T3 B6 Staff Statements March Hearings FDR - Entire Contents - Withdrawal Notices - Emails - Draft Staff Statements - Notes 073

Page 1 of 1
Mike Hurley
From: Mike Hurley

Sent: Saturday, March 20, 2004 8:22 PM
To: Front Office; Stephanie Kaplan; Team 3
Subject: Where you can find the Staff Statements 5 6 7 8
The diplomacy, military, Intel, and nsc approved final staff statements (#'s
5, 6, 7, & 8) are now all on the unclassified drive. You can find them in:
Unclass drive/shared/Team 3/Approved Final Staff Statements/

Diplomacy Staff Statement (032004).doc
Military staff statement 032004 final.doc
Intel staff statement 032004 final.doc
NSC staff statement 032004 final.doc
Thanks,
Mike
3/20/2004
Mike Hurley
From: Bonnie Jenkins
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2004 12:15 PM
To: Philip Zelikow
Cc: Team 3
Subject: FW: Schultz Report - Terms of Loan Arrangement (FOUO)
FYI:
Bonnie
Original Message
From: Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI [mailto:Pat.Downs@osd.mil]
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2004 11:52 AM
To: Bonnie Jenkins; Dan Marcus; Steve Dunne; Graham Giusti
Cc: Deitz, Robert, Mr, DoD OGC; Aly, Stewart, Mr, DoD OGC; Gainor, Sharon, CPO, DoD OGC;
Lehner, Johnathan, Mr, DoD OGC; Jones, Dawn T, LtCol, OSD-USDI; 'dan.levin@usdoj.gov';
'Brian.H.Hook@usdoj.gov1; Dalton, William, Mr, DoD OGC; Sweatt, Susan, COL, OSD-USDI;
Eaves, Jennifer, LCDR, OSD-USDI; Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI
Subject: RE: Schultz Report - Terms of Loan Arrangement (FOUO)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Dan, Steve, Bonnie,
I regret to inform you that we are deferring a decision to allow loan arrangements for our
restricted-read-access documents, such as for the Schultz document, as below.
As you probably know by now, we have identified what appears to be sensitive and highly
classified information in Staff Statements #6 and #7. This situation causes us concern.
I am hopeful that through the DoJ we can agree on appropriate security arrangements to
ensure adequate protection of classified information. Once that is done, hopefully in
short order, we would be happy to reconsider any loan arrangements you desire. Pat
Original Message
From: Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI
Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2004 3:01 PM
To: 'Bonnie Jenkins'; 'dmarcus@9-llcommission.gov'; 'sdunne@9-llcommission.gov1; 'mhurley®
9-llcommission.gov'
Cc: Aly, Stewart, Mr, DoD OGC; Gainor, Sharon, CPO, DoD OGC; Lehner, Johnathan, Mr, DoD
OGC; Jones, Dawn T, LtCol, OSD-USDI; Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI; 'Brian.H.Hook@usdoj.gov'
Subject: RE: Shultz Report - Terms of Loan Arrangement (FOUO)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Bonnie,
Yes, the Shultz report will be included in the Friday delivery. The Schultz document is
being provided to you on a loan basis for up to 30 days. The same groundrules apply to
this document that apply to other restricted-read-access documents. That is, any notes
taken based on the document should not quote portions of the document verbatim; notes
should be properly classified; and no copies of the document, in whole or in part, should
be made. Please call me if you have any questions. Pat
Original Message
From: Bonnie Jenkins [mailto:bjenkins@9-llcommission.gov]
Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2004 2:15 PM
To: Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI
Subject: RE: Unintended Delivery of Read-Access DoD Documents (FOUO)
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

SERIES: Team 3,9/11 Commission
NND PROJECT NUMBER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107
WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/03/2008
BOX: 00002 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 113 DOC ID: 31212166
COPIES: 1 PAGES: 14
ACCESS RESTRICTED^
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:
FOLDER TITLE: Staff Statements: March Public Hearings
DOCUMENT DATE: 03/09/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: Draft
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT: Draft of staff statement 7
This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

9/11 Classified Information
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j^^ESSRESTRICTEDJ
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT: Diplomacy, Staff Statement No. 5

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
Page 1 of 1
Mike Hurley
From: Stephanie Kaplan

Sent: Tuesday, March 09, 2004 5:48 PM
To: Front Office; Team 3; Team 1; Kevin Scheid
Subject: Staff Statement No. 5
Okay, folks.
Please find attached the version of Staff Statement No. 5 that will go to pre-pub review. I received a significant
number of changes at the end (for which I am grateful!), but they caused a major crunch, and I don't have time to
review the draft again. I also did not have time to incorporate most of Scott Allan's changes, but I did include the
most substantial ones.
Please let me know if I missed anything, but I think this passes the test for pre-pub review.
Thanks,
Stephanie
STEPHANIE L. KAPLAN
9-11 COMMISSION
7(202)331-1125
F (202) 296-5545
www.9-11commission.gov
3/9/2004
Page 1 of 1
Mike Hurley
From: Scott Allan

Sent: Tuesday, March 09, 2004 3:57 PM
To: Front Office
Cc: Team 3; Yoel Tobin; Tom Dowling
Subject: Draft Conclusion for the Diplomacy Statement
• Though its success varied, diplomacy was an important part of America's counterterrorism policy before
[and immediately after] 9-11.
From the fall of 1998 through the middle of September 2001, the USG, through a variety of diplomatic
means including warnings, threats, and sanctions, tried to persuade the Taliban to render Bin Ladin to a
country where he could face justice.
• Sanctions and pressing the Taliban continued until right after 9/11. But with the Taliban's resilience to
sanctions and Mullah Omar's increasingly close connection with Bin Ladin, international alienation was not
enough to drive a wedge between the Taliban and Bin Ladin.
• U.S. efforts to force Pakistan to press the Taliban also proved challenging. Islamabad was the Taliban's
most ardent supporter and never seriously pushed the Taliban to move against Bin Ladin and his network.
• Saudi Arabia was a complicated friend [ally/partner] in our diplomatic approach to the Bin Ladin problem.
Its intelligence chief twice traveled to Afghanistan to seek a deal on Bin Ladin only to be rebuffed by the
Taliban. On the other hand, Riyadh's cooperation with Washington on intelligence sharing and disrupting
al Qaeda finances ranged from inconsistent to poor [Roth?].
3/9/2004
Page 1 of 1
Mike Hurley
From: Chris Kojm

Sent: Monday, March 08, 2004 9:30 AM
To: Alexis Albion; Bonnie Jenkins
Cc: Mike Hurley
Subject: Intel,military staff statements
Alexis - I talked a little more to Philip. He wants the bulk of the 3 sightings story in the military piece;
I am working on them there. You should, however, work on a concluding paragraph or two for the intel statement,
summarizing the key findings.
Bonnie - I have made good progress on the military piece. I think I will be done with my edits this afternoon. It
would be exceedingly helpful if you can hook up with Allen Holmes and run down the rest of this story about the
Kuster memo, as I know you intend to do. The story gets stranger and stranger.
3/8/2004
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DOCUMENT DATE: 03/07/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: E-Mail Printout/(Trofs Notes)
FROM: Byman
TO: Allan
SUBJECT: Comments on newest diplomacy staff statement

9/11 Personal Privacy
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DOCUMENT DATE: 03/06/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: E-Mail Printout/CProfs Notes)
FROM: Kaplan
TO: Kojm, et al
SUBJECT: RE: Intel Staff statement

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
Page 1 of 1
Mike Hurley
From: Mike Hurley

Sent: Wednesday, March 03, 2004 8:50 AM
To: Scott Allan
Cc: Team 3
Subject: Tasking from Philip Yesterday
Scott:
Philip is re-working our staff statements.
With respect to the State staff statement, he asked for the following from you:
A compendium of all MemCons or executive summaries of interaction with foreign

leaders on our subjects (CT, Taliban, Pak, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, etc.) during
our period of interest (1998 - September 20, 2001) that involves the President,
National Security Advisor, Secretary of State, or DCI.
• He's interested in what our principals said or wrote (so this would include letters
principals sent) to foreign leaders.
He'd like a clear, annotated chronology of these communications. When did the
meeting occur? Who was involved? Brief points on the message delivered.
Where are the MemCons or summaries held?
• Alexis, Dan Byman, and Warren may all be able to contribute something on this.
So, please call on them for help.
• Philip will also be looking at notes that he took and that I took (that are held at the
NEOB) on Presidents Clinton and Bush's communications (letters/conversations)
with foreign leaders. Philip is likely to insert those points in the chronology you
put together.
Philip would like you to make this tasking a priority.
Thanks,
Mike
3/3/2004
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ACCESS
DOCUMENT DATE: 03/01/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: Note/Notes
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT: Handwritten Notes

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DOCUMENT DATE: 02/25/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: Briefing Paper
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT: Draft Staff Statement
Intelligence as an instrument of U.S. counterterrorism policy

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
Page 1 of 1
Mike Hurley
From: Mike Hurley

Sent: Wednesday, February 25, 2004 2:55 PM
To: Team 3
Subject: Request on Staff Statements
TeamSsters:
To assist with the editing process of the staff statements, I'd

appreciate if you would:
1) double space the text of the hard copy you submit;
2) include a header with the following information:
FROM: Your initials TO: Initials of teammates

separated by commas
Info on which draft it is, e.g., Second draft,

incorporating MH/WB edits
Feb. 25
3) when marking up a colleague's text you're reviewing, please

do everything possible to make your edits clear and
readable, so that we'll know exactly what changes you wish
to make.
Thanks,
Mike
2/25/2004
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 30
FROM: Bass
TO: Hurley
SUBJECT: National Policy Coordination Staff Statement Draft

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
Page 1 of 1
Mike Hurley
From: Warren Bass

Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 5:28 PM
To: Dan Byman
Cc: Mike Hurley
Subject: NSC piece
Thanks for your message, man.

I've worked your points in, but I'd actually love to sit down with you and have another kick at this can (or mix of
this metaphor). I've added a blunt (and not terribly good) graf on analysis, but I'd be curious for your take on how
much we can/should try to get away with.
My main concern is having this in good enough shape that we can start a process with Philip, who I presume has
some very strong views on what he wants said. So I'd just like to make sure we've got the underlying narrative
right, and to make sure that you, me, and Mike are all on the same analytical page when and if we have to fight for
our judgments.
I'm around all week—lemme know when's good for you.
Warren
2/24/2004
Regarding staff statements,
• Important to use a "light touch"
• Byman, Hawley, and I can roll with anything, even a

TLAM in the chest
• You are particularly interested in CT policy, and are

strong in it
• You have had access to materials we haven't seen
• Need a constructive, positive approach
• This is a new genre
• People see things in different ways, have different ideas
• I have to worry about morale, which has been generally

good
• First, don't demoralize
• We've done some heavy lifting, there's more to do

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TO:
SUBJECT: Team3Mates

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DOCUMENT DATE: 02/23/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: E-Mail Printout/CProfs Notes)
FROM: Byman
TO: Hurley
SUBJECT: RE: Some Ideas for your Staff Statements

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FROM: Jenkins
TO: Hurley
SUBJECT: RE: Some Ideas for your Staff Statements

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the wp story is stunning, what a bureaucratic clusterf—k!
"CIA officers working from Islamabad, led by station chief Gary

Schroen, assumed in early 1998 that if their agents captured bin
Laden in southern Afghanistan, a U.S. grand jury would quickly indict
him."
grand juries!! what were these people thinking? my personal opinion

was that bill clinton (like most demos) was (is) absolutely terrified of
physical violence or confrontation, no matter how warranted (or
abstracted), so he sends in the cops when someone just needs to take
a head shot, bottom line is that clinton punked out.
Posted by mike at February 21, 2004 05:57 PM

Page 1 of 1
Mike Hurley
From: Mike Hurley

Sent: Friday, February 20, 2004 12:00 PM
To: Team 3
Subject: Comments from Philip on DoD
Philip called from Charlottesville this morning and during our conversation he
described his conceptual approach to DoD's response to the aQ threat. Essentially, he
sees 4 phases:
I. August '98 through fall '98: The TLAM strikes, Infinite Resolve planning,
including AC-130 and other options;
II. December '98 through May 99: Planning and readiness for TLAM strikes on
bin Laden if locational intelligence is provided;
III. Post-millennium threat: stepped up military planning;
IV. Post-Cole attack: Clarke pressing for military options, but not much
happening
Philip acknowledged that in spring/summer 2001 policy papers were wrestling with the
idea of DoD doing more but that pre9/11 the military hadn't actually initiated any new
planning. Armed Predator was what General Myers cited as the military's offensive
involvement in that period.
Warren/Alexis/Bonnie: Per Philip, EOP 5 documents have some interesting detail on

collateral damage and related issues; this information sheds light on why certain
options weren't selected. We'll need to have a good understanding of why we didn't
move forward on these military options.
He also spoke of 4 schools of thought that he sees in the Clinton administration on use
of force: Clarke—who emphasizes a series of strikes at times and places of our
choosing, keep enemy off balance, show we're serious, hurt infrastructure, go after
Taliban; Zinni—in favor of a policy of bolstering front line states to deal with the
problem, against TLAMS due to collateral damage, likelihood that missiles wouldn't get
bin Laden in any event, and fact they would inflame Muslims against US soldiers/sailors
throughout his AOR; Schoomaker—CT wasn't really DoD's mission, SOCOM was a
supporting command, not decision maker, but should have had lead, though relevant
PDDs, etc. made clear CT was a LE and Intel problem, in any event, SOCOM could only
supply trained SOFs and SOF equipment to CENTCOM; and what Philip calls the
"Principals' School of Thought (Berger, Tenet, Cohen, Albright to some extent)—they're
deeply concerned about the problem, they're in a box trying to find a way out. They
reject the Clarke bombing series option but never accept the Zinni alternative.
I pass this along to you, not because I agree with each point, but to let you know what
he's thinking.
Mike
2/20/2004
OUTLINE
MARCH 2004
DIPLOMACY STAFF STATEMENT
1. Counterterrorism in USG Foreign Policy
a. Counterterrorism in the late 1980's

i) Preemption
ii) Sanctions
b. Counterterrorism in the early 1990' s,

i) Competing priorities
ii) Focusing on state sponsors
iii) Focusing on the middle east
c. Approaching 1998
i) WTC 1
ii) Khobar
iii) Instruments
d. "Hitting Home", Almost

i) Transborder groups
ii) Increasing priorities
iii) Increasing focus on South Asia
e. 1998-2001
i) Millennium threats
ii) Cole
iii) Approaching 9-11
f. 9-11 and Beyond

i) New priorities and strategies
ii) More muscular approach
iii) Areas for concern
A) Current and future sanctuaries
B) US Image overseas
C) Working with others
D) Madrassahs
2. Multilateral Efforts to Combat Terrorism
a. Approach during the early to mid 1990's

i) State Sponsors/middle east
ii) Sanctions
iii) Working with Allies: Gulf states, Europeans
b. Efforts after the Embassy Bombings

i) UN Sanctions
ii) Pressuring the Taliban
iii) Going after the money
c. "With Us or Against Us" - Multilateral approaches after 9-11

i) Enlisting Support on short notice
ii) Staying focused
3. US Policy Towards Afghanistan
a. The Last battle of the Cold War- US goals for Afghanistan in the 1980' s
i) Working with the Mujahedeen- voices of support and
concern
ii) The network grows and the west celebrates
b. Walking Away. US Policy towards Afghanistan from 1990-1997

i) Urgency elsewhere
ii) Limited resources
c. 1997-1998 Understanding the Taliban

i) Early interactions with the Taliban Movement
ii) The ongoing civil war
iii) Concerns about human rights and drugs
iv) American Economic interests
v) Increasing the pressure on the terrorism issue
d. US Policy towards Afghanistan after the 1998 bombings

i) TLAMs and Talks
ii) New focus on the region
iii) Getting by with little/no help from our friends
iv) Demarching the Taliban (being held responsible)
v) Imposing sanctions (State Sponsor/FTO listing)
vi) Limited Success - Taliban's canned response
vii) All in the family—the UBL-Omar Relationship
viii) Reassessing the strategy
A) Approaching the NA
B) Trading UBL for recognition
C) Toppling the Taliban... what fills the void?
ix) Texans and Talibs—The New Administrations Approach to

Afghanistan.
A) No changes coming into the summer of threat
B) Continued pressure and demarches
C) Increasing concerns/revisiting approaches (working
with the NA, Toppling Taliban, military action)
e. Afghanistan in the post 9-11 world

i) One last chance. Calls for Omars to turn over UBL
ii) Enlisting others including the NA
iii) Consolidating our gains
4. US Policy Towards Pakistan
a. A valued Cold War ally- US-Pakistan relations during the 1980's
b. Problems/Priorities with Pakistan during the 1990's (through 1997)
i) Nuke ambition
-Pre 1998 sanctions
ii) Indo-Relations
iii) Democratization
iv) Afghan Policy
A) Strategic Depth
B) Supporting the Taliban
C) ISID
c. Another summer of threat; May 1998-Aug.l998

i) Nuke focused strategy
ii) CT not on the backburner
iii) Ability to achieve goals with sanctions in place
d. Pak. Policy post Embassy bombings:

i) More calls for Afghan cooperation
ii) Limited instruments, limited success
iii) State Sponsor list (Kashmiris)
iv) Oct. 1999 coup—stepping forwards or stepping back
v) Increasing engagement- high profile trips in the winter/spring
2000
vi) Bush Administrations Pakistan Policy. New hopes for
engagement. DCs and Summer meetings with Pak diplomats
e. Pakistan after 9-11
i) Mahmoud in US
ii) Armitage contacts Musharraf; symbolic of the new
relationship
iii) Not yet there... areas for improvement
A) FATA/Karachi as havens
B) Madrassahs
C) Kashmir
5. US Policy Towards Saudi Arabia
6. Sudan as a Terrorist Sanctuary
a. Radical tradition
b. Sudan as a safe haven
i) number of groups
ii) open borders
iii) state support
iv) conferences
v) 1993 State Sponsors list
c. 1995 Isolation Policy set

i) basis/aid workers/Mubarak attempt
ii) support for this policy
iii) Mubarak attempt
d. Out of Africa—UBL leaves for Afghanistan

i) UBL presence in Afghanistan
ii) AQ infrastructure remains despite Sudan claims
iii) Why didn't we take him- March-May 1996 meetings with
USG representatives
e. Sudan policy in the late 1990's and its bearing on USG CT policy
i) Closing the embassy and failure to reopen
ii) Criticism vs. intelligence.
iii) Willing to listen but not giving carrots.
iv) Change in the air
v) Missed opportunities?
vi) Working with the Sudanese on CT in 2000
vii) Still on the list
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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DOCUMENT DATE: 02/18/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: E-Mail Printout/(Profs Notes)
FROM: Hurley
TO: Bass
SUBJECT: Some Thoughts for the NSC Staff Statement

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
Page 1 of 1
Mike Hurley
From: Warren Bass

Sent: Monday, February 16, 2004 1:15 PM
To: Christine Healey; Mike Jacobson; Peter Rundlet
Cc: Mike Hurley; Len Hawley
Subject: Say, is this true?
Just came across this in Time—is it right?
Heeding the pleas from the FBI's New York

City office, where Mawn and O'Neill were desperate for new
linguists and analysts, acting FBI director Pickard asked the
Justice Department for some $ 50 million for the bureau's
counterterrorism program. He was turned down. In August, a bureau
source says, he appealed to Attorney General Ashcroft. The reply
was a flat no.
Pickard got Ashcroft's letter on Sept. 10.
Source is:
Copyright 2002 Time Inc.
Time Magazine
August 12, 2002
SECTION: SPECIAL REPORT: THE SECRET HISTORY; Pg. 28
LENGTH: 10452 words
HEADLINE: They Had A Plan;

Long before 9/11, the White House debated taking the fight to al-Qaeda. By the time they
decided, it was too late. The saga of a lost chance
BYLINE: Michael Elliott, Reported by Massimo Calabresi, John F. Dickerson, Elaine Shannon, Mark
Thompson, Douglas Waller and Michael Weisskopf/Washington; Hannah Bloch and Tim
McGirk/Islamabad; Cathy Booth Thomas/Dallas; Wendy Cole and Marguerite Michaels/Chicago;
Bruce Crumley/Paris; James Graff/Brussels; David Schwartz/Phoenix; and Michael Ware/Kabul
2/16/2004
Page 1 of 1
Mike Hurley
From: Mike Hurley

Sent: Friday, February 13, 2004 10:16 AM
To: Warren Bass
Cc: Alexis Albion; Mike Hurley
Subject: Staff Statements
Warren:
Alexis and I had a conceptual breakthrough on the staff

statements this morning. It almost rivals the Hurley Predator as
missile insight in its intellectual virtuosity.
We'll share this with you this afternoon, after your return from
NEOB and mine from the Townsend interview.
FYI, I'm "breaking bread" with Roger the dodger at 11:30 this
morning. I'll of course be using my case officer powers to get
"gouge" from him.
Mike
2/13/2004
Page 1 of 1
Mike Hurley
From: Mike Hurley

Sent: Thursday, February 12, 2004 6:24 PM
To: 'bonniejenkins@harvard.edu'
Cc: Mike Hurley; Warren Bass
Subject: Proposed Outline for DoD Staff Statement
Hi Bonnie:
Please see attached. Hope this helps.
Regards,
Mike
2/12/2004
Mike Hurley
From: bonniejenkins@harvard.edu
To: Mike Hurley
Subject: Re: Proposed Outline for DoD Staff Statement
Mike,
Thanks. I will look at this in more detail in the next few days. I should note that we are
limited in what we can say about Infinite R because that is all focal point material. That
is the problem with that. No one discussed that information in as much detail as we saw in
the documents themselves. We can discuss this next week.
I will work on the letters to Cohen and Rumsfeld this weekend. I asked Scott and Alexis to
send me the drafts of their letters so I can use them as examples.
Best,
Bonnie
Page 1 of 1
Mike Hurley
From: Mike Hurley
To: Warren Bass; Daniel Byman
Cc: Mike Hurley
Subject: Points for Bonnie's Staff Statement
Warren and Dan:
• I took an initial stab at suggesting points for Bonnie's staff statement.
• Warren, you can find it on the unclass computer, shared drive, team 3
folder: DoD and Military Staff Statement for Bonnie.doc
• Dan, see the attachment and make additions.
• Please make it better.
• I'd like to email it to Bonnie on Friday.
Mike
2/12/2004
To: Bonnie Jenkins
From: Mike Hurley
Subject: Suggested Key Points/Structure for DoD/Military

Staff Statement
Date: February 12, 2004
Bonnie,
• As you know, Team 3 met with Philip yesterday for guidance on the 4 staff
statements we're on the hook to produce for the late March public hearings. I
forwarded our deadlines for the staff statements via separate email.
• I paid close attention to Philip's suggestions and wanted to pass them along to
you, along with my own ideas for how your staff statement might be structured.
I'm engaging with our Team 3 colleagues similarly on their staff statements.
• You should aim for your staff statement not to exceed 10 pages single space.
Keep it concise and tight.
• The statement should "tee-up," or frame the most important issues as context for
commissioners' questions of the officials (in your case Cohen and Rumsfeld).
• The emphasis should be on "high policy" before 9/11, and in the case of
Rumsfeld after 9/11.
• Statements should be factual and not judgmental.
• The public hearings on DoD/Military will only involve Cohen and Rumsfeld, who
will make separate appearances, one right after the other.
Specific points/structure for your DoD/Military staff statement follow:
1. The relationship of counterterrorism to the broader story of American defense

policy.
-What was the military doing around the world?
-What other engagements were we involved in (Iraq, Balkans) ?
-We had been in a Cold War posture, and we were moving
toward a post-Cold War posture. How did CT fit into this?
2. CT as a military challenge
-To what extent was this a military challenge (as opposed to law
enforcement or other USG instruments)?
—Were we really at war with al Qaeda?
-Cite the Kuster memo here as an example of differences of
opinion in DoD
3. How does the question of whether UBL and al Qaeda are a problem
for the military work itself out?
-Describe Zinni's critique
—What other military choices are being considered? How did
the military work through them?
—Are military options being considered as part of a
broader national policy?
What military options were prepared for going after al-Qa'ida before 9-11? Was
there a planned follow-up for the response to the Embassy attacks? (i.e. what
plans were done, Infinite Resolve, etc.)?
When told there was not enough intelligence, did the military try to gather it on its
own? How did it handle the problem of actionable intelligence?
Did the military see Afghanistan as a problem for it in any way? Did it
understand the scope of the danger that was gathering there? Did it plan in any
way for this? Did it torpedo requests by political leaders?
What were the plans, if any, for the response to the attack on the Cole? [See
Hadley MFR.] Given that the Cole was a military target, was this seen as a direct
threat to the US military presence?
4. How does the military role change at the transition, if at all?

-Is there more continuity than change?
5. How are things now? How is the military performing in the war on
terrorism?
i: NSC hearing and problems Page 1 of 3
Mike Hurley
From: Warren Bass

Sent: Monday, February 09, 2004 5:54 PM
To: Mike Hurley
Subject: Staff statement on NSC
Importance: High
Note the confusions about the scope of the staff statement on NSC here. I suspect we'll need both FO and
commissioner guidance on the statements if we don't want to get caught in yet another intramural pissing match.
Original Message
From: Philip Zelikow
Sent: Wednesday, January 07, 2004 10:35 PM
To: Timothy Roemer
Subject: RE: NSC hearing and problems
Tim--
For what it's worth, the staff recommendation is to handle the NSC issues in one day. This seems
sufficient and proportionate in relation to the time we also should devote to CIA, DOD, State, and
Justice/FBI. We still stick to our view of the scope of an appropriate staff statement, but I understand
that you have a different view.
I believe the meeting with the Judge is set to occur on Thursday.
And thank you for your help and good questions in the interview today with Secretary Albright
Original Message
From: Timothy Roemer
Sent: Wed 1/7/2004 2:24 PM
To: Philip Zelikow
Cc:
Philip-
My point is that we need more than a day to tell the story of
counterterrorism policy leading up to the events of 9/11. As you have seen
in the interviews, this is new information that the Joint Inquiry did not
have access to and therefore did not present. We should not only tell the
story with a specific staff presentation on the NSC role in counterterrorism
policy, but make it a highlight of our public hearings and our report. I
recommend that we task Mike and Warren with writing up this statement that
will subsequently be presented to the public before the witnesses testify.
The J.I. did this very effectively, and Lee has often mentioned his interest
in this type of format. Are you opposed to this approach?
On another note, what progress have we made since our meeting in

asking for an extension on our deadline? Has Lee met with the Judge yet?
What did the White House say in response to our request? This must be a
higher priority for us to move on and resolve.
And please send me a copy of the draft to Director Tenet regarding the
access issue. When will this be delivered and what deadline will be
attached? Thank you for your timely response.
2/9/2004
i: NSC hearing and problems Page 2 of 3
Tim
Original Message
From: Philip Zelikow [mailto:pzelikow@9-l lcommission.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, January 07, 2004 10:06 AM
To: Timothy Roemer
Tim —
We are working now to schedule the private interviews with Rice and Hadley,
and hope these will be scheduled to occur soon, later this month or in the
beginning of February.
Their appearance at a public hearing would be in March and April,

respectively, if they accept our invitations. If they do not, the
Commission will need to decide how to proceed, as we discussed.
In part as a response to your well-founded interest in this topic, we do

currently plan to set aside a day of hearings in March to explore national
management of counterterrorism policy by the NSC, to include the
participation of the responsible officials from the Clinton and Bush
administrations. Although we are likely to have a staff statement of some
kind about the course of counterterrorism policy, we are not sure whether
the NSC role should be separated in such a staff statement from the broader
policy story that includes the performance of other agencies.
Philip
Original Message
From: Timothy Roemer
Sent: Tue 1/6/2004 4:24 PM
To: Philip Zelikow
Cc:
Subject: NSC hearing and problems
Philip-1 continue to be very concerned about the inability to

confirm our witnesses(Dr. Rice and Stete Hadley) and specifically outline
the format for our N.S.C. hearing. As you have seen in our extensive
interviews with Steinberg and Clarke, this is a very interesting story and
it takes time to tell it. We have not yet interviewed enough people to tell
the Bush Administration story, yet the documents seem to present a curious
and revealing 9 months. I would like you and Mike Hurley, with Warren Bass
assisting, to provide me (and the Commission)with an outline of how we are
organizing this hearing; public/closed hearings, confirmed and invited
witnesses, format, short synopsis of a staff statement read before the
hearing, etc...Can you get this for me by January 26th?
I will talk to Mike and Warren as well. Thanks. Tim
Original Message
From: Philip Zelikow [mailto:pzelikQW@9-llcommission._goy]
Sent: Friday, January 02, 2004 5:20 PM
To: Commissioners
Cc: frontoffice@9-llcommision.gov
Subject: Additional Agenda Items for Commission Meeting on Monday,
2/9/2004
A£: NSC hearing and problems Page 3 of 3
Jan 5
Commissioners —
Commissioner Ben-Veniste has asked that two further items be placed

on the agenda for discussion at our Monday meeting. These would be:
-- Interim Report from the PDB Review Team
— Commission Policy on Recusals
Philip
2/9/2004
t'
Page 1 of 1
Mike Hurley
From: Warren Bass
To: Team 3
Subject: Hearings: The Zelikow Proposal
Dayi
Staff statement: Diplomatic responses to the terrorist threat

(incl. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, others)
Albright (and Pickering, if desired)
Powell
Staff statement: Military responses to the terrorist threat

Cohen (and Shelton, if desired)
Rumsfeld (and Myers, if desired)
Days
Staff statement: Intelligence responses to the terrorist threat

Tenet
Staff statement: NSC

Clarke
Berger
Rice
2/6/2004
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T3 B6 Staff Statements March Hearings FDR - Entire Contents - Withdrawal Notices - Emails - Draft Staff Statements - Notes 073

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Page 1 of 1

From: Mike Hurley

Unclass drive/shared/Team 3/Approved Final Staff Statements/

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Dan, Steve, Bonnie,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/03/2008

BOX: 00002 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 113 DOC ID: 31212166

FOLDER TITLE: Staff Statements: March Public Hearings

DOCUMENT DATE: 03/09/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: Draft

SUBJECT: Draft of staff statement 7

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/03/2008

BOX: 00002 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 97 DOC ID: 31207985

FOLDER TITLE: Staff Statements: March Public Hearings

DOCUMENT DATE: 03/09/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: Draft

SUBJECT: Diplomacy, Staff Statement No. 5

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

From: Stephanie Kaplan

From: Scott Allan

From: Chris Kojm

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/03/2008

BOX: 00002 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 99 DOC ID: 31207987

FOLDER TITLE: Staff Statements: March Public Hearings

DOCUMENT DATE: 03/07/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: E-Mail Printout/(Trofs Notes)

SUBJECT: Comments on newest diplomacy staff statement

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/03/2008

BOX: 00002 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 98 DOC ID: 31207986

FOLDER TITLE: Staff Statements: March Public Hearings

DOCUMENT DATE: 03/06/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: E-Mail Printout/CProfs Notes)

SUBJECT: RE: Intel Staff statement

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

From: Mike Hurley

Philip is re-working our staff statements.

A compendium of all MemCons or executive summaries of interaction with foreign

Philip would like you to make this tasking a priority.

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/03/2008

BOX: 00002 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 91 DOC ID: 31207979

FOLDER TITLE: Staff Statements: March Public Hearings

DOCUMENT DATE: 03/01/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: Note/Notes

SUBJECT: Handwritten Notes

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/03/2008

BOX: 00002 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 92 DOC ID: 31207980

FOLDER TITLE: Staff Statements: March Public Hearings

DOCUMENT DATE: 02/25/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: Briefing Paper

SUBJECT: Draft Staff Statement

Intelligence as an instrument of U.S. counterterrorism policy

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

From: Mike Hurley

To assist with the editing process of the staff statements, I'd

1) double space the text of the hard copy you submit;

2) include a header with the following information:

FROM: Your initials TO: Initials of teammates

Info on which draft it is, e.g., Second draft,