Fundamental Safety Engineering and Risk Management Concepts, 2012/2013

H. Tan, M.J . Baker and Ian Stanley

Tutorial 4 Reliability Block Diagram and Fault Tree Analysis
1.
Consider the statically determinate structural system with 7 elements shown in Figure Q1. Each
element has a reliability of r.
(a) Denote the event that element i fails by F
i
; write down the logical expression for the structure
failure.
(b) Draw the Reliability Block Diagram.
(c) Draw the Fault Tree for the failure of the structure.
(d) The reliability of each element is r. Determine the reliability of the whole structure.
[
7
r ]



Figure Q1, A statically determinant structural system.
Solution:

(a)
{ }
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
structure failure F F F F F F F =

(b)
For a determinate structural system, the whole structure fails if any of the elements fails. So this a
series network



(c)

Fundamental Safety Engineering and Risk Management Concepts, 2012/2013
H. Tan, M.J . Baker and Ian Stanley



(d)
For series network, the reliability is
7
R r =





Fundamental Safety Engineering and Risk Management Concepts, 2012/2013
H. Tan, M.J . Baker and Ian Stanley

2.
It is desirable to increase the redundancy of the system shown in Figure Q2, consisting of three
identical components, with reliability R=0.9, by duplicating (a) each component in parallel, or (b) the
whole system in parallel.

1) Calculate the failure probability of the new system (a),
a
F ;
[0.000199]

2) Calculate the failure probability of the new system (b),
b
F ;
[0.000361]

3) Prove that the failure probability of system (a) is lower than that of system (b) by giving the
ratio /
a b
F F .
[0.55]


Figure Q2

Solution:

(1)
The Reliability Block Diagram of the new system (a) by duplicating each component in parallel is

The reliability of each duplicated parallel sub-system is

Fundamental Safety Engineering and Risk Management Concepts, 2012/2013
H. Tan, M.J . Baker and Ian Stanley

( )( )
2
2
1 1 1
2
2 0.9 0.9
0.99
R R R
R R
' =
=
=
=


The reliability of the top branch is
2
topBranch
R R R R ' ' ' = =
The reliability of the bottom branch is
bottomBranch
R R' =

Therefore the reliability of the system (a) is
( )( )
2 3
2 3
1 1 1
0.99 0.99 0.99
0.999801
a topBranch bottomBranch
topBranch bottomBranch topBranch bottomBranch
R R R
R R R R
R R R
=
= +
' ' ' = +
= +
=

Thus the failure probability
1
1 0.999801
0.000199
a a
F R =
=
=


(2)
The Reliability Block Diagram of the new system (b) by duplicating the whole system component in
parallel is




Fundamental Safety Engineering and Risk Management Concepts, 2012/2013
H. Tan, M.J . Baker and Ian Stanley

The reliability of each branch is
( )( )
2
2 3
2 3
1 1 1
0.9 0.9 0.9
0.981
branch
R R R
R R R
=
= +
= +
=


Therefore the reliability of the system (b) is
2
2
2
2 0.981 0.981
0.999639
b branch branch
R R R =
=
=

Thus the failure probability
1
1 0.999639
0.000361
b b
F R =
=
=



(3)
The failure probability of system (a) is lower than the failure rate of system (b), the ratio is
0.55
a
b
F
F
=

Fundamental Safety Engineering and Risk Management Concepts, 2012/2013
H. Tan, M.J . Baker and Ian Stanley

3.
The logical expression for the occurrence of the top event, T, of a fault tree is given by
( ) ( ) T A B C D E F G ( =


(a) Construct the corresponding fault tree.
(b) Construct an equivalent network diagram.

Solution:

(a)
The fault tree is


Fundamental Safety Engineering and Risk Management Concepts, 2012/2013
H. Tan, M.J . Baker and Ian Stanley


(b)
The reliability block diagram is



Fundamental Safety Engineering and Risk Management Concepts, 2012/2013
H. Tan, M.J . Baker and Ian Stanley

4.
(a) Draw the fault tree for system failure for the following network diagram and write down the
corresponding logical expression for this event.


Figure Q4

(b) If the component failures are statistically independent events with probabilities of occurrence per
year of:
( )
2
1 10 P a

= , ( )
2
2 2 10 P a

= , ( )
2
3 5 10 P a

=
( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 2 3 4 10 P b P b P b

= = = ,
( )
2
2 10 P c

=
( )
2
1 8 10 P d

= , ( )
2
2 6 10 P d

=
( )
2
10 P e

= ,
evaluate the probability of system failure (in one year) if none of the components can be replaced or
repaired.
[
4
3.11 10

]

(c) If, instead of being statistically independent events, the conditional probability of failure of
component d1 is:
( )
1 2 0.8 P d d =
determine the effect of this on the system failure probability.
[
4
6.89 10

]

Fundamental Safety Engineering and Risk Management Concepts, 2012/2013
H. Tan, M.J . Baker and Ian Stanley

Solution:

(a)
The fault tree for system failure is


System Failure 1 2 3 SS SS SS =
where 1 1 2 3 SS a a a = is the failure of the a1-a2-a3 sub-system,
2 1 2 3 SS b b b = is the failure of the b1-b2-b3 sub-system,
1 1 2 LLSS d d = is the failure of the d1-d2 sub-system.
3 1 SS LLSS c e = is the failure of the 1 LLSS -d-e sub-system,

(b)
( )
2
1 8 10 P d

= , ( )
2
2 6 10 P d

=
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
1 1 2 1 2 8 10 6 10 0.0048 P LLSS P d d P d P d

= = = =

( )
2
2 10 P c

= , ( )
2
10 P e

= ,

Fundamental Safety Engineering and Risk Management Concepts, 2012/2013
H. Tan, M.J . Baker and Ian Stanley

( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
3 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0.0048 1 2 10 1 10
0.03445696
P SS P LLSS c e
P LLSS c e
P LLSS c e
P LLSS P c P e
P LLSS P c P e

=
=
=
=
( ( ( =

=
=


( )
2
1 10 P a

= , ( )
2
2 2 10 P a

= , ( )
2
3 5 10 P a

=

( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2
1 1 2 3
1 1 2 3
1 1 2 3
1 1 1 1 2 1 3
1 1 10 1 2 10 1 5 10
0.07831
P SS P a a a
P a a a
P a P a P a
P a P a P a

=
=
=
( ( ( =

( ( ( =

=


( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 2 3 4 10 P b P b P b

= = = ,

( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
3
2
2 1 2 3
1 1 2 3
1 1 2 3
1 1 2 3
1 1 1 1 2 1 3
1 1 4 10
0.115264
P SS P b b b
P b b b
P b b b
P b P b P b
P b P b P b

=
=
=
=
( ( ( =

( =

=

( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
4
System Failure 1 2 3
1 2 3
0.07831 0.115264 0.03445696
3.11 10
P P SS SS SS
P SS P SS P SS

=
=
=
=




Fundamental Safety Engineering and Risk Management Concepts, 2012/2013
H. Tan, M.J . Baker and Ian Stanley

(c)
All the other events are statistically independent, except d1 and d2 which have the conditions
probability relationship described by
( )
1 2 0.8 P d d = , ( )
2
2 6 10 P d

=

( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
2
1 1 2
1| 2 2
0.8 6 10 0.048
P LLSS P d d
P d d P d

=
=
= =

( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
3 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0.048 1 2 10 1 10
0.0763696
P SS P LLSS P c P e

( ( ( =

=
=

( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
4
System Failure 1 2 3
1 2 3
0.07831 0.115264 0.0763696
6.89 10
P P SS SS SS
P SS P SS P SS

=
=
=
=



Fundamental Safety Engineering and Risk Management Concepts, 2012/2013
H. Tan, M.J . Baker and Ian Stanley

5.
In the offshore oil and gas industry, electrical power is typically generated via gas turbine driven
generators. Power is fed to a main switch board following which the voltage is converted via
transformers to meet local demand.

A typical reliability block diagram (RBD) configuration is shown in Figure Q7(a). The Power
Generation block consists of three parallel Trains, each comprising a gas turbine, a generator and
associated planned maintenance (PM).

Figure Q5(a)

For simplicity, each Power Generation Train can be replaced by a single block with a reliability of
0.93. The Main Switch Board has a reliability of 0.98 and each transformer has a reliability of 0.98.

(i) Calculate the reliability of the Power Generation group, and then the overall system reliability as
shown in Figure Q7(a).
[0.99966,0.980]

(ii) Now assume that due to operational issues only two Power Generation Trains are available.
Calculate the reliability of the Power Generation group and the overall system reliability.
[0.9951, 0.975]

Fundamental Safety Engineering and Risk Management Concepts, 2012/2013
H. Tan, M.J . Baker and Ian Stanley

(iii) Owing to an upgrade of the offshore platform, a new power generation configuration is required.

Figure Q5(b)

The reliability of power generation blocks (PG1, PG2, PG3 and PG4) is the same as in part (a) of the
question (0.93). The Sub Switch Boards have reliabilities of 0.98 and the reliability of power supply
from the adjacent platform is 0.85.

Calculate the reliability of the Power Generation group and the overall system reliability.
[0.979, 0.979]

(iv) Whilst there is inherent redundancy in the Power Generation group, compare the results with those
from part (a) and explain any abnormalities.

Solution:

(i)
For Figure Q7(a):

Parallel connection for Reliability of the Power Generation group, the reliability is
( )( )( ) ( )
3
1 2 3
1 1 1 1 1 1 0.93 0.999657
PowerGeneration train train train
R R R R = = =

Parallel connection for transformer, the reliability is
( )( ) ( ) ( )
3
transformer transformer1 transformer2 transformer3
1 1 1 1 1 1 0.98 0.999992 R R R R = = =

The overall system reliability is the serial connection of Power Generation group, Main Switch Board
transformer MainSwitchBoard
0.999657 0.999992 0.98
0.979656
system PowerGeneration
R R R R =
=
=

Fundamental Safety Engineering and Risk Management Concepts, 2012/2013
H. Tan, M.J . Baker and Ian Stanley

(ii)
Assume that due to operational issues only two Power Generation Trains are available.

( )( ) ( )
2
1 2
1 1 1 1 1 0.93 0.995100
PowerGeneration train train
R R R = = =
transformer MainSwitchBoard
0.995100 0.999992 0.98
0.9751902
system PowerGeneration
R R R R =
=
=



(iii)
For Figure Q5(b):
( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 2 _ _ _1
1 1 1 1 1 0.93 0.98 0.975198
PGA PG PG Sub Switch Board
R R R R
(
= = = (



( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
3 4 _ _ _ _ 2
2
1 1 1 1
1 1 0.93 1 0.85 0.98 0.9792797
PGB PG PG Power cable Sub Switch Board
R R R R R
(
=

(
= =


Therefore,
( )( )
( ) ( )
MainSwitchBoard
1 1 1
1 1 0.975198 1 0.9792797 0.98
0.979496
PowerGeneration PGA PGB
R R R R = (

= (

=

( )( ) ( ) ( )
3
power_distribution transformer1 transformer2 transformer3
1 1 1 1 1 1 0.98 0.999992 R R R R = = =
power_distribution
0.979496 0.999992
0.979
system PowerGeneration
R R R =
=
=


(iv)
In spite of the additional redundancy in Figure 7(b), the overall system reliability is governed by the
reliability of the Main Switch Board as it is in series for the overall system irrespective of whether it is
placed in the Power Distribution group or the Power Distribution group.

Fundamental Safety Engineering and Risk Management Concepts, 2012/2013
H. Tan, M.J . Baker and Ian Stanley

6.
You are given a system of switches connected as shown in Figure Q6. The probability per demand that
a switch fails in the closed position is 10
-4
and in the open position is 10
-3
. There are no other causes of
failure.
(a) Construct a fault tree for the top event T
C
, the circuit is closed when it should be open.
(b) Identify the minimal cut set for T
C
.
(c) Evaluate the probability of the top event T
C
. [
8
10

]
(d) Construct a second fault tree for the top event T
O
, the circuit is open when it should be closed.
(e) Identify the minimal cut set for T
O
.
(f) Evaluate the probability of the top event T
O
. [
6
4 10

]


Figure Q6



Fundamental Safety Engineering and Risk Management Concepts, 2012/2013
H. Tan, M.J . Baker and Ian Stanley

Solution:
(a) Fault tree for the top event T
C
, the circuit is closed when it should be open.

(b)
Minimal cut sets for T
C
:
set 1: AB
set 2: CDE
set 3: CDF

(c) Evaluate the probability of the top event T
C
.
Probability of the failure of sub-system AB is
4 4 8
10 10 10
AB
P

= =
Probability of the failure of sub-system EF is
( )
4 4 4 4 4 4
10 10 10 10 2 10 10
EF
P

= + =
Probability of the failure of sub-system CDEF is
( ) ( )
4 4 4 4 4 12
10 10 2 10 10 2 10 10
CDEF
P

= =

Fundamental Safety Engineering and Risk Management Concepts, 2012/2013
H. Tan, M.J . Baker and Ian Stanley

Probability of the top event
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
8 4 12
8
1 1 1
1 1 10 1 2 10 10
10
C
T AB CDEF
P P P

=
(
=

~

Fundamental Safety Engineering and Risk Management Concepts, 2012/2013
H. Tan, M.J . Baker and Ian Stanley

(d) Fault tree for the top event T
O
, the circuit is open when it should be closed.


(e) Identify the minimum cut set for T
O
.
set 1: AC
set 2: AD
set 3: BC
set 4: BD
set 5: AEF
set 6: BEF

(f) Evaluate the probability of the top event T
O
.
Probability of the failure of sub-system AB is
( ) ( )
3 3
1 1 10 1 10
AB
P

=
Probability of the failure of sub-system EF is
3 3
10 10
EF
P

=
Probability of the failure of sub-system CDEF is
( ) ( ) ( )
3 3 6
1 1 10 1 10 1 10
CDEF
P

=
Probability of the top event
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
3 3 3 3 6
6
1 1 10 1 10 1 1 10 1 10 1 10
4 10
O
T AB CDEF
P P P

=
( (
=

~