&-1 333K

R E S T R I C T E D

PR'EORT

ON

OPERATIO\T

'VERITABLE"

8 Pebruar
... CONT_.

-, 10.
_

'rch 1.945
.

_LA-l-ULJL .3 Paras Situation on the Western Front ' Topography

it 7

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION Section 1 l2 3
i

I - 12 13 - 19 20 - 28 29 - 35

hEnoemy Defe nces

Enemy Order of Battle

Troops Available 5 5.' PART TWO ADgMIISTRATION -.. AY LEVEL Section 6

ii

36

ion Concentrations Communicat . Maintenance and Build Up

37 - 38

7 8

39 - 43

44 - 48

PART THEREE

OIJTLINE PLAN Section 9

i?-. '-

for 30 Corps attack Elan P

i 1 -,,-? .

49 - 52 53 - 55 56 - 57 58
59 - 62

'i -, A I vI

it.

11
12

Air En.gineers
Tr.oaLffic .Control

13
PART FOUIR .NAPMJATIVE .

Section
f

14 Phases of the Operat ion.

15 16 17
Phase 1. Phase 2.

63
64 - 89 90 -96 97 - 104 105
-.

"8 - 13 Peb
14 - 17 Fob 18 - 22 Feb 23 - 26 Fob 26 FPeb - 3 MTar 4 1-0 Mar

it

Pha se, 3.
Phase 4. Phase 5. Phase 6.

tt

18 19
20

114

Vt

115 - 123 124 - 138

PART FIVE

CONCLUSION Section 21

139 - 141

o
"IN

/PART

SIX

\-- 6 I 0 Am 19
0

"I

O ,I
I

- ii

Paras PART SIX COMENTS AND POINTS OF INTEREST Section 22 ;.

2-

Infantry Armour 'and Special Equipments

142

147

23

148 - 151 152 174

24>'Artillery
25 'Royal Engineers

.. 2".?
2

175 - 178 179 - 181 182 - 194 195 - 197 198 - 214 215 - 216

2'6
27 28

Smoke

Air Support Royal Corps of Signals

Camouflage

"

29

\l t

.30 . Miscellaneous

APPEINDIX 'A' Extracts from 30 Corps Operation Instruction No.47'B t 'C' 'D' 'E' T'P Observations ...on. Forest Fighting writh pa"'ticulaL reference to the REICHSWALD. Town Clearing, RA Order of Battle. RA Dumping Programmxne, Activities of 1 'Canadian Rocket Battery during Operat ions ;VERITABLE and. BLOCKBUSTER. 1/250 000 1/100,000 Showing British and American Sectors of 'Operation. Showing British Sector of Operations.

MA4

DIAGRAM I

Concentration Areas and Communications.. Enemy Dispositions.

i_

5
1

Original Objectives and Boundaries. Artillery Deployment .Areas and Tasks. Flooding.

F-1 S 333&
DISTRIBUTION LIST

21 ARff GROUP REPORT ON OPERATION "VERITABLE". Theo Under S.ecretary of State, The War Office
O0 I (Recordas)

MIT 16 (2 copies) 07 MT (L (2 copies) ((50 copies) for distribution to ;-

Tho Under Secretary of Statc, The Admiiralty The Under Secretary of State, The Air Ministry The Supreme Allied Commander, oediterranoan Theatre. (3)

The Corixander-in-Chief, Middle East The Comnander-in-Ohief, Allied Land Forces, South East Asi a (3) The Suprome Conmlander, South-East Asia Corlmand. His Excellency, The Comaiander-in-Chief, (3)

India (3).

The Australian Agrmy Reprosontative, Australia House (3) British Axmy Staff,
tashington-

(3)

3 British Inf antry Division (4) 79 Annourod Division (4)

I Corimiando Brigade The Coramandants :--

Staff College, Camberley (2) Staff College, Haifa Staff College, Quotta (2) (2)

School of Artillery, Larkhill School of Signals School of Infcantry School of Military Engineering

School of Air Support Off icesof the W"ar Cabinet, Historical Section Historical Section, Second Amuy, Co-wloy Barracks, Oxford

.US Theatre Historian, US-ET GALA Documents Section (3)

(2).'

Canadian Military Headquarters (5) Combined Operations Headquarters Secretaiiat, Mvain Heoadquart'ers, Control CoLmirssion for GM1ANY (BE)

British Air Forces of Occupation (o(GBMIANTh)

(2)

Canadian Forces NETHER~UIDS (17) copies for distribution to :2 Canadian Infantry Division (4) (3)

3 Canadi~an Infantry Division (Canada) 4 Canadian Armoured Division I Corps District 8 Corps District 30 Corps District
Guards Division

;(4)

(5) (5) (5)

(4)

3 Canadiwi Infantry Division

1 Axnnoured Division

(CF)

(3

(4)

15 (S) Infantry Division

43 Infantry Division (4)

(4)

51 (H) Infantry Division 52 (L) Infantry Division 53 (r) Infantry Division

(4) (4) (4)

6 Guards Brigade

8 Amioured Brigade
34 Armouroed Brigade 115 Infantry Brigade BACR Training Centre
Copies to. BA: R

JiA to C-in-C: PA to G of S: G(Ops)(Trg & Inf) GSI : G(SD) : G(T) & O : PA to HA : A *Q : A/Q SX: ST : WTSFF Historical (2) : RAC : RA: E

Oct 45.
/PID

G(Ops) Recora.s, HQ British Lmnry of the Rhine.

PART VI

OP-ERATIOONS

Sheet -3

42

ou- Op^.;raticn Gru: 21 lr the RHIIE' arnd the, MS (a)

ERITVLI, ! _ Clearin 8 Feb - lO Mar 5,

the Area between

; C- rments andl Points of Interest from support powerful very cf advanta-e the had Inf (i) In VERITAIBLEI thu -roundc and tho air, but in theo last analysis, the operation was largely tioe an Inf battle, In. spite of our ahr suplrermacy, and supericrity in artillcoy, the difficulties arnr-ur cand sspbcial equip-ecnts, tho tenacity cf the onemoy fougILt (out be should battle the end thu in that recquired terrain cf the weaplons. own their on relyingfrequently Inf, between the 'pCo-sing
Land

vcded areas anc true bf the firhtinv in the wo This was yarticularly (ii) o-nderc expressd.l coci battalion a REICITSWALD' the Of teu clearinp? cf the t1owns. whole way the Bren versus Sprandau was the genreral viewr when he said tIt not being; cnermy the of instcnces Here, too) there were severa.l h". thrcuh t't. -prepared
In generalp, a stand 'when cur en cone in with the baycnct. up. ccmpany one battalion aci'vanccl on a narrvw front with

anies (iii) In ealinv yith towns, ne :f thCe p-rinciples wvas to pass c(amj positions defensive compiany as held in to selected objectives, 1which were
until dayli) ht.

at night an' :-.cro often thlan not the co-pany axis cculd not be keit open Just bufore daylirht, tan ks were br ught up and op-poesition which had ben (Add'iti-nal n tes intense lurino the hours of darkness quicklTy cllalsed. re port), on T(wn Clearing fo,ll w this was h(tly debated by battali n ws (iv) The question f night r lay atta where the enemy it sh-ow th t(. seer nders. An exalin tion (-f results c(TU prefurably frcm delivered was discr a nised r surprised, a daylig ht attack, a night attack enemy, a flank; was cf ten successful. Against a well-preparod 1been the r re have to -ears aj with c-.reful preparation and limited bjectives favoured rnd least cCstly nethcc. (v) The cature .f GENMEP furnishes an example oef a successful;attack by day; the daylight assault a-ainst the stpron- ly held losition around SIEBENGBIWALP on 21 Feb failed, but was successful six days later by a nig ht attack ocn a different axis, (vi) Cooper tion with ther aris and frr "teari spirit" has re- ched a hig4h standalrd.
*~ ~

It

was quite impossibllo t-

attemp.t any clearing operations

t-tions as a result of cour

*(

'roat
Ms .mo

~~~~~p

(vii) The Inf ku-t clo se up to the artillery barrage and concentratiens, tho: air freo nently enr aged targe-ts less than 300 yards ahead of our frwarc/ troops. It is realisedr by the Inf that the risk of casualties frc(m our own enough -lose guns -nd aircralft must be accel ted if the, followe-up is to be the ver c The . rlo cngationcof thlre artillery I-r cgramme tc to succeed),. nd rec rg nisatien, in cc bination with intense cocunter-battery digging; and counter-mcrtar activity, agf in proved f great value. (viii) It -as emphasised th -t wihen one fcrmation is about to lass through ano th'er, wihenever possible the frmer sh:l- se lnd uj, -its own patrols well they Ir.y ive a fresh impetus tc patrol activity and get tht C1ahead s( quickly in the picture. It is rmocre tha-n likely thot the formrti(n to be hove relieved has just had a )eriod f heavy fighting nd atrolling will been d;ne by tired men.

(ix) The a dvunt cf theo Ar cured Personnel Carrier (KANGAROO) has ive nl iadded strength to the Inf. It gives 1rotection against shell andl mcrtarfire in the early stages (f the advance, when slcdiers on foot are hi' -hly
vulnerabtle, where conditions are suitable it can pass inf thrcug-h the ecnemy FDLs and deliver themri at svall loss as far back even a(s the ,-un a.reas,

the cross-baow, thure has been no developi-ent in Inf equipm:ent which is

com+para;ble to the arrival of the KAYNGAROO.

(x)

It

has been said thot since the substitution

cf

tho mu!sket f

(b)

Obscrvcns on Fcrest1....46

46 10 MAY 19

Sheo t (b)

-24.

Observations on Forest Fi.hting with particulrr reference to, the REIHSWALD . The fo cllow.ing notes Cre

Intr

oduction

roduced as a result of conversations with c f 53(W) Inf Dtv, This Brigade fbught its way alimost entirely thro ugh the REICHSWALD Forest frc the NW to the SE corners,

i()

Cor,-la.ilndCers anmd Staff Officers within 158 Inf Brigt:adeC

(ii) The, REICHSWATLD Forest is mainly coniferous with an inner belt cf deciduous Larsge rgrcwth. patches have been cut' clear with little cr no atten:mpt at repla-nting These arpas are covered with low scrub~ Visibility varies frcro- a few yards to two. to three hundred in the cleared areas, Being a State forest it is intersected systematically in rectanUges by numerous tracks and rid-s. These, being cut straight, gave visibility in r:any cases up t, several hunred yards. Mapy reading was complicated by the fact that many tracks shown id not exist or were overgrrcwn, new ones had been Ceveloped, and many cf the clearings had 1.een extended or new ones cut. There are two main concrete two-way roads through the Forept from NORTH to SOUTH, from CLEVE and FRASS~LT, converging at HEKKENS. There are none frcm WEST to, EAST, The various tra.cks, were one way Cnly, unmetalled and became a good foet or more of heavy mud after -the p:anssage of a few vehicles. Cormunications ~iii) a, This Iresents i.rcbably the gLreatest difficulty to be evercome b( th on the brigtde ant battalion:, levels, and to a very large extent controls tactics iarticularly within thel battclion. (See paragraph (.)a, below). This Brigade found it essential, in order addquately to control its Jattalions, to establlish its HQ nc t mcru than 2,000 yards behind the leading b. ttalion., At this ran Gc the rwireless sts worked well. b. Battalions found: the No.18 sot unsatisfactCry in this type of country and'regrded nd rorsentas them as a they bn ided worked, but did nolt rely on them in their 2ignal plC ns (Casualties, within Battalion Signal Sections had been heavy during the ARD3ENNES fighting a few', weeks -earlier and reinfercements were not by any-means fully trained. This must be tCken into consideration therefore in assessingt the mrite.its of these sets). c. The sare remarks as in b, above applied to the 36 Set, In particular it wa~s fCund.- in this op:eration in the Forest, that coop)er- tion, with the ttanks -ey tis r: ans did no-t wc rk. of d. Within Battalions fficerrs as Liaison Officers, cal.le and runner, backed by a liberal use Iroved the only really reliable rer:ns of

coemnunication+

Tracks nd icT (iv) a. Forost tracks, in any weather conditions, will deteriorate ralpidly. In bad weatther, such as existed Quring this op.ration, they will d isintegrate after the pssage of only a few wheeled vehicles and completely after even one heavy tronk has run over them. , This factor makes it essential that staffs Imust give an early decision on the use Cf certain tracks for wheels and thers fsr trackled vehicles t It is a most 0difficul,t ,decision to mcake as ground reconnaissance is essential. .This can cnly hbe done by the fo,:rward tro cps as advance they" nd the tactical situaticn may well irm:ose a comprlete reversal of decisions and plans' already issued, " In this operation toe Brigade, very wisely s it turned cut, bannall wheeled vehicl s ce .t jeeps. Battalion F echelons were entirely tracked using the carriers within the Battatlicns, ap was also the imr rcvised Brigade HC. The latter converted a half track as .a f.rr of rC ther inadec:uate Commrnd Vehicle. ib. :Labour- fo r track maintenance is an acute :rcoblem, It cannot usually, be so'lved- within a Brigade when every man is required cr his rimary busness f fihtin. oyal Einer resources nt very far. Careful planning cn the, hig hest lQevel is thoref cre essontial , / c. Within B{3ttalions....

Sheet -25-. c. - ?ithin Battalions the NITO's reconnaissance larty should always As be rig ht fr rward', Lbhind the leading comla.ny, in this type cof c operatieon the tracks, tho a.dvance centinues it is then in a position to recGnnOiTte Once and all necessary, diversions, and to taie anad sigh the whole route. .an objective is captured the necessary vehicles cacn then be 'brc-u .ht fcrwar . without delay .nd w ithout fear -f blccking the route

fcr prcerly tra inod and permanent drivers.

WEBASELS prcoved invaluable but all cc ncerned- stress the necessiTv The Inf carrier driver canncot get the 1best use out c.f these highly.specialised vehicles after a short few days course and he does net take the same interest in a vehicle whtic he knows is only on loan for a short period, d.

In route reconnaissance carrie(d out by .the' MTOs reconnaissan.ce parties. alone. vehicles those for taped were diversions cert ain cases se ocial Maca

LTOYD Carriers were successful in getting forward the anti tank o, C;uns in this oper. tion. This was 'e almost entirely t, the very careful

Writinr, REoadin 9 Dirocti on Findin; anMd. esa It was anticipated tha.t Map Reading would be a difficult probleri (v) .,a, and probably further cmrplicated by certain inevitable recent changes in the To Forest due to fresh areas being cut, new tracks made t( these areas etc, 'the before upon insisted were precautions certain simplify this matter eCt:oration started, 9 " i, Br-gade HQ issued a trace of the f c rest, on a wideo disFor instance every tribution, erbodying a vyry large .number of code names, track a' number. lateral single every and name a given w'as sin!e ofcPrwrrod. track were also map the on features other any , an nap the on shcown AlT clearings nhmed,
-

Battalions advanced on compass bearings, whether by dight ii.i throuchout including i .rties or day, and they r aaintained regular navigating yards. 100 ,every knotted tap;e white cf use5 thle and pace checkers movement &tcrked On acccunt cf the aobve, precautions all 'b. writing proved Message smorthly antdl direction was accurately maintained.use cf iAP4Y the by produced delays inevitable extremely simple Cnd. the between grcund vaCriations Any elminoated, entirely almost and SLIDEX were any' w wore there and spotted, quickly were an rmap Tactics (vi) a. Experience ained by -thisBrigade in the ARDENYlES, f.ollowed by special training lp)rior tc this REICHS1 4LD Forest opjeration, pr ved thec absclute essenti'al f a Battalion advancing on a'single axas, in other words one corptany up. Tc attempt a wider front in forest fighting leads not only to loss Cf c(ontrol by the Battalion Commander but robably t( the ctual In forest loss, maybe for several hcurs, of sub-units and of vehicles. tc have a comn:ander Battalion a for ry necess :pore probably is it fighting, :ireless, cf his sub-units than in any cthor tyIe. (f operation, firm, cntrol Cable country. ( f sort this in within the Battalion, cannot be relied upon a exist, not do laterals If-frequent tracks. or runners must use existing-, some at back stay mrust axes two on decl:-yed( has he if Commander, Battaliion this h hces If-he track junction until another lateral h1as been cle-ared tends t becrme out of touch with his battle., By fi, hting on one axis only one rain cable has tc b. laid, runners c-n quickly function without fear 1 of being lcst, the Battalion Co.mander can him.self b right fcrward an he \ has his sub;-units under his hand. 4 b. Flank iprtection t. the main'axis is a difficult problem, When fighting thrcugh a fcrest tc reach definite' objectives, as op1osecl to clering , If a Battalicn Commander feels uneasy certain risks must be accepted. it ha, p.rovedo to be tc detail abc ut a flank, the best method tc deal .with on the NW Fr,.ntier ]:rinciil-, picquets flank cf series' a rovicde one cc:omp-:any teo main axis, the from yards hundred one than more seldom are These / c, Operating on the, . . 9

Sheet -2. Operating- on the -ne axis bounf',s :iiven tc the loading ccmrl-any c. are strictly limited andi are usually at mc st some four to five hundred yards. In this way the Leap fr ggint the next ccorpany throu-h is then adccpted. Battalion Com ander.'retains a tight hold on his fighting sub-units, Loading comr] an$es usually move two platoons up, one on each d. sid(e of the axis. Those pla.,teens are deplp(yed cn a very narrow frcnt, i.rocbably not exceeding fifty to sixty yarcs, the whole again being restricted in crder tc make crto in e-f control. There is a. de(finite dangaer from .enemy striking at the tail e. In an advance becomes tooc long. cf a Battalion n one. axis if this tail Forest, RICHSWALD the in case the was as to seize definito objectives, tak.e will He flank. either con unrmopped-up left be enemiy will certa-inly of a unit, cr attack the unit from the every c:;lpocrtunity tc attack the tail Every effort raust e rmade flank cr rear when its objective has be;en seized therefcre to prevent the Bata.lion straggling ( ut alon[ the axis, all-rcund
watch r:ut be

The is reached must be stressed to an even greKater degree than ncormrally. 1 and moving when vpossiblo as tion forri a ti(-ht as have tc l.be shoul endeavour scolid, comlpact delfensive layout when halted. nd ccntact once the enemy on' the movre, It is essential tO keeo lf he will himse stabilize tc chance a has he If Cgainced J:.u.st not be lost. be all the ocre difficult to ,dig cut. As, in fcrest fighting,- artillery To supp)ocrt can seldom be used, this becomes all th e mc re important. effect this a Battalion Commander imst Ie well fc rward in order tc leap frog his companies withcut delay, Risks must be taken in this respect even to is finally the extent of l ushint through the next company before the first cc nsolidated.; f; We aLons (vii) a. All sections were made up tc two Stens for, this noeration,

raintained

throughcut,

c ndc all-round defence once the objective

They proved invaluablet

oe b. The 3-inch mortar was largely man-carried on accocunt 'of ; little indifferent tracks. During the advance the artillery cc.kld give ,r no sujocrt sc that the mrrtar, especially fcr smoke, ircved its vailue many times.
c. The enemy cpp siti'cn ence untered usually consisted cof some ' by one or more SP guns sited tc shoct 'vown the fcrty tc fifty Tnf suppcrte; A hit on an SP The Hun showed a definite respect for the PIAT, tracks4 stayed in that seldom it not did it but, even if c it, gun usually d.amaged anywvay Battalion one in FsIAT, The shot, second a position to receive One sheoots and the second observes the are fought in pairs r threes. This saves any time lag strike .ant if necespa ry sencds in the seo;nd round. sents a definite problem on a long advance [uch as during this operation. PsIAT Twelve bomtbs per company was fCund. tc be all ti at could be taken, " were also effectively used as mortars in some instances.
will not face a determined man with the la1yonet, The Hun still d. On c ie occasion an SP gun sup ported by a comany of 'Infantry was holding up whilst the first weap cn is beiing reloadced. Thie c .rriage of ar:mmnition pro-

the advance across a .clearing in the Forest. Th,e enery were some two After all ordinary nethods to shift re. me, hundred ya:rds away, maybe a little -com;panycoicma nder coheerned led his whole company in a him had failed, the it to The eney id n t wait fr bayonet charge across the open g casualties five were There arrive and a PIAT finished off the SP gun. only tc cur o(wn troopsb .e. One Battalion improcysed a further rifle platoon which was placed un(n.er the Ca rrier Platoon C orcmmnder, the whole acting as a yery . (-The carriers themselves being used in rny. useful two plattoon fire compa This ir:mrovisation was the operation as F echelon tr'nspocrt veh icls). with reinforcements. strength tc u: well was Battalion possible as the and' the necess NCOs and men were withdrawn from ,Rifle Companies to f:rm it, ary weapons were found from the WA.SP Section cf the Carrier Platoon, / f. Artillery could,.....

Sheet -27f. ... Artillery c.ul seldoLr support the avance cw ing t lack f observation 'and darci-ner t cour ovwn'trcoops. Only when the situation stabilised on any particular objective was suppoert possibl an. it then prc vd invllutahle for h(cld.ing or breaking up enDey counter-attacks.
T. The ' Inf were sup, orted by tanks throu; hout. The (!ifficulty of mlanoeuvre in face c~f SP g:uns sited tc fire cdown the tracks an(d the pre;senc,:cf some ninos, inevit bly cause casualties to tanks. But, particulrly in view o f the lack of pcssible artillery supplc.rt, the presence of tanks is consI eored c f great value. The rorale effect cn (ur own Inf canno t Te over estima ted and fcr this reason tank casualties should be accoptoe. Conunincations b(etween tanLk a Intf still reemas ins a problom In this c er. tion the 3(eot C1did not wo.rkl A system of VCrey light signals requires considerable ip repoaraticn and tying{ up sc that it is ensured that tank crows are on the lock cut for. then. Any such systen-, howoevcr, lakes changes of plan ,difficult tc imprc visoc rap idly, No. 26 Yellow snoke gcnerat:.rs were used extensively in this operation tc stop taenk fire when necessary. In one Battalion all non in all secticns carried on c f these generatcrs,

h. Searchligfhts prov.ed f real value in this Forest fightin'. In spite of thet tht lfhts were not in direct sup rt (f this Briade there was no unreasonable delay in passing: demands. Messai es were acted on usually in a i,r( xirmately half an hcur, dlnlnistration . (viii) a., Prior to the coceration it was fully ap preciAted tha t n rn al sup ly during the advance thrcui h the forest could not be ex pected. In consequence 24 hours raticn packs and self heatinl so up were issued and carried in Battalions F echelon transport. This precaution prove itself for it wasthe conly fo,: mrany cf the trc,ops had fir' ver twc .ays. Everyone concerned had ni thirn, but p)raise for the 24 .hours ratio:,n pack and even molre particularly fcr the self heating socups which were cf inestima le valuo in the co-ntinucus.. wet weather I All wished the issue could have been biggr or. be The water rrobler was also a very real one since there could be nc po ssilility (f bringing forward unit water carts (-r trilers. Arrangewents were rade -within the Division for all forward trcoos to carry one adcditional vwater bottle 'per an eitr on the persen or in Battalion F ocheln transport. This was done by "borrowing" water bttloes fron the men Cf' the LAW Reo inient an cther Div Troc ps. This .arrang ement rpoved an unrualifiod success , C nclusi on (ix) a-. There is not the slig htest :'cubl t but that this Bri4gade learnt mnany invalual'elc lessons fro( their fighting, munder the worst pssible
conditions of snow anld ice, in the

LRDENh$ES.

These lessons were ranmred hone,

practised( and perfected durincg the training period nricr t( the operation in the REICHISWALD? The great success achieved during this latter cperaticn proves hew sound thel training was. There was adequate ti.e also, apart from training, tc s:tudy and plan in considerable detail far this operatic n. Clcth mcdel rehearsals were carried cut at all levels, and, as alwayss .roved their value when the opeloration begcarn. b. There is little thrat is really now in the various points discussed above, It is merely a reiteration cf lessons learned in the past but s. often f(rgottqn. Many (of the r ints are very :incr crnes but it is due tc the attention ofl such detail that success is Swon. (c) lown Cle ari ng

Those notes are written on the experiences c f a Battalion which has taken part in clearing,two large towns, GENLJP and GOCH against a determined anrd org nised enemy,. One town had beeon heavily bombedL, ut the othor had nct civilians had been ev. cuatecd from both. The lesscns learnt show that the p:rinciples as laid dcwn in Inf Trainingl Part VIII are sound as far as they go.

(i)

Plannm

Sheet "-28(i) Planning

a, More than in any other operation, very careful an. detailed planninlg is necessary befcre launchinrg any unit or sub-unit into a defended town. Large scale rial;s, enlar/-ed air ph(ctograihs and articularly low obliques, are necessary sc as tc deternmine the key buildin{-s upn which it is likely the enemy will base his Cefence. He dces nct holdc every h-ruse cr factcry ULit thcse freov. where he can obtain a .ccd field cf fire and L.articularly those fron where he can stol. any encircling movor.ement t his rear b. The i'deal is for each section to be able t see exactly which buildinmas it is tc clear L-ofre crcssing the start line, (ii) PrincElos

a^ It is essential that each sub-unit starts from a very firm base, has a sm:~all ccr pact objective, usually a l"key" buildin, of which the Conmjander has m..de a pecrscnal visual reconnaissance before startingg. b. Witlhin the rifle cc r;cny, it ha s been prov(ed that it is unwise s to have more than one sub-unit .crking at one time and th-t the Comia nder cf the succeoed.ingc unit or suL-unit must i:e right f crwarC.d ith the attacking C ommrander t(. see the results rand carry cut his cwn reccnnaissanceo As always too, a reserve must be kolet tc deal with tho unexlj ectcd cTcsts which suddenly cc me to life. c. The n aise and echoes cf street clearing are dsisconcerting a-nd men must always be c n the "qui vive" tc try and locate the eneny - the nest difficult factcr of all. It is essenti al tlcat the.y fight lightly clad and
without the small pack and ick and sho vel, which catch in window frames,

collar Coors, etc. A rifle and bayonet, the Bren, a liberal sup.ly c f grenades, stout hearts and a very high standard cf leadership are all that is requireO. The degre of contrcol thact leadrs rmust keep in these c eorations frust be great. Individuals and Sections must be kep t tc their
objectives and not'allowed t, chase the odd German,

is (iii)

Wd It has indLee-od len learnt by bitter experience that town clearing a tedious anda mrest 'tiring o.eraticn which cannot Lobe hrried.
Da , NiLYht '

-It has beon proved that even in ccm:lete darkness Inf can seize a cbjective in a tmwn and completely clear that areo, , rcvided it is kept small. It is iperhaps the best way to get. a footing in a (defended area, tc rush it imrvaediately the artillery concentrations lift in the dlrkness
limited and catch the enemy whilst he is still b'elow grun' . Large scale

clearing oprerrations are n( t I;ossible in the dark as it is impossible rnc t to by-pass enemy - a -principle - who crme tc life with daylight and cause cdal:aago and confusion cut cf all prcopo-rtion tc their numbers. Searchlig-hts are not af any groat assistance in a taWCn. (iv) Suprting-;. Fire

a. Before zerc the -reatest wei ht cf artillery' is required, but at zerc and afte- wards it shculd lift frcn the objectives tc the far outskirts cf the town, as it is disconcerting tc troC] s clecring tc hear explosions in fro nt cf themr- it also drvcwns.the ncise (f snipers if fired in clnse supp or{t,4 However well trained, in a street it is imp.ossiblo to say with
accuracy whvcse shell it was and the effects of a 2$-pr on a hcuse is not

sufficient t( warrant its use in the close sul.;o,,ort cf trc ps clearing a town. 4.2-inch mortars, cn the ether hand, are valuable as the bcmbs reach the groun flor they becus because , they, of f r danr area, naturally are best used on the back end of the to-cwn. b. Fire and movcr-ement by the Inf remains as imcrtant as over, and the 77 Gronade has p;roaved its great usefulness tc cover street crcssingss. / (v) To Baob r iLot t Bomb

Sheet -29(v) To Bcmb of net to Bomb .

a. Frcm the Infantryman' s .oint cf vie:i, heavy bombinfg has every disadvantage ndl. io adv-nta-ge, unless carried c,ut imr.imediately I-efcre his assault. Then air -:hct(c g.raphs lose some of their value and the danger area f -r heavy nbs thle imme-Idiate -)recludesrushinrg cf the objectives as the last bomb fclls.. Craters and rubble ]reoclude thIe use cf tanks, CROCODILES cr WASPS and( make the evacuation cf casualties even more difficult; l it makes the drill o-f clearin! thrc ugh the back gardens irl.racticaLle, and clearing hruses from the top, impossible.., It also makes the enemyts task of hid'inl and ca couflaging himself many times easier; his snipers always i reclude the use o f a bull<dozor till very late in the operaticns. 'Frcr -: ur experience in .clearin- ? a town nct boem, 'ed, tc one that has been heavily boxmbQd, thoere is little doubt the Infantryman woul1 ask the airman t(. els ,o here, orticularly as he 'c'esnot kill (or even frih-liten the defendaer the. Infantryman is oing tc meet,

b.

(vi)

Ene... moethd.s

We have foun:. that thle Germlian we .have met, rstly o p -ratr)opers, have and futfrcrT t the key buildings and then fr. r the :rcound ?leocrs; only the odd Spandau and snipers havo . eeon up) a storey or tw,C . Beeby traps, were 4ot mnc t .et with in any large n-iunbrp ines were, however, .Ldid in and a-bout all' their dlemoliti(ns, key rcad juncticns and in sejoe gardens, but the latter were usually marke-< ..

concentrated. in,

(vii)

TIs

__su ( fjS

e-1 ri e 0 nce the points that we especially ncted

Thinking back cn our exporioncos, are perhaps :a. b. '. d. (viii)

Hew slcw an c.-peration it is, eand hrcw quickly trecis get tired,. The si:alllness c f t.he obj ective a platoon can take f cr certainty.. warfare" - this was nc: s urp-rise, The imr;mediate effect i.-f "flae but the s-peed witl which the enemy reacted was. The great additional difficulties which t]::e after effect of heavy bombs mrakes 'forthe Infantryrman. le0s sfr Town Clearing,.

Princ

Lastly, the principles we will work for the next Gerr,-(an town we clear:.visually a.. Always plan tc the last detail and brief each sol tier if ,possible. Bach man ziust knew his i:articul.r role in the
platcon "Drill",

b. StaVt each .eration op from a very firm base-, 1 c., Never cerate r more than one p'latoon at . time within a ccrmlany are.. (d' Kee, yc ur reserve ready, but ,d-cn tt keep trcc}js hangin[g -b ut waiting their turn under fire.. Once :'Lown they are sometires difficult tc get upi aain . e. Limit y.ur cbjectives severely. and base your operaticns r(n the "key!, build]ing:~s. . f. Never, never. by-pass an enemiy pc.st - this ; e5s not ap-ply to "cut-off" troops if sent wide rcun-'. the whcle objective. as much as ever . use flarme.o wherever g. Fire and r.ovement ap li;s possible' , h. Dcn! t cverload the. soldier. eager tc destrcy the i. Pr-y that the troups are in great heart, enemy in yet another German strong holdl for without the 'highest fi;ghting spirit bein!. presehnt the best plans r.mde by the leaders will be Cof ne avail.

RESTRICTED , OPERATIONT'-:!:VERITABLE' t CLEARING THE AREA BETWEEN- TEE RHI '.'CT AE TEE AND MAAS

Reference 'Maps' 1/250 0000

N- EUROPE, NW EUROPE, -:GERNA1\,

Sheet 3. -. Sheets 2A and 3A, Sheets K,51 and K52.

PART
.SECTION 1
1

OE

INTRODUCT'ION

SITUATION

ON 'THE

WESTERN

FRONT

By, the -beginning of Dec: 44, the enemyi on the front of 21 Army Group had been driven 'from the WfEST bank of the R MAAS as far SOUTH as MAESEYCK K 67. From- this point, our line crossed -the river and ran roughly just NORTH of SITTARD K 66 to inclusive 'GEIIENKIRCHEN K i36 where it joined up with Ninth US Army (Twelfth US Army Groupi. In the CENTRE of the Western Front, Twelfth US Army Group was making .progress towards securing a springboard for 'a RHINE crossing, 'while far to the SOUTH, Sixth US Army Group was .pushing steadily into 'the SAAR, 2. At this tirne, two: major operations were being prepared in the Brit sector. In the SOUTH, an operation by one ; > corps of Second' Brit-.Arjy was to clear the area between the road GEILENKIRCHEN :- SITTARD and. the R: ROER. This was known as Operat ion'SHEARS (later changed to BLACKCOCK) and had. target d-ate mid-Dec, In the NORTH,; an operation was to be latmched by First Cdn Army in a South-Easterly- direction 'from the NIJMEGEN area. This was known as -VERITABLE anLd was scheduled for early Jan. 3. Both these operations had been studied by 30 Corps, Since the A:RHEo.l opera-tions of Sep -44; until relieved by 2 Cdn Corps in Nov, this Corps had been in ':the NIJlEGEN bridgeheadL. It was then moved to the extreme RIGHT of the Army Group front and carri6d out operations against GEILENKIRCHEN whlich was captured on -19 Nov. During early Dec the weather steadily deteriorated. Operation SHEARS was repeatedly postponed and was eventually' cancelled for the time-: be'ing,

"monts were also put in- : hand for the-'transfer of 30 Corps'

13 Dec, HQ 30 Corps was elieved. by 12 Corps, and moved to First -Cdn~ Army to plan in detaxi for VERITABLE. Arrangeformations to the Cdn sec'tor trnd the programme provided for the concenitration 'there' to 'be effect'ed betWeren 17 and 24 Dec.

30 Corps was to'"open the at':ok from'NIJEGEN.

On

4.

While- : those moves-were getting uder way, Von RUNDSTEDT launched:;. his ARDENNES 'offenSive on ;1 6'Dec against First US Army. For some 48 hrs the situation on the American front
was obscure and. iit was' appreciated at 21 Army -Group that towards ANTTWEP in ad;:. BRUSSELS -Aceordingly,

steps -should be taken to forestall a possible enemy thrust Ove 30 'Corps' NORTH were.cancelled anda
hand which resulted in the plans to

regrouping was put

the dispositions of 30 Corps . ./being as

being as: follows by the night 21/22 Dec

HQ 30 Corps ' :: HASSELT K 36

53 (W) Inf- Div I.

with 33 Armd Bde under command 51 (H) Inf Div

SE of BRUSSELS
on R DYLE EAST of BRUSSELS -in LOUVAIN area Between the DYLE and the MEUSE in area GEEMBLOUX J82 SE of TIRLEMONT

29 Armd Bde (who had been withdrawn from 11 Arrnmd Div to refit: *on L of C with' new tanks) Guards Armd Div -

'43 Inf Div with 34- Tank Bde u'nder command....

6 Guards Tank Bde

K 04

-Area HASSELT'-

SLAASTRICHT K 55 'TONGRES K 34. Area BREE K 58

Or. :.

2 HCR (Armd Car Regt)

0':'. :. ,.'' .'TSE between NAMUR and HUY 'On the MEUSE between NAiMUR and DINANT

SAS' patrols

It was also apparent that -the German plan 'envisaged an attack on ANTVERP from the NORTH through BREDA D 93 with perhaps four divs. To counter .this possibility, further regrouping took place in First Cdn Army itself.

6:.

The ARDENNES battle was fought out with Ninth and First US Armies, under operational control 21 Army Groups operating. on the NORTH of the German , salient while Third 'US Army drove against it.from the SOUTH. 30 Corps crossed the M.EUSE to block the Western end of the gap and came in on the RIGHi of First US: Army, having crossed the L'of C of two. US armies to

do so,

'

7.

As the Allied. counter-off ensive progressed, the opportunity was seized to mount .the original Operation SHEARS. This was now carried out by 12 Corps 'who re-named it BLACKCOCK. It started on 15 Jan, and in spite of conditions ,of hard frosts, sudden thaws and thickt fog, was brought to a

successful concLusion by- 26 Jan, over by Ninth US Army. :

to the R'ROER and the area gained, was subsequently taken

-:The front was . extended up

At th'e same. time, First Cdn Army resumed its arrangements to mount Operation VERITABLE, the target date for which was finally fixed for 8 Foeb. 30 Corps had been gradually pinched out of the ARDEN.ES battle, and on 14 Jan, Corps HQ proceeded to the vicinity of HQ First Cdn Army to pursue its de.tailed planning . During the latter half of Jan 'the formations of 30 Corps were in turn, moved tr Cdn Army.

8!.

A.llies had suffered heavy'.losses- in the ARDEMNES,

Von RUND'STEDT' s effort- had: failed. ': Although the

enemy,.ha'd succeeded in doing was to retard our offensive forone month.. ,In the middle of Dec the Germans had possessed ... /reserves in

all the

reserves in the form of 5 and 6 Pz Armies. At : the end of Jan~ the situation was that '5 Pz was endeavouring to recover from the severe , handling it had received in the ARDENNES .battle,.:while 6 Pz .ha'd' .been 'switched. to .the Eastern Front to meet the Russian offernsiv Whhich had' opened on 12 Jan. .
* -. . h . . a.

The Allies were now about to regain the initiative in *the WEST,. .Ninth US Army remained in 21 Army Group for this purpose. OBJECT OF :OPERATION VERITABLE

9..

' The operation was only one of a series de'signed to' enable the Allies to break into GEPAINY. from the VWEST and to destroy the Gcrman armies opposing them.. Its particular object was to destroy the enemy between the R IMAS and the * R RHINE. and to break through in 'a Southerly .direction between these two rivers.. Wh'n this was completed; 21 ..Army Group would be poised ready'-f or the. next phase, with..a front formed along a length of the RHINE ' GROUPING

10..

VERITABLE was: to .be carried :out by First Cdn Army, reinforced by 30 Brit Corpso Initially, First Cdn Army was to attack on a one corps front' with 30 Brit Corps. Subse'quently, 2 Cdn -Corps was to take over the LEFT sector from 30 Brit Corps, and the attack was to continue on a two corps front, . 2 .Cdn Corps would continue to hold NIJMEGEN and the bridgehead:.acros.s the R WAAL. I Brit Corps-on the LEFT were to continue to hold their .125 mile front on the R MAASo
Fo -. ; : -,*. ...

;11-

comprise the biggest concentration.yet :ass.embled,.by 21 Army Group -on the' Continent, namely -

For the .opening or the attack, 30 Brit Corps would

Six inf divs

One .armd div

Three independent armd bdes Eleven regts of. 79 Airnd DLiv, .grouped under
one bde .HQ
F ive AGsRA Two' /A bdes'

12".

be fixed- by .the Commander- in-Chief, it- would develop 'an offensive across the ROER in conjunction with VERITABLE. Second Brit Army, in. the CENTRE,; were to hold the. WEST bank of .the AS from ROERMIOND to CUIJK E 74 and would operate on .the RIGHT of First Cdn. Army at a. later date.

.the R-. ROER from JULICH F 05 'to ROERVOID. K- 79.

At the outset, Ninth US Army was to hold its

front on

At a date to

..

SECTION 2
... . . . r..

TOPOGRAPHY "

-13.".

Befocore consider ing the nature of: the country in which .the operation was ,to take place, 'it is necessary to emphasise how constricted were the approaches to the battle area. To reach the forward: assembly areas, all formations except the. two Cdn inf divs, had to cross both the R MAAS

..

/and the

and- the YAAS - WAAL Canal. Some had to pass through the built-up area of NIJIMEGEN E 76,. and all had to wheel through more than 90 degrees to line-up opposite the enemy' s defensive positions. . 1,40
,:...

Two main topographical- regions are evident in -.SE of NIJEGEN :.:(a)(g ,The
Th?

the area

f'lood" plai.ns of .the. rivers RHINE

' . ,n 'he . . . . .

MAAS' and NIERS.

'-(;ib). The undulating and wooded terrain between these flood plains. -. 15 - The; wide flood plain of- the PR1'IE has- had its river bed -' .regularized into a single navigable channel, but' obstacles to movement. in the RHIIIE valley are .provided by abandoned -. hannels, marsh anmd backw'abers often w ith-a considerable --depth of water. -.The .MAAS' pli-t al-sQ: .contains, abandoned channels and a .. wide. fldodabl'e zone..--- It is covered with ditches planted ,with popliars 'and dottedtaw:ith co.mpact .villageswhich are ' : , ' tby:orchards.: '.surrolndod 16. During tho'eperio. of high water in Decdcie to the excessive rainfall, flooding was confined alimost.' entirely to the river flood plains. Along the R[-.INE,- its greatest extentt ,was on both sides of the river near E-'EHRICH E 96 'with:othorwise almos.t .continuous flooding up to the winter dykes f:rom /ESEL A 24 down to. NIJIVEGEN. -Along the ./-AS flooding extended up.,: t 1 OQ yds on both' si'des of the river and was, retained chiefly ,by the. high ground. Along the NIERS the wa.ter covered; a narrow strip of meadowland. on either sidoe of the .stream. With the drop in river levels, the' wiht-er flooding had r-cedod by the last week in Jan, and the rivers woere back'..to their regular channels, but the .whole. of the previously flooded area was saturated, with sheet water .in places.: ... There, are no outstanding view points on the f:lood plains, but, the hi g"er ground either side gives some observation, as also do church towers' and other high buildings in the towns and villages. ' ': Except for the two :large forest areas - the REICHSWALD .E 85 and the HOCHWAILD.A. 4 - tha .. ountry between the' river ftlood pla-ins is one of low. gently' undulating plain. It

17.

contains a number of small. woods and is largely arable. The REICHSWALD. and, the HOCOCEIIDD and some of the woods further SOUTH, are divided:up into,.blocks by rides, and occasionally small farms are to be found along these rides. Some portions have been cleared and are now covered with low .scrub. A height of land in the .orm ..of the letter "J" extends from-CIEVE 8955. to the TNW corner of the REICHSWALD, and.'another .also follows the- line .of the HOC~HWALD and . BALBERGER -forests.

18.

From NIJYJEGEN there is.. a .good road alQong the EA-ST bank of the MAAS through G-EN1MEIP 7746 to VENLO 9109. Another runs NORTH of the REICHSWALD. through CLEVE and XALTEN A 1141 to the RUHR. Prom CLEVE' a first class road runs SOUTH ,through GOCH: E '9145 to GEIDERP\T A 0225 and KREPELD A 10. Through the REICHSVfALD.. itself run two asphalt roads from:-the NORTHI which convdg(-ogie' at HEItEENS E 8348, while a third one from CLEVE joinis the HeKKENS GOCH highway at

ASPERDEN 8745

-.

." .. /19.

- 5
19o A considerable amount of data was collected regarding the effect on going conditions of severe frost or of artificial flooding .of the RHINE and MAAS valleys. It .was realised that any prolonged operation after severe frost was likely to -churn up even the. better sandy :anxd gravelly soils which exist to a large extent in the area between the.t-wo rivers. Further, it was clear that the RHINE could: be artificially flooded by breaching the winter dyke- system, - Though complete breaching was considered ipractica-e, :breaching to. effect localized flooding was a comparativey 'easy -matter, In addition, it had to be borne in mind that the Americans might not be able to capture the .ROER dams before they werc destroyed, and this might have far-reaching effects,, All 'these factors received careful consideration prior. to the operation, and the .:risks were accepted,

SECTION 3
20, (a)

EI\TI1YhENCES

(DIAGRA 2)

The defensive system presented three main features . Te construction of three principal lines of defence, . namely the BORWARD Line SIEGFRIED Line HOCHWALD "Layback" (b) The apparent sub-division of the area enclosed. by the -principal lines of defence into self-contained deofens-ive boxes:. The transformation of towns and villages -into strong.points.

(c)

-Tho Forward Line 21. ' These were really strong outposts of the main SIEGFRIE:D defences~ and were manned in strength. They were organised in two lines. In the :,first, depth from outposts to rear companies was about 2,,000 yds, and an average bn'front was 17500 yd's. The most weakly held sector was NORTH of the road NIJ/MEGEN - CLEVE, and, the most strongly held, the KIEKBER.G woods 7451 and WYLER 7858.
. . .. ,

-For the-second line, it was evident that rather less than one-third of. the inf strength was held back and was manning the line running from the R MAAS near GENINEP 7746 along the' Western edge of the REICHSWALD and then to

KRANENBURG 8056.

There was an anti-tank ditch covering

part of- the Western side of the REICHSWALD. Many' of the enemy positions were in. woods and houses. All roads running at right angles to the front were' held in considaerable depth especially the main roads WYLER 7858 - KR ANENBURG and MOOK ..7251 -'GENNEP - HEKKENS 8348 along which short stretches of anti-tank' ditch, road blocks, anti-tank guns and diggings had all been. observed.

..

/SIEGFRIED Line

SIEGFRIED- Line.. 22. At its nearest point, this lay some 3 kilometres EAST of. the forward positions. Some of its works had been constructed- a number of years ago and. were no longer evident on ~.air photos, but a good deal 'of digging had been done of recent months,.. The main belt. ran from .the NIJIVEGEN - CLEE road "-near.TUTHEES 8$255 -almost due SOUTH over the high ground in -the REICHSWAJ to th: vicinity ' of TEKKENS. Here it turned ESE and. then crosseda- the .R NIERS to the Western outskirts of CTOCH, where ..it turned SOUTH again ;and 'continued roughly along: the. 89' Easting, covering the ~approaches to WEEZE 9337, KEW.,I AER 9 6352 and GEiDERN 0225E.;' - : ; NORTH of the REICHSWAILD, between TUTHEES and CLEVE, there was a succession of Jrench syst(,-s stepped back through .NUTTERDEN.. 8456, DONSBRUGGEN 8657 and the high grotmd about 3iATERBORN 8853. A continuous series of trenches had recently been dug to connect the works at DONSBRUGGEN with the ALTER RHINE near DUPFFE/IA/RD 8760, A further development in the last two months had been a 'Line constructed along the 93 Easting between CLEVE, BEDBURG 9252 and GOCH, thus -making the REICHSWALD[: a: self -contained. centre of resistance. Along the Eastern ': ank of the R MAAS there were continuous lines of trenches and weapon pits. '2&L In: the NORTH' the positions werewe, covered by an anti-tank ditch which ran from the REICHSWALD near PRASSELT 8253 down to the railway line and then turned" towards KRANENBURG. From this point it turned lN-E and traversed the. flood plain between -. iEMHR 8358. and NIEL 8160 and. continued to the ALTER RHINEc " . . . ': The're' w.ere furthel'- stretches in tshe HEKKENS neighbour-S hood, linking up the .foiest with the R NIERS. From HONlERSUM 8243, stretches of ditch ran SE, following roughly the direction of the German Dutch frontier. 25. As much of the SIEGFRIED Line was now overgrown, the amount of concrete it containoed was problematical. All available informat ion just prior' tp .'T.he operation, however, including that contained in a captured . map, indicated that the- gr'eat majority of the concrete works were personnel shelters and not fire positions, In. particular, it seemed unlikely that any concrete would be fou.- W-YEST of a line NUTTERDEN - HEKKENS. HOCHWALD ,Layback"l 26. This was a recently constructed. defensive line situated along, the tundulating: groun.d rou-ghly 10 kilometres EAST of the REICHSWAlID. It ran from the LEFT- bank of the RHINE opposite REES 0752 to just' EAST: of :Il(ElIMA:'0346' where it continued SOUTH. past the Western Siode 'of the- 'HOCHWALD and BALBERGER . forests towards GE IDERN'':
, ; ',' ''.~. .. " " l'".'...-.. :.: :' ' .tw ..o

23,

and sometimes three, lines of con-ti isou-s trenches, between 600 and 1 000-. .yds apart. '- Except ;wh6de it fringed the HOCRWIALD (presutmably- regarded in itself as a -satisfactory anti-tanki{ obstacl:e),.--there was'.an ant i -tan.: 'ditOch between the trenches, and each trench line ohad an' a'imot u.-broken belt of wire in front of it. The sector between the RHINE and the HOCHWALD .had. a minebellt in front of 'the Western line of wire,

-Its' main feature wa.s that it'.

cons isteed of twvo,

. ./TIhe Doefensive "Boxes"tI 1:_

7The Defensive "Boxes" 27. The effect of - recent defence work had been to convert the layout into a "defer.ce net". The area was being split up into a series of self-contained boxes enclosed by trenches The following with stretches of anti-tank ditch or river. are some which were- taking shape :.

KRAN1BUR

-Y WYLER -BRUK

7752 HEKEENS - GRAFENTHAL 8746 PALSDORJ. 9146 -BEDBURG

-KIEKBERG - MIDDELAAR 7448 B-RU K KPMANENB-URG SW corner of REICHSWALD - HEKKENS

DONSBRUGGEN - TUTHEES
MIATERBORN - CrRAFENTHAL -

Town and Village Strongpoints 28. Fitting into the above system of boxes was the transformation of towns and villages: into strongpoints, defended Chief of by elaborate trenchworks and anti-tank ditches. DEI - 9842, and these were CLEVE, GOCH,- WEEZE, KEVEIA.ER,

CALCAR A 0049-

SECTION 429.

EDEMY T

ORDER

OF

BATTLE

th A review of the enemy situation on 3 Feb showed that the'.whole front of First. Cdn Army.was opposed by tps of Army To' the NORTH,{ was Twenty.Group H under General .STtDfENTT. Fifth Army." SOUTH -and VEST 'of the RHINE along the IAS :was. First Para Army consa.sting of 84, 1i80, ':90 and 606 ZGV divs,. . The REICHSWAID sector, which may be taken to extend from the bend in the RHINE near ERLEKOM 7863 to MIDDELAAR, appeared. to be controlled by 184 Inf Div. This Div was caught in the FALAISE' pocket and destroyed,' and was reformed in Sep 44 and identified at .MOOK on 21 ;Sep last. It now consisted-of two 'regts .each of two bns, and was thought to include Battle Group KATZININT of .probably three bns, and also tQ have under command 2 Para Regt (three bns) which ordinarily beloonged to. 2- Para Div.
e. . . f. two

There owas evidence also, of two police bns in the sector, identified NORTH of the NIJIAEGEN - CLEVE road. It was estimated that there was a total of eight bns mann i-ng the forward line of, adefences, with, five bns in reserve, or possibly in "lay-back"'. positions. '- They were
likely to be. up to strength. and despite Goerman: reverses on other fronts,' their morale-: was considered high. Estimated locations of flank formations are shovwn on -' Diagram 2. 30. Little was .known of th.e arty of 84 Div but the most recent estimate gave 72 guns (exclud in A) the VERITABLE area,'. and a furthor 24. guns NORTH of the R WAAL. Including HAA-, the maximum estimated number of guns capable of firing on the VERITABLE area was 114.

.../Even less

Even less was knowni about' the anti-tank layout in 84 Div :'.'sector , ' but such clues as .were available indicated that the D iv mighlt havean anti-t-ank ulit resembling that of a ; Voalksgrenadier Div'viz v 9. Anti-tankd CoyAssault Gun Bn kAA Coy .x 9 7.5 cm anti-tank guns 14 x 7.5 cm assault guns 9 x 30.7 cm AA guns

'Ai report: had been received indicating that there might be some ' 21 ;.cmNebelwerfers in the .KPRAIEIlBURG area. ENE.ff COM/,MMNICATIONS 31 o The basic routes behind 84 Di" v s area were the road CLEN ;he 1241 1241h andthe and railway CLEVE E GOCH XANTEN. Aiir recce had c&onfirmed t.he -iniportance of the road, -and [had' disclosed trains -'t and near :GOCHGOCH appeared 'to. 'be 'a: ailhead, Whether CLEVE was also a railhead was not known, but the station the.re had. been heavily bombed. The most striking point about both road and rail routes is their dependence on the bridges across the RHINE at WESEL. The only alternatives were near HOlMBERG- A 2918, some 15 miles further SOUTH. Leading back from the P1ESEL bridges are a main railway line and a main road, both to UNISTER. PFer.ries on the RHINE between NIJMEG-EN and WI:ESEL had not shown themselves vce- .- active. Three ferry points were 'clearly established - at' EEMERI.COH (Class 50),. :at REES 0752 (Class 50) where there was also some .pontoon bridging equipment on the NORTH bank at the end ,of Dec and at XANTEN (Class 20.). I-n the event-of the VWESEL bridges being cut, EL/LERICH' ferry would prove part'ilcularly valuable to the tps NORTH of the REICHSWALD, and the: XA.NTEN ferry should be of help to the forces in 't;he ICKTEEILAER area,
' . . . .

32,

EBEM RESE-1RVES
X, ..: :
. -...- -

33.
'-'

. '' - At .th.e timeVRITABLE iiwhenl .as. ea.Ut to open, the enemy had n.ine diavs holding.. 'he, 101 mile sec'-utor from NIJM-EGEN to DDUREN P 14o., On theo,'otheer hand he aa:;ome 45 odd divs al6'ng 'the 250- mile. st.ret-ch from DUREN to, STRASBOURG. In addition 'to th[e crises -in the EAST which -had already drawn off 6 Pz Army, the enemy-was apprehe.nsive of the inevitable assaultsr impending in the WEST. - Although the AWIEST Wall had. -been' breached EAST of AiiCHEN, there was also the possibility of an attack either fro VENLO or in -the REICHSWALD, and the need to provide some stab-lity to the attenuated lines in ' . 'Central HOLIAND,
s-osi rd. .

34 '

I A shift. NORTiH was -considerce

. ment,

the most likely dev]e.op-

.and the following was estimated to be the maximum

redinforcement of the 'ERITABLE aTea; This was based on the assumption that there was already, or would be by D-Day, one 'lay-back:' div in the GOCH area a nd that the COLOGCNE front was so quiet that the enemy could dare to risk reinforcing from there : D lug D pus -. D plus D4 s7

"One. Inf Div

" One -,0 Assaul.t Gun Bde d '. 'Elemen -ts CIA. (o..ne

One Pz 'Div( complete) TwoInf Divs On PC DCiv ( complete)

P-' and/or one Pz Div

... /The above

The above. figures are additional, EVACUATION Or' CIViLIANS.

not cumulative.

35.

fRepbrts; were. -received .thEat 4-eb LLIG.EN Nby 8364, KdI'OMI 8.16:, -UT 7961. , :and .CIVE were coimpletely evacuateds and '.that SIEBENGJALD:..8641 had'only one family and a few sick left*. It was estimated that:'t..there were not more than 30 f'amili es 'left in the ar ea CLEVE . UDEM - GOCH and in the REICHSWALD .

SECTION: 5

TROOPS

AVAILABLE

POI.

VERITABIE'

36.o

F.'or the. opening .at-tack by 30 Corps, .formations.-were available: -

the 'following

Army Group
Army Troops 30 ArmId Bde

..Armd Divs
Guards Armd Div

ITnf Dlivs

Armd 'Bdes

(79 ;Armd Div)

2 Cdn- AG-RA'

2:Cdn Inxf Div.: 6 Guards Armd 3 Cdn nf Div Bde (Type B) 15 (iS) Inf Div 8 Armd Bde

43 Inf Div
51 9 AGRA 74 AAkBde 106 AA Bde
(H)

.(Type A)
Armd Bde

Inf Div '4

53 (W) Inf Div

(Type B)

Second TAP, consis',ing of 2 Medium Group, 84 Tactical Grou.ps, were i.n suppQ'rt;

and 83 and

10 -

PJART

TWO

A.}/h-NISTtLTION:

ARRANGE1ENTS FOR- THE; /ASSEIVIBLY, OF THE- FORCE '. I BUILD UP :FOR ,TlHl OPIERA;TTON, 0N. . Ei A.

[EL

'SECTION 6- ON G N M TION
37G HQ 30 Brit Corps;,

(DIAG 51 (H) Inf. Div and

uards Armd Div,

53 (W) Inf Div had all been engaged in the fighting in the ARDENNES in Jan. 43 Inf Div with two of the independent armd bdes and some of the AGsRA, were involved in- the operations round GEILENKIRCHENSITTARD at the end of the same month. It will readily.be.. appreciat-ed,. therefor-, that the generaI: ovement- NRTH '''id. :dVeintual concentration for this operation, in a strictly limited time, required most careful. planning and strict .control-. -- .Futher, the' bottle necks imposed. .by the GRAVE, and TMOO bridoges over the R MAAS, and the necessity to maintain secrecy to th- utmost, were. additional major:. fac-tors whicr h ad-.to b' surmounte'd:in the

coicentrt ion p'lan[. :

38.

:'

The concentration areas used-, .in some cases purely for -stagi-ng':purposes,: are ho wn on Diagram 1, attached to which is a-:ime t:able, showing the dates and movement of the %various formations., '2 and 3 .CdnInf Divs are not included in the time' taable since, they were:. already concentrated NORTH of the R MAAS.

SECTION 7. ROMDS
39.

COMTJNI0CATION'S

Under the best of conditions the roads NORTH and .EAST of the general line EINDHOVEN - s'HERTOGENBOSCH are, with one exception, indifferent when it comes to- the question of the major movement of heavy military traffic. During Jan they had been universally icebound., Just prior to the time when, movement was to reach its peak, from 3 Feb onwards, came the thaw with all its attendant troubles. Many roads deteriorated rapidly and eventually ruts developed to a depth of 18 ins to 2 ft, and others collapsed completely at various points. Diversions were extremely difficult to improvise. as the 'surrounding country in most plac'--s became water-logged. The very carefully planned forward movement from staging areas to concentration areas and onwards across the R M[LAS had to be recast daily in the light of existing road conditions. That final assembly was completed by the right time in spite of these abnormal and most difficult conditions, says much for the high standard of staff work of the traffic staffs, and the superhuman efforts of the traffic control personnel and the RE concerned with road maintenance. The principal roads used were two,' Firstly, the road ANTWVERP - TURNHOUT - TILBURG - s'HERTOGEDlBOSCH - GRAVE bridgeNIJMLEGEN with the subsidiary ANTIlERP - BREDA joining it at TILBURG. This road is an excellent two way road throughout, but even so thaw conditions caused serious deterioration in' places, particularly on the pave sectors. Secondly, the road TURNHOUT - iEIDHOVEN - ST OEDENRODE - VEGEL - UDEN ... /ZEELAND -

40.

- 11 -

ZEELAND - BEERS.- CUIJK MOOK bridge - MAIDEN - NJJEGEN. A num-ber of goobd roads exist and joii"this route SOUTH of EINDHOVEN it is EINDHOVEN but none NORTH of NORTH of itself far from first class and the thaw played havoc with considerable .stretches of .- t particul.arly in the area In addition to these two between ZEELAI\'D and MOOK bridged main forward routes, there is one:'good two way lateral between EINDHOVEN and s'IERTOGENeOSCXId-:
RAILWAYS 41, ':For' the first time since the: landing in :NOR&II\DY a major operation was backed by an adequate railway system. -Fpo.r- details of lines in use prioi to the operation, and thos.e projected once the tactical situation permitted, see Diagram 1. New railheads were established at VEGHEL, WUDEN, ELL:-and: I-HPS in Jan. The bridge at RAVENSTEIN was completed on 8 Feb and, though this could not effect the build up for the operation, the line was open to NIJMEG-EN on that date. This materially assisted the maintenance problem once the operation had begun. TRAFFIC 42. The size of the force to be concentrated, the limited roads that could be used, the bottle necks at the GRAVE and MOOK bridges and the fact that in order to preserve secrecy up to the last possible moment no movement except recce parties was allowed NORTH and EAST of the line EINDHOVREN\T sIHERTOGENTBOSCH road-except during -the hours of darkness, thrust a very heavy and responsible task on the traffic control personnel. This was aggravated by 'the day to day improvisation necessary to cope with the- changing weather conditions. Nulmerous diversions had 'to be -manned and one way' sectors of road controlled where two way roads had previously existed. First Cdn Army controlled all roads SOUTH and WEST of the- line EINIDHOVEN ' s'HERTOGENBOSCH and 2 Cdn and 30 Brit Corps those to the NORTH .and EAST of that line. There was a very close liaison maintained between the three APMs concerned. Five CGP Traffic Control Coys, two Army Provost Coys, two Corps Provost Coys and some. twenty officers and three hundred OR of a LAB Regt RA, altogether' some 1,600 men, were utilised in the overall traffic control plan. In spite of all the numerous difficulties, final concentration was completed to time table. All those connected with traffic, both staffs and traffic control personnel, did a remarkable feat to achievet-:his.
-

-ENGINEERS 43. ..: '- Before and during the concentration period, the RE were engaged upon the *reconditioning for one way heavy military traffic of some four hundred miles of existing roadway, and for the cprmpletely new Construction of about one hundred miles of virgin road;, . In addition four main bridges had to 'be built over the /MEUSE, including a high. level floating

bridge at RAVENSTEIN 1220 ft in length,

The rapid-deter-

ioration of the main routes due to their being used by heavy traffic during the e thaw made a great deal of additional work which had to be'carried out without delay. That the final concentration was completed to schedule shows how well they carried out their task,

. .. /SECTION 8

- 12gp--

SECTION 8 -C- ----

C -) - -

MAINTENANCE --)C ii 1-----

I--il--IL

ANDIt--- BUILD ICI*C

m-rl

UP

DAILY: MAINTENANICE

44,i

The total force which had to be catered for up to D-Day With an 'of the operation amounted to some 340,000 men. adequate railway system operating there were no major ' problems in either.'maintenanc or build up from the Army point of view. -though the prevailing weather conditions, the bad state of the roads and the constant congestion of
traffic, made this a cons iderable problem in the forward.

-areas throughout the operation. were worked: out as follows o SuppliesFOL Ammunition Ordnance Coal Miscellaneous
RE. Road Material.

Daily maintenance figures tons per day

tI t f!

1,000
2, 000

800 1 ,000

750 500 850 170

TI

Tf I

'"'-''I"'
; ~1 'd '

"I day
. .Ti T

(including Air-

field construction)

RE Bridging RE General Stores' Total (Approx) BUILD UP

TI".
Ti *

150 ' 7,250

7? ft t'

45

Build up figures, over eight days follows :

were assessed as

Supplies (4 days)
POL .(50 mile.s) Ammunit ion Total BREIAK-DOWATN

2,5b00 3,700
16 ..000 22,200

tons
I,

lt

(in addition 7,000 tons had- already been dumped "in Jan) I -. 2 775 tons per day

46.

Total..of daily maintenance an'd build" Up figures amounted' .to. approximately 10,000: tons per day, and' this broke down into commodities as follows' :-

Supplies
POL Ammunition Ordnance

1,312 2,463

tons
tt

2,800 '".
1,000 "

..

/Coal

-13 Coal Miscellaneous 750 500 tons "

?

E-(all purposes) 1, 200 ' Total

RAILHEADS. ROADHEADS.,

10,025
-.

"

MFCs

47.

The following Railheads were used to handle the above (See diagram 1 )
Supplies 1,312 tons TILBURG EIlDlHOVEN 712

tons

6oo 600 600 .600 600

I ,200
It It

POL

2,463

TURNHOUT BERKEILAAR EINDHOVEN SCIHIJNIDEL

Ammunit ion
2,800
t

UDEN VETGJEL

400
1, 200

ft

s ' ERTOCrENBOSCH

tt

Ordnance

1,000 tons

WVEELDE TURNHOUT

800 200 400 350 600 250 170 1 50

ft

Coal

750

BREDA
BEST

nf

ft

RE Road Material 850 0"

MIELL AIPSEN

RE Bridging 170
RE General

"

s I ERTOGEINBOSCH

Stores NOTE:

150 tons

TILBURG

The following railheads could have handled tonnage over and above that actually dealt with. TILBURG SCHIJITDEL VEGHEL s 'HERTOC-ENBOSCH TURNHOUT 638 600 800 630
1

tons " (for RAP)

1,000 ... /BRDA

14 -

BLP-E

800

tons

350
48. PFirst Cdn Army 2 Cdn Corps 30 Brit Corps

,'

Road-head-was established in the area TURTINHOUT - TILBURG. PMCs were established in the areas WIJCHEN 6259 and OSS- 4855. PMC was established in the area VEGHEL .. UDEN - GEMERT.

- 15 PART THREE OUTLINE PLAJ\T

SECTION 9

PLAN

FOR

30

CORPS

ATTACK

49.

The Corps was to attack with five inf divs up, as under :Prom RIGHT to LEFT 51 (H)

53

(w

Ir.

Div

f Div InV

15 (S) Inf Div 2 Cdn Inf Div

3 Cdn-Inf Div RESERVE and FOLLOW UP Guards Armd Div

43 Inf Div
INITIAL ASSAULT 50. In brief; the respective attacks by the divs on D-Day were to be as follows :-

(a)

51 (H) Iif Div to capture the high ground to the

NORTH of the SW corner of the REICHSWALD Forest. It was then to swing SOUTH and occupy that part of

the forest' and to hold down any attempts by the

enemy to move tps NORTH in that area.

(b)

53 (W) Inf Div to seize the high ground on the Northern edge of the REICHSWALD and then to move EAST along the Northern half of the -forest.
15 (S) Inf Div to attack straight through to KRANENBURG and then to the high ground overlooking
CLEVE.

(c)

(d)
(e)

2 Cdn Inf Div to capture WYLER.

Late afternoon D-Day, 3 Cdn Inf' Div to take ZYPFLIGH, 7860 and IEUT 7961 and then drive EAST across the ALTER RHINE canal. marshy ground to the CLEVE

Objectives and- inter-div boundaries are given in Diagram 3.

51 0

'Timings 15 (S) H-Er for attacks of 51 '(H), 53 (W), D-Day was-8 Feb, The attack of 3 and 2 Can Inf. Divs was 1030 hrs.

Cdn irf Div was to be phased so that the Div could receive the maximum arty support, EXPLOITATION
__uw _ i .

. - .

.r

S..

52,

When 15 (S)

Irnf Div haad fought through, to CLEVE,

it

It was to clear the town and concentrate the Div there. would despatch immedia'tely s-trcng mobile columns to capture, if possible, UDEM 9842 and CALCAR, and to clear the EM!ERICH' road to the WEST bank of the RHINE. 435 Ifn Div would move up on D plus 1 and pass through

15 (S) I'f

Div to attack SOUT-

to GOCHO

53 (W) Inf Div was to clear the RPLEICHSWAID.

. ,./51 (H) Inf Div

51 (H) ,..I Di,; using he.. good .road SOUTH of the 'forest, was to att'ack'GOCH ,coniverti'n'g on the town with 43 Inf Div. The' Ouards Armdd. Div"'was to pass- thro-ugh the MATERBORN area immediately in rear of 43 Inf Div. Advancing on the axis UDEM - HAMMERBRUCH 0736,- VVESEL, ... it was to seize and hold the high grdund NORTH of SONSBECK 0535, ,and to push forward a strong mobile column to seize the WVESEL bridge if -this was still intact

SECTION 10 53.

.ARTIIIERY

The arty support was intended to Be a battle-winning factor, and was provided by 1,000 guns; not including BOPORS
and anti-tank. gs .
.

In outline, the Corps fire plan was : (a) (b) (c) (-d) No fire before 0500 hrs D-Day, except normal activity by RA of 2 and 3 Cdn Inf Div'.s. 0500 0730 hrs, Destructive fire on enemy defonces.

0730 - 0740 hrs. , Smoke build up. 0740 -. 0750 hrs. No firing of any kind. as it was hoped the enemy would open up with his arty and give an opportunity for sounad-ranging and flash-spotting.

(e)
(f)

0750 - 0915 hrs.

0915 hrs..

Destructive fire again.

Smoke screen NM .edge .REICHSWALD starts.

(g) '0920 hrs.Intense, CB as a result. of information from .... . . smoke 'screen, (h) (i) (j) 54.o0920 hrs Opening line of barrage (mixed HE and Smoke) starts,.. . ... 1000 hrs. 1030 hrs. Complete barrage starts. H-Hr and first lift.

The barrage was. on the front of the three CENTRE divs, viz 53 (W), 15 (S.) and 2 Cdn Inf Divs, although it overlapped the boundary between 53 (w) and 51 (H) Inf Divs by 300 ydsb On 51 (H) Inf Div front, except for the above overlap, the arty support consisted of concentrat-io'nis- fired on known , enemy objectives in accordance with the progress of their
. attack or at call from bdes. ... :.. In addition to the programme outlined, above, PEPPERPOT groups were organised in each div. These consisted of the div MG bn, with all available div resources in LAA and antitank guns, plus some gun tanks. Their task was to saturate with fire the enemy defences within range on the front and flanks of the attack from 0530 to 1030 hrs, except for the silent period 0740 to 0750 hrs.

55.

"'

Gun deployment areas,

smoke screens and bombardment ... /areas

areas are shown in Diagram 4. will be found at Section 24.

The arty plan in' detail

SECTION 11 56.

AIR:

The whole resources of Second. TAP were available in 1' of US IX Bombardment addition to -"heavies? Div and Bomber Command., The operation would NOT be delayed. however, in the event of bad weather preventing the air forces from operating. In outline, (a) the air support plan was as follows :

.57.

Prior to D-Day.Operations against railways, bridges and ferries serving the battle area, care being taken not to give any indication of the point of attack. On the night D minus 1/D, "heavies" would try to obliterate EMTERICH, CIEVE and GOCH, cratering being accepted. On D-Day, priority was given to fighter-bombers on the German gun areas, with an FCP and CABRANK available all'day, It was also hoped to use American "heavies" on NUTTERDEN and MATERBORN, using anti-personnel and proximity fuse bombs. Consideration was given to6 the possibilities of dropping liquid. fire bombsor canisters. .. to burn-put certain areas or concrete pill-boxesThese plans had to be rejected as low altitude flyi:n would be necessary and' the probable losses were unacceptable. In addition, all roads leading to the battle area and the RHINE crossings were to be covered by armeod recce and Tactical Recceo

(b)

(c)

(d)

, On night D/D plus 1, approaches and railway

centres would be treated to prevent 'the arrival of

enemy reserves.

SECTION 12 58.
(a)

ENGINEERS

The policy was as follows :

'Formation . respnsibi/liies

Formations were responsible for all tactical breaching operations and for the opening of their own routes forward. Cor. onsibilities

CE.was responsible for maintenance and development of all forward routes. The forward limit of this responsibility was to be fixed from time to time as the .battle deoveloped.

- 18'(c) Priorities Priorities for maintenance and development of routes were laid down for :(i) (ii) The early stages of the battle. The later stages of the battle.

(d)

Tank tracks
These were. to be developeda by forward divs as. required. and were: to be related. to the main forward maintenace routes.

,(e)

Minefield clearance
There was to be no deliberate clearance of extensive minefields which. were to be marked 'and. left for later treatment. Efforts were to be concentrated on clearing roadways and verges, and inf and tank routes through def ences.

SECTION 13

TRAFFIC CONTROL

59.

It was appreciated that the successful execution of the operation .would. largely depend on efficient traffic control. To achieve this a special organisation was created consisting of a Regulating HQ and nine TCPs. This organisation was furnished by 53 Recce Regt. There would be two phases in (a) the problem :-

60.,

During the opening stages of the battle until our tps debouched EAST of CL1EVE During this .phase Divs were to be responsible for the control of traffic within their sectors,

(b)

During the subsequent operations when Corps HQ would control all traffic through their Regulating HQ.

61

During the first phase, the TCPs established were required to report progress of movement on their respective routes to Main Corps HQ. During the second phase, the TCPs were to report progress and also to control movement ini their respective sectors. ' TCPs Nos 1 4, :which were established by D minus 1, were connected by line to Regulating HQ., and Main HQ 30 Corps. Line to the, remainder 'was to be laid as conditions

62.

permitted..

All- TCP sand Regulating 'HQ'were also connected

by wireless on a separate traffic not. Each of the nine TCPs h.ad Lone: sub-S ction CMP attached

Prom Corps resources and six recovery vehicles, also from Corps resources, were- distributed among ' the TOCPs.

- 19 I\TNiRArUTIVE PART FO:UPL ,--- ----- -----' I- LL-I -I I

SECTION 14

PHASES, OF

THE

OPERATION

63.

This narrative is divided into six phases as follows :Phase 1. 8 - 13 Feb The breaching of the SIEGFRIED Line and the clearing of. the REICHSWAID Forest,, concluding with the RIGHT flank of 30 Corps on the MAAS at HEYEN 7853 and. the- LEFT *flank on the RHINE near EI3IERICH. Extension of the front SOUTH and EAST of the REICHSAWALD as a preliminary to the assault on GOCHL Capture of GOGH and preliminary operations against CALCAR. Planning and regrouping for 2 Cdn Corps' operation against the HOCHWAID Line (BLOCKBUSTER) and the abortive attempt to capture WfEEZE.
Opening phases of BLOCKBUSTER, loose-

Phase 2. 14

17 Feb

Phase 3. 18.- 22 Feb Phase 4. 23 - 26 Feb

Phase 5.

26 Feb -

3 Mar
Phase 6.

ning up on 30 Corps front and junction with Ninth US Army. Final elimination of resistance WEST of the RHIlE o-

4 - 10 Mar

SECTION 15 D-rDaLQ Feb.

PAE 1

8 - 13 FEB

64.

In brief, the plans of the forward divs for the initial assault were as follows, :-; (.a) .51 (H) Inf Div to lead with 154 Inf Bde whose task was to secure..the" high ground at the SW corner of the REICHSWALD at -7851 and 7952, including the villages of BREEDEWEG:. and BRUCK. - 153 Inf Bde were then to be passed through, swinging, SOUTH and later. WEST, with the object of clearing and holding t'he high ground at 7551 and 7650, and dominating the main''road MOOK - GENEP. For these operations, the b.des were: supported. in turn .by 107 RAC (gun tanks), FPP EO (CROCODILES), LOTHIANS (FLAILS) and 222 Assault Sqn RE -(AVsRE). (b):. 53 (W) Inf Div, *with 71 Inf Bdee leading, were. to secure .the BRANDENBURG feature in 8053.This being successful, 1.60 Inf Bde were to pass, through 71 Inf Bde,' with the task of braeaching the SIEGFRIED defences in the area .8252 and securing the. STOPPELBERG- feature .in 8553. The bdes were supported. by 9 RTR' and 147 RAPC: (gun tanks), W DGNS (FLAILS), 141 RAC (CROCODILES) and 82 Assault -Sqn RE (AVsR:E)

-20 (c) Initially, 15 (S) Inf Div was to advance on a two bde front. On the RIffC, 46-'-nf Bde had the task of capturing the high ground between the- IW tip of the REICHSWALD and exclusive KRAIENBURG, - 227 Inf Bde ..on-.the LEFT were: to- capture KRANENBURG and block enemy infiltration from the NORTH. These. two bdes had in support the gun tanks of 4 Armd COLDM GDS and 3 Armd SG, FLAILS of 22 DGNS, CROCODILES of 141 RAC and AVsRE of 6 Assault Regt RE.

(d)

2 Cdn Inf Div.

Two bns of 5 Cn Inf Bde,

supported

by' one sqn 13/18 H (gun tanks) and elements of LOTHIANS (FLAILS) and 617 Assault Sqn RE (AVsRE), were to capture the area DEN HEUVEL 7856 - WLER, and open the road NIJI\GEN -' exclusive KRA1ENBURG, (e). 3 Cdn Inf Div were to attack with two bdes up, 8 Cdn Inf Bde on the RIGHT, 7 Cdn Inf Bde on the LEFT. Their task was to capture and clear the low ground between the main road. WYLER.R- RANENBURG - CLEVE and the R RHINE as far as the anti-tank ditch which ran NORTH from DONSBRUGGEN to DUFFELMARD. They were supported by elements of :13/18 ,H,, LOTHIANS: and 617 Assault Sqn RE, and. 114 LVsT (BUFFALOES) of 11 RTR and 5 Ass-ault.Reg tRE. They also had 50 VEASELS. 112, 803 and 810 Pioneer Smoke Coys were also in' support, to screen these LEFT flank ,operations from observation across 'the RHINE, 65. The attack went' in at 1030 hrs. Surprise was gained and although enemy bn commanders had.been warned. to expect an attack, there was no general enemy alert prior to the attack. The arty support was excellent, and counter-battery was most effective. Progress on the LEFT was extremely good, but on the RIGHT opposition was stronger than was anticipated. 154 Inf Bde of 51 (H) Inf Div- met stiff ish resistance in the villages of BRUK' and BREE DEW:7-but by the afternoon had captured their objectives - the high ground at 7952, and 153 Inf Bde were quickly on their objective tpo the SW and were swinging round on to the HMOOK --'GEEP'T o"rad. Mines and MG fire were encountered, but there was little

enemy shelling, and by 1730 hrs, the Div had taken some
150 PW, and were pushing :'on. To their LEFT,'" 53' (W) Inf'Div 'mad steady progress and secured the high ground. at the NW corner of the

.REICHSMWAt,.the leading bde taking about 200 PW on the way.

A lot 'of mines were encounj.tered up to the edge of the forest and. it was very soon apparent'*that the state of the ground

would provide a great proble'm. Though the. CIHURCHILL gun tanks and bridge layers managed to kbep well up with the
leading inf, the FLAILS and CROCODILES .were immediately bogged down after crossing the start line, added to which, the Div axis from the v.icinity of GROESBEEK to the forest, soon showed signs of giving way.'

The -attack of 15 (S)

nf Div went well- throughout

the day, Enemy opposition .was not strong and. our own casualties were light. The main obstacles :to the advance were mines of all types and the ground,' FLAILS cleared a gap through the minefield. at 773553 on,. the Southern axis, but on the Northern axis. vrere' unable to operate owing to ".."./the soft

- 21 -

the soft ground. own gap. By 1700 our hands, anda one road near FRASSELT

Here, however, the gun tanks found their hrs, ANENBURG and about 200 ;P, were in bn had reached the KRANEI\BURG---HEKKENS 8154. : .

On the front of 2 Cdn Inf Div, WYLER turned out to be a strong point surrounded by Schu-mines. The R de MAIS (RIGHT bn of 5 Cdn Inf Bde) had secured DEN LEUVEL by 1120 hrs. A Class 40 bridge was established' over the anti-tank ditch about half a mile SOUTH of TYLER. The:CALG'HIGHRS captured the town' at 1800 hrs after a stiff fPight and the road from there was being swept towards KAPIENBURG,' now firmly in "the hands of 15 (S) Inf Div. The road from GROESBEEK to WTLER was also being opened to assist 15 (S) Inf Div. At 1800 hrs, 3 Cdn Inf Div attacked across the floods and were quickly in ZYFFLICH and ZANDPOL and were'. preparing to advance to LEUT. 66. By midnight all formations had successfully achieved the objectives ordered for the day. Over 1100 PW' had been taken, five enemy bns destroyed or decimated and three more engaged, leaving only two ( or possibly three) as a local reserve. Tactical Recce during the day indicated quite plainly a general, if scattered, Northward movement across the line of the road GELDERN - WIESEL. Our own casualties had. been light, and so far our principal difficulties had been due to bad going, mines and flooding. The latter was particularly disturbing, and it was reported that the flood level in the area NORTH of the NIJMEGEN - CLEVE road had risen 18 ins since 1300 hrs. 67. 30 Corps Intentions for 9 Fob ordered 51 (H), 53 (W), 15 (S) and 3 Cdn Inf Divs to press forward. with the tasks allotted them in the initial Corps Orders (Appendix 'A'). 2 Cdn Inf Div, having completed their task, were to stand firm. 43 Inf Div, now concentrated in NIJMEGENT, were put at one hr's notice to move from 1200 hrs 9 Feb. and Guards Armd Div in TILBURG were at one hr's notice from midnight 9 Feb. D plus 1' 9 Feb 68. - ,, .The day's operations went well against weakening opposition except on 51 (H) Inf Div's front where the enemy had. been reinforced by two bns as a result of a pre-arranged relief. In- the CENTRE, progress was hampered by bad going and congested roads. 51 (H) Inf Div continued.-their advance through the Southern portion of the REICHSWALD with 152 and 154 Inf Bdes, making progress towards the comnunication centre of HEKKENS and' the road HEKKENS - FRASSELT. '153 Inf Bdle on the RIGHT cut the road M0OOK - GENIEP in two places, and then moved NW to clear this axis and the high ground in the area of
RIETHORST 7550.

69.

53 (W:) Inf Div had ma'de good progress during the night 8/9 Feb and by the evening had taken all their,

objectives, and were well established with two bdes on the

STOPPELBERG feature and on the high ground SW of iMATERBORN. Some enemy pressure was felt on their RIGHT flank, and here one bn. killed. 40 enemy and took 70 PW. D'ring the .day 5
.'./the

Div

- 22 the Div axis gave :way. completely and had. to be .closed for repair. The conditions were so' bad that VEASELS had to be towed by BUIIDOZERS. Meanwhile, the- Div traffic was diverted along 15 (S) Inf Div's axis. . ;
. Starting at 0400 'hrs, 15 (S) Inf Div advanced to pierce the NUTTERDEN defences of the SIEGFRIED Line. It had been their intention to make.-five crossings'of the antitank ditch between ANENB.URG and NUVTERDEN, but four had to be abandoned. .The one at 82854.0 succeedede,^ and two bns got over capturing NUTTERDEN and taking 10. 'officers and 240 .ORPW. -During the afternoon44 Inf Bde occupied the MATERBORN feature, , .:..

15 Recce Regt, making use of one of 3 CGdn Inf Divts routes, moved forward from NIJMIEGEN at 1500 hrs with the object of securing a footing on the. roads CLEVE - GOCH, and CLEVE - UDEM, but their patrols were held up by.stubborn enemy resistance in the outskirts of 'CLEVE. ' lMeanwhile, after being at one hr's notice from 1800 hrs, 43 Inf Div moved up along the axis. of 15 (S) Inf Div (road WYLER IKRANEIBURG) with the object of following through -f5 RecceRegt. and continuing the advance on GOCHE and U:.DE .. Until 4.3 Inf Div was clear, no traffic of 1:5 (S) Inf Div was being allowed to use the roads in the Div area.. At 2330 .hrs, -the head of the leading. tps of 43 Inf Div. (129 .Inf Bde) reached NUTTERDEN. . 3 Cdn Inf Div continued their waterborne operations against -light opposition,;, moving .from one is-land. village to another, they occupied MEHR, NIEL, ;IKEEKEN and,-:MILLINGEN, and had taken 500 - 600 Pvr 'in about 24 hrs. Patrols reached the bank of the RHINE., : 70. Traffic problems increased rapidly during the day . owing to imminent flooding of the main. road NIJAMEGEN CLE VE. Just after midday,. 17 ins of-water were reported on .this road. 30 Corps promptly issued orders that no tracked vehicles were to use the -road from STMORENHOOK 7660 to. inclusive KRANENBURG and no column of more than :10 vehicles. was to use this stretch without permission of Corps HQ. The total of VP taken so far was 2,500. It was estimated that our own casualties were about 500, 71 (a) (b) (c) .
as .follows

30 Corps Intentions for .night .9/10 Peb and 10 Fob Wer'o

.

51 .(3) Inf Div to continue clear ingthe road MOOK GENNEP - HEKKENS - GOCH. 53 (w) Inf Div to hold present positions and mop up. 15 (S) Inf Div to open MATERBORN exits. for 43 Inf Div, and after the latter had passed; through, were to push mobile columns to CALCAR, HUISBERDEN 9655,.and to the RHINE at EMMERICHo 43 Inf Div were to pass through 15 (S) Inf' Div and pursue their task of capturing GOCH, UDEMI and, VEEZE. 3 Cdn Inf Div were.-to. continue clearing 'the low ground up to the line of the railway GCLEVE - .GRIETHAUSEN 9159. Guards Armd.:Div were at one hrts notice .from 1800 hrs on 10 Feb. It was hoped to pass them through- at ... /first light

('d) (e)' (f)

- 23 first light 11 Feb, their route being dependent on the state of the roads at the time.

Dplus 2
72.

10 Feb

This was a rather disappointing day's operations owing to the very bad road conditions which obtainedi On 51 (H) Inf Div's front, 152 Inf Bde continued their advance through the Southern part of the REICHSWALD against fairly heavy opposition and were coming up against the allround defences of the HEKIKENS strongpointo 153 Inf Bde completed the clearance of the area HIEIKANT 7449MIIDDELAAR and opened the road MOOKGOCH up to and including OTTERSUM 7946. Patrols were pushed forward to AALIDONK 794.7 and up to ZEIDERHlEIDE 8147 where enemy were encountered in some strength. It was quite clear that G-ENIEP would have to be secured to permit the use of the' road HiOOKOTTERSUM. The enemy had blown the bridge at the NEjT corner of the town and retired to the cellars and sewers. 53 (W) Inf Div spent the day mopping up their area, and in slightly extending their hold on the REICHSWATD. Strong patrols were sent SOUTH to close the gap between their RIGHT and 51 (H) Inf Div, and contact -was. made. 15 (S). Inf Div unflortunately.failed to bounce the enemy out of CLEVE by 3 or 4 hrs, owing too'.he difficulties of movement, and it was not until nearly. midnight that 6 RSF (44 Inf Bde) were able to start clearing the CENTRE of the town. An attack was made to clear the woods YWf of CLEVE in the DONSBRUGGEN neighbourhood and. contact was made with 3 Cdn Inf Div.

73.

During the night 9/10 Feb 15 Recce, Rgt had been trying to open two routes through the MAiTERBOTI fbature. for the use of 43 Inf Div. Progress was slow in- the difficult and saturated country over tracks little else but heavy mud.. Enemy resistance was stiffening and. during the night further movement was stopped by strong enemy SP gun activity from : the area 8953. - .. ' The plan for 43 Iil- Div had been to. advance on one road through NUTTEDMEN and the cross roads in the neck of the .REICHSWALD. thence .via CL E .. ::and BEDBURG 9352. It had originally been intended to put. the second Bdeo on to a second axis. leading through another track through the-nock of the forest and thence via IMATERBORN, Information was that the .going, SOUTH. of the main KRAIEBLR - CtLEVE Vimpassable road was leaving only the one main road through the neck of the REICHSWAID fit for use. Th. Div therefore moved on this one aroad. Its Recce Regt was kept back as it -was hoped to get both leading Bdes deployed ov.: on the general line .ATERBORNCLEVE, with the aid of movement light during the

.night 9/10 Feb.

It had been agreed t-hat whatever portion left on the main road wouldh-iat into the side at NUTTERDEN between the hrs o 0800 -1000 on order to allow units of 15 (s) Inf )iv to pass clear the tovm of CLEVE. oft'-he Div was :with its head 10 Feb in through to

. ,/129

Inf

- 24 129 Inf Bde Group, the leading Bde of 43 Inf Div, got through the neck of the REICHSWMAID during the night but ran into heavy opposition about a mile WEST of CLEVE.: The Bde fought forward and by the early morning were hotly engaged with snipers and SP guns from CLEVE itself. A further threat was developing from the MATERBORN direction and the Bde went into leager with all-round protection. Situated like- this they fought all day through 10 Feb and the night 10/11 Feb. The situation Was frequently tense, Progress during the night had been so slow that the second Bde Group (214 Inf Bde Group) was unable to clear the neck of the forest and accordingly halted with its head at NUTTERDEN for the specified two hrs in the early morning of ,10 Feb. After detailed daylight recce two just useable tracks were discovered through the neck -of the REICHSWAID SOUTH of the main CLEVE road, 43 Recce Regt was brought up the column and launched down these tracks towards MALTERBORN during the afternoon. They failed to get out very far beyond the forest and the enemy were located in strength in the village of MATERBORN and to the WEST of it, 214 Inf Bde Group advanced on the tail of the Recce Regt but by last light had only succeeded in passing 5 DCLI out of the Forest through the Recce Regt. The remainder of the Bde curled up where it was for the night. Owing to the appalling conditions of the roads and the general congestion of traffic in the KRAENEBURG - NUTTEPLDEN area the third Bde of 43 Inf Div (130 Inf Bdo) was ordered to remain in NIJMEGEN for the time being. The weather conditions and the lack of: adequate roads, with the consequent ever increasing traffic congestion, had caused considerable delay on the whole operation in this Northern sector of the front. This impeded the exploitation
of what still appeared to be a favourable situation. By the

end of D plus 2, elements of three enemy reserve divs had been identified, apparently committed piecemealo Within the next four days'-a' total of nine divs were identified on the Corps front. ; ' 74. During the day, 3 Cdn Inf Div made contact with 15 (S) Inf Div in the DONSBRUGGEN area. They secured DUFFEhLMRD and were up to a general line some 500) yds short of the CLEVE RHINE Canal. 'The arty situation on the' Corps front was generally satisfactory and all operations were being covered adequately, except that 53 (W) Inf Div could only be supported as far as the main road -EKItENS - MATERBORN. They would not, however, continue further EAST meanwhile, if the opposition turned out to be heavy. 43 Inf Div now had" three field' regts and one medium regt up in support and a further three medium and one heavy regt were to be moved up on the night 10/11 FPeb to just behind 15 (S) Inf Div. Guards Armd Div HQ with 32 Guards Bde was to commence to move up on 11 P'eb into the GROESBEEK woods, ready to be put on the Southern route through 51 (H) Inf Div. 2 Cdn Inf Div now went into First Cdn Army reserve. Casualties in 30 Corps, including the two :Cdn Divs, were under 1,000 wounded up to 1800 hrs 10 Feb.

,75,

-25
7'6"--

' E-arly on hi's. day, the enemy .blew the-ROER dams on Fiis-t US Army front and an .increase in flooding was to be expected. 3 Cdn Inf Div were finding.. it necessary to adjust their positions to cope with Uhe floods; in the morning, 190 Field -Rgt (15 (S.) Inf Div) reported that their HO in IUAT\ELBUI-?.G. was- surrounded by,water which, was s-till rising and likely to submerge the main road. To attack 'GEin!LEP it was necessary to cross the flooded R NIERS and dur ing- the. day: a .plan was made by the Commander

77.

1-53 Inf Bde (of 51 (-H) Inf Div) to cross the river well NORTH
of the town on to the island lying between the R MAAS and the R NIERSo On the night 10/11 Feob this'.plan was carried out with complete success, the' enemy bo.ing taken by surprise in defences whichi -at' this point, f-aced the .R MAAS and were thus taken in reverse. DPj1us\3 to D
Jus5

11 'to 13 Feb

780. 1-

g-'Some adjustments in plan had- now become necessary, and the tasks of formations over the ne three days were briefly -as follows : .
;

(a) ' (b)

51 (H) Inf' Div to continue to secure the.. GOCH as far as KESSEL 8546: inclusive: :

road GEHiEP -

53 (w) Inf Div to sweep through the SE portion of the REICHSWATLD and complete, .the 'clearance of the forest.
-43 I.nf Div to secure the high ground EAST and TEL of STAATSpORST :CITEV7 9249. and-;:continue the advance towards UDEM and G-OCH. : : - 15 (S) Inf Div to clear CLEVE ahd- hand it over to 3 Cdn Inf Div. They were then to.-form a firm. base on the "Y\ERBORN feature, and push'. a strong mobile column to seize. CALCAR'c . -. 3 Cdn Inf ; Div to take over and' hold the town of CLEVE and to push forw.ard NE along the main road to the EMV/ERICH ferry. Guards Armd Div (less 3.2 Guards Bde) TILBURG area at four ir'-s notGic.. to: remaiin n the

(c) '"'- .. ;(-d) '

(e)"

(f.)

79.

' Opposition on the whole Corps front was: steadily On 'D plus 1 -, one .bn of 7 ]Para Div "was identified, and by the end 'of D plus 2, 'seven bns from three different reserve divs (6 Para, 7 Para and 180 Inf) had yielded prisoners. These reinforcements were conmmitted piecemeal as bns arrived in the area. 15 PG Biv and 116 Pz Div were committed on D plus 4. The enemy put in several counterattacks along the front, and infiltrated wherever possible.

;hardening.

-.

80-.

The' main advances made during this period were on the extreme RIGHT flank where 1EIJEN 7843 was captured on 12 Feb. After very bitter. fighting, 51 (H) Inf Div had secured HEKINS the previous day. An advance of some. 3000 yds was also made EAST of the road I-3EKKENS - CLEVE and along the Southern edge of the 'REICHSWAID, and on 13 Feb the Highland Div. linked. up with the 'felsh DiV '. ;

81. c

:--In the CENTRE, 53 (SW~) Ihf Div cleared the remainder of the REICHSWAALD Forest. Conditions wore extremely difficult, particularly on the very indifferent roads and tracks where . ./only
tracked

26 -

only tracked. vehicles could'"be' used.,. .Enemy' opposition,

though spasmodic. was at times. fierce, and SP, guns shooting o..wn the rides were a great problem Heavy 'counter-attacks *from theo Easteorn edge..on'/2 and 13 peb were:repulsed with .severe losses on both sides, ' . (For some notes on Forest Clearing operations see Appendix 1'B )
. a .

as a result of
.. .a

.these 82.

In their'attempt to break out towards UDEiM and GOCH, '43 I"i Div continued to meet. determined opposition and had .to repulse a number of couter-attacks by inf supported by t'ank's and. SP' guns of 116 P'z Div. The plan lthroughout was to seize -OCH by secturing the high ground SE of BEDBURG and so unhinging the'layback German def'ensive position (See Diagram 2). This layback position was then 'to boe 'rolled up from NORTH to SOUriH pinching out. the STAATSFORST CLEVE. On 11 Feb, 129 Inf Bde were still enga ged. hold ing the ' 'ring SW of CLEVE. It was impossible 'to forecast accurately

when this Bde could be relieved'by units of 15 (S) Inf Div whose role it was to capture the town, so 43 Irif Div continued its advance on its RIGHT flank with 214 Inf Bde Group. A set-piece, attack was- mounted during the afternoon which resulted, after heavy fighting, in the capture of MATERBORN village by one bn, the entry into HAU 9152 during the night
1/12 peb by the- second. bI railway W'EST of BEDBTPrG in -" '129 InfS Bde, launched an attac and. the sthird4' bn reaching the the early morni ing of12 Feb.l

having been relieved by 1 5 (S) Inf Div, on 12 peb to secure the high ground NE

of tGhe STAATSPORST CLEVE. feature

.9351.

By the -evening., BEDBUIRG had- been

secured and one bn was, pushing through to seize the ESELBERG

This hill was successfully captured by

WsILTS on 15 Peb against very heavy oppo'ition from Felements Of

'both 116 PFz and 15 PG Divs,

43 .Recce Regt attempted to

push out along the HAU - GOCH road. on 12 Feb, but quickly ran into strong resistance,, and dturing thei 'next day they 'continued to screen the Forest of'CLEVE.

130 Inf Bde Group could not be brought up from NIJMEGEN owing to the flooding. 83. On 11 Feb, 15 (S) Inf Div completed' the clearing of
CLEVE and handed over the town to 3 Cdn Inf Div the following dhay. The Div' established one Bde 'in the MATERBORN' feature area and attempted to push- another Bde Group, o.with one atrmd regt of 6 Guards. Tank-Bde under cosmand, towards CALCAR. The enemy reacted violently to this latter enterprise, and progress was slow, but by-the afternoodn of 13 Feb the'y had firnly established themsolves in HASSELT " -. " .. : 9453o 843. 5 3 Cdai Inf Div reached the line of the CLEVE RHINE Canal lon 11 Peb and coentinued to move EAST.. KEILEN 91 56 and WARBEYEN 9458 were occupied on 12 Feb and patrols were pushed out towards EMMERICH on the 13th. : During these three days, th: flooding was a severe handicap., As a result of experience gained by. the Dutch in 1926'when the RHINE. overflowed its banks, it was decided to blow certain dykes NE of, NIJEGEN... About two million gallons an hr poured through these; breaches., but the enemy countered by blowing dykes' 'the on the ALTER RHINE :at 9.00600, and. let in about the same quantity,

85.

... /On

12

- 27 On 12 Feb, there was nearly two ft .of water across the main road at 'KPIANBUIRG and by. the following morning the road and railway there wore impassableo 86,' In spite of enemy shelling,. a bridge over the swollen R NIERS' at the IE corner of GEIN\EP was completed by 1100 hrs on 12 Feb. Second Brit Army were under Gailnng the bridging of the MAA.S at GENEP.T Owing to enelmy f.ire into G0E lEP it was not possible to start the bridge from the EAST bank during the day of 12 Peb. On the EST bank, a start was made on a pontoon bridge, but 'Lthe river was still ri-siing and time of comfleti;zon was problemat ical, Howvever, on 13 Feb, reports from US sectors indicated a slight fall in the level of the R HPROERo

AIR

PH.SE I

87.

' 'Medium and heavy bombing attacks prior 'to D-Day : consisted of the following 1 oeb 113 aircraft of VIII USiAd! . 1 dropped 281 tons of IiE on the road bridge at vESEL without success, and 26 aircraft put. 59' to-'ns on the rail bridge, .but. observation of. results wat not possible. 56 aircrafft of 2 Group RA'I dropped 81 tons of HE on an oil mill, actively in production, at THEIDEN E 9260, with good results 30 aircraft of 2 G(.roup PA attacked a POL dump and depot of 27 oil sotorage tanks at EMMIERICH and 48 tons of bombs were seeon to fall in the CENTRE of the target a re a,

2 Feb

6 Feb

Night 287 aircraft of RAP- Bomber Command dropped. 7/8 1eb 1,384 tons of .E on OLEMJE and 153 aircraft put down 467 tons on GOCIOI. in both cases to deny the main routes into the batt'le area. Results were excellent. In addi-.'ion, 95 aircraft of 38 Group dropped 1,670 x 500 lb bombs on the road centre;. and b illeting areas of ANEEZE, UDEM : and CATCAR 88. During Phase 1 of the operations bad. weather soriously interfered with the medium and. heavy bombing progranmmes, In spite of this, however, flying was attempted on every day except 12 Feb. and a number of targets were engaged. The .'weight of attack in most cases had to be curtailed and the results obtained were usually .impossible -to observe. Por

example,

the 'following instances

can be

ited.

On :D-Day

8 Feb, 198 aircraft were scheduled to b mb the NUTTERDEN feature, but owing to the weather and proximity of our omn tps, the attack had to be called off, smainy aircraft jettisoning their bombs on CLEVE(. On, the same day, 144 aircraft were- detailed on A TERBORN. but only 16 attacked and 64 aircraft were directed on IKRAIELTBURGC. by, radar but no results .could be observed. GELDERN and RAIEIIt{BERG A 2128 were attacked on 9 FoPeb; XANTHIT the next day;- SONSBECK and KEVE AER by Lnstruments on ,the 11th, arid WEEZJE, UDEM, XANTEN and IKVELAER again on 13 FePb.

... /89.

- 28 -

'89. ,

Close support, although also seriously impeded by weather conditions, was very successfully carried out by Fighters, Fighter B3ombers and R/P aircraft. On 8 Peb' 841 Group 1AP carried out over 550 sorties, Some .of the more important targ.ets in the immediate battle area includcd
six separate attacks on the.MATERBOPQL feature by Spitfires

andr

Typhoons totalling 60 sorties, and two on the 1\NUTTERDEN

.feature by Typhoons of 26 sorties. }MLILINTCEN 10 sorties, NIEL 32 sorties and IEiHR 1.9 -sorties,w .e other `targets engaged.. Tactical Recce 241 sorties, and Arty Recce 26 sorties were also flown on this day., On 9 PFeb- the weather worsened considerably and little close slpport was possible. 1.0 Peb was a much 'better day andS 84- Group P. Ptflew 122 close suppor't sort'ies out of a total of 338; for the day. The balance was mostly directed against enemy road and rail conmmunicat ions. Few immaediate close support targets wvere called for on 11 Feb but 84. Group RAP flew 305 sorties mostly on interdictions rmed: rocco ran The 12th was an irmpossible flying day, ard there was no activity. On the 13tJh the chief target was the STAATSPO2ST CZVE in close support of' 43 Inf Div. This wVood is some 1,500 yds square lying immedia-tely to the EAST of. the REICHSILLDo A preo-arranged. . air plan was made to boxLb the .'NO-RTH edge and 6to carry out a WINIG3E on the area betw-een it- 'and our own 'ps csonsisting of a beat up with rockets and cannon fire. The forward line of tps was marked by a white smoke screen with red smoke at each ' end, 60 Typhoons and ,-8 Spitfir es attacked in waves, A feature of this operation was the excellent anti-flak treatment 'meted out by our o', a.RA The area was heavily defendced by enemy flak and, after the operation, the pilots reported that little 'w-as directed against them, SONSIBECK was attac:,ke,. by seven sqns of Fighter Bombers .. and HAS-SUM, in direct i.support of 51 (H). Inf Div, was also engaged onr this day.

SECTION 16 .

-ASE

14

7 PEB

90 .

. The period under r.eview was concerned with the capture of essential tactic.al .-features, such as IEOSSEL and the escarpment overlooking GOCHic, as a.preliminary to the assaulton this strongly defended bastion of the enemy defences.. At midday' 15. Feb, 3 Cdn In' Div reverted to-under command 2 Cdn Corps who then assumed responsibili-ty for the LEFT sector from all inclusive GC-AVE GROEST.BEK - CLEVE E3V~E, RI CHo ,.
. . . -

..
-. ' i

1.

91.

32 Guards Bde caime under commnand 51 (H): Inf Div on 14J F eb, moved up that day and captured !HO-EPRSUM 8243 taking IQO0 PW. . The main opposition was mort.ar fire and mines, Taking .over about 2,000 yds of fro fromt ro the Highland Div, they continued to probe forward and captured MULL 834.3 on -16 FPeb and HASSUM the following day,

51 (H) Inf Div beixr.g still

road TIHE:tENS - GOCH, were confronted with the formidable tasks of seizing tISSEL and bridging the. R NIERS in. front of the town, 7 A & SH of 154 Inf Bde attacked during .the night 14/15 Feb and captured the town taking 30 PWT, A Class 9 bridge; was quickly erected over the 160 ft gap. Oving to accumrate shelling and mortaring which caused heavy casualties

responsible for opening the

. o/to the

29.
to-th, :RE.s, c-.nd fog during the nighht 15/16 Foeb which nullified the use of searchlights, the Class 40 could not be completed before 1100 hrs on 16 1'Feb. ASPERDEN 8845 was secured on 16 Peb and T-HIERVOST--8945 on the 17th.

eanwhilo,
arrived in

on 16 Foeb,

52 (I)

Inf Div (less one bde)

the battle.

area and took over the RIGHT hand

sector of 51 (H) !rif' iv.. hey were directed on WEE.ZE and w.re responsible- for clecIaring-' the PEAST bank of the IIAAS. .The leading -bde, 157, started to clear the .wooded area NE of AFFERDEN 8058 tshe same afternoon~ and during the night sedured 1APFERDEN. The Recce Regt established themselves on the road AFFEPRDEJT RELVEID 8238, and in pursuance of their tasko of occupying GROOTE HORST 8639, other elements closed on' *the fortifid_ castle of KASrTEEL BLIJEINEEK 8338 Pu.rther advances in this area were well-nigh imp'ossible TIe leading trps .of the Div were without spocial equipment. now faced- with about 200 yds of deep flood water beyond whicrh we.re strong enemy dcefoen<es' cov ered by an anti-tank

.ditch.

' -

Thu .task , of 55c (or) Inf Div was to seize th.e high ground to the NORTH of' and overlooking ASPER 'bridge 8846 and to -take the bridge i ntact if possible.' This action started on. the night 13/14 Fob and resulted in very bitter f.ighting,. and it was not until the night of 16 Feb that the o-peraton succeed ed , although the brid.ge itself was 'blown 'by the enemy. On the autskirt-s of the SE corner of the forest, enemy resistance vras part'icularly stubborn, and'in .his counter-attack he suffered severely, 40 of his., dead .being. counted in ASPEREBERG 892+7. .-

A,.dvancin t through gh the enemy defences along -the 9. Grid l'East:ing,, 43 Inf Div made slow but steady progress. 13C0 Inf de Group was ordered forward from the NIJiEEGEN area on' 14 :Feb., Early on this. day strong enemy counter-attacks were put -in from three directions to recapture the ESELSBERfeature preceded by hr."f -an hr t s intense shelling. These
attacks were finally d- iven off.Ifost, of 15.Feb and the

morning of 16 Feb we:e taken uzp wibh heavy fighting by 1350 Inf. Bde to seize the important tactical hill f-eatures EAST of the Forest of COI3E!V This- was eventually succes'sful, and at 1500 hrs on 1,6 Peb 214 Inf Bde passed through. " Fight ing continued to be bitter and a series of limited objectives were taken in turn. This Bde captured over 1,000 9PW during its advance on 1l6 Feb land into the early hrs of the 17tth, On this day two bns of 129 Inf Bde tootk over and consolidated the previous dayts :ains of 214 Inf Bde, and the latter continued the advance -o the escarpment overlooking GOCHl between the roads G(OGH - CLE'E and GOCH- CALCAR. This was successfuclly ocaptured, still against

bitter opposition, during the day. These three days of fighting -had outflanked ;thne enemy pos itions in. the STATSFORST ILEVE, and. when this-forest was entered, for purposes of final cleaaring, on the 1 7th, it was found that the -enemy had withdrawn. A carefully co-ordinated fire plan had itept .the enemy in this wood innocuous during the advance by the Div to the EAST of it. This advance from NORTH to SOUTH by. 43 Inf Div had

very considerable effect on the-final outcome of the VERITABIE operation. They had advanced against sustained and heavy opposition some 10 miles .with both flanks largely open to the enelmy. They h'ad successfully rolled up the German lay-back position and.. secured vital high ground
.. ./necessary as

- 30necessary, as .a preliminary to the assault on the GOCH bastion. They captured some 2,300 prisoners during this operation. : On the front of 15 (S) Inf Div progress was also. slow. In. 46 Inf Bde's advance through the wooded area from HASSELT 'towards MOYLASD 9651 they were opposed by spandaus, SP guns and" snipers everyvwhere, in addition to TUhe enemy' s now incre as'sing arty 'and. mortar fire. At ,300 hrs on 15 Foeb, this Bde came under command. Cdn Inf Div'while the rest of 1t5: (S) rnf Div. were withdrawn to "rest in view of the Dives new task, which was ..to pass through 4 Inf Div and atctack -OCHI from the .NORTH.

35 Cdn Inf Div, On 14 Peb the Div secured HILREIDEICH 9659 opposite EPL'ERICH. On 1 5 Feb they reached HTJISB.ERDEN and obtained control of a stretch of flood (~water between themn and the RH]T]E,l
,-': On the same day they took over the part of' the line held by 15 (S) Inf Div in the woods 'SOUTH and WE'ST of M!IOYLAHDO and at noon reverted to command 2 Cdn Corps 'who assumed its operational role. The battle now proceeded on a two

.Corps front.
-- ' - In this area -slow progress continued for the next two : days, By the lni ght of 17 Feb, most 0f the wooded area SOUTH of M0YLAMLD was in 'utr hands an,. LOUISEIDORP 9649 was
seized,

- . 'An-adjustment of the intoer -orps boundary EAST of CLEVE took place on 16 Fob; it was swung from DIE to SE bringing the road CLEVE - CALCA 1 R and UDEN,[ into 2 Cdn Corps' sector. .92. : -The important br idge over the }MAAS at G-ENIP was not -:.yet ope:n. On 15 Feb the CENTRE secti on was in place, and. :both ehd '-sections were constructed and ready to float over, but th, approaches were under 18 ins o water. ' It was ..hoped' to have the bridge open for traff ic on 18 Peb, but in fact the speed. and height of' the river .delayed its use unltil' first light on 20. eob. By the end of this 'pphase, the following enemy formations E .hadbeen identified,.in .addition to odd bat-tle' groups and
security bns :b -.

935

One. Pz Div
i.' One .PG Div

Three Inf Divs

Pour Para Divs .

-: Some of t.hese had been drawnv from the area in which . -Ninith US Army was due to lautnch its offensive, ,- -'. Although the majority of PW .were very tired and battle weary, there was no indication as yet ofC any general breakdowny.of G-erman morale in fron-t; of PiFrs Cdn Army. Total W for the .operation was now 8,700 plus.

NINTH. JUS

ARM?

94.

At a conferenlce. held at' HQ inth US Army on 17 7 Peb e .. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~

, /it was

- 31 (Operation G .PENADE). unless thvre was one in or more of rain before then, or .-an;increase in. flooding. Ninth US Arnly would cross the ROER between DUREN P 14 and d ROERM.OID K .79 and drive NORTH through MNTCPEN GLADBACH P 09 to .the road VENLO - WESEL to link up with 'First Cdn Army, It would clear. the area between, on the RIGHT the R ERPT to DUSSELDORi and thence the R RHIIE, and on the LEFT the R M1.AAZ-S. At' the sa-ine time, First' US Army would co-operate in the direction of COLOGNIEo

it was decided that Ninth US Army would attack on 23 Feb

AIR

PH^ASE 2

95.

i lIediumn and Heavy bombing programnmes during this phase included the followinng targets, On 14. eb, when visibility -was the best so .far in this operation, 2 Group RAF attacked WEEZ., JD1.L S,'TR'ELEN and NIEUKERK wi"n a total of 122 aircraft. VIII USAAP.P dropped 98 tons of HE on the WESEL road bridge and destroyed one of its spans. IX USAAF put over 166 aircraft to attack GELDERN IE VELAER, XANTEN and GOCH. The 15th was to all intents and purposes a non-flying day. On the next day 'UDEM and-WEESE wereattacked by 61 arcraft of 2 Group PRh.P.,. 418 tons of HE from 95 aircraft of RAP B-nmber Command fell on VESEL and 63 aircraft of VIII USAAP also attacked the same town, 17 Feb was another blank day for the TMediums and Heavies, Close support reached its peakc during the excellent flying conditions on 14 Feb. All day targets were engaged in the area SE of CLEVE on the fronts of 15 (S) and 43 Inf Divso. These included strong points, SP guns, mortarsj MG positiolnsa OPs. tanks' and inf in houses or dug de-fences. Later in the day, similar support was given to 51 (H) Inf Div on -the RIGHT flatnk of the 'Corps front. The CABRALK system was in operation all day. This consisted of 4 Typhoons at a time, coming. u'pr every 15 minutes and reporting to the FCOP who 'briefed them in the air. Some thirty two separate attacks were made in this way during the day and some were only 300 yds from our leading tps . In addition to the above, various preo-selected targets were' also engaged including the villages of :SPE.RDEiT and T.ASSUM, and an ammunition dump in the HOCHWATLD,. In all. 84 Group RAP flew 804 sorties on this day - The 15t.h was a blank day, and. no flying was' possible un.til the afternoon ..of the 1 6th, ASPERDEN and HASSUI, were then given more. than ten sqns between. them in support of 51 (H) Inf Div, and the CAiBRANK in s upport of 43 Inf Div carri.d out 12 attacks in the limited flying weather. A total of'. 546 sorties were f lown by 84 :-roup RAP on this day. Pilots reported constantly' "little flak" or :"no flak". This was largely due to the co-operation of: the RA'who, as each wave went in, shelled knoVwn enemy.:e batteries. Little .support was possible on 17 peb owing to bad weather once again,

96,

... /SECTION 17

22SECTION 17 PISE 3 18 ..22 TBB

97.
98.

During this period the operation had two focal poi nts GOCH on 30 Corps front and CAiLC/R on 2 Cdn Corps fronto The town of G-OCH was a bulwark of the German positions

and- besides %the na-tural obstacle of the R NIERS, included twc

anti-tan. ditches among its def encoes. Elements of three divs were collected ;to mna its defences in addition to the norral garrison tps. * In brief, the, plan to effect its capture was as

followsT (a) (b)

R iTERS-

'

51 (H) Inf Div was to clEar the tow.n SOUTH of the 53 (9[) Inf Div was to maintain its positions on the escarpment bettwe;e the river and thle GOCH "CLEfE
railway line, ,43 Inf Div was to maintain its positions on the

(c')

I: Div and the escarpment between the LE:T of 55 (,Xi) road CGOCOT - CAO-,LHq). If enemy opposit-ion was weak, i-t \ras to se iZe that .portion of the town NORTH of the .NIERS. if the capture of GOCH was NOT possible, the Div was to secure eightl crossings over the anti-tankr ditc~h iimmediately SOUTH of the escarpment. (d) 15 (S) Inxf Div was to be prepar,:; to' pass through. 53 (W) and 43 Iurf Divs to capturce; the Northern part
of tihe towvn from the NORTI{.

99.

Durmng the nigt 17/18 .Peb, 214 Inf Bdde (43 Inf Div) af.ter a successful advance .te previous evening, made the
gaps in the anti-tan.k ditch. Opposition to "their further

advance was fierce iandl 15 (S)

in accordance with their orders, ,they did not attelmpot to capture the ;ownon Inf Div (less 46 Inf Bde .which was still with

3 Cdn, Inf Div) was concentrated in the .iEIRVOST area early

, on 18 Feb. -At 1500 hrs the attack was star.ted with 44 Inf Bde in the van. At 1930 hrs, 51 (li) ICnf Div advanced to clear the town SOIUTH of the R NIERS from the NWT. By midnight, 44 Inf Bde was in the outskirts of the town -and 6 KOSB reached the anti-tank ditch and erected a
bridge -at 91544.3 against heavy oppos ition from MGs in em-

placements. 51, (H) Iifn Div madce good progress and got a JUMBO bridge over the a:.ti-tank ,ditch at 901443. In the meantime, 53 (w) Inf Div had. been ordered to join in the assault and to clear tlhe area between the NIERS Cnd the
railway as far as and including the anti -tank: d.itch. progress secured the factory area during the morning. the evening, 15 (S) Inf Div were firmly established in whole area NORTH of the NIERS, having Laken 600 PH. 71 By the

Inf Bde advanced at 'first light 19 Feb, and making steady

Confused fighting continued in the Southern half of the town for the next three days. Althoi -h 5 BW (153 Inf Bde) captured the 'garrison commander and his staff on 19 Feb, the erlemy' formations wyho had come in as reinforcements fought a bitter hou.se-to-house battle, supported by a weight of arty and mortars, and 51 (IH) Inf Div finally cleared it up by the evening of' 21 Feb. * /100.

- 33 100. .On: the remainder of 30 Corps front limited advances. were made. 52 (L) Inf" Div slowly cleared the wooded area around AFFTEDEN but repeated attempts :to break out SOUTH were foiled by' the flooded .country and strong opposition.

In the -gap between 52 (L) Inf Div and 51 (H) Inf Div, 32
G-uards Bde 'fought a h.ard action on 21 -.Feb when they had the ::task.. of :.adva ncing- SOUTH- from HASSUM to. capture SIEBENGEWALD 8641. - .-Veryr st iff opposition was enco.mntered by 3 IG who *led .the. attack. . -On reaching t he line .of'.the R KENDEL, -;the. bn .camie under very heavy shell, mortar and MG fire, F'ew AFVs -.could be' got. .Forward -to support the inf owing to *the impossible. going, and severe' casualties were incurred. As -'the ..bn: could not be maintained in its positions under these :conditions,- iJt; was vwi'thdravm in good order to HASSIUM .to re-organiseo :-. . . . , o

After completing their task of assisting in the capture of GOCH, 53 ('W) Inf Div were withdrawn to rest and refit, one ;bde to NIJJME&EN'and the remainder to the Eastern portion 'of the REICHSWALD. While thc clearilng -of GOCH was 'in -.progress 43 Inf Div had been working Eastwards across the GOGH.- CALCAR road. On 20oPeb they were well across the road and had taken HELVEThBO0M 964-5 -linking- iup with 3 Cdn Inf Div. Thie same, day, they were relieved in this sector by' 15 (S) Iinf D-iv anCid -retLurned to the CLEV:E area to rest and refit. - 1.5 :(>S) Inf Div now continued its advance in the general: direction of UDEM. They took .- BUHHOLT 9543 on 20 Feb -and by 22 Feb had elements almost up to the' railway line some 2500' yds '-EST of; TE, : :DE. 101'o ,- . Meatnwhile on 2 Cdi Corps front, 3 Cdn Inf Div were trying to- clear the woods SOUTH of MOYLAND and to continue the. advance towards CALCAR. The enemy, however, -was fighat ,ingS as strongly here as about GOCH, and he put in a success: ion of counter-attacks. 2 Cdn Inf Div advanced on the RIGHT of the other Cdn Div 'through LOUEISoEDORF and cut the road GO,(H -CALOCAR and captured VERPALLT 9646L on the evening of 19- Feb,.' The .2 l'Cdn Inf Div then -took over the wooded, area SOUTH of the roladCLEVE - CALCAR and by ,. series, of -small scale' attacks, :cleared these woods' by 21. Feb to, within -.1,000 yds of CLCAR. This gradual extension.. of .the front along the high ground disconcerted the MOYL/dID defenders, and- an' attack on' the villiage on 22 Feb, .met little opposition..- Further attemnpts to secure OALCAR, however, wore. unsuccessful for. the-' time being. '

102.

Additional formations were now on their way to theVEPJTABLE battle- area. 4 Cdn Armd Div was rrelieved 'in .1 Brit Corps sector and came unider command 2 Cdn Corps!,. being moved to the area NE of the REICHSWA.A:) Forest, 2. Odi Armd Bade was- to reach the MA&TERBOREN area on 23 .Feb.. .1 A'Irmd ".Div and 3 Brit Inf Div \were also 'moved tp from Second' Brit Army' The armd bde of' Guards Armd Div came into the" NIJMEGEN area on 21 Feb. On the enemy side, Pz IEHR DLiv and one more inr were now identified. div

**oAIR

- 34 AIR.
103;.

PHASE 3

This period was again marked by bad weather and close support was only possible on a very limited scale until 21 Peb o The. Medium and: Heavy bombers carried out a number of attacks chiefly bombing by instruments.-. On 1-8 Feb 155 *LANTCASTERS .of RA.P Bomber Comrnmand dropped 691 tons of HE on VWtESEL. 'On the 19th 166 aircraft of RAP,- Bomber Command. attacked WVESEL again, dropping, 71 6 tons, and 68 aircraft of -:VIII USAAF put' 1 64 tons iE. of. on the, WESEL railway bridge. The 20th -.was a blanri, day and the effort- on 21 FPeb was on a small scale. 30 aircraft from 2 C-roup RAP attacked each UDEIM-and.- EEZE, and IL USAAP Fput over 73 aircraft at XANTEN and 58 at GEL )DEN. The 22nd was' a good. flying day but all. the Allied effort was concentrated deep. into GERIv^IY.Close support on 21 Feb was. mostly on 2 Cdn Corps front -where' heavy enemy opposition was bein.g encountered. -One spectacular attack against, the very solid stone defended' castle of KASTEEL BLIJEi-,.3EEK, close in front- of the forwvard tps .of 52 (L)' Inf Div, is of particular interest. Heavy arty concentrations on this building had made little impression but after the Typhoons and Spitfires nad. finished their attack, t--he structure was consider ably batt erqd. though far from demolished, 24 Pighter Bombers took part in this 'attack. 84- Group PPW f lew ,542 sorties on this day which included pre-arranged attacks on CAi'.WAR, 17 at-acks by 155 Typhoons, LABBECK railway station, ItLLINTEN and. KAiP, On 22 Feb another large number of targets was engaged. The KASTEEL .:BLIJ'ElBEEK was attacked. again r a:d was properly. reduced, and considerable support was rendered to 15 (S) Irnf Div. and-2 and 3 Cdn Inf. Divs,. .

:-104-

SECTIONT 18
105.-

PHASE 4

23

26 FEB

During this period the main activities of First Cdi Army were -the inconclusive attacks on WEEZE and the planning and- regrouping for operation BLOCKBSTER. -Ninth US Army started its operation CTIRENADE, and made .considerable progress, The regrouping which gradually took place resulted in
the following allocations of format'.ons
.,.B r

106.

-.

!p'

..

30O Brit Co
0Guards Armd Div..
6 Guards Armd Bde 8' Armd Bde 34 'Armd. Bde .3 Brit Inf'Div
15 (S) Inf Div (wvho came

2 GCn Co s
CdL Armd Div" 1. 1 Armd 1Div ' 2.Cdn Armd Bde .2 Cdn. Inf'Div 3 Cr1n Inf Div 43 I Div
!

-into-Army:r n reserve .;on relief by 3 Brit Inf Div on 26 Feb) 51 (H) Inf Div

52

L) Inf Div

53 w) Inf Div
.O ./This was

-.

35

This was accompanied by a corresponding redistribution of units of 79 Armd Div. Meanwhile the ''inte..'.orps boundary had been adjusted. from UDEM onwards, bringing the RIGHT of .2 Cdn Corps just EAST of :R-KEREHEIM'. 9938 to inclusive-

SONSBECK 0535, 0o .

'

'

1070.

' Except f:or patrolling there was little activity on the extreme RIGHT of 30 Corps. 52 (L) Inf Div paid several -visits to EASTEEL BLIJENBEEK and on the evening of 24 Feb :a pat.rol entered. 'the castle grounds without interference but -were' fiercely engaged by a party of enemy esconced in the Keep'- itself. ' ' ; ' ' 51- (H) Inf Dti.v carried out some successful small scale operations with the object of linking up with 52 (L) Inf Div on their RIGHT, and of keeping pace with 53 (W) Inf Div during the openring stages` of the latter' s attack on WEEZE., They "secured the.: a'ea" BOECK:ELT 8842 - HULM 9040 - BAYENHOF

8839.

. .

'15 (S) ITnf' Div advanced to prLotect the LEFT of 53 (W) Inf Div and extended their own flank some 1.000 yds towards the road CIOEVE - ULDEL,. They .were then relie'veud y) Brit Inf Div, and at same time Gueards Armd Div took over the Nthrn porther portio n their sector up to the boundary rith -2,'Cdn Corps. -' - : : 108-. The 'task of' _anturi ng VIWEZE fell to 53 () Inf Div' who were to launch their' attack at 0600-hrs on 24 Feb, They were supported by all available arty viz- thirteen fd regts, six mred gs, 'avy oe regts, ande two tWaO HA and regs, by 8 Armd. IBd~e, anid F LS, CROCODITLES, ATVsiE and KANGAROOS of 79 Armd. Dive ; ' .... .

- :A An- initia.l 'brigehead across the stream and anti-tank ditch. NORTH of the` tc-.. Wtas o b' madse by 160 Inf Bde with 'two- bn in.KANC-.i..OS, ' 71 In-f Bde was then to pass through .anJ-capture lEEZE ;I --hile 158I Inf Bde captured HEES 9136,
Exp'loitation to'-vE^MU1,.5 0'1 i3
- .hattac.xk *The-

w-as -the task of 160 Inf Bde.

in the f ace of .stiff

star'ted . totim

opposition,' By :ni.day two bns were astride the road GOCHW/EEZE asbout 4,000 ydts short 1 o2f the latter .place - and during *the afternoon. HE.HENt'..',92.41 -and HOST 9340 were cleared with the he~lpofd OCR~OCIETS.,., 71 Inf: Bde began" too pass through and 'acoy got into LOTTTJM 9339, but the fighting was extremely tough a.-ross the divisional front. The enemy
put in a succession cf counter-attacks, and our losses in

tanks were heavyd-.'...- Never.t.heless 300 PW were taken and the wooded areas. VFEST of t1he railway v-.eo steadily cleared under
heavy arty and mortar -"ire *It- was becono.:.-., cleai that- there e.te was .I chance of armour- and. in in KlA.:GAT)OOS h'reaking througk 'rom thae NORTH and. the Corps- Commande.r ordered. thatJ" 53 '-(W) Inf Div[ would. NOT attempt t o ente. the towm on 025 Feb unless: they were :certain it-'could be cleared easily , The Corps arty would. be rerequire~d to suppdot BLOOCLBSE. on 26. FPob, ad p the Cdn Corps, a,,tack had. bse.n-giV. n priority ovr. any.. 30 Corps operation, At 05,15 hrs on 25" obh 53 '( r) ID'iv 'were told no further adva.ntce would be nma.de '.And-. so, the a; a ulst n O WEEZE from -the NORTH came to a .halt-for the time'be'ing'wxth ou^ tps 'about a mile short of the tovm.,
1

_r; J?.-

__r

- 36 2 Cd.n Corps
10D9, , B: The intention of operation BLOCKIBUSTER .was for the Corps to break: through the enemy defences between inclusive UDEM and. exclusive CALCAR and to position two armd. divs on the HOCHWALD..ridge and then exploit to XAJ\TEN 1141.
00:

.1.091

The phases and tasks of formations were as follows Phase I

:-

was to commence at 0430 hrs 26 Feb. Two bdes of 2 Cdn Inf Div were to secure the high ground immediately SOUTH of CALCAR and establish themselves astride the road CALCAR GOCH in 9949. One bde of 3 Cdn Inf Div to secure the high ground just .NORTH of KEPPEIN

9 7441,.
Phase 2 was NOT '.to commence before 0800 hrs. One bde 3 Cdn Inf Div to capture KEPPEL -and the high ground about 9743. A battle group of two armd regts and two inf bns of 4 Cdn Armd Div was to secure the high ground near TODTENHUGEL
l0145.

Phase 3

Commencing NOT. before 1200 hrs,

11 Armd Div
-

SOUTH of UDEM to secure the spur in- 9940 and 0039. 3 Cdn Inf Div to capture UDEM itself while '-the armd group of 4 Cdn Armd Div closed in on the town from the NE,, Phase 4 11 Armd Div to continue its advance SE to capture SONSBECK and position the leading bde on" the high ground just NORTH of the town, 4 Cdan Armd Div to advarnce EAST and position the leading bde astride the road and railway where they pass betv:en, the HOCHWALD and :BALBERG-ER Forests, -3 and 2 Cdn Inf Divs were to follow up and protect the outer flanks of 11 Armd and 4 Cdn Armd Divs respectivelyo
. :

(4 Arrnd Bde) to advance on axis BUCIHOLT 9543

Exploitation would depend on developments, with the 'armd divs probably directed on XANTEN and. WESEL.'

110.

Phase 1

med regts., three heavy regts and one Cdn Rocket Unit, with all available air support.

fwaI s to be supported by nineteen fd regts, eight

IINTI 111-.

US

ARMY

-Operation GRENADE started:on time at 0330 hrs 23 Feb. The enemy appears to have been caught entirely' by surprise in the initial stages mand very little opposition was lencountered
on the first two days of the operation, This- surprise was
no doubt greatly assisted by the limited opening arty bombardment which only lasted for forty five minutes. - The attack was. launched by: tito Corps, XIX on the RIGHT and. XIII on the 'S Corps la-ter LEFT. ' XVI U extended the Army frontby coming up. on the LEFT of XIII Corps.

112.

':' Twvelve hrs after the assault crossing of the ROER some sixteen bns were across the river. By the early morning of 24 Peb, in spite of great difficulty wi.th the swollen river, .. /very heavy

-37

very heavy and accurate shelling of the sites, and even some determined enemy air action, six Class 40 Treadway bridges, one heavy pontoon bridge, four Class 5 inf support a bridges. um and fo bridges and ferries were in operation on the Army front.. The. build up proceeded fast and so did. the advance of our Allies. By 26. Feb they had reached the 'genera'l li n1E OBEPEMDT F 1363 - OPHERTEN 0868 HOLZWEiLER. 0673 .- .VEhRATH 0477, ERKIELENZ 0177 and XVI US Corps had crossed on the Arm-y LEFT flank seizing KL GLADBACH 9378. Over. 5,800 PW ;had been taken on the. Army front at this stage, and casualties to our: own tps had been very

lighte.

AIR
113.

mPHASE 4_

No flying was possible on :23 Feb, : Oi', the :next day Medium and Heavy .bombers of 2 Group RAF, with 43 ,aircraft, :bombed RHEINBERG and with 45 aircraft REES. ..VIII USAAF railway bridge, but -without-success. The 25th was a day of small effort. 2 Group RAF attacked UDEM and XANTEN.: Visibility remained poor on 26 Feb and the effort was again small, -: 2 Group RAP sent 30 aircraft to attack gun positions aand 1:0 aircraft of 38 Group RAP attacked the ammunition dump at XANTTEN once again. . ,

sent-70 aircraft to try once again to destroy the WESEL

-11~4

Close support on the 24th. after a blank day before, 'was restricted to a very. few flying hrs. :The 25th, after e'arly promise, turned out impossible'flying veather after midday. A few pro-arranged targets, such as the church in WEEZE, were successfully engaged eily in the day. One p articu imnediate close spport engagement, is also worth mentioning. Enemy,. inf were seen 'to be forming, up to counterattack in;.the Northern-' outskirts of WEEZE. .Typhoons already in the air were diverted on to it in a matter of minutes with entirely satisfactory results, -26 -Feb again .proved thoroughly bad from the air point of view and there'was no direct .6lose support for-- the opening of BLOCKBUSTER. :

SECTION
1'15.

-9 PAS

26 FEB to 3 MAR

.This period saw the: opening stages of BLOCKBUSTER, the gradual loosening ipp on 30 Corps front and t-ho steady advance to link up with Ninth US Army. at GELDERN

11.6.

: The operation was: started at0430 hrs 26 FPeb as planned and the first phase was completed by the end of the day against moderate, opposition. 'The main difficulty was the repeated bogging of the. armour in the heavy ground. In spite of this handicap the. high ground' and the escarpment SOUTH of CALCAR were firmly: in our hand as also was KEPPELN, while our advance .had reached the outskirts of -UDEM. 8 Cdn Inf -Bde '3; Cdn Inf Div) had had some. very sevre fighting during the day with some 25% casualties among the inf and 17 tanks out of two sqns out of action by anti-tank guns, PANZERFAUST and PANTHERS. The Bde killed a large number of
. .. /Germans in

-- 38 Germans ;.i- KEPPELN- and -took 300 Pv. after some fierce fighting-"h The: Corps took over.1100 PW:before dusk and in order .that the enemy should be given no- time to reorganise, the Corps .Commnander. decided that the. -two 'Armd:Divs' and 3 Cdn Inf Div should- press on with thoeir advance -'during the night. 117. . ' '': On 27 Feb the.advance, was' slowed'by' stiff ening opposition, and the bad weather. -which deprived the ground tps of :air .support. .'.UDEM and, the. area EAST' of 'rHEERFE3LD 9042 were cleared and. a 2,OQO .yds advance-was made along the road TUDEM IKERVENHEIM. 4 Cdn Armd Div succeeded in penetrating the HOCHWALD "layback" and had elements in the gap between the HOCHWVAID and the BAIBERGER Forests. Further NORTH, 2 Cdn Inf D'iv managed to ..get' their leading tps into the HOCHVIVALD defences in the area 0242, and on their LEFT flank, 43 Inf Div entered CALCAR almost unopposed. They also occupied GRIETH. 01:55 on-the bank of .. the.RHI-E, oIn pursuance of the

policy of giving the enemy. no respite, the'armd' divs were

ordered to continue the-' advance during the night,with bdes of the inf. divs taking. over in turn, the ground won.

Af.. Aurther 800 PW- were captured mostly from 116 Pz Div..and a Para RegtIt was estimated that the. Corps now had'.100 tanks off .the road, two thirds of them through boggi-g .and the rest by enemy action.: '
r li,

The next day, 3 Cdn Inf Div followed up 11 Armd Div . who reached the wooded area 01337. 4 Cdn Armd Div continued
to push 'slowly through the. forest gap, meeting increasingly

heavy opposition .and repeated count r-attacks. 2 C'd Inf Div pushed on to .the SE' and broaconed their penetration -into the HOCHWALD. On the extreme LEFT, 43 Inf Div made ground: in .the general. area of the road 'running "E[ from

APPELDORN Q.347.

..

...

' '- '.The day was one hard..of fighting ith progress' irregular. On-. the RIGHT,- 1. Armd Div had been lsowed by heavy fire .from ER.VE1I.HEIM and. the canal' in'0039'. As 2 Cdn Inf Div were met .by, the retieating garrisoil of 'CALCAR, their progress was' less than. was expected, and this meant that 4 Cdn Armd Div in the middle were creating an uncomfortable salient. The plan was now for 11 Armd Div to press on to the. high ground NORTH of SONSBECK while 4 Cdn Armd Div, supported by 2 Cdn Inf Div, strove to get through the HOCHWALD. If -11..Armd Div's progress cont.inued to be slow 3 Cdn Inf-.- Div-would- be passed through, between the two armd divs, to secure' the high ground NORTH of SONSBECK. A. limiting :factor would be the roads, which were now'in a very
bad st'ate. " "

119.

11 Armd Div in the next three days, extended -their

.front SOUTH of the BALBERGER Forest, but were-unablee to

.advance on to the SONSBECK plateau and by 3 Mar were waiting for 3 .Cdn Inf Div:to secure this-'ground.
* *g-o*n.

Furt.her :NORTH, progress On the rest -of the front was slowe'd dowi 'appreciably. The enemy, composed largely of Para Divs, was. fighting faatically to hold 'a hinge' on whichc to swing- his' tps from the frnt--of 30. Corps..Some progress was indeed..made., by, 3 and ar,'.::about three-quarters of the HOCWALD, and .BALBERGER Forests had been, cleared. ' ..' '

/3c. 0cor.

- 3930 Coprs 120, '::'. Innmediately 2 Cdn Corps operation got under way, opposition on this front began to loosen. On the RIGHT, 52 (L) Inf Div broke out EAST on 27 Feb from the AFFERDEN area towards SIEBENAEWALD and took over the sector, of 51 (H) Inf Div who were withdrawn to refit. 1 Cdo Bde from Second Brit Army came under their conmand and operated on the general axis of the .road APERDEN - WEI'L 8629. Good progress was made and by 3 Mar, this Div was on the general line ST PETRUSHEIM 8736 I EES, with the Cdos established. in LANGS-TRAAT 8336, and .V EIL . 53 (W) Inf Div, who had been held NORTH of '.VWEEZE since 25 Feb, captured the town with little opposition on 2 Mar, and were pushed. straight down the road WEEZE - KEVELAER 9632 GELDERN where they linked. up with the Americans who had come in from the EAST. After taking over from 15 (S) Inf Div: on 25 Feb, 3 Brit Inf. Div continued to probe forwards. .On 27 Feb they cleared the woods and cut the road 'DEM - WEEZE in the general area. 9640 and 9740 -They cleared 'KERVENHEIM on 1 Mar, and. WIMNIKENDONK 9934'the following day and were up to the road GELDERN- KAPELLEN in the area 0229 0330 on 3 Mar.
*NI US ARM.

121,

By 27 Peb, the three Corps advance had broken through the enemy main line of defence and the. speed of the advance increased owing' to the weakness of the enemy reser.ves. MJNCHEN GLADBACH 0989 was taken on 1 .Mar by XIX Corps, and .on the RIGHT'XIX Corps pushed down. the LEFT bank of the R. ERFT directed on NEUSS 2689. On the LEFT, XVI Corps drove NW and entered VENLO and ROERMOND. The [enemy produced elements of Pz LEHR Div in the MUNCHEN GLADBACH area, but his tanks were quite'unable to impede the American's advance and they suffered heavy losses. XIX .Corps cleared NEUSS on 2 Mar and reached the RHINE in two places, and XIII Corps got into KREFELD. On the LEFT, XVI Corps cleared ROERMOND on 1 Mar .and VENO the following -day. Early on 3 Mar, the Americans were in GELDERN, SEVELEN -0922. and. NIEUKIRK 051-8, and 35 Inf .Div of XVI Corps made

contact with 53 (W) Inf Div in .GELDERN

AIR PHASE 5

122.

Weather was again a limiting factor during this phase. On 27 Peb- 62 aircraft of 2 Group RAP bombed MARIENBAUM and SONSBECK. On the 28th GELDERN, by 2 Group RAP, and RHEINBERG by IX USAAF, were attacked. KEVEIAER-,, and once again XANTEN, were engaged by 61 aircraft of 2. Group RAP-when 96 tons of bombs were dropped on 1 Mar. The effort remained small on the nrext day with a few aircraft of 2 Group RAP attacking .GELDERN, KEVELAER and RHEINBERG. On 3 Mar the road and rail bridges at VWESEL were once more attacked by some 70 aircraft of 2 Group RAF but remained standing after the raid.

, ./123.

40 123. '84 Group RAP flew 123 sorties on 27 Peb but only 8 of these were in immediate close support and. 35 on pre-arranged targets. The 28th w'asa- altogether be'tter day'and this Group flew 602' sorties,, 237 being on pre-arranged 'targets and 31 in imm.ediiate clos support. .Tactical Recce claimed 36 sorties and'Arty' Recce 11. The ..chief targets were WINN.KENDONK, 32 Typhoons, 'nemy columns in. KIRVENfEIM and a tank cum i.nf concentration. NORTH of WEZE. Later in the day a spectacularly successful attack .was. put Jin on a large factory' in WEEZE which 'burst' into' flames' at the first- salvo entirely .satisfactorily. Weather :again .interfered with close support on Mar. M1 84.Group RAP flew some 246 sorties against a variety of targots including SONSBECK. '2 Mar was -another bad flying day. 84.Group, RAP managed- to fly over 300 sorties but most of these were . .pre-,arranged non .targets, rail interdiction and armed .. reconnaissance. .The best targets proved to, be two attacks- on concientra.tions of enemy tps in the woods NORTH of WINNEKENDONK and" one on some arty billets near WETTEN. Four attacks were also attempted on enemy batteries but they were difficult to locate, and full success could 'not be claime'..' e .n 53'Mar 84" Group . AP.flew 312 sorties again mostly onpre-arr:ahged targetss, rail interdiction and armed recce. Some'.. immediate' close 'support .however was given primarily on 2 Cdn 'o.p's' fron.t in the ' .. HOCHWAID .area. ... .. 1

SECTION 20
12-. . T.h.i.s.. -

, PHASE 6
. -.

4 - 10 MAR
.and

12-4..

'

This phase conclu'ded the VERITABLE operation, and although some very heavy fighting, took place, it was primarily a'final clearing up of all enemy. resistance on the .LEFT bank of' the RHINE.' The enemy 'fought stubbornly, in some cases fanatically, to hold his ever-shrinking bridgehead in front of VWESEL in order to evacuate as many personnel and as much equipment across the River as possible. In this he was very largely successful owing to continued bad weather which did not' allow our air forces to exploit their supremacy on what should have been a Heaven-sent target. Large numbers of PW wore taken and much equipment was abandoned, but the total bag was not- what had been expected.. On 6 Mar, the boundarya:between 30 Corps' and 2 Cdn Corps was extendeda from SONSBECK to CIEUEIHOF 113348, ana the junction of the railways GELDERNI.- .WESEL: and RBEINBERG - CLEVE in 1534. From 'here it ran 'NE' along the pailway line to the

WESEL bridge.

The whole was" inclusive to the Cdns.

Operational command of all' tps under 30 Corps passed to 2 Cdn Corps at 1800 hrs on 8 Mar.

30 Corps.
125. ' "-- On the extreme RIGHT flank: 52. (L) Inf Div continued to clear up the area .between the R AS and the main - GOCH GEIDE.RN"road,. On 4 Mar,_ Cdo -Bde, little' opposition, contascted. 17 US. Cavalry Recce Regt in :WALBECK 9623, ani'.52 (L) IInf Div began 'to concentrate in the area SOUTH and. WEST: of GELDERN -.- WALBECK. 'This :Div did not come back into the battle until 7 Mar;'
.advancing.'against

... /126.

- 41 126. 53 (W) Inf Div, on 4 Mar., having cleared GEILDERN in conjun6tion with 134 Bn 35 US Inf Div, turned NE and moved up the axis GELDERN- ISSUM 0927 - - ALPEN 1531- WESEL in conjunction with US forces on its RIGHT flank. ISSUM was
captured against light opposition. Progress on5 and 6 Mar, through heavily wooded country to the SOUTH of ALPEN., was slow against increasingly strong opposition chiefly consisting of Spandaus and heavy shelling. By 7 Mar they werefirmly established on the Northern fringe of the woods with patrols out towards ALPEN, apparently strongly held, and the line of the ALPSCHE LEY 1531, 1630. On this day, 52 (L) Inf Div started to take over from 53 (W) Inf Div who were withdrawn to the WALBECK area to rest. 127* On 4 Mar, 3 Brit Inf Div continued their advance and by midday were firmly established in KAPELLEN 0431.' - The enemy had efficiently cratered the roads in this area and blown the bridges across the FLEUTH and itosubsidiary streams, and in consequence progress was slow, -Opposition was not heavy. Further NORTH elements reached the area SOUTH of HUSENHOF 0435* During the next two days the Div cleared.the WINKELSCHER BUSCH against only slight opposition, pushed out patrols NE from this wood and made 'contact with 3 Cdn Inf Div on the LEFT. The plan for Guards Armd Div on 4 Mar was to pass through 3 Brit Inf Div and advance EAST to seize BONNINGHARDT 1231 and the high ground EAST of it. After initial delays due to cratered roads and blown bridges SOUTH and WEST of KAPELLEN, the village of HAMB 0631 was quickly overcome and a number of PW taken. The main axis to be used was the road
. KAPELLEN - METXEKATH 0932 - BONNINGHARDT. Heavy fire,

128.

including SP, from WINELESCHER BUSCH, caused the loss of several tanks and held up the advance on this axis. 5 Mar was mainly spent in clearing the woods along the axis between the WINKELSCHER BUSCH and METXEKATH, the latter place being captured during the evening together with several anti-tank guns and some hundred PW. The next dayst advance was entirely successful. After moderate opposition at the beginning BONNINGHARDT was captured, and the high ground to its EAST with comparative ease. Many PW were capturdd. Owing'to the convergence of some five divs on to a rapidly shrinking enemy perimeter, this Div found itself attacking on an ever narrowing frontage. During 7, 8 and 9 Mar short advances were made in. conformity with flank formations, and, having reached their objectives along the road XANTEN RHEINBERG, on the very narrow frontage from the road/rail crossing 158349 to some twelve hundred yds to the RIGHT, the Div was squeezed out and came back into rest areas. 2 Cdn Corps 129. 11 Armd Div retained their position'SOUTH of the BALBERGCER FORST from 4 - 7 Mar gradually edging forward as 3 Cdn Inf Div advanced along -the high ground NORTH of SONSBECK. However, by this date -it was obvious that there was no longer the need to retain this Div in the battle area. Guards Armd Div and 4 Cdn Armd Div'were already operating in the area originally intended as 11 Armd Div's objectives so that the latter reverted to command Second Brit Army and were pulled right out, . On 4 Mar 3 Cdn Inf Div continued its task of clearing the BALBERGER FORST; Up to midday opposition was very strong particularly on the Northern edge. After that% however, a
. ./def inite

.130.

42 definite slackening took place- and. it was felt that the enemy was fpulling' out. " : By the late evening the whole forest area was reported clear, During-5 and 6 Mar. this Div fought SE to clear the spur and:h. igh ground NORTH of SONSBECK. The enemy resisted 'stubbornly at first to retain a hold on this :dominating ground, but by the; evening of 6. Mar the whole area was in our hands, - A very large number of mines were,.encountered which slowed down the operation. SONSBECK itself was entered against' light opposition by midday on the same day, and contact-was made with-3 Brit Inf Div to the SOUTH early in the -afternoon. .This Div took no further active part in the operation and: on 10 Mar was -withdrawn to the REICHSWAID area to rest and refit. 131.* 4 Cdn Armd Div was brought forward during 4 Mar and concentrated. in the BALBERGER VWALD. ; Its task was to advance, .once SONSBECK had been secured 3 Cdn Inf -byDiv,' on'the axis SONSBECK VEEN 1.135 - BMENZELEN 1636 and seize the latter -.place. The 'Div started away well enough and: en.couintered no ..pposition -until just V'EST of VEEN.. In this ari.ea the roads had all been cratered most efficiently, there' w're extensive m;nefields. and the enemy had dug::himself well. in both in VEEN itself and in 'the woods just to the NORTH. All attempts to capture VEEN were unsuccessful until the morning of 9 Mar. During this period very heavy mortaring was receivoed from the woods both NORTH and. SOUTH of the village. Various attempts to outflank the place were def eated by enemy minefields, However by 9 Mar. routes through these had been made to- the SOUTH and a successful attack capturing the woods to the NORTH led to the fall of this strong point. 'WIENTHAL was. captured on 10T Mar and leading elements. ad:vanced. up to the railway making contact with 52 (L) Irnf Div on the RIGHT and 2 Cdn> Inf Div on the LEFT. MENZELET, the f inal. objective initially of this Div, had alreadry been captured by 52 (L) TInf Div advancing from the SOUTH earlier that day. 2 Cdn Inf Div on 4 Mar continued its task of clearing the HOCHWALD. Opposition was strong at first but gradually slackened - and there were signs-of an enemy withdrawal By the evening the whole of the wooded areas were c leaur including those astride the railway NORTH-of SEELEDEOF.074.. On the 5th and 6th slow progress .was maintained' towards XA0TEN against .increasingly strong opposition.: . An attack. was launched. tovwards the Western oUtskirts of -the-' town early on -. 6, :ar.. but .was repulsed and. the- forward tps to 0had withdraw behind. their' start line. It became .obvious that a full sc..ale .:attack w-ould. be necessary 'to seize th-is last main enemy bulwark defending the -- RIGHT- limit of his bridgehead.' It
was fully defended 'by an anti-tank ditch, ininzefiolds and

132.

dug in erplacements. During the rest of 6 and 7 Mar the forward tps suffered heavy mortaring arn. ,he lling from both sides of the PHINIE. A carefully,'prepaoed attack was put in on 8 'Mar in conjunction with '3 Inf Div on -the "L'-T.; Very ; .heavy .shelling and. mortaring, and. stubborn ground resistance was mainaina.ned. throughout the day by the' enemi Paratrooperso -By night f all,. however, the built up. areas an d the high ground to.:.the, SOUTH'of the town were in o-: hands and. this '.Div collected over 400 PW dcuring the day - Heav fighti.ng' continued on 9- Mar :during, the clearing of the. remasini.p high 'ground SOUTH and SE of XANTEN, and in the XANTEN 'forest but by. the end of the day enemy opposition had noticeably .ack-ened and all objectives were captured. . This day produced 17 officers :and 460 iother PW 10 Mar. saw this Dv pushing-on SE along ' -the XANTEN H-I'. BEIERG road against little o'r no opposition, clear-ing 'up small pockets'or of three four enemy s-till in ... /the XANTEN

43 -

the LXAI.TEN forest, and finally linking up with 4 Cdn Armda Div, and. 52. (L) Inf Div who. had sent out elements NW from MENZELEN

-636o.
. . .. .. ..

133.

43 Inff Div continued its task of protecting the. LEFT. flank. of 2 Cdn Corps and clearing up to the LEFT bank of. the RHINEE during' this phase. On 4'Mar APPELDORN 0447.-was entered and the, whole bend in the RHINE' opposite REES 0752 was cleared.. Pushing on, both VYNEN 0845, and M[RIENBAUM on the main road, were captured. Just NORTH of the latter place one bn had the satisfaction of knocking out two 88 mmn guns and an anti-tank gun, at the same .time capturing 20 PW. A further 60 PW were taken in VYNEN. WARDT 1044 and WICKEPMANSHOF 0843 were seized on 5 Mar. Little progress was made on 6 and 7 Mar against enemy positions in front of XANTEN. This .period was spent in regrouping, planning and active patrolling prior to the assault of this stronghold in conjunction with 2 Cdn Inf Div on 8 Mar. 43 Inf Div's task
in ;this combined attack was the capture of XAZTTEN itself.,

whilst 2 Cdn Inf Div seized the built up and factory areas, and the high ground to 'the SOUTH and SE of the townm. PeFor this operation 43 Inf Div had the assistance of both FLAILS and CROCODILES. The\ enemy, young Paratroopers of excellent morale, resisted stubbornly and in many cases fanatically. Great difficulty was experienced in-bridging, and g etting tps across the anti-tank ditch, and the first attempt failed, ' The second attempt was,. however,. successful, and the'final objectives, including the town, were reached and consolidated by nightfall. The village of LUTTINGEN 1142' and some small woods to the EAST, were also strongly defended' and very bitter fighting ensued all day in the area. It was not until the 9th, after an. attack 'had been put in from the NE end of XANTEN, that this area was finally cleared. The fall of XANTEN, the enemy's last main centre of resistance on his RIGHT flank, virtually finished the whole of operation VERITABLE since the small bridgehead now lay wide open and his position on the LEFT bank. of the RHINE was no longer tenable. 134.- . 52. (L). Inf Div returned to. the battle area on 7/8. Mar relieving 53 (W) Inf Div on- the extreme RIGHT. On 8 Mar this Div captured AIPEN 1531, advanced to'wards the castle in the area of HAUS LOO 1633 and extended their LEFT flank along the MUHOHL stream to VWEYERSHOF 1433. Opposition was stubborn all day including heavy shelling, mortaring and persistent sniping. *The advance continued slowly next day. The enemy contested the line of the MUHOHL and.HAUS LOO with determination, and although the latter was eventually captured, the castle, a few hundred yds further NORTH, held out until the early morning of 10 Mar, On the night 9/10 Mar, the pnemy decided, to evacuate the bridgehead. In consequence progress was rapid on the 10th. RILL 1734, MENZELEN 1636, GEST 1838 and GINDERICH 1739 were all captured against light

opposition.

Contact with 4 Can Arnd Div and 2 Cdn Iff Div

was made in the afternoon on the LEFT, and with 35 US Inf Div on the RIGHT. A number of PW and many stragglers were pulled in on this last day of the fighting. NINTH 135.

US

ARMY

XIX Corps continued to operate in the NEUSS area and on 5 Mar had cleared the WEST bank of the RHINE from DUSSELDORF to KREFELD. Further NORTH, XIII Corps reached the RHINE on 4 Mar, and captured ORSOY on 5 Mar and XVI Corps cleared RHEINBERG on 6 Mar. XVI Corps made further .. /contact with

contact with 30 Corps at ARCEN 9120 and, ISSM.;0926 on 4 Mar. XVI Corps then moved. NE with their LEFT on the ISSUM - WESEL road. The enemy held on stubbornly to the Southern hinge of his bridgehead.in the woods. about OSSENBURG 1931. XVI -.Corps, however, gradually dr.bve .them in, and on 10 Mar. captured' BUDERICH. Contact was lost with the enemy that night and on the morning of 11 Mar, the Cbrps. mopped up .the.:remaining stragglers in conjunction with 52 (L) Inf Div. . .At 1040 hrs, an air OP reported. 'both WESEL bridges blown, AIR
136. -

PHASE 6

During this period the weather again most seriously

-interfered with our air effort. Theo Medium and. Heavy bombers were only able to operate on 5, 6 and the v cry early morning of 7 Mar. Close support was restricted to 5 Mar only. The enemy may consider himself fortunat.e- that the weather intervened to protect his constantly diminishing bridgehead on the LEFT bank of the R RHINE opposite WESELo Little less than complete destruction of his forces might have been achieved had the weather been kinder.
;-. .. . -:.

137.

On 5 Mar, 41 aircraft of 2 Group RAP dropped 164 x 1,000 lb. bombs on the WESEL bridge, and 48 aircraft put down I183 x 1,000 lb bombs on the rcad bridge, both .:RCP controlled.; Hits were' claimed but the bridges still remained .up. On the next day 39 MOSQUITOES of RAP, Bomber Command attacked tp concentratioins in WESEL putting down 41 tons of 'HE. This attack. was followed by two .further ones. The first the same evening. an.d the second early on-the morning of 7 Mar. 82 Heavies dropped. some 463 tons of HE. -During the intervening hrs between thesoe two attacks, 46 single MOSQUITOES kept the pot boiling.Close support was restricted unfortunately to 5 Mar only. :Even on this day,.. although 84. Group RAF flew 234 sorties, visibility was .b'ad . immed.iate close support almost impossible, and most of the effort'was-.. co'centrated on armed recces and f ighter" operations.'

138.

- 45 PART, FIVE CONCLUSION

SECTION 139.

21

Operations .VERITABLE and GRENADE achieved their object and concluded with 21 Army Group lining the WEST bank of the RHINE from DUSSELDORP to ARNHEt. . The two operations had direct bearings on one another. The delay in mounting G.RENADE, due to the.. excessive flooding, caused First Cdn Army to bear the brunt longer than was intended. By so doing, however, they attracted to themselves several formations from further SOUTH. The original enemy garrison in the. VERITABLE area of one reinforced inf div was finally swollen to three inf, ,four para, two Pz and one PG
divs.

On the other hand, the rapid success of Ninth US Army's attack relieved the pressure on First Cdn Army front. By 1 Mar the enemy, threatened with encirclement began to pull out on his Southern flank to f orm the WESEL bridgehead. 140. It is the. opinion of First Cdn Army that the volume of fire from enemy guns ,and mortars in the VERITABLE battle was the heaviest and the best applied that they had met on the Continent. An estimate compiled from order of battle sources shows the following numbers to have been available early in
Mar - .

8 and 12 cm mortars

'-

581 136 451 179 195 229

15,. 21 and 30 cm mortars Field guns Me-dium guns Anti-tank guns AA guns Total:. 141. Enemy losses :-

717 .ortars

1 054 guns

First Cdn Army PW 22,239 Estimated killed and long . ...... . , .term wounded 22,000
Ninth US Army PW 29,379 "
" " "

16,000

Total: .. 51,618

38,000

These came from eighteen divs and a multitude' of miscellaneous formations,

46PART SIX TCQOE.TS AND POINTS'

.'

OF

INTEREST

SECTION .22 142.

IIFANTRY

- In. :VERITABIE the Inf had the advantage of very powerful support from the ground and the air, but in the last analysis, the operation was largely an Inf battle. In spite of our air supremacy, and superiority in arty, armour and special equipments. the tenacity of the enemy and the difficulties -'of the terrain required that in the end the- battle should be fought 'out between the opposing Inf, frequently relying on
their own weapons.

143. '

This was particularly true of the fighting in the wooded areas and the towns, Of the clearing of "'the'REICHSWALD a bn commander expressed the general view when he said, "tIt was Spandau versus Bren the whole way through,". Here, too,, there were several instances of the enemy not being prepared to stand when our men came in with the bayonet. In general, a bn advanced on a narrow front with one coy up. -In dealing with towns., one of the principles was to pass coys in to selected objectives, which were held as coy defensive positions until daylight. It was quite impossible to attempt any clearing operations at night, and more often than- not, the coy axis could tiot be kept open. Just, before daylight, tanks -were brought up and opposition which had been intense during the hours of. darkness quickly collapsed. (Additional notes on Town Clearing are included at Appendix IC').

144.

The question of night or day attacks was hotly debated

by bn commianders..., An examination of. results seems to show

that where the enemy was disorganised or suprised, a daylight attack, delivered preferably from a flank, was often successful. Against a well-prepared enemy, a night attack with careful preparation and limited objectives appears to. have been the more favoured and least costly method. The capture of GEMhIEP furnishes an example of a successful attack by day; the daylight assault' against the strongly helda position around SIEBENGEWALID 8641 on 21 Feb failed* but was sucdessful six days later by a night attack on a different axis. 145, Co-operation with other arms.-and- formations as a result of our great "team spirit" has reached a high standard. The Inf kept close up to the arty barrage and concentrations; the air frequently engaged targets less than 300 .yds ahead of our forward tps.. It is realized by the Inf ... that the risk of casualties -from our own guns and aircraft .. must be accepted if the follow-up is to be close enough to .succeed,, The prolongation of the arty programme to cover the digging and reorganisation, in combination with intense counter-battery and counter-mortar activity,, again proved of great value. . 146. It was emphasised that when one formation is about to pass through another, wherever possible the former should send up its own patrols well ahead so that they may give a fresh impetus to patrol activity and get quickly in the -picture. It is more than likely that the formation to be
... /relieved has

- 47 r relieved has just had a period of heavy fighting and patrolling will have been done by tired men,

147.

The advent of the Armnd Personnel Carrier (KANGAROO) has

given added strength to the Inf. It gives protection against shell and mortar fire in the early stages of the advance, when soldiers on foot are highly vulnerable; where conditions are .suitable it can pass inf through the enemy FDLs and deliver them at small loss as far- back even as the' gunl areas,.
.. -

It has been said that since the substitution of'the musket for the cross-bow there has beoen no development in Inf equipment which is comparable to the arrival of the KANGAROO

SECTION 23

ARMOUR

AND

SPECIAL

EQUIIPMENTS

CAPITAL TANKS 148, It was hoped tha-t after the initial break-in, and again in the BLOCKBUSTER operation, the opportunity would occur for a large scale breakthrough by armour. Solely from the point of view of the quantity and quality of the German forces this might have been possible, but the weather and ground made it impossible. Flooding and the extremely bad going confined movement to roads and tracks. These in turn became congested and did not stand up to the traffic. Well appreciating these facts, the- enemy turned all ha.mlets, towns and centres of communications into. strongppints. These were made as tankproof-as possible -by the construction of anti-tank ditches the blowing of bridges and the -cratering of roads. These strong points gave great depth to the enemy defences and could not be by-passed by armour but had to be methodically reduced by the inf. On occasions when the armour tried to advance independently, its losses were severe. The effective employment of armour was therefore confined to close support of the inf. In this it was of the greatest assistance, both materially and morally. It was usually on the scale of a Regt of tanks to an inf bde or at least'.a sqn.to a bn,
SPECIAL EQUIPMENTS

149.

150.

Throughout the operation, tps of 79 Armd Div were allotted according ,to the specific requirements of the formation -and units they -were suppoting. ; Under reasonable conditions the devices were successful, but the state of the
t9.rrain. was the.limiting factor. '

151

;' AILS could rarely be employed off the roads, although on occasions they were used to flail gun areas. In saturated ground they became hopelessly bogged, in some Qases down to the flailing jibs. CROCODILES were a great success when going conditions permitted their use. Against pill-boxes, fox-holes in woods, and built up areas, serious and stubborn resistance was overcome by the use of flame, which continues to terrify the enemy. It must, however, be exloited immediately before the enemy can regain his composure. ... /WASPS have

- 48WASPS have strong support among Cdn formations who have had much experience in their use, and. they are generally preferred. to CROCODILES for most operations. The WASP has the great advantage .of being directly under the bn commander at all .times and. is thus readily available. Cdc inf and motor-bns, and inf -recce' regts are all equipped with s.ix WASPS each. The WASPS proved very useful clearing enemy from woods, villages. and f arm bu ld-ings.. BADGER (RAM)- Flame Throwers were used for the first time .in this. operation and were particularly effective in an attack on lVINhETHAL. First C.dn, Army express the opinion that users have no confid-' ence in the ILFEBUOY equipment as' it is 'mechanically unreliable and too heavy. AVsRE used petards against pill-boxes and strong points that were beyond the scope of CROCODILES. On one occasion a reinforced concrete pill-box manned by 40 enemy was destroyed by three AVsRE which fired 24 rounds in salvoes, penetration being four ft, and 30 of the enemy hastened to surrender. AVsRE carrying fascines and SBG were used successfully to bridage road craters- and anti-tank ditches, KANGAROOS have become most popular and were: in constant Owving to their forward role casualties amongg these vehicles and their crews were highes.t of all the devices. Moreover, crews MUST' have time for: rest and -maintenance,

.demand.

BUFFALOES alone made possible the Cdn operations across the floods on the LEFT flank. They were: again most useful in crossing the swollen R NIERS, 152. The salient point that emerged from the use of these various devices on VERITABLE is that their enmployment.must be planned with the greatest thoroughness. However hurriedly they are-required, they,should. never be committed wi.-th inadequate preparation.

SECTION 24
153.;

ARTILLERY

The -arty available for the support of this operation consisted of 1034 field, meodiun, heavy, super-heavy and. HAA guns. The RA order of battle is shown at Appendix tD#.
DEPLOY}AENT

154. -

out in darkness - no movement of guns being allowed EAST of R 'AAS in .daylight. ._The time-table is summarized below : ~~~Y
.: .l.o.w.. !~. ..

por d0eployment- areas see Diagram 4., On. grounds of security recce. were, originally cofined. to CsRA,. CsAGRA and COs, and normal recce parties did not move in until 48 hrs before the guns. ' Occupation of gun positions -was carried

o 0 0

GHT,

- 49
NIGHT D minus 6/D minus 5 D minus 5/D minus 4 GUNS DEPLOYING Five fd regts Six fd regts One LAA regt

4 AGRA
D minus 4/D minus 3 9 AGRA One LAA regtOne HAA regt Pour fd 3 and 5 One LAA One A'A regts AGsRA regt regt

D minus 3/D minus 2

D minus 2/D minus I

Four fd regts Cdn Rocket unit

FIRE PLAtT
155. outlined to CsRA and CCRA 30 Corps' plan was 'first CsAGRA at a conference on D minus..13 and consisted. of :(a) No firing before 05.00 hrs D-Day except by2 and. 3 Cdn Inf Divs.

(b)

0500 hrs .,-0945 hrs

(i) (ii) Harassing of enerny HQs and communications.. :Bombardment of enemy locations to destroy as many enemy as possible and utterly demoralize the survivors. Deception smoke screens. Counter Battery and -Counter Mortar.

(iii) (iv)

(c)

0o945 hrs - 1600 hrs

(i) Barrage in support 2 Cdm Inf Div, 15 (s) and 53 (W)' Inf Div attack. Concentrations and Stonks in Div attack. Smoke screens., Bombardment of enemy localities. Inf Div

(ii)

support 51 (H)

Inf

(iii) (iv)

(d)

1700 hrs - 2100 hrs

(i) (ii) Support of 3 Cdn Inf Div attack. Preparation for 15 (S) attack, and 53 (W) Inf Divs' second

(e)

2100 hrs - 0100 hrs (i) Support of 15 (S) and 55 (W) Inf Divs' attack. Preparation 15 (S) second

(ii)

Inf Div final attack.

50

(f)

01 00h

090

_r. hrs09C

Support of 15 (S) Inf Div final attackc 156. During the preliminary bombardment, a deception smoke screen was to be fired. along the whole length of the front followed by a complete silence from 0740 hrs to 0750 hrs. This screen and silence was intended to fulfill two purposes, viz:(a) To get the enemy to man his guns and fire his defensive fire - and to then hit him a hard blow while he was thus exposed. To give sound-rangers, four-pen recorders, etc, the opportunity of locating any arty guns and mortars which fired during the period of silence.. During this period, one hostile battery and 19 mortars were, in fact, located. It was also arranged that as manmy BOPORS, anti-tank..guns and ~MGs should contribute. This effort known as "PPEPPERPOT" was an undoubted contribution to the destruction of enemy morale and further :details are given in paragraph : 1 62 below. .157. CORA 30 Corps held a further conference with CsRA and CsAGRAX on D minus 9 and a final conference on B minus 4. In the opinion of the RA Staff 30 Corps, .the final conference was perhaps a little late, and subsequent work by the RA Staff and RE reproduction section would have been easier if the- final time for alterations to the' fire plan-'could have been fixed 2. hrs earlier, i.e, 1800 hrs D minus 5. DETAILS OF FIRE PIAN PRELIMINARY BOMBADMENT

(b)

158.
(a) (b) (c) (d)

ect
To harass enemy HQs and, communications. To destroy as many enemy as possible and reduce survivors to a state of ".shell happiness"o To neutralize enemy mortar areas. To harass enemy yositionxs in concrete emplacements.

- The bulk of targets for bombardment on their own front were selected by divs. Much information was supplied by HQ RCA 2 Cdn Inf Div which had a fairly complete picture of the situation.
. . : ' , . . : '.

Each locality was subjected. to an .increasing intensity .of fire until the enemy morale was shattered, and the weight of shell applied to each target was based on RA 30 Corps experience in previous operations. 159. Five bombardnents were carried out :

., ./Time

- 51 Time Targets Numnber of guns

0500 - 0945 FDLs, HQs and communications (less 10 mins silence)

648
plus rockets

1030 - 1215 1235 - 1640 1700 - 2030

2100 - 0100

Localities in depth of
barrage and mortar areas Localities between 1st and 2nd objectives Localities in IUJTTERDEN
area

38 plus rockets
168.

138 74'

Localities in MATERBORN area

160.

An essential principle of these bombardments was that each target should be engaged as many times as possible, e.g. :Targets Number Engaged Number of attacks on, each target Average number of attacks on each target 11.5

HQs, Cormmunications, FDLso Mortar areas. Localities in depth and concrete emplaoements.

159

1,831 136 514

30 79

4.5 6.5

161.

It was planned that each target should have a minimum of 6 tons directed on to it whilst certain more important targets should receive more severe treatment. The weight of shell actually fired was :Tarets

Number of Total Weight Targets of ;

Shell
. ... _.

Average weight er target 8,8 'tons

Approx).

HQs, Communications FDLs. Mortar areas. Localities in depth. and concrete ermplacements.
PEPFERPOT

159 30 79

1,400 tons

345 700

f"

11.5- "
8.9 "

"

162.

Responsibility for, the preparation..of programmes was divided. between 2 Cdn Inf Div and 51 (H) nf Div. Two armd regts, two ILAA regts: and. two batteries of 17 pounders (towed) were available above Div resources, and owing to difficulties of deployment they were allotted out to the two divs.' : Suggestions for targets were submitted to HQ RCA 2 Cdn Inf Div :by the Div PEPPERPOT Commanders - and traces were prepared for each div front.

**$163.

- 52 163. (a) (b) . (c) The policy adopted was :As many assorted. weapons as possible to fire on each task. To maintain continuous fire (except for the general 10 minutes silence) for nearly five hrs. Each weapon to engage as few tasks as possible - as all fire was indirect and weapons were not equipped for switching. ,

164,

The following summary illustrates PEPPERPOT on the LEFT half of the front :Type of Weapon 17 pr'(tank) 75 mm 40 mm 17 pr (anti-tank) 4,2 in mortar MVGNumber 24 30 78 24 48 96 Total rounds fired 7,200 9,000 69,360 4,800 14,400 1, 300,000

165.

All accounts show that PEPPERPOT justifigd the apparent heavy expenditure of ammunition and was a definite 'factor in the success of the general fire plan. COUNTER BATTERY

i66.

(a)

Policy (i) (ii) Normal activity by .Cdn arty Prior to D-Day already deployed - silent for remainder. D-Day onwards Very active.

-(b)

Command
... - . ... . ": ..: '.; ,

(i)

Prior to 0500'hs D-Day H minus 5 hrs. to H-hr.

'-

2 Cdxn Corps. Co'nander' 5 AGRA, - - ...

(ii)

After H-hr :NORTH of Grid.'58 " -

Commander. 2 Cdn AGRA Commandoer 5 AGRA Commander 9 AGRA

Between Grids 61 and 48. SOUTH of Grid 50 (c)

A counter battery programme was prepared by' CBO 30 Corps. based on information provided by CBO 2 Cdn, Corps. 45 -hostile batteries were engaged during this programme .which consisted of four. :separate bombardments"

... /BOMBADMENTS

- 53 BOMBARDMENTS TIMEE Number of First 0500-0645' O Second 0750-0820 Third 0820-0850 Fourth 0920-1000

hostile
batteries. engaged Average number of guns engaged against each hostile battery :Fd Mod

37

36

14

45

84 48

48 35 5

62

155 nrm HAA

Super-heavy

46 72

3 9
2

2 5
1

4 10
-

5 13
1

Total : We ight of shell on each hostile battery (d)

146

91

-76

137

4.7 tons

3.1 tons

3 tons

12

Inspection of hostile battery positions after the . operation revealed. that at least 49 enemy guns had been knocked outt or abandoned. Shooting .was generally satisfactory and the approximate area covered by a bombardment was 250 yds by 160 yds.

COUNTER MORTAR 167. (a) Locations of enemy mortar areas prior to D-Da'y were furnished by CMO 2 Cdn Inf Div who had been accumulating information for 22 months. The CM bombardment programme was dove-tailed into the preliminary bombardment, and all mortars that had been active since 15 Jan were included, (b). During D-Day counter mortar was the responsibility of the CMO 2 Cdn Inf Div at HQ RCA 2 Cdn Inf Div, He had direct communication by Line Telegraphy with some 20 OPs across the Corps front as well as communications with two Radar sets and two ML sets. Between 0500 hrs and H-hr twenty three enemy mortars became active and were bombarded with 7. 2 in howitzers, Nineteen 10 of these mortar areas were located the minutes silence. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~M0 had the call on ten during 7~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2 in~.

(c)

10 minutes silence.
BARRAE .

CMMO had the call on. ten 7.2 in

"

batteries for bombardments-

168.

(a) (b)

The barrage was determined by CsRA concerned and co-ordinated by the CCRA 30 Corps. As a result of different requirements it was necessary to introduce a.slight wheel and to make the barrage irregular in shape.

/(c )

54 (c) The barrage fire was 500 yds in depth -

Three field lane S 100 yis apart in depth. Two medium lanes superimposed 100 yds. (d) It had been intended to introduce a pause line which would apply to everybody but this could not be arranged to suit 2 Cdn Inf Div - and the latter's pause line was 600 yds ahead of 15 (S) Inf Div. The barrage was moved forward in blocks of 300 yds every 12 minutes. One minute before the end of firing on each block, all guns on the front line ceased firing HE. One gun per tp then immediately fired one round YELLOW smoke as an indication to the infr that no more HE would be fired on that line and that the barrage would lift in one minute. It was reported that this form of indication worked very satisfactorily, and the attacking tps were able to keep tight up behind the barrage.

(e)

SMOKE SCREENS 169. (a) (b) (c) 0730 - 0740 hrs. Deception screen across whole front.' See Diagram 4 line A - B. 0915- 1300 hrs. Screen in front of REICHSWALD. See Diagram 4l line X - Y Z. During the attack 2 Cdn Inf Div had an exposed LEFT flank due to zero hr for 3 Cdn Inf Div being 8 -hrs later. Flank protection was provided by a smoke screen 4,000 yds long - controlled by an OP of 3 Cd Inf Div. It lasted from 1030 hrs- 1600 hrs and was very effective.

See Diagram 4, line P - Q.

SUPPORT OF DIV ATTACKS 170. (a) The fire plan for the initial attack by 51 (H) Inf Div consisted of concentratiom and stonks on kinown enemy localities. Fire plans for the later attacks staged by 15 (S) Inf Div and 53 (W) Inf Div were prepared by the respective OCsRA. For areas covered by preliminary bombardment, barrage, and lines of smoke screens, see Diagram 4,

(b)

NOTE :DU~TING171. (a)

It was decided that owing. to the need to clear roads for movement of guns on nights immediately before D-Day, all basic dumping. should be completed by night D minus 6/D minus 5. In consequence it was necessary to dump before all gun positions had been finally fixed, and before the fire plan had been finally co-ordinated. However, only the positions of one field and- one medium regt were changed after their dumping programme was
completed. ...

(b)

Main dumping programme .began *on 25 Jan and was virtually completed by night 1/2 Feb.

- 55 (c), Approximately 500,000 rounds, .eighing some 11,000 tons were dumped. All' dumping was carried, out at night and every precaution taken to conceal the dumps. Details of the programme are given at Appendix 'E'. I CDN ROCKET 'UNIT 172. (a) The unit consists of 12 Rocket projectors of 32 barrels and 15 salvoes were available for the operation. Each div submitted targets for the "land mattress". The rockets were fired on the "ripple" system to avoid colliding in the air, and they covered an area of 400 yds s quare. As rockets have more blast than splinter effect thereby "stunning" enemy in the target area, targets were chosen and engaged immediately before our own inf arrived in the target area. A summary of the activities of the Rocket unit is shown at Appendix'- F'. (d) Deployment areas and target areas are shown at Trace 'S' attached.

(b)

(c)

SUCCESS OF FIRE SUPPORT

173. (a) The initial assault must be reckoned highly successful in that elaborate. defences were penetrated with small losses, and this was largely due to the excellent fire support. Investigation of PW on effects of fire plan were summarized by First' Cdn Army as follows:"The most pronounced feature of arty fire leading up to the assault was its morale effect. The fire was such that gun crews were unable to man their guns until the barrage ceased. Communications were totally disrupted, as telephone lines were cut very early, and it was impossible to send runners. "After the arty preparation with its prolonged strain on the nerves, PW say that they had an impression of overwhelming force opposed to them, which, in their isolated state, with no cormmunications, it was useless to resist." There is little doubt 'that the speed with which inf followed up the barrage surprised the enemy very much. (c) Throughout, the whole of D-Day, when well over 500,000 rounds were fired, not one single case was, reported of a round falling short amongst our own tps, which reflects great credit on command posts, gun layers and crews over a strenuous period. "PETER" fuzes (T-97 Proximity) were used, by certain ...regts, for the first time in this operation. It has been found impossible to obtain.precise information as to their effect, either by observation or from PW, although 2 Cd-n Inf Div have stated "it was thought these fuzes had proved effective" .
. .

(b)

(d)

- ---

*(e)

- 56 (e) Counter battery seems to have prevented any large scale retaliatory enemyshelling during the attack.

(f)

It

is not possible to draw any definite conclusions on

the relative merits of concentrations and stonks on 51 (H) Inf Div front as opposed. to the barrage on the other fronts. It would appear that the advantages of a quick' followup easily outweigh the advantages of one type of support as against another. This is borne out by the fact that bns which got left well behind the barrage or concentrations suffered higher casualties. SUMMARY OF EFFECT OF FIRE P.LAN (From notes compiled by No.2 ORS) 174. (a)
.,

A density of 650 - 1,300 field and medium, shells per - -kilometre square succeeded in cutting all line communi-'cations in forward defences.

(b') A density of 650 field and medium shells per hr per map :-square i;ee, 1 ; 2 shells per minute within 200 yds seems to have been enough to keep personnel in their shelters.

(c)
"' (d)

A density of 2,600 shells per hr per map square i.e. 6

shells every minute within 200 yds, ".seems to have ]been enough to neutralize the quality of tps in these defences. There is an indication that numbers of shells are more important. than sheer weight of shells. PEPPERPOTS Sare therefore a most valuable way of increasing fire effect without much increase in weight of amnunition. There is an indication that our own casualties do not fall much with weights of fire of over 100 tons per kilometre map square put on the enemy.

(e)

.:

SECTION 25

ROYAL EN&GINEERS

ROADS 175.
deteriorate rapidlyv under the weight of the traffic which was using them.' Approximately twelve formation Engineers, three road construction coys and twenty-nine pioneer coys were ,employed on making and keeping th1 routes usable for the operation.
.

When the thaw set in on 31 Jan all roads' commenced to

2 'Cdn Corps were responsible for the development-and maintenance of all' forward. routes in 30 Corps area' prior to D-Day' of this operation which. also included those in the initial deployment areas in the. GROESBEEK 'sector. This involved the transportation, off loading and introduction of some 54,000 tons of stone and rubble into the road communi. : cation system prior to :the operation, ' The: Germans made: effective road blocks' by cratering with 500 lb bombs.The cra which were 70 ft in diameter

and 12 ft deep, had to be bridged owing to the water which .. /filled the

- 57 filled the craters faster than it could be pumped out. Altogether 95 bridges each of an average length of 75 ft were built apart from those over the R NEUSE, BRIDGES OVE R MEUSEU

176.

Routes were developed, and bridges .over the R MEUSE were provided to support the operation as follows :PLACE MOOK (a)
MOOK GEMP (b)

. CLASS . 40
24 40

TYPE

'

LENGTH 1,095 ft
1,286 ft

BAILEY Pontoon bridge

BAILEY on existing piers BAILEY and BAILEY Pontoon - brid~ge -

4,008 ft

GENEP WELL LOTTUM VENLO VENLO (a)

30 40 40 40 9

BAILEY bridge on existing piers BAILEY Pontoon bridge BAILEY Pontoon bridge BAILEY and BAILEY Pontoon bridge . Folding Boat Equipment

1,023 ft 610 ft 850 ft 1,343 ft .. 400 ft

Constructed before the operation was launched.

(b)

The very long legth of the GEhNTEP bridge was necessitated by the flooding of the approach roads.

FLOODING 177. RHINE

(a) Diagram 5 gives the effect of the flooding due to the breaching, by the Germans, of the banks of the R RHINE at points A, B, E and P. The flooding potential was a major factor which, affected Engineer deployment and activity both during the build up 'and through the subsequent phases of this operation until
the' latter part of Feb when the R HIhE began to drop
, .. * . ....-............... . .

(b)

steadily.
% _

(c)

The initial breach at A flooded ERLEKOM polder' and. drowned a BAILEY bridge which had been constructed by 3 Cdn Inf Div on the proposed axis of 7 Cdmn Inf Bde, This axis was then projected along the Southern dyke of the polder but the blowing of breach B. which completely flooded the flood. plain to the road NIJMEGEN- WINER, washed out road traffic in the early phases and necessitated a completely amphibious operation on the 3 Cdn Inf Div front. The -build up of flood water collapsed the QUER DAM which caused the flooding of the area SE and threatened the vital road WIYLER - KRAIEIMBURG. Simultaneously

(d).

... /with this

- 58 with this darkening picture the gates at the Northern end of the SPOY Canal and. breach E were blowvn by the enemy. The former added to the KRANENBURG threat, whilst the latter inundated that area NORTH of. the road CLEVE - CALCAR". . (e) Engineer versatility during this period was taxed to the utmost. Amongst the many additional major tasks now to be tackled vwere. the *construction of, innumerable ramps to enable the LVsT to mount the polder dykes; the blowing of mines -now under water, to allow passage for the LVsT; the marking "bf traffic channels- with inTprovised buoys; road maintenance and the operation of ferries. The road WYLER - RAENBURGCT, the proposed main artery for all purposes, went under water. The line of the road was marked with buoys, and bqth Class 9 and Class 40 ferries were constructed and successfully passed traffic betwreen WYLER and KJANENBURG. The picture on 3 Cdn Inf Div front at this time closely resembled a peace-time regatta and the navigational tactics of army mariners revolutionised naval traditions overnight. The pressure of water NORTH of the road WYLIER KRANENNBURG whilst flooding the main road also added to the saturation of the ground between GROESBEEK and the REICHSWAID and necessitated the use of the railway GROESBEEK K - RANENBURG as a route.

(f)

(g)

(h)

The. level of the 5 TEIE at NIJMECEN was lower than the

polder flooding NORTH of the road NIJiCEG-EN - WYLER. Engineers were directed to blow the main winter dyke at point D which lowered the flood waters appreciably and which reduced' the pressure -in the KPRAEJBHRG area.

(i)

-With the falling of the R RHI\E during the latter days of-Peb sheet flooding subsided, but the ground. remained impassable to all traffic other than LVsT.
However, roads previously inundated became clear and'

strict traffic control enabled the Engineers to rebuild those portions washed away, and to reinforce those sections weakened by the flood water. (j) Flooding as encountered on the Northern front of this operation presented :a major obstacle to the success of the operation as a whole. Had not a phibians been available, coupled with the resource of the Engineer formations .concerned, the delay imposed might well have had far reaching off ect.

178.

NEUSE
The level of the R MSUSE was rising rapidly when
operation VERITABLE started. and..on 15 Feb it reached a peak level' slightly higher than its .previous peak at the end of Nov. -This caused. extensive flooding- on both .banks and

delayed the construction andl

use of the additional bridges.

,. ./SECTION 26

59 SECTION 26 1-79. SMOKE

Throughout the operation there was a very real threat that observed enemy arty fire from the RIGHT bank of the RHINE would interfere with our attacks and .moves on the LEFT flank. To counter this threat three and a half Smoke Coys in all were used to prevent the Germans getting observation of our movements. The work done by the Smoke Coys can be divided into four. phases. Phase 1 (a) (b) The object was to protect the operations of 3 Cdn Inf Div from observation by German OPs across the RHINE. The method used was to establish a line of generators on the general' line of the winter dyke from NIJAIEGEN upstream. The generators were deployed about 2,000 yds behind the leading tps. The effect of the smoke was :(i) (ii) (iii) (iv). (e) It helped the tactical plan of 3 Cdn Inf Div and enabled bdes to form up under cover. It screened maintenance of 3 Cdn Inf Div by LVsT.

1800 ,

(c). (da)

It hid the maintenance traffic of DUKIVs along the WYLER - KRANENBURG road. It conoealed our intentions from the enemy.

The Germans were not prepared to shoot by predicted methods at any other than the usual harassing targets, -but they were quick to take advantage of any gaps in the screen. Also they did not make much attempt during this phase to shoot up the points of emission. Phase 2 A mixture of: "Beam', stations, i.e. ea group of generators, and the normal method of deployment, of generators, was used to prevent the observation by the Germans of CLEVE and the road approaches to it. The traffic on these roads was heavy but movement was well concealed by the smoke. . Phase 3 The screen was continued to CALCAR;

Phase 4
The object of the screen waoZ toprotect 43 Inf Div in .-their attack on XANTEN and their consolidation there. The wind was suitable and the beam method was used. The screen was a great success and enabled 43 Inf Div to have more traffic on the main road than would have been otherwise possible. Casualties from enemy shelling from the far bank were very light,
.. ,/During the

- 60 During the course of the advance on XANTEN it had been decided to- "shoot up" an area on the far bank by the The guns and mortars carrying out PEPPERPOT method. this shoot had their task of getting into position and firing made reasonably simple and secure under cover of the smoke. 181. (a) 'The following: points are of interest All smoke operations require time to lay on and must be planned. carefully well in advance by Technical '' Officers. : ' All smoke operations require a considerable amount of recce by Technical Officers. When used on a large' scale it is essential to have a This HQ should be near the HQ of Smoke Control HQ. Whereas it will the formations fighting the battle. to be near a have it may HQ -usually be near the Corps this of phase first In the Div or even Bde HQ. Inf Div HQ. 3 Cdn near. HQ was operation the Smoke Control The following organisation for a Smoke Control HQ recommended by First Cdn Army : Commander (A CW Staff Officer) Group Controller (A Pioneer Officer) to look - fter the smoke coys. a is

(b) (c)

(d)

Corps CW Technical Officer - Staff Captain (useful to have a Technical Officer ' C: W acting as such) Met Officer CW (e) Smoke operations on a grand scale present a big Q Smoke Control HQ can use lorries from smoke problem. trun -.. -.... . '

coys< to help in lifting forward the' smoke oil and other stores provided it is not more than about a ten mile

In estimating the smoke stores required for a screen, the figure of 1.5 ton per thousand. yds'per hr was used
'as a basis. This figure had been arrived at from

The previous screens and was found. to be adequate. total 'tonnage figure was then divided between No. 24 generators and fog oil according to the plan of deploy. ment and. the resourses available. In this operation, about 500,000 gallons of fog oil
and. 85,000 No..24 smoke generators were used, a total

of 3, 500 tons of smoke stores.

,....

(f) (g)

Impromptu small screens require time to lay on. Except for their normal harassing programme, the Germans generally do not fire if they cannot see.

.. ./SECTION 27

61 SECTION 27
0 ERS NEIUM AiD IEAVY" B2

AIR

SUJPPORTE

182'

The pIan for mediumS and 'heavy bombers involved. the attack before D-Day of POL -dumps and installations within tactica-l distance from the battle-field, "and' the two" bridges over the R RHINE at WESEL. . On the nigh-t D minus 1/b-Day, heavy attacks were carried out on communication centres and defence strong points, behind the main enemy defence line.

On D-Day, a series of attacks by medium bombers. was planned

to neutralize the main enemy defens.:ive areas-: in the path of

the attack,: but achieved only limited success,

owing to

.weather condSitions. Thereafter, a'ttanks were 'mainly directed'against commnunication centre-s :and billeting areas, though an ammunition dump and the bridges .at WESEL took on a very .
inportant

aspect later on in the operation. o

FI UTM BpOTsER8 -Ae Z/ AI:RCA ci T

.. .-

FIGHITERS 183o

Tactical Grotps were employed. in their normal role of attaining" air superiority over- the. batt'le. ar ea. and a programme of rail interdiction was carried-.out when wea'uhi permitted. In addition a series of enemy HQs was attacked.. Since these operations did not differ from the normal activity of; the RAP, no further comment is made on this form of' air support.

184b. ,

A large propo'rtion of the 'effort were emiployed " . .. : ._

of fighter bombers and . -::-

R/P 'aircraft was directed.to close support of forward tps, and in this connect ion an PCP, Contact Cars and. Contact 'Tanks

It is to be noted that this. was the first occasion in this theatre in which the agencies for the forward control of aircrafst were available at full scale, Prom 8 Peb until 10 Mar (a' total of 31 days, of which

on 19. no close support was possible), 468 sorties wvere flown

wunder PCP control; an average per workinrg day of 40 sorties and per operational day of 16 sorties-. The-- busiest-.days were

14. Peb (128 sorties),

sorties.), ..

21 Feb (60 sorties) aynd 22 Peb (68

TIE'-PGP AN1I 185.

follows :POP

CONTACT CARS

At H-hr, the POCP and Contact Cars vrere deployed as

. 30 Brit Corps 15(S) Inf Div

Contact Car No.1

Contact Car No.2 Contact Car No.3'"

Contact Car No. 4

51. (H) Innf Div 43 Inf Div

Guards Armd. Div

Contact Car No.5

3 Cdn Inf Div io h.lhovn. at Annexure 'P',

The netting of the forward. lins

... /SITING' OVP POP

- 62SITING- OFPCP 186, Operation VERITABLE be.gan on a one corps front, that of 30 .Brit Corps; subsequently 2 .Cdn-tCorps took. over the LEFT flank of the sector an- were responsible-for s-taging Operation .BLOCKBUSTER.- . The . .G'r was -:sited close. to HQ 530 Brit Corps - from 8 - 18 Peb; independently from 18.23- Feb, and close to HQ 2 CIn Corps frorm\ 24 Feb^-: 10 Q.:.-r. It was found that support could be given to e.ither or both Corps irrespective of siting., and no operational. difficulties were experienced,

-. EXTRA COMUNICATIONS: .S TO FCP

187,- .

' In addition to the. normal rwireless communications, lines were laid: ,.to the C the. GS0 2 (Air) Off -the. Corps, the Corps, .exchange- and the M-obile Radar Control,.Post which .was responsible for controlling blind bombing.through cloud by both fighter and " medium bombers and which: was' sited throughout operations" close to the FCP. Communication with the distant .Corps was by R/T.. on the . net, :-a-n -additional No.33 set being. deployed at t.h.e: Corps for -thepurpose. . 'without: difficulty to -provide-a fourth ASSU: net d.uring *,Operation BLOCKBUSTER. jDEPLOYrENT 0OF CONTACT :CARS

An extra No.9 (.Cdn).setas. installeo

at the

188-

. -D iring; the course -of the operation Contact:tCars were freely switched by formations,. ultimately,.:. a a rule to forvrard bdes. It was considered subsequently, however, that better service could be obtained at HQs of inf divs; bdes .beir.ng. served by a normal .tentacle. However, in armd divs, siting at the bde was considered preferable so that the Car/Tank could be on the spot in the event of a break through. It was found unnecessary to allot both. a Contact Car/Tank and an ordi.nary. tentacle, to the same formation, as the Contact Car/Tank was always ab le to cope wi'.h .normal tentaele work. TARGETS . NDERTAKEN BY PCP :-

189. (a) (b)

The majority of targets engaged were

Houses forming integral parts of defensive positions. Infconcentrations a .wood. in small woods or in- a section of

(c)
(d) (e) .

Gun positions.
. Tanks and SP guns. OPs in towers, church spires, etcd

An enemy counter-attack was engaged by a section of R/P Typhoons. seven minutes after -he target: demand was originated. The counter-attack was broken up and no further requests were made., '- ' . - .. . .. The target .closest to our own tps was 250 yds. In all cases where own tps were.. close to a !difficult' target, red smoke. was used as an indicator. Otherwise, it was considered preferable for the attack to be made without red smoke since :-

- 63 (i) The enemy was warned by its air attack was imninent. presence that an

(ii) (iii)

Smoke aimnunition was fairly scarce, There was always the possibility of the aircraft and the smoke not arriving over the target at the same time, resulting in an abortive sortie.

Where red smoke wIas required the tentacle or Contact Car originating the request usually needed 10 to 12 minutes warning. Efficient co-ordination is essential between the ALO arid the RA Staff on this point to reduce this time to the .minimum and also make the necessary arrangements for "Applepie" counter battery fire. E:FPLOY]MENT OF CONTACT CARS ATLS 190o The major portion of the work done consisted in laying on, listening to and disseminating the results of Tactical Recce. Contact Cars asked for Tactical Recce over the ASSU and these demands were co-ordinated by Army HQ. Aircraft called up in turn each car which had made ,the d.remands, and reported the results of its observations. After this prearranged Tactical Recoe was conmpleted, any other car could come up on the air, and the recce pilot would carry out further recce if possible. The Contact Cars handled 84 offensive strikes. through = out the operations without difficulty. When targets were' undertaken very close to oulr forward tps, the POP either handed over control to the appropriate car or ordered the aircraft to clear the target with the car before attacking. AIR OP 192, When the 22 set in the Contact Car was not in use on the conmmand net, it was tuned in to the CPA's niet, and was then used to pass targets found by Tactical Recce to the guns, or received suitable air targets from Air OP aircraft. This use of the Air OP link was found more valuable than a similar tie up to the FCP. SL AmRY.193o Although bad Weather would appear to have interfered greatly with the air effort during this operation, it must be remembered that during the months \of Feb and early Mar, little better can usually be anticipated, In the early stages, vwhen good flying conditions wore perhaps more vital than later on, a great vol.ume of air support was possible. Probably the most inTportant'contributionr mde towards the success of the operation was the effect of long and. short term interdiction of enemy communications, comprising rail cutting, bombing of bottle necks and road centres. armed recces on roads, railways and rivers. As a result of this ceaseless activity the enemy was unable to launch against us any force capable of de-riving us of the initiative. He was comp.elled, by lack of transport, of petrol, of clear roads and railways, to comit his reinforcements piecemeal. 194. The results of air support canno.t, in an operation of this kind, be measured by the visual signs of enemy equipment destroyed or damaged. The results of an air attack .. . /are blurred

1910

AN NXU PL

SLCItON

27.

Q' To

LAYOUT OF FCP
Al PCPAFT

/fTO No.2
WD L.tJNK

IF &LQUIMKLD

Al PCP Af T

OPERATION

"VERITABLE

SECRET
ANNEXURE 'P TO SECTION 27

D DAY S/GNAL DIAGRAM -1 CANADIAN ASSU

/15 (5)
INF DIV,

/I 5(5) iMF DiV,

/3

CON

INF DIV ,/

3CDN INF ON

IOg

ARMD
DlV

D43
INF DiV

FORWArD

LINKS

LEGEND
0
^

/5cue w//" 7entacle

/5 Cu. Armd. W/T Tentacle

IE-

Con,:c CCar

-.. 64 are blurred on the ground by the effects of arty and mortar fire on the same targets. This operation, however, further proved that the co-operation opf air forces, integrated with the other superiorities of the Allies, c&umulatively wears down the will and the capacity of the enemy to resist. There is no doubtt tht repeated attacks by fighter bombers has the" effect of imaking each German soldier feel that he personally is being sought out and chased by something The eventual effect on against which he -has no replyo

morale is devastating.

SECTION 28 COIaLWNICATIONS
Lines 95o (a)

PROYAL

CORPS

OF

SIGNiJWS

30 Brit Corps established a planning HQ at BOXTEL prior to the concentration of the. formtions; which were to take part. in the operation. The elaborate communiLcations re quired necessitated the building of 40 trunk lines into this HQ. This was done by extending cables from the trunk centre of s 'IERTOGENBOSCH to BOXTEL. CSO First Cdn Army was requested to provide line communications: from BOXTEL to the various Divs moving up., both when in staging areas and in their final concentration. Great difficulty wvas experienced in obtaining accurate locations for the various HQs on "the move forward. In one. case five different This was unavoidable locations were quoted for one IQ. as the changes were caused by weather conditions affecting march tables and the suitability of site originally selected. However, it made the problem of providing line communlication very difficult*' In addition, the HQs were located at a considerable 'distance from BOXTEL necessitating the setting up of long distance circuits with the attendant problems of the establishment of repeater stations and the installa.tion of special ringing equipment. For the purpose of conducting the operation, Main HQ .30 C orps moved to ATTERT and. Rear EHQ 30 Corps moved to GILVE. To provide sufficient circuits for these HQs. ;40 pairs of the s'HE IOERNBGOSCH NIJ}IVEGEN cable - were cut in to each location. The work at HtATTERT involved the laying of a mile and a 'half of underground cable through the frozen ground .. Once the operation co-mmenced aunder ground cable did not exist'and it was necessary to build all the routes required. The few roads available and the heavy volcume of traffic on these roads, made building a very difficult jobO Alternative routes 'were normally provided so that cormniunica.tions could. still be carried out when the main route suffered damage, either through our own vehicles, or by enemy.action. This necessitated the Qstablishment of test points and signal centres at important junctions along the route. P Class carrier quad vwas used extensively on the main artery and the
.*o

(b):

(c)

(d)

/two

- 65 "two alternative main arteries so that carrier equipment could be inserted where required as it was not possible to predict the moves of the HQ. (e) 14 pair double armd subnarino cables were laid across the R MAAS aIt 1IOOK andGENLEP. Originally, quad cables were laid on the bridges but. the necessity for opening the. bridges to. permit water-borne traffic through, s'mde these routes very uncertain. The subm ariine cable' drums were n.ounted in BFFALOES and these were founid'to be the ideal vehicle f or this particular type of w".ork. ;

(f) -

As many of these routes were vinder wa'ter due to flooding, W'EASELS were used as cable laying vehicles
and-proved most' satisfactory. ' Their tw o limitations vwere first.,ily that they could not cope with rough vater, and secondly, they could not carry enough stores to permit the building of l ng quad cable lines. D Class cables were found to be unsuitable when laid under wat;er so it vwas the practice to lay quad cable right down to Bde HQ levell. -

(g)

For the conmmencement of the operation , 30 Corps Signals was augmented by the addition of approxima:tely 3 line sections, half a DR section, 1 'tele op 'section, and 1 medium wireless section, from resources of CSO3First Cdn Army and CSO 21 Army roupo. Throughout the operation, it was the practice of Corps Signals to Supply a quad cable detachment to each div with orders to build and nmaintain a quad to the leading Bde moving on the Div axis. -;This assisted the Div Signals in providing..line to one of their bdes and ensuared that line would be available back to Corps when.the .Div HQ moved forward.

(h)

(i)

LLater in thoe operation-, when 2 Cdn Corps took over the

LEFPT CENT.RE of the front, an attempt was made by 30 Corps to hand over parrt of the existing line systeml to ;2 Cdn Corps. This did not prove satisfactory and it is considered, even at the cost of duplication, it is '-better t6 provide new lines.

(j)-

In the V

,ERITABLE area. there were no buried cables

The

crossing the frontier 'from- HOLLAID'into GERIM,gEY. Once CLEVE was cleared, Army Signials s-ent recce parties

forward to locate German underground cables.

CENTRE of CIEVE was complet l"y destroyed so that it was impossible to trac e them from. the telephone exchange. Cable locators were used and before BLOCKBUSTER comnenced/ the 68 pair cable running from CLEVE to GOCH had been. fully restored. It was necessary, however / to termi-nate this cable at the edge of the town. ;' A c omp)osite. line ciagram is- ,attachecd as Annexure IR .1 ', 'WIREIESS 196. (a) The main- Wireless problem was the large number of simailar formations which had to use wireless in a very limi.ted area. It was therefore necessary that power and aerial lengths should be kept to a minimum. Formations not engaged in mobile operations were placed on wireless silence and all formations. were put on .. /minimize

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- 66 minimize whenever possible. (b) The C 52 Set was issued on a limited scale immediately . before the operation. It was used prinipally onarty, nets and proved quite satisfactory.

(c)

lAs usual,--wireless coimmunications within the inf bns

were not satisfactory, nor were the various methods which were used to communicate between tanks and info Some formations had received wireless sets No.46 for use within inf bns and thie better wireless communication within these formations was easily apparentO The problem of Inf commun.ications has been receiving attention for some time. Firm recommendations from this theatre have now been submitted to the War Office,

STORES 197. (a) Before the operation,- a large dump of cable and line A second dump was gear was established- at NIJMEG-EN. set up at CLE'VE at the beginning of BLOCKBUSTER, During the operation, an abnormal iamount: of all types of cable was used, as the following figures show
:

(b)

Assault Cable

-'

yds

: " '

151,000

D3 Single D8 Twisted Field. Quad . Carrier Quad Typoe:

miles

5,377
3,267 1, 61 315

This large expenditure-'was brought aboust by the number of set piece attacks, each requiring its initial cable netiwor-k,o anc because units wvere so thick on the ground, so many' cables would be laid along each-road as to make recovery of cable virtually impossible. Sufficient supplies of all t.types- of ccable owere available -throughout the operation.,

SECT.-ON 29
196o

CA:OUFIAGES

A carefully co-ordinated plan was made by First Cdn Army. in: .conjunction with Commander -R 'Force for the conceal. "ment -of"forma'tions -talking part in .the operation. Aircraft wre rflown over concentration areas to test

the efficacyr of the measures put in force, as a result of

which orders were issued for particular attention to be given to the following point-s' :'
: ., q /: ~ . .: . .} -' ;'

(a)

By night:
( i) A high standard of blackout to be "maintained and blacTkout timings extended half an hr : ---- each way. --

(ii)- No fires to be lighted out of doors during the "' r- . hrs' of' blackout ', .. ./(iii)

-67(iii) All torches to be dimmed,

(b)

By day:
(i) Movement of vehicles and personnel to be reduced. to a minimumo. All parades, including meals, far as possible under cover. to take place as

(ii)

(iii)

Stationary vehicles to make the utmost use of

cover.

(iv)

Camouflage nets to be used .at all times in in other areas vehicles to be rural areas; parked close against buildings..

199.

At an early stage in the preparation for a large scale operation, the importance of Camouflage measures must be stressed to all rankis taking part and a proper plan made. The special camouflage instructions dravwn up must be distributed downvm to units in sufficientt time to ensure that they can be obeyed,, Concealment of Art

200.

The object of the concealment was to deny the enemy information as to the special concentration of arty in the areas EAST and SOUTH of NIJIMEGEN .until such time as the guns opened fire. A Camouflage'Pool of specialist officers from HQ 21 Army Group was allocated to HQ 30 Corps, and an SO 2 wras attached to the PA Branch HQ 30 Uorps from 21 Jan until D-Day to advise the CCPtA.

201. (a)'

The gun areas were divided roughly into two sectors NORTH of the I..iAS nearly all sites. and old gun sites. good area with tree cover for Ground covered .with old tracks

'-

(b)

SOUTH of the IMAAS - practically no tree cover, but 'well spotted with farmhouses and cottages which offered Virgin ground, good concealment if properly used, Forwa.rd with practically no tracks or old gun sites. Distance of gun areas overlooked by enemy PDLs. areas from enemy varied between 1,000 yds tQ' 3 miles,

202.

During the dumping period, the,. whole area was covered A sudden .thaw on 29 Jan necessitated with thick snow. Except for the quick changes in ammunition camouflage. morning of 6 Peb, visibility was bad dur ng the last few Enemy air recce was, however, made on 6 Feb . days,
" .. . .

203.

The CCRA was advised that real concealment of such a 'large concentration (over 1,000 guns) would not be practicable unless digging and occupation of sites were postponed Orders until after last photographic light on D minus 1, were in consequence issued that no digging or occupation of sites would take place before 1600 hrs on D minus 1, but that guns and essential equipment wouldli' in hiding near the sites until that time, and all unessential vehicles and All road movement personnel would withdraw from the areas. As dumping of.,. ammunition in large. was to be by nighlt. ... /quantities had

- 68 quantities had to take place some weeks prior to D-Day, the concealment problem resolved itself into two phases : (a) /(b) Concealment :of ammunition and dumping activity, Concealment of guns etc whilst waiting in areas until 1-600 hrs on D minus 1, assembly

20Lo

A Camouflage Pool Officer was attached to each AGRA - nd each group of divs. a This was done in sufficient time to enable them to accompany all recce parties from the outset, . . The camouflage of -the ammunition had to, be-: done by night and required careful recce the day before, and checking of adumps before first lighto Camoiuflage: .officers provided all units concerned .with sketch plans for each site showing dumnping places and track places. .- These officers also ke-pt a-constant watch on. the .'dumps to ensure that: camouflage was being maintained. r'he method employed wvas- to. dispose the ammunition in unrecognisable ways (false hedges, stacked against walls_ of: houses,. kitchen garden patterns and irregular-patches to imitate scrub). It was all drumped within ranhandling distances of .the sites. : . The concealment of the guns and vehicles" also required previous. rcce with .unit representatives to find suitable hides.'. In. area NORTH of the MAAS, evergreen tree cover was used, but SOUTH of the river both ammnunition and guns were placed in hedges, farmyards, barns and haystacks, and covered with, nets, tarpaulins, anrid. brushwood. . Distances of' guns from battle positions when in hiding, 'varied between 10 yds and 200 yds. Few guns were over 100 yds from positionso

205.

.206,

207,

- ammunitiont

Nets were made available in the PIMC from which was being dravm and included both snow and ordinary nets'...Sufficient wer:e available so that units had a pool for use on the -'more exp-osed. dTdumps, Brushwood, snow itself and fir treoes.were also used to .a large e xtento However, the real key to the problem was, siting -. 'both by dispersal in'..unroc.ognisable groups, andl by placing. to allow approach .along-tracks or und-er cover
.

208.

-. The state of the ground and roads after -the thaw caused a partial failing of. the scheduled scheme in the following ways : . (a) Roads became mpassable, .All guns could not get in by night and; some had to move by day^ Track plans could not be followed in Mlany of the sites had to be changed this was well 'controlled. ,
f * ' -

(b) (c) :

all cases, hurriedly although

,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Bad visibility, except on 6 Feb, helped. considerably in the last few days and enabled gun positions to be built early on D minus I when essential for operation of guns by the specifi ed time . 209. Wagon lines were situated some 10 miles to the rear of g-un areas, where camouflage discipline might have been better than it was ,

..v /210

69
210, A certain number of Nissen huts had to be erected and these were sited against,.existing'houses in most cases. Because of 'the extreme cold, tps were naturally inclined to light fires. HQ 50 Corps issuedL instructions forbidding this except in built up areas. If snow had remained 2a landing' strip for Air OPs would have been cleared with snow ploughs and arrangements were made to camouflage these by continuing the pattern with ploughs. The thaw settled this particular problem. White *material was issued for planes in case of renewed snow. In spite of the various limitations, concealment reached a high standard, This was proved by various flights over, and photographs taklen of, the .area Normal discipline by itself would not probably have achieved this without constant detailed specialist advice on each site, though the camouf l.ago di.scipline and training of units was good. The exception was that connected with B vehicles which.-was-not utp to standard in most caseso .'As a resu.t of this operation the foll9ow'r.: i-o.nmts :-The Camouflage officer responsible for the co-ordination of the concealment plan mus t work at "hoe IHQ of the Senior Arty Officer frorm the first momtent that planning begins. Thereafter careful programmes of dumping and movement must be imad-e in order that the camouflage resources are able to cover the concentration. The programme should *be so arranged that dumping and movement are by night only, although this is obviously not always practicable. If a plaa iJs not made, units will calory out their recces witthout camouflage representatives. The necessity for this co.-ordinated camnouflage programmne *cannot be ovetrstressed. Dumping and forward..movement of guns should not be coincident, in order that the camaouflage resources can be conceo-l-tratod on one problem at a time. . uns and .ammirition should. t packed and dumped on sites carefully selected for conca lment as near. as possible to tLhe firing positions.- .These sites includ e farmyarnds hedges, barns , houses and gardens. Once the guns are deployed on- to f irin positons only a moderate doegree of concealment s possi.ble. In ..very god .grounda certain ,amount of careful digging may be proof against air, photogr.aphy if the firing sites are cho'ss-n with a view to coniceal :,';. But if as is usual in such large concentrations, co-ordination cannot be given to camouflage in siting, then digging and occupation should be held back to the last practical -. moment. In planniimg the concealment, the possibility of postponement .of D-Day is a factor that moust be carefully considered, as the appearance of thle ground is very much changed af-ler digging has commenced. If possible, therefore, the decision as to postponement shaild be

211.-b

21.2.

215.

214.

Eare emphasised

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

made before digging or occupation has commenced.

. O./(g)

70
(g) In any large scale concealment project it is not sufficient to rely on unit camouflage, but it' is necessary to concentrate all available special camouflage resources in personnel and stores under a central direction or control.

SECTION 30
TRAFFIC DISCIPLINE 215.

IDISCELLAE]OUS

There has been a. serious decline in traffic discipline during this and recent operations. and the Brit Army compares unfavourably in this respect with the American Army. to show In general, when on. the road, officers fail enough energy in maintaining the standard of discipline that In spite of abundant notices, dou,.bleexisted before D-Day. vehicles do NOT pull off the road banking is frequent; long when halted nor are men posted to signal on traffic; because some vehicle columns are found halted nose to tail in front requires a minor adjustment and no one will take the trouble to go and finud out what is happening, etc, etc. class, but they alone Provost are generally first It would be eased if more cannot cope with this problem. these would be doubly motor cycle road patrols were used; effective if they had the power to issue a "ticket" -to offenders on the spot. AIR PHOTOGRAPHS

216.o

Great use was made of air photographs both before and The very accurate interpretation of during the operation. photographs is considered to have had far-reaching results The major part of the detailed towards eventual success. information on enemy defences came from accurate defence Many of the defences were later ground checked overprints. with the overprint after the battle and were found to, have Counter battery progranmmes been almost entirely accurate. were largely based on information taken from overprints and in several cases enemy guns were found to have been knocked Good photographs 'and sound out in their emplacements,. of inestimable value in operations factors are interpretation against fixed or highly organised defences.