TITLE THIRTEEN CRIMES AGAINST HONOR Crimes against honor 1. 2. Libel by means of writings or similar means (Art.

355); Threatening to publish and offer to prevent such publication for a compensation (Art. 356); Prohibited publication of acts referred to in the course of official proceedings (Art. 357); Slander (Art. 358); Slander by deed (Art.

act, commission, condition, status or circumstances tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead Character of the words used to make it defamatory. Words calculated to induce suspicion are more effective in destroying reputation than false charges directly made. Ironical and metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for slander. A charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearer to suppose and understand that the person against whom they are uttered is guilty of certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach his honesty, virtue or reputation, or to hold him up to public ridicule . (U.S. vs. OConnell, 37 Phil. 767) Malice has been defined as a term used to indicate the fact that the defamer is prompted by personal ill or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed. Kinds of Malice.

3.

4. 5. 359); 6. Incriminating innocent person (Art. 363); 7. Intriguing against honor (Art. 364). Article 353 LIBEL ELEMENTS: 1. That there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstances. 2. That the imputation must be made publicly. 3. That it must be malicious. 4. That the imputation must be directed at a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead. 5. That the imputation must tend to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person defamed. Notes: 1. Libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any

Malice in law This is assumed and is inferred from the defamatory character of an imputation. The presumption of malice attaches to the defamatory statement especially if it appears to be insulting per se. The law presumes that the defamer made the imputation without good intention or justifiable motive. Malice in fact This refers to malice as a fact. The presence and existence of

personal ill-will or spite may still appear even if the statement is not defamatory. So, where the defamatory acts may be presumed from the publication of the defamatory acts imputed refer to the private life of the individual, malice may be presumed from the publication of the defamatory statement because no one has a right to invade anothers privacy. Distinction between malice in fact and malice in law Malice in fact is the malice which the law presumes from every statement whose tenor is defamatory. It does not need proof. The mere fact that the utterance or statement is defamatory negates a legal presumption of malice. In the crime of libel, which includes oral defamation, there is no need for the prosecution to present evidence of malice. It is enough that the alleged defamatory or libelous statement be presented to the court verbatim. It is the court which will prove whether it is defamatory or not. If the tenor of the utterance or statement is defamatory, the legal presumption of malice arises even without proof. Malice in fact becomes necessary only if the malice in law has been rebutted. Otherwise, there is no need to adduce evidence of malice in fact. So, while malice in law does not require evidence, malice in fact requires evidence. Malice in law can be negated by evidence that, in fact, the alleged libelous or defamatory utterance was made with good motives and justifiable ends or

by the fact that the utterance was privileged in character. In law, however, the privileged character of a defamatory statement may be absolute or qualified. When the privileged character is said to be absolute, the statement will not be actionable whether criminal or civil because that means the law does not allow prosecution on an action based thereon. Illustration: As regards the statements made by Congressmen while they are deliberating or discussing in Congress, when the privileged character is qualified, proof of malice in fact will be admitted to take the place of malice in law. When the defamatory statement or utterance is qualifiedly privileged, the malice in law is negated. The utterance or statement would not be actionable because malice in law does not exist. Therefore, for the complainant to prosecute the accused for libel, oral defamation or slander, he has to prove that the accused was actuated with malice (malice in fact) in making the statement. 2. Malice is presumed to exist in injurious publications Where the imputation is based upon matters of public interest, the presumption of malice does not arise from the mere publication of the defamatory statement. A matter of public interest is common property. Malice in fact comes into play when the statement made is not defamatory per se, as when the offender resorts to underserved praises or satirical method of impeaching the virtue, honesty

and reputation of the offended party. It can also appear in the form of innuendos. This discussion leads to the conclusion that the determination of libelous meaning is left to the good judgment of the court after considering all the circumstances which lead to the utterance or publication of the defamatory statement. The question is not what the writer of an alleged libel means but what the words used by him mean. The meaning given by the writer or the words used by him is immaterial. The question is not what the writer meant but what he conveyed to those who heard or read him (People vs. Encarnacion, 204 SCRA 1) How to overcome presumption of malice. the

publication. Writing a letter to another person other than the person defamed is sufficient publication. (See Sazon vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 692) The crime is libel if the defamation is in writing or printed media. The crime is slander or oral defamation if it is not printed. 4. Person libeled must be identified. But the publication need not refer by name to the libeled party. If not named it must be shown that the description of the person referred to in the defamatory publication was sufficiently clear so that at least a 3rd person would have identified the plaintiff. When a libel is addressed to several persons, unless they are identified in the same libel, even if there are several persons offended by the libelous utterance or statement, there will only be one count of libel. If the offended parties in the libel were distinctly identified, even though the libel was committed at one and the same time, there will be as many libels as there are persons dishonored. Illustration: If a person uttered that All the Marcoses are thieves," there will only be one libel because these particular Marcoses regarded as thieves are not specifically identified. If the offender said, All the Marcoses the father, mother and daughter are thieves. There will be three counts of

The presumption of malice is rebutted by showing : 1. that the accused published the defamatory imputation with good intention; that there is justifiable motive for making it; that the communication made is privileged; and

2. 3.

4. accused must prove the truth of the defamatory imputation in those cases wherein truth is a defense. 3. Publication is communication of defamatory matter some third person/s the the to

Publication is the communication of the defamatory matter to a third person or persons. So, the delivery of a defamatory writing to a typesetter is sufficient

libel because each person libeled is distinctly dishonored. If you do not know the particular persons libeled, you cannot consider one libel as giving rise to several counts of libel. In order that one defamatory utterance or imputation may be considered as having dishonored more than one person, those persons dishonored must be identified. Otherwise, there will only be one count of libel. Note that in libel, the person defamed need not be expressly identified. It is enough that he could possibly be identified because innuendos may also be a basis for prosecution for libel. As a matter of fact, even a compliment which is undeserved, has been held to be libelous. 5. To presume publication there must be a reasonable probability that the alleged a libelous matter was thereby exposed to be read or seen by 3rd persons. Republication of defamatory article is punishable. One is liable for publication of defamatory words against another although he is only repeating what he heard and names the source of his information. A person who repeats a slander or libelous publication heard or read from another is presumed to indorse it. (People vs. Salumbides and Reanzares, C.A., 55 O.G. 2638) Criterion to determine whether statements are defamatory

1) words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person against who they are uttered were guilty of certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach their honesty, virtue or reputation, or to hold the person up to public ridicule(US v OConnel) 2 )construed not only as to the expression used but also with respect to the whole scope and apparent object of the writer.(P v Encarnacion) The test of libelous meanings is not the analysis of a sentence into component phrases with the meticulous care of the grammarian or stylist, but the import conveyed by the entirety of the language to the ordinary reader. (Lacsa vs. FAC, et al., 161 SCRA 427). In libel cases, the question is not what the offender means but what the words used by him mean. ( Sazon vs. CA, 255 SCRA 692) Praises undeserved slander in disguise. are

Where the comments are worded in praise of the plaintiff, like describing him with qualities which plaintiff does not deserve because of his social, political and economic status in the community which is too well known to all concerned, are which intended are intended to ridicule rather than praise him, the publication is deemed libelous (Jimenez vs. Reyes, 27 SCRA 52) Even if what was imputed is true, the crime of libel is

committed unless one acted with good motives or justifiable end. Poof of truth of a defamatory imputation is not even admissible in evidence, unless what was imputed pertains to an act which constitutes a crime and when the person to whom the imputation was made is a public officer and the imputation pertains to the performance of official duty. Other than these, the imputation is not admissible. When proof admissible 1. of truth is

-false accusation -false need not be accusation is made under oath made under oath Newsweek v IAC Newsweek portrayed the island province of Negros Occidental as a place dominated by big landowners. Plaintiffs are associations of sugarcane planters. HELD: Dismissed. To maintain a libel suit, the specific victim must be identifiable. Defamatory remarks directed at a group of persons are not actionable unless the statements are all-embracing or sufficiently specific for victim to be identifiable. An action for libel allegedly directed against a group of sugar planters cannot be done by resort to filing a class suit as each victim has his specific reputation to protect. In this case, each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. Rule regarding Officers: Public

When the act or omission imputed constitutes a crime regardless of whether the offended party is a private individual or a public officer;

2.

When the offended party is a government employee, even if the act or omission imputed does not constitute a crime, provided if its related to the discharged of his official duties. Requisites of defense in defamation 1. If it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true; It was published with good motives; It was for justifiable ends.

2. 3.

Defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or acts of public officers which are related to the discharge of their official duties will not constitute libel if the accused proves the truth of the imputation. But any attack upon the private character of the public officers on matters which are not related to the discharge of their official functions may constitute Libel. Where malice cannot be inferred from false defamatory statements, the ruling appears to be the true only if the offended party is a government employee, with respect to facts related to the discharge of his official duties. With his jurisprudence, it should now be

If a crime is a private crime, it cannot be prosecuted de officio. A complaint from the offended party is necessary. Libel Perjury

emphasized that actual malice is now required to be proven. It is enough to rely on presumed malice in libel cases involving a public official or public figure. Malice is now understood to mean publication with knowledge of falsehood or reckless disregard of the statements veracity. The burden of proof has not only been shifted to the plaintiff in libel, but proof has not only been shifted to the plaintiff in libel, but proof of malice must now be clear and convincing. Case Doctrines: The fact that a communication is privileged is not a proper ground for the dismissal of a complaint for libel. In the first place, it is a matter of defense. Secondly, the fact that a communication is privileged does not mean that it is not actionable. The privileged character simply does away with the presumption of malice which the prosecution has to prove in such a case. (Lu Chu Sing, et al., vs. Lu Tiong Gui, 76 Phil. 669) Libel in answer to another libel is not a defense. (Pellicena vs. Gonzales, 6 Phil. 50) If the defamatory imputation is in the nature of self-defense under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code such that the publication was done in good faith, without malice and just adequate enough to protect his good name, the statement may be considered privileged. (People vs. Baja, 40 O.G. 206; People vs. Mendoza, C.A. 74 O.G. 5607) The fair and true report of official proceedings refer to proceedings in the three

branches of government, to wit: judicial, legislative and executive. The publisher is limited only to the narration of what had taken place even if the report contains defamatory and injurious matter affecting another person, libel is not committed for as long as what is contained is a fair and true report of the proceedings. Under Article 354, the publisher becomes liable when he makes comments or remarks upon the private character of person, which are not relevant or related to the judicial, legislative or executive proceedings. Under our libel law, defamatory remarks against government employees with respect to facts related to the discharge of their official duties will not constitute libel, if defendant is able to prove the truth of the imputations. But any attack on the private character of the officer on matters which are not related to the discharge of his official functions may constitute libel since under our laws, the right of the press to criticize public officers does not authorize defamation. (U.S. vs. Bustos, supra; Sazon vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Article354 REQUIREMENT OF PUBLICITY Kinds of privileged communication

a. Absolutely privileged not actionable even if the actor has acted in bad faith b. Qualifiedly privileged those which although containing defamatory

imputations could not be actionable unless made with malice or bad faith When the defamatory imputation comes under the criteria of an absolute privileged communication, the presumption of malice under Article 354 has no application. The presumption of malice, however, comes into play when the defamatory statement is a conditional or qualified privileged communication. To overcome this presumption of malice in law, the defamer must prove during the proceeding that the defamatory imputation was committed because of a legal, moral or social duty. Privileged communication as categorized in this discussion is a matter of defense. It is not a ground for a motion to quash after the arraignment of the accused. (See Mercado vs. CFI of Rizal, 116 SCRA 93) . If after the prosecution has presented its evidence, it becomes evident that the defamatory statement was made by the accused because of a legal, moral or social duty, then the accused can file a demurrer to evidence, as in the meantime, there is absence of malice in law which is presumed in all defamatory imputations. General Rule: Every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown Exception: a. private communication in performance of legal, moral or social duty

Requisites 1. that the person who made the communication had a legal, moral or social duty to make the communication or at least he had an interest to be upheld 2. that the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty on the matter that the statements in the communication are made in good faith without malice in fact

3.

b. fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments and remarks Requisites 1. that the publication of a report of an official proceeding is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of a statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by a public officer 2. 3. that it is made in good faith that it is made without any comments or remarks

Doctrine of fair comment A fair comment on matters of public interest is included and is covered by the mantle of

privileged communication which constitutes a valid defense against libel and slander. If the comment is an expression of opinion based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might be reasonably inferred from the facts. Further explaining the right to comment on a public issue, the Court said, If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot become less so merely because a private individual is involved. The public primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participants and not on their prior anonymity or notoriety. ( Borjal vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1 ) Santos v CA HELD: No malice, he simply furnished the readers with the info that a complaint has been filed against the brokerage firm and reproduced the pleading verbatim with no embellishments. Article 355 LIBEL BY MEANS OF WRITING OR SIMILAR MEANS A libel may be committed by means of 1. Writing; 2. Printing; 3. Lithography; 4. Engraving; 5. Radio; 6. Photograph; 7. Painting; 8. Theatrical exhibition; 9. Cinematographic exhibition; or 10. Any similar means. In the enumeration above, television is not included, probably because at the time the Revised Penal Code was

conceived, television had not yet been invented. However, the law provides, or any similar means which easily qualifies television is such species or category. (People vs. Casten, C.A., G.R. No. 07924-CR promulgated December 13, 1974) Article 356 THREATENING TO PUBLISH LIBEL AND OFFER TO PREVENT SUCH PUBLICATION FOR A COMPENSATION Acts punished 1. Threatening another to publish a libel concerning him, or his parents, spouse, child, or other members of his family; Offering to prevent the publication of such libel for compensation or money consideration.

2.

It involves the unlawful extortion of money by appealing to the fear of the victim, through threats of accusation or exposure. It contemplates of two offenses: a threat to establish a libel and an offer to prevent such publication. The gravamen of the crime is the intent to extort money or other things of value. Blackmail In its metaphorical sense, blackmail may be defined as any unlawful extortion of money by threats of accusation or exposure. Two words are expressive of the crime hush money. (US v. Eguia, et al., 38 Phil. 857) Blackmail is possible in (1) light threats under Article 283; and (2) threatening to publish, or offering to prevent the publication of, a libel for

compensation, 356.

under

Article

because of infidelity, adultery or crimes involving chastity. Lacsa v IAC Lacsa found that Marquez was not a proprietary member of PCA thus not qualified to be president. He wrote to the BOD and to Marquez. He caused to publish the second letter. HELD: Letter is not privileged communication. To be classified as such it must be free from malice. Granting that the letter was privileged communication, written out of a duty of an officer towards the members, such character was lost when it was published. Under Republic Act No. 1477, amending Rep. Act. No. 58, the publisher, editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news report information appearing in the said publication which was related to him in confidence unless the court or a house or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the security of the State. Article 358 ORAL DEFAMATION SLANDER Two Kinds Defamation: of

Article 357 PROHIBITED PUBLICATION OF ACTS REFERRED TO IN THE COURSE OF OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS ELEMENTS: 1. That the offender is a reporter, editor or manager of a newspaper, daily or magazine. 2. That he publishes facts connected with the private life of another. 3. That such facts are offensive to the honor, virtue and reputation of said person. Note: Even though made in connection with or under the pretext that it is necessary in the narration of any judicial or administrative proceedings wherein such facts have been mentioned. With its provisions, Article 357 has come to be known as the Gag Law. It prohibits reporters, editors or managers of newspapers from publishing articles containing facts connected with the private life of an individual; facts which are offensive to the honor, virtue and reputation of persons. But these must refer to facts which are intimately related to the offended partys family and home. Occasionally, it involves conjugal troubles and quarrels

/ Oral

1. action of a serious and insulting nature (Grave slander) 2. light insult or defamation not serious in nature (simple slander) Factors that determine gravity of the offense:

a) expressions used b) personal relations of the accused and the offended party c) circumstances surrounding the case Notes: The gravity of oral defamation depends not only on the expressions but also on the personal relation of the accused with the offended party. Other circumstances like the presence of important people when the crime was committed, the social standing and position of the offended party are factors which may influence the gravity and defamatory imputation (Victorio vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 645). Note that slander can be committed even if the defamatory remark was done in the absence of the offended party. (People vs. Clarin, C.A., 37 O.G. 1106) Words uttered in the heat of anger constitute light oral defamation (P v Doronilla) If the utterances were made publicly and were heard by many people and the accused at the same time levelled his finger at the complainant, oral defamation is committed (P v Salleque) The word puta does not impute that the complainant is prostitute. (People vs. Atienza, G.R. No. L-19857, Oct. 26, 1968 ) It is a common expression of anger or displeasure. It is seldom taken in its literal sense by the hearer. It is viewed more as a threat on the part of the accused to manifest and emphasize a point.

(Reyes vs. People, 27 SCRA 686) Article 359 SLANDER BY DEED ELEMENTS: 1. That the offender performs any act not included in any other crime against honor. 2. That such act is performed in the presence of other person or persons. 3. That such act casts dishonor, discredit or contempt upon the offended party. Notes: Slander by deed is a defamation committed by the offender against the complainant through the performance of any act which casts dishonor, discredit or contempt upon another person. Slander by deed refers to performance of an act, not use of words. Two kinds of slander by deed 1. and 2. Simple slander by deed; Grave slander by deed, that is, which is of a serious nature.

Whether a certain slanderous act constitutes slander by deed of a serious nature or not, depends on the social standing of the offended party, the circumstances under which the act was committed, the occasion, etc.

b. The acts of slapping and boxing the woman, a teacher, in the presence of many people has put her to dishonor, contempt and ridicule. (P v Costa) If the acts committed against the offended party caused her physical injury which did not require medical attendance, then the crime would be maltreatment which is classified as slight physical injuries. c. P v Motita Accused held a mirror between the legs of complainant to reflect her private parts. The crowd laughed. Guilty of slander by deed. Distinctions: a. Unjust Vexation-irritation or annoyance/anything that annoys or irritates without justification. b. Slander by Deed-irritation or annoyance + attendant publicity and dishonor or contempt. c. Acts of lasciviousnessirritation or annoyance + any of 3 circumstance provided in Art335 of RPC on rape i. use of force or intimidation ii. deprivation of reason or rendering the offended unconscious iii. offended party under 12 yrs of age+lewd designs Article 360 PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR LIBEL Who are liable: a. person who publishes, exhibits or causes the

publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or similar means(par.1) b. author or editor of a book or pamphlet c. editor or business manager of a daily newspaper magazine or serial publication(par.2) d. owner of the printing plant which publishes a libelous article with his consent and all other persons who in any way participate in or have connection with its publication (US v Ortiz) A defamatory statement by itself is not a crime. It is the undue publication of the defamatory imputation which makes it a crime. It is therefore in this concept that proprietors and editors of periodicals are also made responsible for the appearance of defamatory matters in any newspaper under their management. Venue of criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamation: a. where the libelous article is printed and 1st published OR b. where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense Libel cases are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. Inferior courts have no jurisdiction to try written defamation. (People vs. Hechanova, 54 SCRA 101) Where one of the offended parties is a public officer:

a. if his office is in the City of Manila - RTC of Manila OR - city/province where the article is printed and 1st published b. Otherwise - RTC of the city/province where he held office at the time of offense OR - where the article is 1 st published Where one of the offended parties is a private individual: - RTC of province/city where he actually resides at the time of the crime - where article was printed st or 1 published In order to prevent controversies as to the venue of criminal actions for written defamation, the information or complaint must contain averments as to whether the offended party is a private or public officer at the time of the commission of the offense and whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and first published. (Agbayani, et al., vs. Hon. Sayo, et al., L-47880, April 30, 1979) Note: Offended party must file complaint for defamation imputing a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio (e.g. adultery, concubinage, rape, seduction, abduction, and acts of lasciviousness) Under the last paragraph of Article 360, only defamation consisting of the imputation of private offenses such as adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness shall be prosecuted by the offended party by filing a complaint.

Outside of this enumeration by law, the crime is considered a public crime which may be prosecuted de oficio. Soriano v IAC The Philippines follows the multiple publication rule which means that every time the same written matter is communicated, such communication is considered a distinct and separate publication of libel. Where the publication is libelous per se, actual damages need not be established. This is so because libel, by its very nature, causes dishonor, disrepute and discredit and injury to the reputation of the offended party. It is something inherent and natural in the crime of libel. (Lu Chu Sing vs. Lu Tiong Gui, 76 Phil. 669) Article 361 PROOF OF THE TRUTH Admissible when: a. the act or omission imputed constitutes a crime regardless of whether the offended party is a private individual or a public officer b. the offended party is a government employee, even if the act or omission imputed does not constitute a crime provided it is related to the discharge of his official duties Requisites for Acquittal: a. it appears that the matter charged as libelous is TRUE (for situations 1 and 2 above) b. it was published with good motives and for a

justifiable end (for situation 1 only) Notes: The proof of the truth of the accusation cannot be made to rest upon mere hearsay, rumors, or suspicion. It must rest upon positive direct evidence, upon which a definite finding may be made by the court (US v Sotto) Admission on the part of the accused that he committed a mistake will not serve to free him from criminal liability. But it may serve to mitigate the penalty imposed on him or lessen his civil liability. ( Phee vs. La Vanguardia, 45 Phil 211 ) Article 362 LIBELOUS REMARKS Libelous remarks or comments on privileged matters (under Art. 354) if made with malice in fact will not exempt the author and editor. *This article is a limitation to the defense of privileged communication. The main thrust of the law is to punish libelous remarks or comments on matters which are privileged, if made with malice in fact. So, a newspaper reporter who distorts facts connected with official proceedings or who adds comments thereon as to cast aspersion on the character of the parties involved, is guilty of libel even through the defamatory matter is published in connection with a privileged communication. (Dorr vs. U. S., 11 Phil. 706) INCRIMINATORY MACHINATIONS

Article363 INCRIMINATING PERSON

INNOCENT

ELEMENTS: 1. That the offender performs an act. 2. That by such act he directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime. 3. That such act does not constitute perjury. Two Kinds: a. making a statement which is b i. defamatory or ii. perjurious (if made under oath and is false) b. planting evidence Note: article is limited to planting evidence and the like This crime cannot be committed through verbal incriminatory statements. It is defined as an act and, therefore, to commit this crime, more than a mere utterance is required. If the incriminating machination is made orally, the crime may be slander or oral defamation. If the incriminatory machination was made in writing and under oath, the crime may be perjury if there is a willful falsity of the statements made. If the statement in writing is not under oath, the crime may be falsification if the crime is a material matter made in a written statement which is required by law to have been rendered.

As far as this crime is concerned, this has been interpreted to be possible only in the so-called planting of evidence. There is such a crime as incriminating an innocent person through unlawful arrest. (People vs. Alagao, et al., G.R. No. L-20721, April 30, 1966) Article 364 INTRIGUING HONOR How committed: -by any person who shall make any intrigue which has for its principal purpose to blemish the honor or reputation of another person Notes: The crime is committed by resorting to any form of scheme or plot designed to blemish the reputation of a person. The offender does not employ written or spoken words, pictures or caricatures to ridicule the victim. Rather, he uses some ingenious, crafty and secret ploy which produces the same effect. Intriguing against honor is referred to as gossiping. The offender, without ascertaining the truth of a defamatory utterance, repeats the same and pass it on to another, to the damage of the offended party. Who started the defamatory news is unknown. Where the source of polluted information can be traced and pinpointed, and the accused adopted as his own the information he obtained, and

passed it to another in order to cause dishonor to the complainants reputation, the act is Slander and not Intriguing Against Honor. But where the source or the author of the derogatory information can not be determined and the accused borrows the same, and without subscribing to the truth thereof, passes it to others, the act is one of Intriguing Against Honor. b. Committed by saying to others an unattributable thing, if said to the person himself it is slander. Distinction between intriguing against honor and slander: When the source of the defamatory utterance is unknown and the offender simply repeats or passes the same, the crime is intriguing against honor. If the offender made the utterance, where the source of the defamatory nature of the utterance is known, and offender makes a republication thereof, even though he repeats the libelous statement as coming from another, as long as the source is identified, the crime committed by that offender is slander. Distinction between intriguing against honor and incriminating an innocent person: In intriguing against honor, the offender resorts to an intrigue for the purpose of blemishing the honor or reputation of another person. In incriminating an innocent person, the offender performs an act by which he directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime.

AGAINST

RA4200 The Anti - Wire Tapping Act Acts punished: 1) any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word a) taps any wire of cable OR b) uses any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or walkie talkie or tape recorder 2) any person, whether or not a participant in the abovementioned acts: a) knowingly possesses any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record or copies thereof of any communication or spoken word b) replays the same for any other person c)communicates the contents thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person Notes: a. Peace officer is exempt if acts done under lawful order of the court. You can only use the recording for the case for which it was validly requested. b. Information obtained in violation of the Act is inadmissible in evidence in any hearing or investigation.

c. Gaanan v IAC An extension phone is not one of those prohibited under RA 4200. There must be either a physical interruption through the wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept or record the spoken words. The extension phone was not installed for such purpose. CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE Article 365 ELEMENTS OF IMPRUDENCE: RECKLESS

1. That the offender does or fails to do an act. 2. That the doing of or the failure to do that act is voluntary. 3. That it be without malice. 4. That material results. damage

5. That there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration a. his employment occupation or

b. degree of intelligence, physical condition, and c. other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. ELEMENTS OF IMPRUDENCE: SIMPLE

1. That there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender.

2. That the damage impending to be caused in not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest. Quasi-offenses punished

settled that criminal negligence is only a modality in incurring criminal liability. This is so because under Article 3, a felony may result from dolo or culpa. Notes:

1.

Committing through reckless imprudence any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave or less grave felony or light felony; Committing through simple imprudence or negligence an act which would otherwise constitute a grave or a less serious felony; Causing damage to the property of another through reckless imprudence or simple imprudence or negligence; Causing through simple imprudence or negligence some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

Test for determining whether or not a person is negligent of doing of an act which results in injury or damages to another person or his property. Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured? If so, the law imposes on the doer, the duty to refrain from the course of action, or to take precaution against such result. Failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring the admonition borne of this provisions, is the constitutive fact of negligence. (Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809, 813) Test of Negligence. Did the defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The penalties under Article 365 has no application in the following cases: 1. When the penalty provided for the offense ifs equal or lower than that provided in pars.1 and 2 of Article 365. In this case, the penalty shall be that which is next lower in degree than that which should be imposed, in the

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Distinction between reckless imprudence and negligence: The two are distinguished only as to whether the danger that would be impending is easily perceivable or not. If the danger that may result from the criminal negligence is clearly perceivable, the imprudence is reckless. If it could hardly be perceived, the criminal negligence would only be simple. There is no more issue on whether culpa is a crime in itself or only a mode of incurring criminal liability. It is practically

period which the court may deem proper to apply. 2. When by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, the death of a person is caused, the penalty is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. 1) Art.64 on mitigating and aggravating circumstances not applicable. 2) Failure to lend on the spot assistance to victim of his negligence: penalty next higher in degree. 3) Abandoning usually punishable under Art 275, if charged under Art 365 is only qualifying and if not alleged cannot even be an aggravating circumstance. 4) Contributory negligence not a defense, only mitigating The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence. It is against public policy to invoke the negligence of another to escape criminal liability. (People vs. Quiones, C.A., 44 O.G. 1520) The above-mentioned doctrine should be reconciled with the doctrine of concurrent proximate cause of two negligent drivers. In the case of People vs. Desalis, et al., C.A., 57 O.G. 8689, the two accused were drivers of two speeding vehicles which overtook vehicles ahead of them and even encroached on the others lane without taking due precaution as required by the circumstances.

The court found the concurrent or successive negligent act or omission of the two drivers as the direct and proximate cause of the injury caused to the offended party. The court could not determine in what proportion each driver contributed to the injury. Both were declared guilty for the injury suffered by the third person. When negligence does not result in any injury to persons or damage to property, then no crime is committed. Negligence becomes punishable when it results in the commission of a crime. (Lantok, Jr. vs. Hon. Gorgonio, L-37396, April 30, 1979, 75 O.G. 7763) Last clear chance doctrineThe contributory negligence of the injured party will not defeat the action if it be shown that the accused might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party Emergency ruleAn automobile driver, who, by the negligence of another, is suddenly placed in an emergency and compelled to act instantly to avoid a collision or injury is not guilty of negligence if he makes a choice which a person of ordinary prudence placed in such a position might make even though he did not make the wisest choice. Doctrine of Pre-emption It is a rule in collision cases which the driver of a motor vehicle to make a full stop when crossing a thru-street. Any accident therefore which takes place in said corner gives to rise to the presumtion of negligence

on the part driver of the motor vehicle running thru-street has already reached the middle part of the intersection. In such a case, the other driver who has the right of way has the duty to stop his motor vehicle in order to avoid a collision. (People vs. Taradji, 3 C.A. Rep. [25] 460) P v Cano Negligence is a quasi-offense. What is punished is not the effect of the negligence but the recklessness of the accused. P v Carillo 13 yr old girl dies 3 days after surgery due to an overdose of Nubain which triggered a heart attack that caused brain damage. HELD: Guilty of simple negligence resulting to homicide. Carillo was the anesthesiologist, he and his coaccused failed to monitor and provide close patient care, to inform the parents of the childs true condition, to prove that they exercised necessary and appropriate degree of care and diligence to prevent the condition. Buearano v CA Conviction of the accused in the charge of slight and less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence constitutes double jeopardy to the charge of the crime of damage to property through reckless imprudence. Since this is the mode of incurring criminal liability, if there is only one carelessness, even if there are several results, the accused may only be prosecuted under one count for the criminal negligence. So there would only be one information to be filed, even if the negligence may bring about resulting injuries which are slight.

Do not separate the accusation from the slight physical injuries from the other material result of the negligence. If the criminal negligence resulted, for example, in homicide, serious physical injuries and slight physical injuries, do not join only the homicide and serious physical injuries in one information for the slight physical injuries. You are not complexing slight when you join it in the same information. It is just that you are not splitting the criminal negligence because the real basis of the criminal liability is the negligence. If you split the criminal negligence, that is where double jeopardy would arise. Accused is not criminally liable for the death or injuries caused by his negligence to trespassers whose presence in the premises he was not aware of. In the case of People vs. Cuadra, C.A., 53 O.G. 7265, accused was a truck driver. Unknown to him, several persons boarded his truck and while driving along a slippery road which has a declinations of 25 degrees, the left front wheel of the truck fell into a ditch. In his effort to return the truck to the center of the road, the truck turned turtle, throwing off two of the passengers who boarded the truck without his knowledge. As a consequence, one of them died. Cuadra was acquitted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and physical injuries. Overtaking of another vehicle is a normal occurrence in driving. But when the overtaking is done from right, it shows recklessness and disregard of traffic laws and

regulations. It is likewise so when the overtaking is done while another vehicle is approaching from the opposite direction. This is a violation of Section 59(b) of the Motor Vehicle Law (People vs. Songalla, C.A., 67 O.G. 8330) Driving within the speed limit is not a guaranty of due care. Speed limits impose the maximum speed which should not be exceeded. The degree of care required of a motorist is not governed by speed limits but by the circumstances and conditions obtaining in the place at the particular time. So, if the maximum speed limit is 80 kilometers per hour and the vehicle driven at 30 kilometers per hour, but because of the very slow pace of the vehicle, an accident occurs, the observation of the speed limit will not be acceptable evidence of due care. (people vs. Caluza, C.A., 58 O.G. 8060) Force majeure in relation to negligence. Force majeure has reference to an event which cannot be foreseen or which being foreseen, is inevitable. It implies an extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the actor or perpetrator. In negligence, the immediate personal harm or damage to property is perceivable and can be prevented by the exercise of reasonable care. As the event is foreseeable, the failure of the actor to use reasonable care to prevent harm or damage constitutes reckless imprudence or simple negligence. (People vs. Eleazar )