Viable Joint Ventures

Maurice Yolles
Liverpool John Moores University Business School, Liverpool, UK.
February 1998
4th Systems Science European Congress, Valencia, Sept. 20-24, 1999

Abstract

In management systems, methodological complementarism has been criticised by the fundamentalists of

paradigm incommensurability. They tell us that because methodological paradigms are
incommensurable, that methodologies cannot be used together. There is a move to theoretically counter
this argument. One approach is to show a basic connection between the methodological
complementarism of management systems and the cooperative strategic management theory of joint
alliances that, if appropriately explored, might suggest a systemic theory of joint alliances.

1. Introduction
In the field of management systems the use of methods/methodologies can be seen as a purposeful
organisation of inquiry that can be applied to complex situations (Yolles, 1998a, 1999), enabling in-
quirers to reduce that complexity and create desirable intervention strategies that enable intended
change to occur. There is an argument that the joint or complementary use of a plurality of meth-
ods/methodologies can bring more to an inquiry process than the use of a unitary approach. However,
there is a fundamental argument against this (Burrel and Morgan, 1979) that such a plurality involves
paradigm incommensurability that invalidates the joint use of methods/methodologies. The funda-
mentalists who support this argument say that inquirers cannot venture a joint inquiry involving a
plurality of methods/methodologies. This is because each of the plurality has its own paradigm that
will be incommensurable with that of the others. Those who do mix methods, it is claimed, may be
pragmatists (Jackson, 1992) who are not operating in a theoretically legitimate way. As such their
processes of inquiry may involve conflicting knowledges that derive from the different paradigms,
and result in the formulation of strategies for intervention that are not consistent with intentions.
To more broadly appreciate the nature of this fundamental view, consider that there is an or-
ganised activity related autonomous group of people that has associated with it a paradigm. The para-
digm will be incommensurable with another paradigm belonging to another such group if they each
have different conceptual extensions, or if similar conceptual extensions are qualitatively distinct thus
having different meanings (Yolles, 1998, 1998a, 1999). Paradigms are therefore describable as being
commensurable when they are conceptually coextensive and qualitatively similar. Mostly we can
think of different paradigms as being incommensurable to some degree. Whether they are so recog-
nised very much depends upon the language that is used to describe the conceptual extensions.
Consider now the field of strategic management, where durable corporate organisation exist
in complex situations and operate in ways that will affect their effectiveness and durability, and de-
termine their futures. They can also enter into a type of mutual complementary activity called a joint
alliance (Kelly and Parker, 1997) that includes strategic alliances, strategic partnering, and licensing
agreements. Interestingly, there do not appear to be any fundamentalist arguments that deny that joint
alliances can legitimately occur, perhaps in part because today in the complex commercial world that
we find about us there are so many durable ones. Indeed, joint alliances, far from being criticised by
fundamentalists, are supported by many as being one potentially good way of dealing with certain
classes of complex situations.
Until now no approach appears to have been made to explore the relationship between in-
quiry related and corporate organisations across the fields of management systems and strategic man-
agement. If inquiry related and corporate organisations were each to be seen as different species of
the same genus, then it is likely that we could apply the fundamentalist argument of paradigm in-
commensurability to both in relative ways. In this paper our interest will be to show how corporate
and inquiry organisations can be seen to be different species of the same genus, and that as a result

1
fundamentalism can be applied to joint alliances as it can to the complementarism of meth-
ods/methodologies. Fundamentalism has taken hold in management systems, but as already suggested
it would appear to be contrary to the practical wisdom of corporate strategic management and the
theoretical arguments that support it. This contradiction should be examined more closely, first by
focusing in on fundamentalism.

2. The World View Basis of Fundamentalism

In order to examine the notions supported by our fundamental friends and thus to explore whether
apparently valid arguments against methodological complementarism are also applicable to joint alli-
ances, it will be appropriate to first consider the base ideas upon which rest their criticisms. This
means that we shall explore the nature of paradigms. However, to do so we can with benefit broaden
the exploration to that of world view.
According to Yolles (1996, 1998) there are two types of world view: weltanschauung and
paradigm. The term weltanschauung was first introduced into systems by Churchman (1979), and is
used as part of Soft Systems Methodology (Checkland and Scholes, 1990). It is seen by some as a
view that is often personal and indescribable: that is it cannot be clearly described formally through
language that enables a set of explicit statements about its beliefs and other attributes that enable eve-
rything that might be expressed about the world view to be expressed. In this sense we refer to welt-
anschauung as an informal world view. Different from weltanschauung is the paradigm, a term ex-
plored in some depth by Kuhn (1970). Weltanschauungen become paradigms when they are formal-
ised (Yolles, 1999), and the passage towards this requires a formalised non-normative or semi-
formalised shared weltanschauung to be created called a virtual paradigm that may or may not be-
come a paradigm (Yolles, 1996). While individuals and groups may behave in ways that are deter-
mined by their weltanschauung, paradigms emerge when the groups become coherent through a de-
gree of formalisation.
Both weltanschauungen and paradigms are forms of world view that operate through culture
(beliefs, values, attitudes and language), concepts established within “rational” organised structures
called propositions, and norms (Ibid.). They have a relationship with each other, and with the
behavioural world that is coupled to the physical or social forms that we see around us. This
relationship is shown in figure 1 (Yolles, 1999), where we have collected together the types of world
view and called them the cognitive domain, and these have been differentiated from the behavioural
domain within which is defined by the “real” or perceived behavioural world. In order to distinguish
between these two domains and the transformations that occur between them, we have also
introduced the transformational domain.

Transformational domain

Behavioural domain Paradigm

representation (formal world view)

organisation of development/ formation/ Cognitive

Behavioural world intervention learning consolidation domain

interpretation
Weltanschauung
(informal world view)
reflection/creation

Figure 1: Relationship between types of world view and behaviour

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This model can be reformulated, with the three domains being placed together to form a deep,
surface, and transforming relationship. The transforming domain involves an organising process that
manifests at the surface whatever is projected from the deep domain, and vice versa. We shall refer to
the transformation as transmogrification - which is a transformation that may be subject to surprises.
Transmogrification is a mapping from the cognitive to the behavioural domains that manifests a
structure with which is associated behaviour. We shall refer to the properties of a transmogrification
that enable it to map from the one domain to the other as its morphism.
In mathematics (see Bachman and Narici, 1966, p.5 and p.51) and in particular the dynamics
of complex (ergodic) systems (Arnold, and Avez, 1968), two types of morphism can be defined. An
isomorphism is a 1:1 transmogrific mapping, while an homeomorphism is a 1:n mapping. Relating
this to figure 1, in the former only one unique transformation is possible from the cognitive to the
behavioural domain. In the latter, and number of behavioural outcomes will be possible from a given
cognitive situation.
With this mapping idea in mind we can modify the model of figure 1, and consider the cognitive
domain to be deep and embedded in a the behavioural domain. Transmogrification converts from the
cognitive world to that of the physical behavioural manifest world with a homeomorphic potential. Thus
for instance, if this manifest world is seen to be composed of individuals that create organisations that
each have a form, then that manifest behavioural form is sensitive to the composition of individuals that
defines a possibly innumerable number (n, which may be large) of situations over time. The
composition of individuals who make up a situation will potentially influence the nature of that
transmogrification, and a manifested physical form is the result of the homeomorphic potential that can
be thought of as having a status not unlike that of a quantum field.. These forms may each be different,
and have associated with them different behaviours. In contrast to this, an isomorphic transmogrification
will define a unique manifestation if it has not been subjected to surprises that interfere with meaning.
This conceptualisation is illustrated in figure 2, where we use a closed curve to show the homeomorphic
potential of transmogrification.
Manifest behavioural domain

Transmogrific
Domain

World view populated

Cognitive Domain

Figure 2: Model identifying a relationship between World Views and Behaviour

This model acts as the basis of the theory of viable systems as developed by Yolles (1999)
through the work of Stafford Beer and Eric Schwarz. It also connects with the work that has appeared in
artificial intelligence and language theory. Chomsky (1975), in his attempts to develop a theory of
transformational grammar of language, distinguished between the semantics of a message and its syntax.
Semantics occurs at a “deep” or cognitive domain of knowledge that carries meaning. Syntax is a
manifestation of semantics that is created through the “surface” that has structure and from which we make
utterances. A structurally similar model is used in the field of artificial intelligence (Clancy and Letsinger,
1981) that distinguishes between deep and surface knowledge.
Deep knowledge is generic, being independent of any particular situation. It adopts first
principles and fundamental propositions that can represent individual or shared group beliefs. It is
associated with understanding, and develops according to general theories. It is also associated with
deep reasoning processes, the purposes of which are: (a) to build up or maintain cognitive models
perceived to be relevant to the current “reality”, (b) to make generalisations, (c) to formulate models

3
relevant to surface knowledge. Deep knowledge can also be called cognitive knowledge, and is
generated by a world view. Surface knowledge can be called situational or behavioural knowledge
because it directly relates to a particular situation and its associated procedural behaviour. Its acquisition
occurs through the collection of facts, through measures of performance, and through the creation of
algorithms, procedures, or sets of rules. Such knowledge acquisition occurs through a process of
learning and experience about the situation. It is related to skill, and can derive from heuristic processes.
The two types of knowledge are analytically and empirically distinct.
We can also use figure 2 recursively to show how we can attribute the properties of a system
to a behavioural situation rather than declaring it to be one. In the same way that we can map from the
cognitive to the behavioural domain, so too we can map from the domain of world views to the “ex-
plicitly imagined” behavioural domain. From this we can project a cognitive system model onto the
dotted line of figure 2. This can now be designated as the boundary of a “new” cognitive domain that
can be mapped into the behavioural domain. Alternatively, some may wish to see the dotted line im-
posed on the behavioural domain, taking it to be a system.

3. Arguing to Extending the Fundamentalist Paradigm

An argument can be created that complementarism is actually important to the viability of organisa-
tions. We are familiar with the weltanschauung principle that tells us that no view of reality can be
complete, that each view will contain some information about reality, but that the views will never be
completely reconcilable. The principle of finding a more representative picture of reality by involving
as many weltanschauungen as possible generates variety through opening up more possibilities in the
way situations can be seen. Those who adhere to this principle during an inquiry consequently regard
weltanschauung pluralism as desirable.
We know that a plurality of weltanschauungen can form a shared weltanschauung, and that
when this becomes formalised a paradigm appears. It is reasonable to consider then, that there should
also be a paradigm principle that might be expressed as follows. A paradigm defines a truth system
that results in a logical process that determines behaviour. The truth system is also responsible for
recognising and producing what its viewholders consider to be knowledge about reality. Since differ-
ent paradigms have different truth systems, knowledge across paradigms will never be completely
reconcilable. Formal models of reality are built from paradigms, and each model will contain some
knowledge that guides behaviour.
Paradigms are created by groups of people, and a paradigm principle should be analogous to
the weltanschauung principle. Thus, no formal model of reality can be complete, and finding a more
representative picture of a given reality by involving a plurality of formal models generates variety
through opening up more possibilities in the way situations can be addressed through action.
Now, to consider the fundamentalist argument we must first direct our attention to methodol-
ogy since it is here that their arguments are applied. The coordination of a plurality of meth-
ods/methodologies is concerned with the idea that different inquiry approaches will likely result in
intervention into a complex problem situation, and each approach has attributes that can be used for
benefit in different situations. In accordance with the paradigm principle, it recognises that they may
each operate out of different paradigms, and have different rationalities stemming from alternative
theoretical positions which they reflect. Each methodology will generate a view of reality and inter-
vention strategy that is itself connected to the penchant of the methodology that spawns it. According
to the principle of complementarism, the different paradigms can in principle operate in ways which
are complementary to one another, each finding strength of examination and evaluation that others
might not have in respect of different classes of situation.
We have said that arguments against complementarism by fundamentalists are that
methodologies derive from different paradigms that are incommensurable. This means they cannot be
compared or used in a coordinated way. Now, paradigms create the cognitive basis that becomes
manifested as behaviour, and our thesis is that since they are generically related to purposeful
adaptive activity systems generic theory that applies to one must also apply to the other. Thus, if we
can construct a generic theory of complementarism, then it must apply to corporate organisatons in

4
the same way as it does to organisations of inquiry. Indeed, in both cases any plurality of
organisations operates out of their own different paradigms, and complementarism can be seen as a
conditional cooperation between them for some perceived benefit. When we use the term
complementarism, it will therefore have associated with it the implicit understanding that the
organisations we are referring to are viable in that they have duration and adaptability, a cognitive
domain, and a behavioural domain.
It is curious that fundamentalists are concerned with complementarism in the management
systems field, but not in that of strategic management. From the perspective of purposeful adaptive
activity systems, it seems paradoxical that it can apply to one field and not the other. We therefore
suggest that fundamental arguments only hold true because their own paradigm is conceptually
bounded - that is they do not possess enough conceptual extensions to enable them to explain the
process of behavioural complementarism.
To see more clearly what we mean by this, consider Zeno’s paradox (Gale, 1968, p387). This
explains how it is impossible to move between two points A and B in space. To reach B from A you
must travel half the distance to it to a point say a1, and to get from a1 to B you must reach a point
half way to it at a2. This argument is recursive as you move to a3, a4, a5,.... To count the full distance
that you have travelled you must add all of the half distances which forms an infinite series,
suggesting mathematically that you can never reach B. The solution to the paradox is to introduce
time as a new analytically and empirically independent conceptual extension that operates as a
limiting factor on the summation. The introduction of this new conceptualisations has meant that a
new paradigm has been created with new propositions and beliefs, and it is incommensurable with the
previous paradigm.
Paradoxes can be seen as fundamental contradictions of paradigms. Attempting to solve a
fundamental contradiction from within paradigms is not possible. Rather, a new paradigm must
appear with extra conceptual extension(s) that are able to deal with it. Like the fact that we know that
we reach B from A but cannot explain how, we know that organisations operate in joint ventures even
though they each have different paradigms.
There is an argument that methodological complementarism can be undertaken legitimately.
It extends the fundamentalist paradigm by introducing a conceptual extension that derives from the
work of Habermas in his theory of human interests. Our own approach lies in a similar vein, but
extends the paradigm from one to three conceptual extensions. Within the context of methodology,
these can lie in a single frame of reference, and can thus be thought of as orthogonalities. They are
cognitive influence, cognitive interest, and cognitive purpose.
Firstly, let us consider the idea of cognitive influence. New paradigms arise through the
process of knowledge recognition or creation, or knowledge migration that occurs through the
cognitive influences of other paradigms. A typical example of knowledge migration is the formation
of the Organisational Development paradigm (in part from Lewin’s work in 1947), that has cognitive
influences from politics, sociology, and psychology. Secondly, the notion of cognitive interest relates
to the structural/behavioural domain and as we shall see shortly, can be differentiated from the
knowledge domain. Finally, cognitive purpose (Yolles, 1999) relates to rational and cybernetic
processes that can also be differentiated from the knowledge domain. Both cognitive interests and
purposes will be considered in more detail below.
We can apply the lesson of Zeno’s paradox to complementarism quite simply now. We do
this by saying that in the same way that time was a new conceptual extension in a new paradigm that
acts as a constraint on behaviour in respect of distance, so cognitive interests and purposes act as
constraints on complementarism. This then reduces the significance of paradigm incommensurability.

4. Extending the Fundamentalist Paradigm

Several approaches to methodological pluralism (Jackson, 1993, pp201-202) occur through the selec-
tion of paradigms that are based on ideas within Habermas’ theory of human interests (Habermas,
1970). It tells us that human beings possess two basic cognitive interests in acquiring knowledge: a
technical interest relate to the human endeavour referred to as work, and a practical interest for inter-

5
action (table 1). Another cognitive interest is critical deconstraining that results in the human en-
deavour emancipation, seen to be subordinate to work and interaction because it results from exploi-
tation and distorted communication. Corresponding to these three classifications of human endeav-
our, are three types of knowledge that can facilitate “ideal” qualities of human situations, referred to
as empirical analytical sciences, historical hermeneutic sciences, and critical sciences.

Table 1: Relationship between human cognitive interests and their corresponding types of knowledge
Technical
Work. This enables peo-
ple to achieve goals and
generate material well-
being. It involves techni-
Cognitive cal ability to undertake
interests action in the environment,
and the ability to make
prediction and establish
control.
Empirical analytical sci-
ences, concerned the with
technical control of objec-
tified processes.
Knowledge
type
Practical
Interaction. This requires that people
as individuals and groups in a social
system gain and develop the possi-
bilities of an understanding of each
others subjective views. It is consis-
tent with a practical interest in mu-
tual understanding that can address
disagreements, which can be a threat
to the social form of life
Historical hermeneutic sciences,
relating to practical interest. They
can provide understanding of inter-
subjective life, and aim at maintain-
ing and improving mutual under-
standing between people.
Critical deconstraining
Emancipation. This enables people to
(i) liberate themselves from the con-
straints imposed by power structures
(ii) learn through precipitation in so-
cial and political processes to control
their own destinies.
Critical sciences, which recognise the
limitations and dangers of inappropri-
ately applied empirical analytical and
historical hermeneutic sciences. The
attempt to synthesise and systemise
them to enable people to reflect on
situations and liberate themselves from
domination by existing power struc-
tures and processes.

Systems methodologies may be validly used in a complementary way when viewed in terms
of Habermas’ classifications [Jackson, 1993, p290-291]. To do this, we should see Habermas’ classi-
fications of cognitive interest as providing distinctions between knowledge and technical/practical
behaviour. Now we are aware that (a) given knowledges derives from given paradigms, and (b) in-
quiry behaviour is part of method. Thus, we see that inquiry behaviour and paradigms are analytically
distinct. This leads to the argument that while paradigms guide knowledge production and therefore
determine knowledge type, systems methodologies should be seen to serve cognitive interests. Most
approaches would seem to follow this distinction.
Cognitive interests are associated with work and interaction, and as such are connected with the
behavioural domain in figure 3 that uses energy as a commodity (Yolles, 1999). This leads us to consider
the other domains of the figure and their relative commodities. A cognitive property of the cognitive do-
main is cognitive influence, the commodity of which is knowledge. That of the transmogrific domain is
cognitive purposes, that has as its commodity information. All three are analytically and empirically in-
dependent.
Cognitive purpose derives from the idea that paradigms have associated with them purpose, and
that cognitive purpose is manifested from the paradigm. In the same way that one can construct a frame
of reference that is cognitive interest related, and that constrains knowledge migration in respect of a
complementary activity, so cognitive purpose similarly enables the creation of frames of reference
through constraint on knowledge. There are argued to be three types of cognitive purposes that effec-
tively correspond to Habermas’ types of cognitive interest. These are described in table 2, and have been
similarly associated with knowledge type. Here, cybernetic cognitive purpose is concerned with intention
and is a precursor for technical cognitive interest; rational cognitive purpose is concerned with logico-
relational constructions, and determined the ability for practical behavioural matters to be dealt with;
ideological cognitive purposes is connected with the manner of thinking, and is a precursor for the con-
ception of critical deconstraining.
These conceptualisations enable us to explore the variability of mappings between word views
and cognitive systemic models intended to represent issues of “real world” behavioural situations. Con-
sider that a world view is manifested in the cognitive system world by establishing a model that is in-
tended to represent issues that should be included in the creation of an intervention strategy. This map-
6
ping will be transformed, and during this process it will be susceptible to cybernetic, rational, and ideo-
logical attributes of cognitive purpose. Thus for instance, a mapping is subject to variation in informa-
tion, controls, goal formation, and ethical conceptualisations.

Table 2: Relationship between human cognitive purposes and corresponding types of knowledge
Cybernetical
Intention. This is through the
creation and strategic pursuit
of goals and aims that may
change over time, enables
Cognitive people through control and
purpose communications processes to
redirect their futures.
The science of control and
communications. It has asso-
ciated with it goals that de-
rive from a belief system and
Knowledge knowledge; knowledge of
Type group norms and standards
enable the organising nature
of cybernetic processes to be
defined or redefined.
Rational
Logico-relational. Enables mis-
sions, goals, and aims to be defined,
and approached through planning.
It involves logical, relational, and
rational abilities to organise thought
and action and thus to define sets of
possible systemic and behaviour
possibilities.
The science of reasoning. Logical
processes derive from a belief and
conceptual system that give rise to a
propositional basis. It involves
specialist type of knowledge that
comes from a penchant that ulti-
mately determines cognitive pur-
poses.
Ideological
Manner of thinking. An intellectual
framework through which policy makers
observe and interpret reality that has a
politically correct ethical and moral ori-
entation, provides an image of the future
that enables action through politically
correct strategic policy, and gives a po-
litically correct view of stages of histori-
cal development in respect of interaction
with the external environment.
The science of ideas. It is an organisation
of beliefs and attitudes (religious, politi-
cal or philosophical in nature) that is
more or less institutionalised or shared
with others. It provides a total system of
thought, emotion and attitude to the
world and is reflected in any organising
process. It refers to any conception of the
world that goes beyond the ability of
formal validation.

As a result of this approach, it is argued that different methodologies have different independent
cognitive purposes. The methodologies can now be established within a frame of reference that connects
them together through their cognitive purpose. As a result, it is possible to see each methodology as an
orthogonality in a space of inquiry.
Methodological cognitive purposes can be represented as goals and aims, and examples of differ-
ent methodologies and their cognitive purposes are offered in Yolles(1998a). In particular, an example is
also provide of how two methodologies can be used together. These are Systems Intervention Strategy
(SIS) and Organisational Development (OD) that have been used together in the Open (University) Busi-
ness School in order to extend inquiry processes. Moving between the two methodologies has been called
the Mabey switch by Yolles (1998a), and the way that it has been done satisfied what Jackson refers to as
a pragmatic approach. However, Yolles has argued that by building a frame of reference that effectively
links the methodologies through their cognitive purposes, they can be used legitimately against the con-
text of paradigm incommensurability.

5. Joint Alliances and Paradigms

The term joint alliance describes various forms of cooperation between two or more organisations
(Kelly and Parker, 1997). Joint alliances arise in order to satisfy cognitive influences, purposes or
interests. They may occur between organisations of different size and geographical location, and dif-
ferent sectors (e.g., private, public, non-profit making). They are of a different nature to the more de-
tailed legal specifications of mergers, acquisitions, or intricate partnership agreements. According to
Kelly and Parker, these latter are less flexible since they tend to take more time to implement, are
usually based on a rigid set of terms and conditions, are less likely to be able to adapt quickly to
change, and can be difficult to decouple if the need arises. Alliances develop through the establish-
ment of a virtual paradigm that may initially be ill-formed and unstable, and it is because of this that
they can be volatile, with many dissolving prematurely. On the other hand, an alliance may have a
limited cognitive influence, purpose or interest, and be intended to have a limited life span and do-
main of action. An example of such an alliance is the single project. A joint alliance may also be an
enduring long term general agreement. If this occurs, it is usually the case that an establishable para-
digm will have developed that will have associated with it recognisable patterns of behaviour.
7
 Joint alliances have become fashionable in a number of industries since it is believed that
they can improve performance, increase competitiveness, and combat changes. The strategic motiva-
tion for alliances vary with the organisations involved and their cognitive purposes and interests.
Some examples have been given by Kelly and Parker. We have selected a five of these and supposed
of the types of alliances their capability of becoming viable systems in their own right (Table 3), that
is to be purposeful adaptable activity systems with cognitive properties. As a result, we have pro-
posed their associated cognitive properties.

Table 3: Example alliance situations and their cognitive attributes as a viable systems
Situation Cognitive Interest Cognitive Purpose Cognitive Influence
Cooperation in research Share cost of innovation Lead time to development Share basic knowledge of
and development innovation
New markets in Asia and Joint working with host Developing joint control Share product and market
eastern Europe country organisation to and logico-relational knowledge
develop market processes with host coun-
try organisation
Accessing segmented Help in facilitating access Share product knowledge
specialist local market to local markets
Guide technical knowl- Develop new goals Share technical knowl-
edge to keep up with de- edge
velopment in technology
Expand market share in Help by facilitating mar-
stagnant or crowded mar- ket access to new markets
kets

Once a joint alliance has been created and is seen as a purposeful adaptive activity system
then its origin may be argued to centre on one of the three domains identified in figure 3. This idea
links in with a classification of types of joint alliance (Kelly and Parker, 1997) that result in the three
domains with indication of their centre of origin:
1. Horizontal alliances occur between competitors in an industry through functional need (Bergquist
et al, 1995), thus centring on the behavioural domain of a joint venture. Collaboration across spe-
cific functions like research and development can reduce both costs and risks by sharing expertise;
another form of collaboration is cross-licensing agreements that enables risks across international
markets to be reduced.
2. Vertical alliances between organisations that shares the control of operations, thus centring on the
cybernetic domain of a joint venture. In so doing it utilises the specialist skills associated with the
partner organisations. Such a distribution can aid operational efficiency, as it can aid effective-
ness; examples of such partnerships occur between organisations in the supply-delivery chain who
may be suppliers, marketers, or distributors.
3. Diagonal alliances across organisations in different sectors of operational activity can occur by
their pooling knowledge, expertise, resources, or technology. It thus centres on the cognitive do-
main of the joint venture. Diagonal alliances represent a form or operational convergence between
the partner organisations when, for instance, the technologies of IT and telecommunications tech-
nologies come together through such a partnership.

6. Towards a Systemic Theory of Joint Ventures

Our interest here is to formulate what will perhaps become the base of a systemic theory of joint ven-
tures, linking joint alliance with methodological complementarism. We have argued that organisa-
tions must be seen as purposeful adaptive activity systems, as should be the joint ventures that are
created between them. These ventures may be alliances between the organisations or methodological
linkages operated by an inquirer.
Some are arguments have been given that address the issues raised by fundamentalists against
methodological complementarism. Since complementarism also occurs as alliances between corpo-

8
rate organisations seen as purposeful adaptive activity systems, these arguments should also apply
here, since if we are interested in developing a general theory of joint ventures the arguments must be
consistent across the two fields of management systems and strategic management. Developing on the
base the arguments of Berger and Luckman (1966) on the process of socialisation, it becomes axio-
matic that all organisations (whether they are corporations or methodologies) have their own para-
digms. If the fundamentalist arguments of paradigm incommensurability are to be held true, then this
means that joint ventures between different organisations are not possible. However, this is contrary
to our experiences, and so it is essential that we construct an argument that explains how they do it.
The argument must clearly be consistent with that given above for methodologies, suggesting that all
organisations should be seen in terms of cognitive purposes and cognitive interests.
If the notion of organisational complementarism is to be seen as valid, then we must shift
from the fundamentalists paradigm to one that has additional conceptual extensions. In our approach
these are cognitive influence, purpose, and influence. Now, complementarism involves the creation of
a virtual paradigm that enables the formulation of the nature of the cooperative behaviour. This
involves a process of cognitive influence that derives from the paradigms associated with the
participants involved in the cooperation. It also involves the development of cognitive purpose that
enables mission and goals to arise and be pursued. Further, it involves the creation of aims by active
individuals. Within joint alliance theory it is common to talk of project mission and goals. The notion
has, however, also be applied to joint methodological ventures (Yolles, 1998; 1999). The arguement
is that when a cognitive domain is established it results in the formation of a metasystem that directs
the system. The metasystem can be used to enable an explicit relationship to be defined between an
inquirer and an intervention strategy resulting from inquiry. By examining the metasystem, we are
therefore examining the cognitive purposes for an inquiry. These are cognitively projected as the
mission of a methodology, and there will often be associated goals that derive directly from that
mission. There will also be inquiry aims. All are related to the orientation of an intervention intended
for the situation being inquired into as determined by weltanschauungen and paradigms. A mission
for inquiry derives from the cognitive organisation (beliefs, values, attitudes) of a paradigm, with goals
that are defined in terms of a cognitive purpose. A set of methodological aims or inquiry cognitive
purpose also exist that is related to the purpose for inquiry as interpreted through the weltanschauung
of an inquirer. Thus for instance, in methodologies that adopt Beer’s Viable Systems Model it can be
argued that the mission will be organisational viability, the goals to achieve organisational dynamic
stability and adaptability, and aims of an inquiry in that organisation will relate to policy selection,
coordination, integration, future development. While the inquirer’s aims are determined through
weltanschauung, the mission and goals of the methodology derive from a paradigm that constrains the
way the methods that derive from it are applied to the situation to be investigated.
We can link joint alliance theory to methodological complementarism by developing some
rules given by Kelly and Parker (1997) on formulating successful joint alliances. We have coupled
them together with a possible set of rules that relate to joint methodological ventures, as proposed in
table 4. These notions could be developed by formulating other characteristics that relate to tables 1
and 2, though no space is available here to do this.
It is clear that an important aspect of joint alliances is culture. In joint alliances, cultural dif-
ferences are often cited as the cause for failure, so this is important for their formation (Fedor and
Werther, 1996). We are aware that there are a number of different attributes of culture, that include
beliefs, values, attitudes, and language; and norms and standards are also important. Thus for exam-
ple, managerial style is a behavioural manifestation of these, and can jar alliances. Consider an ex-
ample of a current joint alliance in which cultural differences may be disruptive. The UK government
has proposed the establishment of a partnership with the private sector in its metropolitan public
transport system. Thus for example, it is proposed that the private sector control the underground
railway infrastructure, while government maintains its control of the customer transaction processes.
This will only work if each partner to satisfy its distinct cognitive purposes within its own partner-
ship. Thus, one can envisage that government cognitive purposes are to qualitatively satisfy the pub-
lic transport need, while that of the private sector is to satisfy quantitative profitability. It may be that

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unless these cognitive purposes are satisfied through some form of conceptual innovation they will
appear to be contradictory and lead to the failure of the partnership.

Table 4: Possible rules relating to the development of joint ventures

Characteristics Joint Alliances
Cognitive There should be long term mutual cognitive in-
Interests terests in an alliance
Cognitive Cognitive purposes that are seen as strategic aims
Purposes and objectives of corporate organisations should
compatible
Cognitive There should be a sharing of knowledge to enable
influence the creation of a new paradigm that rules the
alliance and guides it behaviour
The whole The competencies of the alliance should be
greater than that of any one operating partner
Culture Cultural compatibility between partner organisa-
tions is important. For instance a general wisdom
is that many organisations that have similar size
and age also have a similar cultural maturity
Trust Trust between organisations is essential, reducing
the need to elaborate procedures
Interconnections Open communications between the corporate
organisations involved in an alliance is essential
Relational Change in the partner relationships can inevitably
change involve volatility
Methodological Complementarism
There should be a perceived inquirer interest in
establishing complementarism
Purposes that are seen as strategic aims and ob-
jectives of methodologies should be compatible
A new virtual paradigm is essential that results
from a selection and pooling of appropriate
knowledge that satisfies cognitive interests or
purposes.
Two utility of the combined set of methodologies
should be greater as a whole than that of an indi-
vidual methodology
Cultural compatibility between the different
paradigms of with each methodology is impor-
tant, so that both have the same values, common
beliefs, and attitudinal approach. However, new
complementarist virtual paradigms may modify
the culture.
Trusting that the methodologies are able to work
together through appropriate knowledge migra-
tion is essential
Relating the outputs of each methodology to an-
other is essential
Change in the methodological relationships can
inevitably involve volatility

There are parallels in methodological complementarism. A framework should be established

which illustrates how the methodologies are able to relate to each other. They can be related through
cognitive interest, for instance as explained to be the case for a strategic structured approach called
Total Systems Intervention (Flood, 1995), or through cognitive purposes as used by Mabey (in his
Mabey Switch, (Yolles, 1999)) by linking Systems Intervention Strategy with Organisational Devel-
opment. Here, cultural attributes should similarly be related, so that two methodologies that are
commensurable in a core subset of its propositions may well be able to be linked by an inquirer
within a joint methodological venture. This commensurability will be illustrated by the ability of the
inquirer to create a virtual paradigm that enables the framework to be defined, and to use the method-
ologies as orthogonalities.

7. Conclusion
There are parallels between the arguments that are made about the creation of joint alliances between
organisations, and those that come into being under the banner of methodological complementarism.
A common platform that enables them to be considered as different species of the same genus is to
consider them to both be purposeful adaptive activity systems. This enables them to be considered in
terms of three domains: cognitive, transformational, and behavioural, each with the cognitive proper-
ties of influence, purpose and interest. The possible importance of this is that it may provide the po-
tential for further developing the theory associated with joint alliances, beyond that explained in the
current literature. It may also more closely link in the theory of methodological complementarism,
enabling us to formulate a more general viable systems theory of joint ventures.

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