This article was downloaded by: [King's College London] On: 28 August 2013, At: 23:34 Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uter20

Cyber-Fatwas and Terrorism

Gabriel Weimann
a a

Department of Communication, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel Published online: 17 Oct 2011.

To cite this article: Gabriel Weimann (2011) Cyber-Fatwas and Terrorism, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34:10, 765-781 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2011.604831

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the Content) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/termsand-conditions

Studies in Conict & Terrorism, 34:765781, 2011 Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2011.604831

Cyber-Fatwas and Terrorism

GABRIEL WEIMANN
Department of Communication University of Haifa Haifa, Israel

Downloaded by [King's College London] at 23:34 28 August 2013

In 1989, the term fatwa became globally known, following Ayatollah Khomeinis deathfatwa issued on Salman Rushdie for his novel, Satanic Verses. Today, the Internet has become a useful platform for posting of fatwas and interpretations of fatwas. The present article highlights the use of jihadist fatwas, and especially online fatwas, as a major instrument in bridging the current wave of terrorism and religion. The analysis, based on a database collected in a 12-year-long project of monitoring thousands of terrorist websites, illustrates how cyber-fatwas are related to key issues in promoting terrorism: justifying the use of suicide terrorism, the killing of innocents, the killing of children and women, the killing of Muslims or the use of various weapons (including weapons of mass destruction and cyberterrorism). There are two implications of the trends documented in this study: First, the analysis of the online fatwas and the fatwa wars may provide insight about the terrorists, their motivations, their doubts and fears and, secondly, it may guide countercampaigns.

The martyr operation is the greatest of all sorts of Jihad in the Cause of Allah. A martyr operation is carried out by a person who sacrices himself, deeming his life less value than striving in the Cause of Allah, in the cause of restoring the land and preserving the dignity. . . . But a clear distinction has to be made here between martyrdom and suicide. Suicide is an act or instance of killing oneself intentionally out of despair, and nding no outlet except putting an end to ones life. On the other hand, martyrdom is a heroic act of choosing to suffer death in the Cause of Allah, and thats why its considered by most Muslim scholars as one of the greatest forms of Jihad. From a fatwa, issued in 2006 by Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, the prominent Muslim scholar

What is a Fatwa?
A fatwa is an Islamic religious ruling, a scholarly opinion on a matter of Islamic law. Because there is no central Islamic priesthood, there is also no unanimously accepted method to determine who can issue a fatwa and who cannot, leading some Islamic scholars
Received 17 January 2011; accepted 15 March 2011. Address correspondence to Prof. Gabriel Weimann, Department of Communication, University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel. E-mail: weimann@soc.haifa.ac.il

765

766

G. Weimann

to complain that too many people feel qualied to issue fatwas.1 In Sunni Islam any fatwa is non-binding, whereas in Shia Islam it could be considered by an individual as binding, depending on his or her relation to the scholar. The person who issues a fatwa is called, in that respect, a Mufti (i.e. an issuer of fatwa). As described by Bar, The mechanism by which the scholar brings the principles of shariah to bear in the practical world is qhIslamic jurisprudence, and its product is the fatwaa written legal opinion or ruling on a specic subject, which dispels uncertainty and shows the clear path for behavior on the chosen subject. A fatwa can only be given by a scholar with wide enough knowledge of shariia to be considered a mufti. The classic fatwa consists of a question (istifta), posed by a petitioner (mustafti pl. mustatifun), and a response (jawab). A fatwa must be based on the sources (usul) of qh: these include the Quran, the Sunna, logical analogy (qiyas) and consensus of the ulama. However, most fatwas make little use of these tools and instead very often cite precedentsfrom decisions by the mujtahidun of early Islam and the codex of existing fatwas.2 This is not necessarily a formal position since most Muslims argue that anyone trained in Islamic law may give an opinion (fatwa) on its teachings. A fatwa may concern many aspects of individual life, social norms, religion, war, peace, jihad, and politics. Millions of fatwas have been issued over the 1,400-year history of Islam; most of them deal with issues faced by Muslims in their daily life, such as the customs of marriage, nancial affairs, female circumcision, or moral questions. They are usually issued in response to questions by ordinary Muslims. In 1989, the term fatwa became globally known, following Ayatollah Khomeinis death-fatwa issued on Salman Rushdie for his novel, Satanic Verses. The killing of the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 was attributed to a fatwa issued against him by Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, commonly known in the United States as The Blind Sheikh. Rahman was the spiritual leader of the radical group Jamaat alJihad. Members of this group assassinated Sadat and Rahman was indicted along with them because he was accused of issuing a fatwa ordering Sadats murder. Later he traveled to the United States where he issued a fatwa in America that declared lawful the robbing of banks and killing of Jews in America. He called on Muslims to assail the West, cut the transportation of their countries, tear it apart, destroy their economy, burn their companies, eliminate their interests, sink their ships, shoot down their planes, kill them on the sea, air, or land. Rahman was arrested on 24 June 1993, along with nine of his followers, following the rst World Trade Center bombing in February 1993. The FBI managed to record Rahman issuing a fatwa encouraging acts of violence against U.S. civilian targets, particularly in the New York and New Jersey metropolitan area. The most startling plan, the government charged, was to set off ve bombs in 10 minutes, blowing up the United Nations, the Lincoln and Holland tunnels, the George Washington Bridge, and a federal building housing the FBI. The Internet soon became a popular platform for Islamists to present their messages, including fatwas. There are numerous online fatwas sites, mostly in the form of answers given by Muslim authority. Some of these websites publicize their sites with slogans like The most comprehensive online Islamic fatwa guide and 1346 Fatwas Available (FatwasIslam.com), Fataawa from the Major Scholars of the Muslim World (fatwaonline.com). The numerous fatwas posted in these websites relate to daily Muslim practices, duties, and guidance. They are not violent and they do not promote terrorism, suicide, or

Downloaded by [King's College London] at 23:34 28 August 2013

Cyber-Fatwas and Terrorism

767

war. However, several jihadi fatwas started to emerge online and today the Internet has become the most instrumental and effective instrument for spreading terrorist fatwas. In his article, The Internet is the New Mosque, Abdallah el-Tahawy, a journalist at Islam Online, argues,

Specically, the Internet has become not only a clearinghouse for Koranic text, but also for religious guidance and even fatwas (religious edicts). This new, global online Islam has been propagated by countless websites maintained by sheikhs, religious scholars and even laymen. Today, any person can look up a fatwa on any subject, checking whether a particular action is haram (forbidden) or halal (permissible), sometimes within minutes, with just a few clicks of the mouse. Needless to say, this accessibility has been a boon to Islamic practice.3

Downloaded by [King's College London] at 23:34 28 August 2013

Fatwas: Bridging Terrorism and Religious Motivation

David Rapoport suggested a theory to advance the understanding of terrorism: his model presents four waves of international terrorism.4 A wave, according to this model, has three characteristics: (a) a cycle of activities characterized by expansion and contraction phases, (b) covering multiple nations, and (c) driven by a common predominant energy that shapes the participating groups characteristics and mutual relationships. By studying the history of terrorism since the 1880s, Rapoport identied four distinct waves of terrorism: anarchism, anti-colonialism, socialism, and religious fundamentalism. The rst wave, anarchism, began in Russia and was largely the result of slow democratization processes. Russian anarchists initiated the ideas and tactics for a strategy of overthrowing political systems by conducting serial attacks on authority gures and public conventions, hoping to create chaos and anarchy. World War I was followed by reforms and political changes that depressed the incentives for anarchist terrorism. However, a new wave, anti-colonialist terror, emerged: the post-war treaties helped to delegitimize colonies and empires by breaking up the imperial and colonial structures. Hence, the second wave of terrorism focused on political violence aiming to secure the withdrawal of empires from overseas territories and the establishment of new, free states. A third wave of terrorism which predominated in the last third of the twentieth century centered on Marxism, Socialism and extreme-left ideologies. Within the Cold War context, training and support for terrorists became increasingly internationalized, and so did the targets of terrorist attacks. A fourth wave, the religious one, corresponded with two major events: the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, bringing to power Islamic clerics who sought to export the revolution, and the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. These events contributed to the emergence of the fourth wave of terrorism, quickly assuming a strong religious orientation, initially centered on Islam. Although the waves theory has gained a rm footing in the present literature on terrorism, not much effort has gone into the examination of the mechanisms and processes by which each wave managed to attract supporters, followers, and operatives. The present wave is undoubtedly fueled by religious motivation but how is this type of motivational activation executed? The present article highlights the use of fatwas, and especially online fatwas, as a major instrument in bridging current terrorism and religion.

768

G. Weimann

Jihadist Fatwas
The authors of jihadist fatwas come from diverse backgrounds. Some are scholars, some are religious authoritative gures, and others are political leaders of radical movements who are not seen in the wider Islamic world as having authority to provide fatwas, but are accepted as authorities by their own followers. Moreover, not all of the fatwas are initiated by individuals; some are published or posted online by Islamic institutions or by Fatwa Committees afliated with certain Muslim communities or with radical jihadi groups. Osama bin Laden issued two fatwas, in 1996 and then again in 1998. Both documents appeared initially in the Arabic-language London newspaper Al-Quds Al-Arabi. At the time, bin Laden was not a wanted man in any country except his native Saudi Arabia, and was not yet known as the leader of the international terrorist organization Al Qaeda. Therefore, these fatwas received relatively little attention. Bin Ladens 1996 fatwa is entitled Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places. It is a long declaration, documenting American activities in numerous countries. It was faxed to supporters across the world.5 The 1998 fatwa was signed by ve people, four of whom represented specic Islamist groups: Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Ahmed Refai Taha, alias Abu Yasser, of al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya (in Egypt). Mir Hamzah, Secretary of the JamiatUlema-ePakistan, and Fazul Rahman, Emir of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh. The signatories were identied as the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders. This fatwa complains of American military presence in the Arabian Peninsula, and American support for Israel. It purports to provide religious authorization for indiscriminate killing of Americans and Jews everywhere. In this fatwa, faxed to the London newspaper Al-Quds, the group also wrote: The ruling is to kill the Americans and their allies is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it, in order to liberate the Al Aqsa mosque [Jerusalem] and the Holy Mosque [Mecca]. . . . This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God. . . . We, with Gods help, call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with Gods order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they nd it. The importance of fatwas for promoting violence and terrorism is described by Kenan Malik in his book From Fatwa to Jihad.6 As Malik argues, both The Satanic Verses and the Danish cartoons (in 2005) did not immediately lead to violent overreaction: it took quite a while, in each case, to carefully stoke the res before a small number of opponents had managed to fan the ames in just the right way to make for the conagrations that followed. Ayatollah Khomeinis fatwa against Salman Rushdie was a turning and rallying point; the reactions to it, especially by European governments, suggested that such intemperate actions were a great way to get attentionand to get ones way. And, as Malik shows, many have continued to play right into the hands of the small but very vociferous extremist minority.

Downloaded by [King's College London] at 23:34 28 August 2013

The New Platform: Online Terrorism

The rise of the global jihad movement in the recent decades has coincided with the expansion and development of online communication platforms. Paradoxically, the very decentralized network of computer-mediated communication that U.S. security services created out of fear of the Soviet Union now serves the interests of the greatest foe of the worlds security services since the end of the Cold War: international terror. Postmodern terrorists are taking advantage of the fruits of globalization and modern technologyespecially the most advanced communication technologiesto communicate, seduce, plan, and coordinate

Cyber-Fatwas and Terrorism

769

their deadly campaigns. In 1998, less than half of the organizations designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the U.S. State Department maintained websites; by the end of 1999, nearly all these terrorist groups had established their presence on the Net. By now, all active terrorist groups have established at least one form of presence on the Internet and most of them are using all formats of up-to-date online platformse-mail, chatrooms, e-groups, forums, virtual message boards, and resources like YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and Google Earth.7 The network of computer-mediated communication (CMC) is ideal for terrorists-ascommunicators: it is decentralized, it cannot be subjected to control or restriction, it is not censored, and it allows access to anyone who wants it. Websites are only one of the Internets services used by modern terrorism; there are many other facilities in cyberspace e-mail, chat rooms, e-groups, forums, virtual message boardsthat are used more and more by terrorists. Thus, for example, Yahoo! has become one of Al Qaedas most signicant ideological bases of operation. They utilize several facets of the Yahoo! service, including chat functions, e-mail and, most importantly, Yahoo! Groups. According to former CIA counterterrorism chief Vince Cannistraro, Internet communications have become the main communications system among al-Qaeda around the world because its safer, easier and more anonymous if they take the right precautions, and I think theyre doing that. One of the earliest jihadi websites, azzam.com, stated: We strongly urge Muslim Internet professionals to spread and disseminate news and information about the jihad through email lists, discussion groups and their own Web sites. The more Web sites, the better it is for us. We must make the Internet our tool. The Internet became a useful platform for posting of fatwas and interpretations of fatwas. As noted by Bar, The age of information has opened up a new venue for Muslims to acquire religious instruction without coming in direct contact with the consulting Sheikh. The Internet now allows a Muslim to send a query to any learned Sheikh by E-Mail and to receive his ruling either directly or in the public domain of websites dedicated to such fatwas.8 This trend was well documented by Bunts studies.9 According to Bunt, the Internet has profoundly shaped how Muslims perceive Islam and how Islamic societies rely today on online fatwas, social-networking sites, blogs, and online forums. Furthermore, the Internet has dramatically inuenced forms of radical Islam and radical Islamic activism, including jihad-oriented campaigns and terrorist propaganda. Online terrorist fatwas have become instrumental platforms for such campaigns. Although most online fatwas are not related to terrorism, violence, radicalism, or jihad, recently terrorist groups are using the Internet to post radical fatwas. There is a clear rise in the number of fatwas that declare jihad as a religious obligation and dene clear guidelines for the waging of jihad. Many of these online fatwas provide moral and religious justication for the use terrorism and relate to terrorist issues including the denition and identication of the battle space in which the attacks are to be executed; the identity of the legitimate victims, the proper means of actions, and the legitimacy of suicide attacks.

Downloaded by [King's College London] at 23:34 28 August 2013

Cyber-Fatwas of Terror
As argued by numerous scholars, the role of radical online fatwas in legitimizing terrorism is a pivotal element in the social and political legitimization of terrorism and in the motivation of its supporters.10 This article now illustrates how these cyber-fatwas are related to key issues in promoting terrorism: justifying the use of suicide terrorism, the killing of innocents, the killing of children and women, the killing of Muslims or the use of various weapons (including weapons of mass destruction [WMD] and cyberterrorism). The analysis is based

770

G. Weimann

on a database collected in a 12-year-long project of monitoring thousands of terrorist websites.11 When this research was started in the late 1990s, there were merely a dozen terrorist websites; by 2000, virtually all terrorist groups had established their presence on the Internet and in 2003 there were over 2,600 terrorist websites. The number rose dramatically and by January 2010 the archive contains over 7,600 websites serving terrorists and their supporters. The monitoring of terrorist websites involves tracking them, downloading their contents, translating the messages (texts and graphics) and archiving them according to a preset coding system. This allows for various content analyses including the use of online fatwas or the online debates on terrorist fatwas.12 Who are Legitimate Targets? In March 2005, the Sala Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), today known as Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), issued a fatwa for jihad against foreigners in Algeria.13 The Fatwa calls for the killing of the Jews and the Christians and all other nonbelievers in Algeria. The fatwa, signed by Abu Ibrahim Mustafa, the Emir (prince) of the Sala Group, is being circulated on jihadist websites. Abu Ibrahim Mustafa took over leadership of the Sala Group in October 2003 and immediately pledged loyalty to bin Laden and Al Qaeda. According to the fatwa, the Sala Group states in these hard circumstances for the Muslim nation in general, and especially the mujahideen, to declare war on every foreigner nonbelieverin the Algerian lands. The governments in the Muslim lands are no more than ags put by the Crusaders before leaving to keep a watchful eye on the Muslims so they dont have a government which brings back the glory of Islam. Abu Mustafa calls on all Muslim Algerians to ght foreigners and disregard the local government: Everyone, which concerns the individuals and establishments, is doing the duty for the victory of Islam and Muslims, is pushing away the attacks of Jews and Christians and other non-believers as they declare that they are not bound by any agreement with the converted Algerian government. Jihadi fatwas also reinterpret the denition of civilians. Al Qaeda thesis is that in democracies, citizens are culpable for their governments decisions. A fatwa authorizing this view was issued by Hammoud al-Uqla al-Shuyabi, the godfather of Saudi jihadis. Already in 2001 he published a fatwa declaring holy war against America and its supporters, and included members of the Saudi royal family among its targets. Whoever supports the indel is considered an indel, said Sheikh Hamoud bin Oqla al-Shuaibi, in his fatwa. It is a duty to wage jihad on anyone who attacks Afghanistan. He answered a question posted on the Net about when jihad, or holy war, is permissible: Jihad is allowed against indels like the Jews, Christians and atheists, he replied online. Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi is an Egyptian cleric and preacher, with a history of activism in the Muslim Brethren. He was forced from Egypt for his extreme views, and he lives in Qatar. His fatwas are published and distributed mainly online. He issued numerous fatwas on jihad and violent activities including one legitimating the targeting of Israeli civilians including women since an Israeli woman is not like women in our societies, because she is a soldier. Another example of a conveniently exible denition of civilians concerns Iraq: Al-Qaradawi issued a fatwa permitting the abduction and killing of American civilians in Iraq in order to pressure the American army to withdraw from Iraq, arguing that all of the Americans in Iraq are combatants, there is no difference between civilians and soldiers, and one should ght them, since the American civilians came to Iraq in order to serve the occupation. The abduction and killing of Americans in Iraq is a [religious] obligation so as to cause them to leave Iraq immediately.14 In a similar vein, the Fatwa Committee established by the Jordan-based Sala-jihadist cleric Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi issued

Downloaded by [King's College London] at 23:34 28 August 2013

Cyber-Fatwas and Terrorism

771

Downloaded by [King's College London] at 23:34 28 August 2013

a fatwa on 12 February 2010, concerning the permissibility and desirability of targeting Christian Nigerian civilians in countries other than Nigeria. In November 2009, Quilliam, a think tank funded by the British Home Ofce, claimed that jailed jihadists in Britain are strengthening jihadist movements by posting online fatwas. Abu Qatada, described by MI5 as Osama Bin Ladens right-hand man in Europe, has published fatwas on the Internet from Long Lartin prison, in Worcestershire, Britain, calling for holy war and the murder of moderate Muslims. Qatada, a radical Islamist cleric who is wanted on terrorism charges in Jordan, is held in the supermax segregation wing of the prison that should be one of the most secure buildings in the country. Yet, Qatada and Adel Abdel Bary, leader of the U.K. branch of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, were able to smuggle out a series of fatwas legitimizing attacks by Al Qaeda and endorsing the murder of moderate Muslims and Muslims who were opposed to Al Qaeda. A question posted on the Minabr Al-Tawhidwal-Jihad website, belonging to the Sala ideologist Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, asked about attacking Christians in Egypt: What is the ruling regarding attacking churches and blowing them up and what is the ruling on attacking stores, vehicles, and other Christian property? What is the ruling with regards to intentionally or unintentionally attacking Christian women and children? The ruling, posted by Sheikh Al-Shanqiti was: if we narrow down the conict, it is only permitted to attack those heading the attack against the Muslims, whether they are priests or not. But if we expand the conict, then it is permitted to harm anyone in which thereis an interest in attacking, according to the stages of the conict and its severity. . . . This is because they [the Christians] are the ones who enabled the West to reach Islamic countries and served as fth column against Islam. Therefore, their blood is permitted as well as their money and property.15 According to him Christians are the target in the conict today because they are taking the position of the aggressor, not simply because they are Christian. He states that children and women must not be harmed unless they took part in attacking Muslims. He explains that it is permitted if women and children are unintentionally harmed, but that one should be wise and prevent the enemy from using them as a shield. More recently, al-Shanqiti posted a fatwa as a response to an individual asking if Muslims are justied in attacking Christians in Muslim lands as revenge for what is committed against Muslims elsewhere. Shanqitis fatwa (posted on 31 December 2010), claried that

We clarify that these Christians present in Muslim lands are not the people of the covenant, and the rules of protection do not apply to them. Not every unbeliever born in a Muslim country or living there are of the people of the covenant, because protection under the covenant has description and conditions, which if not fullled, make a person outside the people of the covenant. We mention that the rulings of protection under the covenant do not apply to the unbelievers residing in lands of Islam today, because they do not pay the jizia or abide by inferiority, and do not stop harming Muslims. Each one of these alone is sufcient to abrogate the covenant, because their blood was permissible from the start. As for the case of targeting them, it is up to the leaders of jihad in every country. If they decide to confront them in revenge for our Muslim sisters, then we should help them, and every Muslim who loves jihad must be an arrow in their quiver.

772 What are Legitimate Actions?

G. Weimann

Hamid Abdallah Ahmad al-Ali is a Kuwait-based terrorist recruiter who provided nancial support and ideological justication for Al Qaedaafliated groups seeking to commit acts of terrorism in Kuwait, Iraq, and elsewhere.16 Al-Ali provided nancial support for these recruits, including paying their travel expenses to Iraq. He was listed by the Security Council on 16 January 2008 as being associated with Al Qaeda for participating in the nancing, planning, facilitating or perpetrating acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, or in support of, supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to, and recruiting for Al Qaedaafliated cells in Kuwait. In his role as a recruiter for terrorist organizations, Al-Ali has issued fatwas providing justication for acts of terrorism, including a fatwa endorsing suicide bombing operations and more specically the ying of aircraft into targets during such operations. This fatwa sanctioned the permissiveness, and sometimes necessity, of suicide operations on the conditions of crushing the enemy (or causing moral defeat to the enemy), to obtain victory. According to this fatwa, in modern time(s) this can be accomplished through the modern means of bombing, or by bringing down an airplane on an important site that causes the enemy great casualties. Other online fatwas are calling for the targeting of Western companies such as CocaCola and McDonalds. In November 2010, senior Sala ideologue Abu Muhammad AlMaqdisis jihadi website Al-Minbar Wal-Tawhid posted a fatwa permitting mujahideen to target companies owned by indels, such as Coca-Cola and McDonalds. The fatwas on the website Al-Minbar Wal-Tawhid came in response to a posting by a member named Abu Sayyed Qutub, which included the following questions: What is the ruling regarding companies that distribute Jewish and American products, such as Coca-Cola and McDonalds?; Is it permissible to receive help from gangsters in order to carry out jihad operations, as they say the jihad in Algeria is doing?; And is a group of fewer than 10 young people without military or organizational experience permitted to target tourists in countries with apostate [Muslim] governments, where no known jihad group operates?17 Sheikh Abu Walid al-Maqdisi, a Gaza-based cleric, replied that according to Sharia, it is forbidden to harm Muslim lives and possessions but permissible to target indel and polytheist lives and possessions. If the owners of these companies are Muslims, it is forbidden to harm or steal from them, even if they distribute or sell goods produced by the Jewish and Christian enemies of Allah, as long as the essence of the commerce and of the goods is permissible according to sharia, Maqdisi said. However, if these companies are controlled by indels, their property may be taken as booty, since the indels of today are considered combatants. Kidnapping and killing tourists was permissible so long as it was done by people who are reliable, knowledgeable in Sharia, and have organizational and military experience and are acting for the benet of Muslims, he said. If a Muslim lives where no organized jihadist group exists, he should establish one, Maqdisi said. Finally, Muslims are prohibited from obtaining help from indel gangsters (although they may purchase weapons from them), he added. While Sharia does not bar Muslims from receiving help from Muslim criminals, the assistance should be rejected if it is likely to harm the reputation of the mujahideen, or their jihad plan, according to Maqdisi. A recent fatwa posted by Sheikh Abu Dharr Al-Samhari Al-Yamani in January 2011, referred to a question directed to the Sheikh by a surfer who asked whether it is better for him to personally leave for jihad or whether he should concentrate on recruiting new youth in the south of the Arabian Peninsula.18 The surfer also asked for the Sheikhs opinion on the Jihadin Yemen. In his response, the Sheikh explains that the choice between leaving for jihad and recruiting members for jihad should be decided by considering which one

Downloaded by [King's College London] at 23:34 28 August 2013

Cyber-Fatwas and Terrorism

773

Downloaded by [King's College London] at 23:34 28 August 2013

would be the most useful to the mujahideen. Thus, if one can recruit a large number of young people to ght as mujahideen, then this is the better option. As to jihad in Yemen, the Sheikh explains that since Yemen is saturated with the pure blood of the Prophets friends and since the tyrannical rulers in the Arabian Peninsula turned it into a nest for the Crusaders it should be regarded as a battleeld for jihad. Even cyberterrorism and attacks on websites were authorized by online fatwas. In October 2008 a fatwa was published on the website of the Islamist Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement.19 It declared that attacking American and Israeli websites by hacking and sabotage is allowed under Islamic law and is a form of jihad or holy war, top Muslim scholars have decreed. The fatwa was issued by a committee from the highest authority in Sunni Islam, Egypts Al-Azhar University in Cairo. This is considered a type of lawful Jihad that helps Islam by paralyzing the information systems used by our enemies for their evil aims, said the fatwa. This Jihad is not different from the armed one. In fact, it might be more important if you consider the global dimensions of the Internet. Whoever wins this war will become the strongest in the realm of information, the fatwa continued. The fatwa was posted online as a response to numerous questions from radicals asking to be allowed to destroy Israeli and American states websites. On the Legitimacy of Suicide Operations Suicide is an undesirable act by most religions, including Islam (see the Qurans verse Spend your self in the way of Allah; do not cast yourself into destruction). Yet, jihadi fatwas found creative ways to justify suicide bombing. In the forbidding verse the words in the way of Allah ( sabil Allah in Arabic) are interpreted as for the sake of Allah. Thus, some fatwas claim that this means you are supposed to commit suicide if it is done for Allah. The same verse that is interpreted traditionally in Islam as prohibiting suicide is interpreted in these fatwas as supporting suicidal actions if committed in the way of Allah. Another tactic is to present suicide as a new conception of martyrdom. This shift challenges traditionally strong and Islamic prohibitions against suicide.20 Freamon argues that this transformation of religious doctrine, . . . resulted in the appearance of a new norm of jihadist battleeldself-annihilationa norm that is now accepted as a valid discharge of religious obligation under the law of the military Jihad.21 Al-Qaradawi is a leading gure in online terrorist fatwas and a good example for the use of fatwas to legitimize terrorist actions. Here is a typical Question and Answer form of fatwa issued by al-Qaradawi: The martyr operation is the greatest of all sorts of jihad in the cause of Allah. A martyr operation is carried out by a person who sacrices himself, deeming his life [of] less value than striving in the cause of Allah, in the cause of restoring the land and preserving the dignity. To such a valorous attitude applies the following Quranic verse: And of mankind is he who would sell himself, seeking the pleasure of Allah; and Allah hath compassion on (His) bondmen (Quran, 2: 207). But a clear distinction has to be made here between martyrdom and suicide. Suicide is an act or instance of killing oneself intentionally out of despair, and nding no outlet except putting an end to ones life. On the other hand, martyrdom is a heroic act of choosing to suffer death in the cause of Allah, and thats why its considered by most Muslim scholars as one of the greatest forms of jihad. When jihad becomes an individual duty, as when the enemy seizes the Muslim territory, a woman becomes entitled to take part

774

G. Weimann in it alongside men. Jurists maintained that when the enemy assaults a given Muslim territory, it becomes incumbent upon all its residents to ght against them to the extent that a woman should go out even without the consent of her husband, a son can go too without the permission of his parent, a slave without the approval of his master, and the employee without the leave of his employer. This is a case where obedience should not be given to anyone in something that involves disobedience to Allah, according to a famous juristic rule. . . . To conclude, I think the committed Muslim women in Palestine have the right to participate and have their own role in jihad and to attain martyrdom.22

Downloaded by [King's College London] at 23:34 28 August 2013

Qaradawis fatwa on suicide were echoed in numerous other terrorist fatwas. For example, Dr. Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, then one of the leaders of Hamas, argued that suicide depends on volition. If the martyr intends to kill himself, because he is tired of lifeit is suicide. However, if he wants to sacrice his soul in order to strike the enemy and to be rewarded by Allahhe is considered a martyr (shahid). We have no doubt that those carrying out these operations are martyrs. Rantisi based the distinction on Qaradawis fatwa. The legitimization of suicide attacks by fatwas was challenged by counter-fatwas. In August 2005 the Syrian Abu-Basir al-Tartusi posted online a fatwa under the headline A Word of Warning About Suicide Operations. He argued: I have received 1,000 questions about these operations, which are for me closer to suicide than martyrdom. They are haram (forbidden) and impermissible, for several reasons. Al-Tartusi, who lives in London, cited in the fatwa some of the (Prophet Muhammads) sayings, among them: Anyone who harms a believer has no jihad. The fundamentalists launched a bitter attack on Al-Tartusi on their websites and accused him of letting down Al Qaedas supporters. One of them asked, What do you expect from him when he lives in London? Another posting argued One should not get attached to these people because they did not ght before. The rules on jihad are taken from the mujahidin. I never thought of learning about jihad from those sitting who are used to issuing fatwas from London. In March 2010 Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri launched his fatwa against suicide bombers, explaining in a 600-page document that They [terrorists] cant claim that their suicide bombings are martyrdom operations and that they become the heroes of the Muslim Umma [global brotherhood]. No, they become heroes of hellre, and they are leading towards hellre. Again, this fatwa resulted in numerous online criticisms arguing that Qadri misinterprets the jihadi notion of martyrdom and is in fact a traitor.

On Economy and Terrorism Fatwas are used to promote nancial supports for the ghters: in October 2006, an Islamic website posted a fatwa by Sheikh Suleiman Ulwan, a Saudi scholar who has praised the 11 September attacks.23 The fatwa urges Muslims to deliver their religious tax (zakat; the Islamic law requires Muslims to distribute the zakat among the needy) to the mujahideen, explaining that Muslims who cannot physically participate in jihad must support it nanciallyby providing for the mujahideens personal needs or by nancing their military operations and weaponry. The fatwa quotes various sources, including the medieval Islamist scholar Ibn Taymiyya, who said: He who is able to partake physically in Jihad but lacks the nancial means to do so should utilize other Muslims property to equip himself, whether this property comes from zakat. . . . from the states treasury, or from any other

Cyber-Fatwas and Terrorism

775

Downloaded by [King's College London] at 23:34 28 August 2013

source, including stolen property which he [i.e., the mujahid] cannot return to its legitimate owner since the latter is unknown. . . . The legitimacy of nancing terrorism was challenged by a fatwa issued in June 2010 by Saudi Arabias top religious leadership, known as the Council of Senior Ulema. The fatwa states: The Council rules that the nancing of terrorism, the inception, help or attempt to commit a terrorist act of whatever kind or dimension, is forbidden by Islamic Sharia and constitutes a punishable crime thereby; this includes gathering or providing of nance for that end. The fatwa exempts legitimate charity to help the poor from this ban. Given the role that wealthy Saudis have played in nancing radical Islamic groups, the fatwa has a signicant potential impact. Recently, American-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki posted an online fatwa on stealing money from the West for the purpose of nancing jihad. In a fatwa posted on 16 January 2011 as the lead article of the fourth issue of Inspire, Al Qaedas English-language magazine online, Al-Awlaki encourages jihadists living in the West to assist the nancing of jihadi activities through any means possible, including theft, embezzlement, and seizure of property. In his article titled The Ruling on Dispossessing the Disbelievers Wealth in Dar al-Harb [Land of War], al-Awlaki argued that it is just to take away the wealth of the enemy through deception or force, and urged Muslims to use the stolen money to fund jihad. He ordered the targeting of government-owned property, banks, global corporations, and wealth belonging to disbelievers with known animosity towards Muslims. Al-Awlaki says Muslims living in the West are not bound by any laws or contracts that prohibit them to harm their countries of residence: It is the consensus of our scholars that the property of the disbelievers in Dar al-Harb is halal [permissible] for the Muslims and is a legitimate target for the mujahidin. Yusuf al-Qaradawi released a fatwa on 14 April 2004, stating that the boycott of American and Israeli products was an obligation for all who are able. The fatwa declares: If people ask in the name of religion we must help them. The vehicle of this support is a complete boycott of the enemies goods. Each riyal, dirham . . . etc. used to buy their goods eventually become bullets to be red at the hearts of brothers and children in Palestine. . . . To buy their goods is to support tyranny, oppression and aggression. Buying goods from them will strengthen them; our duty is to make them as weak as we can. . . . American goods, exactly like the great Israeli goods, are forbidden. It is also forbidden to advertise these goods, even though in many cases they prove to be superior. America today is a second Israel.

On Using Weapons of Mass Destruction Online terrorist fatwas related to the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In May 2003 a young Saudi cleric named Shaykh Nasir bin Hamid al-Fahd published A Treatise on the Legal Status of Using Weapons of Mass Destruction Against Indels.24 This fatwa has been used by Al Qaeda and its supporters as a justication and authorization for using WMD against indelsin this case, against the United States. Al-Fahd begins by describing the term weapons of mass destruction as an inexact term, claiming that chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons that killed a thousand people would be called by the West internationally banned weapons, whereas the use of high explosive bombs weighing seven tons apiece and [that] killed three thousand or more would be called internationally permissible weapons. On that basis, he dismisses the Wests treaties and regulations banning WMD proliferation as mere attempts to scare others and protect itself.

776

G. Weimann

Downloaded by [King's College London] at 23:34 28 August 2013

Thus it is evident, he wrote, that [the Western nations] do not wish to protect humanity by these terms, as they assert; rather, they want to protect themselves and monopolize such weapons on the pretext of banning them internationally. Thus, he argues, All these terms have no standing in Islamic law, because God Almighty has reserved judgment and legislation to Himself. . . . This is a matter so obvious to Muslims that it needs no demonstration. . . . In judging these weapons one looks only to the Koran, the Sunnah [i.e., the sayings and traditions of the Prophet], and the statements of Muslim scholars. Al-Fahd also argues that large civilian casualties are acceptable if they result from an attack meant to defeat an enemy, and not an attack aimed only at killing the innocent: The situation in this regard is that if those engaged in jihad establish that the evil of the indels can be repelled only by attacking them at night with weapons of mass destruction, they may be used even if they annihilate the indels.25 In 2008 bin Ladens deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, released his book titled Exoneration. In it, he resurrects the WMD fatwa issued by Nasir al-Fahd in 2003.26 Al-Zawahiri adopts Fahds ideas to reach the same conclusion: The use of nuclear weapons would be justied as an act of equal retaliation, repaying like for like. Al-Zawahiri raises key Quranic themes to sweep away all potential objections to the use of WMD and adopts Fahds examples verbatim: The Prophet Mohammeds attack on the village of al-Taif using a catapult, for instance, permits the use of weapons of general destruction incapable of distinguishing between civilians and combatants.27

When Fatwas Clash Online

Online fatwas have become both widespread and controversial in the past few years. Since 9/11, the issuing of fatwas by radical clerics and terrorist groups has increased dramatically. As a result, several regimes in the Middle East have attempted to counter the emerging trend. Thus, for example, the government of Saudi Arabia issued instructions that only authorized ulama could issue fatwas and only the government was authorized to issue rulings on jihad. In Kuwait, a fatwa committee was established to coordinate and approve fatwas. But terrorist fatwas faced additional challenges from within: inner debates and arguments resulted in wars of fatwas, conducted mostly online. According to Bunt, There is a long-term discussion on the legitimacy of fatwas and the qualications to leads online debates.28 Sometimes fatwawars break out between websites issuing contradictory proclamations on certain issues. A number of Saudi Salast religious scholars, for example, led by Abdullah bin Jibreen and Nasser al-Omar, issued a series of fatwas against Hezbollah during its war with Israel in the summer of 2006, labeling it as an un-Islamic party working for Iranian interests in the region.29 These fatwas prompted counter-fatwas, denouncing the timing of the original fatwas. Meanwhile, Qaradawis site said simply that [t]he Lebanese Resistance is jihad, suggesting that it is legitimate. Following these clashing fatwas, furious debates broke out among users on hundreds of online forums. A report on the main fatwas published in October 2010 on the Minabr Al-TawhidwalJihad website, belonging to the Sala ideologist Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, reveals that since Al-Maqdisis arrest on 17 September 2010, there has been a signicant decline in the number of questions on the subject of jihad on his website.30 The questions addressed to this website are now answered by the Websites Sharia Committee comprised of several prominent Sala Sheikhs. Some of the questions and fatwas related to the use of terrorism and violence and even to the importance of online fatwas: one question related to Saudi Arabias decision to only empower the senior religious clerics with the ability to issue

Cyber-Fatwas and Terrorism

777

fatwas and ght the websites containing fatwa sections, to block them and to prosecute website owners. The answer issued by Sheikh Abu Al-Mundhir Al-Shanqiti claimed that appropriating a fatwa to one specic person or group is in contradiction to the concept of spreading knowledge. Such a move is an attempt to take over Allahs religion in a manner that prevents the public from being exposed to fatwas and religious opinions that do not coincide with the rulers opinion. Such a state of affairs may cause the public to deviate from the true path. Therefore, the responding Sheikh calls on decent religious clerics to ght it and publish everywhere, even online, their fatwas. In September 2010, Sheikh Qaradawi, who has issued numerous radical fatwas for many years, posted another controversial fatwa. In his new fatwa, Qaradawi, accused Chechen mujahideen of ignorance, unjustied Takr, and violence. The main postulate in this fatwa was Qaradawis claim that Islam has forbidden changing the blamed, if it leads to a greater harm. And it doesnt envisage to get rid of the harm in the same way, especially when there will be an even greater harm after that.31 Furthermore, Qaradawi called the jihad of the mujahideen in Chechnya and the Caucasus a violence that has nothing to do with the letter of Sharia or with its spirit. This contradicts his own fatwa in 2004 where Qaradawi himself dened the armed ght of the Chechen people against the Russian aggression as one of the best kinds of Jihad in the Cause of Allah, stating that It is the duty of every Muslim to back oppressed Muslims in all parts of the world. No doubt that Chechens ght in defense of their lands, honor and religion, and hence they are doing one of the best kinds of Jihad in the Cause of Allah. Qaradawis controversial fatwas led Islamic scholars to accuse him of ignorance and distortion of the Sharia. For example, Sheikh IbnJibreen argued: There is no doubt that this man makes concessions (in religion)! The reason for this is that he wants to be beloved by people, and therefore, he does concessions for them. For example, when he saw that most people listen to music, he said that it is not prohibited. We say: do not listen to his fatwas, and warn people against them! Recently, fatwas are used in the debates between groups. For example, the Hamas Fatah conict has evolved into a war of fatwas over various issues. One of them was the permissibility of praying outside the mosques and over the authority to pass such rulings. The Palestinian Clerics Association, which is afliated with Hamas, bans prayers in the open air, while a ruling by the Palestinian Chief Justice Sheikh Taysir Al-Tamimi and Palestinian Grand Mufti Sheikh Muhammad Hussein, who are associated with the PA and Fatah, permits them. During the war in Lebanon (2006) a heated dispute erupted online, causing exchange of fatwas among Sunni religious men concerning supporting the Shiite Hezbollah. An old fatwa published by Sheikh bin Jibrin was republished in 22 July 2006. This fatwa states that it is forbidden to support the Hezbollah, joining it or even praying for it to achieve victory. Posting this fatwa on the Internet created an online fatwas battle focusing on the armed conict in the region but in fact reecting the Sunni-Shia split. It seems that the old fatwa of Sheikh bin Jibrin was used to support the Saudi ofcial political position during the crisis, thus using Sunni fatwas against Iran and Hezbollah. Even disagreements on terrorist actions are now formed as an online exchange of fatwas. For example, a harsh online debate erupted after the London bombings, on 7 July 2005. The criticism came from Syrian Mustafa Abd al-Munim Abu Halimah, better known as Abu Basir al-Tartusi, a Syrian jihadi scholar residing in London. On 9 July 2005, Abu Basir published a fatwa on his website that protested the London bombings and the killing of innocent British civilians.32 Abu Basir described the London bombings as a disgraceful and shameful act, with no manhood, bravery, or morality. We cannot approve it nor accept it, and it is denied Islamically and politically. Abu Basirs criticism and fatwa drew many

Downloaded by [King's College London] at 23:34 28 August 2013

778

G. Weimann

angry responses in jihadi forums.33 These harsh responses led Abu Basir to publish yet another online declaration on 11 July 2005, under the title The Love of Revenge or the Legal ruling. In this second announcement he explained that his criticism of the London attacks was not a retreat from his former support of jihad. But, he argued, there should not be any symmetry of revenge between the Muslims and their oppressors. Abu Basirs fatwa and his criticism of the London bombings led to an online response in the form of a long and unsigned fatwa titled The Base of Legitimacy for the London Bombings and Response to the Disgraceful Statement by Abu Basir al-Tartusi. This response to Abu Basir is similar in form and arguments to the Islamist justications for the 11 September attacks. One critic of Abu Basir argued that Muslims need no fatwa or other form of writing, each time an attack takes place on enemy soil since This is an integral part of the Muslim Sunnah. The Muslims should be glad and show their joy for every tragedy that happens to the indel oppressors and aggressors, he argues, and stop being sympathetic with them. Moreover, he criticizes the condemnations of the London bombings, claiming that they are contradicting Islam: I warn my believing brothers to stop criticizing their brothers, the Mujahidin, especially these days.34 Another lingering debate within the online jihadi circles relates to the use of WMD. As noted earlier, Al Qaeda has opened the door for its supporters to use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons to further the goals of the global jihad. To this end, Al Qaeda has provided the religious fatwas justifying the use of WMD. However, in April 2007 the Islamist website Al-Firdaws posted an article by Abu Zabadi titled Religious Grounds for [Launching] a Nuclear Attack.35 The article, presented as a response to recent rumors about al-Qaedas plan to attack the U.S. with WMDs such as a nuclear bomb, unequivocally opposes the use of WMDs by Muslims against the West, and attempts to counter the legal justications for their use recently put forward by some prominent religious scholars afliated with Al Qaeda and other jihad movements. The authors main concern is not the legitimacy of obtaining WMDs for purposes of deterrence, but whether Islam sanctions a rst-strike nuclear attack by Al Qaeda against the United States or Europe. The author states that such an attack is forbidden, and presents several arguments in support of his position: (a) Using WMDs May Provoke U.S. WMD Counterattack; (b) If God Wishes to Wipe America Off the Face of the Earth . . . The Matter Is In His Hands; and (c) If Bin Laden and His Followers Wish to Respond [to U.S. Attacks] in Kind, They Should [Confront] the Evil Troops on the Battleeld. The posting of this article sparked a erce debate among participants on the forum, with some participants supporting the authors reasoning and conclusions, and others forcefully rejecting them. Most of the forum participants who criticized the article took up religious arguments made in the past by prominent contemporary Islamist sheikhs.36 Very often, the best way to overcome splits and disagreements is through the publications of fatwas. As Moss and Mehkhennet argue: The jihad etiquette is not written down, and for good reason. It varies as much in interpretation and practice as extremist groups vary in their goals. But the rules have some general themes that underlie actions ranging from the recent rash of suicide bombings in Algeria and Somalia, to the surge in beheadings and bombings by separatist Muslims in Thailand.37 These fatwas can bridge gaps and solve disagreements among terrorist communities. Moss and Mehkhennet described six of these basic jihadi rules: (1) You can kill bystanders without feeling a lot of guilt; (2) You can kill children, too, without needing to feel distress; (3) Sometimes, you can single out civilians for killing; bankers are an example; (4) You cannot kill in the country where you reside

Downloaded by [King's College London] at 23:34 28 August 2013

Cyber-Fatwas and Terrorism

779

unless you were born there; (5) You can lie or hide your religion if you do this for jihad; and (6) You may need to ask your parents for their consent.38 Bin Laden himself published an online call to resolve the inner conict. On 23 October 2007, al-Hesbah posted a 34-minute video featuring a new address by Osama bin Laden titled To Our People in Iraq. In the video, produced by Al Qaedas media company as-Sahab, bin Laden praises the jihad ghters in Iraq for their steadfast struggle against the Crusader occupation, which, he says, has brought honor to the Islamic nation. Then he urges them to unite their ranks, and to resolve all differences based on Islamic Sharia. Those who err or sow division among the Muslims, he adds, should be tried according to Islamic law. Lastly, bin Laden criticizes the phenomenon of jihad ghters who blindly follow the orders of their organizations and commanders, forgetting that infallibility is a virtue that only Allah and the Prophet possess.

Conclusion
Downloaded by [King's College London] at 23:34 28 August 2013
One of the Internets most contentious aspects is how it enables people to bypass traditional channels of authority. The growing popularity of online Islamic religious rulings or fatwas has been noted also by modern terrorists. The radical Islam has adopted the Internet as a favorite platform for spreading jihadi fatwas, legitimizing the use of violence, of suicide, of targeting innocents, and even of killing moderate Muslims. There are two implications of the trends documented in this study: First, the analysis of the online fatwas and the fatwa wars may say a lot about the terrorists, their motivations, their doubts and fears. In many ways, it allows one to open a window to a world about which little is known. It may also serve counterterrorism: The war on terrorism is becoming more and more a psychological war fought over minds and hearts. In such wars, studying the terrorists mindsets, sources of guidance, debated issues, and authoritative leaders may be a valuable tool for counterterror campaigns. By learning the ow of fatwas, their sources and reasoning and by monitoring the debates over fatwas one can nd practical ways to support the voices against terror, to broaden gaps within these dangerous communities, and to channel the discourse to nonviolent forms of action. Second, the study of online terrorist fatwas may guide countercampaigns. Shmuel Bar, who studied thousands of online fatwas, highlighted the role of counter-fatwas and recommended competition: for every fatwa that promises Paradise to those who engage in jihad, a counter fatwa should threaten hellre.39 Currently, the radical, terrorist fatwas are almost unchallenged: This is a one-sided battle; the radicals are on the offensive, whereas counter-attacks of moderates are few and far between. Fatwas commanding terror can only be countered by a clear opposing consensus (ijma) of mainstream ulamaa. Such a consensus does not exist; on the key issues relating to Islamic terror the mainstream ulama a silence, a silence which for many of their followers is construed as consent. . . . It is in the home eld of this presumed silent majority that the main battle is taking place, and as long as it does not enter the fray, the battle cannot be won.40 There are attempts to launch counterterror fatwas: Targeting public resources, corruption, hijacking planes, and blowing up buildings was the most important line in the historical fatwa that was issued in April 2010 by the Saudi Arabian Senior Ulema Council, which is in practice the most important religious authority in the Islamic world. This is a line that explicitly prohibits the actions of terrorist groups that claim to be Islamic and who ght in the name of Islam. However, this fatwa was almost unnoticed since it received little media coverage and was not posted on the online platforms were most jihadi fatwas are. As Al-Rashid noted, Without publicity this fatwa remains as nothing more than a mere piece of paper, and terrorists will continue to benet with regards to nancing, recruitment, and winning

780

G. Weimann

public sympathy. Therefore it is in the interests of terrorists and the extremists who support them for this fatwa to remain unknown and not receive any publicity, and they are trying to bury or silence this fatwa.41

Notes
1. Shmuel Bar, Warrant for Terror: The Fatwas of Radical Islam and the Duty to Jihad (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littleeld Publishing, 2006), pp. 117. 2. Shmuel Bar, Jihad Ideology in Light of Contemporary Fatwas, Research Monographs on the Muslim World Series No 1, Paper No 1 (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2006), p. 1. 3. Abdallah El-Tahawy, The Internet is the New Mosque: Fatwa at the Click of a Mouse, Arab Insight 2(1) (2008), pp. 1120. 4. David C. Rapoport, The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism, in Audrey K. Cronin and James M. Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004). 5. Magnus Ranstorp, Interpreting the Broader Context and Meaning of Bin-Ladens Fatwa, Studies in Conict and Terrorism 21(4) (1998), pp. 321330. 6. Kenan Malik, From Fatwa to Jihad: The Rushdie Affair and its Legacy (London: Atlantic, 2009). 7. Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, The New Challenges (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006); Gabriel Weimann, The Psychology of MassMediated Terrorism, American Behavioral Scientist 52(1) (2008), pp. 6986; Gabriel Weimann, Terrorism and Counterterrorism on the Internet, in Robert Denemark, ed., The International Studies Encyclopedia Volume XI (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 2010), pp. 69887005; and Abraham Kaplan and Gabriel Weimann, Freedom and Terror: Reason and Unreason in Politics (London: Routledge, 2011). 8. Bar, Jihad Ideology, p. 3. 9. Gary Bunt, Virtually Islamic (Cardiff, UK: The University of Wales Press, 2000); Gary Bunt, Islam in the Digital Age: E-Jihad, Online Fatwas and Cyber Islamic Environments (London and Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2003); and Gary Bunt, iMuslims: Rewiring the House of Islam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009). 10. See for example Bar, Jihad Ideology, p. 15. 11. Weiman, Terror on the Internet; Gabriel Weimann, WWW.Al-Qaeda: The Reliance of al-Qaeda on the Internet, in Responses to Cyber Terrorism, NATO Science for Peace and Security Program (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2008), pp. 6169; Weimann, Terrorism and Counterterrorism on the Internet. 12. Gabriel Weimann, When Fatwas Clash Online: Terrorist Debates on the Internet, in James Forest, ed., Inuence Warfare: How Terrorists and Governments Fight to Shape Perceptions in a War of Ideas (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2009), pp. 4974. 13. Cited at http://www.homelandsecurityus.net/terrorist%20groups/Salast%20Group/sala group for call and combat.htm 14. Cited at http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1231.htmhttp://www.memri.org/report/ en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1231.htm 15. See ICTs Periodical Review: FatwasOctober 2010. Available at http://www.ict.org.il/ Portals/0/Internet%20Monitoring%20Group/JWMG Periodical Review Fatwas October 2010.pdf 16. According to the report of the Security Council Committee concerning Al Qaeda and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities. Available at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/ NSQI23608E.shtml 17. Cited at http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/report.htm?report=4779 18. The full text in Arabic is available at http://www.tawhed.ws/FAQ/display question?qid=203 4&pageqa=2&i 19. Cited at http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=3.0.2595019598

Downloaded by [King's College London] at 23:34 28 August 2013

Cyber-Fatwas and Terrorism

781

Downloaded by [King's College London] at 23:34 28 August 2013

20. See, for example Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, Fatwa: Whether Suicide Bombings are a Form of Martyrdom, 8 November 2003. Available at http://qaradawi.net (in Arabic). 21. Bernard Freamon, Martyrdom, Suicide and the Islamic Law of War, Fordham International Law Journal 27 (2003), p. 300. 22. Available at http://www.meforum.org/646/the-qaradawi-fatwas 23. Available at http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/blog personal.htm?id=22&param=JT 24. The full text is available at http://carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/fatwa.pdf 25. The full translated text is available at http://www.jihadspin.com/NeclearFatwa.pdf 26. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, AlQaedasNuclearAmbitions, Foreign Policy (December 2010). Available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/16/al qaedas nuclear ambitions?page= 0,0 27. Al Qaedas Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri Justies WMD Terrorist Attacks with the Quran and a Hadith, Terror Trends Bulletin (November 2010). Available at http://terrortrends bulletin.wordpress.com/2010/11/19/al-qaedas-dr-ayman-al-zawahiri-justies-wmd-terrorist-attackswith-the-quran-and-a-hadith/ 28. Bunt, iMuslims, p. 117. 29. Cited by El-Tahawy, The Internet is the New Mosque, p. 18. 30. ICTs Periodical Review. 31. The full text is available at http://www.islam.ru/pressclub/tema/fetwacec 32. Available at http://www.abubaseer.bizland.com/hadath/Read/hadath17.doc 33. The main responses appeared on the Sala forum Al-Hesbah. See, for example, in http://www.alhesbah.org/v/showthread.php?t=26865 and http://www.alhesbah. org/v/showthread.php?t=26751 34. Cited by Reuven Paz, Islamic Legitimacy for the London Bombings (July 2005). Available at http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM no 4 vol 3 - Islamic legitimacy.pdf 35. Available at http://alrdaws.org/vb/showthread.php?t=28142 36. See MEMRIs Special Report No. 34, Contemporary Islamist Ideology Authorizing Genocidal Murder (15 September 2004). Available at http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi? 37. Michael Moss and Souad Mekheenet, The Guidebook for Taking a Life, New York Times (10 June 2007). Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/10/weekinreview/10moss.html 38. Ibid. 39. Bar, Jihad Ideology, p. 15. 40. Ibid., p. 15. 41. Abdul Rahman Al-Rahid, Activating the Counter-Terrorism Fatwa, Asharq Alawast (17 May 2010). Available at http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=20980