Abduction? Deduction? Induction? IsthereaLogicofExploratoryDataAnalysis?

http://www.creativewisdom.com/pub/Peirce/Logic_of_EDA.html Yu,ChongHo PaperpresentedattheAnnualMeetingofAmericanEducationalResearch Association,NewOrleans,Louisiana,April,1994 ThispaperwaswrittenwiththevaluableinputfromDr.JohnT.Behrens

Abstract
ThephilosophicalnotionsintroducedbyCharlesSandersPeirce(1839 1914)arehelpfulforresearchersinunderstandingthenatureof knowledgeandreality.InPeirceanlogicalsystem,thelogicof abductionanddeductioncontributetoourconceptualunderstandingofa phenomenon,whilethelogicofinductionaddsquantitativedetailsto ourconceptualknowledge.AlthoughPeircejustifiedthevalidityof inductionasaselfcorrectiveprocess,heassertedthatneither inductionnordeductioncanhelpustounveiltheinternalstructureof meaning.Asexploratorydataanalysisperformsthefunctionasamodel builderforconfirmatorydataanalysis,abductionplaysaroleof explorerofviablepathstofurtherinquiry.Thus,thelogicof abductionfitswellintoexploratorydataanalysis.Atthestageof abduction,thegoalistoexplorethedata,findapattern,andsuggest aplausiblehypothesisdeductionistorefinethehypothesisbased uponotherplausiblepremisesandinductionistheempirical substantiation.

Contents

PremisesofPeirceanPhilosophyofScience AntiCartesian Antiskepticism AntifoundationalismandAntireductionism TruthandReality KnowledgeisCumulativeandSelfcorrective ImplicationsofPremisestoQualitativeandQuantitativeResearch PragmaticandClearCutAnswers? Quantitativeapproachisnotaquickfix Balancingmodelanderrorisstrugglebetweenbeliefanddoubt RealistandTruthSeeking? Multipleapproachesarenotontologicalbutepistemological Thenatureofknowledgeisnotsocialbuttranscendental Realityisintersubjectivity LogicalpositivismandReductionism? Conceptualworkscanleadtoontologicalreductionism Quantitativeresearchisnotaonewayreduction Fallibilism PeirceanLogicalSystem Abduction... isnotsymboliclogicbutcriticalthinking isnotPopperianfalsificationbuthypothesisgeneration isnothastyjudgmentbutpropercategorization Deduction... cannotleadtonewknowledge doesnotspecifynecessaryorsufficientcondition reliesontruepremises Induction... isinconclusiveininfinitetime isundefinableinasinglecase generatesempiricallawsbutnottheoreticallaws isbasedongeneralityandlawoflargenumbers Conclusion References

Peirceanphilosophyofscienceisanabundantintellectualtreasure.CharlesSanders Peircewascompetentinlogic,mathematicsanddifferentbranchesofscience,including astronomy,chemistry,physics,geology,andmeteorology.Hewasversedinmostofthe ancientandcontemporaryschoolsofthoughtinlogic(Brent,1993).Peirces'swritings providemanyinsightfulapplicationstopsychologistsandeducationalresearchers.The thesisofthispaperisthatbyapplyingPeirceannotionoftruthandreality,qualitativeand quantitativemethodsarecooperativeratherthancompetitive.IntheviewofPeircean logicalsystemwemaysaythelogicofabduction(firstness)anddeduction(secondness) contributetoourqualitativeorconceptualunderstanding ofphenomena(Hausman, 1993),whilethelogicofinduction(thirdness)addsquantitativedetailstothequalitative orconceptualknowledge. QualitativeandQuantitativedisparitiesarecenteredaroundtheissuesofprescriptiveand clearcutanswersversesdescriptivelanguagesandsingleandobjectiverealityverses multipleandsubjectiverealities(Langenbach,M.Vaughn,C.&Aagaard,L.,1994 Erlandson,Harris,Skipper&Allen,1993).Thegapbetweenqualitativeandquantitative researchmightbefilledbymultipleapproacheswhichemployabduction,deductionand inductionaltogether.Thefirstsectionofthispaperwilldiscussseveralassumptionsof thePeirceanphilosophicalsysteminanattempttoreconcilethedifferencesinqualitative andquantitativeresearch.Thesecondpartofthispaperwillevaluatethestrengthsand weaknessesofthesethreelogicalprocessesunderPeirceandirection.]

PremisesofPeirceanPhilosophyofScienceofPeircean PhilosophyofScience
AntiCartesianCartesian
Antiskepticism. OneoftheassumptionofPeirceanphilosophicalsystemisantiCartesianskepticism. DesCartes(1641/1964)doubtedeverything,evenhisownexistence.Inhisview, knowledgeoriginatesfromdoubtsandquestioning.Peirce(1868)rejectedtheCartesian traditionbyarguing,"Wecannotbeginwithcompletedoubt."(p.140)Ratherheensured whatHegeliansdenywedon'thavetobecertainofeverythinginordertoknow something.In"TheFixationofBelief,"(1877)Peircesaidthatwearesatisfiedwith beliefsratherthandoubts.Althoughknowledgeisfallibleinnature,andinourlimited lifetimewecannotdiscovertheultimatetruth,wewillstillfixourbeliefsatcertain points.ThisiswhyPeirce'sepistemologyisconsideredthepercussor topragmatism.At thesametime,Peircedidnotencourageustorelaxourmindandnotpursuefurther inquiry.Instead,hesawseekingknowledgeasaninterplaybetweendoubtsandbeliefs, thoughhedidnotexplicitlyusetheHegelianterm"dialectic." Unfortunately,WilliamJamestookPeirce'snotionofsatisfactionofbeliefsbut overlookedthestrugglebetweendoubtsandbeliefs.Jamesargued,"Thetrueisthename ofwhateverprovesitselftobegoodinthewayofbelief...isonlytheexpedientintheway

ofourthinking."(1898/1975,p.421909/1927,vii)Inotherwords,forJamestheissueis notwhatistruth,butwhatwebelieveistruth.GullvaagsaidthatAmericanpragmatism is,toagreatextent,aresultofJames'misunderstandingsofPeirce(citedinCoppock, 1994).Also,JohnDeweytookPeirce'snotionof"fixingbeliefs"anddevelop instrumentalpragmatismfor"fixingsituations."Inotherwords,forDeweytheissueis notwhatistruthmetaphysically,butwhatwouldworkunderaspecificcircumstance. PeircestronglyresentedbothJames'psychologicalpragmatismandDewey'soutcome basedinstrumentalism,andthusPeircerenamedhispragmatismas"pragmaticism"in ordertodistinguishhimselffromJamesandDewey(Smith,1978). AntifoundationalismandAntireductionism .Besidesskepticism,Peirce(1868)alsodisagreedwithDesCartesonfoundationalism. PeirceshowedafirmrejectionagainsttheCartesianpostureoflayingthefoundationof epistemologyontheunchangedselfconsciousness(I thinkthereforeIam)andinnate ideas.DesCartes'discoveryofanalyticalgeometryandCartesiancoordinatesledtothe notionthatknowledgecanbereducedtologicomathematicalmethods,whichisbasedon humaninnateoperationalstructure(Piaget,1971).ForPeirce,reducingourperceptionof thiscomplexworldtocertainelementsorfoundationssuchasselfconsciousnessand purelogic,willdenythecontinuityanduniversalityofevents.

TruthandReality
Theseissuesregardingfoundationsareessentiallyontological:Whatisthenatureof reality?Onwhatultimategroundscanknowledgebebuilt?SometimesPeirce'sposition seemstobeinconsistentinthisregard.Peircestatedthathardnessisnotanattributeofan objectuntilwemeasureit(1878a).However,thisstatementshouldnotbeinterpretedasa positionthatthereisnoobjectivereality.WhatPeirceimpliedwasthatknowledgeisa socialconstruct.Theconceptofhardnessisaresultofourtestandmeasurement, however,truthisnotjustasocialconstruct(Parker,1994). Peircemadeadistinctionbetweentruthandreality.Truthistheunderstandingofreality throughaselfcorrectiveinquiryprocessbythewholeintellectualcommunityacross time.Ontheotherhand,realityistheexistenceindependentofhumaninquiry(Wiener, 1969).Intermsofontology,thereisonereality.Inregardtomethodologyand epistemology,thereismorethanoneapproachandonesourceofknowledge.Realityis "whatis"whiletruthis"whatwouldbe."Oneofthedifferencesbetweenpragmatismand pragmaticismcanbeviewedasorientationtotruthandreality.DeweyandJamesadopted asubjectiveandhumanisticviewtotruthi.e.knowledgeisahumanandsocialconstruct anditcanbeknownwithoutatranscendentalstandard.ForDewey"theproblemof philosophyisnothowwecancometoknowanexternalworld,buthowwecanlearnto controlitandremakeit,andforwhatgoals"(Durant,1926/1961,p.523).Incontrast, Peirceintroducedametaphysicaldimensionintopragmaticismandimpliedauniversal andtranscendentalstandard(Apel,1981).ForPeircetheinquiryofknowledgeisaform offreeassociationorcreativethinkingthatresembletheDivinemind(Oakes,1993),or theHegelian"AbsoluteSpirit"(Margolis,1993).

KnowledgeisCumulativeandSelfcorrective
UnlikeThomasKuhn's(1962)emphasisonparadigmshift,Peircestressedthecontinuity ofknowledge.First,knowledgedoesnotemergeoutofpurelogic.Instead,itisa historicalandsocialproduct.Asmentionedbefore,PeircedisregardedtheCartesian attitudeofdoubtingeverything.Tosomeextentwehavetofixourbeliefsonthose positionsthatarewidelyacceptedbytheintellectualcommunity(1877). Kuhnproposedthatthepatternofinquiryisaprocessofnewframeworksoverthrow outdatedframeworks.Peirce,incontrast,consideredknowledgetobecontinuousand cumulative.Rescher(1978)usedthegeographicalexplorationmodelasametaphorto illustratePeirce'sidea:Thereplacementofaflatworldviewwithaglobeworldviewisa changeinqualitativeunderstanding,oraparadigmshift.Afterwehavediscoveredallthe continentsandoceans,measuringtheheightofMountEverestandthedepthoftheNile riverisaddingquantitativedetailstothequalitativeunderstanding.AlthoughKuhn's theorylooksglamorous,asamatteroffact,paradigmshiftsmightoccuronlyonceina centuryorafewcenturies.Themajorityofscholarsarejustaddingdetailstoexisting frameworks.Knowledgeisselfcorrectiveinsofarasweinheritthefindingsfrom previousscholarsandrefinethem.

ImplicationstoQualitativeandQuantitativeResearch
Inthispapertheintentisnottosettlealldebatesbetweenqualitativeandquantitative research.Nevertheless,theprecedingpremisesofPeirceanphilosophyshedssomelight onthedispute.

PragmaticandClearCutAnswers?
Quantitativeapproachisnotaquickfix First,quantitativeresearchmethodsareapttoPeirce'spragmaticismratherthanJamesor Dewey'spragmatism.Forpragmaticreasonsstatisticsdoesproduceclearcutanswers. However,inacaseofhypothesistesting,fixinganalphacutoffdoesnotimplythatthe caseisclosedandnofurtherinquiryisneeded.Onmorethanoneoccasion,Ihaveheard peoplesaythatqualitativeresearchismoredifficultthanquantitativebecauseinthe formerthedataismessyandtheanswerisnotclearcut.Unfortunately,adecisionbased uponrejectingthenullornotgivesapicturethatstatisticiansarefindinganeasyoutor seekingforasimpleanswer. Balancingmodelanderrorisstrugglebetweenbeliefanddoubt QuantitativeresearchisneitherJames'psychologismnorDewey'sinstrumentalism.First, thegoalofstatisticsisnottoproduceaquickfixtomakeusfeelgood.Second,statistics willnotjuststopatwhatworksandwhatcannotwork.Rather,itwillgofurthertofind outwhysomethingworksandwhysomethingdoesn't.Inaddition,statisticianswho provideaquickfixmaynotdoexploratory dataanalysisatall.Exploratorydataanalysis,

likequalitativestudy,handlesmessydata.Theprocessofbalancingsmoothandrough,fit andresidual,ormodelanderrorcanbeviewedasPeircean'sinteractionbetweendoubt andbelief.Thecommonalitybetweenqualitativestudyandexploratorydataanalysiswill bediscussedlater.

RealistandTruthSeeking?
Somewriterscreatedtheunnecessarypolarityofperspectiveseeking(qualitative research)versestruthseeking(quantitativeresearch)(Langenbachetal.,1994Erlandson etal.,1993).Langenbachetal.evensaidthatquantitativeresearcherswhoaccept"truth seekingontology"contendthatultimatelythereexistsonebestanswer. Multipleapproachesarenotontologicalbutepistemological First, itisdoubtfulwhetherstatisticiansacceptthatthereexistsonly"onebestanswer." Second,"onebestanswer"isnotanontologicalconcern.Askingwhetherthemansionof awealthymanhasonemilliondollarsisonequestionaskingwhichisthebestway to breakintothehouseandstealthemoneyisanotherquestion.Whenqualitative researcherslookformultipleandsubjectiverealities,thisisanepistemologicalissue. Whenquantitativeresearchersacceptanobjectivereality,thisisinregardtothe ontologicaldimension.Inpractice,mostquantitativeresearchersstillusemultiple approachestoaddressmultiplerealities.Inotherwords,quantitativeresearchersdolook forperspectives.Asmentionedbefore,inPeirceansystemtheterm"truth"isnotthesame asultimatereality.Ifwerefertoquantitativemethodsasameansoftruthseeking,we shouldseethetruthastheunderstandingofreality,butnottherealityitself.Wemake decisionsbaseduponstatisticsduetopragmaticreasonssocalledfixingourbeliefsat certainpoints.However,wepassourfindingstosubsequentresearcherssothatdetails canbeaddedandmistakescanbecorrected. Thenatureofknowledgeisnotsocialbuttranscendental Qualitativeresearchersadopt"perspectiveseeking"and"descriptivelanguage,"which aresociallyconstructed.Themisuseofthisapproachmayleadtoradicalnominalism, whichwasopposedbyPeirce(Parker,1994).Nominalismviewsthecoreissueof epistemologyastheuseofterminology,andthereisnologicalmappingbetweenthe languageandthereality.Whetheratheoryisacceptableornotrelieshighlyonits compatibilitywiththe"standardlanguage."IwouldstandwithPeirce'spragmaticism beyondthesubjectiveandhumanisticlevelofunderstandingofknowledge,thereshould beatranscendentallevelattheunderlyinglogicandstructureofreality,inKantianterm, the"internalstructureofmeaning." Realityisintersubjectivity IwouldgobeyondPeircetosuggestaunitybetweentruthandreality,truthand perspective,andthehumanisticworldandthetranscendentalworld.Perspectiveseeking versestruthseekingcanbeviewedasanotherversionofthesubjectobjectspilt

introducedbyDesCartes.Barrett(1986)criticizedthisdualismasunnecessary:Most modernphilosophersrangingfromphenomenologiststoanalyticphilosophersrejectsthe Cartesiandichotomy.Formodernphilosophers,intersubjectivityismoresuitableto epistemology.KnowledgeisaresultofintersubjectivityIamapartofreality,and realityisapartofmetruthscarryperspectives,andperspectivescontaintruths.The worldIknowispartlyshapedbymyinput,andbeingwhoIamispartlycausedbythe inputfromtheworld.Inthissense,thereisn'tarealityentirelyindependentofhuman inquiryneitheraperspectivewithouttheinfluencefromtheworld.

LogicalpositivismandReductionism?
Conceptualworkscanleadtoontologicalreductionism Whenquantitativeresearchislabelledas"logicalpositivism,"whatpeoplehaveintheir mindsisareducedworldoflogicandmathematicssuggestedbyRussellandWhitehead (1910).Althoughmanyscholarsdiscreditreductionism,Searle(1993)defendedthevalue ofontologicalreductionism,inwhichobjectsofcertaintypescanbeshowntoconsistof nothingbutelementsofothertypes.Forexample,genescanbeshowntobecomposedof nothingbutDNAmolecules.Searleassertedthatinhistoryofsciencesuccessfulcausal inferencestendtoleadtoontologicalreductions.Whenpeoplecriticizereductionism, theypinpointitsweaknessofleavingessentialfeaturesout.Butanontologicalreduction capturestheinvariantelementsthataresufficientforrepresentingthewholeobject. DatacompressionisagoodmetaphortoillustrateSearle'sposition.IfIuseasoftware compactorsuchasStuffit,CompactProorPKZIPtoreducethesizeofafile,laterthe entirefilecanberecomposedwithoutanydatatruncation.ButifIusea"lossy"method suchasJPEGorMPEGtopackagraphicfile,detailswillloseatthestageof decompression.OneshouldnotdeclinetouseStuffitorCompactProaftertheirpictures losttheimagequalitythroughJPEGorMPEGcompression.Bythesamereasoning,one shouldnotdisbeliefontologicalreductionismwhiletheyhaveproblemswithnon ontologicalreductionism. However,thegoalofontologicalreductionisatthestageofconclusion,notatthe processofinquiry.Inotherwords,ontologicalreductionistheendbutnonontological reductionisthemeans.Datareductionmethodsinstatisticalproceduresarenodoubt nonontologicalreductionsi.estatisticalnumbersresultedindatareductionmethodsarea distortedrepresentationoftheworld.LikeJPEGandMPEG,datareductionsacrifices somedetails,butsoareotherlanguagesandsymbols,even"descriptivelanguage." Actually,everyresearchapproachisreductiveinnature,otherwisethehugechuckof informationwillbeburdensometoresearchers.Takethelossymethodasananalogy again.AlthoughJPEGandMPEGtrimoffsomepixelsduringcompression,the reconstructedimagesarestillsharpenoughtorecognize,forthelostdetailsaretoosmall tobedetectablebyhumaneyes.Theimportantpointistotransmitthewholepicture,not thecombinationofeverypieceofdetail.Bythesametoken,researcherswanttoseeabig pictureratherthantonsofdata.

Peircerecognizedtheexistenceofanontologicalandmetaphysicalreality.Inregardto quantitativeresearchmethods,theinquiryconcerningtheconceptualaspectiscapableof pointingtothedirectionofontologicalreduction.Inthisview,exploratorydataanalysis, whichcontributestoconceptualunderstanding,hasnocontradictionwithSearleand Peirce'sposition. Quantitativeresearchisnotaonewayreduction Indeed,quantitativeresearchasawholeisharmoniouswithSearleandPeirce'snotions. Itisamisunderstandingtoseequantitativeresearchasaonewayreductionofcomplex phenomenatonumbers.Oneofthegoalsofquantitativeresearchistofindtheoptimal balancebetweenparsimonyandgoodnessoffit.Duringtheprocessofexploratorydata analysis,acarefulstatisticianalwaysgoesbackandforthtoaddvariablestoortake variablesoutofthemodel.Iseenoevidencethatstatisticsisaonewayreduction.

Fallibilism
InPeirce'sview,knowledgeisfallibleinnaturebutcontinuousinquirymakesknowledge selfcorrective.Quantitativeunderstandingbuildsonqualitativeunderstanding,andthey cancorrecteachother.Rescher(1978)interpretedthatforPeircetheprocessof qualitativeinductioncanbecorrectivelymonitoredbyquantitativeinduction.For instance,asmoreandmorepatientsareinfectedwithHIVfromheterosexualactivities, ourconceptionthatAIDSisonlyadiseaseofhomosexualityischanged.Rescher contentedthat"PeirceisthusatoncewithSirRonaldFisherindeclaringthatthetheory ofstatisticalinferenceingeneral,makekeycontributionstothescientificinduction." (p.13) Ontheotherhand,qualitativeunderstandingcancorrectquantitativeknowledgeby pointingoutnewdirectionsthathavebeenneglected.Forexample,ineconomics unempolymentandinflationusedtobeexplainedbythePhilip'sCurveandFisher equation,butlaterthephenomenonthathighunemploymentrateandhighinflationrate occuratthesametimestimulatedtheintroductionofnewtheoriessuchastheSupply SideEconomics.Manystatisticiansarehighlyawareofthefalliblenatureofthe discipline. Statisticsisnotjustmeasurement,butisalsoconcernedwithmeasurement error.Manystatisticalendeavorscanbeviewedastheefforttofindoutadditionalerrorin relationstotheleasterror.Iseenoevidencethatstatisticsisregardedasaformof absolutemeasurement. Actually,quantitativeandqualitativemethodologiessharemorecommongroundsrather thanconflictinregardtoepistemology:Theybothadmitthatthereismorethanoneway toapproachrealitythereisacontinuitybetweenqualitativeandquantitative understandingthereisatensionbetweenthecomplexworldandthereducedmodel thereisafalliblenatureofallinquiries,andthusconclusionsaretentativeratherthan final.Moreimportantly,theybothattempttobreakdownthedataandreconstructthem intoapattern.Intheprocessofpatternseeking,theybothusesymbolicrepresentations.

Qualitativeresearchapplieslanguagewhilequantitativeresearchemploysnumbers. Neitherismoredescriptiveorreducingthantheotherone.

PeirceanLogicalSystem
Exploratorydataanalysis,whichaimsatsuggestingapatternforfurtherinquiry, contributestotheconceptualorqualitativeunderstandingofaphenomenon.Althoughit dealswithnumbers,theendingpointisnotstatisticalfigures.Rathertheproductisthe hypotheticalinsightoftheessentialfeatureorpatternofanevent.Inotherwords,the majorconcernisnot"howmuch,"but"what"and"how." Abduction,thelogicsuggestedbyPeirce,canbeviewedasalogicofexploratorydata analysis.ForPeirceabductionisthefirstness(existence,actuality)deduction,the secondness(possibility,potentiality)andinduction,thethirdness(generality,continuity). Abductionplaystheroleofgeneratingnewideasorhypothesesdeductionfunctionsas evaluatingthehypothesesandinductionisjustifyingofthehypothesiswithempirical data(Staat,1993).

Abduction
Abductionisnotsymboliclogicbutcriticalthinking Abductionistolookforapatterninaphenomenonandsuggestahypothesis(Peirce, 1878a).Despitethelonghistoryofabduction,abductionisstillunpopularamongtextsof logicandresearchmethodology,whichemphasizeformallogic.Logicisdividedinto formaltypesofreasoning(symboliclogic)andinformaltypes(criticalthinking).Unlike deductionandinduction,abductionisatypeofcriticalthinkingratherthansymbolic logic,thoughinthefollowingexampleabductionisillustratedwithsymbolsfor simplification: Thesurprisingphenomenon,X,isobserved. AmonghypothesesA,B,andC,AiscapableofexplainingX. Hence,thereisareasontopursueA. AbductionisnotPopperianfalsificationbuthypothesisgenerationis Thisprocessofinquirycanbewellappliedtoexploratorydataanalysis.Inexploratory dataanalysis,afterobservingsomesurprisingfacts,weexploitthemandcheckthe predictedvaluesagainsttheobservedvaluesandresiduals.Althoughtheremaybemore thanoneconvincingpatterns,we"abduct"onlythosewhicharemoreplausible. Inotherwords,exploratorydataanalysisisnottryingouteverything.Rescher(1978) interpretedabductionasanoppositiontoPopper'sfalsification(1963).Therearemillions ofpossibleexplanationstoaphenomenon.Duetotheeconomyofresearch,wecannot affordtofalsifyeverypossibility.Asmentionedbefore,wedon'thavetoknow everythingtoknowsomething.Bythesametoken,wedon'thavetoscreeneveryfalse thingtodigouttheauthenticone.Peircearguedthatanimalshavetheinstincttodothe

rightthingswithoutstruggling,wehumans,asakindofanimal,alsohavetheinnate abilitytomaketherightdecisionintuitively. Abductionisnothastyjudgmentbutpropercategorizationis Itisdangeroustolookatabductionasimpulsivethinkingandhastyjudgment.Inthe essay"TheFixationofBelief,"Peirceexplicitlydisregardedthetenacityofintuitionas thesourceofknowledge.Also,exploratorydataanalysis,asanapplicationofabduction, isnotapermitfortheanalysttobenaivetootherresearchrelatedtotheinvestigated phenomena(Anthony,1994).Peircestronglycriticizedhiscontemporaries'confusionof propositionsandassertions.Propositionscanbeaffirmedordeniedwhileassertionsare finaljudgments(Hilpinen,1992).Theobjectiveofabductionistodeterminewhich hypothesisorpropositiontotest,notwhichonetoadoptorassert(Sullivan,1991). ForPeirce,progressinsciencedependsontheobservationoftherightfactsbyminds furnishedwithappropriateideas(Tursman,1987).Definitely,theintuitivejudgment madebyanintellectualisdifferentfromthatmadebyahighschoolstudent.Peircecited severalexamplesofremarkablecorrectguesses.Allsuccessisnotsimplylucky.Instead, theopportunitywastakenbythepeoplewhowereprepared: a).Bacon'sguessthatheatwasamodeofmotion b).Young'sguessthattheprimarycolorswereviolet,greenandred c).Dalton'sguessthattherewerechemicalatomsbeforetheinventionofmicroscope (citedinTursman,1987). Peircestatedthatclassificationplaysamajorroleinmakinghypothesis,thatisthe charactersofphenomenonareplacedintocertaincategories(Peirce,1878b).As mentionedbefore,thePeirceanviewofknowledgeiscontinuousratherthan revolutionary.Abductiondoesnotattempttooverthrowpreviousparadigms,frameworks andcategories.Instead,thecontinuityandgeneralityofknowledgemakesintuition possibleandplausible. PeircewasanadmirerofKant.HeendorsedKant'scategoriesinCritiqueofPureReason (1781/1969)tohelpustomakejudgmentsofthephenomenalworld: 1.quantity(universal,particular,singular) 2.quality(affirmative,negative,infinite) 3.relation(categorical,hypothetical,disjunctive) 4.modality(problematic,assertoric,apodeictic). Also,PeirceagreedwithKantthatthingshaveinternalstructureofmeaning.Abductive activitiesarenotempiricalhypothesesbasedonoursensoryexperience,butratherthe verystructureofthemeaningsthemselves(Rosenthal,1993).BasedontheKantian framework,Peirce(1867/1960)laterdevelopedhis"Newlistofcategories." Inshort,abductionbyintuition,canbeinterpretedasobservingtheworldwith appropriatecategorieswhicharisefromtheinternalstructureofmeanings.The implicationsofabductionforresearchersisthattheuseofexploratorydataanalysisis

neitherexhaustingallpossibilitiesnormakinghastydecisions.Researchersmustbewell equippedwithpropercategoriesinordertosortouttheinvariantfeaturesandpatternsof phenomena.Thestatisticalmethod,inthissense,isnotonlynumbercrunching,butalsoa thoughtfulwayofdissectingdata.

Deduction
Aftersuggestingaplausiblehypothesis,thenextstageistorefinethehypothesiswith logicaldeduction.Deductionisdrawinglogicalconsequencesfrompremises.The conclusionistruegiventhepremisesaretruealso(Peirce,1868).Forinstance, AllAsareBs. CisB. Therefore,CisA. Deductioncannotleadtonewknowledge First,thiskindofreasoningcannotleadtothediscoveryofnewknowledge,becausethe conclusionhasalreadybeenembeddedinthepremise(Peirce,1900/1960).Insomecases thepremisemayevenbetautologicaltruebydefinition.Brown(1963)illustratedthis weaknessbyusinganexampleineconomics: Anentrepreneurseeksmaximizationofprofits. Themaximumprofitswillbegainedwhenmarginalrevenueequalsmarginalcost. Anentrepreneurwilloperatehisbusinessattheequilibriumbetweenmarginalcostand marginalrevenue. Theabovedeductionsimplytellsyouthatarationalmanwouldliketomakemore money.Thereisasimilarexampleincognitivepsychology: Humanbehaviorsarerational. Oneofseveraloptionsismoreefficientinachievingthegoal. Arationalhumanwilltaketheoptionwhichdirectshimtoachievehisgoal(Anderson, 1990). Theabovetwodeductiveinferencessimplyprovideexamplesthatarationalmanwilldo rationalthings.Thespecificrationalbehaviorshavebeenincludedinthebiggersetof genericrationalbehaviors. Deductiondoesnotspecifynecessaryorsufficientconditiondoes Second,usuallyinferencesmadewithdeductivemethodsdonotspecifywhetherthe premiseisanecessarycondition,asufficientcondition,orboth.Forexample,rationality isanecessarycondition,butnotasufficientcondition,ofmakingthecorrectchoice. Sometimespeoplemayfailtoselecttherightalternativebecauseoflackoffaithor courage. Deductionreliesontruepremises Third,deductionisfallibleaswecannotlogicallyproveallthepremisesaretrue.Russell andWhitehead(1910)attemptedtodevelopaselfsufficientlogicomathematicalsystem.

Intheirview,notonlycanmathematicsbereducedtologic,butlogicisthefoundationof mathematics.Inthetraditionalhierarchyofknowledge,biologyseekssupportfrom chemistrychemistryneedsprooffromphysicsphysicsdependsonmathematics.The notionthatmathematicsreliesonlogicimpliesthatallknowledgecanbeexplainedby logic. However,Godel(1947/1986)foundthatitisimpossibletohavesuchaselfcontained system.Anylowerordertheoremorpremiseneedsahigherordertheoremorpremisefor substantiationanditgoesonandonandnosystemcanbecompleteandconsistentatthe sametime. PeircereviewedRussell'sbookPrinciplesofMathematicsin1903,butheonlywrotea shortparagraphwithvaguecomments.Nonetheless,basedonPeirce'sotherwritingson logicandmathematics,Haack(1993)concludedthatPeircewouldbeopposedtoRussell andWhitehead'snotionthattheepistemologicalfoundationsofmathematicslieinlogic. Itisquestionablewhetherdeductiveknowledgesoundjustbecausethelogicorthe mathematicsstands.Nomatterhowlogicalahypothesisis,itisonlysufficientwithinthe systemitisstilltentativeandrequiresfurtherinvestigationwithexternalproof.For instance,accordingtogeometryrules,thesumofthreeanglesinsideatriangleis180 degree.However,ifoneappliesthispremiseofatwodimensionalplanetoathree dimensionalworld,thedeductiveconclusionwillbetotallywrong.Whenyoudrawsa triangleonthisplanetsuchasstartingfromNorthPoletothewestofequator,andstopat theeastofequator,thesumofthreeanglescanbemorethan180degree. Thislineofthoughtposedaseriouschallengetoresearcherswhoareconfidentinthe logicalstructureofstatistics.Mathematicallogicrepliesonmanyunprovenpremises.For example,themishmashofnullandalternativehypothesesthedisputablecomputationof effectsizetheredundancyofBartlett'stesttheartificialcutoffofalphalevelandsoon. Statisticalconclusionsareconsideredtrueonlygiventhatallpremisesthatareappliedare true.Asamatteroffact,Kline(1990)foundthatmathematicshaddevelopedillogically withfalseproofandslipsinreasoning.Thus,hecalledthedeductiveprooffromself evidentprinciplesinmathematicsan"intellectualtragedy,"(p.3)anda"grandillusion" (p.4). InrecentyearsmanyMonteCarlosimulationshavebeenconductedtodeterminehow robustcertaintestsare,andwhichstatisticsshouldbefavored.Thereferenceandcriteria ofallthesestudiesarewithinthelogicomathematicalsystemwithoutanyworldly concerns.Forinstance,FisherprotectedttestisconsideredinferiortotheRyantestand theTukeytestbecauseitcannotcontroltheinflatedTypeIerrorverywell(Toothaker, 1993),notbecauseanypsychologistsoreducatorsmadeaterriblywrongdecisionbased upontheFisherprotectedttest.PillaiBartlettstatisticisconsideredsuperiortoWilk's LambdaandHotellingLawleyTracebecauseofmuchgreaterrobustnessagainstunequal covariancematrices(Olson,1976),notbecauseany significantscientificbreakthroughs aremadewiththeuseofPillaiBartlettstatistic.ForPeircethiskindofselfreferent deductioncannotleadtoprogressinknowledge.Knowingisactivitywhichisby definitioninvolvementwiththerealworld(Burrell,1968).

Actually,statisticsisbynomeanspuremathematicswithoutinteractionswiththereal world.GaussdiscoveredtheGaussiandistributionthroughastronomicalobservations. Fisherbuilthistheoriesfromapplicationsofbiometricsandfertilizer.Survivalanalysis orhazardmodelarethefruitofmedicalandsociologicalresearch.Itemresponsetheory wasdevelopedtoaddresstheissueofreducingtestbias.ForPeirce,deductionaloneisa necessarycondition,butnotasufficientconditionof knowledge.Instead,abduction, deductionandinductionmustworktogether.

Induction
InductionintroducedbyFrancisBaconisadirectrevoltagainstdeduction.Bacon (1620/1960)foundthatdeductivereasonersrelyontheauthorityofantiquity(premises madebymasters),andthetendencyofthemindtoconstructknowledgeclaimsoutof itself.ByusingasimilarmetaphorintroducedbyanthropologistCliffordGeertz,Bacon criticizeddeductivereasonersasspidersfortheymakeawebofknowledgeoutoftheir ownsubstance.Althoughthemeaningofdeductiveknowledgeisentirelyselfreferent, deductivereasonerstendtotakethosepropositionsasassertions. Asmentionbefore,propositionsandassertionsarenotthesamelevelofknowledge.For Peirceabductionanddeductiononlygivespropositions,butselfcorrectinginduction givesthesupportofassertions.CarnaptookPeirce'snotionthatinductionisself correctiveanddevotedeffortsinbuildingacomprehensivesystemofinductivelogic (Tursman, 1987).However,weshouldbecautiousnottoovergeneralizeinductionasthe salvationofdeduction. Inductivelogicisbaseduponthenotionthatprobabilityistherelativefrequencyinlong runandagenerallawcanbeconcludedbasedonnumerouscases.Forexample, A1,A2,A3...A100areB. A1,A2,A3...A100areC. Therefore,BisC. Inductionisinconclusiveininfinitetime Hume(1777/1912)arguedthatthingsareinconclusivebyinductionbecauseinthe infinitetimetherearealwaysnewcasesandnewevidence.Inductioncanbejustified,if andonlyif,instancesofwhichwehavenoexperienceresemblethoseofwhichwehave experience.Takethepreviousargumentasanexample.IfA101isnotB,thestatement "BisC"willberefuted.Humeevenusedmoreradicalexamplessuchasnaturemay changeitscourse.Myexamplesarefromsociologyandeconomics. Basedonthecasestudiesinthe19thcentury,sociologistMaxWeber(1904/1976)argued thatcapitalismcouldbedevelopedinEuropebecauseof theProtestantworkethicother culturesliketheChineseConfucianismarebyessenceincompatiblewithcapitalism. However,afterWorldWarTwo,theemergenceofAsianeconomicpowerssuchas Taiwan,SouthKorea,HongkongandSingaporedisconfirmedtheWeberianhypothesis.

Weneverknowwhenaregressionlinewillturnflat,godownorgo up.Eveninductivereasoningusingnumerousaccuratedataandhigh powercomputingcangowrong,becausepredictionsaremadeonly undercertainspecifiedconditions(Samuelson,1967).Dueto Americaneconomicproblemsintheearly'80s,quiteafewreputable economistsmadegloomypredictionsabouttheU.S.economysuch asthetakeoverofAmericaneconomicandtechnologicalthroneby Japan.Bytheendofthedecade,Roberts(1989)concludedthatthose economistswerewrongoncontrarytothoseforecasts,theU.S. enjoyedthelongesteconomicexpansioninitshistory. Inductionisundefinableinasinglecase Second,inductionsuggeststhepossibleoutcomeinrelationtoeventsinlongrun.Thisis notdefinableforanindividualevent.Tomakeajudgmentforasingleeventbasedon probabilitylike"yourchancetosurvivethissurgeryis75percent"isnonsense.In actuality,thepatientwilleitherliveordie(50%).Also,thisiswhypeopleinHongKong areveryanxiousabouttheconstructionofanuclearplantinDayaBay,SouthChina, eventhoughthestatisticreleasedbytheChinesegovernmentshowsaverylow probabilityofaccident.Inasingleeventofnuclearmeltdown,thechanceofsurvivalis absolutelyzero. Inductiongeneratesempiricallawsbutnottheoreticallaws Third,Carnap,asaninductivelogician,knewthelimitationofinduction.Carnap(1952) arguedthatinductionmayleadtothegeneralizationofempiricallaws,butnottheoretical laws.Forinstance,evenifweobservethousandsofstones,treesandflowers,wenever reachapointatwhichweobserveamolecule.Afterweheatmanyironbars,wecan concludetheempiricalfactthatmetalswillbendwhentheyareheated.Butwewillnever discoverthephysicsofexpansioncoefficientinthisway.Peirce(1900/1960)helda similarposition:Inductioncannotfurnishuswithnewideasbecauseobservationsor sensorydataonlyleadustosuperficialconclusionsbutnotthe"bottomofthings." (p.878) Inductionisbasedongeneralityandlawoflargenumbers Nonetheless,forPeirceinductionstillhasvalidity.ContrarytoHume'snotionthatour perceptionofeventsaredevoidofgenerality,Peircearguedthattheexistencewe perceivemustsharegeneralitywithotherthingsinexistence.Peirce'smetaphysical systemresolvestheproblemofinductionbyassertingthatthedatafromourperception arenotreducibletodiscrete,logicallyandontologicallyindependentevents(Sullivan, 1991).Inaddition,forPeirceallempiricalreasoningisessentiallymakinginferences fromasampletoapopulationtheconclusionis"merelyprobably(nevercertainly)true" and"merelyapproximately(neverexactly)true"(O'Neill,1993).Forster(1993)justified thisviewwiththeLawofLargeNumbers.Ononehand,wedon'tknowthereal probabilityduetoourfiniteexistence.However,givenalargenumberofcases,wecan

approximatetheactualprobability.Wedon'thavetoknoweverythingtoknow something.Also,wedon'thavetoknoweverycasetogetanapproximation.This approximationissufficienttofixourbeliefsandleadustofurtherinquiry.

Conclusion
Insummary,bothdeductionandinductionhavedifferentmeritsandshortcomings.For Peirceareasonershouldapplyabduction,deductionandinductionaltogetherinorderto achieveacomprehensiveinquiry.Abductionanddeductionaretheconceptual understandingofaphenomena,andinductionisthequantitativeverification.Atthestage ofabduction,thegoalistoexplorethedata,findoutapattern,andsuggestaplausible hypothesiswiththeuseofpropercategoriesdeductionistobuildalogicalandtestable hypothesisbaseduponotherplausiblepremisesandinductionistheapproximation towardsthetruthinordertofixourbeliefsforfurtherinquiry.Inshort,abductioncreates, deductionexplicates,andinductionverifies.

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