New Extremist Group in Pakistan and Afghanistan Linked to Al-Qa'ida and Taliban

Former al Qa'ida-linked Taliban officials recently formed an organization known as Purkani

in Peshawar, according to reporting. The group's goals—similar to those of ai-Qa'ida and
the former Taliban government—include decreasing US and western influence. Senior
Purkani leaders—including former Taliban police chief Maulawai Nuruddin and former
Taliban intelligence officers—are allegedly attempting to enlist members through
inflammatory statements claiming that foreigners are attacking Islam. Afghan members of
Purkani reportedly reside in the provinces of Ghazni, Khowst, and Zabol.
• According to reporting, former Taliban and al-Qa'ida personnel were forming a
new anti-coalition jihad movement by the name of Kkadgrn aJ-Furqan. Purkani
may be a garbled reference to this group. (S//REL) -
Captives Deny Qaeda Worked With Baghdad Page 1 of 2

PRINTER ifftlENBlY FORMAT STARBUCKS.CQW

June 9,2003

Captives Deny Qaeda Worked With Baghdad

By JAMES RISEN

W ASHINGTON, June 8 — Two of the highest-ranking leaders of Al Qaeda in American custody

have told the C.I. A. in separate interrogations that the terrorist organization did not work jointly
with the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein, according to several intelligence officials.

Abu Zubaydah, a Qaeda planner and recruiter until his capture in March 2002, told his questioners last
year that the idea of working with Mr. Hussein's government had been discussed among Qaeda leaders,
but that Osama bin Laden had rejected such proposals, according to an official who has read the Central
Intelligence Agency's classified report on the interrogation.

In his debriefing, Mr. Zubaydah said Mr. bin Laden had vetoed the idea because he did not want to be
beholden to Mr. Hussein, the official said.

Separately, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the Qaeda chief of operations until his capture on March 1 in
Pakistan, has also told interrogators that the group did not work with Mr. Hussein, officials said.

The Bush administration has not made these statements public, though it frequently highlighted
intelligence reports that supported its assertions of links between Iraq and Al Qaeda as it made its case
for war against Iraq.

Since the war ended, and because the administration has yet to uncover evidence of prohibited weapons
in Iraq, the quality of American intelligence has come under scrutiny amid contentions that the
administration selectively disclosed only those intelligence reports that supported its case for war.

Bill Harlow, a spokesman for the Central Intelligence Agency, declined to comment on what the two
Qaeda leaders had told their questioners. A senior intelligence official played down the significance of
their debriefings, explaining that everything Qaeda detainees say must be regarded with great
skepticism.

Other intelligence and military officials added that evidence of possible links between Mr. Hussein's
government and Al Qaeda had been discovered — both before the war and since — and that American
forces were searching Iraq for more in Iraq.

Still, no conclusive evidence of joint terrorist operations by Iraq and Al Qaeda has been found, several
intelligence officials acknowledged, nor have ties been discovered between Baghdad and the Sept. 11,
2001, attacks on Washington and New York.

Between the time of the attacks and the start of the war in Iraq in March, senior Bush administration
officials spoke frequently about intelligence on two fronts — the possibility of links between Iraq and
Al Qaeda, and Baghdad's drive to develop prohibited weapons. President Bush described the war

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/09/international/worldspecial/09INTE.html?pagewanted=p... 6/10/03
 June 3, 2003

To: General Counsel Daniel Marcus

Assistant General Counsel Steven/Dunne
Team Leader Douglas MacEachin I/
Fm: SSA Quinn John Tamm, Jr.
Subj: Investigation in Boston, MA
On 06/24/2003 through 06/26/2003 I will be in Boston, MA for
two separate hearings in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Massachusetts. The hearings are on consecutive days, the 24th
and the 25th. This travel will paid for by the FBI, and is part
of my previous assignment. I will have some time to conduct
investigation, on the behalf of the Commission, related to the
hijacking of American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines
Flight 175.
I respectfully recommend that the Commission request
permission for me to meet with Assistant Special Agent in Charge
(ASAC) Thomas Powers, FBI, and SSA Teresa Lang, FBI, of the
Boston Field Division. These meetings would not be considered a
formal interview, but for the purpose of determining what
information about the 9/11/2001 hijacking of Flights 11 and
Flight 175 is available. ASAC Powers supervised the pro-active
terrorism investigations in the Boston area, both before and
after 09/11/2001. SSA Lang's squad has conducted the follow-up
investigation since 9/11.
I would also request permission to review the complete set
of volumes of the Boston case file for 265A-NY-280350. This
review would assist us in determining what additional
investigation may be necessary in the Boston area. The files
would contain the interviews of all security personnel, both in
Boston and Portland, ME, law enforcement officials, airline
personnel, Massachusetts Port Authority personnel, and various
private citizens who may have had contact with the ten hijackers
in the Boston area. A list of potential interviews could then be
compiled for use by the Commission.
I would need to have an answer on this request by 06/16/2003
so that the meetings could be scheduled around my hearing
schedule. Thank you.
 Unclassified — Commission Use Only

Date: June 11,2003

To: Philip Zelikow
From: Mike Hurley and Dan Byman
Re: Assessing Iraq's Links to al-Qa'ida
CC: Chris Kojm, Doug MacEachin, and Kevin Scheid

The relationship between Iraq and al-Qa'ida, and more broadly the one between Iraq and
terrorism, raises several issues for the Commission's work.1 As this issue is politically
sensitive and analytically muddy, it may be best to start from a common sheet of paper.
This is especially important in that the inquiry into this relationship could quickly
become resource and labor intensive. Therefore, it is advisable to determine how far we
wish to delve into it.

For many years before the September 11 attacks, several outside commentators (most
notably Laurie Mylroie, whose work was endorsed by former DCI Woolsey and
influential advisors such as Richard Perle), claimed that Iraq was responsible for several
terrorist attacks commonly attributed to al-Qa'ida. Mylroie focuses her charges on the
1993 World Trade Center attack, but also raises questions about the Oklahoma City
bombing, the 1998 Embassy bombings, and other incidents. Immediately after the
September 11 attack, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz and others argued for a war
against Iraq as part of the first salvo in the war against terrorism. In the build up to the
second Gulf war, President Bush and his senior advisors contended that Iraq had links to
al-Qa'ida, though they did not claim that Saddam's regime had a specific connection with
the September 11 attacks.

These claims raise several related questions for Teams One, Two, and Three:

For Team One:

• Was Iraq behind any attacks commonly attributed to al-Qa'ida?

• To what extent did Iraq support, direct, facilitate, or otherwise help al-Qa'ida,
both before and after September 11?

For Team Two:

• If there were strong links before September 11, why did the Intelligence
Community miss these connections or not convey them to senior Clinton
administration officials, several of whom have said publicly they saw little
evidence of any link?

• Conversely, if there were strong links before September 11 that were widely
known, did policy makers politicize intelligence or otherwise try to minimize
these links?

The Congressional Joint 9-11 Inquiry did not examine Iraq's relationship with al-Qa'ida in any detail.

Unclassified — Commission Use Only

 Unclassified — Commission Use Only

• If there were not strong links after September 11, was intelligence politicized by
policy makers trying to build a case for war?

For Team Three:

• Did the failure to remove Saddam's regime before September 11 help al-Qa'ida
directly or indirectly?

• Did the recent focus on Iraq hinder the effort against al-Qa'ida? If there were no
strong links between Iraq and terrorism, did the effort to join the two issues hinder
the pursuit of either one?

We have several options when we conduct our research:

• First, we can simply address this issue in passing. If we believe the intelligence
linking Iraq and al-Qa'ida is weak, and we believe the policy implications were
limited to rather harmless "overselling," then we can move on. This option is
especially attractive given that each team already has considerable work to do.

• Second, we can assess the intelligence aspects of this question but leave the policy
implications for another day. The work involved would be more limited, and we'd
avoid making judgments on extremely contentious issues.

• Third, we can engage in a comprehensive review that addresses the various

intelligence and policy issues. It may be best for this to be a classified appendix
or otherwise distinct from the larger body of work.

To end with the obvious, the political sensitivities of this issue are considerable. Even
the fact that we are investigating this connection may prove contentious. The claims that
Iraq had strong links to al-Qa'ida after September 11 in particular represents a political
football if we or any other official voice contend that this issue was overblown by policy
makers justifying going to war, even if this was done in good faith.

Unclassified — Commission Use Only