Two Arguments for Design:

Inference and Intuition

Jacob A. Swenson Autumn Quarter 2009

Consider, anatomize the eye; survey its structure and contrivance, and tell me, from your own feeling, if the idea of a contriver does not immediately ow in upon you with a force like that of sensation - Cleanthes, in Humes Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion David Hume, in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, uses ctional characters to evaluate the evidence that can be gained from experience regarding the existence and nature of God (or gods). The ultimate question is what beliefs can be rationally formed on the basis of this evidence. The principle focal point of this debate is the claim that nature is the work of an intelligent creator. The majority of the dialogue concerns the traditional Argument from Design, however, I argue here that Hume also acknowledges another sort of argument, closely related to the Argument from Design, which I shall call the Argument from Inference. The central concern of this paper will be to show that Hume not only recognizes such an argument, but actually considers it reasonable for a rational agent to endorse it. Furthermore, Hume seems to think that it goes beyond a sensible skepticism, at least in the case of beings like us, to altogether deny the force of this argument. Since our historical position diers greatly from Humes, in that we have a powerful naturalistic 1

account of the origin of life on earth, namely, the Darwinian Theory of Evolution, I go on to briey reevaluate the degree to which it is reasonable for a rational agent to endorse the Argument from Inference today. In order to understand the relationship between these two arguments, it will be helpful to lay outline each of them and identify their dialectical signicance. Cleanthes introduces the Argument from Design in Part II (p.15) and we can schematize the main moves as follows: 1. Nature exhibits a remarkable degree of order and complexity. 2. Of all the objects which we experience, only artifacts (machines) exhibit a similar degree of order and complexity. 3. These artifacts (machines) are brought into existence by the activity of an intelligent creator. 4. Since like eects prove like causes,1 5. We can reasonably infer that the most likely cause of Natures existence is the activity of something like an intelligent creator. Now, the bulk of the dialogue consists of Philo scrutinizing this argument. In the course of the conversation, Philo challenges nearly every premise, with the exception of (3).2 At the end of this litany of attacks, it is dicult to see, if one takes Philos points on board, exactly what remains of the traditional theological conclusions that are normally drawn from the argument. And indeed, Hume recognizes this by having the only religiously orthodox interlocutor in the dialogue storm o. 2

So, if we are at all sympathetic to Philo, we nd that the theological conclusions we can draw from the Argument from Design are quite curtailed.3 This seems to be precisely the position of Cleanthes, who is the other religious - though heterodox - interlocutor in the dialogues. Yet, despite Cleanthess concession that he must reject several orthodox theological beliefs - most notably, the belief that God is innite (p. 67) - he continues to advocate for a modest theism. At this point in the dialectic4 , however, he must convince Philo, and the reader, why we shouldnt simply throw out the idea of a designer altogether. It is precisely at this point that Cleanthess second argument comes to play. For the argument purports to show precisely why we need not abandon the idea of an intelligent author of nature altogether. We can schematize this Argument from Intuition (as Im calling it) which Cleanthes rst introduces in Part. III (p. 25), as follows: 1. When one examines Nature, with attention to ones own feeling and sensation, one can intuitively come to the idea that nature is the product of a creator. 2. When this idea strikes someone, it does so with great force and appears as mere common sense. 3. The arguments which deny that Nature is the product of a Creator require complex argumentation and reasoning (or perverse and obstinate metaphysics, as Cleanthes puts it). As a result, these ideas are less forceful. 4. Since it is reasonable to take the simplest and most forceful idea as the best one, 5. One can reasonably retain the idea that nature is the product of a creator. 3

Now, there are several things that we should note about the Argument from Intuition. First, we must separate Cleanthess talk of a feeling and sensation, in (1), from similar language employed by Demea. In Part X, Demea says, Each man feels, in a manner, the truth of religion within his own breast; and, from a consciousness of his imbecility and misery rather than from any reasoning (p. 58). Though Cleanthess also exhorts us to attend to our sensation, rather than reason alone, he ask us to focus our attention on ideas we have about what is outside of us (an ordered natural world) rather than what lies within us (our own misery). Demea adopts religion on account of the factors that Hume lays out in The Natural History of Religion ; namely, fear and hope (NH, 31, 43). Presumable, Cleanthess intuitive idea of an articer is not motivated by hope an fear. If it is motivated by a mood at all, it is motivated by awe or wonder at the complexity and unity of nature, which we sense cannot be merely coincidental, but must be the product of an author. Second, the Argument from Intuition is conditional in the sense that it only applies to rational agents insofar as, when surveying nature, they do indeed arrive at the intuitive idea of a designer. Thus, if one claims not to share this intuitive idea of a designer, Cleanthess argument obviously cannot convince them to endorse it. To people in this position, however, the argument at least seeks to demonstrate that individuals who do possess such an idea are not unreasonable if they endorse it. Third, the Argument from Inference crucially depends upon the inadequacy of an alternative explanation. Since Cleanthess argues that we should accept the simplest and most forceful explanation, rational agents should endorse the intuitive idea of a designer only be-

cause the alternative ideas concerning the origin of nature are convoluted and unconvincing. In the case where there is no viable alternative idea concerning the origin of life, there is no rational obstacle to endorsing the intuitive idea of a designer. Fourth, in addition to simply convincing us that there is no rational obstacle to retaining the idea of a designer, Cleanthess argument is supposed to play a persuasive role. If we dont already have the intuitive idea of a designer (as is perhaps the case of Philo in the beginning of the dialogue), Cleanthes asks us to examine our experience of nature before we say, in good faith5 , that such idea does not forcefully come upon us. If Cleanthes succeeds in getting us to see our experience of nature in that way - that is to say, as the work of a contriver - then he has an argument as to why we should endorse such an experience. The way in which this argument lays claim to our belief, however, diers greatly from that of the Argument from Design. For, the Argument from Design seeks to show that we should, simply as rational beings, be able to draw analogy between human artifacts and nature, and from such an analogy, infer that the most likely explanation of natures origin is an intelligent creator. The Argument from Intuition, however, has what is perhaps a more modest aim of persuading us to accept this idea, not simply because we are rational beings, but because we are beings who are susceptible to this peculiar type of experience.6 With these provisos in mind, we can now turn to the nal part of the dialogues, where Philo, after dismantling the Argument from Design, seems to return to the Argument from Inference. There, he says, A purpose, an intention, a design strikes everywhere the most careless, the most stupid thinker; and no man can be so hardened in absurd systems as at

all time to reject it (p. 77) and exclaims, [W]hat pitch of pertinacious obstinacy must a philosopher in this age have attained who can now doubt of a supreme intelligence! (p. 78) What seems of particular importance here is that Philo, though skeptical of the Argument from Design on its own, cannot deny the intuitive presence of the idea of designer, nor can he deny that it would be anything but obstinate to reject such an idea. In other words, he seems to oer a limited endorsement of Cleanthess second argument, the Argument from Intuition. Although commentators have doubted the Philos sincerity in the nal section of the dialogues, his caution in making these remarks should assure us that Hume intends Philos comments to be ernest. For Philo clearly still takes himself to dier from Cleanthes as to degree to which they accept the idea of a designer. While Cleanthess holds to the idea of God as person, Philo supports a more abstract picture of God as mind or thought. By this, I take it that Philo means that because nature does nothing in vain , we can say that it appears as the intentional result of a mind (i.e. since nature acts by the simplest methods, and chooses the most proper means to any end ) (p. 77, my emp. in bold). Even more importantly, they still disagree as to whether this idea of a designer includes some moral content - that is to say, whether the works of nature appear to be the work of a benevolent author. Since the tone of Philos concluding remarks are conciliatory, and since he portrays his dierences from Cleanthes as a matter of degree, it is safe to conclude that Hume himself at least in the dialogues - remains neutral as which position we should endorse. He portrays

the positions of both Cleanthes and Philo as rationally tenable. Nevertheless, it is important to note that by the end of the dialogue, both Cleanthes and Philo appear to endorse the Argument from Inference (to some degree). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that Hume, too, endorsed this argument. In other words, despite the fact that Hume is often portrayed as a great skeptic in matters of religion, the conclusion of the dialogues suggests that he actually believed human beings are by and large susceptible to this particular type of religious experience (the intuitive idea of a designer of nature) and that to altogether reject it would be to go beyond a sensible skepticism. If my assertion is correct and Hume did indeed endorse the Argument from Intuition, what should we make of this fact? The rst thing to be said is that the Argument from Inference is crucially linked to the time period in which the text was written. For, according to the Cleanthess Argument from Intuition, we should endorse this idea only in the absence of a simpler and more forceful idea about the origin of nature. In fact, premise (4) of the argument, which indicates that we should accept the simplest and most forceful idea concerning the origin of nature cuts against the Argument from Intuition in the modern context. For modern readers do possess a stronger and more forceful idea concerning the origin of nature: the Darwinian Theory of Evolution. Not only does this idea provide us with a much richer framework for explaining precisely how natural complexity originated, it also can be laid out in a relatively clear and simply manner7 (i.e. in a manner that does not depend on obstinate or perverse metaphysics). So, perhaps, Hume only endorses the Argument from Inference because during his lifetime there was an absence of adequate

alternative ideas concerning the origin of nature. And to a large degree, this must be true. Hume seems, through his characters, to acknowledge the historically situated and thus tentative nature of the Argument from Intuition. This can be seen both from the structure of Cleanthess argument, which only succeeds in the absence of a forceful alternative concerning the origin of nature, but also in Philos claim that it would be rash for a philosopher in this age to reject the intuitive idea of a designer (78, my emp.). There is another reason, however, why Hume may have endorsed the Argument from Inference, that is more dicult to simply wave away. In the dialogues, Hume treats the intuitive idea of a designer as deriving from a natural association of the mind between the the idea of nature and the idea of an articer. In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (or, ENCU ), Hume identies three types of association: resemblance, contiguity in time or place, and cause or eect (Section III). The intuitive association between the idea of nature and the idea of an articer clearly falls into the category of resemblance. What is important here is to note that Hume puts such an association in the same category as our association between cause and eect. Although Hume does not take these associations to be purely ration, he must acknowledge that they run very deep. For if the idea of cause and eect is an association, then its dicult to see how beings like us could rid ourselves of it, even if we had good reason to do so. Hume seems to be placing the idea of a articer in the same category as cause and eect, and thus he must think that this association also runs quite deep. So, what should modern readers of Hume make of the Argument from Intuition today,

particularly if they want to remain faithful the Humes own insights? On this point, I think that there are two things to be said. First, in light of modern evolutionary theory, which oers a simple and forceful account of the origin of nature, the Argument from Intuition no long succeeds. If we are to endorse the idea that is simplest and most forceful, we should endorse the ideas of evolutionary theory, which oer a simple and powerful explanation of the origin of nature. Second, however, we must still address the question as to what we should make of the association between the idea of nature and the idea of articer, which I have claimed that Hume took to be important. We might think it reasonable to simply ignore such an association, despite its common sense appeal, just as we nowadays ignore the seemingly commonsense association between the idea of the earth and the idea of a at surface. In other words, we should take it that scientic advances have simply shown that sometimes our natural associations simply turn out to be wrong. On the other hand, if the associations of resemblance play an equally important role in human life as do the association between cause and eect, as we noted above, we might wonder if we can really rid ourselves of this intuitive idea altogether. Therefore, we might ask if it would be possible to reconcile the scientic explanation concerning the origin of nature with the intuitive idea of a designer in such a way that they do not conict. If we could do so, they it would not seem irrational to hold onto such an association. Thus, in the spirit of Cleanthess original Argument from Intuition, we would leave open the possibility that a reasonable being could endorse the intuitive idea of a designer, even. To do this we

would need to somehow show that the idea of a designer does not conict with claims about the specic mechanisms by which nature originated. The diculty with such an approach, even if it were to succeed, is that by separating the idea of a designer from the specic mechanisms by which nature originated we shall arrive at a picture of author of nature that is either: (1) Deistic and thus entirely removed from the creation process, in which case we might wonder what it means to say this being is the author or creator of nature, or (2) Entirely impersonal, in the sense that the author of nature is identical to the principles or laws which drive the specic natural mechanisms, and, in that case, we might wonder what it means to call such a thing (i.e. a set of principles or laws) God at all. So, although Hume found the Argument from Intuition compelling during his lifetime, the situation is dierent for us. In light of modern scientic theories, we have access to better and more compelling explanations for the origin of nature and the complexity it displays. Furthermore, even if we, like Hume, take associations to be a powerful (and perhaps uneliminable) part of life for beings like us, it would seem like the most we could reasonably infer from such an association is the existence of a Diestic or Impersonal God. While this does not preclude other grounds for believing in the existence of God, it certainly demonstrates how the landscape of natural religion has changed in light of scientic advances. Whereas Hume seems to portray Cleanthess belief in a person-like God - built on the foundation of two arguments for design - as a reasonable option, it seems that Cleanthess position is untenable today. Even if we claim some intuitive idea of a designer, we can only use such an idea to support a very minimal and thin conception of God8 , which it would seem can play

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very little role in our general picture of the origin of nature.

Notes
This premise, on which Cleanthes implicitly relies, is explicitly pointed out by Philo in Part V (p. 34). We can briey survey the challenges he raises as follows. Regarding (1), he suggests that what appears orderly to us may only be the result of the deities many bungled attempts at world-making (p. 36) and also challenges the idea that nature exhibits a moral order (Part XI). He suggests, in contradiction to (2), that perhaps nature more closely resembles an animal than a machine (p. 39-40). Though Philo supports (4), he uses it to argue against the traditional conception of God as Innite and Perfect (36-40). In fact, if we are persuaded by Philos argument against (2), we may not think the Argument from Design goes through at all. This is particularly important for modern readers who, having accepted the theory of evolution and see nature as a type of self-regulating system, may be more sympathetic to such a point than Humes early readers. It is important to note, here, that although it comes in at this point in the logical dialectic, it rst appears much earlier in the dialogue. However, the argument only takes on its dialectical importance when the member of the dialogue return to it in the section 12, where Philo seems to endorse it. Part of the rhetorical force of Cleanthes argument is to throw doubt on the idea that beings like us could in all honesty deny such an experience. Wittgenstein remarks in On Certainty that At the end of reasons comes persuasion (612) and Cleanthes tactic here is a good illustration of what this might mean. When weve arrived at an impasse where reasons alone are insucient, as seems to be the case here between Cleanthes and Philo after they debate the Argument from Design, we might have recourse to an appeal to experience itself, in an attempt to alter each others view of the situation. Roughly speaking, we can explain complexity in nature using the concept of natural selection, whereby certain genetically inherited traits confer a survival benet for on their possessor, enabling their possessor to survive and successfully reproduce, and thus to continue the propagation of their genetic material. Though this itself is a simplication, the story also becomes more complex when we try to explain the origin of the rst cell(s), or the origin of the rst genetic material (RNA, DNA). Nevertheless, even that part of the story does not seem to depend upon complicated metaphysical notions.
7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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In fact, the job of any Cleanthes today, would be to explain what, if anything, we could mean by using terms like diety or creator.

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