SystemGrounding ImpactonreliabilityandSafety

Presentedby: DaleepMohla SergioPanetta JimChannon ScottLee

Agenda
SystemGroundingConsiderationsfor600 Voltsandlesssystem TypesofSystemGroundingavailable ProsandConsofeach Mitigationstrategies Selectionguidelineformitigation Questions

SystemsGroundingConsiderations
Cost? Safety? Reliability? Impactofunintendedoutages? Productionloss? Environmental? Safety?

TypesofSystemGrounding
Ungrounded SolidGrounded ImpedanceGrounded

UNGROUNDED(DELTA)SYSTEM

L O A D Feeder(with
capacitanceto ground)

Transformer Secondary

UNGROUNDEDSYSTEM:
NORMALOPERATION&FAULTEDOPERATION

Allphasesareat linetoneutralvoltage aboveground(eg:347V)

A&Bphasesare
atlinelinevoltage aboveground (eg:600V)

Neutralpointestablished bydistributedcapacitance

PhaseCatgroundpotential Nofaultcurrent (noreturnpathtosource)

Normaloperation

GroundfaultonphaseC

UNGROUNDEDSYSTEM:
FAULTEDOPERATIONWITHTRANSIENTOVERVOLTAGE

A&Bphasesare:
>Linelinevoltageabove ground

PhaseC>groundvoltage Intermittentfaultcurrent Personneldanger

Normaloperation

Intermittent groundfaultonphaseC

UNGROUNDEDSYSTEMS:
ProsandCons
Pros MinimumInitialcost Abilitytorunwithonephasefaultedtoground IsolationofPrimaryandSecondarycurrents(harmonics)

Initiallyusedbytheindustrytopreventunplannedoutages

UngroundedSystems
Cons Difficulttodetectground faults nofaultcurrent Runningwithagroundfaultincreasesstressoninsulation, leadingtophasetophasefaults Intermittentfaultmaycausetransientovervoltage

SOLIDLYGROUNDEDSYSTEM

L O A D

WyeConnected TransformerSecondary

Feeder(with
capacitanceto ground)

SolidlyGroundingSystem
Pros Minimumfirstcosts Immediateisolationoffaultedsystem Voltagestabilization Allowsuseofneutralforsinglephaseloads Visibledetectionoffaultedequipment Equipmentinsulatedratedforphasetoground voltage

SolidlygroundedSystems
CONS
Unplannedoutages Voltagedipsduringfaultconditions Higharcingcurrentsthroughgroundingsystems Motorterminalboxcovershavebeenreported blownaway FireHazardespeciallyinHazardous(Classified)Areas Highrepaircostandtime

RESISTANCEGROUNDEDSYSTEM
L O A D

NGR

WyeConnected TransformerSecondary

Feeder(with
capacitanceto ground)

RESISTANCEGROUNDEDSYSTEM
WITHAGROUNDFAULT L O A D
IF
X

TransformerSecondary NGR

Feeder(with
capacitance)

CurrentLimitedtoNGRLetThrough

Resistance(Impedance)Grounded Systems
Pros
Reducesunplannedoutages Transientstabilityofthesystem Eliminatesundesiredvoltagedipsduringfault conditions Allowsfaultdetectionofthefaultedequipment Minimizesarcingfaultcurrentandarcflashhazard

Resistance(Impedance)Grounded Systems
CONS Initialinvestment Faultdetectionandremovalrequired SystemIntegritymaintenancerequired Equipmentinsulationratedforphaseto phasevoltages

ProtectionorPrevention: Whichismoreeffective?
Seatbelts,Airbags,*Accidentavoidance? *alarmandautomaticresponsewhencloseto anothercar) NFPA70E/CSAZ462primarilyaddressprotectionof personneltominimizepersonnelinjurydueto electricalhazards:ShockandArcFlashbyremoving powerwithsomesoftsuggestiononreductionof hazards Engineeringcontrolsminimizethepotentialof electricalincidents SafetyBydesignminimizesinjurypotential. RoleofHighResistanceGrounding?
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GroundFaults
Therehasbeendocumentationovertheyears indicatingthatbetween80%and95%ofall electricalfaultsinitiateasgroundfaults.By limitingthegroundfaultcurrenttoasmall magnitude,agreatmajorityofallphaseto phasearcingfaultscanbeeliminated. Informalnumbersarethatlessthan1%ofthe faultsareinitiallystartasthreephasefaults (jumpersleftinstalled,snakesetc)
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PowerSystemGrounding
120.3 FPN No. 3:
high-resistance grounding of lowvoltage and 5 kV (nominal) systems, are techniques available to reduce the hazard of the system
MitigationElectricShockandArcFlashEnergy ATotalSystemApproachforPersonnelandEquipmentProtectionIEEE IASPCIC2010

PowerSystemGrounding
4.3.1.1 Note (3)
high-resistance grounding of lowvoltage and 5 kV (nominal) systems, are techniques available to reduce the hazard of the system
MitigationElectricShockandArcFlashEnergy ATotalSystemApproachforPersonnelandEquipmentProtectionIEEE IASPCIC2010

70E 130.5
InformationalNoteNo.3:Theoccurrenceofarcingfault insideanenclosureproducesavarietyofphysicalphenomena Forexample,thearcenergyresultingfromanarcdevelopedinthe airwillcauseasuddenpressureincreaseandlocalizedoverheating. Equipmentanddesignpracticesareavailabletominimize theenergylevelsandthenumberofatriskproceduresthat requireanemployeetobeexposedtohighlevelenergy sources.Provendesignssuchasarcresistantswitchgear,

remoteracking(insertionorremoval),remoteopeningand closingofswitchingdevices,highresistancegroundingof lowvoltageand5kV(nominal)systems,currentlimitation, andspecificationofcoveredbuswithinequipmentare techniquesavailabletoreducethehazardofthesystem

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HighResistanceGroundingSystems HighResistanceGrounded
Thereisminimalarcflashhazard,asthereis withsolidlygroundedsystemsonthefirst fault,sincethefaultcurrentisnormally limitedtoaverylowvalue

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HighResistanceGrounding
DoesResistanceGroundingreallyreduce: UnplannedSystemoutages? Potentialofarcflashhazard? EngineersanswerItdepends

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HighResistanceGrounding Yes
ifandonlyif NeutralgroundingsystemIntegrityis maintained. AND firstfaultisclearedbeforeinceptionof secondfault.
(Secondfaultonthesystemwillresultinaphaseto phasefaultIFtheFIRSTFAULTISNOTCLEARED)

PossibleLossofNeutralPath
OpenorShortedNeutralPathtoGround
Broken or Grounded Wire Loose Connection Resistor Failure Corrosion Broken Wire
Excerpt from a technical paper presented at 2009 IEEE IAS Electrical Safety Workshop 25

Hazard Control Measures

Hazard Control Measures

outlined in ANSI Z10

Elimination

Substitution

Engineering Controls

Warnings

Administrative Controls

PPE

Addressed in 70E Tables Addressed in NFPA 70E Prevention Protection

An effective electrical safety program incorporates all control measures

WarningofRisk
A N HRG C HRG C C B A N HRG C B A N B

Open Circuit: Desired fault current cannot flow. Ungrounded System.

Open Circuit: Desired fault current cannot flow. Grounded thru high inductive transformer. Resonance System.

Short Circuit: Undesired fault current can flow. Place CT close to N, >costs (elevated N).
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Solidly Grounded LossofGroundinHRGSystems System.

AutomaticReductionofRisk
GroundFaultRelay&SensingResistor
DetectsOpen/ShortCircuitsandmaintainsGrounding

A N HRG C

Sensing Resistor

Relay

LossofGroundinHRGSystems

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AvoidingSecondGroundFault
Toreducearcflashhazard,itiscriticaltoreducethe possibilityoftwofaultsatthesametime.

How? Warningofrisk
Eithermakesuremaintenancepeopleremovethe groundfaultimmediately

Automaticreductionofrisk
Providesensingequipmenttoprioritizefeedersto avoidsecondsimultaneousgroundfault
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FAULT INDICATION USING 3 LAMPS

FAULTED FEEDER INDICATION

ZSCT

ZSCT

M1
AN

M2

GM METER
LOAD 1 LOAD 2

GM METER

Indication of first Feeder fault

MGFR relays
R

100A PICKUP
R

100A PICKUP
R

100A PICKUP
R

2.5A PICKUP

5A NGR

- Alarm on first fault Trip on second fault Cannot prioritize essential feeders Difficult to locate fault(s)

MinimizingSecondSimultaneous GroundFault

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NGR DDAI
DDR2 DSP MKII ALARM

CM

FM1 FM2 FM3 FM4

Faulted Feeder First Fault Alarm Faulted Phase Indication

Second Fault Trip Selective Inst. Feeder Tripping Ground Current as % of Let Through

ALARM

DSP MKII
SWGR

DDR2
TRIPS

CM

FM1 FM2 FM3 FM4

ALARM

DDR2
CM

DSA
FM1

Combined DSA/DSP Identifies individual faulted load and Phase Second Fault Protection Backup

DSPRelay DoubleendedUnitsubApplication

ParallelGenerators
TYPICAL PARALLEL GENERATOR HIGH RESISTANCE GROUNDING SCHEME
Zero Sequence Current Sensors (one per feeder; one per generator) G G G G GENERATORS 600V

600V To BMS 15-20A, 3P 100 kAIC

DDR2-6

DSA

To BMS

DS-PM2

See Notes 1 and 2. Optional DS-PM2 Pulsing Card 2 - #16AWG, 24 Vdc for pulsing control Notes: 1. NGR/Zig-Zag assembly w ith pulsing resistor, IPC Part Number: OHMNI-6PM-5-ZZ 2. NGR/Zig-Zag assembly w ithout pulsing resistor, IPC Part Number: NTR600-5-ZZ

5A, 600V Zig-Zag Grounding Transformer

5A, 347V Neutral Grounding Resistor Optional Pulsing Resistor AWG#8 as per CEC 10-1108(3)

MitigationStrategies
Good Systemmaintenancepractices Better Warnings Alarms Procedures PPE BestAutomaticReductionofRisk Elimination EngineeringControls

MitigationStrategiesselection
Whichonetouse? ItDepends Considersafety/cost/benefit Impactduetofailureinthesystem Cansystembeshutdownimmediately? Costofshutdown? Maintenancepractices? Environmentalconditions? Liabilityconsiderationsofdesign?

Riskreduction
Keystrategyin70E/CSAZ462isrisk analysis Risk=FrequencyXConsequences UseofHRGreducestheprobabilityof frequencyandthusreducestherisk

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RiskAnalysis
DoesHRGreducestheincidentenergy requiredtobeputonlabel?

NO.
Labelisbasedon3phaseboltedfault

BUT
itdoesreduceprobabilityofhighincident energy(80 95%)ofthetimeandcanbe utilizedinRiskAnalysis.
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Questions?
Thankyouforbeinghere!! Thanksforprovidingmewithaforumfor preachingelectricalsafetybydesign DaleepMohla,IEEEFellow,P.E d.c.mohla@ieee.org
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