26.

Aglipay vs Ruiz Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioners attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner. Issue: Whether the issurance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution. Held: There has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs. Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition. The court resolved that petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs.

27.

Garces vs Estenzo Facts: wo resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed: a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations.

b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the saints feast day.

These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the churchs property since church funds were used in its acquisition. Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated. Issue: Whether or not any freedom of religion clause in the Contitution violated. Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was placed in a laymans custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the councils funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property. 28. Lozanida vs COMELEC Facts: Lonzanida was elected as mayor and served two consecutive terms from 1988 to 1995. He then ran again for the same position in the May 1995 elections, won and discharged his duties as mayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation and filed an election protest before the RTC, w h i c h r u l e d t h a t t h e r e was a failure of elections and declared the position of m a y o r v a c a n t . T h e COMELEC affirmed this decision and petitioner acceded to the order to vacate his post. In the 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor but was protested against due to the reason that he allegedly had served 3 consecutive terms already.

Issue: Whether or not it may be considered that petitioner had served 3 consecutive terms, granting that he did not finish his term in 1995. Held: Negative. By reason of his involuntary relinquishment of office, petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term and became a private citizen. 29. Villena vs Secretary of Interior Facts: Villena was the then mayor of Makati. After investigation, the Secretary of Interior recommended the suspension of Villena with the Office of the president who approved the same. The Secretary then suspended Villena. Villena averred claiming that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the matter. The power or jurisdiction is lodged in the local government [the governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of the Administrative Code. Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of supervision over local governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of charges against elective municipal officials are those contained in sec 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended. In other words, the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if he has that power under existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter provisions govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective local officials while sec 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the genera law which must yield to the special law. Issue: WON the secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official under investigation. Held: There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial governor by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code which provides that The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power. For instance, counsel for the petitioner admitted in the oral argument that the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the President could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official; it would be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the

incongruity would be more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official (sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without the power to suspend a municipal official. The power to suspend a municipal official is not exclusive. Preventive suspension may be issued to give way for an impartial investigation. 30. Lacson vs Roque Facts: Mayor Lacson broadcasted some allegedly defamatory and libelous utterances against Roque. The said broadcast was made from the City Hall. Roque filed a petition on gorunds of misconduct against Lacson and that the latter used his public office to malign the former. Roque requested that Lacson be removed as the mayor. Issue: Whether or not the mayor may be removed by the president from his post. Held: The power of the President to remove officials from office as provided for in section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code must be done conformably to law; and only for disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines he may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the Government of the Philippines. Again, this power of removal must be exercised conformably to law. The Presidents power of general supervision over local governments could be exercised by him only as may be provided by law in accordance with the constitutional limitation. 31. Mondano vs Silvosa Facts: Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against him for rape and concubinage. The information reached the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered the governor to investigate the matter. Silvosa then summoned Mondano and the latter appeared before him. Thereafter Silvosa suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding. Silvosa invoked the RAC which provided that he, as part of the executive and by virtue o the order given by the Asst Exec Sec, is with direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction . . . and to that end may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his Department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations. Issue: WON the governor can exercise the power of control.

Held: Yes because the heads of various executive departments are agents of the President who, constitutionally, have general supervision over local governments, as may be provided by law. Supervision, in administrative law, means overseeing or the power or authority of an official to see that subordinate officers perform their duties The respondent Governor, upon the indorsement of the Assistant Executive Secretary, is only acting as an agent of the President in investigating the petitioner. 32. Marcos vs Manglapus Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the

limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime. The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. 33. Binamira vs Garrucho Facts: Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority. He was designated as general Manager by the Chairman of the PTA Board. Issue: Whether or not, the petitioner was illegally removed from his designation. Whether or not , petitioner should be reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority Held: Appointment and designation are distinct from each other. The former is defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, the appointment results in security of tenure. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official and is legislative in nature. The implication is that he shall hold office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority.

34.

Sarmiento vs Mison Facts: When Salvador Mison was appointed to the Office of the Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, this petition for prohibition filed by taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional was filed on the grounds that said appointment is in violation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution for it was not approved by the Commission on Appointments. Issue: Whether or not the appointment is valid. Held: Misons appointment is constitutional. Sec. 16, Article VII states that: Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. x x x It is clear that the first group shall need the confirmation of the CoA. Also, it can be seen from reviewing the records of deliberation of the 1986 Constitutional Commission that it has been clearly stated that appointments to the second and third groups of officers can be made by the President without the confirmation of the CoA. In the issue at hand, it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the CoA is required. Furthermore, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs under Sec. 601 of R.A. 1937 which states that Sec. 601. x x x The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines.

35.

Calderon vs Carale Facts: In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the CoA. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor. Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned Carale et al as the Chairman and the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC, the appointment was not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation. Calderon questioned the appointment saying that w/o the confirmation by the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Sec16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CoA of appointments extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the CoA. Held: It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

36.

Aytona vs Castillo Facts: Aytona one was of those appointed by outgoing president Garcia during the last minute of his term. Aytona was appointed as the ad interim governor of the Central Bank. When Macapagal took his office as the next president he issued Order No. 2 which recalled Aytonas position and at the same time he appointed Castillo as the new governor of the Central Bank. Aytona then filed a quo warranto proceeding claiming that he is qualified to remain as the Central Bank governor and that he was validly appointed by the ex-president. Macapagal averred that the ex-presidents appointments were scandalous, irregular, hurriedly done, contrary to law and the spirit of which, and it was an attempt to subvert the incoming presidency or administration. Issue: Whether or not Aytona should remain in his post. Held: No it is not. Such appointments must be decline.

37.

Alajar vs Alba Facts: RA 603 created the City of Roxas. Sec 8 thereof provides that the vice mayor shall be appointed by the president. Pursuant t the law, Alba was appointed as the mayor. Later on, the president sent communication to Alba telling him that he will be replaced by a new appointee, Alajar. Alajar was then declared as the acting mayor. Alba refused to leave his post and he appealed his case before the Judge Evangelista who ruled in favor of him. Alajar then complained. Alba argued that section 2545 of the RAC w/c provides: Appointment of City Officials. The President of the Philippines shall appoint, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the Congress of the Philippines, the mayor, the vice-mayor . . . and he may REMOVE at pleasure any of the said officers . . ., has been declared incompatible with the constitutional inhibition that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law, because the two provisions are mutually repugnant and absolutely irreconciliable. Issue: Whether or not Alba can be removed by the president upon displeasure. Held: he question is whether an officer appointed for a definite time or during good behavior, had any vested interest or contract right in his office, of which Congress could not deprive him. The question is not novel. There seems to be but little difficulty in deciding that there was no such interest or right. Admittedly, the act of Congress in creating a public offi ce, defining its powers, functions and fixing the term or the period during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right and the tenure or the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office, is a valid and constitutional

exercise of legislative power. In the exercise of that power, Congress enacted RA 603 on April 11, 1951, creating the City of Roxas and providing, among others for the position of Vice-Mayor and its tenure or period during which the incumbent Vice-Mayor holds office at the pleasure of the President, so, the logical inference is that Congress can legally and constitutionally make the tenure of certain officials dependent upon the pleasure of the President. Therefore, Alba was appointed by the pleasure of the resident and can also be removed when that pleasure ceases. 38. Aparri vs CA Facts: On January 15, 1960, private respondent approved the following resolution # 13, hereby appointing Mr. Bruno Aparri, as general manager of NARRA, with all the rights, prerogatives and compensations to take effect on January 116, 1960. On March 15, 1962, the board of directors approved resolution # 24 which stating thereat that the incumbent general manager shall perform his duty up to the close of office hour on March 31, 1962. In accordance with the provisions of section 8, sub-section 2 of RA 1160. It hereby fixes the term of office of the incumbent general manager until march 31, 1962. Petitioner file a mandamus with preliminary injunction with the first instance court. The petition pray for the annulment of the resolution of NARRA board. Issue: Whether or not board resolution No. 24 was a removal or dismissal of petitioner without cause. Held: It was affirmed that the term of office of petitioner expired on March 31, 1962. It is necessary in each case to interpret the word "Term" with the purview of the statutes so as to effectuate the statutory scheme pertaining to the office under examination. In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by law. However, the power to fix the term is rested in the board of directors subject to the recommendation of the office of economic coordination and the approval of the president of the philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks of no removal but an expiration of the term of office of the petitioner. The statute is undeniably clear. "It is the rule in statutory construction that if the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. Its meaning and intention of the legislative must be determined from the language employed and where there is no ambiguity in words, there is no room for construction. The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term rather, his right to hold office ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962, of his term to hold such office.

39.

Drilon vs Lim Facts: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. The RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway. Issue: Whether or not the lower court has the jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC. Held: Yes.

40.

Kuroda vs Jalandoni Facts: Kuroda was the highest ranking Japanese officer stationed in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation. He was then charged before the Military Commission due to the atrocities that were done against non combatant civilians and prisoners during the war. His trial was in pursuant to EO No. 68 which established the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals. Kuroda is questioning the legality of the said EO arguing that the same is not provided for in the Constitution. He further underscores the fact that the Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations Covering Land Warfare hence we cannot impose against him any criminal charges because it has no laws to base on, national or international. Issue: Whether or not Kuroda can be charged in Philippine Courts. Held: EO No. 68 is constitutional hence the Philippine courts can take cognizance of the case at bar. EO No 68 is in pursuant to the constitutional provision that states the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. The Hague Convention and other similar conventions whose principles are generally accepted are hence considered as part of the law of the land.

41.

Aquino vs Military Commission no.2 Facts: In September 1972, after the declaration of Martial Law, Ninoy was arrested and was placed under custody. He was brought Fort Bonifacio. He filed for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus which was denied by the SC. Ninoy then questioned the validity of such denial and the declaration of martial law; at the same time he questioned the authority of the military court [No. 2] created [pursuant to GO 2-A] to try him and his other companions. He was being charged for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives. He was also being charged for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and for murder. All were filed before the military court. Ninoy argued that the military court has no jurisdiction or civilian courts are still operational. Issue: Whether or not Ninoy can be vaidly charged before the military court. Held: The SC upheld the power of the president to create military tribunals or military courts which are authorized to try not only military personnel but also civilians even at that time civil courts were open and functioning. The SC basically rejected the open court theory observed in the USA.

42.

Olaguer vs Military Commission no.34 Facts: In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians. They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus. Issue: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted. Held: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time the case reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were already released from military confinement. When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from their confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become moot and academic. But the military court created to try the case of Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still continues to subsist.

Issue2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning. Held: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military courts or tribunals during the period of martial law in all cases involving civilian defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned. 43. IBP vs Zamora Facts: In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metropolitan Manila, the President ordered the PNP and the Phil. Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for crime prevention and suppression. The IBP questioned validity of the order invoking its responsibility to uphold the rule of law. Issue: WON the Integrated Bar of the Philippines has legal standing to petition for the annulment of the LOI and to assail the constitutionality of the declaration of deployment of the Philippine Marines. Held: No. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by the whole citizenry. The IBP has failed to show any specific injury it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned order. The presumed possible injury is highly speculative. 44. Montenegro vs Castaneda Facts: In October 1950, Montenegros son was arrested by military agents. Three days after the arrest, PP 210 was proclaimed suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Montenegro then filed before the court to have his son be set free for his arrest was w/o cause and that the said PP should not be applied retroactively to his son for it would then constitute a violation of the constitutional prohibition against bill of attainders. Montenegro then filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus demanding the detainers to bring his sons body and explain his detention. Castaeda et al argued that the court has no judicial authority over the matter invoking the PP and the previous ruling in Barcelon vs Baker. Issue: Whether or not Montenegros petition should be granted. Held: As ruled by the SC in the Barcelon case, Montenegros petition is likewise denied. The constitutional authority of the President to suspend in case of imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion under Article 7 may not correctly be placed in doubt.

45.

Barcelon vs Baker Facts: In the early 1900s in Batangas, Barcelon was detained by orders of Baker. Barcelons lawyers petitioned before the court for a writ of habeas corpus demanding Barcelon and Thompson, one of his men, to explain why Barcelon was detained. They alleged that there is no legal authority behind Barcelons arrest and it was w/o due process. The Atty-Gen averred that Baker et al acted only pursuant to the Gov-Gens resolution in 1905 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Cavite and Batangas (Sec 5 of The Philippine Bill). Barcelon argued that there is no rebellion or invasion or insurrection during his arrest hence he should be set free. Issue: Whether or not Barcelon was arrested with due process. Held: The SC held that the issue is a political question. Only the president can determine the existence of the grounds specified in the Constitution for the suspension o the privilege o the writ of habeas corpus. This power is discretionary and therefore not justiciable. The president has superior competence to assess the peace and order condition of the country. Hence, the determination held by the president (GG) of the Philippines of the existence of any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should be conclusive upon the courts. The justification was that the president (GG), with all the intelligence sources available to him as commander-in-chief, was in a better position than the SC to ascertain the real state of peace and order in the country.

46.

Lansang vs Garcia Facts: Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites. Issue: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional. Held: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this case where the SC declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground could be established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after

satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic Communistoriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus. 47. Garcia-Padilla vs Enrile Facts: In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a house in Bayombong, NV, were arrested by members of the PC. The raid of the house was authorized by a search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina, mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no warrant of arrest was issued but rather it was just a warrant of arrest hence the arrest of her son and the others was w/o just cause. Sabino and companions together with 4 others were later transferred to a facility only the PCs know. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Issue: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino is valid. Held: In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in the Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Case was again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of the WoHC was once again held as discretionary in the president. The SC again reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the governments campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection. 48. Aquino vs Enrile Facts: On January 21, 1975, a petition for prohibition was filed to seek the nullification of some Presidential Decrees. The first ground upon which the petition is predicated states that Marcos does not hold any legal office nor possess any lawful authority under either the 1935 Constitution or the 1973 Constitution and therefore has no authority to issue the questioned proclamations, decrees and orders. This challenges the title of the incumbent President to the office of the Presidency and therefore is in the nature of a quo warranto proceedings, the appropriate action by which the title of a public officer can be questioned before the courts. Only the Solicitor General or the person who asserts title to the same office can legally file such a quo warranto petition. The petitioners, however, do not claim such right to the office and not one of them is the incumbent Solicitor General.

Issue: Whether or not the Marcos government is a lawful government. Held: First of, petitioners do not have the personality to file suit. On the issue at bar, the SC affirmed the validity of Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081 issued on September 22, 1972 by President Marcos because there was no arbitrariness in the issuance of said proclamation pursuant to the 1935 Constitution; that the factual bases had not disappeared but had even been exacerbated; that the question as to the validity of the Martial Law proclamation has been foreclosed by Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution. Under the (1973) Constitution, the President, if he so desires; can continue in office beyond 1973. While his term of office under the 1935 Constitution should have terminated on December 30, 1973, by the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973, the sovereign people expressly authorized him to continue in office even beyond 1973 under the 1973 Constitution (which was validly ratified on January 17, 1973 by the sovereign people) in order to finish the reforms he initiated under Martial Law; and as aforestated, as this was the decision of the people, in whom sovereignty resides . . . and all government authority emanates . . ., it is therefore beyond the scope of judicial inquiry. The logical consequence therefore is that President Marcos is a de jure President of the Republic of the Philippines.

49.

Vera vs People Facts: This case involves Act 422 or the Probation Act, which empowered Provincial Boards to appropriate salaries of probation officers for the maintenance of the probation system in respective provinces, also this act allows the delegation of power to provincial boards to support or not to support the probation system. This case came from the Criminal case of PP vs. Cu Injeng where the respondent judge of CFI Manila (7thbranch)heard the application of probation by Mariano Cu Unjieng. In a criminal case against Cu, the trial court under the respondent judge convicted Cu of the crime charged to him. The defendant, Cu, filed a motion for reconsideration, and was later, filed an application for probation, which was later approved by the respondent judge. Hence, an original action for certiorari and prohibition was filed by the petitioners alleging that the respondent judge CGADALEJ placing Cu under probation. The petitioners also questions the constitutionality of the RA 422, contesting that it is violative of equal protection clause provided in the constitution, since it allows inequalities among different provinces Issue: Does equal protection of law require territorial uniformity?

Held: No. While equal protection of law does not require territorial uniformity, however, there is a limit to allowable territorial lack of uniformity.

50.

Tanada vs Angara Facts: the instant case is a petition for certiorari,prohibition and mandamus filed bby petitioner to contest the constitutionality of joinuing the WTO which was concurred upon by majority of the Senate. Petioner contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, specifically Art,11 sec 19, and art 12, sec 10. Issue: Whether or not such affiliation is prohibited by our constitution Held: Art 2 of the constitution, the principles stated herein are not selfexecutingg. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guidelines in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactments of laws. They are not sources for causes of action. Furthermore, the treaty is in harmony with the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the amity with all nations. The deliberation and voting of the senate, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO agreement, thereby making it a part of the law of the land. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

51.

Bengzon vs Drilon Facts: On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower Courts General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional. HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item.

52.

Kilosbayan vs Morato Facts: This is a petition seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in G. R. No. 113373, 232 SCRA 110. Petitioners contended that the amended ELA is inconsistent with and violative of PCSO's charter and the decision of the Supreme Court of 5 May 1995, that it violated the law on public bidding of contracts as well as Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution in relation to the COA Circular No. 85-55-A. Respondents questioned the petitioners' standing to bring this suit. Issue: Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition. Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because some cases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of the law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. And they do not have present substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit.

53.

Guazon vs De Villa Facts: The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific target house to be search and that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards. The residents were rudely rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their houses. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents complained that they're homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of their money and valuables had disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported incidents of maulings, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical informations. The respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents contends that the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities were the said drives were conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the actual operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such event.

Issue: Whether or not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of human rights. Held: It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the procedure used or the methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities" .Based on the facts stated by the parties, it appears to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as th rights of the squatters and low income families are fully protected. However, the remedy should not be brought by a tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and not one violator is properly charged. In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom the court can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no permanent relief can be given. In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were committed, the court temporary restraint the alleged violations which are shocking to the senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila. 54. Republic vs Dela Cruz Facts: On December 25, 1996, Tingas joined a cockfight. He let his brotherin-law de la Cruz install the gaff on his game cock. Unknown to Tingas, de la Cruz betted against his cock. When Tingas cock won, he was advised to collect the bet from his brother-in-law, feeling betrayed he challenged de la Cruz into a fist fight. Cooler heads parted the two. Later de la Cruz returned with a bolo and hacked to death Tingas. Issue: Whether or not evident premeditation is present thus making de la Cruz guilty for murder. Held: The following were not shown to concur on the part of de la Cruz: a.) Time when he decided to commit the crime, b.) An overt act showing that de la Cruz clung to his determination to commit the crime, c.) Lapse of a sufficient period of time as to that would allow de la Cruz to reflect upon the consequences of his act. In this case, de la Cruz killed Tingas no later than when the fistfight was over. No sufficient time lapsed for him to plan the killing of Tingas. Therefore, hes only guilty of homicide.