%oo+$om9 .adl($,*reno+'o/
S&),e$t4 ( was e/($ted 3 "1 ", ( need a $ont(n&an$e
Fear Mr+ Loom(s,
C was wron'0&lly e/($ted on 3 "1 ", and C need a $ont(n&an$e (n t%e $r(m(nal trespass matter t%at yo&
set o/erly N&($.ly a'a(nst my eJpress w(s%es anyway+ My a)(l(ty to $olle$t e/(den$e ne$essary to my
de0ense and ot%erw(se prepare %as )een ad/ersely a00e$ted+ Add(t(onally, C donMt 0eel as t%o&'% yo& are
per0orm(n' (n an appropr(ate manner as de0ense $o&nsel, )&t rat%er yo& seem st&$. (n yo&r
prose$&tor(al ways, too N&($. to loo. 0or any eJ$&se w%atsoe/er to )&ry oneMs $ase, so C t%(n. yo& %a/e
0or$ed a spl(t %ere, w%($% 0&rt%er pre,&d($es my $ase and a&'ers towards a $ont(n&an$e+ Please mo/e
0or one (mmed(ately and $opy me on my ent(re 0(le )y ema(l and 0aJ please+ Add(t(onally, please see.
$lar(0($at(on 0rom t%e RMC as to w%et%er C am allowed to e/er send an ema(l to
renom&n($re$ords*reno+'o/+ Please note, today, D&d'e 3lana'an den(ed R($%ard :(llMs latest 0r(/olo&s
"!/"
mot(on+
F(d yo& .now t%at Ke/(n Kelly, o0 t%e State =ar o0 Ge/adaMs C%ara$ter and 3(tness Comm(ttee 0or at
least t%e last de$ade owns and r&ns t%e Spearm(nt R%(no str(p $l&) (n Las ;e'as4
%ttp4//www+re/(ew,o&rnal+$om/l/r,L%ome/22/Mar@2E@7ed@22/news/"!8"81+%tml
C .now C always l(.e my t%ree %o&r to&rs o0 %ea/y %anded moral(-(n' 0rom someone w%o r&ns a
monol(t%($ str(p $l&) (n Las ;e'as+
Oo& are on t%e State =ar o0 Ge/adaMs 0ee d(sp&te $omm(ttee, arenMt yo& Mr+ Loom(s? Fo yo& own any
str(p $l&)s?
Mr+ Loom(s, w%($% o0 t%e elements o0 t%e trespass $%ar'e RMC !+"2+282 do yo& 0eel are wea.est 0or
Fep&ty C(ty Attorney D(ll Fra.e, w%om C (n0ormed a)o&t t%e adm(ss(on )y Reno PF O00($er C%r(s
Carter t%at R($%ard G+ :(ll, EsN+ )r()es %(m, )&t 0or w%($% Ms+ Fra.e (nd($ated a $omplete la$. o0
(nterest and eJpressed t%at s%e wo&ld not )e 0ollow(n' &p on t%at report o0 )r()ery o0 a RPF O00($er+
Mr+ Kadl($, please pla$e a $opy o0 t%(s $orresponden$e (n D(ll Fra.eMs personnel 0(le+ Add(t(onally
please pla$e one (n All(son OrmaaMs personnel and employment 0(le too, (n add(t(on to Fep&ty C(ty
Attorney Fan 7on'Ms employment 0(le, as all t%ree o0 t%ose Fep&ty C(ty AttorneyMs were pro/(ded t%at
report and all t%ree (nd($ated t%ey d(d not $are and %ad no (ntent(on o0 0ollow(n' &p or ot%erw(se
(n/est('at(n' t%e adm(ss(on )y RPF O00($er C%r(s Carter t%at R($%ard G+ :(ll, EsN+ )r()ed %(m+ C t%(n.
t%e 0a(l&re to 0ollow &p )y any o0 t%ese 3 Fep&ty C(ty AttorneyMs relates to any 0&t&re ne'l('ent %(r(n',
tra(n(n', and s&per/(s(on $la(ms t%at t%e Reno C(ty Attorney may need to de0end a'a(nst w%en
represent(n' t%e Reno PF l(.e (t d(d (n t%e Eeo0 /+ P(tsno'le $ase4
%ttp4//www+l/r,+$om/news/reno@o00($(al@a$$&sed@o0@w(tness@tamper(n'@""E1!E1!+%tml
Oo& .now, Fep&ty C(ty Attorney OrmaasMs de$(s(on to p&s% on 0or t%at V<2 tra00($ t($.et (s loo.(n'
more and more (nterest(n'+ BB
O%, and, Mr+ Loom(s, Fr+ Merl(ss presen$e (s ne$essary )e$a&se %(s &nderstand(n' o0 t%e eJtent to
w%($% %(s attorney, R($%ard G+ :(ll, EsN+ %ad e00e$t(/ely res$(nded any e/($t(on Order )y send(n' a )(ll
0or t%e same amo&nt as 0&ll &se and o$$&pany o0 t%e lo$at(on at "" R(/er Ro$. St+ 'oes to t%e
s&)stan$e o0 t%e elements 0o&nd (n RMC !+"2+282 as well as t%e $red()(l(ty o0 )ot% Merl(ss and :(ll+
S(n$erely,
#a$% Co&'%l(n, EsN+, PO =OH E2I1, REGO, G;, !I12E, tel4 <<1 33! !""!, 0aJ4 I8I EE< <829
#a$%Co&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om Ge/ada =ar Go4 I8<3
Close Pr(nt
3&ll /(ew
W
W
=a$. to messa'es
RE4 rm$ "" $r E821 yo& are appo(nted $o&nsel? 0or p&entes ne ta(tel??
/</"
Ke(t% Loom(s
To M#a$% Co&'%l(nM
3rom4 Ke(t% Loom(s 5.e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net6
Sent4 Mon /</" 34< PM
To4 M#a$% Co&'%l(nM 5-a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om6
Mr+ Co&'%l(n4
E@ma(l wor.s well 0or me+
Ke(t% Loom(s
3rom4 #a$% Co&'%l(n Tma(lto4-a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$omU
Sent4 Monday, 3e)r&ary <, 2" <41E AM
"I/"
To4 .e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net
S&),e$t4 rm$ "" $r E821 yo& are appo(nted $o&nsel? 0or p&entes ne ta(tel?
%(, ( '&ess Mr+ Loom(s was appo(nted as my 3rd de0ense attorney (n RMC $ase "" $r E821+ C %a/e not
%eard anyt%(n' a)o&t t%(s $ase, and t%e RMC (nd($ated t%ey %ad not%(n' s$%ed&led+ Please
$omm&n($ate w(t% me only /(a ema(l or 0aJ please, %a/(n' (ss&es w(t% my ma(l (n$(dent to domest($
/(olen$e $omm(tted a'a(nst me my 0aJ (s I8I EE< <82+ t%an.s,
#a$% Co&'%l(n
3&ll /(ew
W
W
=a$. to messa'es
$o&rt date?
3/21/"
Ke(t% Loom(s
To M#a$% Co&'%l(nM
3rom4 Ke(t% Loom(s 5.e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net6
Sent4 Mon 3/21/" 842I PM
To4 M#a$% Co&'%l(nM 5-a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om6
Mr+ Co&'%l(n4
C %a/e reN&ested t%at $o&rt set yo&r trespass $ase 0or tr(al (n a)o&t 32 days+ C w(ll let yo& .now t%e date
and t(me as soon as C .now+
Ke(t% Loom(s
3&ll /(ew
W
W
=a$. to messa'es
RE4 $o&rt date?
3/2</"
Ke(t% Loom(s
To -a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om
3rom4 Ke(t% Loom(s 5.e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net6
Sent4 7ed 3/2</" 843E PM
To4 -a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om
Mr+ Co&'%l(n4
On w%at 'ro&nds, ot%er t%an t%ose already set 0ort% (n yo&r eJ(st(n' mot(on, do yo& )el(e/e a mot(on to
d(sm(ss s%o&ld )e 0(led?
Ke(t% Loom(s
3rom4 #a$% Co&'%l(n Tma(lto4-a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$omU
Sent4 7ednesday, Mar$% 2<, 2" "481 AM
To4 .e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net
S&),e$t4 RE4 $o&rt date
Mr+ Loom(s,
Please $opy me on any and all $orresponden$es, 0(l(n', or ot%er do$&mentat(on or /er)al reN&ests,
$orresponden$es, et$+ t%at yo& s&)m(t to t%e Co&rt, (n$l&d(n' t%e one yo& re0eren$e )elow+ Please do
not 0ollow Ta(telMs ta$t o0 a'ree(n' to reN&ests or 0a(l(n' to oppose mot(ons w(t%o&t e/en attempt(n' to
o)ta(n my perm(ss(on to (n ad/an$e t%ereo0+
C wo&ld l(.e 0or yo& to dra0t a Mot(on to F(sm(ss (n t%(s $ase 0or me re/(ew+
2/"
T%an.s,
#a$% Co&'%l(n, EsN+, "8 E+ It% St+ A, REGO, G; !I1", tel4 <<1 33! !""!, 0aJ4 I8I EE< <829
#a$%Co&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om Ge/ada =ar Go4 I8<3
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
3rom4 .e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net
To4 -a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om
S&),e$t4 $o&rt date
Fate4 Mon, 1 Mar 2" "E42I4"I @2!22
Mr+ Co&'%l(n4
C %a/e reN&ested t%at $o&rt set yo&r trespass $ase 0or tr(al (n a)o&t 32 days+ C w(ll let yo& .now t%e date
and t(me as soon as C .now+
Ke(t% Loom(s
3&ll /(ew
W
W
=a$. to messa'es
RE4 $o&rt date?
3/2I/"
Ke(t% Loom(s
To -a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om
3rom4 Ke(t% Loom(s 5.e(t%loom(s*eart%l(n.+net6
Sent4 3r( 3/2I/" "24"8 AM
To4 -a$%$o&'%l(n*%otma(l+$om
Go worr(es+ Made me la&'%+
Co&ple o0 N&est(ons4
F(d yo& 0(le an appeal 0rom D&st($e o0 t%e Pea$e S0erra--aSs e/($t(on order?
C0 yes, %as (t )een resol/ed?
F(d S0erra--a anno&n$e at t%e $lose o0
"/"
traffic/ parking citations
Chris Carter that Richard G. Hill, Esq. bribes him, but for which Ms. Drake indicated a complete
lack of interest and expressed that she would not be following up on that report of bribery of a
RPD Officer. Mr. Kadlic, please place a copy of this correspondence in J ill Drake's personnel file.
Additionally please place one in Allison Ormaa's personnel and employment file too, in addition to
Deputy City Attorney Dan Wong's employment file, as all three of those Deputy City Attorney's
were provided that report and all three indicated they did not care and had no intention of
following up or otherwise investigating the admission by RPD Officer Chris Carter that Richard G.
Hill, Esq. bribed him. I think the failure to follow up by any of these 3 Deputy City Attorney's
relates to any future negligent hiring, training, and supervision claims that the Reno City Attorney
may need to defend against when representing the Reno PD like it did in the Eeof v. Pitsnogle
case:
http://www.lvrj.com/news/reno-official-accused-of-witness-tampering-116586528.html
You know, Deputy City Attorney Ormaas's decision to push on for that $70 traffic
ticket is looking more and more interesting. \\
Oh, and, Mr. Loomis, Dr. Merliss presence is necessary because his understanding
of the extent to which his attorney, Richard G. Hill, Esq. had effectively rescinded
any eviction Order by sending a bill for the same amount as full use and occupany of
the location at 121 River Rock St. goes to the substance of the elements found in
RMC 8.10.040 as well as the credibility of both Merliss and Hill.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar
No: 9473
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Wed 3/21/12 9:18 AM
To: cityclerk@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov; vj@npri.org; mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us
4 attachments
PAUL SIFRE TransparentNevada city of reno failed to report cost of health care benefits.htm (3.6 KB) , KIMBERLY
BRADSHAW TransparentNevada.htm (3.3 KB) , J OHN TARTER TransparentNevada tarter 2010.htm (3.3 KB) ,
MARCIA LOPEZ TransparentNevada sergeant monica lopez 2010.htm (3.3 KB)
Dear City Clerk,
I prefer if you communicate to me in writing, by email only. I have a ticket from 1/12/12 that I believe should be dismissed.
Issue NO 020148154. I was wrongfully arrested by the "community oriented policing" Reno Police Department shortly before
that ticket was, apparently issued. Yes, a custodial arrest for "jaywalking" of an attorney, myself. I do not believe I should be
charged for the ticket under these circumstances. Further, upon being released from jail in 25 degree cold late that night, right
after the last RTC bus for the night had left (what a coincidence). Sargent Sifre admitted to me at the scene of the wrongful
arrest that he ordered it done by fresh face training cop Officer Leedy. I was literally attacked by the Reno Police Department,
my camera taking out of my hands. I told Sargent Sifre not to turn the camera off, but he did so, gleefully. You think a
young sargent making more than some of the top litigation attorneys in town (and more than District Court J udges make)
would be a bit more cheerful, but you would be wrong. See, I was at my former home law office filming Richard G. Hill's
crew taking the personal property in it that I believe I will ultimately be entitled to sue for damages to, to the town dump.
Now, RPD Officer Hollingsworth did tell me that, because I was just peacably there on public property, on the sidewalk, that I
was not breaking any laws....but, see...Richard G. Hill didn't like that, probably because I was gathering evidence that will
ultimately make the "wrong site surgery" he did on behalf of his Californian nuerosurgeon landlord client, something for
which Hill will be liabile for (Hill decided to bill his client somewhere in the neighborhood of $40K to attempt to remove me,
a commercial tenant, from the property via the summary eviction procedures found in NRS 40.253, based only on a No Cause
Eviction notice, which is expressly forbidden (one cannot summarily evict a commercial tenant unless the non-payment of rent
is alleged...and Hill didn't want to get into that because the facts were so poor on habitability and retaliation, etc., etc. So,
Hill also gets a TPO issued by the Reno J ustice Court, in record time, within forty minutes of filing it that day....And RPD
Officer Look practicaly broke into the Washoe County jail trying to serve it on me within an hour of Hill filing it. Gosh,
those RPD Officers sure work hard when Richard G. Hill, Esq. is involved! But just you try to get them to arrest anyone
from Nevada Court Services for trespassing, even though someone posted a video of them doing just that on youtube:
http://www.freeexistence.org/police_state.html
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zbNoYqK_ZU4
Then there is Sargent Tarter, would retaliated against me for reporting to him that RPD Officer Chris Carter admitted to me to
taking bribes from Richard G. Hill, Esq. in connection with my 11/12/11 arrest for trespass (apparently I am never eligible for
a citation from the Reno PD or for an OR release from the WCSO, how convenient for everyone...) by issuign me three traffic
citations minutes after he demanded I leave Richard G. Hill's vicinity (or the area near Hill's law office at 652 Forrest St.)
where I had gone upon being released from jail on 11/15/11 to retrieve my wallet and Nevada driver's license from Hill, whom
refused to give me those items for another 7 days, and who further withheld my client's files from me and them for another 6
weeks. Then, RMC J udge Nash Holmes had me arrested for summary contempt in court when I dared to cross examine
Sargent Tarter about his retaliatory citations. While having me arrested, J udge Holmes apparently decided the court was
entitled to keep both of my cell phones and my electric shaver.
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar
No: 9473
--Forwarded Message Attachment--
Detail page for PAUL SIFRE
Name PAUL SIFRE
Position
Sergeant
Reno
Notice
The City of Reno failed to report the cost of employee health care benefits. Only the cost
of retirement benefits is included within the "Benefits" category for this jurisdiction.
Year 2009
Base Pay $89,019.87
Overtime and
Callback Collected
$7,595.10
Total Pay $108,955.53
Benefits Accumulated $32,937.35
Total Pay & Benefits $141,892.88
State Government: Salaries, CAFRS, Main Contracts Page, State Financial Documents
Education: CCSD Warrants, NSHE Budgets
Politicians: 2010 Transparency Survey, Congressional Disbursements
Connect: Facebook, Twitter
About Us: Contact Us, FAQ, Disclaimer
TransparentNevada is provided by the Nevada Policy Research Institute as a public service.
--Forwarded Message Attachment--
Detail page for KIMBERLY BRADSHAW
Name KIMBERLY BRADSHAW
Position
7555 Sergeant
Reno
Year 2010
Base Pay $109,225.10
Overtime and
Callback Collected
$5,644.98
Other Pay $38,501.64
Total Pay $153,371.72
Benefits AccumulatedN/A
Total Pay & Benefits $193,785.03
State Government: Salaries, CAFRS, Main Contracts Page, State Financial Documents
Education: CCSD Warrants, NSHE Budgets
Politicians: 2010 Transparency Survey, Congressional Disbursements
Connect: Facebook, Twitter
About Us: Contact Us, FAQ, Disclaimer
TransparentNevada is provided by the Nevada Policy Research Institute as a public service.
--Forwarded Message Attachment--
Detail page for J OHN TARTER
Name J OHN TARTER
Position
7555 Sergeant
Reno
Year 2010
Base Pay $109,225.10
Overtime and
Callback Collected
$7,733.14
Other Pay $17,535.81
Total Pay $134,494.05
Benefits AccumulatedN/A
Total Pay & Benefits $174,907.34
State Government: Salaries, CAFRS, Main Contracts Page, State Financial Documents
Education: CCSD Warrants, NSHE Budgets
Politicians: 2010 Transparency Survey, Congressional Disbursements
Connect: Facebook, Twitter
About Us: Contact Us, FAQ, Disclaimer
TransparentNevada is provided by the Nevada Policy Research Institute as a public service.
--Forwarded Message Attachment--
Detail page for MARCIA LOPEZ
Name MARCIA LOPEZ
Position
7555 Sergeant
Reno
FW: City Clerk's Office
Year 2010
Base Pay $92,481.00
Overtime and
Callback Collected
$7,012.04
Other Pay $16,916.20
Total Pay $116,409.24
Benefits AccumulatedN/A
Total Pay & Benefits $150,627.21
State Government: Salaries, CAFRS, Main Contracts Page, State Financial Documents
Education: CCSD Warrants, NSHE Budgets
Politicians: 2010 Transparency Survey, Congressional Disbursements
Connect: Facebook, Twitter
About Us: Contact Us, FAQ, Disclaimer
TransparentNevada is provided by the Nevada Policy Research Institute as a public service.
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Thu 3/08/12 4:22 AM
To: cityclerk@reno.gov
Dear Sharon and Reno City Clerk's Office,
I have not heard or received anything on the request I sent below. Please respond only by email or fax as I have been a victim
of domestic violence recently that has faced tampering with his mail...
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar
No: 9473
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: cityclerk@reno.gov
Subject: City Clerk's Office
Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2012 08:14:04 -0800
Dear City Clerk and Sharon,
Hello, I am writing again about these tickets. I was told that when you go to court at the RMC and you get a ticket while there
for a court date that you will be given a voucher that will take care of that ticket. I went to Court on November 30th, 2011. I
was told there was not possibility of jail time, however, J udge Howard sentenced me to a summary three days in jail on the spot,
so my car was parked there and I was in jail when the ticket came on December 3rd, 2011. May I please have that ticket
excused under the policy I mention above? Please let me know if there is anythind I need to do in that regard.
With respect to the other ticket, from 11/3/11, I wish to dispute it and have not been able to get any information from the City
Clerk's Office with respect to getting a court date or why fines accrue prior to such an opportunity for judicial review. Should not
the additional fines be stayed until an opportunity for review? Please communicate with my by email, in writing.
Thanks,
Zach Coughlin
PS. I am indigent.
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: cityclerk@reno.gov
Subject: RE: debt validation documentation request and dispute letter under FDCPA to City of Reno et al
Date: Mon, 9 J an 2012 19:01:22 -0800
Dear Reno City Clerk's Office,
Hello, I hope you are having a nice day.
I have called several times and keeping leaving messages about disputing the following parking tickets, and do not believe any "additional
fines" should have attached to the base fine where I have communicated that I am disputing them and have not receive a response with regard
to the date and time of my hearing to dispute them:
Citation Details
Citation Number: 020146724
Amount Due: $60.00
Issue Date: 12/03/2011 10:30:00
Plate Number: 838NER
State: NV
Related Citations
We have found the following additional outstanding citations for this license plate number. Please check the box next to each
additional citation that you would like to pay for at this time.
Citation Number Issue Date Amount Due
020145322 11/03/2011 03:20:00 $55.00
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: renodirect@reno.gov; renomunirecords@reno.gov
Subject: debt validation documentation request and dispute letter under FDCPA to City of Reno et al
Date: Mon, 9 J an 2012 18:09:30 -0800
Dear City of Reno,
This writing is written notice to you that I dispute the debt your office and the City of Reno and or the Reno Municipal Court
has recently sent me, alleging that I owe some debt for either parking tickets and or traffic citations. Further, I request
verification and documentation in support of your contention that I owe such a debt pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2521, and may contain confidential information intended for the
specified individual (s) only. If you are not the intended recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and
that any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is confidential, intended only for the named
recipient(s) and may contain information that is privileged, attorney work product or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient(s),
you are notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on the contents of this information is prohibited and may be
unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or are not the named recipient(s), please notify the sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in
any form immediately. Receipt by anyone other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work product, or other applicable privilege.
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com