International Phenomenological Society

Bergson in Mexico: A Tribute to Jos Vasconcelos Author(s): Patrick Romanell Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Jun., 1961), pp. 501-513 Published by: International Phenomenological Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2105019 Accessed: 13/04/2009 14:48
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BERGSON IN MEXICO: A TRIBUTE TO JOSIR VASCONCELOS * Prior to the Mexican Revolution of 1910, Mexico was to all intents and purposes hardly more than a cultural colony of Europe, despite achievement of political independence from Spain the century before. With the Revolution, Mexico as a cultural entity per se was born. In contrast to the ostensibly anti-nationalist banner of the Russian Revolution of 1917, the 1910 Revolution in Mexico was openly nationalistic in general orientation. The Mexican Revolution at the beginning of the twentieth century not only came to fulfill the War of Independence at the beginning of the nineteenth by urging the political and economic recovery of Mexico; but, what is more crucial from an ideological standpoint, it came also to complete the Spanish Conquest at the beginning of the sixteenth century by encouraging the cultural and intellectual discovery of Mexico herself. This ideological discovery of Mexico by the Mexicans themselves is reflected most pointedly in those thinkers who have interpreted the Revolution in terms of the pivotal concept of la mexicanidad. Therefore, if we want to understand what is new about old Mexico, we must go ultimately to her representative philosophers. Why? Even if we don't accept in toto the opinion of the eminent medical historian Henry E. Sigerist, that "philosophers are the most powerful makers of history," 1 we must at least admit that they are its most persuasive remakers. Just as we can't understand the United States of America without the thinkers of the Enlightenment, so we can't understand the United States of Mexico without the pensadores of the Revolution. Now, of all the "patriotthinkers" of the Mexican Revolution, the greatest has been without question the late Jose Vasconcelos (1882-1959). To see his intellectual contribution in its proper context, we must take a brief look at the general development of philosophy in Mexico during the last fifty years. Contemporary Mexican philosophy may be divided, roughly, into two periods: (1) the Bergsonian (from 1910 to 1925), and (2) the Orteguian (since 1925). Each of these periods finds its ultimate roots in one way or
* The substance of this paper was presented at the Sixth Inter-AmericanCongress of Philosophy, University of Buenos Aires, Sept. 4, 1959. 1 Henry E. Sigerist, A History of Medicine, Vol. I (New York, Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 31.

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another in the Mexican Revolution of 1910. As I had occasion to point out in a recent lecture on the subject at Indiana University, the Revolution begets the idea of la mexicanidad, and this as a consequence begets in time the idea of "Mexican philosophy." In the first or Bergsonian period the approach to the idea of "Mexican philosophy" is primarily as philosophy, while in the second or Orteguian period the approach to the same idea is primarily as Mexican. The reason for the difference here between the two stages in the nationalization of the Mexican mind may not be too obvious. But, before there can be any authentic Mexican philosophy at all, clearly, there must first be philosophy as such. Now, granting with Samuel Ramos that it was the Spanish philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset who helped the present intellectual generation in Mexico find "the epistemological justification of a national philosophy," 2 it was above all the French philosopher Henri Bergson who helped the previous Mexican generation of the Revolution find the methodological justification of philosophy itself. For what distinguishes philosophy in Mexico since 1910 from its previous career is precisely a stubborn quest for autonomy. While still to a large extent dependent on European "mother philosophies" for its inspiration, contemporary Mexican philosophy no longer cares to be handmaiden to an extraneous master - be it the Church, the State, or Industry. As the historical scope of this essay is restricted to the earlier Bergsonian period of contemporary Mexican philosophy, how specifically did philosophy in Mexico acquire autonomy as a field of inquiry? This takes us directly to the philosophical counterpart in 1910 of the famous Grito de Dolores in 1810, namely, the Revolt against Positivism in Mexico. The first organized public manifestation of the Mexican revolt against positivism goes back to a lecture series sponsored by a society of young intellectuals named "El Ateneo de la Juventud," founded in Mexico City on October 28, 1909. The Ateneo scheduled six public lectures in. commemoration of the first Centennial of Mexican Independence at the Law School of the University of Mexico during August and September of 1910. The lectures were printed the same year in pamphlet form. In the foreword, we read that the purpose of the lecture series was: "to study the personality and work of Hispano-American thinkers and men of letters." 3 However, the real motive behind the Ateneo lectures was to create a fervent interest throughout Mexico in Hispano-American ideals so that the Mexican people could find a legitimate mode of self-expression
2 Samuel Ramos, Historia de laifitosofia en Mexico (M6xico,Imprenta Universitaria, 1943), p. 149. 3 Antonio Caso et. al., Conferencicsdel Ateneo de la Juventud, (M6xico, Imprenta Lacaud, 1910), p. 7.

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and thereby feel at home spiritually. Of the six Hispano-American personalities covered in the series by the members themselves of the Ateneo, four were Mexican (Manuel Jose Othon, Jose Joaquin Fernandez de Lizardi, Sor Juana Ines de la Cruz, Gabino Barreda), the other two being Eugenio M. de Hostos of Puerto Rico and Jose Enrique Rodo of Uruguay. The young lecturers included such eventual celebrities of the New Mexico as Antonio Caso, Jose Vasconcelos, Alfonso Reyes (the Ateneo's "Benjamin"), and Pedro Henriquez Urefia of Santo Domingo, the "Socrates" of the group. Though the subsequent efforts of the Ateneo in the field of adult education did not have the immediate impact on the cultural awakening of Mexico its members had envisaged, we may say in retrospect that its search for intellectual independence constitutes on the ideological plane what the Mexican Revolution of 1910 is on the political. Furthermore, of the six lectures sponsored by the Ateneo in the late summer of 1910, the lecture that comes closest to spelling out the general dissatisfaction with the positivistic ideology that had been reigning in Mexico for a couple of generations, was the last one by Vasconcelos on "Don Gabino Barreda y las Ideas Contemporaneas." Turning Comte upside down by restoring value to man's "poetic sense" and taking Comte's leading Mexican disciple Gabino Barreda to task for not realizing that scientific principles are "mere hypotheses," Vasconcelos appeals to Poincare, Carnot, Clausius, Lord Kelvin, and Bergson, closing with these daring and telling words against the official philosophy of the decadent regime of Porfirio Diaz in Mexico: "The positivism of Comte and Spencer could never satisfy our aspirations." 4 This final lecture of the series, which was delivered by Vasconcelos on the fateful evening of September 12, 1910 (that is, just three days before Independence Day in Mexico and almost on the eve of the Revolution itself), expresses so well the spirit of his new generation of the Centenario that we have christened it elsewhere the Mexican Declaration of Philosophical Independence. Whatever misgivings we may have about the later Vasconcelos for his conservative turn of mind, there is no doubt that the early Vasconcelos became in 1910, with his Grito del Ateneo against Positivism, the Father Hidalgo of Mexican Philosophy. If Comte and Spencer (and their Mexican disciples, Gabino Barreda and Justo Sierra, respectively) could never satisfy the aspirations of the Ateneistas, which philosophers could? To reply with the version of the story as given by Henriquez Urefia:
"We felt the intellectual oppression together with the political and economic oppressionwhich a large part of the country was aware of already. We saw that
4Ibid., p. 164.

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the official philosophywas too systematic, too definitive not to be mistaken. Then we embarked on reading all the philosopherswhom positivism used to condemn as useless, from Plato, who was our greatest teacher, down to Kant and Schopenhauer. We even took Nietzsche seriously, imagine that! We discovered Bergson, Boutroux, James and Croce."5

Incidentally, the Dominican writer does not specify in the passage just quoted, an influence peculiar to Vasconcelos at the time, namely, Plotinus and Hindu mysticism. But, of all the sources of inspiration behind the Mexican revolt against positivism, the subsequent evidence leads one to the conclusion that the most influential was Henri Bergson. This is perfectly clear from even a cursory examination of the work of Caso and Vasconcelos, the two major philosophers of the Ateneo and the generation of the Centenario. In fact, in his memorial tribute to Bergson in 1941, Vasconcelos admits outright that the first stage of his own thought was "doubtless Bergsonist" and credits the French philosopher for being "the most important philosophic animator of our era." 6 As to the reason for Bergson's profound influence itself in Mexico during the first quarter of the present century, this is not hard to figure out. As that great French philosopher had worked out at the beginning of the century a neat doctrine of intuition in An Introduction to Metaphysics (1903), as a weapon to combat the positivism founded by his own countryman Auguste Comte and developed subsequently along Darwinian evolutionary lines by the English positivist Herbert Spencer, so Caso and Vasconcelos later on in the century appealed in turn to Bergsonian intuitionism in order to attack the same men, as well as their Mexican disciples. Nor is it hard to explain why the reaction against nineteenth century positivism in Mexico was more violent than its predecessor in France. Positivism in Mexico was not a mere product of armchair speculation - all metaphysical speculation being bad or outmoded anyway, by positivist definition. Rather, Mexican positivism was the propaganda arm of President Diaz, "the honest tyrant." So much so that it took a whole Revolution to tear loose both the Arm and the Tyrant! Given the political backing of positivism in Mexico from approximately 1867 to 1910, is it any wonder that the youths Caso and Vasconcelos should turn to Bergson for help in the restoration and rehabilitation of speculative philosophy? Politics aside however, what counts philosophically is this: Although Caso and Vasconcelos remained to the end disciples of Bergson, they were not mere imitators or expositors of his in Mexico. For the truth is that
y otrosensayos (M6xico,El Colegiode 5 Quoted in Alfonso Reyes, Pasado inmedicato M6xico,1941), p. 47. 6 Jose Vasconcelos, "Bergson en M6xico,"Filosofia y Letras, Tomo I, No. 2 (1941), p. 239.

TOJOSEVASCONCELOS 505 IN MEXICo:A TRIBUTE BERGSON they develop Bergsonian thought along two different lines. Whereas Caso develops an ethical dualism out of the dualistic (scientific) strain in Bergsonian thought, Vasconcelos develops an aestheticmonism out of the monistic (mystical) strain found there. Needless to add, this very difference between the two Mexican Bergsonists is itself indicative of the ambiguity of Bergson's own philosophical position, as is pretty apparent in his last important work, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. The instability of Bergson's system of philosophy is due to the conflict of the two strains in his thought. On the one hand, as a dualist in biology, Bergson must assume the duality of origin of matter and life, on the ground that since "life cannot be resolved into physical and chemical facts, it operates in the manner of a special cause, added on to what we ordinarily call matter." 7 But, on the other hand, as a mystic in religion he is logically forced to interpret matter and life as "complementary aspects of creation." 8 Yet, the outcome of trying to do justice to both strains - the dualistic and the monistic - is, alas, to confuse a dualistic with a doubleaspect theory of metaphysics - which is Bergson's dilemma. To see how Caso and Vasconcelos differ from Bergson as well as from each other, a short comparison of their respective work will be necessary. We begin with a comparative survey of Caso and Bergson. Antonio Caso, who used to teach with consummate eloquence sociology as well as philosophy at the University of Mexico, was fond of stating his version of Bergsonian dualism in sociological, rather than in biological or psychological, terms. Making a polar distinction reminiscent of Heinrich Rickert, he writes: "Culture is opposed, logically, to Nature." 9 This polarity between nature and culture is interpreted ontologically, receiving elaboration from a neo-vitalistic standpoint in his main work entitled La existencia como economia, como desinteres y como caridad, which first appeared in 1916 under a shorter title and the subtitle Ensayo sobrela esencia del cristianismo. The central thesis of the work is that only through love (in the Pauline sense of caritas) can man achieve a "mystical victory" 10 over life. Exploiting for his own purposes Bergson's view in CreativeEvolution that each organism aims "only at its own convenience" and "goes for that which demands the least effort," 11 Caso concludes that life sub specie utilitatis is essentially a selfish business. Hence the full moral
7 Henri Bergson, The Two Sourcesof Moralityand Religion (New York, Holt, 1935), p. 104. 8 Ibid., p. 245. 9 Antonio Caso, La filosofia de la culturay el materialismohistoric (M6xico,Alba, 1936), p. 160. 10 Ibid., La existenciacomoeconomic,comodesintermsy comocaridad(2nd. ed., Mexioo, M6xicoModerno, 1919), p. 128. 11 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution(New York, Holt, 1911) p. 129.

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meaning of the general proposition, "Culture is opposed, logically, to Nature," is: Love is opposed, logically, to Life. Caso does not actually say

so in so many words,but that's what he is drivingat substantiallyin his cristiana,which not only assumes a book. low does this Cosmovisi6n conflictbetweenlife and love but takes it to be the major "antinomy"of ethics and religion,comparewith Bergson'sposition? It will be recalledthat Bergsonconfessesin his last testament, The Two
Sources of Morality and Religion (1932), that its mystical conclusions

those of ourformerwork,"12 naturally,thoughnot necessarily, "complete CreativeEvolution (1907), his masterpiece. Now, the important thing about Bergson'sconfessionis the distinctionit impliesbetweena natural position.This is significant and a necessary completionof his philosophical becauseit has bearingon the question as to Caso'sown contributionto Bergsonismin Mexico. Caso'sEssay on Existence (Ist ed., 1916; 2nd ed., 1919; 3rd ed., 1943) is importantnot only in that its first two editionsanticipatethe "thorough going mysticism"13 aimed at in Bergson'swork of 1932. But, by virtue of having done so, it also showsthat the Mexicandisciplemust have been somehow aware years before his French master that the mystical conclusions of The Two Sources of Morality and Religion do not necessarily Evolution.For, logically, they don't completethosereachedin Creative

"impetusof love" and "impetusof life" not being so congruous,after all, Bergson to the contrarynotwithstanding.In fact, Caso'swork is more consistent, for that matter, with an ethics of love than even Bergson's own Two Sources,where, it is written, "all morality, be it pressureor aspiration,is in essence biological."14 Why so? Because, in contrast to Bergson's metaphysical biologist, the core of Caso's philosophy of the bioconductis that all genuinemorality is in essence anti-biological, life being logical for him being identical with the egoistic. Consequently, nothingto bragabout, we shouldnot makea moralvirtue out of biological necessity. In short, down with the Iron Rule of the elan vital! The Cross of Jesus symbolizesthe DiamondRule of Ethics! To sum up Caso'srelationto Bergsonand his contributionto Bergsonism in Mexico,we may say that whereasBergsonshows us what is right with life, Caso shows us what is wrongwith it. Like Bergson, Caso is a Mexican,he is a neovitalist with neovitalist, but being characteristically a tragictouch. Caso'sis an Ode in Dispraise,not in Praise, of Life. Now, quite apartfromthe semanticdifficultiesover such weaselterms as "life" and "love," Caso'smessage is of the greatest spiritual significancees12 13 14

Ibid., The TwoSource8 of Moralityand Religion,p. 245. Ibid., p. 210. Ibid., p. 91.

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peciallyat a time like ours,when all we seem to be doingis makingfrantic preparations for sheersurvivalin a robot worldthat might not even be fit for a clamto live in, let alonefor man. By way of arriving at Vasconcelos'scontributionto Bergsonismin Mexico,let us see at a glance how he differsfrom Caso. The very tag of identification of the Vasconcelian system of philosophy, "aesthetic monism," should be sufficient to distinguishit, to repeat, from Caso's Christianor ethical dualism.This tag comes originallyfrom the title of a little book publishedin 1918,El monismo estitico,whichis a previewof the system. The book, named after the system, is itself precededby another
sort of preview entitled Pitagoras (1916), and is followed by three thick companion volumes - Tratado de metaftsica (1929), Etica (1932), and Est~tica (1936). Such Trilogy of Aesthetic Monism is completed by L6gica orgcinica (1945) and Todolog'a (1952). Ironically enough, the Todologia was intended to be the mystic culmination of the system and, as a matter

of fact, constitutes the author'slast testament, but, as its title suggests (pacelinguisticpurists),it is a veritablepotpourri, dealingin purelyspeculative mannerwith all sorts of things on earth, and in heaventoo! Note should be taken that Vasconcelos'sfirst draft of his viewpoint in
the essay on Pitagoras comes out in the same year - 1916 - as the first edition of Caso's main work, the original title of which was La existencia como economia y como caridad. However, it is plain from the start, that

even though both men look at the world from a spiritual perspective, Vasconcelosinterpretsit on the whole in aesthetic terms, rather than in ethicalones. The importantpoint to bear in mind about Vasconcelosand Caso,as far as theirrelationto Bergsonis concerned, is that whereasCaso anticipatedin a way Bergson'smystical conclusionsin The Two Sources, Vasconcelosnot only anticipated, but actually worked them out into a virtually new system of philosophy.To the extent that this is the case, Vasconceloswas a much more creative mind than Caso,though nowhere near as carefulin his scholarship.The fact that Vasconceloshas not yet receivedthe philosophic recognitionhe deservesin Mexico,not to mention elsewhere,is only proof of the fate of the proverbialprophet having no honorin his own country. Thereare, to be sure, exceptionsto this undue the philosopher.'5 neglect of Vasconcelos Still, if I may venturehere to be a prophetmyself, I predictthat Vasconceloswill come into his own as a some day and his work will be seriouslyexaminedon strictly philosopher philosophicalgrounds,as it should be anyway. When that day arrives,
15 Patrick Romanell, Making of the Mexican Mind (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1952), pp. 95-138; La formationde la mentalidadmexicana (M6xico,El Colegio de Mexico, 1954), pp. 109-159; "II MonismoEstetico-di Jose Vasconcelos,"Rivista di Filosofia, Vol. XLIV, No. 2 (1953), pp. 137-157. Also, Agustin Basave, La filosofia de Jose Vasconcelos (Madrid,CulturaHispanica, 1958).

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his system of Aesthetic Monism,whose very accent on the coordination of heterogenouselements is a subtle reflection of the cultural mestizaje of Mexicoherself,will be seen in its true proportionsand be regardedas and "Mexicanphilosophy" a more genuine product of la mexicanidad than all the dreamsof "a cosmicrace" and all the speculationson Iberofound lavishly in those two companionpropagandapieces Americanism the politician,La razac6smica(1925)and Indolog'a(1927). of Vasconcelos Whateverwe may think of "aestheticmonism"as a system, it has at least piece parading the virtue of beinga philosophy,and not just a propaganda philosophy." as "Mexican origiof Vasconcelso's Turningwithout furtherdelay to a consideration nality with respect to Bergson,there are at least three respectsin which the disciplegoes beyond Bergsonthe master,and thus comes Vasconcelos closer than the French philosopherto the cherishedgoal of "complete removes mysticism"they have in common.In the first place, Vasconcelos the dualisticstrainin Bergsonianmetaphysicsby insistingthroughouthis philosophicsystem on a rigorous"existentialmonism"of cosmicenergy monism"- matter and life and together with a diversified"hierarchical of the same being conceivedas three different"revulsions" consciousness However, it energy, that is to say, not as three different substances.16 should be added for the sake of the record that after returningto the Roman CatholicChurchin his later years, Vasconcelosreintroducedthe dualisticstrain of traditionalreligioninto his thought. This comes out in full force in a paper preparedfor the Twelfth InternationalCongressof Philosophy at Venice, which appearedshortly before his death. In the paper, which may be the very last he published,Vasconcelosflatly deis the only being "whois not energy."17 claresthat Godthe Creator In the second place, part of Vasconcelos'soriginality with respectto the latter'sinitial conceptof intuBergsonlies in that he deintellectualizes ition as "intellectual sympathy" by making it "super-intellectual": pathos or emocion.In so doing, Vasconcelosanticipates the very "extension"of intuition beyond the philosophicpale which Bergsonis led to in The Two Sourcesfrom mystic convictions. Even so, there remains a differencebetween the two thinkers.While the Frenchmaster differentiates "mystical intuition"18 from other varieties and has some qualms about its cognitive reliability, the Mexicandiscipleis a more thoroughgoing mystic in methodologyinsofaras he would insist that all intuition there For Vasconcelos, is at bottom mystical,that is, "supra-intellectual."
Jose Vasconcelos,La revulsionde la energia(Mexico, 1924), pp. 1-22. Ibid., "El hombrey la diversidadde la naturaleza,"RevistaMexicanade Filosofia, Afio I, No. 2 (1958),p. 6. 18 Henri Bergson, The Two Sourcesof Moralityand Religion,pp. 244-245.
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is no difference except in name between the way of the prophet and saint on the one hand and the way of the poet and philosopher on the other, inasmuch as each of them in his own manner reveals res significans via

man's special organ of "aesthetic emotion." This brings us to the very

heart of Aesthetic Monism as a philosophic system and to what is unique about it, namely, its aestheticmethodology or "organic logic." The most characteristic and novel thing about Aesthetic Monism as a system of philosophy is that its author deliberately and daringly assigns primacy to the imagination as a way of knowing at a time when practically everybody swears by the method of science. To appreciate Vasconcelos's contribution and not just take it for granted, we must not forget that, save for a few noteworthy exceptions, imagination has been methodologically suspect for a long, long time in the history of Western thought, with the net result that it, like poor Cinderella, has been obliged to play second fiddle to its more favored rivals, reason and will. Since the turn of the century, however, the status of imagination has improved considerably. Witness, for example, the significant work done by Croce and Bergson to that effect, and Montague's vision that creative imagination is "man's nearest approach to the ways of primordial Being." 19 Moreover, lately, the voice of imagination is beginning to be heard from even scientific quarters, as is illustrated by a recent contribution from the pen of Edmund W. Sinnott, a distinguished American botanist.20 Nevertheless, to our knowledge, no man has made as strong an appeal to the logical significance of imagination as Vasconcelos - at least not since the time of Schelling's pregnant hunch that art is the organon of philosophy. To be sure, as in the case of Bergson, Vasconcelos can be easily criticized

for taking his pet method of imaginationtoo seriouslyand for not taking the othermoresoberways of knowingseriouslyenough.Such criticismof in logic is doubtlesspertinent,yet we must not overlookthe romanticism other side of the picture. All told, we could put Vasconcelos'sover-all contributionin relation to Bergson'sas follows. While Bergson teaches world what is wrongwith science,Vasconcelosteaches our contemporary it what is rightwith art. The differencehere betweenthe two messagesis one of emphasis,of course,but in matters of philosophysuch differences in theory. in accent make all the difference a further development of Bergsonian represents Aesthetic monism thought in the sense it makes explicit what is only implicit in Bergson's defenseof metaphysicsin a worlddominatedby science,to wit, that meta19 William P. Montague, GreatVisions of Philosophy (La Salle, Open Court, 1950), p. 25. 20 Edmund W. Sinnott, "Man's Unique Distinction," Main Currentsin Modern Vol. 14, No. 5 (1958), pp. 99-106. Thought,

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physics can truly substantiate its claim to dispense with the abstract concepts of science if and only if it operates with the concrete intuitions of the artist. By expanding Bergson's thesis in the classic essay on Laughter (1900), that art brings us "face to face with reality itself," 21 and by clarifying the meaning of Bergsonian intuition, that it is "aesthetic in character," Vasconcelos arrives at the far-reaching conclusion that the only way of fully understanding the nature of things is through "aesthetic intuition" or "aesthetic thinking." 22 Why? Because things, being actually "heterogenous," can only be comprehended by a mode of thought which is appropriate to them, and the mode which fits the circumstances thinking, product of creative imagination. perfectly is precisely aesthetic If this is so, then metaphysical truth and artistic truth coincide. According to our Mexican author, the fundamental trouble with ordinary or discursive reasoning - the deductive type of thinking used exclusively in pure mathematics and to a lesser extent in the natural sciences - is that it reduces the "heterogenous" to the "homogeneous," the particular to the general, the concrete to the abstract. Such reduction of the qualitative to the quantitative yields useful scientific information, no doubt, but science is not wisdom. However, instead of candidly admitting the limitations of their analytic method, rationalists (Vasconcelos dubs them abstraccionistas) react like the fox of the fable, calling the grapes out of reach sour. In other words, ironically enough, thinking itself is much more "complex" than the rationalists think! Wherein lies the superiority of aestheticthinking over the ordinary kind? In its power of "coordination," answers Vasconcelos. This power to coordinate whole areas of knowledge without reducing them to a least common denominator is the peculiar property of human imagination. Contrary to popular opinion, man's imagination is not an "arbitrary faculty," inasmuch as the human mind, besides having the built-in set of categories that Kant assigns to it, is "also endowed with special forms of understanding applicable to the aesthetic phenomenon," namely, "rhythm, melody, and harmony." 23 This "aesthetic trinity" - rhythm, melody, harmony - constitutes by the - the discovery of which he claimed to way Vasconcelos's AprioriEsteitco be "in large part" his own.24 Now then, whatever be our opinion of this Mexican variety of Aesthetic Transcendentalism, there is something quite refreshing and instructive about its attempt to effect via the imagination a concordance of reason and emotion, especially when we have so-called
Henri Bergson, Laughter(New York, Macmillan,1911), p. 157. Jose Vasconcelos,Todologia(M6xico,Botas, 1952), p. 156, p. 55. 23 Ibid., p. 193. Also, "The Aesthetic Development of Creation," in Papers and Abstractsof the Second Inter-AmericanCongressof Philosophy (New York, Columbia University Press, 1947), p. 124. 24 Ibid., Estetica(3rd. ed., M6xico,Botas, 1945), p. 215, p. 641.
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BERGSON IN MEXICO: A TRIBUTE TO JOSE'VASCONCELOS 511 cognitivists" and "emotivists" these days who separate the two unnecessarily. So much for the second or methodological respect in which Vasconcelos goes beyond Bergson. In the third and final place, Vasconcelos carries mysticism further than Bergson not only because he is a more thoroughgoing monist in metaphysics and a more thoroughgoing intuitionist in methodology, but because he is a more thoroughgoing mystic in practical philosophy. This raises the delicate yet crucial question as to the whole aim of mysticism and the definition of the ideal mystic. According to Bergson, "the ultimate end of mysticism is the establishment of a contact, consequently of a partial coincidence, with the creative effort which life itself manifests. This effort is of God, if it is not God Himself. The great mystic is to be conceived as an individual being, capable of transcending the limitations imposed on the species by its material nature, thus continuing and extending the divine action. Such is our definition." 25 This is Bergson's definition of complete mysticism and the great mystic, but not Vasconcelos's. On the contrary, in the eyes of our Mexican philosopher, the ultimate objective of mysticism is not to seek an "identity" or coincidence, partial or total, but a "harmony" of creature and Creator.26In a word, mysticism is not pantheism. Moreover, the really great mystic for Vasconcelos would be that exceptional person who not only succeeds "in triumphing over materiality," 27 as Bergson rightly maintains, but who succeeds also in transcending the limitations of life itself, that is, in triumphing over vitality. Of the two foregoing views, which reveals greater insight into the question at issue? If a nonmystic like myself can speak here at all about something admittedly ineffable, I suspect that Vasconcelos's view is more in keeping with the mystical experience itself than Bergson's - the latter sounding a bit too sensible and too secular to fit the exceedingly peculiar logic of the situation. For one thing, Bergson's conception of the ideal mystic is such that his model individual is kept so occupied with divine business that he has no time to pause and listen to the voice of God. Bergson identifies complete mysticism with the mysticism of Christianity, but his humanistic interpretation of the latter would be quickly challenged by the Christian mystics themselves. According to Vasconcelos, who speaks for them, the ultimate goal of la mistica, which constitutes "the supreme science," is attainable only through the "supernatural operation" of grace, that is, through the gift of God, not through any efforts of man.28 In this connection, Bergson may be quite justified in insisting that
25 26 27 28

Henri Bergson, The Two Sourcesof Moralityand Religion,p. 209. Jose Vasconcelos, Todologia,p. 73. Henri Bergson, The Two Sourcesof Moralityand Religion,p. 246. Jose Vasconcelos,Todologia,p. 244.

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"complete mysticism is action," 29 and not mere contemplation. But I am afraid he is on the wrong track when he insists at the same time that the distinguishing mark of a thoroughgoing mysticism is its faith "in the efficacy of human action," 30 and concludes therefrom that it is this faith which makes the mysticism of Christianity superior to the other historic forms of mysticism. For his conclusion about the superiority of Christian mysticism, however true, is based on the dubious assumption that the Christian mystic actually believes in the efficacy of human action. No, Vasconcelos would contend that what makes Christian mysticism a complete, "active mysticism" is its complete faith in the efficacy of divine, not human, action. Otherwise, what would distinguish Christian mysticism from ethical humanism? Besides, the Mexican author thinks that "there is a profound difference between the religious and the ethical," the ethical enjoying in his philosophic system only a "secondary rank." 31 Whereas the essence of religion resides in "knowing how to forgive," the essence of morality lies in knowing how to give and take - justice being simply a calculating matter of checks and balances.32 To recapitulate, the most interesting feature of Aesthetic Monism when compared with Bergson's philosophy, is that it culminates in mysticism by way of artistic experience, rather than by way of moral experience. Hence whatever differences exist between Bergson and Vasconcelos in philosophical thought are due ultimately to the fact that the former's final mysticism stems from ethical concerns, the latter's from aesthetic ones. This being the case, it follows from the preceding considerations that an aesthetic mystic like Vasconcelos, who had his ear tuned to the music of the spheres and, as a result, was apt to be more receptive to the voice of God, is a better mystic in theory - though not necessarily a better moralist - than an ethical mystic like Bergson, whose chief concern was the improvement or "the conquest of the world." 33 Even though Bergson himself was convinced that the Christian mystics exemplify in history what he called complete mysticism, it seems that he had too much of the aura of the Jewish prophets in his cultural background and in his own soul to adopt a full-fledged Christian mysticism. In any event, whoever is correct about the essence of mysticism, Vasconcelos holds with Schopenhauer, as against Bergson, that the ultimate goal of human life is "to transcend life," not "to create" it.34 In short, like his compatriot Antonio Caso, Vasconcelos was a radical pessimist about life.
Henri Bergson, The Two Sourcesof Moralityand Religion, p. 215. Ibid., p. 214. p. 164. Jos6 Vasconcelos,Todologict, Ibid., p. 165. 33 Henri Bergson, The Two Sourcesof Moralityand Religion,p. 229. 34 Jose Vasconcelos,Tratadode metaft 8ica (M6xico,M6xicoJoven, 1929), p. 205.
29 30 31 32

BERGSONIN MEXICO: A TRIBUTE TO JOSE'VASCONCELOS

513

With these brief comments on mysticism, we bring to a close this account of the influence of Bergson in Mexico. Of the three main contributions of contemporary Mexican philosophy - (1) development of Bergsonism, (2) development of the idea of a national philosophy, (3) development of a tragic sense of life - our study has been limited to a discussion of the first contribution - which is the foremost to be made so
far in Mexico. Mexican Bergsonism, which was born with the Revolution as a reaction against positivism, develops after 1910 along two lines, each

corresponding to a strain of Bergsonian thought. In the first part of our memorial tribute to Vasconcelos, I have tried to show in summary fashion, for purposes of contrast, that Antonio Caso represents a more consistent version in Mexico of Bergson the dualist in that he developed an unashamed Christian dualism. In the second part, the attempt has been to show in some detail that Jose Vasconcelos represents a more consistent version in Mexico of Bergson the mystic in that he in turn developed an unashamed Catholic mysticism. Reference has already been made to the fact that in 1941, the year of Bergson's death, Vasconcelos paid great tribute to the French master in his article "Bergson en Mexico," published in Mexico's principal philosophical journal, Filosofta y Letras.35Henceforth the year 1959 will always be remembered in the annals of Western philosophy as both the centennial of Henri Bergson's birth and the year when his greatest disciple in Latin America, Jose Vasconcelos of Mexico, died. PATRICK ROMANELL.
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, MEDICAL BRANCH, GALVESTON.

35

Tomo I, No. 2 (1941), pp. 239-253.