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Dialectic and Dialetheic Author(s): Graham Priest Reviewed work(s): Source: Science & Society, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Winter, 1989/1990), pp. 388-415 Published by: Guilford Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40403028 . Accessed: 21/07/2012 04:40
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Vol. 53, No. 4, Winter Science 6fSociety, 1989,388-415

DIALECTIC AND DIALETHEIC

GRAHAM PRIEST

Dialetheism Dialectics Introduction: Requires

beconnection ESSAY ARGUES FOR an intimate I willnotatand dialetheism. tweendialectics Dialectics, I to discuss all the will nor to define here; attempt tempt uses that have been made of thatnotion.Rather,I will conon the use that Hegel and, later,Marx made of it. centrate A dialetheia is a true a little morecomment. Dialetheism1 requires has its ordinary, where "contradiction" contradiction, logical, of theform A&-A. is a truestatement sense.Thus, a dialetheia the viewthatthereare true conDialetheism is, consequently, is a somewhat In modern dialetheism noveland tradictions. form, thosewho acceptit have as yetunorthodox position. Typically, of the logicalparadoxesand been drivento it by consideration that connected The burdenof thisarticle is,however, problems.2 view is no so. the name be the itself means by may novel, although In particular, Marx's dialectics is based on dialetheand Hegel's ism.With thebenefit ofhistorical we maynot,perhaps, hindsight no findthisoverwhelmingly For one beforethiscensurprising. tried harder than to think theconsequences tury Hegel through of thought about or of itself, thinking categories applyingto themselves. And thisisjust the kindof self-referential situation thatgivesriseto the logicalparadoxes.
1 The word is a neologism. For its genesis, see the preface to Priest,et al, 1989. 2 For example, see Priest, 1979. The first part of Priest,1986, containsa discussion of dialetheismand furtherreferences.

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DIALECTIC AND DIALETHEIC 1 It Is Necessary toArgueThis Why

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in a contemporary context to itis very necessary Despitethis, Prima and Marx's is dialetheic. that dialectics facie, Hegel's argue in theScience case. For example, dialetheism is an open-and-shut quotations ofLogic(1969) Hegel says(in thisand all subsequent italics are in the original):
is a host of contradictory . . . common experience . . . says that . . . there things, exists not merelyin external whose contradiction contradictory arrangements, but in themselves.(440.) reflection,

And asserts boldlya fewlineslater:

External sensuous motion is contradiction'simmediate existence. Something moves,not because at one momentit is here and at anotherthere,but because at one and the same moment it is here and not here, because in this "here," it at once is and is not.

that where of Hegel assert ifnotmost, Yet many, interpretations and even asserts one, he mustbe Hegel talksof contradiction, else. For example, Acton understoodas meaningsomething (1967a, 444):
Hegel did not regard formallogic as a philosophicalscience,and he therefore rejected any view that its categories should dominate philosophical thought. is used in a certainway by formal Thus, the factthat the word "contradiction" himselfto thatmeaning.When for confining logicianswas not for him a reason in mind a methodin which he had Hegel was advocatingthe dialecticalmethod, courted were ratherthan avoided refutations tensionsand opposites,conflicts, or evaded.

to interpret dihave beenjust as content Marxist philosophers Cornforth in a similar alectical contradictions Thus, (1971, way. 92):
inherentin the The key conception of dialecticsis this notion of contradiction verynature of things. . . . But what exactlydo we mean by "contradiction"? of real, If we consider the real, complex movementsand interconnections tendenciescan and do exist in complex things,then we find thatcontradictory them. For example, if the forces operating in a body combine tendencies of

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of And ifthemovement attraction and repulsion, thatis a realcontradiction. with to the combines the to socialise tendency tendency society production a contradiction of this is real the the appropriation products, preserve private too.

And Norman(Normanand Sayers,1980,49):

totheinterdependence The term "contradiction" is usedtorefer concepts. ofopposed ... tocertain kinds ofconflict. . . . The term is [also]usedtorefer "contradiction" of a human If theconflict conflict within thepurposive is an internal activity can be seen or socialinstitution, thentheconflict individual or a humansociety

as a self-contradiction.

who have subit is not onlyWestern Moreover, philosophers For of "contradiction." scribedto a non-literal interpretation untilthe early1950s "contradicorthodoxSovietphilosophers, of things tion"seemsto havebeentakento meana variety (often dinot clearlydistinguished), includingopposing tendencies, Wetcontradictions and logical (see ametrically opposedconcepts, toholdthat all ofthese, orthodox ter,1958,349). It was,however, After the obtainin reality. the logicalcontradictions, including mean the idea that "contradiction" might early1950s,however, Thus Sheptubecamemuchlessorthodox.3 logicalcontradiction lin (1978, 259):
in which movein opposite directions and which haveopposite Aspects changes trends of functioning and development are calledopposites, whiletheinteractionof theseaspectsconstitutes a contradiction.

And wheremodernSovietphilosophers are preparedto admit that a dialectical contradiction is a logical charcontradiction, they that assert these occur "in but "in not acteristically may thought," belief or be Thus, whatever, inconsistent; reality." systems, may but dialetheias cannotoccur.Thus, Narskii(1965, 33; see also Narskii, 1970):
statements on the pattern"is and is not" eithercomprise Contradictory erroneous assertions or formulations of problems solution a requiring through of modification. process 3 Someofthehistorical is told inLobkowicz, 1961. See alsoComey, 1966. story

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Now, whilethereare certainly examples of Hegel and Marx using in other than itslogical sense, to insist notion of contradiction the when theyclaimed that theynevermeant what theysaid literally or even when they asserted occur in reality, that contradictions inflicts such violence on their dialectics that the contradictions, distortedproduct is but a pale shadow of its proper self. For the in Marx and Hegel is central theoreticalnotion of contradiction preciselythe logical one. Other uses are derivative,and usually fromthe centralnotion.So I shall argue; derive theirsignificance and in doing so, take on orthodoxy,East and West. 2 The Argument AgainstthisInterpretation

I willmountthe case forthe thesisin subsequentsections.But it is necessaryto explain whyso manyhave rejectedthisview, first and see why this is mistaken. betweendialecticsand forquite rightly, Hegel distinguished, mal logic - which was for him the Aristotelian logic of his day. holds in formallogic; but formal The law of non-contradiction applicable onlyin a limitedand well defined area logic is correctly (notablythe staticand changeless); in dialecticallogic, which applies in a much more general domain, the law of nonfails.Subsequent dialecticiansaccepted Hegel's discontradiction tinction.But formallogic has now matured into modern Frege/ Russell logic. This is immenselymore powerfulthan syllogistic, and has broughtthe science of reasoningto age. Whetheror not justified in doing so, most modern dialecticians East and account of West- see Frege/Russell logic as givinga definitive the most abstract norms of correct and scientificthought. Dialecticallogic,whateverelse it is, mustat least be compatiblewith this, which, of course, rules out dialetheias. Thus Hegel's and Marx's rejection of the law of non-contradiction, and, conto be inhave had of notion their contradiction, sequently, on pain of a charge of being unscientific, terpretednon-literally, or of irrationalism. (For the formersee, e.g., Colletti, 1975, 28. For the lattersee Norman, in Norman and Sayers, 1980, 50.) Nor has the supposed significanceof modern formal logic writers.While defenders of dialectic been lost on anti-Marxist have been doing theirbestto explain thatHegel and Marx did not mean what theysaid, Popper (1940, 317; see also Acton, 1967b,

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assumed that characteristic 392),with charity, Hegeland Marxdid with mean what theysaid, and used thisassumption together to absurdity: some babylogicto reducedialectics
thenone ... it can easilybe shownthatif one wereto acceptcontradictions itwouldmeana complete wouldhaveto giveup anykindof scientific activity: of science.This can be shownby proving thatif two breakdown contradictory

beadmitted; forfroma couple of whatever statements are admitted, must anystatement

can be validly inferred. statements whatever contradictory anystatement

formal ofwhom know little most Thus,modern dialecticians, very to be intimidated, and evenbrowlogic,haveallowedthemselves dialectical contradictions. beaten,intoreinterpreting in thelight of thesucThis reaction, understandable though naive.Someonewho cess story whichis modernlogic,is rather and therefore that acceptsthat thereare true contradictions, some things are bothtrue(A) and false(~A) is hardly goingto of Frege/Russell logicthattruth acceptthe unarguedassumption and falsity are mutually exclusive.Truth and falsity overlap; of theform A&-A to be true.It whenceit is possibleforthings - A&-A; then,thatPopper'smuchvauntedinference follows, henceB is quite invalid, sincethe premise maybe truewhile theconclusion not be. all,onlya may Frege/Russell logicis,after of the of norms like most theories it is and theory reasoning almostcertainly false.It is notablethat20th century logicians - as opposed to thosewho merely themselves it quote - have been under no illusions about the contentious and oftenshaky natureof some of the assumptions builtinto the Frege/Russell exclusiveness oftruth and falsity theory. Thoughthemutual may not have been questioned (until recently), many other prehavebeenquestioned, and often thattruth suppositions rejected: and falsity are exhaustive; thatall termsdenote; thatthe conditionalis truth that"existential has functional; quantification" existential and so on. import; even thosewho made the above observation, Dialecticians, wouldhave been hampered in standing up to beingbludgeoned withthePrincipia Mathematica due to the factthattherewas no articulated formal of logicsatisfactory fortheir theory purposes. This has nowchanged.Though only to receivethe just starting - logicswherePopattention deserve, they paraconsistent logics

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- have undergonea veryimpressive fails deper's inference in this the last is not on 20 years.4 Though paper velopment the outlines of at leastone of these formal logic,I willindicate I take to be most satisfactory the one the for fact (in logics who know so that even those little formal dialetheic purposes), theclaimthat formal logic logicwillat leastbe able tosee through or that to be false, even showsdialetheism Frege/Russell logic the onlysimple, intuitive, logicalsemantics. provides
3 Dialetheic Logic

one of thetruth to each sentence logicassigns Frege/Russell in addivaluesT (true)and F (false).Dialetheic mayassign, logic: semantic and values both tion, false).(Thus, technically, (true is that a sentence of{T,F}.) The fact subsets valuesare non-empty versa. rule out itsbeingfalse,and vice truedoes not,therefore the truthvalues of Given the truthvalues of basic sentences, table"conditions. out "truth worked be can sentences by complex are: of conditions truth the for So, negation example, ~A is truejust ifA is false -A is false just ifA is true are: And thoseforconjunction A8cBis truejust ifA is trueand B is true A8cBis false just ifA is falseor B is false The truth conditions These truth are,of course, quiteorthodox. what one wouldexpect. are alsoexactly fordisjunction conditions is NoticethatifA is trueand false,so is -A; and so, moreover, claim.Logicaltruth as dialetheists itis true, A&c-A.In particular, and logicalconsequenceare also definedin the orthodoxfashion: A is a logicaltruth just ifA is (at least)trueunderall of values assignments
to these can be found in Priestand Routley,1984. Furtherdiscussion 4 An introduction as the introduction can be found in ch. 3 of Priestand Routley,1983, whichis reprinted to part 2 of Priest,et al, 1989.

394

SCIENCE6fSOCIETY A is a logicalconsequence ofB just ifevery assignment of valuesthatmakesB (at least)truemakesA (at least) true

if A is a to note thatA is a logicaltruth It maybe interesting same setof semantics the these two-valued Thus, give tautology. Av~A both and orthodox truths as does Thus, logic. logical surof these seem The second truths. are -(AJk-A) may logical But if a certaincontradiction, A8c~A, may be initially. prising true, there is no reason why the "secondarycontradiction" shouldnot also be true.The semantics do, (A8c~A)8c~(A8c~A) from the different of notion a however, logicalconsequence give B is nota be expected, and as might one. In particular, orthodox B the ofA8c~~A, as maybe seen bysimply assigning consequence A bothT and F. value F, whileassigning to extendthesepromatter It is an entirely straightforward full first-order for to a semantics semantics logic.I will positional in can be notgivedetailshere(they 1987,ch. found, e.g., Priest, I willsaya little moreaboutidentity. reference 5), butforfuture = b a be of form statements the may bothtrueand false, Identity A little care has to be takenconcerning likeall otherstatements. one does truth valuesare assigned;but providing how,exactly, of identity, such as the law of this,all the standardprinciples = ofidenticals, are assured.As (a a) and thesubstitutivity identity a b for~a = b. usual, I willwrite will One final, and non-standard, piece of logicalmachinery in We in useful the discussion. also prove have, Engsubsequent a wayofnominalizing natural sentences. lishand other languages, of this The mostuniform is "that" way doing simply byprefixing to the sentence. Thus the sentential is phrase"John happy"becomesthe noun phrase"that is John happy."But thereare also other theverbintoa gerund. Thus,in ways:forexample, turning the exampleat hand we obtain"John's beinghappy."Though orthodox such logichas no formal analogueof thisnominalizing, in discussions is necessary and quitestandard of thesemantics of attitudes.5 our For we need to assume propositional purposes,
5 See, for example, the discussion in Montague, 1973. Note that Montague has a very sophisticatedtheoryof the behaviorof A. What we require of the notion willbe much simpler, though quite compatible with his account. In particular, on Montague's approach, M=A~A is true provided thatA is not T and F at all worlds.

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All we need is an operator, nominalizer. verylittleabout the A which suchthat I will write as which (and maybe readas "that") AAis a nounphrase, and therefore an denotes ifA is anysentence, assume little about. we it Which denotes, very may object object. clear thatin some sense AAand A~A are However,it is fairly (ThinkofJohn's beinghappyand hisnotbeinghappy; opposites. notloving andJohn's orJohn's etc.)Sincean object Jill, Jill loving is not the same as its opposite,it is naturalto require that of logic, As willnowbe clear to thosewho have a modicum A account is almost the above of the with theexception operator, ifwe wereto add one. In fact, thesame as theorthodox exactly bothT and F thenwe is assigned thatno sentence thecondition are a Thus thesesemantics wouldhaveexactly logic. Frege/Russell a case that which cover of orthodox just logic generalization is orthodox orthodox logic just a logicignores;and conversely, a dialectically which imporignores specialcase ofthesesemantics weare reasonaboutwhich ifthesituation case. In particular, tant then one, so thatthereare no dialetheias, ing is a consistent of is classical logic quite applicable.(The preciseunderstanding see Priest, a sensitive this claimis,however, 1987, issue,on which follows: as a little claim ch. 8.) Thus we may stretch Hegel's validin itsdomain,but formal logicis perfectly (Frege/Russell) is more dialectical (dialetheic) general. logic But whatis thedomainof classical logic?An easyansweris we havesaidwhich vacuousuntil is fairly Butthis "theconsistent." There to be, consistent. be expected areasare,or mayreasonably had a have but dialecticians about for debate room be this, may when is the static here: line standard consistent; change only arise.At anyrate,it is quite do contradictions thepicture enters is based on dialetheism withtheclaimthatdialectics compatible writers for other suchas Marx,shouldcastigate that dialecticians, are Those contexts contexts.0 in certain themselves contradicting is to be expected. a contradiction (The just notof thekindwhere in Priest, is discussedfurther ad absurdum use of reductio critical 1986.)
6 Thus Marx: "But then he [Adam Smith] suddenly changes the whole basis of his with a few lines distinctionand contradictswhat he started the whole investigation earlier" (Capital, Vol. II, 273). That Marx sometimescriticizespeople for being inof dialecticsby Havas, 1981. See is used againstthe dialetheicinterpretation consistent also Norman and Sayers, 1980, 49.

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but it is quite sufnot dialectics; Dialetheic logicis certainly therigorof a with is ficient to showthatdialetheism compatible formallogic.7 And protectedby the above connon-trivial siderations againstthe slingsand arrowsof outrageouslogical moveon to dialectics we can claims, proper.
4 Motion:An Illustration

of to givea simpleillustration It willbe useful, to start with, Let us take as to dialectics. be thewaydialetheic logicmay applied 1 to in that section from an examplethequotation above, Hegel is tobothbe and not ofmotion be in a state (orchangein general) at time. be in a certain a certain b,occupiesa Supposea body, spot differthe instantaneous time. What is at a certain certain s, spot, and itsbeingat rest?A Russell ence between itsbeingin motion but a would say "none": being in motionis not an intrinsic, Let A be the relational state.Hegel would say "consistency."8 A is true, and trueonly "bis at spots" Then if is at rest, sentence b the A since does indeed If b in then is is true, motion, (T). occupy to in started it has since it is motion, already spots; but,equally, ~A is true. ThusA is both there: leavethat spot;hencebis notstill or notHegel was right about trueand false(T and F). Whether thisis an issue I will not discusshere (see Priest,1985). The semantics relevant pointisjust thatdialetheic givesus a perfectly whatHegel says. literal wayof understanding Some dialecticians wouldarguethatHegeliancontradictions cannotbe of thekindillustrated here.For thiscontradiction is a extensional contradiction: a contradiction of the merely logical form where there is no essential connection between the A&c-A, One can, forexample,infer each of A and -A from conjuncts. thiscontradiction and asserteach independently. By contrast, dialectical contradictions are intensional. There is an internal relation between theconjuncts whichis notcapturedby a mere extensional Thus, dialectics conjunction.
7 In particular,it does not "obliteratethe distinctionbetween truth and falsity"or "abandon . . . the idea of entailmentand deductive argument,"as Norman claims (Norman and Sayers, 1980, 49). 8 The contrast is discussed in Priest, 1985, which also elaborates on the dialetheic connections.For more formaldetails see Priest, 1982.

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lays stress on the fact that this two-foldinterrelationof opposites is to be as mere conjunctionor succession,but dialectically, conceived,not "eclectically," thatthe one cannot exist in the sense thatthese opposites are so farintertwined the other.Not onlydo theynotexclude each other,theypresuppose and without condition each other. (Wetter,1958, 340.) reciprocally

to detach eitherconjunctfrom In particular,it is not permissible the description.(This the other and assert it, withoutfalsifying is made in Havas, 1981.) criticism To a certain extent this objection is simplyanswered. Less be quite misleadingand than the whole (relevant)truthcan itself the situation. of a false Thus, suppose your car runs picture give out of petrol and you ask me where the nearest garage is. If I detach and assert only the firstconjunct of "There is a garage around the corner but it is closed" my answer will be highly to use the nomisleading.There is a conversationalimplicature, has not been omittionof Grice (1975), thatrelevantinformation ted. But in dialectical contexts,the distinctionbetween something's being true (only) and its being true and false is quite crucial. Thus to assert only A when A&-A is true is equally puts it (1969, Vol. I, book 1, section misleading.As Hegel himself ch. 10, 91): 1,
The commonest injusticedone to a speculative [i.e., dialectical] content is to make itone-sided,thatis, to giveprominenceonlyto one of the propositionsinto which it can be resolved. It cannot then be denied that this proposition is foronce one of the propositions isjustasfalseas itis true, statement asserted; butthe the othermustbe equally considered and is takenout of the speculativecontent, stated.

Nonetheless,as Hegel and mostotherdialecticianshave stressed, are no mere "accidental" conjunctions. dialecticalcontradictions In some sense the contradictory conjunctsdepend on each other, so that the one could not exist withoutthe other. Thus, there should indeed be a more intimaterelation between dialectical contradictoriesthan mere extensional (external) conjunction. What this is, we will be in a position to see by section 8. 5 The History ofHegel'sDialectic I can now no longer put off the promised argument that are dialetheias,and that this notion of dialectical contradictions

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contradiction is the centralone in dialectics.Since much of whatis at issue is the interpretation of what Hegel and Marx said, no mere quoting of textscan suffice forthis.I willargue historically: the influences given philosophical actingon Hegel and Marx, and what Hegel, in particular, about them,thereis no other very says sensible interpretation.9 Let us start with Hegel.10 An importanttraditionthat influencedHegel was thatof the medieval(and especiallyChristian) Neo-Platonists and theirRenaissance successors(see Kolakowski, Vol ch. 1978, I, 1). But the Neo-Platonistscertainlyheld that contradictory thingswere true of the One. For example, Plotinus and nowhere and nothing,everywhere says that it is everything {Ennead, V. 2, 1; see also Gilson, 1972, 43ff). Eckhart says that God is being and yet,beyond being, and thus not being (Smart, of all opposites 1967, 450). Cusa saysthatGod is the reconciliation 1, XXII). All thingsare thus true (and false) {De Docta Ignorantia, of God:
... in no waydo [distinctions] existin the absolute maximum[the One]. . . . The Absolute maximum... is all thingsand, whilst being all, is none of them . . . (Ibid 1, IV, in Heron, 1954, 13.)

In the Neo-Platonist One (or God), whichcreated man, finally for the latter(and, accordingto some, the formeralso) to findfulfillment in the other, Hegel saw his Absolute. As he puts it in the on theHistory Lectures (1895, 548): "The thoughtof ofPhilosophy the intelligible world,is the concreteIdea as we have seen totality, it withthe Neo-Platonists."It is natural,then,that Hegel should also take over the idea thatthe Absolute is literally contradictory. will tryto argue that the Still,since more prosaic commentators did not intend theircontradictions Neo-Platonists or, at literally, fromthe loonier least,thatiftheydid, Hegel emancipatedhimself aspects of his predecessors,let us move forwardin time to the meantcontradiction proximateinfluenceon Hegel, who certainly when he said it,and who does not (?) have a loony fringe:Kant.
9 Some other argumentsare given by Sayers,one Marxistwho mostcertainly doesmean contradictionwhen he says it, in Norman and Sayers, 1980 (see especiallych 4). 10 The materialin the nextthreesectionsdrawsheavilyon Priestand Routley,1983, chs. 1 and 2, reprintedas the introductory etai, 1989. My account chaptersof part 1 of Priest, of Hegel's and Marx's dialecticshere does, however,differfromthat given there in some importantrespects.

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of The relevant partof Kantforour purposesis thesection called the Transcendental Pure Reason and theCritique Dialectic, of of Pure Reason. in particular thatpartof itcalledtheAntinomy fourpairsofarguments, each fora pairof In this, Kantproduces of neither each conclusions. However, pairofargucontradictory in anysimple the contradictions ments is fallacious sense;rather, are an outcomeof reason itself (A297; B354ff;A339; B397). are true. are sound, theirconclusions Now, if such arguments wind.Close,perhaps, closeto thedialetheic Thus, Kantis sailing in all of the thesamesubtle flaw For Kantdiagnoses butnotwith. of a outside its the category legitimate arguments: application For example,in thefirst bounds(e.g.,A498, B526ff). argument is from has a cause" to there a of the first step "everything pair has a cause." Kantsuggests of existents) "theWorld(i.e.,totality hasa causeis true, event the that theprinciple that every although in to us that to can refer intuition," is, only objects "given "every" an unbounded is not The World, totality, being experienced. but reason. in this to us way, merely apprehendedby given is thatreasonand itscategories The cruxof Kant'sposition forcontent are dependent Indeed,thatis what upon experience. to find direct to show. It is difficult he takes the antinomies form other than some this for very strong assumption, arguments this And once is as of positivism (such Hume's). rejected and tolead on is admitted from far reason, beingparasitic experience, on antinomies a lifeof its own Kant'sposition the collapses. contradictions, Reason,by unimpeachable produces arguments, thelinethatKant's be true.This is exactly musttherefore which of thisforthepointat of thecentrality took.In virtue successors at somelength. issue,I willquote Hegel on thematter Discussing 48, 76-77): Kant,he says(1975, section
theunconditioned of tocomprehend nature which reasonmakes In theattempt In other itmaintains are calledAntinomies. intowhat itfalls theWorld, words, and in sucha waythat each of aboutthesameobject, twoopposite propositions From this it follows that the with them hastobe maintained body equalnecessity. runintocontradicofwhich statements thespecific ofcosmical fact, descriptive butonly an appearance. The explanation cannot be a self-subsistent tion, reality, not affect theobjectin its the contradiction does that Kant offered alleges by which to the Reason seeks to it. but attaches essence, only comprehend proper was broached thatthecontradiction is occasioned In thiswaythesuggestion of thecategories. or bytheintrinsic And to itself, quality bythesubject-matter

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introducedinto the world of Reason by the offerthe idea thatthe contradiction of is inevitable and essentialwas to make one of the Understanding categories the most importantsteps in the progressof Modern Philosophy.But the more the solution.Its only motivewas the issue thus raised,the more trivial important an excessive tendernessfor the thingsof the world. The blemishof contradiction,it seems, could not be allowed to mar the essence of the world; but there could be no objection to attachingit to the thinkingReason, to the essence of mind. Probablynobody will feel disposed to deny that the phenomenal world to the observingmind; meaning by "phenomenal" the presentscontradictions world as it presents itselfto the senses and understanding,to the subjective between the essence of world and the mind. But if a comparison is instituted essence of mind, it does seem strange to hear how calmly and confidently the modest dogma has been advanced by one, and repeated by others, that It is no esthoughtor Reason, and not the World, is the seat of contradiction. into contradictions that Reason falls to round and turn only by explain cape maintained to of the is For this the categories categories. application applying be necessary.. . .

is not on. These must Thus, Kant's evasion of the contradictions be true of the World. was also concluded by the That there are true contradictions last of the influenceson Hegel thatI willconsider,Fichte. Fichte, like Hegel, startedfromKant, and like Hegel criticizedthe Kantian postulationof the thing-in-itself (Taylor, 1975, 36, 77). This leftonlythe other partof the Kantian ontology:the transcendental ego. The nature of the ego, or self,is to think;but there is nothingto thinkabout except itself;and it is impossibleto think else to contrast it with.(So at somethingunless thereis something least thought Fichte.) Hence, the self had to create something the non-self, different, (This againstwhichitcould conceiveitself. Reason leading a lifeof itsown.) It therefore is precisely produces contradiction.Specifically, the non-selfmust also be self, since else exists. As Fichte nothing puts it (quoting from Heath and section ". is posited Lachs, 1982, 3, 106): . . insofaras the not-self [in the self],the selfis not posited in the self; but "... insofaras the not-self is to be posited [in the self],the self must be posited therein."Thus, the self is both posited and not posited, and the as Fichteputs it Or, more pithily, posited is both selfand not-self. a few lines later: self = not-self and not-self= self. As regularreaders of Fichtewillknow,the story ends happily. The self (thesis),by its cunning postulationof the not-self(an ti-

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whatitis,viz.both, and thetwolive comesto understand thesis), after even birth ever to a new (synthesis), giving happily together whichperpetuates the tradition. little antithesis, But his only criticisms of criticized Fichte. course, Hegel, twofold: thatFichtehad not elevatedthe first, were,essentially, and second, transcendental Geist; ego into something grander, the natureand significance of the thathe had misunderstood finalsynthesis (1895, 499). This aside, Hegel tookover Fichte's for presentpurposes,the dialectic and, particularly wholesale, of the stateof the self.As Hegel nature alienated contradictory himself, put it (1895, 549-50): pellucidly, thoughhardly
is independent, but stillin this ... in beingself-conscious [self-consciousness] relation to whatis outsideself-consciousness. it has a negative independence as thecritique ofthought which This is infinite appearsat one time subjectivity, in thecaseof Fichte, as thetendency or and at another in thecaseof Kant, time, infinite form is the concrete. Absolute, pure, expressedas impulsetowards theEgo. self-consciousness, itspositive relation as itsnegative, thus. . . recognizes . . . Self-consciousness in other theseopposite its as positive, or, and itsnegative words, recognizes or it as the activities as same,i.e., recognizes pureThought Being self-identity, and thisagain as separation.

is therefore established. Hegel's dialetheism

6 in Hegel'sDialectic Contradiction

This being so, let us now look at the centralrole thatdiIt willbe useful todistinguish three aletheias playin hisdialectics. fundamental there is the movedialectic. of Hegel's First, aspects Then there are the theglobaldialectic. I will callthis ofGeist. ment One of these conwhich this is achieved. local developments by theotherconcerns the of thecategories; cernsthedevelopment I will call these the and societies. of logical development people dialectics and historical respectively. ofFichte. is Hegel'sversion The transcenThe globaldialectic or as ithas become,has as itsessence, dentalego, or spirit (Geist) it think about itself. And all there must it is Since think. to is, telos, it mustcreateitsopa contrast, sinceit cannotdo thiswithout posite,nature (Taylor, 1975, 89). Exactlyas withFichte,this For spirit, thatis literally a situation s, is contradictory. generates

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of section3: then both spiritand not spirit.In the notation which is not is spirit: nature, n, (s=s)&(s^:s). Alternatively, spirit, of thiscontradiction allows (truth) (n=s)&(n=s).The existence to think what it is: and and nature, (understand) spirit spirit spirit in whichformit is the not spirit;and thusto achieveits telos, Absolute.It should be noted thatthe Absoluteis stilla condo notannihilate each other; state.Natureand spirit tradictory each stillexists,requiring the other.In the finalstateof the the contradiction is said to be resolved;or aufgehoben; dialectic, but as Hegel is oftenat pains to pointout, the statewhichis in thiscontext, is more continues to exist.Resolution, aufgehoben of a puzzle:we knowtheanswer. likethe resolution The puzzle to us. is does notceasetobe a puzzle;it ceases just puzzle (A riddle stilla riddleeven if we all knowtheanswer.) oftheAbsolute in theglobaldialectic is not, The achievement at in a trice.Rather, arrived the production of a catehowever, tothink is achieved a period that allows itself gory spirit onlyafter of conceptual thelogicaldialectic. The mostprimitive evolution, a contradiction. This contradiction being, produces procategory, which is itself ducesa novelcategory, This,in turn, contradictory. And so it goes,untilwe arrive at the producesa novelcategory. Idea (Taylor,1975,339) - a category which Absolute appliesto the biggest contradiction of themall, the Absolute. This allows to think itself. thought The inspiration forthelogical dialectic is Kant'sAntinomy of Pure Reason. As we notedin the last section, Hegel concluded of reasonwhich thattheprinciples theuse of thecategogovern riesin Kant'santinomies entail a contradiction: thecategories are therefore inconsistent. the Kantian antinomies Moreover, are,for Allcategories or at leastall the Hegel,butthetipofan iceberg. ones are It isjust this which important contradictory. produces thelogicaldialectic. excellent discussion of all this; (See Taylor's Taylor,1975, 228.) The arguments used in the Logicto showthatthe various are inconsistent are a motley and rather categories unconvincing crew. The same may be said of the waysin whichthe conin one category tradictions it may However, giveriseto another. to illustrate the with one that of help process example, beingand 1,ch. 1). Consider becoming (Hegel, 1969,Vol. I, book 1,section If were to that a, be, is, to have no being. something, merely

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other than being,then therewould be nothingto properties has no properties an object that at all,i.e.,that itfrom distinguish bothbe and notbe,Ba&c~Ba (where B is isnot.It wouldtherefore of being).Thus,we are led to a category theone place predicate *Ba=*~Ba. These are ofthings, a, whosebeingis their non-being the thingsthatare comingintobeing or out of it. (Recall the thecategory of changein section discussion 4.) This is therefore
of becoming.

is nota process a development, The logicaldialectic, though withone thatis. For spirit is connected in time.It is, however, humankind its and social embodiedin nature, and, particularly, dialectic.Each and these change in the historical institutions; itsproperties of reflects a socialinstitution, Geist, being fragment in of an the whole as extent. to a certain (Rather imageis visible it In is of a hologram.) particular, contradictory. any fragment whichit musttryto achieveby Thus, it also has its own telos maunlikethesimilar state. a contradictory However, producing in the destruction results neuverwiththewhole,thismaneuver are therefore Contradictions of the situation. and replacement not so the wholeitself whole of the fatalto parts (finite beings); which succeedsthe thatthestate It follows (Taylor,1975,105ff). in the same it old does nottranscend waythatthe (aufhebt) quite In particular, contradiction. thespirit/nature transcends Absolute true(though newones willbe). is no longer theold contradiction of situation is that of kind this example Hegel'smostfamous of the master/slave relationship (Taylor,1975, 153-7). At a cerof othersfor theirdetain stage,people need the recognition to cooperatepropnot have learned Since (telos). they velopment this that maybe achievedis by recognition erly,the onlyway But the force.Othersmustbe enslavedand made to recognize. evenifthey dehumanizes of others enslavement them;and thus, are forcedto recognizethe master,theycannot provide the that the masterrequires.By a dialecticalirony, recognition of the does provideforthe development the situation however, is requiredto labor.Beslave.For the slave,unlikethe master, cause of this,the slave gains controlover the world,whichis in a precarious at any theslavelives freedom. Moreover, position: is heightened, he maybe killed;thushis self-awareness moment This pavesthewayforthe awareofhisfreedom. and he becomes of the slavery. overthrow

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Beforetheoverthrow, thestateof theslaveis literally a conis both and one: he free bound The con(not free). tradictory stateof forcedlaborhas, of course,been stressed tradictory by in section. But and we willtakethis the next Marxists, up perhaps thepersonwho has brought out thecontradictory natureof the freedom mostvividly is Sartre.For exproducedbyoppression ample,he says(1949, 12, mytranslation):
Neverhavewe been freer thanundertheGerman We had lostall occupation. that of speaking; our rights, and primarily we wereinsulted to our facesevery enmasse, as We weredeported as workers, as Jews, dayand we had to be silent. on in on we the would screen, everywhere walls, newspapers, political prisoners; facethat ouroppressors togiveus ofourselves: meetthevileand insipid wished Because of all thatwe werefree.Sincethe Nazi poisonslippedintoour very sincean all-powerful wasa victory; every thoughts, purethought policesought each wordbecameprecious, of to constrain us to silence, like a declaration since we were each carried the of surrounded, principle; gesture weight a ... commitment.

It is likely tobe objected that this state is notliterally contradictory in different since the is free and bound so, oppressedperson itis often Moregenerally, claimed that conrespects. dialectically states are never dialetheias since the contradictory apparently in are true different Nor(see,e.g., tradictory predicates respects man and Sayers,1980, 30-1). Severalpointsare relevant here. The first is thatthegeneralclaimhas little goingforit.There is to it save a assertion that dialetheias are nothing support dogmatic this is the first contradiction we have met Moreover, impossible. where this charge looks even remotely plausible. Secondly, itmust be admitted that somecontradictions however, by signaled dialecticians do seem to be only apparentcontradictions, the in whichthe conappearancebeingdispelledonce the respects are out. tradictory predicates apply spelled The thirdpointis that, despitethis,the chargethata contradiction is onlyapparentit oftenmuchharderto make stick thanis supposed.The quotation from Sartre illustrates this. What are the sensesin whichtheoccupiedpeople werefreeand not? couldnot,becauseoftheoccupaTheywerenotfreein that they do as chose. thismade tion, exactly they But,as Sartrestressed, them realizethat could do exactly as they chose.Butthis is no they consistent it is as One disambiguation: just contradictory. maybe

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werenotfreein thesensethat, to saythatthey tempted though as could do wouldbe punished for chose,they they exactly they doing manyof the thingstheywantedto do. But thisis just fastand loose withthe notionof doingas one chooses. playing where one must be silent or be shotis a paradigm The situation of be describedas involving one whichwould correctly no real choice.The trouble hereis that thenotion ofhaving a choicedoes not have the crystal mathematical of, precision e.g., predicates. fordeciding a free We use several criteria whether choiceis made. for the correctattribution sufficient of the Each is normally these not all line on the side sometimes same may up phrase;yet of thefield.And ifthey of the do, theonlyadequatedescription will be one. Neither it do to well a situation contradictory may ofapplication showthatthephraseis criteria insist thatthemany suchas "has Forquiteunambiguous phrases, facto ambiguous. ipso of of 700C," may have manydifferent criteria a temperature no means are and these by logicallyguaranteed application; coincidence.11 Thus, a summarydismissalof putativeconin respect"is quite on the groundsof "difference tradictions superficial.
7 in Marx'sDialectics Contradiction

HavingdiscussedHegel, let us now turnto Marx,who ininvolves a somefrom hisdialectic herited Hegel.Marx'sdialectic of Hegel's, and certainly has a what radical re-interpretation it is very similar. We But structurally, different rather emphasis. the dialectic and the between in as global Hegel,distinguish may, and historical. twolocal dialectics, logical theyoungMarxreinterof Feuerbach, Undertheinfluence as Man or, better, humanity. Hegel's global pretedHegel's Geist To be a became the dialecticof humanity. dialectictherefore which is This is a certain is to have telos, self-development. person but by working, labor. But the to be achievednot by thinking, in contradiction to people. itself and comestoexist laboralienates Alienatedlabor (objectified labor) is, of course, just capital(esas private of labor of the heart the value) theory existing sentially
11 For a furtherdiscussion of contradictionand multicriterial terms, see Priest and Routley,1983, ch. 3, section 1, and ch. 5, section2. These chaptersare reprintedas the to parts 2 and 4 of Priest,et ai, 1989. introductions

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with Hegel is the similarity Despite the re-interpretation, a obvious.Moreover, as in Hegel, the alienatedstateis literally still one. while h=h, h, humanity, contradictory Humanity, being loses its essence ("specieslife"),becomesdehumanized.Thus, is nothumanity, hih. Marxsometimes makesthepoint, humanity not withrespectto humanity, but withrespectto its essential, characteristic: labor.For example,he says(1977, 110): defining,
not onlyin the factthatmy means of life [Alienation]is manifested Estrangement . . . also in is to someone else but the fact that itself everything something belong - that my activity else- ... from itself [labor] is something different

their telos.

contradiction between Thus we have thefundamental property. The contradiction is reand people (labor) capital(dead labor). whereprivate solvedby the production of a communist society for thusfulfilling labor themselves, property people disappears,

otherwise itwouldnot Of course, thelaboris still myactivity; itself. to itself be different from Thus thelaboris bothidentical fromitself: and different (/=/)&(/=/). The mostimportant structural difference betweenHegel's and Marx'sdialectics is thatin the final forthepresent concern theresolution ofthecontradiction actualstageofMarx'sdialectic removes there is no contradiction between labor and it; ly capital in a communist society. Marx'sdiscussion of theglobaldialectic in his occursmainly earlierworks, and especially theEconomic andPhilosophical Manalso see Vol. ch. His discussion of the I, (But 32.) uscripts. Capital, local dialectics is moreprominent in thelaterworks, the notably Grundrisse and Capital Of thesedialectics, the logicaldialectic is of In lesser his dedialectic, perhaps importance. logical Hegel duced the categoriesof Thought by consideringthe conin each.In thesameway, tradictions Marxdeducescategories, but this time theyare the categories of Man, and particularly of economics. This is mostevident in theearly of Vol. I of chapters withthe basic notionof a commodity, Marx Capital Starting arrives at the notions of money, and so on. the ex(See capital in Ilyenkov, cellent discussion ch. see also 1960, 5; 1977, Ilyenkov, essay 10.) How plausibleall thisis I need not discuss, but an example

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Marx'sdeduction ofthenotion ofmoney thesituation: willclarify Human artifacts be used or they ofthecommodity. from that may But ifthey are beingused they are notbeing maybe exchanged. Marx this vice versa. records and by sayingthatan exchanged, an use or be a value, value,Va,but Ua, a, may (exchange) object, not both,~(Ua8cVa): "The same commodity cannot,therefore, in the same expression of simultaneously appear in bothforms as polaropposites" excludeeach other value.These forms (1976, is the commodity 140). But in the exchangeof a commodity, it is therefore as bothuse and (exchange) toanother related value; is acquiredat thepoint The contradictory both:Ua8cVa. property of (ex)change(1976, 152):
and a "value." It appears as the A commodityis a use-value or object of utility, two-foldthing that it really is as soon as its value possesses its own particular which is distinctfrom its natural form. This form of form of manifestation, is exchange value, and the commoditynever has thisformwhen manifestation or exchange relation looked at in isolation,but only when it is a value-relation kind. witha second commodityof a different

of something, Thus we are led to theexistence a, whosebeinga use value is exactlyits being an (exchange)value *Ua=*Va, allowstheexchangerelaand therefore whichmediates money, tion(1976, 198):
and mutually We saw . . . thattheexchange of commodities impliescontradictory exclusive conditions. The furtherdevelopment of the commoditydoes not but rather provides the form withinwhich they abolish these contradictions, are have room to move. This is, in general,the way in whichreal contradictions resolved.

themostimporis undoubtedly local dialectic The historical or institution social Each one in Marx'slater tant practice writings. The realizaimmanent an of as telos hasa (nowthought tendency). which cannotbe it intoa contradictory tionof thisforces state, sustained;whenceit disappears.Perhapsthe mostfamousexof productheforces between ample of thisis thecontradiction to theCritique in thePreface of production tionand therelations telos. havea certain of production The forces Economy. ofPolitical ata certain In ordertofulfill this, they development, stageintheir the But of relations the social ultimately capitalism. produce

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which therefore cease. The undercut thosevery forces relations, one of affairs is a state literally contradictory forMarx. capitalist of contradictions. For example, In fact, it realizes a number proVol. ch. and the duction is socialand yetprivate II, 27); (Capital, laborers(like Hegel's slaves)are bothfreeand bound. are not maybe leveledthatthesestates Again,theaccusation are true sincethecontradictory predicates contradictory, literally In response madein reply in different to this, thepoints respects. The are to thesamechargeagainst Hegel pertinent. chargemay have somejustice; but to suppose thatthisis alwaysso is just In thelastsection we sawthatitwas notso easy wishful thinking. to separatefreedom from bondagein thecase of theslave.This if will be reinforced we considerMarx's analysisof the point For the freedom of the similar of the predicament wage-slave. not from his but is inextricais bondage, separable wage-laborer it.As Marxexplains, itis thenature ofhislabor blyboundup with so that hisfreedom which bothboundand free, makesthelaborer on a worldscale a chronic is his bondage.Withunemployment withthe miserable reality, cryof the perpetually unemployed in wordsof Marx have an unour the ears, following ringing mistakable verisimilitude ("Adam Smith: Work as Sacrifice," Marx, 1973,611):
In the sweatof thybrowshaltthou labour! wasJehova'scurse on Adam. And this is labour for[Adam] Smith,a curse. "Tranquillity" appears as the adequate state, as identical with "freedom" and "happiness." It seems quite far from Smith's mind that the individual,"in his normal stateof health,strength, skill, activity, also needs a normalportionof work,and of the suspensionof tranquilfacility," ity.Certainly,labour obtains its measure fromoutside, throughthe aim to be attained and the obstacles to be overcome in attainingit. But Smith has no inklingwhateverthat thisovercomingof obstaclesis in itselfa liberatingactivthe externalaims become strippedof the semblance of ity- and that,further, external natural merely urgencies,and become posited as aims which the individual himselfposits- hence as self-realisation, of the subject, objectification hence real freedom,whose action is, precisely,labour. He is right,of course, labour and wage-labour,labour that,in its historicformsas slave-labour,serflabour;and not-labour,by always appears as repulsive,always as external forced as "freedomand happiness." This holds doubly: forthiscontradictory contrast, labour. . .

The forced butself-creating nature of wage-labor is nottheonly criterial tension in thiscontradiction. There is also that existing

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between the legal position and the harsh realityof the laborer's situation.Again Marx (1976, ch. 10, 415-6):
from of producour worker theprocess It must that be acknowledged emerges of a it. In the as owner he entered from when tionlooking market, differently of comto face with other owners he stood face "labour commodity power," he sold his The contract another owner. one owneragainst modities, bywhich so to that he was in black and labourpower tothecapitalist white, speak, proved it was was concluded, But when the transaction freeto dispose of himself. he is thattheperiodof timeforwhich discovered thathe was no "freeagent," forwhich he is forced tosellit, is theperiodoftime tosellhislabour-power free a singlemuscle, willnot let go "whilethereremains thatin factthe vampire of theserpent For of to be sinew, against exploited." "protection" drop blood, have to put theirheads together theiragonies,the workers and, as a class, can be socialbarrier of a law,an all-powerful they bywhich compelthepassing into and death families and their themselves from slavery by prevented selling withcapital. contract voluntary

These tensionsin the criteriaforfreedommean thatthe only situationis as being accurateway of describingthe wage-laborer's both free and not free. The quotations make it quite clear what but it in no way considerationsground each of these attributions; followsthatfreedomfallsapart neatlyinto different aspects,like a raw with as chicken. an over-cooked chicken,separation Rather, can only be done by violence. Before we leave Marx, a word about Engels. Engels has a much plainer literary stylethan eitherMarx or Hegel. Because of to dialetheism thishe is, of the three,the one whose commitment ch. is least gainsayable. Thus, he says (1975, 12, 139, 140):
ofplacecanonly mechanical evensimple Motion itself isa contradiction: change oftime bothina a bodyat one and thesamemoment comeaboutthrough being place,beingin one and thesameplaceand also notin it. placeand in another itself and yet is at eachmoment a living that in this, Lifeconsists thing precisely that is contradiction is a Life else. therefore, itself, objectively present something itself. and resolving and is constantly in things and processes, asserting

Engels' evident dialetheismhas not found favorwiththose who dialecticsin such a wayas to writeout its have wanted to interpret and even some abuse, from dialetheism.This has led to criticism,

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westernwriters:Engels' views are crude and unsophisticated.It should be clear now that this does Engels a great injustice; his viewson contradiction are no different fromthose of Hegel and Marx: he just expresses them in a language thatthe man on the Clapham omnibus can understand. Where Engels is due forsome censure is in his enthusiasmfor seeing contradictionwhere it does not exist- an enthusiasm which has carried over to many subsequent Marxists. For example, the claim that the square root of -1 is a contradictory entity(1975, 141) demonstratesan unfortunatenaivete about mathematics. (Though modern criticsshould rememberthat he, unlike they, had not had the opportunityto read Weierstrass, Dedekind and the other 19th-centurymathematicians who of analysis.)Even in helped sortout the morassin the foundations under the contradictions bed, however,Engels was merely seeing that was already present in the subject. accentuatinga tendency Hegel was already strainingto show that many of the so-called in the local dialecticsare literally contradictions so; and Marx was never one to let pedantryget in the way of a good bit of rhetoric ch. 2, section 5, quoting from McLellan, (Poverty of Philosophy, 1977, 215):
Meanwhile the antagonismbetweenthe proletariat and the bourgeois is a struggle of class against class, a strugglewhichcarriedout to itshighestexpression is total revolution. Indeed, is it at all surprisingthat a societyfounded on the the shock of body oppositionof classes should culminatein brutalcontradiction, as its final denoumenti against body,

in Difference Identity

Having discussed the occurence and role of dialetheias in Marx's and Hegel's dialectics,I now want to returnto the question, lefthanging at the end of section4, of the exact nature of dialectical contradictions.Many of the dialetheias that we have come across in the preceding discussion are of the form (a=b)8c(ab), something's being both identicalwith,and different from something (else?). This is Hegel's (in)famous notion of in difference identity (Taylor, 1975, 80). Though manyhave been this notion it is, as we see, quite transparent once one puzzled by ceases to tryto reinterpret Hegel in a consistentfashion. I will now argue that this is theformof a dialecticalcontradiction, to which all others reduce.

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of the form (a=a)8c(aa). First,we have met contradictions These are obviouslyof this form. Another main form of contradictionthat we have come across in the preceding sectionsis where a thingis identicalwithits opposite: AA=A~A Thus, for example, that something,a, is free (Fa) is identical to its being bound (not free): *Fa=*~Fa. This, too, is a special form of in difference.For, as we noted in section 3, it is always identity of opposites isjust the identity true thataAta~A. Thus, identity in difference(AA=A~A)&(AA*A~A). In fact, the identityof opposites *A=*~A is doubly conA8c~A. For since it also gives rise to the contradiction tradictory, eitherA or ~A; withoutloss of generality, suppose the former. Then AA is true,by the T-scheme (AAis true iffA). But if AA = of A~A, AA is true implies A~A is true (by the substitutivity A~A too. It follows that the is true Hence ~A, again by identicals). T-scheme. Thus, both A and -A. Some doubt may be cast on thisargumentby the factthat it uses the law of excluded middle,Av~A, a law of logic thatHegel note thatthe law is quite valid on sometimesshoots at. But first, I noted there.Secondly,when Hegel as of section the semantics 3, does shoot at the law, it is not because he thinksit failsto be true; it is hardlyworththe troubleof sayingit" in factit "is so trivial, section book Vol. 1, eh. 2C, 438). Rather,it is because 2, I, (1969, it may be false (as well)! of opposites are worth Two particularcases of the identity in difference often describes on. First, identity Hegel commenting with identical itself is its being that something'sbeing by saying of opposites (Aa=a) fromitself.This is just the identity different = (Aa=a).Secondly,to returnto the dialecticsof motionthatwe discussed in section4, this,too,can be seen as a case of the identity of opposites. For we may take the instantaneouscontradiction produced in a state of motion to be that the body's being in a certain place is its not being in that place, *A=*~A. This will implythatit both is and is not in thatplace, A8c~A, as I have just is identiobserved. Moreover,because thistypeof contradiction fied as a stateof change, it is natural to describe any stateof the form*A=*~A as a state where AA is changing into its opposite of opposites is frequently A~A, or vice versa. Thus, the identity describedin thisway,as, forexample, the oppositesgoingoverinto each other.

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we We have now seen that all the dialectical contradictions in difference: We have metare instancesof identity (a=b)8c(ab). may thereforetake this to be the general form of a dialectical contradiction. This is an excellentwayof doingjustice to the point we noted in section4, thatthe poles of a dialecticalcontradiction must have a tighterrelationthan mere extensionalconjunction. in difference(a=b)8c(ab), a and b, For the poles of the identity are actually identical with (though different from) each other; is the therefore (dialectical) identity relationship between the of a dialectical contradiction. poles
9 Dialectics and Epistemology

I have discussed the role and form of contradictionin dialectics. There is, of course, much more to dialecticsthan this. Much of the interestin Hegel's and Marx's dialecticsis in their analyses of the nature of concrete contradictorysituations. in differenceof various notions,such as Moreover, the identity matterand consciousness,freedom and and being nothingness, I cannot have many consequences and ramifications. necessity hope to explore them all here, in what is already a very long one example: thatof paper. But let me, as a taste,explore briefly and (This is taken from being-in-itself being-in-consciousness. full where a and non-formal discussionmay Sayers, 1985, part 1, be found.) An object, a, may exist in consciousness Ca, or out of consciousness (in itself),-Ca. Let us write c for ACa, its being in A~Ca. Suppose that consciousness,and c* for its being in itself, these are related by the identityin difference of opposites: of philosophy (c=c*)&(c=c*).Then various people in the history have seen only one side of this contradiction,and have thus landed themselvesin awkward philosophical problems. Dualists (such as Locke) argued that the thingin itselfand the thing in consciousnessare merelydistinct c=c*. This raises the problemof how knowledge is possible, since there is, ipsofacto,no way of into the object turningthe objectof knowledge,the thingin itself, of consciousness. Non-dialectical monists,on the other hand, argued merely that c=c*. This position comes in two varieties. Traditional idealists (such as Berkeley) denied the autonomous existence of a mind-independent and thus wished to rereality,

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of insolubleproblemsconcernduce e* to c. This leads to a variety of ing the objectivity knowledge,the problemof otherminds,etc. Traditional materialists (such as centralstatematerialists) by contrast,denied the autonomous existence of matter-independent of and thustriedto reduce c to c*. This leads to a variety thought, for those stressed but more by functionalists, problems; example, those posed bythe phenomenologicalaspectsof thought crucially, (which stillplague functionalism). The dialectical monist,however,has seen both sides of the Like the traditional dualist theyassertthe distinctcontradiction. ness of c and c*9 and thus avoid the problems associated with eitherof the reductionist programs.Like the traditionalmonist, of c and c*, thus avoiding the however,they assert the identity between the two. The contradiction of the disjuncture problem of the object in itselfinto marks the transition c=c*9 indeed, consciousness,and thus of cognitionitself.Thus, the dialectical in differenceof the monist sees the recognitionof the identity the and thing-without-consciousness, thing-within-consciousness as central to an adequate understandingof the (=*)&(=*), nature of cognition. of Eulathus' famous There is an objection here reminiscent the dialectical monist that since to Protagoras; namely reply asserts that c=c*then they are still stuck with the distinction between c and c*; and since theyassert that c=c* theymust still have the problem of reducing one to the other. Thus the conof both positions,not the tradictory positiongivesrise to the worst best. Though the replyis a cleverone, it does not work. For it is not the mere factthatcc* thatgives rise to the problem for the dualist, but the fact that there is no way of bridging the gap between the two poles. For the dialectical monist,this bridge is whichmarksthe transition of the provided by the contradiction, that And the mere fact one consciousness. into accepts that object to the either other. one to reduce c=c* does not require Indeed, no to there should be also are that distinct, temptation they given do this. 10 Conclusion With this rather brief look at an application of dialectics, whichshows veryclearlythe dialetheicnature of dialectics,I will

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end. Knowledgeable dialecticians will,in a sense,have learned from a much this nothing paper: rose,by anyothername,is a be decidedly rose;yeta rose,byanother name,might misleading; I hope, at any rate,thatdialecticians willat leasthave learned fromthispaper thatit is a spadethatis called "a spade."12
The University of Queensland Australia Queensland,
Uwe ofthis for draft 12 1 amgrateful comments on an earlier Campbell, papertoRichard draft wasread at thesecondHegel Petersen Partof that and especially Sean Sayers. 1986. of Newcastle, New SouthWales,November conference at the University

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