-3 (2), 2010

European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

An Attempt at Pseudo-Democracy and Tactical Liberalization in Turkey: An Analysis of Ismet Inns Decision to Transition to a Multi-Party Political System

Kemal Ozden* and Ihsan Yilmaz**

Abstract

Turkish experiment of transition to multi-party politics in 1946 has been seen by transition to democracy comparativists as an example of the cases in which the ruling elites deliberately decide that the society is diverse so this diversity needs to be translated into the political sphere by allowing multi-party politics. However, this study challanges this view and suggests that a close reading of the critical juncture of 1946 when the President and the leader of Republican Peoples Party smet nn decided to allow other parties to operate shows that it was not that the President nn succumbed to the reality of diversity but domestic and international concerns forced him to act towards a multi-party political structure. In his mind, he had a pseudodemocratic system where he and his party would continue to rule the country in a hegemonic party system setting where a ruling party monopolizes the political arena, using coercion, patronage, media control, and other means to deny formally legal opposition parties any real chance of competing for power.
Keywords: Pseudo-Democracy, Tactical Liberalization, Multi-Party Politics,

Democratic Elections, Turkish Politics, smet nn

(corresponding author), Fatih University. kemalozden@fatih.edu.tr Fatih University. iyilmaz@fatih.edu.tr

**

189

Kemal Ozden, Ihsan Yilmaz

Introduction What conditions make democracy possible and what conditions make it thrive? Political scientists favor types of explanations for this question. First, stable democracy is connected with certain economic and social background conditions. Second explanation argues that there is a need for certain beliefs and attitudes among the citizens for democracy to survive. Third explanation looks at the social and political structure (Rustow 1970, 337-338). But the problem is, these explanations do not address the question how democracies emerge in the first place (Rustow 1970, 339). Rustow (1970) argues that the vast majority of citizens must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to in order democracy to emerge. Secondly, the dynamic process of democratization is set off by a prolonged and inclusive political struggle (Rustow 1970, 352). The emergence of new elite that arouses a depressed and previously leaderless social group into concerted action could start such a struggle (Rustow 1970, 352). Polarization not pluralism is the defining characteristic of the emergence period (Rustow 1970, 354). Thirdly, emergence of democracy is related to deliberate decision of the political leaders to acknowledge the existence of diversity and to be ready to transmit the diversity into political parties by allowing political parties to be established and freely operate (Rustow 1970, 355). Turkish experiment of transition to multi-party politics in 1946 has been seen by scholars, and Rustow is one of them, as an example of the above-mentioned third explanation that the political leaders delibaretely decided that the society was diverse so this diversity needed to be translated inti politics by allowing multi-party politics but a close reading of the critical juncture of 1946 when the President and the leader of Republican Peoples Party (RPP) smet nn decided to allow other parties to operate shows that it was not that the President nn succumbed to the reality of diversity but domestic and international concerns forced him to act towards a multi-party political structure. But again, a close scrutiny of his decisions and behaviours before and after the decision shows also that in his mind he had a pseudo-democratic system where he and his party would continue to rule the country in a hegemonic party system setting. In a hegemonic party system, a relatively institutionalized ruling party monopolizes the political arena, using coercion, patronage, media control, and other means to deny formally legal opposition parties any real chance of competing for power (Diamond 2002, 25). In the words of Volpi (2004, 1063), the term pseudo-democracy resonates distinctively with the contemporary era, in which democracy is the only broadly legitimate regime form, and regimes have felt unprecedented pressure (international and domestic) to adoptor at least to mimicthe democratic form (see also Collier and Levitsky 1997, Levitsky and Way 2002, Diamond 2002, 24). In such a

190

European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

political setting, the existence of formally democratic political institutions, such as multiparty electoral competition, masks (often, in part, to legitimate) the reality of authoritarian domination. (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1999, xviii). Some other scholars labe this phenomenon as tactical liberalization (Brumberg 2004). In these tactically liberalized pseudo-democracies, elections and other democratic institutions are largely faades, yet they may provide some space for political opposition, independent media, and social organizations that do not seriously criticize or challenge the regime (Diamond 2002, 26). Our analysis of the Turkish case suggests that this is what the President nn had in mind when he opted for multiparty politics in 1946s Turkey just after the World War II. To perceive that the transition to a multiparty era was an event that appeared at a stroke would no doubt be a grave error. In Turkish political history, and in particular in the process of democracy, many national and international social, political and economic factors were effective in reaching this very crucial stage. A single party emerges from a society that is believed to be classless. There is only one party in the system because there are no other classes. The RPP elites, due to this belief, assumed that there was no need for other political parties and even today the heated debates surrounding Islam-state-society issues show that the RPP elite has always wanted to maintain their imagined monopolist political hegemony over the public sphere by several means (see in detail Yilmaz 2002, 2005, 2009). In a party congress in 1923, Mustafa Kemal, founder of the Turkish Republic and RPP stated that In my view, our people will follow many different interests from each other and because of this, does not reside amongst the various classes that are in conflict with each other. The classes within the nation are of the nature that are necessary, that complement each other and form a whole. For this reason the Peoples Party will work to provide the rights, the reasons for advancement and the prosperity for all classes (Saribay 2001, 43-44). Thus, initially the Kemalist elite advocated the view that there was no need for a second party as the nation was assumed to be monolithic and homogenous. But as a result of the domestic and international pressures, they had to accept a second party but this time they implicitly argued that there was no need for a second ideology. That is why they only recognized a party that was established by their former party colleagues. As a matter of fact, like Mustafa Kemal before him, nn encouraged his former party colleagues to establish a party. 1946 is the strongest evidence to show that what nn was doing was not different from what Mustafa Kemal did. He only needed a weak opposition party to tackle domestic and international pressures. As far as the international setting, concerns and pressures were concerned, this was indeed a reminiscent of the modernist and

191

Kemal Ozden, Ihsan Yilmaz

western-oriented Ottoman elite tradition of the nineteenth century: any time they wanted to please the Western powers they announced liberal changes such as 1839 and 1856 but hesitated to apply them. Domestic Pressure One of the main domestic pressures that forced both Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his successor  smet nn to move towards tactical liberalization or pseudodemocracy was the fact the Turkish society experienced democracy and multi-party politics well before the establishment of the Republic in 1923 which started a one party authoritarian regime. Thus, to say that a multi-party system in Turkey commenced in 1946 is in one respect a mistake for prior to the single party era in 1923, a multi-party political system was present in the Ottoman state and even during the Independence War between 1920-1922, the Parliament had two main groups that opposed each other on several issues. Domestic pressure had always existed during the time of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and even in his most powerful years he responded to these pressures by having a satellite party established in 1930. But observing the new partys meteoric rise in popularity, he shut down the party after 3 months of operation even though the new partys ideology was identical to his own ruling party (Republican Peoples Party) and its founders were his old friends, including his sister. When looking at political parties during the Ottoman period, we first note that they emerged as a society or committee (cemiyet) and later took the name party (f1 rka). Even though certain organizations had party or a prototype party characteristics, the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress (ttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) is considered to be the first political party. Aside from this, the Ottoman Union Committee (ttihad-1 Osmani Cemiyeti) founded in 1889, the Private Enterprise and Re-Administration Committee (Teebbs-i ahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti) founded in 1902 and in the following years, the Ottoman Freedom Party (Osmanl1

Ahrar F1 rkas1 ), the Ottoman Democracy Party (Osmanl1 Demokrat F1rkas1 or F1rka-i bad), the Moderate Freedom Lovers Party (Mutedil Hrriyetperveran F1rkas1 ), the Peoples Party (Ahali Partisi), the Ottoman Socialist Party (Osmanl1 Sosyalist F1rkas1 ), the Freedom and Alliance Party (Hrriyet ve tilaf F1rkas1 ), the National Constitution Party (Milli Merutiyet F1rkas1 ), the Social Democrat Party (Sosyal Demokrat F1rkas1 ), the Peoples Participation Party (Halk  tirakiyun F1rkas1 ) and numerous other political parties whose names have not been mentioned here clearly indicate that parties continued their activities throughout the late Ottoman era.

192

European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

Even if it is believed that a one-party system reflects the characteristics of a classless society, soon after the Parliament began its activities, different viewpoints, political movements and power groups began to emerge. Different from Mustafa Kemals First Group, the Second Group continued its activities as an opposition group. dris Kkmer explained the reason for this separation as, Competition among bureaucrats. According to Kkmer, this Second Group was in fact parallel to the Ottoman Freedom and Allegiance Party. After its founding in 1920, certain dissidences appeared in the Turkish Parliament, Turkey Grand National Assembly (TGNA). In essence these differences can be gathered into two groups. The first group was those that supported the ideas and programs under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and the second group, which allegedly were the so-called supporters of the sultanate and caliphate. In fact, Heper says that, religion was never used as a tool for the mobilization of the masses of people other than the first years of the War of Independence (Heper 1986, 375). Since the separation of the Parliament prevented the rapid working of the reforms, Mustafa Kemal sought measures that would accelerate the work of the TGNA. One solution was to form a large group within the Parliament thereby obtaining a majority and thus have the Parliament work move forward again. To this end, Mustafa Kemal formed the Anatolian and Rumelia Legal Defense Group together with 151 of his friends on 10 May 1921. In the election that took place on the same day, Mustafa Kemal was elected to the Groups leadership. In time those who were outside the Anatolian and Rumelia Legal Defense Group were given the name the Second Group and this group by opposing certain activities became an opposition movement (Yucel 2006, 53). The first group within the Parliament became the Halk F1rkas1 in 1923. The name was changed to the Cumhuriyet Halk F1rkas1 on 10 November 1924 and to the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- CHP (Republican Peoples Party- RPP) in 1931 (Kili 1976, 21). The RPP had assumed the centralist, secular and nationalist roles of the unionists (Turgut 1986, 435). Since a preparation for elections was in question, the duality that arose in Ottoman society and as a consequence the resistance against the Islamist-Eastern fronts power that could win a majority, forced this Group to cooperate among themselves. While under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, the First Group contained representatives that were not prepared for the declaration of the Republic and even those who opposed it (Kkmer, 100). The Second Group could not prepare for the 1923 elections and did not enter the elections. Later it dissolved by itself. Actually, new amendments on the Treason Act in 1923 ( hanet-i Vataniye Kanunu) of is an important

193

Kemal Ozden, Ihsan Yilmaz

factor behind the dissolution of the second group (Erdoan 2003, 53). Because more than 1500 death penalty were given according to this act between 1920-1923. Progressive Republican Party In the transition to a multi-party system and up to the Democratic Party, two important party experiments took place in Turkey. The first was the Progressive Republican Party (Terekkiperver Cumhuriyet F1 rkas1 ) (PRP) and the other was the Free Republican Party ( Serbest Cumhuriyet F1 rkas1 ) (FRP). The events that took place in the transition to a multi-party system, led the RPP to believe that other parties would violate the reforms. This situation was the cause for the postponement to a multi-party transition for a considerable period of time (Kili 1976, 81). Those who were outside the First Group in the Parliament were uneasy due to the fact they were not a strong opposition, that there was only one power in the Parliament and as a consequence they were not faced with a secure opposition and in their view that this was a danger to democracy. After the War of Independence, certain disputes appeared among Mustafa Kemal and his friends in the Parliament on the question of a series of reforms to be undertaken. Within time these differences became deeper and wider. Certain representatives who were uncomfortable with the actions of the Republican Peoples Party and who opposed them considered resigning. In fact, an important number of them were Mustafa Kemals comrade-in-arms prior to and after the War of Independence. Among the leading figures in this group were Kaz1 m Karabekir, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Refet Bele, Rauf Orbay and Adnan Ad1 var. Within this context a total of eleven individuals resigned from the Republican Peoples Party and formed a new party under the name of the Progressive Republican Party in 1924. Following the allowance of a multi-party system with the 1924 Constitution, the founders of the Progressive Republican Party, which was founded on 17 November 1924, were concerned that without the existence of an opposition all powers lodged in the Parliament would create an authoritarian administration. The objective of the Progressive Republican Party was to establish a democratic balance within the country. The Progressive Republican Party thus became the first opposition party in the history of the Republic. Tense relations between the Republican Party and the Progressive Party took place in the Parliament, whereas some members of the Republican Party claimed that the two parties programs were similar and that the Progressive Party was founded needlessly. As a result of the election, Kaz1 m Karabekir became the chairman of the Progressive Republican Party, Rauf Orbay as the deputy chairman and Ali Fuat Cebesoy was appointed to the position of general secretary. The program of the Progressive Party stated that it was faithful to the Republican

194

European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

administration and in any event the word republican in its name can be seen as an indication of this declaration. In other words, it had no intention of bringing back the sultanate and the caliphate as their adversaries claimed. However, they claimed they were bound to the will of the people and that the reforms which would modernize society should not take place immediately but through time by adjusting to the process. The Progressive Partys program, to summarize, emphasized its loyalty to the will of the nation and its adherence to the republican administration and that the reforms necessary to modernize society should not take place rapidly but rather piecemeal. Compared to the Republican Peoples Party, the PRP adopted more liberal and democratic views and attached greater importance to individual freedoms. Within a short time adding 28 representatives, the PRP followed a liberal democratic platform and in this respect its objective was to revive the liberal economic policies spearheaded by the Private Enterprise and Re-Administration Committee founded by Prince Sabahattin. The party shortly found wide support in the press (Tuncay 1981, 106). However, with the Sheikh Said uprising, before it could complete its seventh month of political life, the PRP was closed by the government on 3 June 1925. Shortly after the partys closing, on the justification that the party had a role in the Izmir Assassination attempt against Mustafa Kemal, the founders and members of the PRP were tried in court and as a result 17 of the party members were executed. Rauf Orbay and Adnan Ad1 var were sentenced to ten years of hard labor (Zurcher 1992, 123). Later, nn pointed out that the Independence Tribunal which banned this party, exaggerated so called conservative discourses of Progressive Party (Heper 1998, 177). Free Republican Party With the closing of the Progressive Republican Party on 3 June 1925, the multiparty experiment in Turkey came to an end and once again a one-party period commenced. When looked from the outside, the one-party administration had been led to wrong assessments and the view that Turkey was governed by a dictatorship was becoming widespread. Feeling uncomfortable from the negative image formed outside, Mustafa Kemal considered a new party towards a transition to a new multiparty system. In addition, the reforms carried out between 1922 and 1930 had led to a resistance against the government. An opposition movement was simmering throughout the country. Certain goods coming under state monopoly and the effects of the economic recession spreading throughout the globe had given a momentum to this opposition. Political and economic stagnation had led to citizens questioning the one-party government. Atatrks principle of etatism was perceived wrongly by those within the party and a monopolism or state capitalism took place in its implementation

195

Kemal Ozden, Ihsan Yilmaz

(Kucukomer 1994, 95). Mustafa Kemal asked his school friend Fethi Okyar to be the leader of this new party. Aside from the partys founder, the partys name, program and the members of the Parliament to be transferred to the new party were determined personally by Mustafa Kemal. Thus, the Free Republican Party was founded on 12 August 1930. Fourteen members from the Republican Peoples s Party transferred to the new party (Tuncay 1995, 71). Among the important members of the FRP, Atatrks sister Makbule Atadan is mentioned (Tunaya 1952, 630). With this party Mustafa Kemal sought to end the negative dictatorship image seen from the outside; control the opposition from the inside, and warn and require vigilance against the thought of the Republican Peoples s Party members and smet nn that the reforms have been set, what was necessary has been done and that the principles of the Republic have been completely adopted. According to the party program of the FRP, it was attached to the principles of republicanism, nationalism and secularism, that it defended liberalism and the granting of political rights to women (Akin 2002, 148). The FRP found a large mass of followers among the nation soon after its founding. Those who opposed the RPP government and those against the reforms quickly gathered around the FRP. For this reason Fethi Okyars visit to the Aegean region as a political rally prior to the local elections became the stage for important developments. Meetings that took place in this region witnessed very wide citizen participation. The Izmir visit became the vehicle for significant events and the cry, Fethi Bey is coming shook the region. The people of Izmir gathered at the meeting area in wave after wave and nearly went down on their knees for Fethi Bey shouting, Save us, save us. In this confusion the father of a child shot by a policeman laid the child at his feet and pleaded, This is our first sacrifice but if more sacrifices are necessary we are willing to do so, but please save us. Despite all the precautions taken at these meetings, demonstrations against the government and reforms nevertheless took place. This situation, from the view of the vitality of the reforms, indicated that it was too early to form an opposition party. However, expanding very rapidly during a short period, the FRP won 22 out of 500 municipalities in the 1930 local elections. FRPs win at Samsun and Silifke provinces caused a shockwave in the government and claiming that the FRP had committed fraud; certain municipal election results were cancelled. Silifke was punished by decreasing its administrative structure from a province to sub-province. This change of administrative structure resulted in a lot of economic, social and cultural disadvantages for the dwellers of these provinces. This type of punishments has unfortunately appeared from time to time in Turkish history of democracy. A similar situation took place during the Democratic Party era. After Osman Blkba1 was elected to the

196

European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

TGNA from K1 rehir province as an independent candidate, the Democratic Party turned K1 rehir into a sub-province. The allegations that the FRP engaged in irregularities during the local elections caused heated debates in the Parliament and brought Mustafa Kemal and Fethi Bey face to face with one another. Fethi Bey not wanting to be in a predicament where the FRP rapidly became a party of those focused against the Republic and the reforms, dissolved the party by submitting a petition to the Ministry of the Interior. During the foundation of the Free Party, Atatrk wrote a letter to Fethi Bey stating that as the President he is above party politics and that he could not intervene in the activities of both parties (Tunaya 1952, 633). The FRP closed on 17 November 1930 after three month of political life. Thus, not being free despite its name and with the closing of a satellite party, the continuation of a one-party regime in Turkey until 1950 became inevitable. Despite the fact that the FRP used the word free in its name, it is quite obvious that this party was neither free nor independent. Consequently, one cannot claim that with this party a transition to a multi-party system took place. On the contrary, this period only shows that a transition took place from a single-party to a dominant party system. In a dominant party system, there can be more than one party but only one party is given the opportunity to come to power. The other parties either do not have the power to govern or such a power and opportunity is not accorded to them. After the Free Republican Party, a number of other parties were tried to be established in 1930 and 1931, but either they were not allowed to be formed or those established were shut down a short time later. Examples that can be provided are the Turkish Republic Workmen and Farmers Party, the Peoples s Republic Party and the Secular Republic Workers and Farmers Party. As the support given to the Progressive Republican Party and the Free Republican Party had shown that the reforms had not been sufficiently embraced by the people, which had pushed them to seek new avenues of recourse. The sociological factor that made this recourse meaningful was the deepening conflict of interest between the war affluent and the large land owners on the one side and the bureaucracy on the other. The reason for this was that the RPP, through the Law on the Provision of Land to Farmers and based on its belief in populism, wanted to elevate the living standards of the poor segments in the country but that this ultimately infringed the interests of the more powerful segments of society (Saribay 2001, 51). Insufficient infrastructure in the countryside and basic necessities such as roads, water and electricity not reaching villages had opened RPPs legitimacy to debate. In 1953, only 10 villages out of 40,000 had electricity. Inflation had risen and civil servants

197

Kemal Ozden, Ihsan Yilmaz

were the segment most affected by this rise. The discomfort felt by villagers due to heavy taxes had gone as far as becoming the subject of jokes. The 1942 wealth tax had put pressure on the upper class and had left them in difficult circumstances leading them to openly realize that the RPP did not protect their interests. During the Second World War, the government by lowering the prices of agricultural produce in order to fight inflation and introducing an Agricultural Tax had left farmers in a precarious situation. The 1945 Law on the Provision of Land to Farmers created bitterness among large land holders and led the way for the strengthening of the opposition. Together with all of these negative factors, the disenfranchisement of basic political rights by citizens, the ban on political organizations, for example trade unions, had increasingly strengthened the argument for an opposition throughout the country. By the end of the Second World War,  smet nns government had become deeply unpopular, even hated, by the large majority of the Turkish population for a variety of reasons. Zurcher (2003, 206) notes that the small farmers in the rural areas, who made up about 80 per cent of the total population had not seen any great improvement in their standard of living, in health, education or communications. For instance, as late as 1953 the total number of villages that had been linked up to the electric grid was only ten (10), or 0.025 per cent of Turkeys 40,000 villages. On the other hand, the one characteristic of the modern state with which the villagers had become familiar during the 25 years of Kemalist rule was only the states effective and sometimes ruthless control over the rural masses and the gendarme and tax collector became more hated and feared than ever (Zurcher 2004, 206). The landlords and villagers had been alienated by laws which virtually allowed forced collection of farm produce (Ahmad 1993, 102). Moreover, the states secularist policies, especially the suppression of expressions of popular faith, severed the most important ideological bond between state and subject (Zurcher 2004, 207). The erosion of the political alliance between the military-bureaucratic elite, the landlords, and the bourgeoisie made the status quo impossible to maintain (Ahmad 1993, 102). As Zurcher (2003, 207) underlines, nns government lost the support of important elements of the Young Turk coalition since during the WW II, the government, faced with the necessity to feed and equip a large army, had paid for its needs by having the Central Bank print money, thus creating inflation. At the same time, nn had tried to mitigate the social effects of this policy by establishing price controls and by punitive taxation on excessive profits through the wealth tax and the tax on agricultural produce. The inflation had led to a sharp drop in purchasing power for the civil servants, who numbered about 220,000. For lowerranking civil servants the drop was about one-third; for senior civil servants it was as high as two-thirds, which was something that led to tensions within the bureaucracy

198

European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

(Zurcher 2004, 207). In addition, even though its main victim had been the non-Muslim business community, the wealth tax ( varl1 k vergisi) of 1942 had caused suspicion among the nascent Turkish bourgeoisie who perceived that the Kemalist regime, dominated as it was by bureaucrats and the military, was not an reliable supporter of the bourgeoisies interests (Zurcher 2004, 207). Similarly, large landowners who had been an essential element in the Young Turk coalition since the First World War, had also been alienated by the nns policy of artificially low pricing of agricultural produce to combat inflation during the war (Zurcher 2004, 208). nn was aware of the domestic tensions and pressure and remembering Atatrks experiment with the Free Party in 1930, he decided to allow a degree of political liberalization and the formation of a political opposition as a safety valve. But as Zurcher (2003, 208) highlights, his tactical liberalization move owed also something to international developments. International Pressure and Multi-Party Discussions In 1945, as the Second World War came to an end, the winds of freedom and democracy were blowing throughout the world. Fascism, which represented an authoritarian state ideology in Europe and Asia, had been eliminated and the atomic bombs dropped on Japan had changed the course of the war signaling the defeat of the Axis Powers. As a result, a more liberal and democratic government view had taken over from an authoritarian state view and, with that, an etatist and authoritarian state understanding in Turkey began to be questioned. In a very general sense, the defeat of the Axis powers in the WW II was in itself a victory for democratic values of the The United States of America, a pluralist, capitalist democracy, and its allies. The USA emerged from the war as the dominant world power and its example could not fail to impress many in Turkey, just as it did in countries all over the world (Zurcher 2004, 208). But as noted by Zurcher (2003, 208), there were more immediate reasons why nn felt compelled to move closer to the West and especially to the United States. Even though a close relationship with the Soviets had been the cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the relationship had been soured first by the MolotovRibbentrop pact and then by Turkeys neutral stance during the WW II and as a result the Soviets announced that it would not renew the friendship treaty with Turkey after it lapsed in 1945 and in June that year, in conversations with the Turkish ambassador, Molotov formulated a number of conditions that would have to be met before a new friendship treaty could be signed. They included a correction of the border

199

Kemal Ozden, Ihsan Yilmaz

between the two countries, returning to the Soviet Union the areas in northeastern Anatolia that had been Russian between 1878 and 1918, and the establishment of a joint TurkishRussian defence force in the area of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, in order to guard the Black Sea (Zurcher 2004, 208). To the chagrain of Turks, when the Soviets tabled their proposals at the inter-allied Potsdam conference in July, neither the British nor the Americans immediately rejected them (Zurcher 2004, 208). In other words, the pressure exerted by the Soviets regarding the eastern provinces had led Turkey to accelerate its search for alliances and her request to join the United Nations was answered with the demand for greater democracy by the West. Moreover, with the outbreak of the Cold War and civil war in neighbouring Greece, nn became well aware that the West desired a politically stable Turkey (Ahmad 1993, 108). It was clear to nn that, in order to profit fully from the American political and military support and from the Marshall Plan, it would be helpful for Turkey to conform more closely to the political and economic ideals (democracy and free enterprise) cherished by the Americans. Thus we can say that the political and economic change in Turkey after 1945 had both domestic and international roots (Zurcher 2004, 208). Signs of Pseudo-Democratic and Tactical Liberalization Intent of smet nn As a result of these domestic and international pressures, the RPP government and National Chief  smet nn faced softening their stance through liberal policies. Starting from the beginning of 1945, democracy was given a place in the statements made by nn. In his speech on 19 May 1945, while emphasizing the importance of democracy, underlined the need for measures to make the regime more democratic and gave his word on this matter. Accordingly, on the opening session of the Parliament on 1 November 1945, he stated the need for an opposition party and that a direct voting system was necessary (Saribay 2001, 52). Moreover, in 1947 important structural changes were made in the RPP organization in order to adapt the multi-party system (Kili 1976 , 99). In fact, in some of his meetings, nn had emphasized the importance of democracy. He stated that there was a virtue in democracy and during one of his trips, he told the people that they would learn to discover the trutj within a democratic life (Heper 1998, 137). After the legal obstacles to a multi-party system had been lifted, 15 political parties were founded within one year. These parties were the following: The National Development Party founded on 18 July 1945 and the Democratic Party founded on 7 January 1946. Other political parties established in 1946 are the Social Justice Party, the Liberal Democracy Party, the Farmers and Villagers Party, the Social Democracy Party

200

European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

of Turkey, the Socialist Party of Turkey, the Socialist Workers Party of Turkey, the Workers and Farmers Party of Turkey, the Socialist Laborer and Villager Party of Turkey, Only for Country Party, the Ergenekon Villagers and Workers Party, the Refinement and Protection Party, the Islam Protection Party and the Homeland Duty Party. The first founding stage of the Democratic Party can be considered with the Declaration of the Four of 7 June 1945. Karpat states that formal opposition to the republican party originated first within its own ranks over the question of land reform in 1975. The rebels eventually formed their own party, the Democratic Party in 1946 (Karpat 1973, 320). The opposition within the RPP was focused around Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan and Fuat Kprl. These members of the Parliament submitted a motion to the RPP group asking for a full implementation of the constitution and the lifting of all obstacles to democracy. This warning known as the Declaration of the Four can be considered as symbolizing the first powerful opposition within the RPP. These declarations were supported both by the liberal leaning Vatan and the left leaning Tan newspapers. Such events were evidence of an increasing opposition to the RPP and the government between the right as well as the left wings of the party. Adnan Menderes and Fuat Kprl wrote critical articles in Tan and Vatan newspapers, respectively. The Declaration of the Four eventually led to the expulsions of Menderes, Kprl, and Koraltan from the RPP on 21 September 1945. Later Bayar resigned from the party at his own request. The departure of these four members of the Parliament signaled that a new party was on the horizon. During the formation of a new party, Celal Bayar worked together with smet nn and Bayar received the approval from nn on 6 January 1946. The following day, on 7 January, the Democratic Party officially came into being and Celal Bayar was appointed as the chairman of the party. Bayar and nn worked closely together in the preparations for launching the new party. The fact that Bayar was a veteran Young Turk, and trusted as someone who subscribed to the fundamental tenet of secularism, undoubtedly eased the acceptance of the existence of an opposition party by the Kemalist bureaucracy and party (Zurcher 2004, 211). The RPP appeared as it was satisfied in the founding of the Democratic Party and saw it as a party that would oversee the government and pronounced that they were not apprehensive of it. There was no sense of alarm in RPP circles at the news of the opposition party as its leaders were all Kemalists of long standing who espoused the same basic philosophy as their opponents with only a difference in emphasis. Mahmud Cell Bayar was, with smet nn, the grandee of Turkish politics (Ahmad 1993, 103).

201

Kemal Ozden, Ihsan Yilmaz

Feroz Ahmad (1993, 105) notes that:

The Democrat Party was expected to behave as the Free Republican Party had done in 1930 and the Independent Group during the war, as a token opposition which would keep the government on its toes without actually challenging its legitimacy. That is why nn pressed Bayar to become the leader of the opposition even though Bayar was (Ahmad 1993, 104). uncertain of the outcome. Initially, therefore, the DP came to be seen by the public as a control party, a safety valve which could be turned on and off so as to deflect public hostility and head off a popular explosion. Initially it seemed as though the Democrats would serve precisely that function. Their programme hardly differed from that of the ruling party. They adopted the six principles of Kemalism, as was required by the constitution, but said that they would interpret them according to the needs of the times (Ahmad 1993, 105).

On the other hand, the Democrat Party, wanted to rid itself of the image that it was a satellite, a simulated party (Kocak 2002: 181). But its own programme differed less and less from that of the RPP. The DP subscribed to the basic Kemalist tenets of nationalism and secularism, so it could not differentiate itself from the government on that score (Zurcher 2004, 213). Cell Bayar agreed that there were no ideological differences (Ahmad 1993, 109). nn did not intend to hand over the power to the DP so national elections were brought forward from July 1947 to July 1946, clearly in the hope of catching the Democrats before they were fully established (Zurcher 2004, 212). As Demirel (2005, 248) underlines the RPP garnered 3,165,096 votes ofthe 7,953,055 votes cast in the 1950 election, after twenty-seven years of rule, showing that the use of force or intimidation remained under control during the years of single-party rule and based on this, nn must have been calculating that he could win the elections. The RPP won the 1946 elections. But,
One reason the RPP was returned with a majority was that there had been massive vote rigging. The electoral procedures were far from perfect: there was no guarantee of secrecy during the actual voting; there was no impartial supervision of the elections and, as soon as the results were declared, the actual ballots were destroyed, making any check impossible. It has to be remembered that at this time all local and provincial administrators were RPP party members, who had great difficulty in discriminating between political opposition and high treason. The scale of the fraud was so obvious that there was an outcry in the country. Cell Bayar stated that, according to a DP inquiry, the real number of seats won by the party was much higher and that there had been wickedness involved in the election. His statement to this effect was published in the newspapers in disregard of a government notice that strictly forbade any criticism of the elections (Zurcher 2004, 212, see also Kocak 2002, 183).

202

European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

Ahmad (1993, 107) cocuncurs: There was a general consensus that the election had been conducted in an atmosphere of fear and repression. Moreover, the parties of the left were ruthlessly crushed after 1945 and not allowed to function until the early 1960s (Ahmad 1993, 110), showing that understanding of both RPP and its ideological twin, DP, of democracy was limited. Conclusion Turkish experiment of transition to multi-party politics in 1946 has been seen as an example of the cases in which political leaders delibaretely decided that the society was diverse so this diversity needed to be translated into politics by allowing multiparty politics. However, but our analysis of the domestic and international pressures and events surrounding the 1946 elections suggest that it was not that the President nn realised the diversity of society but domestic and international concerns forced him to allow multi-party politics. His decisions and behaviours before and after the decision shows also that in his mind he had a pseudo-democratic system where he and his party would continue to rule the country in a hegemonic party system setting where a relatively institutionalized ruling party monopolizes the political arena, using coercion, patronage, media control, and other means to deny formally legal opposition parties any real chance of competing for power (Diamond 2002, 25). Our analysis of the Turkish case suggests that pseudo-democracy was what the President nn had in mind when he facilitated transition to multi-party politics in 1946s Turkey just after the WW II. As the vote-rigging of the nns party RPP shows, in tactically liberalized pseudo-democracies, elections and other democratic institutions are largely faades and autocrats would stubbornly stick to power by whatever means.

References Ahmad, Feroz. 1993. The Making of Modern Turkey. London and New York, NY: Routledge. Akin, Sina (Ed.). 2002. Yak1 na Trkiye Tarihi, 1. Cilt, 1908-1980, stanbul: Milliyet Kitapl1 1 . Brumberg, Daniel. 2004. The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy. Journal of Democracy , 13 (4). 4668.

203

Kemal Ozden, Ihsan Yilmaz

Collier, David and Steven Levitsky. 1997. Democracy with adjectives: conceptual innovation in comparative research. World Politics, 49 (3). 430451. Demirel, Tanel. 2005. Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy: The Turkish Case in a Comparative Perspective. Armed Forces & Society, 31(2). 245-271. Diamond, Larry, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. 1999. Democracy in

Developing Countries. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Diamond, Larry. 2002. Thinking about hybrid regimes. Journal of Democracy, 13 (2). 2135. Erdoan, Mustafa. 2003. Trkiyede Anayasalar ve Siyaset, 4th ed. Ankara: Liberte. Heper, Metin, 1986. Trkiyede slam, Siyasal Sistem ve Toplum Orta Doudaki Baz1 lkelerle Bir Kar1 lat1 rma. Trk Siyasal Hayat1 n1 n Geliimi. (Ed. Ersin Kalayc1 olu, Ali Yaar Sar1 bay ). Istanbul: Beta Bas1 m Yay1 m Da1 t1 m. Heper, Metin, 1998. smet nn, The Making of a Turkish Statesman, Leiden: Brill. Karpat, Kemal H. 1973. Social Change and Politics in Turkey, Leiden: Brill. Kkmer, dris. 1969. Dzenin Yabanc1 lamas1 , Bat1 lama. Istanbul: Ant Yay1 nlar1 . Kkmer,  dris. 1994. Btn Eserleri 5, dris Kkmerle Trkiye Tart1 malar. Istanbul: Balam Yay1 nc1 l1 k.

stne

Kili, Suna. 1976. 1960-1975 Dneminde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinde Gelimeler. Istanbul: Boazii niversitesi Yay1 nlar1 . Koak, Cemil. 2002. Siyasal Tarih (1923-1950), Trkiye Tarihi 4, ada Trkiye 1908-

1980, 7th edition, (Ed. Sina Akin), Istanbul: Cem Yay1 nlar1 .
Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A Way. 2002. The rise of competitive authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy, 13 (2). 5165. Rustow, Danwart A. 1970. Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,

Comparative Politics. 2(3). 337-363.

Sar1 bay, Ali Yaar. 2001. Trkiyede Demokrasi ve Politik Partiler. Istanbul: Alfa Yay1 nevi. Tunaya, Tar1 k Zafer. 1952. Trkiyede Siyasi Partiler 1859-1952. Istanbul: Doan Karde Yay1 nlar1 . Tunay, Mete. 1995. Siyasal Gelimenin Evreleri, Cumhuriyet Dnemi Trkiye Ansiklopedisi, 7th Vol., Istanbul: letiim Yay1 nlar1 .

204

European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

Tunay, Mete. 1981. Trkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek Parti Ynetiminin Kurulmas1 (19231931). Ankara: Yurt Yay1 nlar1 . Turgut, Nkhet. 1986. Trkiyede Siyasal Muhalefet Olgusu ve Anlay1 1 . Trk Siyasal

Hayat1 n1 n Geliimi. (Ed. Ersin Kalayc1 olu, Ali Yaar Sar1 bay ). Istanbul: Beta Bas1 m Yay1 m Da1 t1 m.
Volpi, Frederic. 2004. Pseudo-Democracy in the Muslim World. Third World

Quarterly. Vol. 25, No. 6. 10611078.

Yilmaz, Ihsan. 2002. Secular Law and the Emergence of Unofficial Turkish Islamic Law. Middle East Journal, 56(1). 113-131. Yilmaz, Ihsan. 2005. State, Law, Civil Society and Islam in Contemporary Turkey. The

Muslim World, 95. 385-411.

Yilmaz, Ihsan. 2009. Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a Catalyst. Insight Turkey, 11(2). 93-112. Ycel, M. Serhan. 2006. Trkiyenin Siyasal Partileri. Istanbul: Alfa Yay1 nlar1 . Zrcher, Erik Jan. 1992. Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet F1 rkas1 , (Trans. Gl . Gven), Istanbul: Balam Yay1 nlar1 . Zurcher, Erik Jan. 2004. Turkey: A Modern History. London: IB Tauris.

205