FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.

DOCTRINE: There is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. That the employer is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code. SOME OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CRIMES UNDER THE PENAL CODE AND THE CULPA AQUILIANA OR CUASI-DELITO UNDER THE CIVIL CODE ARE: 1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern. 2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage. 3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.) FACTS: BOCOBO, J.: G.R. No. L-48006 : July 8, 1942 CFI(cr:convicted) CA(p.civ: liable) SC(Affirmed) At past 1:00 am, May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by PEDRO FONTANILLA and a carretela guided by PEDRO DIMAPALIS. The carretela was overturned, 16-year-old boy FAUSTINO GARCIA, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the CFI-Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced with prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. CA AFFIRMED the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. The parents of the deceased (herein respondents) brought a civil action in the CFI-Manila against FAUSTO BARREDO (sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla).

CA: The liability sought to be imposed is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or employee.

ISSUE: May the plaintiffs bring a separate civil action against Barredo making him primarily and directly responsible as an employer of Fontanilla? YES. HELD: delitos and cuasi delitos should be distinguished. A quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored. CIVIL CODE: 1089,1092-3, 1902- 4; see 2176 REVISED PENAL CODE: 100-3, 365 That while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless Article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extracontractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extracontractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. In Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana.

QUASI-DELICTS AND THE EMPLOYER'S PRIMARY AND DIRECT LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLE 1903 OF THE CIVIL CODE. Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and establishments but with subsidiary character. The Civil Code does not coincide because article 1903 says: "not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible :" subordinates and employees either for acts during their service or on the occasion of their functions. One is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902 ; but, BY EXCEPTION, one is liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility. Is this responsibility direct or subsidiary? o RPC distinguishes: minors and incapacitated persons: responsibility is direct (article 19), others, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); article 1903, the responsibility should be understood as direct, "for the acts of those persons for whom one should be responsible ."

CFI awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2K plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. CA reduced the damages to P1K with legal interest from the time the action was instituted . It is undisputed that FONTANILLA 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to BARREDO's responsibility, the CA found: o There is proof that he (didnt) exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage: he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding violation. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of Article 1903 CC.

o CC:

THEORY OF THE DEFENSE: the liability of Barredo is governed by the RPC where liability is only subsidiary, and since there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case.

SPANISH CASE of 1910: Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by a street car owned by the "compaia Electric Madrilea de Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but he was acquitted. The widow filed a civil action against the street car

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company, and the the lower court awarded damages. The company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code because by final judgment the nonexistence of fault or negligence had been declared. The SC-Spain dismissed the appeal: o First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car company. As in the present case: Fontanilla (driver) has not been sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer. Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence-- SC Spain: this did not exclude the coexistence of fault or negligence. In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence which he did not overcome - under article 1903. Thus, there were TWO LIABILITIES OF BARREDO: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights . (plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective method of relief). o Third. The employer was held liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held liable for damages in a civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been convicted.

liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right. o Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only while they are in process of prosecution , OR in so far as they determine the existence of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by the election of the injured person. Since no criminal proceeding had been instituted out of the accident, the provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived the laws. INTERPRETATION OF THE WORDS OF ARTICLE 1093, " fault or negligence not punished by law" It has been shown that the liability of an employer arising out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. The acts to which these articles are applicable are those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another . BUT where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code . A typical application of this distinction may be found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for passage, while that to the injured bystander would originate in the negligent act itself. In MANZANARES VS. MORETA: the mother of the 9-year-old child Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the death of the child, who had been run over by an automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. o A clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime OR of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.

SPANISH CASE of 1919: an action was brought against a railroad company for damages because the station agent, employed by the company, had unjustly and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the plaintiff. o This case shows that the same act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. The employer and not the employee who was being sued.

In RAKES vs. ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC CO: the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff (laborer of the defendant) because the latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was being transported, and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. o SC held that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one 'not punished by the laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. The civil liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the law. Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that the injured party should seek out a third person criminally

In BERNAL AND ENVERSO VS. HOUSE and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd: Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages. o Although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, award of damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902.

The defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. The

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In BAHIA vs. LITONJUA AND LEYNES: the action was for damages for the death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the servant in driving an automobile over the child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the steering gear.

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defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the defective condition of the steering gear. o ARTICLE 1903 not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also provides when the liability shall cease. "shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage." 2 THINGS ARE APPARENT: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee, PRESUMPTION: there was negligence on the part of the matter or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that PRESUMPTION IS JURIS TANTUM (disputable presumption) and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. If the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability. This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant. THEREFORE, the defendant's theory re his secondary liability is rebutted by the six cases cited. HE IS PRIMARILY AND DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE IN DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 1903, IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 1902, OF THE CIVIL CODE. Counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code.

such selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director."

Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent . The employer and employee become as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him. All these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.

Fourthly, a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. It is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. This will make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.

DIFFERENCES: o Firstly, the 365, RPC punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. Thirdly, to hold that the only way to make defendant's liability effective is to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first is cumbersome. But there is a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice. The primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct. According to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not exercise

Judgment of the CA is AFFIRMED

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of AGAPITO ELCANO, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees. DOCTRINE: We here hold, in reiteration of Barredo v. Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. FACTS: BARREDO, J.: G.R. No. L-24803, May 26, 1977 CFI(recovery of damages:dismissed) SC (45:reversed) The criminal case against Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in the CFI-QC. He was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake ." When appellants filed their complaint against the defendants, they filed an MTD.

2. 3.

The action is barred by a prior judgment/res-adjudicata; The complaint had no COA vs the father because the latter was relieved as guardian through emancipation by marriage.

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1.

The action is a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the ROC;

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GROUNDS:

It was denied. But was granted on MR, hence, this appeal.

ISSUES: 1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed? NO. 2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code be applied, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of, Reginald-- a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married? NO. HELD: FIRST ISSUE: reiteration and further clarification of the dual character (criminal and civil) of fault or negligence as a source of obligation as established in Barredo vs. Garcia. The nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito AND mere culpa or fault: that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued. o Criminal case: because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code, with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. The separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.

Article 2177 should not be construed literally: construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. The preliminary chapter on human relations of the NCC establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) FROM the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the RPC, and, in a sense, the Rule Rule 111 ROC, contemplate also the same separability. It is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress." Article 2176 covers both acts "not punishable by law" and acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. The extinction of civil liability referred to in Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the RPC , whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Therefore, the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence THAT ACQUITTAL IS NOT A BAR TO THE INSTANT ACTION AGAINST HIM.

SECOND ISSUE: re the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of his father. That Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld. While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)" , it is, however, also clear that pursuant to article 399, EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE OF THE MINOR IS NOT REALLY FULL OR ABSOLUTE. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian . He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian." ** FC 228(3); 234;236 Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company ." In the instant case, Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual . According to Manresa, under Article 2180, the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons . On the other hand, the implication of Article 399, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. And SURELY, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a

SC applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. See Barredo case re foundation Deeper reflection reveals that the thrust of the pronouncements in Barredo is not so limited, it actually extends to fault or culpa . It was ruled that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." It is to be noted that the NCC, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter . ARTICLE 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." Article 2177 of the new code provides: ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

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CODE COMMISSION: Criminal negligence is a violation of the criminal law, while civil negligence is "culpa aquiliana" or quasidelict, of ancient origin, having always its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Therefore, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence , whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action , not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.",

minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent. Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald . However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age , as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son .

the Civil Case for damages based on quasi-delict. The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the Civil Case is quasi-delict, not an act or omission punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict and an act or omission punishable by law are two different sources of obligation. For the petitioners to prevail in the action for damages, they have only to establish their cause of action by preponderance of the evidence. WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE, and Civil Case is REINSTATED and REMANDED . CHARMINA B. BANAL, petitioner, vs. HON. TOMAS V. TADEO, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC-Quezon City, Branch 105 and ROSARIO CLAUDIO, respondents. DOCTRINE: While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. CRIMINAL LIABILITY will give rise to CIVIL LIABILITY only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to another. (See Sangco). Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another. Civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied, The payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense. FACTS: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: G.R. No. 78911-25 Dec 11, 1987 RTC(rejected the appearance of the pvt prosec, MR denied) SC(65:granted) 15 separate informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed against respondent Claudio before the RTC-QC, originally assigned to Branch 84 whose presiding judge inhibited himself when respondent Claudio filed a petition for recuse (May 19,1986). The cases were assigned to Branch 105 which was presided over by Judge Johnico G. Serquina, which would later be replaced by Judge Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr. Claudio was finally arraigned (November 20, 1986); she pleaded not guilty to the charges. Pre-trial was then set (January 8, 1987). During the Pre-Trial, the respondent court rejected the appearance of the private prosecutor (Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos) on the ground that the charge is for the violation of BP. 22 which does not provide for any civil liability or indemnity and hence, "it is not a crime against property but public order." The petitioner filed an MR of the order. Respondent Claudio filed her opposition to the MR. The respondent court denied petitioner's MR, Hence, this petition questioning the orders of the respondent Court.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is REVERSED and the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. :: AQUINO, J, concurring: Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly broad enough to include any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society." See article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that " the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an adult."

CANDIDA VIRATA, et. al, petitioners, vs. VICTORIO OCHOA, MAXIMO BORILLA and CFI-CAVITE, respondents. DOCTRINE: It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action under the RPC or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the NCC. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent act. FACTS: FERNANDEZ, J.: G.R. No. L-46179 Jan. 31, 1978 CFI(MTD: granted) SC(45:civ case reinstated) Arsenio Virata died (September 24, 1975) when the passenger jeepney driven by Maximo Borilla (registered in the name Of Victoria Ochoa) bumped the former while walking along Taft Avenue. Borilla is the employer of Ochoa. A criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence was instituted against Borilla in the CFI- Rizal. At the hearing, Atty. Julio Francisco, the private prosecutor, made a reservation to file a separate civil action for damages against the driver on his criminal liability. Then, Atty. Francisco filed a motion to withdraw the reservation. He then actively participated in the trial and presented evidence on the damages. The heirs of Virata again reserved their right to institute a separate civil action; The heirs commenced Civil Case in the CFI-Cavite for damages based on quasi-delict against the driver Borilla and the registered owner Ochoa. The defendants filed an MTD, ground: that there is another action (Criminal Case) pending between the same parties for the same cause. September 8, 1976, CFI- Rizal in the Criminal Case acquitted the accused Borilla on the ground that he caused an injury by accident. January 31, 1977, CFI-Cavite granted the MTD.

HELD: The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent act. Before the Criminal Case was decided, they manifested that they were filing a separate civil action for damages against the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney based on quasi-delict. The acquittal of the driver, Borilla, of the crime charged is not a bar to the prosecution of

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ISSUE: May the heirs of Virata prosecute an action for the damages based on q.delict against Borilla and Ochoa? YES.

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FOR RESPONDENTS: BP. 22 punishes the act of knowingly issuing worthless checks as an offense against public order. Thus, it is the State and the public that are the principal complainants, hence, no civil indemnity is provided for by BP. 22 for which a private party or prosecutor may intervene. FOR PETITIONER: "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable." Thus, indemnity may be recovered from the offender regardless of whether or not BP 22 so provides.

EULOGIO OCCENA, petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO M. ICAMINA, Presiding Judge, Branch X of the RTC -Antique; THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CRISTINA VEGAFRIA, respondents. DOCTRINE: Petitioner may appeal from the decision on the civil aspect which is deemed instituted with the criminal action and such appeal, timely taken, prevents the decision on the civil liability from attaining finality. What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentional or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. Article 2219 (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. This provision of law establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation. The offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary damages. FACTS: FERNAN, C.J.: G.R. No. 82146 January 22, 1990

ISSUE: Did the RTC act with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in rejecting the appearance of a private prosecutor? YES. HELD: Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable" (Art. 100, RPC). That when a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society/ or the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. MISCONCEPTION: civil liability actually arises from the crime (when, in the ultimate analysis, it does not.) Article 20, NCC: Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime (Bagtas v. Director of Prisons). EVERY CRIME gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, AND also to civil action for the restitution of the thing , repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses. (US v. Bernardo). Indeed one cannot disregard the private party in the case at bar who suffered the offenses committed against her. The petitioner too is entitled to relief as a member of the public which the law seeks to protect. She was assured that the checks were good when she parted with money, property or services. She suffered with the State when the checks bounced. In Lozano v. Hon. Martinez , SC held that " The effects of a worthless check transcend the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touch the interests of the community at large ." YET, SC too recognized the wrong done to the private party defrauded when it stated that "The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or the holder, but also an injury to the public ." Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of BP 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty- handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do so, may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught. The petitioner's intervention in the prosecution of the Criminal Cases is justified not only for the protection of her interests but also in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice mandated by the Constitution (Section 16, Article III, Bill of Rights, Constitution of 1987). A separate civil action for the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome, and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioner's rights may be fulIy adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort t o a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. WHEREFORE the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent court is ordered to permit the intervention of a private prosecutor in behalf of petitioner

MCTC(convicted) RTC(appealed the civ aspect:denied) SC(42: granted) Petitioner Eulogio Occena instituted before MCTC- Sibalom, Antique, a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against private respondent Cristina Vegafria for uttering: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas ," which, freely translated, mean: "You are a foolish Barangay Captain, ignoramus, traitor, tyrant, Judas" and other words of similar import which caused great and irreparable damage and injury to his person and honor. Private respondent/ accused entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued. Petitioner did not reserve his right to file a separate civil action for damages. MCTC convicted the Private respondent of Slight Oral Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of P50. No damages were awarded to petitioner as the trial court's opinion that "the facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant the awarding of moral damages." Petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the decision to RTC; petition was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner now appeals to SC by way of a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul the RTC decision for being contrary to Article 100 of the RPC and Article 2219 of the NCC providing that moral damages may be recovered in libel, slander or any other form of defamation. PETITIONER submits that public respondent RTC erred in relying on the cases of Roa vs. de la Cruz, and Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al. In Roa, the decision of the trial court had become final before Roa instituted a civil action for damages; whereas in the instant case, the decision of the trial court has not yet become final by reason of the timely appeal, and no civil action for damages has been instituted by petitioner against private respondent for the same cause. Tan, on the other hand, contemplates of two actions, one criminal and one civil, and the prosecution of the criminal case had resulted in the acquittal of the accused, which is not the situation here where the civil aspect was impliedly instituted with the criminal action in accordance with Section 1, Rule 111, of the ROC . PRIVATE RESPONDENT argues that the decision of the trial court carries with it the final adjudication of her civil liability. Since petitioner chose to actively intervene in the criminal action without

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reserving his right to file a separate civil action for damages, he assumed the risk that in the event he failed to recover damages he cannot appeal from the decision of the lower court. ISSUE: 1. Was the decision of the MCTC constitutes the final adjudication on the merits of private respondent's civil liability? NO. Is petitioner entitled to an award of damages arising from the remarks uttered by private respondent and found by the trial court to be defamatory? YES.

ALFREDO P. PACIS and CLEOPATRA D. PACIS, petitioners, vs. JEROME JOVANNE MORALES, respondent. DOCTRINE: Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, the liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a persons own negligence. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care. FACTS: CARPIO, J. : G.R. No. 169467 : February 25, 2010

2.

HELD: #1: The decision of the MCTC as affirmed by the RTC cannot be considered as a final adjudication on the civil liability of private respondent because said decision has not yet become final due to the timely appeal filed by petitioner with respect to the civil liability of the accused in said case. It was only the unappealed criminal aspect of the case which has become final. In People vs. Coloma: from a judgment convicting the accused, 2 appeals may be taken. FIRST, the accused may seek a review of said judgment (both civil and criminal actions); while the complainant may appeal with respect only to the civil action (because the lower court has refused to award damages or because the award made is unsatisfactory to him). The right of either party to appeal in the event of conviction of the accused is not dependent upon the other. Thus, private respondent's theory that in actively intervening in the criminal action, petitioner waived his right to appeal from the decision that may be rendered therein, is incorrect and inaccurate.

RTC(Pacis) CA(reversed) SC(45:sets aside~CA,Pacis) Petitioners Alfredo and Cleopatra D. Pacis filed (17 January 1995) with the trial court a civil case for damages against respondent Morales. Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Dennis Pacis, Jr., a 17-year old student who died in a shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store in Baguio City. Respondent is the owner of the gun store. Alfred, then 17 years old and a 1st year student at the BCF taking up BSCS, died (January 19, 1991) due to a gunshot wound in the head which he sustained while he was at the Gun Store. Aristedes Matibag and Jason Herbolario were with Alfred at the time of the shooting. They were sales agents and the caretakers of the gun store at that particular time. The bullet was fired from a gun brought in by a customer (Cal. 22 Rimfire Magnum). It was left by Morales in a drawer of a table located inside the gun store. Defendant was in Manila at the time. Jarnague, the regular caretaker, was also not around. Jarnague entrusted the keys to Matibag and Herbolario which included the key to the drawer where the gun was kept. Matibag and Herbolario later brought out the gun and placed it on top of the table. Pacis was attracted by the sight of the gun got hold of the same. Matibag asked Pacis to return the gun. The latter followed but it went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head. A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag who was acquitted of the charge because of the exempting circumstance of accident under Art. 12 (4) of the RPC. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners (Spouses Pacis) ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs (P30K as indemnity for the death; P29K as actual damages for the hospitalization and burial expenses, P100K as compensatory damages; P100K as moral damages; P50K as attorneys fees. That Respondent is civilly liable under Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 NCC. The accidental shooting of Alfred which caused his death was PARTLY DUE TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF RESPONDENTS EMPLOYEE Matibag and Herbolario even if they were only paid on a commission basis. Under the Civil Code, respondent is liable for the damages caused by Matibag on the occasion of the performance of his duties, UNLESS respondent proved that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage . Respondent failed to observe the required diligence when he left the key to the drawer containing the loaded defective gun without instructing his employees to be careful in handling the loaded gun.

#2: Determine first the basis of civil liability arising from crime. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses are governed by Article 100 RPC in relation to Article 2177 on quasi-delict. A person who is criminally liable is also civilly liable is the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has dual character. In treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others, no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime. In the case at bar, the RTC ruling that no civil liability arising from the felonious act of the accused is erroneous. As a GENERAL RULE, a person who is found to be criminally liable offends (2) entities. (No civil liability if: 1 no offended party, or 2 no damage was caused to a private person). Here, theres an offended party whose main contention is that he suffered damages in view of the defamatory words and statements uttered by private respondent. It must be remembered that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. And malice may be inferred from the style and tone of publication subject to certain exceptions which are not present in the case at bar. Calling petitioner so and so is sufficient to cause him embarrassment and social humiliation. Petitioner testified to the feelings of shame and anguish he suffered as a result of the incident complained of. Having misapprehended the facts, the trial court's findings is not conclusive upon the SC. SC rules that for the injury to his feelings and reputation, being a barangay captain, petitioner is entitled to moral damages (P5K and a further sum of P5K as exemplary damages). WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

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Respondent appealed to the CA which reversed the trial courts Decision and absolved respondent from civil liability under Article 2180 NCC. That respondent cannot be held civilly liable since there was no employer-employee relationship between respondent and Matibag; therefore, the latter was was not under the control of respondent with respect to the means and methods in the performance of his work. There can be no employer-employee relationship where the element of control is absent. Thus, Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not apply in this case and respondent cannot be held liable. That even if respondent is considered an employer of Matibag, still no negligence can be attributed to respondent illustrated in Picart vs. Smith: THE TEST OF NEGLIGENCE is this: o x x x. Could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or take precaution against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. x x x.

Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a family. WHEREFORE, SC GRANTs the petition. It SETS ASIDE the Decision of the CA; RTC ruling reinstated.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, MERCEDES L. JAVELLANA, petitioner, vs. ITONG AMISTAD, respondent. DOCTRINE: If the civil liability arises from other sources than the commission of the offense, such as from law or contract or quasi-delict, its enforcement has to be by an ordinary civil action as expressly provided in Article 29 NCC, which may be disposed of as a mere preponderance of evidence would warrant. Then, all the defenses available, such as prescription, lack of jurisdiction, set-off, and the other grounds for a motion to dismiss may be availed of. (pp vs Herrera) An appeal from that decision would reopen the question of defendant's civil liability arising from the alleged crime. And considering that such civil liability must be based on the criminal responsibility of the defendant (art. 100, RPC), any review or re-examination of the question of civil liability would perforce require a new determination of defendant's criminal liability. But another trial upon defendant's criminal responsibility cannot be held, in view of his previous acquittal in the justice of the peace court. So the appeal from the decision of the justice of the peace court is not authorized by law. However, if the civil action is reserved, or if the ground of acquittal is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, a separate civil action may be filed, the complainant alleging a cause of action independent of, and not based on, the commission of an offense. Only preponderance of evidence would then be required. FACTS: DE CASTRO, J.: G.R. No. L-34666 Oct. 30, 1981 An information was filed against ITONG AMISTAD of the crime of Estafa (316.2, RPC). It was alleged that he sold (January 30, 1965) to Ben Palispis an unsegregated portion of 42K sqm of a parcel of land in Baguio City. Then to Teodoro Mat-an the remaining 42K sqm of the same parcel of land; Despite knowing fully well that on February 10, 1962, he had entered into an agreement with MERCEDES L. JAVELLANA to convey 10K sqm from the subject parcel of land for P10K. Amistad already received P5K. CFI acquitted the accused holding that 1) "the case is civil in nature" and 2) "the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt." From the judgment of acquittal, the complainant appealed to the CA the civil liability of the accused. CA dismissed the appeal saying that a judgment of acquittal should be disallowed; the offended party cannot appeal if the accused is acquitted (People vs. Herrera). Besides, the offended party has the remedy of bringing a civil action independently of the criminal action. MR was denied. Petitioner cites Section 2, Rules 122, Section 3 of Rule 111, and Article 29, NCC. From the aforequoted provisions, remedy of appeal is expressly granted to her inasmuch as the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action

Respondent maintains that he is not guilty of negligence and lack of due care as he did not fail to observe the diligence of a good father of a family. (that he kept the firearm in one of his table drawers, which he locked and such is already an indication that he took the necessary diligence and care that the said gun would not be accessible to anyone). Petitioners filed an MR which the CA denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: 1. Did CA err in reversing the RTC decision?YES. 2. Is the Respondent civilly liable?YES. HELD: Under Article 1161 NCC, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the RPC OR they may opt to file an independent civil action for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for damages against respondent whom they alleged was Matibags employer. Petitioners based their claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Under PNP Circular No. 9 (Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair), a person who is in the business of purchasing and selling of firearms must maintain basic security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled. As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. o FIRST: the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Also, it was not shown if respondent had a License to Repair.

ISSUE: From a decision of acquittal, may the complainant in a criminal action for estafa appeal the civil aspect of the case? NO. HELD:

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Article 29 NCC requires the institution of a separate action by the filing of the proper complaint giving the accused an opportunity to file an appropriate responsive pleading (answer, MTD). In a criminal action, notwithstanding that the action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted therewith, if not reserved or waived, the accused is not afforded the same remedy. The obvious reason is that the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense, with respect to which pre-trial is never held to obtain admission as to the commission thereof, except on the occasion of arraignment. In People vs. Herrera: The decision of the justice of the peace court which acquitted the defendant of the charge and DID NOT MAKE ANY PRONOUNCEMENT HOLDING THE DEFENDANT CIVILLY LIABLE PUT AN END TO THE CASE, not only by freeing the defendant from criminal responsibility BUT ALSO BY REJECTING ALL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM THE ALLEGED CRIME of malicious mischief. The offended parties not having reserved their right to bring a separate civil action, the aforesaid decision of acquittal covered both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case under Rule 107.l.a. Petitioner may not complaint of being denied due process for disallowing her appeal since she can institute a separate civil action if her cause of action could come under the category of quasi-delict or one arising from law, contract or any other known source of civil liability, but certainly not anymore from the offense of which petitioner had already been acquitted.

Subsequently (October 30, 1974), private respondent filed a Civil Case against the petitioner which involved the same subject matter and act complained of in the Criminal Case. Petitioner alleged as special and affirmative defenses: no cause of action and barred by the prior judgment. o o Petitioner filed an MTD but was denied. Petitioner filed with SC a petition for certiorari (cpm:65), but was dismissed for lack of merit. MR was also denied.

CFI ruled in favor of the private respondent ordering the petitioner to pay the former: P 6.9K for hospitalization, medicines and so forth; P2K for other actual expenses; P25K for moral damages, P5K for attorney's fees, and costs. CA affirmed the decision (July 29, 1987) of the lower court but reduced the award for moral damages to P18K. MR was denied.

ISSUE: May the private respondent, without reserving the civil action arising from the act complained of, file a separate action for civil liability? YES. (petitioner was acquitted in the criminal action on reasonable doubt and no civil liability was adjudicated or awarded in the judgment of acquittal ) ** collateral issue: law of the case, R65 not applicable HELD: Private respondent participated and intervened in the prosecution of the criminal suit against petitioner. Under the present jurisprudential milieu, where the trial court acquits the accused on reasonable doubt, it could very well make a pronouncement on the civil liability of the accused and the complainant could file a petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to include such civil liability in the judgment of acquittal. Article 29 enunciates the rule that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same criminal act or omission. The allegations of the herein complaint supports and is constitutive of a case for a quasi-delict committed by the petitioner. Thus, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for damages. WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is DENIED and the decision of the respondent CA is AFFIRMED.

CA Resolution appealed from is AFFIRMED, and the instant petition is DISMISSED. EDGAR JARANTILLA, petitioner, vs. CA and JOSE KUAN SING, respondents. DOCTRINE: The same act or omission (in this case, the negligent sideswiping of private respondent) can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused ONLY when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (People vs. Rogelio Ligon). The ruling is based on Article 29 NCC. The failure of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer enforceable. FACTS: REGALADO, J.: G.R. No. 80194 March 21, 1989

HUN HYUNG PARK, petitioner, v. EUNG WON CHOI, respondent. DOCTRINE: Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case . The first is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The parties are the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private complainant is merely a witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The second is the civil action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits. The public prosecutor has generally no interest in appealing the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused. The acquittal ends his work. The case is terminated as far as he is concerned. The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused. In case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused

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Petitioner was charged before CFI-Iloilo for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. Private respondent did not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action and he intervened in the prosecution of said criminal case through a private prosecutor. Petitioner was acquitted based "on reasonable doubt".

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Private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was side-swiped by a VW Beetle driven by petitioner Edgar Jarantilla along said street toward the direction of the provincial capitol (July 7, 1971) in lznart Street, Iloilo City. Private respondent sustained physical injuries as a consequence.

does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. FACTS: C-MORALES, J.: G.R. No. 165496 : Feb 12, 2007 Respondent Choi was charged (August 31, 2000) for violation of BP 22 for issuing a PNB check in the amount of P1.8M which was dishonored: insufficient funds. After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence, asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that he received the notice of dishonor, hence, the presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise. MeTC-Makati granted the Demurrer and dismissed the case. The prosecution's MR was denied. Petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the case to the RTC contending that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect. RTC granted the appeal and ordered respondent to pay P1.8M with legal interest. Upon respondent's MR, RTC set aside its decision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC "for further proceedings, so that the defendant [-respondent herein] may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case." Petitioner's MR was denied, case was elevated to the CA which dismissed his petition. o The verification and certification of non-forum shopping was not fully complied. The petition is not accompanied by copies of certain pleadings and other material portions of the record, (i.e., motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence, etc). The Decision of the RTC attached to the petition is uncertified and illegible mere machine copy of the original. Petitioners failed to implead the respondent in the petition. People as party

of the rule. It would play on predilection and pay no heed in providing enough assurance of the correctness of the allegations. RE COPIES OF CERTAIN PLEADINGS AND OTHER MATERIAL PORTIONS: The materiality of those documents ( i.e., Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence, Demurrer to Evidence and the Opposition thereto, and the MeTC February 27, 2003 Order dismissing the case ) is very apparent since the civil aspect of the case, from which he is appealing, was likewise dismissed by the trial court on account of the same Demurrer. The Rules require that the petition must "be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate original or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court. Petitioner fell short in his compliance with Rule 42, the mandatory tenor of which is discernible and is well settled.

RE FAILURE TO IMPLEAD THE PEOPLE: is of no moment, as petitioner is appealing only the civil aspect of the case. MeTC acquitted respondent. As a rule, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Either the offended party or the accused may appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused.

RE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE FILED WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT: The whole case is submitted for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

RE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE FILED WITH LEAVE OF COURT: The accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer. A court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence. The only recognized instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue. In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Respondent did not assail the RTC order of remand thereby recognizing that there is basis for a remand. o Respondent defense: he merely borrowed P1.5M with the remainder representing the interest, and that he already made a partial payment. Petitioner counters: the payments made by respondent pertained to other transactions. Given these conflicting claims which are factual , a remand of the case would afford the fullest opportunity for the parties to ventilate, and for the trial court to resolve the same.

ISSUE: Did CA err in dismissing the petition? NO. HELD: RE VERIFICATION: Rule 7.4: A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," OR upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.12 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) A pleading may be verified under either of the two given modes or under both. The use of the preposition "or" connotes that either source qualifies as a sufficient basis for verification and, needless to state, the concurrence of both sources is more than sufficient. The range of permutation is not left to the pleader's liking, but is dependent on the surrounding nature of the allegations which may warrant that a verification be based either purely on personal knowledge, or entirely on authentic records, or on both sources. Verification is not an empty ritualFor what is at stake is the matter of verity attested by the sanctity of an oath to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading have been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative. To sustain petitioner's explanation that the basis of verification is a matter of simple preference would trivialize the rationale and diminish the resoluteness

Petitioner's citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is incorrect. The governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure which pertains to a civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit.

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SC upholds respondent's right to present evidence as reserved by his filing of leave of court to file the demurrer. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The case is REMANDED to MeTC.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO NAVOA, et al, defendants-appellants. DOCTRINE: Only [his] criminal liability is extinguished by [his] death but the civil liability remains. FACTS: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: G.R. No. L-67966, July 31, 1984 Accused-appellants Mario Navoa, et. al were found by the CFIBataan guilty of the crime of murder penalized under Article 248, RPC. They were ordered to indemnify jointly and solidarity the heirs of the victim Tomas Izon, for P20K. The 3 accused appealed to IAC which affirmed the findings of the Trial Court but modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua. IAC certified the case and elevated the entire records to SC for review. SC affirms the judgment of conviction imposed, indemnity was raised to P30K. September 28, 1984

At around 6pm of March 21, 1981. Cresenciano Germanes was walking ahead of the sole prosecution eyewitness ( Iega Abreo). Near the house of Esperidion Badeo, 4 men attacked Cresenciano. She saw Manuel Badeo hack Cresenciano at the back with a bolo. Rogelio Badeo then hacked Cresenciano with another long bolo also at the back. Bonifacio Tangpus followed with a stab at the right portion of Cresenciano's stomach, after which Esperidion Badeo hacked Cresenciano's back. Noticing that Cresenciano was still alive, Rogelio came back and "finished him off." Manuel Badeo admitted having hacked Cresenciano but averred that he did so in self-defense. That he picked up the fallen pistol of Cresenciano and later surrendered it to the barangay captain who corroborated Manuel's claim. Esperidion Badeo had an alibi. That he was then in the mountain in Saransang making a kaingin on the land owned by Estelita Tangpus. Esperidion and Rogelio Badeo executed a joint affidavit denying participation in the killing Cresenciano. RTC-Leyte found the Manuel and Esperidion Badeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder ~ RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of Cresenciano P30K. Manuel and Esperidion appealed to SC. August 10, 1990, Esperidion died ( cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to pulmonary tuberculosis). No final judgment had as yet been rendered, in the resolution (August 21, 1991) the case against Esperidion was dismissed, entry of judgment was made on August 22, 1991. The Solicitor General filed an MR alleging that while the criminal liability of appellant Esperidion had been extinguished by his death pursuant to Article 89, RPC, his civil liability arising from the criminal offense subsisted in accordance with Articles 1231 and 1161, NCC in relation to Article 112, RPC; As provided for in Section 17, Rule 3 ROC, upon proper notice, the legal representatives of the deceased appellant should appear as substitute parties herein insofar as the deceased's civil liability for the crime is concerned .

RESOLUTION: G.R. No. L-67966

The accused filed an MR of the July 31 Decision.

ISSUE: Is the finding of the IAC supported by the evidence on record? YES. Did Navoa's death (properly manifested before the IAC ) been accorded proper legal consideration? NO.

HELD: #1: The IACs conclusion is based on a careful and judicious review of the entire record and the testimonies during the hearing. The unrebutted testimony of Saguinza is more than sufficient to sustain a conviction as it established not only conspiracy, treachery, and evident premeditation, but even the very motive of defendants-appellants in perpetrating the crime. #2: Mario Navoa, died (June 14, 1984) due to a cerebro-vascular attack. The counsel for the accused manifested the fact on June 20, 1984 unaware that IAC had already certified the case to SC, which, in turn, promulgated its Decision on July 31, 1984 unaware of Navoa's death. The judgment of conviction will thus have to be set aside as against him. However, the plea for extinguishment of the deceased's civil and criminal liability is without merit.

ISSUE: Has the civil liability of Espiridion been extinguished upon his death? YES. HELD: In People vs. Satorre, in a separate opinion in the resolution by Associate Justice Ramon C. Aquino distinguished the term "pecuniary penalties" (las pecuniarias) in Article 89 refers to fine and costs as distinguished from " pecuniary liability" (responsabilidades pecunarias) in Article 38 which include reparation and indemnity.

*** The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in favor of Manuel. Anent Esperidion Badeo's civil liability, we find that there is no basis for its imposition in view of the absence of a clear showing that he committed the crime imputed to him. Esperidion could not have been at the scene of the crime because the kaingin area where he had been staying was a good five-hour hike away through a trail . Court may believe one part of a testimony and disbelieve another part. WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is AFFIRMED insofar as appellant Manuel Badeo is concerned. The resolution is RECONSIDERED insofar as it considers as extinguished Esperidion Badeo's civil liability. However, finding that Esperidion Badeo should be acquitted as he did not commit the crime imputed to him, no civil liability is hereby imposed on him.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL BADEO, et al, defendants-appellants. DOCTRINE: As to the personal penalties: Article 89, RPC provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished ONLY when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment." Subsequent decisions of the Court held that while the criminal liability of an appellant is extinguished by his death, his civil liability subsists. In such case, the heirs of the deceased appellant are substituted as parties in the criminal case and his estate shall answer for his civil liability. FACTS: FERNAN, C.J.: G.R. No. 72990, Nov. 21, 1991

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ROLITO CALANG and PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC.,petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. DOCTRINE: Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code pertain to the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that an employee has committed. Such provision of law does not apply to civil liability arising from delict. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability Articles 102 and 103 are deemed written into the judgments in cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. Nonetheless, before the employers subsidiary liability is enforced, adequate evidence must exist establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2) they are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency. The determination of these conditions may be done in the same criminal action in which the employees liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced, in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment. FACTS: BRION, J.: G.R. No. 190696 August 3, 2010 At around 2pm, April 22, 1989, Rolito Calang was driving a Philtranco Bus along Daang Maharlika Highway Sta. Margarita, Samar when its rear left side HIT the front left portion of a Sarao jeep coming from the opposite direction. Cresencio Pinohermoso, the jeeps driver, lost control of the vehicle, and bumped and killed Jose Mabansag, a bystander. The jeep turned turtle (3) times before finally stopping at about 25 meters from the point of impact . 2 of the jeeps passengers were instantly killed, while the other passengers sustained serious physical injuries. The prosecution charged Calang with multiple homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence before the RTC-Calbayog City. The RTC found (May 21, 2001) Calang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property, and sentenced of arresto menor. The RTC ordered Calang and Philtranco , jointly and severally, to pay P50K as death indemnity to the heirs of Armando; P50K as death indemnity to the heirs of Mabansag; and P90K as actual damages to the private complainants. The petitioners appealed to CA which affirmed the RTC decision in toto. It ruled that petitioner Calang failed to exercise due care and precaution in driving the bus. Various eyewitnesses testified that the bus was traveling fast and encroached into the opposite lane when it evaded a pushcart that was on the side of the road . That he failed to slacken his speed, despite admitting that he had already seen the jeep coming from the opposite direction half a kilometer away. That Philtranco failed to prove that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent the accident. The petitioners filed with SC a petition for review on certiorari, but was denied. Hence, this MR. The petitioners also insist that the jeeps driver had the last clear chance to avoid the collision.

LIABILITY OF PHILTRANCO: The RTC and the CA both erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang. Philtranco was not a direct party in this case. Since the cause of action against Calang was based on delict, both the RTC and the CA erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang, based on quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180, NCC. If at all, Philtrancos liability may only be subsidiary. Article 102, RPC states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. The foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers according to Article 103. WHEREFORE, SC PARTLY GRANTS the present motion. The CA decision that affirmed in toto the RTC decision with the MODIFICATION that Philtrancos liability should only be subsidiary.

SPOUSES FEDERICO FRANCO and FELICISIMA R. FRANCO, petitioners, vs. IAC, ANTONIO REYES, MRS. SUSAN CHUAY and LOLITA LUGUE Respondents. DOCTRINE: Distinction should be made between the subsidiary liability of the employer under the RPC and the employer's primary liability under the NCC which is quasi-delictual or tortious in character. Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, liability originates from a delict committed by the employee who is primarily liable therefor and upon whose primary liability his employer's subsidiary liability is to be based. Before the employer's subsidiary liability may be proceeded against, it is imperative that there should be a criminal action whereby the employee's criminal negligence or delict and corresponding liability therefor are proved. If no criminal action was instituted, the employer's liability would not be predicated under Article 103. On the other hand, under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, liability is based on culpa aquiliana which holds the employer primarily liable for tortious acts of its employees subject, however, to the defense that the former exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees. The conviction of the employee primarily liable is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability. While an appellee who is not also an appellant may assign error in his brief if his purpose is to maintain the judgment on other grounds, he cannot ask for modification or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief unless he has also appealed. FACTS:FERNAN, C.J.: G.R. No. 71137 October 5, 1989

At about 7:30pm of October 18, 1974, Macario Yuro swerved the northbound Franco Bus he was driving to the left to avoid hitting a parked truck in Capas Tarlac, thereby taking the lane of an incoming Isuzu Mini Bus being driven by Magdaleno Lugue. The 2 vehicles collided. Dragged 15m from the point of impact, the mini bus landed right side down facing south in the canal of the highway, a total wreck. The collision resulted in the deaths of the (2) drivers, Yuro and Lugue, and (2) passengers of the mini bus. The registered owner of the Mini Bus, and the wives of those who died filed an action for damages through reckless imprudence before the CFI-Pampanga against Mr. & Mrs. Federico Franco , the owners and operators of the Franco Transportation Company. Defendants affirmative defense: that as owners and operators, they exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of all their employees, including the deceased Yuro.

HELD: LIABILITY OF CALANG: No reason to overturn the lower courts finding on Calangs culpability.

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ISSUE: Was there a basis to hold Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang since it was not a party in the criminal case? YES~ SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY.

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The trial court rejected that defense: the act of the Franco Bus driver was a negligent act punishable by law resulting in a civil obligation arising from Article 103, RPC and not from Article 2180. It said: " This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises, and not a case of civil negligence and the defense of having acted like a good father of a family or having trained or selected the drivers of his truck is no defense to avoid civil liability ." On appeal, IAC agreed that defendants-appellants' driver was guilty of reckless or criminal imprudence ; the civil obligation of the appellants arises from Article 103 of the RPC resulting in the subsidiary liability of the appellants. Petitioners filed an MR but the same was denied. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioners contend that the allegations in paragraph 9 of the Amended Complaint, private respondents unequivocally claim that the former as the employers of the driver of the Franco Bus are jointly and severally liable to the latter for the damages suffered by them, which makes the Civil Case an action predicated upon a quasidelict under the Civil Code subject to the defense that the employer exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.

JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant,vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee. DOCTRINE: Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual. From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. The liability created by article 1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority existing between the person called upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of it. (Manresa) Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon it members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain members of society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention, if productive of injury, give rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation . With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability with certain well-defined exceptions to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged . This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agents or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reason of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct. As a general rule it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor should assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based; while on the contrary, in a case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to prove negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p. 76]). The field of non- contractual obligation is much more broader than that of contractual obligations, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an extracontractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties. FACTS: FISHER, J.: G.R. No. L-12191;October 14, 1918

ISSUES: Was the action for recovery of damages instituted by private respondents predicated upon crime or quasi-delict? Q.DELICT May IAC properly increase the award of damages in favor of the private respondents (Chuay and Lugue) who did not appeal said court's decision? NO.

HELD: Subsidiary liability is governed by Articles 102 and 103 of the RPC while primary liability is governed by Articles 2176-77, 2180. Here, no criminal action was instituted because the party supposed to be primarily liable for the damages suffered by private respondents died. Thus, petitioners' subsidiary liability has no leg to stand on considering that their liability is merely secondary to their employee's primary liability. Logically, this remedy is not possible.

RE DEFENSE : due diligence of a good father of a family . The appellants were not able to establish the defense of a good father of a family in the supervision of their bus driver. The evidence presented is purely self-serving. No independent evidence was presented as to the alleged supervision of appellants' bus drivers , especially with regard to driving habits and reaction to actual traffic conditions. The only kind of supervision given the drivers referred to the running time between the terminal points of the line. The appellants who ran a fleet of 12 buses plying the Manila-Laoag line, have only 2 inspectors whose duties were only ticket inspection. There is no evidence that they are really safety inspectors. Therefore, SC finds petitioners liable for the damages claimed pursuant to their primary liability under the NCC.

RE IAC INCREASING THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED: IAC is without jurisdiction to increase the amount of damages awarded to private respondents who did not appeal the decision of the lower court. For failure of herein private respondents to appeal the lower court's judgment, the amount of actual damages cannot exceed that awarded by it. They limited their claim for actual and compensatory damages. WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA is modified decreasing the award to private respondents of actual and compensatory damages.

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Jose Cangco was an employee of Manila Railroad Company as a clerk earning P25 monthly. He lived in San Mateo, Rizal; and in coming daily by train to the company's office in Manila, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. There is a cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As the train slowed down another employee-passenger got off the same car alighting safely. When Jose Cangco stepped off, one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons; his feet slipped and he fell violently on the platform. His body rolled and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated (amputated ~ The plaintiff spend P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of his curation. ). After the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop. The accident occurred between 7 and 8 pm on a dark night, and as the railroad station was lighted dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car. He instituted this proceeding in the CFI-Manila to recover damages upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform. The trial judge found that although negligence was attributable to the defendant, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering. Hence the plaintiff appealed.

the Civil Code the law creates a presumption that he has been negligent in the selection or direction of his servant, but the presumption is rebuttable and yield to proof of due care and diligence in this respect. When the sources of the obligation upon which plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence if he does not his action fails. But when the facts averred show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery . If the negligence of servants or agents could be invoked as a means of discharging the liability arising from contract, the anomalous result would be that person acting through the medium of agents or servants in the performance of their contracts, would be in a better position than those acting in person. If such a theory could be accepted, juridical persons would enjoy practically complete immunity from damages arising from the breach of their contracts if caused by negligent acts as such juridical persons can of necessity only act through agents or servants, and it would no doubt be true in most instances that reasonable care had been taken in selection and direction of such servants. In no case has the court ever decided that the negligence of the defendant's servants has been held to constitute a defense to an action for damages for breach of contract.

ISSUE: May Cangco recover damages? YES. HELD: It cannot be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. Thus, its liability is direct and immediate , differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. In the Rakes case, Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a contract. o These articles [1902 and 1903] are applicable to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi-contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to article 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code.

RE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE: The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its servants was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting . Under the DOCTRINE OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (Rakes case), if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence. That it is negligence per se for a passenger to alight from a moving train... that this proposition is too badly stated and is at variance with the experience of every-day life. The TEST by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ORDINARY OR REASONABLE CARE. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury ." (Thompson) In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. CONCLUSION is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.

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As Manresa says the liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. A master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into consideration the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his servants, even within the scope of their employment, such third person suffer damage. True it is that under article 1903 of

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The decision of lower court is REVERSED.

***MALCOLM, J., dissenting: With the general rule relative to a passenger's contributory negligence, and, "An attempt to alight from a moving train is negligence per se." Adding these two points together, should be absolved from the complaint, and judgment affirmed. AIR FRANCE, Petitioner, vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the CA, Respondents. DOCTRINE: It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. FACTS: SANCHEZ, J.: G.R. No. L-21438; 9.28,1966 Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims to Lourdes (March 30, 1958). Defendant Air France, through its authorized agent PAL , issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. At Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat because there was a white man who had a better right to the seat . Plaintiff refused, and a commotion ensued. CFI-Manila sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Carrascoso P25K by way of moral damages; P10K as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome; plus P3K attorneys' fees. CA slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket to P383, and affirmed the appealed decision. Petitioner also assails respondent court's award of moral damages; that Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith ; and that the decision of the CA fails to make a finding of bad faith.

class not only without his consent but against his will. This has been sufficiently established by plaintiff in his testimony corroborated by the corresponding entry made by the purser of the plane in his notebook. The defendant could have easily proven it by having taken the testimony of the said Manager by deposition, but defendant did not do so; the presumption is that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced ; the Court is constrained to find that the Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok not merely asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane. The manager imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, THIS IS BAD FAITH. For, "bad faith" contemplates a " state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose ."

RE RESPONSIBILITY OF AN EMPLOYER FOR THE TORTIOUS ACT OF ITS EMPLOYEES: For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code: ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage . That upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty . The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier - A CASE OF QUASI-DELICT. DAMAGES ARE PROPER. The judgment of the CA does not suffer from reversible error. SC accordingly vote to AFFIRM the same.

JULIAN C. SINGSON and RAMONA DEL CASTILLO, plaintiffs, vs. BPI and SANTIAGO FREIXAS, in his capacity as President of the said Bank, defendants. DOCTRINE: The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. FACTS: CONCEPCION, C.J.: G.R. No. L-24837; 6.27.68 Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case in the CFI-Manila was sentenced with hi co-defendants to pay P105.5K to the plaintiff therein, Philippine Milling Co . Singson and Lobregat had seasonably appealed, but not Villa-Abrille & Co. Judgment became final and executory. A writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon BPI in which the Singsons had a current account - insofar as Villa-Abrille's credits against the Bank were concerned. There was no information that the garnishment was merely intended for the deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille & Co., Valentin Teus, Fernando F. de Villa-Abrille and Joaquin Bona,. Subsequently, 2 checks issued by Singson (P383 in favor of B. M. Glass Service ; and P100 in favor of the Lega Corporation) and drawn against BPI. Believing that the Singson had no more control over the balance of his deposits in the said bank, the checks were dishonored and were refused payment by the said bank . Singson wrote BPI claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of Execution and Notice of Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. The President of the said bank verified and confirmed the same, and apologized to Singson. Also, the action of garnishment from his account had already been

ISSUE: Was CA correct to award moral damages? YES. HELD: Petitioner received the corresponding amount in payment of firstclass tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. RE MORAL DAMAGE: As a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations, plaintiff suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, causing plaintiff mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in moral damages in the amount of P30K. The foregoing substantially aver: First, there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage; Second, That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already, seated." and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages .

RE QUESTION OF BAD FAITH: The plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist

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removed. BPI rectified the mistake, resulting in the temporary freezing of the account of the plaintiff with the said bank for a short time. Subsequently, Singson commenced the action against the Bank and its president for damages in consequence of said illegal freezing of plaintiffs' account. CFI-Manila dismissed the complaint upon the ground that plaintiffs cannot recover from the defendants on the basis of a quasi-delict, because the relation between the parties is contractual in nature; and because plaintiffs have not established the amount of damages allegedly sustained by them. It held that plaintiffs' claim for damages cannot be based upon a tort or quasi-delict, their relation with the defendants being contractual in nature.

Tek Hua Trading Co. was dissolved (1976). The original members of Tek Hua including Manuel C. Tiong, formed Tek Hua Enterprising Corp., herein respondent corporation. So Pek Giok, a managing partner of Tek Hua Trading, died (1986). His grandson, So Ping Bun, occupied the warehouse for his own textile business (Trendsetter Marketing). DCCSI sent (1989) letters addressed to Tek Hua Enterprises, informing of the 25% increase in rent, but was later reduced to 20% effective January 1, 1990. Lessor implemented another 30% rent increase. That failure of the lessee to accomplish the contracts shall be deemed agreement to the termination of the lease. Private respondents did not answer any of these letters. Still, the lease contracts were not rescinded. Private respondent Tiong sent a letter (1991) to petitioner informing the latter of his need of the subject warehouse. Petitioner refused to vacate. He requested formal contracts of lease with DCCSI in favor Trendsetter Marketing. The lease contracts in favor of Trendsetter were executed. In the suit for injunction, private respondents pressed for the nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and petitioner. They also claimed damages. RTC annulled the 4 Contracts of Lease, and made permanent the writ of preliminary injunction. It also ordered the defendant to pay the aggrieved party, Tek Hua Enterprising Corporation, the sum of P500K for attorneys fees. Petitioners MR was denied. CA upheld the trial court. On MR, CA reduced the award of attorneys fees to P200K.

ISSUE: Are the plaintiffs entitled to recover damages? HELD:. In Air France vs. Carrascoso, the passenger who, despite his firstclass ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the aircarrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although the relation between a passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature ... the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort". In view of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake he and his subordinate employee had committed. An award of nominal damages - the amount of which need not be proven would suffice to vindicate plaintiff's rights. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED.

ISSUE: Did CA err in affirming the trial courts decision finding So Ping Bun guilty of tortuous interference of contract? NO. HELD: Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of anothers interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if (a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with, (b) the invasion is substantial, (c) the defendants conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and (d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general negligence rules. Here, petitioners Trendsetter asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent corporation of the latters property right. Clearly the three elements of tort interference above-mentioned are present in the instant case. It is clear that petitioner prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation . Though petitioner took interest in the property of respondent corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him. The lower courts did not award damages because the extent of damages was not quantifiable. The permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts is also correct. The injunction saved the respondents from further damage or injury caused by petitioners interference. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA are hereby AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION that the award of attorneys fees is reduced to P100K.

SO PING BUN, petitioner, vs. CA, TEK HUA ENTERPRISING CORP. and MANUEL C. TIONG, respondents. DOCTRINE: The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse. A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one person of the enjoyment by the other of his private property. This may pertain to a situation where a third person induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract. Justification for protecting ones financial position should not be made to depend on a comparison of his economic interest in the subject matter with that of others. It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives. Lack of malice precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones. FACTS: QUISUMBING, J.: G.R. No. 120554; 9.21.99 Tek Hua Trading Co entered (1963) into lease agreements with Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. (DCCSI). Subjects of (4) lease contracts were premises located at Binondo used to store its textiles. The contracts each had a one-year term; that should the lessee continue to occupy the premises after the term, the lease shall be on a month-to-month basis. The contracts expired, the parties did not renew the contracts, but Tek Hua continued to occupy the premises .

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G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003 o LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners, vs. MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY, respondents. DOCTRINE: The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage. The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or (b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission . In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault, an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved. A liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasidelictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply. FACTS: VITUG, J.: About 7:30pm, a drunk Nicanor Navidad entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token. While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard, approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman , was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously. The widow of Nicanor along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a crossclaim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards. RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally. The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack of merit. The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed. Prudent appealed to the CA and was exonerated from any liability. It held LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable. MR was denied. o That a contract of carriage had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token. There was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad. Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman.

ISSUE: Who should be made liable for the death of Navidad? HELD: Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers (see 1755-56, 1759, 1763). The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier . In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.

SHOULD PRUDENT BE MADE LIABLE? NO. If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, NCC. The premise for the employers liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. How must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. Regrettably that there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven. WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability.

THE CONSOLIDATED BANK and TRUST CORPORATION (SOLIDBANK), petitioner, v. CA and L.C. DIAZ and COMPANY, CPAs, respondents. DOCTRINE: The law on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is generally applicable when there is no pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties. For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence, or culpa contractual, the bank is liable to its depositor In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent. In contrast, in

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culpa aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent. The defense of exercising the required diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a complete defense in culpa contractual, unlike in culpa aquiliana. FACTS:CARPIO, J.: G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003 Private respondent L.C. Diaz and Company, CPAs (L.C. Diaz) is engaged in the practice of accounting. L.C. Diaz opened (March 1976) a savings account with Solidbank. 14 August 1991: L.C. Diazs cashier (Macaraya) filled up a 2 savings slip (1. cash deposit slip : P990 ; 2. checks deposit slip : P50). Macaraya gave their messenger (Calapre) the Solidbank passbook, and instructed him to deposit the money with Solidbank. Calapre went to Solidbank as instructed. The teller acknowledged receipt of the deposit and stamped them accordingly with DUPLICATE and SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE. While processing, Calapre went to Allied Bank leaving the passbook with Solidbank. When he returned to retrieve the passbook, the Teller informed him that somebody got the passbook. Calapre reported the incident to Macaraya. Macaraya immediately went to Solidbank with Calapre and tried to deposit a 200K check. She asked for the passbook but the Teller told her that someone got their passbook. The following day, L.C. Diazs CEO arranged for Solidbank to stop any transaction using the same passbook. However, on the same day, they learned of the unauthorized withdrawal of P300K bearing 2 authorized signatories who denied signing the withdrawal slip. A certain Noel Tamayo received the P300K. September 1991: L.C. Diaz charged its messenger, Ilagan, and Verdazola with Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document. RTC-Manila dismissed (1992) the criminal case after the Prosecutor filed an MTD. August 1992, L.C. Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of its money, which the latter refused. L.C. Diaz then filed a Complaint for Recovery of a Sum of Money against Solidbank with the RTC-Manila. The trial court absolved Solidbank and dismissed the complaint. L.C. Diaz appealed to the CA which reversed (1998) the decision of the trial court. Solidbanks MR was denied (1999), but deleted the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

bank and the depositor is the contract that determines the rights and obligations of the parties. The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of banking, RA 8791.This fiduciary relationship means that the banks obligation to observe high standards of integrity and performance is deemed written into every deposit agreement between a bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family. However, the fiduciary nature does not convert the contract between the bank and its depositors from a simple loan to a trust agreement. Failure by the bank to pay the depositor is failure to pay a simple loan, and not a breach of trust.

Solidbanks Breach of its Contractual Obligation Article 1172 of the Civil Code provides that responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is demandable. For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence, or culpa contractual, the bank is liable to its depositor. When the passbook is in the possession of Solidbanks tellers during withdrawals, the law imposes on Solidbank and its tellers an even higher degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook. The tellers know, or should know, that the rules on savings account provide that any person in possession of the passbook is presumptively its owner. If the tellers give the passbook to the wrong person, they would be clothing that person presumptive ownership of the passbook, facilitating unauthorized withdrawals by that person. For failing to return the passbook to Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz, Solidbank and Teller No. 6 presumptively failed to observe such high degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook, and in insuring its return to the party authorized to receive the same. Here, L.C. Diaz has established that Solidbank breached its contractual obligation to return the passbook only to the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. Thus a presumption that Solidbank was at fault and its teller was negligent in not returning the passbook to Calapre. The burden was on Solidbank to prove that there was no negligence on its part or its employees. o Solidbank failed to discharge its burden. Solidbank did not present to the trial court Teller No. 6 who was supposed to return the passbook to him. The record does not indicate that Teller No. 6 verified the identity of the person who retrieved the passbook. Solidbank also failed to adduce in evidence its standard procedure in verifying the identity of the person retrieving the passbook, if there is such a procedure, and that Teller No. 6 implemented this procedure in the present case.

The trial court pinned the liability on L.C. Diaz based on the provisions of the rules on savings account, a recognition of the contractual relationship between Solidbank and L.C. Diaz, the latter being a depositor of the former. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals applied the law on quasi-delict to determine who between the two parties was ultimately negligent.

Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its employees under the principle of respondeat superior or command responsibility.

ISSUES: Is Solidbank liable for breach of contract due to negligence in the performance of its contractual obligation to L.C. Diaz.? YES. HELD: Solidbanks Fiduciary Duty under the Law Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence, or culpa contractual.

Proximate Cause of the Unauthorized Withdrawal PROXIMATE CAUSE is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. The proximate cause of the unauthorized withdrawal was Solidbanks negligence in not returning the passbook to Calapre.

The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by Article 1980 NCC. There is a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor. The savings deposit agreement between the

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

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The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case. This is a case of culpa contractual , where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant from liability. Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract.

reimburse contending that the same was non-refundable. Petitioner filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage and damages in RTC-Makati City. Petitioner alleged that her failure to join Jewels of Europe was due to respondents fault since it did not clearly indicate the departure date on the plane ticket. Respondent was also negligent in informing her of the wrong flight schedule through its employee Menor . She insisted that the British Pageant was a substitute such that the cost should be properly set-off. Respondent company denied responsibility and insisted that the correct departure date was clearly and legibly printed on the plane ticket. The travel documents were given to petitioner two days ahead of the scheduled trip. Respondent can no longer reimburse the amount paid since the same had already been remitted to its principal in Singapore, Lotus Travel Ltd., which had already billed the same even if petitioner did not join the tour. That it is accepted industry practice to disallow refund for individuals who failed to take a booked tour. Respondent also maintained that the British Pageant was not a substitute package tour. RTC ordered the defendant to return and/or refund to the plaintiff P54K with legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date when the complaint was filed. The trial court held that respondent was negligent in erroneously advising petitioner of her departure date. The trial court declared that petitioner was guilty of contributory negligence and accordingly, deducted 10% from the amount being claimed as refund. Respondent appealed to the CA which also found both parties to be at fault. However, the appellate court held that petitioner is more negligent than respondent because as a lawyer and well-traveled person, she should have known better than to simply rely on what was told to her. Thus, she is not entitled to any form of damages. MR was denied. Hence this petition under Rule 45.

Mitigated Damages Under Article 1172, liability (for culpa contractual) may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. The liability of Solidbank should be reduced. Pursuant to PBCom vs CA, L.C. Diaz must shoulder 40% of the actual damages awarded by the appellate court. Solidbank must pay the other 60% of the actual damages. WHEREFORE, the MODIFICATION. decision of the CA is AFFIRMED with

ESTELA L. CRISOSTOMO , petitioner, vs. CA and CARAVAN TRAVEL & TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC., respondents. DOCTRINE: The test to determine whether negligence attended the performance of an obligation is: did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. There is no fixed standard of diligence applicable to each and every contractual obligation and each case must be determined upon its particular facts. The degree of diligence required depends on the circumstances of the specific obligation and whether one has been negligent is a question of fact that is to be determined after taking into account the particulars of each case. FACTS: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: G.R. No. 138334; 8.25.03 Petitioner Estela L. Crisostomo contracted the services of respondent Caravan Travel to arrange and facilitate her booking, ticketing and accommodation for a tour dubbed Jewels of Europe for P74K. She was given a 5% discount. The booking fee was also waived because her niece (Menor) was respondents ticketing manager. Menor delivered to respondents residence (Wed, June 12, 1991) travel documents and plane tickets. Petitioner then gave Menor the full payment for the package tour. Menor told her to be at NAIA on Saturday, 2 hours before her flight on board British Airways. She did not check her travel documents; to her dismay, she discovered that the her plane ticket was for June 14, 1991. She called up Menor to complain. Menor prevailed upon petitioner to take British Pageant which costs US$785 or P21K; She gave respondent US$300 as partial payment and commenced the trip. Upon petitioners return, she demanded from respondent the reimbursement of P61K, representing the difference between the sum she paid for Jewels of Europe and the amount she owed respondent for the British Pageant tour. Respondent company refused to

ISSUE: Was there a contract of carriage? NONE. Is petitioner entitled recover damages? NO.

HELD: RE CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE: Article 1732: A common carrier is defined as persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public. Clearly, respondent is not a common carrier. It simply makes travel arrangements in their behalf (procuring tickets, facilitating travel permits or visas, booking customers for tours). At most, respondent acted merely as an agent of the airline, with whom petitioner ultimately contracted for her carriage to Europe. The object of a contract of carriage is the transportation of passengers or goods. It is in this sense that the contract between the parties in this case was an ordinary one for services and not one of carriage. The standard of care required of respondent is that of a good father of a family under Article 1173 of the Civil Code. This connotes reasonable care consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person would have observed when confronted with a similar situation . Respondent performed its prestation under the contract as well as everything else that was essential to book petitioner for the tour. Had petitioner exercised due diligence in the conduct of her affairs, there would have been no reason for her to miss the flight . Needless to say, after the travel papers were delivered to petitioner, it became

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incumbent upon her to take ordinary care of her concerns . This undoubtedly would require that she at least read the documents in order to assure herself of the important details regarding the trip. The negligence of the obligor in the performance of the obligation renders him liable for damages for the resulting loss suffered by the obligee. Fault or negligence of the obligor consists in his failure to exercise due care and prudence in the performance of the obligation as the nature of the obligation so demands. The evidence on record shows that respondent company performed its duty diligently and did not commit any contractual breach. Hence, petitioner cannot recover and must bear her own damage.

injuries and the interests of air carriers seeking to limit potential liability. It employs a scheme of strict liability favoring passengers and imposing damage caps to benefit air carriers. It precludes a passenger from maintaining an action for personal injury damages under local law when his or her claim does not satisfy the conditions of liability under the Convention. A claim covered by the Warsaw Convention can no longer be recovered under local law, if the statute of limitations of two years has already lapsed. o However, Philippine and American jurisprudence recognizes that the Warsaw Convention does not "exclusively regulate" the relationship between passenger and carrier on an international flight. The present case is similar to cases in which the damages sought were considered to be outside the coverage of the Warsaw Convention.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED. PAL, petitioner, v. HON. ADRIANO SAVILLO, Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 30 , Iloilo City, and SIMPLICIO GRIO, respondents. DOCTRINE: The emotional harm suffered by the private respondent as a result of having been unreasonably and unjustly prevented from boarding the plane should be distinguished from the actual damages which resulted from the same incident. Under the Civil Code provisions on tort, such emotional harm gives rise to compensation where gross negligence or malice is proven. FACTS: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: G.R. No. 149547; 7.4.08 Private respondent Grio was invited in the 1993 ASEAN Seniors Annual Golf Tournament in Jakarta. He and several companions purchased tickets from PAL (MNL-SG-JKT-SG-MNL); that PAL would take them from Manila to Singapore, while Singapore Airlines would take them from Singapore to Jakarta. But upon their arrival, Singapore Airlines rejected the tickets because they were not endorsed by PAL. (if Singapore Airlines honored the tickets without PAL's endorsement, PAL would not pay Singapore Airlines for their passage). Private respondent tried to contact PAL's office but it was closed. Stranded with no recourse, private respondent was subjected to humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, serious anxiety, fear and distress. Eventually they purchase tickets from Garuda Airlines. They arrived in Jakarta at about 12:00 mn. After the series of nervewracking experiences, private respondent became ill and was unable to participate in the tournament. Upon his return, private respondent brought the matter to the attention of PAL and SA, both disowned liability and blamed each other for the fiasco. Private respondent filed (August 1997) a Complaint for Damages before the RTC seeking compensation for moral damages in the amount of P1M and attorney's fees. PAL filed an MTD, ground: prescription. That under Warsaw Convention any claim for damages in connection with the international transportation of persons is subject to the prescription period of two years. RTC denied the MTD (Warsaw is inapplicable). CA likewise dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by PAL and affirmed the Order of the RTC. That Warsaw Convention must not be construed to preclude the application of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. Applying Article 1144 which allowed for a ten-year prescription period, the appellate court declared that the Complaint filed by private respondent should not be dismissed.

Here, Singapore Airlines barred private respondent from boarding the Singapore Airlines flight because PAL allegedly failed to endorse the tickets of private respondent and his companions, despite PAL's assurances to respondent that Singapore Airlines had already confirmed their passage . While this fact still needs to be heard and established by adequate proof before the RTC, an action based on these allegations will not fall under the Warsaw Convention, since the purported negligence on the part of PAL did not occur during the performance of the contract of carriage but days before the scheduled flight. Thus, the present action cannot be dismissed based on the statute of limitations provided under Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention. The present case involves a special species of injury. The applicable prescription period is provided under Article 1146 of the Civil Code:..instituted within four years: (2) Upon a quasidelict. Complaint was filed : on 15 August 1997, which was less than four years since PAL received his extrajudicial demand on 25 January 1994. Thus, private respondent's claims have not yet prescribed. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED.

HELD: The Warsaw Convention applies to "all international transportation of persons, baggage or goods performed by any aircraft for hire." It balances the interests of passengers seeking recovery for personal

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ISSUES: Should the petition prosper? YES.

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