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Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture
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Fluid adaptation of contested citizenship: second-generation migrant Turks in Germany and the United States
Zeynep Kl & Cecilia Menjvar
a a b

Department of Sociology , University of Alaska Anchorage , Anchorage , AK , USA

b

School of Social and Family Dynamics, Program in Sociology , Arizona State University , Tempe , AZ , USA Published online: 01 May 2013. To cite this article: Zeynep Kl & Cecilia Menjvar (2013): Fluid adaptation of contested citizenship: second-generation migrant Turks in Germany and the United States, Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture, 19:2, 204-220 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2013.789217

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Social Identities, 2013 Vol. 19, No. 2, 204 220, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2013.789217

Fluid adaptation of contested citizenship: second-generation migrant Turks in Germany and the United States
Zeynep Klc varb a* and Cecilia Menj
a Department of Sociology, University of Alaska Anchorage, Anchorage, AK, USA; bSchool of Social and Family Dynamics, Program in Sociology, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA

(Received 17 December 2011; nal version received 15 September 2012) This paper explores belonging in the context of legal citizenship for secondgeneration Turkish immigrants in Berlin and in New York. Fluid adaptation refers to the discursive boundaries of immigrant identity articulations, the contextual and shifting adjustments immigrants make to their sense of belonging. Immigrant belonging, gauged by encounters with bureaucracies and participatory expressions, is shaped in large part by the receiving states legal framework and citizenship status. Belonging is complicated by racialization and exclusion, and affected by intersectionalities of immigrant experience. Limited citizenship models necessitate deployment of fluid and alternative membership models. Alternative forms of belonging underscore the power of the nation-state in delimiting belonging. Keywords: citizenship; belonging; racialization; second-generation immigrants; Turkish immigrants

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Introduction This paper explores belonging in the context of legal citizenship from the perspective of second-generation1 Turkish immigrants. Immigrant identity and citizenship are deeply interconnected with the existing legal and cultural discourses of the host country. Whereas other forms of citizenship and belonging, such as rights and obligations, are important in themselves (Bosniak, 2006; Isin, Nyers, & Turner, 2009), access to legal citizenship and racialization processes in the host country have a profound impact on other forms of citizenship, including membership and rights. In the context of limited access to legal citizenship and racial, racialist, and racist discourses (Silverstein, 2005, p. 365), it becomes difficult for individuals to identify themselves as members of the host country, even if they never lived elsewhere. Such limitations necessitate flexible understandings and framing of their belonging vis-a `vis the state and the public, and we call this fluid adaptation. We locate fluid adaptation against a fixed understanding of cultural identity promoted by multiculturalist agendas and European media discourses (Petzen, 2004). When a host country denies immigrants full legal citizenship rights, they also face racism and discrimination, and if their country of origin does not offer them a viable place to belong, immigrants are likely to develop a fluid sense of belonging, which results in alternative membership discourses, often expressed in individuals
*Corresponding author. Email: zkilic@uaa.alaska.edu
# 2013 Taylor & Francis

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perceptions as citizenship beyond the state. These alternative formulations of belonging are ways to cope with exclusion and discrimination by compartmentalizing and reframing a more inclusive and emotional dimension of belonging. Focusing on citizenship as migrants lived experience culturally and symbolically (Isin, 1999) provides a concrete way to examine how the legal context, together with racialization processes, shapes immigrant belonging. As in critical race theory, we focus on narratives over the analysis of law where the modern state touts democracy and equality yet simultaneously practices discrimination through racial hierarchies (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001). Examining the experiences of secondgeneration immigrants allows capturing the long-term effects of the context immigrants face both the legal regime and discriminatory practices on belonging. Our examination, therefore, has implications for discussions on integration, belonging, and membership in the context of constrained rights and limited paths to legal citizenship. In contrast to arguments about trends toward postnational or transnational forms of belonging (Baubo ck, 1994; Soysal, 1994), the deployment of fluid and alternative membership models is not simply a strategy to circumvent the power of the nation-state; indeed, the fluid forms of membership highlight the key place of the nation-state as a legitimate axis of power in daily life. Individuals in in between positions do not float freely between two societies, enjoying the benefits of both, but rather remain deeply aware of the power of their marginal position in both. Residence permits, passports, visas and hostile attitudes on the part of the receiving society serve as reminders of a marginal position in the host society, and unfamiliarity with the sending societys norms and customs that comes from not having lived there is a reminder of a marginal position there. Indeed, the case of individuals who must straddle two states by developing alternative and fluid forms of membership underscores the centrality of states (Bloemraad, 2006) in demarcating immigrant belonging and membership. Empirically, this paper is based on second-generation Turks in Berlin, Germany, whose experiences we contrast with Turks of the same generation in New York/New Jersey in the US. Our primary focus regarding fluid adaptation remains on the experiences of Turks in Berlin; however the US case provides a fruitful comparison of the experiences of the same group in two different legal and racial contexts to highlight the nuanced effects on immigrant belonging. Fluid adaptation appears commonly among those who do not find recognition in either the sending or the receiving state. Access to full membership through citizenship by no means guarantees belonging or acceptance as equal members, as the case of women and minority groups attests. Balibar (in Goldberg, 1990) outlines how the Western, liberal, universal concept of citizenship is based on hegemonic and majoritarian practices. It is exclusionary processes, conveyed through racism and discriminatory practices, which intertwine with the migration history of a particular group, that impinge on membership and belonging. Although immigrant groups encounter overt forms of racism in their receiving societies, today they likely face veiled forms of racism, or cultural racism. Cultural racism is based on notions of cultural, instead of racial, superiority, which makes it possible (and natural) for nation states to form closed communities, and to define groups as culturally different, as Others and, therefore, excludable (Barker, 1981). Legal exclusion and racist practices intertwine, as cultural racism justifies a restrictive immigration policy

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directed at groups presumed to be culturally different (Barker, 1981), and the presence and cultural differences of these groups are assumed to lead to conflict (Wren, 2001). Furthermore, intersectionalities matter, as differences by their gender, race/ethnicity, social class, and religion, among other social locations, further shape experiences of belonging. Thus, as Yuval-Davis (2006) has argued, belonging is shaped by both the formal context (legal citizenship) as well as by emotions (and identity), which are related to perceptions of inclusion or exclusion, or a desire for attachment. To situate the Turkish case, we turn to two bodies of literature that have examined multiple forms of belonging: citizenship and racialization. Citizenship and belonging We propose that being recognized and being understood is largely a reflection of host states citizenship practices for second-generation migrants. Equal citizenship usually applies to those who are considered to be authentic members of the national community, in other words, to those who belong (Bosniak, 2006, p. 96). And though the concept of citizenship has expanded to include some who did not belong, such as slaves, workers, new immigrants, Jews, Blacks, women, belonging is still contested as the protection these groups obtain is neither equal nor adequate (Walzer, 1989, p. 211). Our focus is on a sense of belonging as expressed by participants rather than participatory citizenship. We contend that an examination of the experiences of second-generation Turks in Germany shows how citizenship/membership as belonging is negotiated vis-a ` -vis the state, and how immigrants perceive their reception in the host society through a racial and cultural lens. Study participants were born and raised in Germany, which they considered home, even without possessing German citizenship. Those who were naturalized might still experience exclusion and discrimination, for example, when their belonging might be contested during a routine traffic stop or through media coverage hinting at who can claim to be German. In this sense, the politics of belonging is multifaceted, as are attachment to home, or the emotional aspects of identity (Yuval-Davis, 2006), and hence narratives and stories are central to understand it. Bosniak (2000) notes that legal citizenship legitimizes immigrants and redefines them as consequential. We follow Bosniak (2000, 2006) to underscore a moral understanding of citizenship that places legal citizenship status as shaping belonging, not only from immigrants own viewpoint but also in the host societys perception of their belonging. Immigrants interpretations and the meanings imparted by their place are important to understand individuals relationship to the state. Bureaucratic paperwork and waiting times, and the extent and length of the process for naturalization highlight the vital role the state plays in demarcating citizenship (Menj var, 2006). These requirements underscore the distinctions between foreigners and citizens, which in turn accentuate the importance of citizenship status in an era of ever restrictive immigration policies (Coutin, 2000). And as Duyvendak (2011) observes, bureaucratic requirements often lead immigrants to make their households (their private sphere) public so as to prove their new identity. Bureaucratic scrutiny of the private sphere does not guarantee acceptance, however, as cultural differences become highlighted against a native culture, and these differences, though supported by the logic of multiculturalism, are counter to

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immigrants interests. Thus, immigration laws shape a symbolic sense of connectedness. Attachment of this kind requires openness on the part of the receiving context so that immigrants can feel part of a national community; however, as Bhabba (1994) and Hall (1992) argue, unity is a factor of power, exclusion, closure, and cannot allow the cultural Other to be included. Hence practices of racism must be discussed in parallel to citizenship discourses to understand the Turkish experience in Europe. Racism and belonging Cultural racism is particularly applicable to the case we examine. Blaut (1992) suggests that European success in the industrial revolution is used as a justification of European superiority (i.e. progressive, liberal, civilized, and modern) over nonEuropean (i.e. backward, fundamentalist, and traditional) groups. Therefore Turks, as the largest non-European, non-Christian minority in Europe, become the picture of a culturally inferior group where culture replaces race through metaphors of territory and nation (Miles, 1989; Wren, 2001). If culture is natural (like biology), bounded and fixed, then by definition, an immigrant can never truly belong because their culture is in their nature. Turkish experiences in Europe showcase a racialization process, particularly through a preoccupation with cultural differences based on religion (Islam) in public discourse. Silverstein (2005) defines racialization as both the process and the practice of classification into an ethno-racial hierarchy, and the racialization of a group negatively affects their social mobility, access to resources and daily experiences (Baldoz, 2004; Villanueva, 2002). The seemingly non-racial and inclusive language in the legal framework cannot be understood without considering experiences on the ground, where exclusion and racism hinder belonging to reveal discriminatory state practices. Border control, policing techniques, incarceration and gentrification targeting racialized populations (e.g. queers, people of color, immigrants, Muslims) represent violent expressions of institutional discrimination (Haritaworn, 2010 2011). Furthermore, differential racialization also occurs, where minority groups are racialized at different times and rates for different needs (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001). One marginalized group may even be working against another, such as German gay rights groups standing against the homophobic Turkish/Arab/Muslim groups who simply cannot fit into this tolerant discourse. Particularly following 9/11 and the war on terror, Petzen (2012) suggests that state racialization of Muslims in Europe has been increasingly accepted by the public, even among anti-discrimination activists. Though similar processes take place in Europe and the US, Turkish populations in these settings experience racialization differently, as we will explain in the findings. Data and methods This paper is based on in-depth interviews conducted with 28 second-generation Turkish immigrants in Berlin, Germany, and in New York/New Jersey in 2001 and 2003. They are complemented by a year-long field work in both cities, which included participant observation, analysis of media coverage and 75 additional interviews with various Turkish immigrant generations, as well as with leaders of migrant organizations and notable personalities in the Turkish landscape of both settings (e.g., elected or campaigning politicians, editors, writers, government officials etc.).

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We focus on a subset of the larger data set: we include only second-generation individuals in each city in order to maintain comparability across locales. However, observations from the larger data set support our main points. Our use of interviews to understand the legal framework follows Critical Race Theory, which stresses the importance of legal storytelling by people of color to expose how seemingly inclusive legal frameworks can discriminate and exclude in practice (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001, p. 9). As in qualitative research, the participants in this study do not represent all Turkish migrants, or all second-generation migrants. However, through theoretical sampling we composed a group of participants with a wide range of educational and income levels, religious practices and affiliation, and residential patterns in both settings. The size of the community and the immigrant groups status in the host country are important considerations as well. The Turkish group is much smaller in the US, which makes them less visible, and phenotypically, Turks in the US are relatively indistinguishable from the white population. However, for practicing Muslim Turks, especially women who wear headscarves, following 9/11 and the Iraq war, Muslim identity has become more visible but less desirable, as Islam now occupies a central, but negative, position in US discourse (Bakalian & Bozorgmehr, 2009). Turks were already highly visible in Germany and as the anti-Islamic discourse has grown stronger in Europe after 9/11, more negative attention has resulted in further racialization, which partly explains the differential levels of belonging expressed by our participants. Our two study sites, though different in some respects, are similar in important methodological criteria: The immigrants are second-generation Turks in both locales, the sites are large, cosmopolitan world cities with large immigrant populations (Berlin and New York City (NYC)), both communities represent the largest Turkish cluster in their respective countries, and both are located in Western developed nations where support for multiculturalism and diversity coexist with antiMuslim discourse. Background of Turkish migration Turkish migration to Germany has been ongoing for half a century. Labor migration from Turkey to Europe started in 1961 with temporary bilateral agreements, as European industries needed labor for postwar re-development efforts. Turkey benefited greatly from these agreements through remittances and decreased unemployment rates in Turkey. More than half a million Turks arrived in Europe zuekren & between 1971 and 1973, and 90% were recruited by German industries (O van Kempen, 1997). By 2000, 86% of Turkish citizens living abroad were in Germany (Abadan Unat, 2006). Today Turks are the largest minority group in Europe, with a population of around four million, and constitute 25% of all foreigners (Crul & Vermeulen, 2003). More than 60% (about 3 million2) live in Germany and about 300,000 live in Berlin (Migration Policy Institute, 2010). Following the oil crisis, the official labor recruitment program ended in 1974 but migration continued through family unification, asylum seeking, and by clandestine means (Schnapper, 1994). Turks permanent settlement met with resistance from the host society; they had overstayed their initial welcome as temporary workers and had

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become unwanted long-term residents. And today the presence of a large group of Turks who have resided in Germany legally for more than ten years without acquiring permanent membership available after five years3 may be telling of the estranged relationship between the German state and its largest minority (Green, 2005). Two important developments in the German legal framework, which would affect immigrant belonging, are worth mentioning. In 1999, Germany revised its Citizenship Law to allow immigrants children temporary dual citizenship status until the age of 23. Though this is a significant departure from the previous citizenship model where migrants children were not granted German citizenship at birth, this law has been mentioned in our interviews frequently as a sign of things not really changing. zdemir,4 among others, mentioned that they expected these Parliamentarian Cem O dual citizens to choose German citizenship to retain its benefits. Hence it does not represent real choice or change but rather a suspended period of uncertainty and regular questioning of belonging. Therefore data collection beginning in 2001 is significant for mapping reactions to the change in the law.5 Additionally, in 2005, the Act Controlling and Restricting Immigration and the Integration of EU-citizens and Foreign Nationals (Zuwanderungsgesetz) came into effect, which recognized Germany as a country of immigration after years of rejecting this characterization. Since our interviews were completed before 2005, our participants frequently referenced the rejection of being an immigrant country (and a lack of specific migration law) as delusional of the German demographic reality. Green (2005) notes that Germanys formal resistance to grant dual citizenship discourages naturalization because it is not applied equally across all groups, perhaps as a result of the differential racialization we discussed earlier. Thus, even among naturalized Turkish Germans, there is a sense of permanent temporariness (Bailey, Wright, Mountz, & Miyares, 2002) or liminal legality (Menj var, 2006), a state that comes from living in between spaces of legal inclusion and exclusion. Turkish migration to the US is not a recent phenomenon. Flows from the end of the nineteenth century consisted of mostly non-Muslim Ottoman subjects and some ethnic Turks, reaching their highest numbers in the early twentieth century, with over 290,000 immigrants (Kaya, 2003). The characteristics of this early migration are similar to those of labor migration to Germany, that is, it was composed of unskilled and uneducated peasants arriving for work in factories (Acehan, 2008; S enyu rekli, 2008). The second wave occurred after WWII until 1980, with up to 50,000 Turks arriving (Kaya, 2003), which included educated professionals and skilled workers who established their own businesses (Ko apar, 2009). Their educational and ser Akc economic standing facilitated this groups economic incorporation into the American elite (Karpat, 2008). There was a surge in Turkish migration in the early 1990s, which coincided with stricter US admission policies and limited visa opportunities (Kaya, 2003). However the US Diversity Visa program established in 1990 created a new flow. Unlike the Western-focused second-wave immigrants, this wave included practicing Muslims, interested in lost Turkish values while simultaneously embracing modernization (Karpat, 2008). This recent migration is comprised of unskilled or semiskilled workers, mostly from central and northern Anatolia, who enter occupations in the low wage service sector, such as gas stations. This wave represents a unique pattern compared with the second waves secular Westernized Turks (Karpat, 2008). Indeed,

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Akinci (2002) observed that the US Turkish population has started to resemble the Turkish population in Germany, calling it the Germanification of Turkish Americans. Our data parallel this observation in that our two populations have recently become more similar, a feature that formed the basis for our comparison between Turks in Germany and the US. There are several estimates of the number of Turks in the US today. Since most Turks identify themselves as white in the census, it is difficult to determine the size of this population accurately. Only 117,575 individuals identified themselves as Other Turkish in the 2000 Census (US Census Bureau, 2000). Of these, 65,004 are foreign born, which means 45% are US-born and belong to the second or subsequent generations. The ACS6 estimates 19,798 people born in Turkey are living in the NYC metropolitan area, with 94,968 nationwide (American Community Survey, 2008). Other estimates place the Turkish population much higher, between 200,000 and 400,000 (Saatc i, 2008) with about 100,000 located in and around NYC (Ko ser Akc apar, 2009). In spite of the similarities of the two groups in our study, there are some important differences, especially regarding formal citizenship. NYC Turks in our sample were born in the US and are therefore American citizens by birth because US citizenship is based on jus soli, conferred to any individual born in US territory. This is not the case for our Berlin sample. Although recent modifications to German citizenship law have changed the long-held principle of citizenship based on jus sanguinis, in practice this is complex, as our participants indicated repeatedly. And even though citizenship discourse is not the only factor that shapes belonging, and these two communities are perceived differently along racial/cultural hierarchies, we argue that formal state recognition expressed in legal citizenship is critical in fashioning belonging among second-generation immigrants. Encounters with the host state

To capture our participants experiences empirically we center our discussion on their encounters with the state through naturalization processes and interactions with government employees and institutions such as the police, through which rites of institution (Bourdieu, 1991) are enacted. These encounters also unveil racialization processes that are expressed in differential treatment by officials, thus, these encounters often meld state reception with discriminatory and exclusionary practices. We focus on what these encounters mean to our participants to capture how the legal context of reception shapes belonging in the national community and how their experiences highlight incongruities between legal language and actual practice. We leave out expressions of participatory citizenship, an intermediate space concretized in civic participation, particularly in the Turkish organizational landscape. Though it is here where one may expect Turks to enact alternative forms of belonging, we found that the second generation was largely absent in these spaces.7 We expected that Berlin Turks would be active in this sphere as they routinely referred to the need to get rights. In both Berlin and New York Turkish organizations, however, the overwhelming majority of participants were first generation and temporary Turkish immigrants on visas. Berlin Turks avoided migrant organizations with supposed homeland agendas as they suggested an

issues surrounding legal citizenship

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orientation towards Turkey rather than Germany. They also noted that political, religious, and ethnic divisions imported from Turkey created an overly politicized organizational landscape (Argun, 2003; Jacobs, Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2006).8 German politicians and the local media express similar concerns about the transnational nature of migrant organizations, suggesting that an orientation towards the homeland can only mean a lack of integration (Avc, 2008). In contrast to the migrant organizations preoccupation with Turkey, our participants stated that their preference would be a migrant-centered agenda, not a Turkish one, focused on minority issues relevant to Germany. This engagement, even without concrete civic practices and participation, points to their political subjectivity, their image of themselves as actors in the German political discourse, with or without legal citizenship. It is noteworthy that Berlin promotes itself as a World City housing 195 nationalities. Along with this identification come municipal funds to showcase diversity, which in turn encourages immigrant groups to present themselves as culturally distinct. But what is culturally Turkish in German eyes? Depictions of women with headscarves (Islam), mustached men (non-modern), colorful bazaar images (exotic) along with honor killings women subject to violence by their fathers, brothers and husbands draw the limited boundaries of the Turkish image (Petzen, 2012). Hence, inclusion in the German public space necessitates staying close to these images. This encourages immigrant organizations to present a limited cultural image, which satisfies the multicultural and diversity agenda yet relegates them to a culturally unfit category; framed as Other, perpetually foreign, and culturally racialized in the eyes of broader society (Barker, 1981; Silverstein, 2005).

Berlin Turks: fluid membership and ambiguous belonging Overall, Berlin Turks relationship with Germany is bittersweet. They express criticism and disappointment as a result of exclusionary state politics, but this is nuanced with moments of inclusion. For the naturalized, German citizenship releases them of endless paperwork trails. Both the time saved and the less-tense bureaucratic encounters are welcome. Canan, a 24-year-old woman and naturalized citizen, explains,
I am happy I naturalized. For example, when you go to the municipality they immediately ask for [Turkish] passport. When they see I have an Ausweiss [German ID], they are surprised. They are 100% certain that if you look Turkish, you will not have German nationality. Most of the time they start listing all the paperwork you need to fill out. You have to interrupt;, I do not have to, I am German. Take something as simple as cell phone service. My friend had to bring proof of residency from the police. Mine took half-an-hour; the contract, the phone, the whole thing. He is still waiting for the paperwork. Travel, the same thing. All I do is show my Ausweiss. You bypass so many questions and procedures by naturalizing.

Study participants suggested that the difficulty of acquiring citizenship for Turks exemplifies the underlying reluctance to include Turks as Germans compared with other groups, such as ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union who were granted automatic citizenship (owing to the jus sanguinis rule). Participants noted that in their case, language acquisition, living in non-segregated neighborhoods or

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adopting a German lifestyle were not enough to be considered a member of the German national community.9 The quotidian reminders within the German bureaucracy reflecting exclusionary practices by subjecting Turks to additional and what is defined as unnecessary procedures make it difficult to articulate an emotional connection to Germany. Zehra (25) who has been naturalized notes,
I want to live in a country where immigrants are accepted. Some of our government officials may say we are now an immigrant country but the public doesnt agree. They are still using Auslander [foreigner] in daily language. When I first started university, I was told you are a foreigner. You need to go upstairs where the international students register. I studied here, my diplomas are from here, I am a permanent resident, why would I go to the international students office? I am treated as the students who just arrived from Africa or Turkey. I was so angry. It didnt occur to me that I would be subjected to different treatment, discrimination. For example, there is an office for people who studied here but are from the Mediterranean but I was turned away. I was told I am not from the Aegean because Turks were not included in that definition!

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Encounters with bureaucracy do not become easier after naturalization because racial undertones permeate relationships in both the formal and informal contexts. For example, several participants mentioned that when a Turk is pulled over by a German police officer, the officers assumption is that they are a Turkish, not a German citizen. Even after presenting proof of citizenship, they mentioned, the Turkish name guarantees Turkish treatment. This burden is felt heavily by Berlin Turks, a sentiment that in turn strains their relationship with German institutions. The criminal justice system, for example, was routinely brought up in interviews to illustrate the differential treatment Turks experience, treatment that comes from seeing Turks as Others. Canan (24) noted, If a German kid steals cars 30 times, he gets a slap on the hand or stays at a youth rehabilitation facility a short time. If a Turkish kid does the same thing twice, they are shipped back to Turkey. Similarly, Zehra (25), a naturalized woman, describes the differential treatment by the police:
There is definitely racism among Germans. You notice this more when you look at the way the police functions. A simple example: My friends brother and his friend, who are teens, do something stupid. They dare each other to steal something, like a wallet worth 5 marks. They both have like 100 marks in their pockets. Of course, they are both Turkish citizens. The police immediately put them in jail. German law does not send German kids younger than 18 to jails. But the police sees a typical Turk as one who steals. If there is a dirty deed somewhere, Turks and foreigners must have been responsible. If two kids are fighting and one is German, the other is Turk, the Turkish one is immediately taken into custody, even if the German kid started the fight. So, as a result Turks see themselves like the Blacks in America, Blacks of Europe.

On the one hand Berlin Turks see naturalization as a step towards belonging but they soon realize that it does not correspond to an acceptance of their physical appearance, name, or religious affiliation in either institutional or informal encounters. These exclusionary practices that remind them that Turks and Germans are not equal take away from the momentarily inclusive formal context that granted them citizenship. As a result, Berlin Turks talk about the German government, laws and the underlying racial logic as key factors that inform their daily interactions with bureaucratic institutions. This makes identification with the nation difficult. An

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exclusionary state is understood as a series of passports and documents, albeit vital ones. Thus, in the context of exclusion, immigrants invoke identities beyond the state. Through the enactment of these rites of institution they become aware of their potential to establish other links and develop other identities. The perceived rejection from the state (through its citizenship practices) and the German public (through routine forms of racialization practices in schools, friendships or media portrayals) sharpen Berlin Turks political identity. When their desire to articulate German belonging is met with resistance, they choose to define their belonging as fluid: one based on local, regional, or supranational forms of membership beyond the German vision that excludes them. Thus, Berlin Turks mostly referred to themselves as Europeans (a supranational or postnational identity) or as Berliners (city/local identification), while some identified as world citizens (a universal understanding of community), as Kurds (ethnic), Alevis (sectarian), or more nuanced sub-national/regional identifications from Turkey (Zaza Kurd from Dersim, Tahtaci Alevi from Antalya, etc.). One could end here, but the picture is more complicated, as Berlin Turks also experience moments of inclusion, which position the German state in a positive light, and which lead them to adopt nuanced perspectives of belonging. For example, they compare the German government with that of the US, and conclude that the German government takes better care of its citizens through social services like education, unemployment, health benefits and child support. To be sure, participants attachments and belonging are not shaped only by racism or the receiving states actions. Their homeland state also plays a part, which leads to a different perspective of the German government and of Germany itself. For instance, the majority of participants mentioned feeling more secure with a German than with a Turkish passport. Thus, in spite of their ambivalent feelings toward Germany, they believe Germany would protect its citizens if they were to get in trouble in another country. They explained that the Turkish government was unwilling or unable to take care of its citizens and to grant rights to minorities. In comparison, Berlin Turks believe that the German government is economically, religiously and ethnically more fair and distributes national resources more equitably than the Turkish government. For instance, Semra (27), a university student who does not have German citizenship said; One good thing about Germany is that you wont go hungry here. There are laws, even if you are unemployed; the state would take care of you. Plus, people pay their taxes here; they dont try to avoid it. Criticism of the state and the nation arises when participants perceive that the German context presents Turkishness as antithetical to Germanness. Since they see themselves as part of the German future, they see a definition of belonging attached to formal bureaucratic requirements as problematic and inefficient because many of them would be excluded from that discourse as Turkish citizens/foreigners. Even if they were to relinquish Turkish citizenship for German, they believe that Germans do not accept this switch as authentic or genuine10 Germanness. Hence participants often felt stuck; they could neither rid themselves of their Turkishness nor proudly display it alongside their Germanness. In their view, this German notion of belonging, which has been based in large part on a difficult process of acquiring formal citizenship in differential fashion, is problematic and constraining. Citizenship is intimately tied to belonging to a community; hence, enjoying rights without a sense of belonging is not considered full, equal citizenship (Karst, 1991

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cited in Bosniak, 2006). This is precisely what our participants views reflect when they say that possessing a German passport is not equal to being considered German. Legal citizenship is important, but by itself not enough to create belonging; routine discriminatory practices further shape the effects of formal citizenship. Sevim (27), who was naturalized at age 17 to become eligible to work in the police force, said So what was the result of me acquiring German passport? What was the use? You have black hair they say, which makes my position in German eyes very clear. Similarly, Turgut (31) also thought his naturalization would mean more acceptance from fellow Germans but he found that he was socially perceived to be non-German. I see that clearly now, which I thought would not be the case anymore. Rejection through racial hierarchies (such as black or coarse curly hair, brown eyes, nonGerman names, etc.) additionally makes belonging emotionally a harder affair even when legal inclusion is granted. Thus, Berlin Turks go back and forth between moments of inclusion and exclusion. For them, inclusion happens because there are universal human rights that the German government protects, as it would be the case in any other democracy, not because the state sees Turks as equal to Germans. In contrast, exclusion happens when reminded that they are Turks first and foremost, a reminder of their marginalization in Germany no matter their social position. These seemingly contradictory positions are balanced by second-generation immigrants through a detachment of legal citizenship from citizenship as belonging (Bosniak, 2006) as if they were enacted in two different planes.

New York Turks: un-ambiguous belonging In contrast to Berlin Turks nuanced discussion of their relationship to Germany, New York City (NYC) Turks describe an unproblematic and inclusive relationship with the US. Noteworthily, NYC Turks do not deal with government bureaucracy, as Berlin Turks do routinely, since they are US citizens by birth. Additionally, as a small and rather invisible group who can pass as white, they are not subjected to the kind of racialization that marks Berlin Turks as culturally inferior. The Everyone is an immigrant mentality invoked in the public discourse creates a different cultural environment where Turkishness can be presented in a positive light, compared with the German Volk discourse. These are all elements of the context of reception that, we argue, are critical in shaping immigrant belonging. Hence NYC Turks have no quotidian encounters with the state that may remind them of their position as insiders/outsiders. Moreover, their Turkish passports (as dual citizens11) were filed by their parents when they were young and thus they did not have to interact with the Turkish government either. Their experiences highlight how the absence of regular encounters with state bureaucracy, of rites of institution (Bourdieu, 1991), sets the tone for their relationship with the home and host states. None of our participants had any recollection of an encounter with state bureaucracy from the position of an immigrant. For example, Melis (35) said,
I remember me and my mother, we had one [Turkish] passport, me as the baby on hers. I think it was renewed later on. Maybe it is expired now. Not sure . . . I guess I should check with my mother. I remember that my grandfather became a citizen and my mom

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had my dad contact him about that. Maybe my father was a citizen? Because he was married to my mom? But I dont know. I dont think he gave up his Turkish citizenship.

Meliss lack of knowledge about her fathers struggles with the legal system is not unique, as almost none of our participants were themselves involved in the process. As a result, NYC Turks, in contrast to Berlin Turks, did not feel the state had treated them differently and hence did not articulate a critical stance. Furthermore, unlike Berlin Turks who had shouldered the responsibility of speaking for their parents in legal procedures since childhood, NYC Turks were never in such a situation because their parents had little contact with immigration officials after migration. Thus, they also did not question how the system treated their parents. Indeed, in contrast to Berlin Turks, NYC Turks did not know much about their parents migration history. This situation can be explained by their relatively small and largely invisible migration, which has not elicited attention from the immigration authorities or the public to try and stop it, which also shapes their largely uncritical relationship with the US government, its immigration policies and the American public. In comparison with New York Citys diverse and vibrant immigrant demographic, Turks are perceived as white enough. Participants commented that Americans cannot correctly guess their ethnicity and usually misidentify them as Greeks, Italians or Spaniards, all European and desirable groups within the US racial hierarchy. Additionally, NYC Turks commented on how different NYC is compared with other US cities as they perceived diversity and high immigrant diversity as a primary characteristic of the city, hence suggesting that their immigrant status was unproblematic in the NYC context but that it may differ elsewhere. The uniqueness of their city was also brought up among Berlin Turks, defining Berlin as different from other German cities due to its unusually diverse cultural mosaic. The difference, however, is that in comparison with other immigrant groups, Turks and Arabs occupy the bottom rung of the ladder in Berlin, and Germany in general, while this is not the case for Turks in NYC. NYC participants detachment from regular contact with legal structures and the lack of direct negative attention from the public and public officials mean that their sense of belonging differs drastically from that of Berlin Turks. They do not talk about the US government denying them their rights or about the US institutional structures as racist, immigrant-phobic, or unfair, as Berlin Turks often did. In Aynurs (32) words,
[American] laws are not discriminatory. They are discriminatory only for the protection of their own people so that it is economically sound. Some other countries have not done that and people have brought down their own economies so they are doing something important I think. They have to be extra careful since we are the leaders in the world. With lots of terrorists and things like that they are just a little bit extra cautious with nations that are non-Christian to protect the society.

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Aynurs position signals her perception of her membership status: she is an American citizen first, Turkish second. Furthermore, she does not consider herself as part of a problematic immigrant group, e.g., the Latino immigrants who are portrayed as taking jobs away from Americans and syphoning off US social resources.

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Z. Klc var and C. Menj

Focusing on the experiences of Turks in Berlin, but drawing comparatively from the perspectives of same-generation Turks in the US, our analysis has permitted us to highlight how different understandings of belonging are constructed as a response to the receiving countrys formal treatment of a group, through a discourse of citizenship and institutional discrimination, as well as informal encounters within a racial hierarchy. We propose that the formal structures of reception immigration and citizenship laws that seep through formal organizations, such as state bureaucracies coupled with racialization practices and discriminatory treatment fundamentally shape the experiences, practices and perceptions of belonging for Turks in both countries. Thus, Berlin Turks deploy a variety of narratives to make sense of their encounters with the law (symbolically as well as in institutional practices) and public discourse about their racial/ethnic/cultural/religious standing within the multicultural setting of Berlin. They highlight their Turkishness, Germanness or a combination of both to make a home where they feel they decidedly belong. The multiple facets of identities they referenced may suggest that Berlin Turks define belonging in entirely situational terms, but the issue is more complex. Whereas they recognize the exclusionary state practices that have shaped their place in the nation as outsiders, often expressed in bureaucratic requirements, paperwork and racist encounters that exclude them as culturally inferior, they also credit the German state for the rights that it provides them, especially in comparison with Turkey or the US. Such a separation of citizenship and belonging was not present among NYC Turks. They thought of themselves as Americans and as individuals, not part of the Turkish category, which could not be avoided by Berlin Turks in discussions of their membership in Germany. Though both Berlin and NYC Turks presented flexible and contextual notions of belonging, NYC Turks have more space to maneuver and more flexibility to situationally define themselves. Their citizenship status and their racially acceptable status through their association with European immigrants in the American racial imagery, gave them no reason to challenge their treatment as immigrants. The lack of exclusionary encounters in the case of NYC Turks allowed both categories of national belonging (Turk or American) to acquire positive, desirable and largely unproblematic perceptions of belonging among our participants. It is instructive that this is not the case among racialized immigrant groups in the US whose experiences might resemble more closely those of the Berlin Turks (e.g. Latino immigrants). Therefore NYC Turks did not seek alternative terrains of belonging outside the state. Berlin Turks, on the other hand, had no such flexibility. The citizenship rhetoric that formally pushed Turks as outsiders and the racialized setting that excluded them as Others necessitated a rights approach, invoking transnational rights discourses as a form of recognition. Berlin Turks therefore resorted to ways of belonging as Turks (via specific regional and sectarian affiliations in Turkey), as Berliners (different from the rest of Germany), or as Europeans (supranational space), while NYC Turks could belong primarily as Americans or Turks/Turkish Americans. Though the new German law is seen as a positive change towards recognizing future generations of immigrants as Germans, it is also considered as another way for German citizenship to take precedence and symbolically erase Turkish citizenship

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through the requirement to opt for a single citizenship by adulthood. This is particularly the case when citizens of other EU or non-EU countries are permitted dual citizenship. Noteworthily, Berlin Turks wanted to belong to the German state as authentic citizens, to be naturalized and to live in integrated neighborhoods etc. However, some refused to naturalize as a political act to protest against the racial and legal exclusion; in refusing to naturalize felt they could retain a measure of dignity. The treatment of Turks in Berlin as undesirable Germans/citizens encouraged a migrant political subjectivity, including among those who are not German citizens, while Turks in the NYC sample were apolitical regarding their belonging as American citizens. Indeed, Duyvendak (2011) argues that in the US home is less historically associated with the nation, hence immigrants can become fellow Americans quickly. Strong associations made between home and history, territory or ancestry in the European context makes it harder for Turks to be considered fellow Germans. Our comparative angle to highlight immigrants citizenship practices and interpretations of perceived inclusion/exclusion permitted us to capture the effects of the legal context and its public reflection through racial discourses, highlighting the central place of the state in shaping conceptualizations of immigrant membership and belonging. Focusing only on one location would have missed important analytical nuances. Finally, our contribution goes beyond the immediate case of Turkish immigrants. At a time when receiving states around the world increasingly implement stiffer immigration laws and diminish citizenship rights for immigrants, formal processes that spur racism and anti-immigrant hostility, as observed in the case of Arizona legislation SB107012 as well as in discussions of constitutional amendments to annul US citizenship by birth,13 we must consider what legal structures and discrimination do to a sense of belonging, and how they are experienced on the ground. A finding that children of various backgrounds who were more aware of Arizonas SB1070 felt less American (Santos, Menj var, & Godfrey, 2013) exemplifies this point. As trends c shift towards policies that problematize migrant belonging, through what I duygu & Sert (2010) call the securitization and economization14 of international migration systems, our findings here have policy relevance as well. Immigrants whose sense of belonging is challenged through formal bureaucratic requirements and racist and discriminatory practices exemplify fluid and situational ways of belonging. Such belonging becomes necessary to cope with and to combat legal and racial configurations in the context of reception. Notes
1. Second generation describes native-born children with at least one foreign-born parent (Rumbaut, 2007). 2. 7 million are Turkish nationals (http://www.migrationeducation.org/22.0.html). 3. Naturalization among Turks decreased to 33,388 (2006) from 104,000 (1999), declining since the new law came into effect. 4. Personal interview, November 2001, Berlin. 5. The new law rocks the foundation of meaning of German, and the nature of citizen (Mandel, 2008, p. 321). 6. People with Turkish ancestry in NYC metropolitan area, 33,680.

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7. Six Berlin Turks were active in Turkish organizations, nine never were and two were active in a political party. Two NYC Turks were members of US professional associations, nine had been involved in Turkish associations at some point, and two had no involvement. In both communities, participants reported participation as children (language, folkdance classes). 8. Participants attributed this to greater freedom of expression and representation. 9. See Isin & Turner (2007) on citizenship processes becoming more difcult in Europe as the focus on security has increased post 9/11. 10. See Duyvendak (2011) on European primordial assumptions of nation as home, as compared with a more ambivalent US approach. 11. Germany requires Turks to provide proof of relinquished Turkish citizenship before granting German citizenship. The US does not. 12. http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/sb1070s.pdf 13. Peter Schuck, Op-Ed (2010). 14. [T]he security concerns of migrant-receiving countries make their immigration policies and practices more restrictive, while their economic interests make such policies more c selective (I duygu & Sert, 2010, p. 4).

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