Property: Doctrines of Cases

Under Atty. Mendoza

IMMOVABLE AND MOVABLE 1. Ladera v. According to Article 334 of the Civil Code (now 415), Immovable property are the following: Lands, building, roads, and Hodges constructions of all kinds adhering to the soil; Applying the principle Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemu, the law makes no distinction as to whether the owner of the land is or is not the owner of the building. In view of the plain terms of the statute, the only possible doubt could arise in the case of a house sold for demolition. In the case of immovables by destination, the code requires that they be placed by the owner of the tenement, in order to acquire the same nature or consideration of real property. In cases of immovable by incorporation, the code nowhere requires that the attachment or incorporation be made by the owner of the land. The only criterion is union or incorporation with the soil. Ladera did not declare his house to be a chattel mortgage. The object of the levy or sale was real property. The publication in a newspaper of general circulation was indispensible. It being admitted that no publication was ever made, the execution sale was void and conferred no title on the purchaser. The alleged purchaser at the auction sale, Magno, is a mere employee of the creditor Hodges and the low bid made by her as well as the fact that she sold the house to Villa on the same day that Hodges sold him the land, proves that she was merely acting for and in behalf of Hodges. It should be noted that in sales of immovables, the lack of title of the vendor taints the rights of subsequent purchasers. Unlike in sales of chattels and personalty, in transactions covering real property, possession in good faith is not equivalent to title.

2. Mindanao Co. v. Assessor Treasurer

Bus City and

For movable equipments to be immobilized in contemplation of the law must first be "essential and principal elements" of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be "unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established." We may here distinguish, therefore, those movable which become immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry for those which may not be so considered immobilized because they are merely incidental, not essential and principal. Thus, cash registers, typewriters, etc., usually found and used in hotels, restaurants, theaters, etc. are merely incidentals and are not and should not be considered immobilized by destination, for these businesses can continue or carry on their functions without these equity comments. Airline companies use forklifts, jeep-wagons, pressure pumps, IBM machines, etc. which are incidentals, not essentials, and thus retain their movable nature. On the other hand, machineries of breweries used in the manufacture of liquor and soft drinks, though movable in nature, are immobilized because they are essential to said industries; but the delivery trucks and adding machines which they usually own and use and are found within their industrial compounds are merely incidental and retain their movable nature. Similarly, the tools and equipments in question in this instant case are, by their nature, not essential and principle municipal elements of petitioner's business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely incidentals acquired as movables and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. Even without such tools and equipments, its business may be carried on, as petitioner has carried on, without such equipments, before the war. The transportation business could be carried on without the repair or service shop if its rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop belonging to another. In the case at bar the equipments in question are destined only to repair or service the transportation business, which is not carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of land, as demanded by the law. Said equipments may not, therefore, be deemed real property. Therefore, the equipment in question declared not subject to assessment as real estate for the purposes of the real estate tax.

3. Makati Leasing and Financial Corp v. Wearever Textile Mills

SC cited Tumalad v. Vicencio where it ruled that unlike other cases wherein third persons assailed the validity of the chattel mortgage, it is the defendants-appellants themselves as debtors-mortgagors who are attacking the validity of the chattel mortgage and thus, the doctrine of estoppel therefore applies to herein defendants-appellants having treated the property as personalty. As stated in Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Jaramillo, moreover, it is undeniable that the parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property, as long as no interest of third parties would be prejudiced thereby. If a house of strong materials, like what was involved in the above Tumalad case, may be considered as personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the contract so agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby, there is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such. This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped from denying the existence of the chattel mortgage. YES. The said house is not personal property, much less a debt, credit or other personal property not capable of manual delivery, but immovable property. As explicitly held, in Laddera vs. Hodges, "a true building (not merely superimposed on the soil) is immovable or real property, whether it is erected by the owner of the land or by usufructuary or lessee. It is true that the parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal property for purposes of said contract. However, this view is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. It is based, partly, upon the principle of estoppel. Neither this principle, nor said view, is applicable to strangers to said contract. Much less is it in point where there has been no contract whatsoever, with respect to the status of the house involved, as in the case at bar.

4. Evangelista Alto Surety

v.

Sales on execution affect the public and third persons. The regulation governing sales on execution are for public officials to follow. The form of proceedings prescribed for each kind of property is suited to its character, not to the character, which the parties have given to it or desire to give it. Enforcement of regulations would be difficult were the convenience or agreement of private parties to determine or govern the nature of the proceedings.
The foregoing considerations apply, with equal force, to the conditions for the levy of attachment, for it similarly affects the public and third persons. 5. Tsai v. CA Whether or not petitioners contention that the nature of the disputed machineries i.e. that they were heavy, bolted or cemented on the real property mortgaged by EVERTEX to PBCom, make them ipso facto immovable under Article 415 (3) and (5) of the NCC. - NO. While it is true that the controverted properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties herein gives a contrary indication, i.e. to treat machinery and equipment as chattels. If the machineries in question were contemplated to be included in the real estate mortgage, there would have been no necessity to ink a chattel mortgage specifically mentioning as part of the aforementioned schedule listing the machineries covered thereby. 6. Sergs Products v. PCI Leasing The court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, the parties are estopped from claiming otherwise. In the present case the lease agreement clearly provides that the machines in question ate to be considered as personal property. Clearly then, petitioners are estopped from denying the characterization of the subject machines as personal property. Under the circumstances, they are proper subjects of the writ of seizure. The Civil Code considers as immovable property, among others, anything "attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object." The pump does not fit this description. It could be, and was in fact separated from Yap's premises without being broken or suffering deterioration. Obviously the separation or removal of the pump involved nothing more complicated than the loosening of bolts or dismantling of

7. Yap v. Tanada

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other fasteners. 8. Machinery Engineering Supplies v. CA Replevin, governed by Rule 62 of Court, is applicable only to "personal property". When the sheriff repaired to the premises of respondent, Ipo Limestone Co., Inc., machinery and equipment in question appeared to be attached to the land, particularly to the concrete foundation of said premises, in a fixed manner, in such a way that the former could not be separated from the latter "without breaking the material or deterioration of the object." Hence, in order to remove said outfit, it became necessary, not only to unbolt the same, but also to cut some of its wooden supports. Moreover, said machinery and equipment were "intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry" carried on said immovable and tended." For these reasons, they were already immovable property pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 415 of Civil Code of the Philippines. WON power barges, which are floating and movable, are personal properties and therefore, not subject to real property tax. Held: Yes, Article 415(9) of the NCC provides that docks and structures, which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast are considered immovable property. Thus, the barges are categorized as immovable property by destination, being in the nature of machinery and other implements intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend to directly meet the needs of said industry or work. PROPERTY IN RELATION TO THE PERSON TO WHOM IT BELONGS 1. Laurel v. Garcia As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation. The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite. Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the governments own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property. Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises.

9. Fels Energy v. Prov of Batangas

2. Republic v. CA

The Public Land Act prohibits the encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired under a free patent or homestead within 5 years from the grant of such patent. Such encumbrance results in the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to the public domain. Respondent Morato cannot fully use or enjoy the land during the duration of the lease contract as such contract "impairs the use of the property" by the grantee. The mortgage on the other hand, constitutes a legal limitation and the estate, and the foreclosure of such mortgage would necessarily result in the auction of the property. Even if only a part of the property has been sold or alienated with the prohibited period, such alienation is a sufficient cause for the reversion of the whole estate to the State. Moreover, Morato cannot own foreshore land. From the findings of the CA, the land has become foreshore. Accordingly, it can no longer be subject of a free patent under the Public Land Act. When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public domain. The subject land, being foreshore, should therefore be returned to public domain. The 24 lots are public while the remaining 26 are patrimonial property and must be paid just compensation. (SC applied the classification under municipal corporations than the Civil Law) The principles are: 1.) If the property is owned by the municipality in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it; and 2.) If the property is owned in its private or propriety capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation. Articles 423 and 424 of the New Civil Code provides for the classification of properties of provinces, cities, and municipalities into property for public use and patrimonial property. If this is applied, all the 50 lots and buildings, except the two lots used as High School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province. However, under the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public. Under this norm, it is enough that the property be held and devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc. to be considered public. R.A. 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga province of its share in the value of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not being utilized for distinctly governmental purposes. But certainly, the 24 properties which are used as capitol lot and building, hospital lot and building, etc. are considered for public use and therefore, the Congress has control over them.

3. Prov. Zamboanga v. City of Zomboanga

4. Chavez v. PEA

No. Amari cannot claim good faith because even before Amari signed the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999, petitioner had already filed the instant case on April 27, 1998 questioning precisely the qualification of Amari to acquire the Freedom Islands. Even before the filing of this petition, two Senate Committees had already approved on September 16, 1997 Senate Committee Report No. 560 which concluded that the Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public domain. Thus, Amari signed the Amended JVA knowing and assuming all the attendant risks, including the annulment of the Amended JVA. Amari has also not paid to PEA the full reimbursement cost incurred by PEA in reclaiming the Freedom Islands. Moreover, Amari does not claim to have even initiated the reclamation of the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas covered in the Amended JVA, or to have started to construct any permanent infrastructure on the Freedom Islands. In short, Amari does not claim to have introduced any physical improvement or development on the reclamation project that is the subject of the Amended JVA.

PEA cannot claim that it is similarly situated as the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) which under R.A. No. 7227 is tasked to sell portions of the Metro Manila military camps and other military reservations is incorrect. PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of other alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable or disposable

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lands of the public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands.

5. Chavez v. NHA

To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn around and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. 1. Yes. The reclaimed lands across R-10 were classified alienable and disposable lands of public domain of the State. First, there were three presidential proclamations classifying the reclaimed lands across R-10 as alienable or disposable hence open to disposition or concession. These were MO 415 issued by President Aquino, Proclamation No. 39 and Proclamation No. 465 both issued by President Ramos. Secondly, Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 issued by the DENR classified the reclaimed areas as alienable and disposable.

Admittedly, it cannot be said that MO 415, Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are explicit declarations that the lands to be reclaimed are classified as alienable and disposable. We find however that such conclusion is derived and implicit from the authority given to the NHA to transfer the reclaimed lands to qualified beneficiaries. In line with the ruling in Chavez v. PEA, the court held that MO 415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 cumulatively and jointly taken together with Special Patent Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 more than satisfy the requirement in PEA that [t]here must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession.

2. Yes. Even if it is conceded that there was no explicit declaration that the lands are no longer needed for public use or public service, there was however an implicit executive declaration that the reclaimed areas R-10 are not necessary anymore for public use or public service. President Aquino through MO 415 conveyed the same to the NHA partly for housing project and related commercial/industrial development intended for disposition to and enjoyment of certain beneficiaries and not the public in general and partly as enabling component to finance the project. Also, President Ramos, in issuing Proclamation No. 39, declared, though indirectly, that the reclaimed lands of the Smokey Mountain project are no longer required for public use or service. In addition, President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 465 increasing the area to be reclaimed from forty (40) hectares to seventy-nine (79) hectares, elucidating that said lands are undoubtedly set aside for the beneficiaries of SMDRP and not the public. MO 415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are declarations that proclaimed the non-use of the reclaimed areas for public use or service as the SMDRP cannot be successfully implemented without the withdrawal of said lands from public use or service.

3. Yes. When Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 were issued, inalienable lands covered by said proclamations were converted to alienable and disposable lands of public domain. When the titles to the reclaimed lands were transferred to the NHA, said alienable and disposable lands of public domain were automatically classified as lands of the private domain or patrimonial properties of the State because the NHA is an agency NOT tasked to dispose of alienable or disposable lands of public domain. The only way it can transfer the reclaimed land in conjunction with its projects and to attain its goals is when it is automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State. Being patrimonial or private properties of the State, then it has the power to sell the same to any qualified personunder the Constitution, Filipino citizens as private corporations, 60% of which is owned by Filipino citizens like RBI. OWNERSHIP IN GENERAL A. RIGHTS INCLUDED IN OWNERSHIP 1. Javier v. No. The following are the requisites of res judicata: a) there is final judgment or order; b) the court have jurisdiction over the Veridiano II subject matter; c) former judgment is a judgment on merits; and d) identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. The first three are present. There is identity of parties in the case. What is required is not absolute but substantial identity of parties. In the case, Rosete is a successor in interest of Babol by title. Nevertheless, there is no identity of cause of action. CC 926 is a complaint of forcible entry or accion interdictal where the issue is physical or material possession of real property. In this case, Javier merely claimed a better right or prior possession over the land without asserting title. CC 2203-0 is an action to recover a parcel of land or accion reivindicatori. In this case, Javier expressly alleged ownership (by virtue of the Original Certificate of Title issued) and specifically prayed that she be declared the rightful owner and be given possession of the disputed portion. A judgement in forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and declares only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership. 2. Garcia v. CA Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. Atty. Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios exercised their right to dispose of what they owned when they sold the subject property to the Magpayo spouses. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. To possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so. On the other hand, "one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong." 3. Rodil v. CA Yes, the owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. Every owner has the freedom of disposition over his property. It is an attribute of ownership, and this rule has no exception. The Republic being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the prerogative to enter into a lease contract with RODIL in the exercise of its jus disponendi. The contracts of May 17 and May 25 1992 are valid. They are not proscribed by law, neither is there a law prohibiting the execution of a contract with provisions that are retroactive. 4. Isaguirre v. De Lara A mortgage is a contract entered into in order to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation. It is constituted by recording the document in which it appears with the proper Registry of Property, although, even if it is not recorded, the mortgage is nevertheless binding between the parties. Thus, the only right granted by law in favor of the mortgagee is to demand the execution and the recording of the document in which the mortgage is formalized. As a general rule, the mortgagor retains possession of the mortgaged property since a mortgage is merely a lien and title to the property does not pass to the mortgagee. However, even though a mortgagee does not have possession of the property, there is no impairment of his security since the mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted. If the debtor is unable to pay his debt, the mortgage creditor may institute an action to foreclose the mortgage, whether judicially or extrajudicially, whereby the mortgaged property will then be sold at a public auction and the proceeds therefrom given to the creditor to the extent necessary to discharge the mortgage loan.

B. PRINCIPLE OF SELH-HELP AND STATE OF NECESSITY 5. Caisip v. People Art. 429 of the Civil Code reads: The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. It is obviously inapplicable to the case at bar, for, having been given 20 days within which to vacate Lot 105-A, complainant did not invade or usurp said lot. She had merely remained in possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have become its co-possessor. Appellants did not "repel or prevent in actual or threatened ... physical invasion or usurpation." They expelled Gloria from a property of which she and her husband were in possession even before the action for forcible entry was filed against them, despite the fact that the Sheriff had explicitly authorized them to stay in said property for 20 days, and had expressed the view that he could not oust them without a judicial

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order. Weeding and refusing to leave Lot 105-A, Gloria had NOT committed a crime in the presence of the policemen. It is clear that appellants had, by means of violence, and without legal authority, prevented the complainant from "doing something not prohibited by law," (weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her "to do something against" her will (stopping the weeding and leaving said lot), "whether it be right or wrong," thereby taking the law into their hands, in violation of Art. 286 of the RPC. There was community of purpose between the policemen and Caisip, so that the latter is guilty of grave coercion, as a coconspirator, apart from being a principal by induction. 6. People Pletcha YES. Under Art. 429 of the NCC, the owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof, and may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual pr threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. It is a sort of self-defense. It is lawful to repel force by force. The use of such necessary force to protect propriety or possessory rights constitutes a justifying circumstance under the RPC. The Constitution also provides, No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws. The Municipal Court should have taken into account Pletchas situation, a poor farmer, pitten against the giant of a corporation, the former just fighting for his small piece of land passed on from his father (which, is in his possession en concepto dueo and had been planted by him with bananas and agoho trees, hence he has pro tanto acquired at least in his favor color of title thereto pursuant to Articles 436 and 541 of the NCC). As to Peoples contention, it is the corporation which has all the time, legal facilities and money to question Pletchas possession/ownership. In invasion of property, force may be used against mere disturbance of possession at anytime as long as it continues. If it consists of real dispossession, force to regain possession can be used only immediately after the dispossession. But once possession has been lost, even if wrongfully or illegally, and the usurpers possession has become firm by the lapse of time, the lawful possessor must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property (Art. 433, NCC) for he must invoke the order of the competent court (Art. 536, NCC). In this case, usurpers possession has not yet become complete. The crews act of trespass justified Pletcha to shoo them away, even by means of a bolo, as they refused to listen to his appeal. Pletchas situation required immediate action. Art. 429 applies. Pletcha was acquitted. C. USE INJURING THE RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS 7. Andamo v. IAC - ALL ELEMENTS ARE PRESENT. Elements of quasi-delict: 1. Damages suffered by the plaintiff 2. Fault or negligence of the defendant 3. Connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff ANDAMO sufficiently alleges that they will continue to sustain damage due to the water paths and contrivances built by respondent corporation No pre-existing contractual obligation clear case of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. USE OF ONES PROPERTY IS NOT WITHOUT LIMITIATIONS. Article 341: Owner CANNOT make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person. Adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the right and interest of others. We RECOGNIZE the owners land to build structures on his land, such structure must be maintained using ALL REASONABLE care so that they cannot be danger to adjoining landowners. ANDAMO can claim indemnification IAC decision reversed. v.

D. SURFACE RIGHTS OF OWNER 8. Republic v. CA The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the acquiring of a patent over it. As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok. The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein. For the loss sustained by such owner, he entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings. The Court ruled that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.

E. RIGHT TO ENCLOSURE 9. Custodio v. CA The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and the damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely a part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied. When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life. F. RIGHT TO RECOVER 10. Abejaron v. NO. An action for reconveyance of a property is the sole remedy of a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or Nabasa erroneously registered in another's name after one year from the date of the decree so long as the property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value. The action does not seek to reopen the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration but only purports to show that the person who secured the registration of the property in controversy is not the real owner thereof. Fraud is a ground for reconveyance. For an action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, it is essential for the party seeking reconveyance to prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud. Such was not performed by the petitioner. ACCESSION 1. Bachrach Motor v. Talisay

No. The bonus is not a civil fruit. The Supreme Court held that the bonus had no immediate relation to the lands in question but merely a remote and accidental one and, therefore, it was not a civil fruit of the real properties mortgaged to the Philippine

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National Bank to secure the obligation of the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., being a mere personal right of Mariano Lacson Ledesma. It is not one of those meant by Art. 442 of the Civil Code when it says other similar income since the phrase merely refers to things analogous to rents, leases, and annuities. Assuming that it is income, still it is not income obtained or derived from the land itself, but obtained as compensation for the risk assumed by the owner. It should, moreover, be remembered that the bonus was not based upon the value or importance of the land but upon the total value of the debt secured. Hence, the PNB does not have a preferred right with regard to the bonus as against herein petitioner.

2. Ignacio v. Hilario

O. The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building under article 453. The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article 361, either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same. But this is not the case. The order of Judge Natividad compelling defendants-petitioners to remove their buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffsrespondents only because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings not to sell the land, is null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be executed and is, furthermore, offensive to articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code. The judgment has never become final, it having left matters to be settled for its completion in a subsequent proceeding, matters which remained unsettled up to the time the petition is filed in the instant case (value of improvements). The writ of execution is set aside and the lower court ordered to hold a hearing in the principal case wherein it must determine the prices of the buildings and of the residential lot where they are erected, as well as the period of time within which the plaintiffs-respondents may exercise their option either to pay for the buildings or to sell their land.

3. Ignao v. IAC

Prior to the partition, all the co-owners hold the property in common dominion but at the same time each as an owner of a share which is abstract and undetermined until partition is effected. As co-owners, parties may have unequal shares in the common property, quantitatively speaking. But in a qualitative sense, each co- owner has the same right as any one of the other co-owners. Ever co-owner is therefore the owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time, the owner of a portion which is truly abstract, because until division is effected such portion is not concretely determined. When the co-ownership is terminated by a partition and it appears that the house of an erstwhile co-owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to another co- owner which was however made in good faith, then the provisions of Art. 448 should apply to determine the respective rights of the parties. Pursuant to Art. 448, the owner of the land shall have the right to appropriate or to oblige the one who built to pay the price of the land. The law is clear and unambiguous when it confers the right of choice upon the landowner and not upon the builder and the courts.

4. Colleges Timbang

Filipinas v.

NO, THE APPELLANTS CONTENTION IS SUPERFLUOUS. There is nothing in the language of these two articles, 448 and 546, which would justify the conclusion of appellants that, upon the failure of the builder to pay the value of the land, when such is demanded by the land-owner, the latter becomes automatically the owner of the improvement under Article 445. Although it is true, it was declared therein that in the event of the failure of the builder to pay the land after the owner thereof has chosen this alternative, the builder's right of retention provided in Article 546 is lost, nevertheless there was nothing said that as a consequence thereof, the builder loses entirely all rights over his own building. The remedy left to the parties in such eventuality where the builder fails to pay the value of the land, though the Code is silent on this Court, a builder in good faith not be required to pay rentals. He has right to retain the land on which he has built in good faith until he is reimbursed the expenses incurred by him. Possibly he might be made to pay rental only when the owner of the land chooses not to appropriate the improvement and requires the builder in good faith to pay for the land but that the builder is unwilling or unable to pay the land, and then they decide to leave things as they are and assume the relation of lessor and lessee, and should they disagree as to the amount of rental then they can go to the court to fix that amount. This was ruled in the case of Miranda vs. Fadullon, et al., 97 Phil., 801.

5. Manotok Tecson

v.

YES. When the decision of the trial court became final and executory, it became incumbent upon Judge Tecson to issue the necessary writ for the execution of the same. There is no basis for him to deny Manotok's motion to avail of its option to appropriate the improvements made on its property. Under Art. 448, the right to appropriate the works or improvements or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land belongs to the owner of the land. The only right given to the builder in good faith is the right to reimbursement for the improvements, the builder cannot compel the owner of the land to sell such land to the former. Also, to be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential a person assert title to the land on which he builds, i.e. he be a possessor in the concept of owner, and that he be unaware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. It is such builder in good faith who is given the right to retain the thing, even as against the real owner, until he has been reimbursed in full not only for the necessary expenses but also for useful expenses. However, in this case, Madlangawa's good faith ceased after the filing of the complaint by Manotok. A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits only so long as his possession is not legally interrupted and such interruption takes place upon service of judicial summons (Art. 544 and 1123 of the NCC). The repairs and improvements introduced by Madlangawa after the complaint was filed cannot be considered to have been built in good faith, much less, justify the denial of Manotok's fai-rn of option. Also, since the improvements have been gutted by fire, basis for Madlangawa's right to retain the premises has already been extinguished without Manotok's fault, there is no other recourse for Madlangawa but to vacate the premises and to deliver the same to Manotok. Petition granted. Judge ordered to issue writ of execution.

6. Bernardo Bataclan

v.

Where the planter, builder, or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of "forced co-ownership", the law has provided a just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who is allowed to exercise the option because his right is older and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing. In this case, the plaintiff, as owner of the land, chose to require the defendant, as owner of the improvements, to pay for the parcel of land.al la

7. Durano v. Uy

A purchaser of a parcel of land cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, such as when the property subject of the purchase is in the possession of persons other than the seller. A buyer who could not have failed to know or discover that the land sold to him was in the adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith. In the herein case,

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respondents were in open possession and occupancy of the properties when Durano & Co. supposedly purchased the same from Cepoc. Petitioners made no attempt to investigate the nature of respondents' possession before they ordered demolition in August 1970. Based on these provisions, the owner of the land has three alternative rights: (1) to appropriate what has been built without any obligation to pay indemnity therefor, or (2) to demand that the builder remove what he had built, or (3) to compel the builder to pay the value of the land. 32 In any case, the landowner is entitled to damages under Article 451, abovecited.

8. Ballatan v. CA

YES. GF. The Gos had no knowledge that they encroached on petitioners land. Moreover, Li Ching Yao built his house on Lot 27 before any of the others did. He constructed his house in 1982, Go in 1983, and Ballatan in 1985. There is no evidence, much less, any allegation that respondent Yao was aware that when he built his house he knew that when he built his house he knew that a portion thereof encroached on Gos adjoining land. It was the erroneous survey be Engr. Quedding that triggered these discrepancies. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted in good faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own the building, planting, or sowing, after payment to the builder, planter, or sower of the necessary and useful expense, and in the proper case expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure. The owner of the land may also oblige the builder, planter or sower to purchse and pay the price of the land. If the owner chooses to sell his land, the builder, planter, or sower must purchase the land, otherwise the owner may remove the improvements thereon. The builder, planter, or sower, however, Is not obliges to purchase the land if its value is considerably more than the building, planting, or sowing. In such case, the builder, planter, or sower must pay the rent to the owner of the land, if the parties cannot come to terms, over the conditions of the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof. The right to choose between appropriating the improvement or selling the land to the builder, planter, or sower is given to the owner of the land. Thus, the petitioners, as owners of Lot 24, may choose to purchase the improvement of sell the land to the Gos.

9. Del Ocampo v. Abeisa

Article 448 of the NCC cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants or sows on the land owned in common for then he did not build, plant or sow upon land that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a third person under the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership. HOWEVER, when, as in this case, the co-ownership is terminated by the partition, and it appears that the house of the defendants occupying a portion of the plaintiffs' land was built in good faith, the provision of Article 448 should apply. Applying the aforesaid provision of the Civil Code, the plaintiffs have the right to appropriate said portion of the house of defendants upon payment of indemnity to defendants as provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, the plaintiffs may oblige the defendants to pay the price of the land occupied by their house. However, if the price asked for is considerably much more than the value of the portion of the house of defendants built thereon, then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. The defendants shall then pay the reasonable rent to the plaintiff upon such terms and conditions that they may agree. In case of disagreement, the trial court shall fix the terms thereof. Of course, defendants may demolish or remove the said portion of their house, at their own expense, if they so decide.

10. Pacific v. Esguerra

Farms

NO. The appellant is an unpaid furnisher of materials. The application by analogy of the rules of accession would suffice for a just adjudication. Article 447 of the Civil Code provides:The owner of the land who makes thereon personally or through another, plantings, constructions or works with the materials of another, shall pay their value; and, if he acted in bad faith, he shall also be obliged to the reparation of damages. The owner of the materials shall have the right to remove them only in case he can do so without injury to the work constructed, or without the plantings, constructions or works being destroyed. However, if the landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of the materials may remove them in any event with a right to be indemnified for damages. Applying article 447 by analogy, the buildings are the principal and the lumber and construction materials that went into their construction are the accessory. Thus the appellee, if it does own the six buildings, must bear the obligation to pay for the value of the said materials; the appellant which apparently has no desire to remove the materials, and, even if it were minded to do so, cannot remove them without necessarily damaging the buildings has the corresponding right to recover the value of the unpaid lumber and construction materials. Well-established in jurisprudence is the rule that compensation should be borne by the person who has been benefited by the accession. No doubt, the appellee benefited from the accession. It should therefore shoulder the compensation due to the appellant as unpaid furnisher of materials. Appellee was not a buyer in good faith and for value. It cannot be free from paying compensation. The appellee cannot claim ignorance of the pendency of the civil case because the Insular Farms, Inc. was defended by the same lawyer from the same law firm that commenced the present action. J. Antonio Araneta, as counsel for the Pacific Farms, Inc., cannot close his eyes to facts of which he as president of the Insular Farms, Inc. had actual knowledge. It follows, as a necessary corollary, that the sale at public auction conducted by the defendant sheriff of the six buildings described in the certificate of sale was valid and effective. In view of equity, Pacific Farms, Inc. is granted a period of thirty (30) days to exercise the option of redeeming the six buildings, by paying to the defendant- appellant Carried Lumber Company the sum of P4,710.18, with legal interest until the said amount shall have been fully paid.

11. Pecson v. CA

With regard to Art. 448, the provision on indemnity may be applied in analogy. Whoever is the owner of the land may appropriate whatever has been built, planted or sown after paying indemnity. However, it does not apply when the owner of the land is also the builder of the works on his own land who later on loses ownership by sale or donation. Art. 546 refers to the necessary and useful expenses which shall be refunded to the possessor in good faith with right of retention. However, it does not state how to determine the value of the useful improvement. The respondents [court and private respondents alike] espouses as sufficient reimbursement the cost of construction in 1965, however, this is contrary to previous rulings which declares that the value to the reimbursed should be the present market value of said improvements so as not to unjustly enrich either of the parties.

12. CA

Technogas

v.

When petitioner purchased the land from Pariz Industries, the buildings and other structures were already in existence. The record is not clear as to who actually built those structures, but it may well be assumed that petitioners predecessor-in-interest, Pariz Industries, did so. Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the encroachment

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over a narrow, needle-shaped portion of private respondents land was done in bad faith by the builder of the encroaching structures, the latter should be presumed to have built them in good faith. It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it was acquired, until the contrary is proved. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his, and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. Hence, such good faith, by law, passed on to Parizs successor, petitioner in this case. The obvious benefit to the builder under Article 448 is that, instead of being outrightly ejected from the land, he can compel the landowner to make a choice between the two options: (1) to appropriate the building by paying the indemnity required by law, or (2) sell the land to the builder. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land.

13. Pleasantville v. CA

Under the circumstances, Kee had acted in the manner of a prudent man in ascertaining the identity of his property. Lot 8 is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-69561, while Lot 9 is identified in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 106367. Hence, under the Torrens system of land registration, Kee is presumed to have knowledge of the metes and bounds of the property with which he is dealing. But as Kee is a layman not versed in the technical description of his property, he had to find a way to ascertain that what was described in TCT No. 69561 matched Lot 8. Thus, he went to the subdivision developer's agent and applied and paid for the relocation of the lot, as well as for the production of a lot plan by CTTEI's geodetic engineer. Upon Kee's receipt of the map, his wife went to the subdivision site accompanied by CTTEI's employee, Octaviano, who authoritatively declared that the land she was pointing to was indeed Lot 8. Having full faith and confidence in the reputation of CTTEI, and because of the company's positive identification of the property, Kee saw no reason to suspect that there had been a misdelivery. The steps Kee had taken to protect his interests were reasonable. There was no need for him to have acted ex-abundantia cautela, such as being present during the geodetic engineer's relocation survey or hiring an independent geodetic engineer to countercheck for errors, for the final delivery of subdivision lots to their owners is part of the regular course of everyday business of CTTEI. Because of CTTEI's blunder, what Kee had hoped to forestall did in fact transpire. Kee's efforts all went to naught.

14. CA

Geminiano

v.

Article 1678. The Court noted that as the private respondents are mere lessees, they knew that their occupation of the premises would continue only for the life of the lease. Plainly then they cannot be considered builders in good faith. The Court ruled that Article 448, in relation to 546, which allows full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with a belief that he is the owner thereof. Moreover, the Court held that the rights of the private respondents as lessees are governed by Art. 1678 which allows reimbursement to the extent of one-half of the value of the useful improvement if the lessor opts to appropriate the improvements. However, petitioners refused to exercise that option leaving the respondents the sole right to remove the improvements without causing any more impairment upon the property than is necessary.

ACCESSION NATURAL 1. Austin v. IAC Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river. The accretion on the western bank of the Cagayan River had been going on from 1919 up to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. It was gradual and imperceptible. Only when Lot No. 3351, with an original area of 5 hectares described in the free patent that was issued to Macario Melad in June 1956, was resurveyed in 1968 did it become known that 6.6 hectares had been added to it. Lot No. 3351, covered by a homestead patent issued in June, 1950 to Pablo Binayug, grew from its original area of 18 hectares, by an additional 50 hectares through alluvium as the Cagayan River gradually moved to the east. These accretions belong to riparian owners upon whose lands the alluvial deposits were made. The reason for this principle is because, if lands bordering on streams are exposed to floods and other damage due to the destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers as may prejudice the owners thereof should in some way be compensated by the right of accretion. The private respondents' ownership of the accretion to their lands was not lost upon the sudden and abrupt change of the course of the Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted to its old 1919 bed, and separated or transferred said accretions to the other side (or eastern bank) of the river. Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code apply to this situation. The sudden change of course of the Cagayan River as a result of a strong typhoon in 1968 caused a portion of the lands of the private respondents to be "separated from the estate by the current." The private respondents have retained the ownership of the portion that was transferred by avulsion to the other side of the river.

2. Cureg v. IAC

The allegation of private respondents that they were in possession of the motherland through their predecessors in interest had not been proved by sufficient evidence. Since petitioner's OCT clearly stated that the land is bounded on the north by the Cagayan River, private respondents' claim over their motherland, allegedly existing between petitioner's land and the Cagayan River, is deemed barred and nullified with the issuance of the OCT. The foregoing considerations indubitably show that the alleged motherland is nonexistent. The subject land is an alluvial deposit left by the northward movement of the Cagayan River and pursuant to Art. 457 of the New Civil Code which provides: "To the owners of the land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the current of the waters.

3. Viajar v. CA

Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides that: To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. The presumption is that the change in the course of the river was gradual and caused by accretion and erosion. For a period of more than 40 years, the Suague River overflowed its banks yearly and the property of the defendant gradually received deposits of soil from the effects of the current of the river. The consequent increase in the area of Lot No. 7511 due to alluvion or accretion was possessed by the defendants whose tenants plowed and planted the same with coin and tobacco. Under the law, accretion which the banks or rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters becomes the property of the owners of the lands adjoining the banks. It clearly appearing that the land in question has become part of defendant's estate as a result of accretion, it follows that said land now belongs to him. The fact that the accretion to his land used to pertain to plaintiffs estate, which is covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, cannot preclude him (defendant) from being the owner thereof. Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Petition is DISMISSED.

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4. De Nazareno v. CA 1) NO. Accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 of the NCC requires the concurrence of the ff. requisites:(a) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;(b) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and(c) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or the sea coast). These are called the rules on ALLUVION which give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the current waters. N & T admit that the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials [and sawdusts by the Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations] on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that the accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible resulting from the action of the waters or the current of the said creek and river. "Current" indicates the participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide. Hence, the absence of the 1st and 2nd requisites of the rules on alluvion. Alluvion must be the EXCLUSIVE work of nature. N & T cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner since the accretion was man-made/artificial, and as such part of the public domain. In filing said application Antonio described the lot as an orchard but this was controverted by S & R as said land actually covers a dry portion of Balacanas Creek and a swampy portion of Cagayan River. Investigation report also stated that except for the swampy portion which is fully planted to nipa palms, the whole area is fully occupied by a part of a big concrete bodega of N & T and several residential houses made of light materials, including those of S & R which were erected by themselves sometime in 1978. (2) YES. The subject lot being public land, being an artificial accretion of sawdust, the Director of Lands has jurisdiction, authority and control over the same as mandated under Sec. 3 and 4 of CA 141 which states: Sec. 3. The SANR shall be the exclusive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act through the Director of Lands who shall act under his immediate control. Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have the direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of public domain and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the SANR. 5. Navarro v. IAC The petitioners claim is misplaced. The principle of accretion is only applicable to owners whose estates are adjacent to rivers as stated in Article 457 of the Civil Code. The disputed land is an accretion not on a riverbank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of to Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. The disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public domain. As part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by any private person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a competent authority." Only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the right and the power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of establishment of special industries or for coast guard services. Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive or legislative department has already declared the disputed land as qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of petitioners as owners of the estates adjacent thereto

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