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9 Nov 2006
Overview
MSG-3 What is it?
Objectives / Methodology
Decision Logic
Maintenance Philosophy Differences Structural & Systems Inherent Reliability Hierarchical Maintenance
C-5 MSG-3
Why: Recommendations from a C-5 General Officer Steering Group to Improve Aircraft Availability
Transition from fly-to-fail philosophy
What: Develop and Catalog Scheduled C-5 Inspection and Maintenance Requirements Along With Scheduled Intervals and Rationale for Each Task. How: Using Scheduled Maintenance Program Development Approach Described in Air Transportation Associations MSG-3 Decision Logic Document.
MSG-3 Program
MSG-3 or RCM? RCM is the philosophy MSG-3 is the methodology used to execute the philosophy Improve Reliability and Aircraft Availability Maximize MC Rates Minimize NMCS and NMCM Rates Reduce Maintenance Costs Eliminate unnecessary maintenance tasks Extend the interval(s) of maintenance tasks Improve efficiency of maintenance tasks (standardizes work) Ensures Operational Safety, Suitability, & Effectiveness Enabler for Air Force Smart Operations 21 (AFSO21) and Condition Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 126.5 121.7 113.5 112.0 111.0 111.0 111.0 111.0 111.0 111.0 111.0 111.0 111.0 111.0 111.0 111.0 111.0 111.0 67.2 60.1 51.6 53.1 49.4 45.5 44.6 44.9 45.4 46 46.3 48.8 49.6 52 42.9 41.7 40.8 40.4 37.5 37.8 53.1 53.9 56.8 59.9 62.9 65.8 67
80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
4 Yr Tasks
All lower level core tasks are accomplished during the next higher level check Intervals based on 1996/97 Inspection Interval Integrity Program (I3P) Study
MSG-3 (Leading)
Systems Driven: Monitor each aircraft for degree of degradation Proven structured decision logic used by all engineers
Vs.
Hierarchical maintenance tasks: higher level intervals satisfy the requirements of lower level intervals
Enterprise review and approval with a single team responsible for the entire maintenance program (both field and PDM) Performance Based Planning: Each tail is monitored and maintenance requirements tailored for each
Vs.
Vs.
Benefits
Maximizes aircraft availability
Major Tenet of Aircraft Availability Improvement Plan (AAIP) Extended inspection intervals frees up assets
Safeguards inherent safety and reliability Ensures Operational Safety, Suitability, & Effectiveness Reduces Costs / Cost Avoidance Creates program credibility and instills confidence by involving all stakeholders Integrates all levels of maintenance activity Outcome has logic that is defensible at all levels of scrutiny Assures that all areas of the aircraft are thoroughly covered and have the proper level of inspection
Realized Benefits
Slat Inspections Issues During Depot Functional Check Flights MSG-3 Checklist Developed, Approved and Implemented by Engineering
-70-0462 39 Slat Discrepancies Prior to Mar 05 PDM Input / Nov 05 Output -87-0040 14 Slat Discrepancies Prior to Aug 05 PDM Input / Jan 06 Output Parts Requirements to Support MSG-3 Checklist Identified Requirements Provided to CSW for Entering into the File Maintenance Computations
BEFORE MSG-3
SORTIES
70-0462 107
87-0040 230
TOTAL 327
AFTER MSG-3
SORTIES FLYING HRS SLAT PROBLEMS
FLYING HRS
SLAT PROBLEMS
367.9
39
1381.0
14
1748.9
53
Provide Quick Hits for problem areas for current program until MSG3 implementation
Implementation Overview
Total Parts
2743 485
Percent
77% 13%
Tinker Ogden
Other
158 112
111
4% 3%
3%
System
14
23 24
Flight Controls
Turbofan Power Plant Auxiliary Power Plant
504
256 112
41
Air Conditioning
195
System
Electrical Power Supply Lighting System Hydraulic & Pneumatic
46
47 49
Fuel System
Oxygen System Misc. Utilities
343
45 82
51
Instruments
81
System
Auto Pilot Malfunction Analysis & Recording
Total Parts 40
74 19 16 11 19 29
59 61 62 63 64
System
Total Parts 4
13 5
69
71 72
3
27 39
76
Electronic Countermeasures
14
System
Emergency Equipment Explosive Devices & Comp
Total Parts 20
2
Totals
3609
12 13
14 23 24 41
49 4
67 6 14 3
System
Electrical Power Supply Lighting System Hydraulic & Pneumatic
Total Parts 13
5 5
46
47 49
Fuel System
Oxygen System Misc. Utilities
21
1 13
51
Instruments
System
Total Parts 3
4 1 3
63
64
UHF Communications
Interphone
1
2
System
AFSATCOM Emergency Equipment Totals
Total Parts 2
6 311
SUMMARY
Full Air Staff Commitment to MSG-3 3,949 Parts Identified 3,609 Parts Stock Listed 340 Part Not Stock Listed 77% of the Parts DLA Source of Supply 13% of the Parts WR-ALC (Robins) List Provided for the Not Stock Listed Parts
Questions?
Back-up Slides
1
Deterioration
Upgrade
Restore
SAFETY BOUNDARY
Not necessary to find every defect in a zone at every check. Program provides multiple opportunities to detect degradation prior to reaching the limit of acceptable deterioration. Repairs restore structure to original Inherent Reliability. Upgrades are necessary when deterioration rate is excessive.
1
Deterioration
4
Component Replacement
Upgrade REV
SAFETY BOUNDARY
Normally system component replacements will not restore system Inherent Reliability back to original design level
Reliability Enhancement Visit (REV) restores deteriorated system to its original design level
System upgrade increases inherent reliability above original design level
FF7 & FF7B FF16 FF28 & FF28B (B model = FS 484 only) FF33 & FF33B CF8 & CF8B AF1B AF4 & AF4B
Fuselage Side Panel Frames, FS 544 to FS 1024 Contour Box Beam Backup Fittings FS 310 through FS 465
Forward Ramp Lock Hooks at FS 454 and FS 484 Forward Fuselage Upper Lobe Skin From FS 416 To FS 581 Upper Lobe Frame Flange at FS 1744 Longeron and Doubler Above Aft Personnel Door at FS 1844 AFT Personnel Door Frames and Internal Support Beams
A/C
Pre-Flight
All
Thru-Flight
All
Home Station
Every 120 days Every 16 months (480 days) Every 48 months (1460 days) 8 Years (96 months)
All
Minor Isochronal
All
Major Isochronal
All
All
Specific
No
No
Yes
No
Level 1 Analysis
Is the functional failure EVIDENT to the operating crew during the performance of normal duties? Evident Failure
Yes
Yes
No
Hidden Failure
Does the functional failure or secondary damage resulting from the functional failure have a DIRECT adverse EFFECT on operating SAFETY?
No
No
Does the combination of a hidden functional failure and one additional failure of a system related or backup function have an adverse EFFECT on operating SAFETY?
Yes
Does the functional failure have DIRECT adverse EFFECT on operating CAPABILITY?
Level 2 Analysis
Evident Safety Maintenance tasks and intervals required to assure safe operation
Yes
Evident Operational Servicing Task at Pre/Post Flight Restoration task at Major ISO GVI task at ISO Discard at PDM
Yes
Yes
No
No
Hidden Safety Maintenance tasks and intervals required to assure availability necessary to avoid multiple failures effects Hidden Non-Safety Maintenance tasks and intervals desirable to assure the availability to avoid the economic effects of multiple failures
Evident Economic Maintenance tasks and intervals desirable if cost is less than repair cost of failure
Systems Analyses - Completed Systems Task Consolidation - Completed Parts Supportability Analysis by System
In Progress (ECD: Aug 07)
Commercial Best Practice Work Cards (ECD: Jun 08) Providing Quick Hits for problem areas for current program until MSG3 implementation
Reliability
Man-hours based on average available 750 man-hours per day Goal reduce maintenance costs and maintain Pre MSG-3 reliability Outcome reduced maintenance costs and increased reliability Great reduction in Light Checks due to incorporating enhanced zonal programproper time to find, proper time to fix
Hours
Traditional Program
Time
Pay-off cheaper to maintain a more reliable aircraft Data Provided by Delta Tiger Team Consultant
Implementation
FY10 Implementation General Officer Approval Required
AF/A4, AFMC, AMC, ANG, AFRES, AETC
MRRB/Funding Part Supportability Technical Manuals IETMS Manpower / Rates /Skill Mix
Element
Mitigations
MSG-3 tasks are well analyzed, changes to existing work packages could be significant MSG-3 parts identification completed. Individual parts supportability analyses being conducted. High priority requirements provided to CSW for immediate inclusion in file maintenance computations. OPR established to ensure parts are supportable without funding constraints. Identifying new requirements. No current impact on program execution. No new skills required. 730th ACSSS will review MSG-3 maintenance program manpower requirements with MAJCOMs to ensure field manpower cuts support new skill mix for the new program. No change in PDM skill mix; must insure right number of personnel are available to support new program.
Maintenance Planning
Supply Support
Technical Data
Computer Resource Support Facilities Policy
Funding
Until parts, manpower, support equipment and work package content is identified extent of funding is unknown
Enterprise Coordination Maintenance Culture Implementation Schedule Culture change consists of two elements. Initial and sustainment. Each has to succeed for change to take place and maintain. Failure of either issue can drive the risks up. A well coordinate program with progress tracking will assure success. MRRB approval is key to FY10 start date
Conclusion
Implementation will:
Decrease frequency, not number of Inspections Create a more detailed inspection Increase Planned Work Package Decrease Unplanned Work Standardize work Increase Aircraft Availability Require parts commitment Need support from Logistics community
14
23
Flight Controls
Turbofan Power Plant
1
2
24
41
1
1
System
Flight Controls Turbofan Power Plant Instruments
Total Parts 12 16 1 29
Totals