Civil Law Review b22

B. Absolute community of property (ACP) FC 88, 91, 92, 93 Section 1. General Provisions Art. 88.
. The absolute community of property between spouses shall commence at the precise moment that the marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement of the community regime at any other time shall be void. (145a) Section 2. What Constitutes Community Property Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter. (197a) Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property: (1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the community property; (2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However, jewelry shall form part of the community property; (3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property. (201a) Art. 93. Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the community, unless it is proved that it is one of those excluded therefrom. When applicable, FC 75, 103 (3); 130 (3); 92 (3) Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any other regime. In the absence of a marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community of property as established in this Code shall govern. Art. 103. XXX Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. Art. 130. XXX Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property: (3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property. Commencement, FC 88 Art. 88. The absolute community of property between spouses shall commence at the precise moment that the marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement of the community regime at any other time shall be void. Waiver during marriage, FC 89 Art. 89. No waiver of rights, shares and effects of the absolute community of property during the marriage can be made except in case of judicial separation of property. When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of property, or after the marriage has been dissolved or annulled, the same shall appear in a public instrument and shall be recorded as provided in Article 77. The creditors of the spouse who made such waiver may petition the court to rescind the waiver to the extent of the amount sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. Waiver after marriage, FC 89 par. 2 cf NCC Art. 168 FC 89 par 2 See above NCC 168. The wife may, by express authority of the husband embodied in a public instrument, administer the conjugal partnership property. Suppletory rules: Co-ownership, FC 90; of NCC 484-501 FC 90. The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the absolute community of property between the spouses in all matters not provided for in this Chapter. NCC - CO-OWNERSHIP Article 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. In default of contracts, or of special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this Title. Article 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void. The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved. Article 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it
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PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda
according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by agreement, express or implied. Article 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. Article 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the coownership. Article 489. Repairs for preservation may be made at the will of one of the co-owners, but he must, if practicable, first notify his co-owners of the necessity for such repairs. Expenses to improve or embellish the thing shall be decided upon by a majority as determined in article 492. Article 490. Whenever the different stories of a house belong to different owners, if the titles of ownership do not specify the terms under which they should contribute to the necessary expenses and there exists no agreement on the subject, the following rules shall be observed: (1) The main and party walls, the roof and the other things used in common, shall be preserved at the expense of all the owners in proportion to the value of the story belonging to each; (2) Each owner shall bear the cost of maintaining the floor of his story; the floor of the entrance, front door, common yard and sanitary works common to all, shall be maintained at the expense of all the owners pro rata; (3) The stairs from the entrance to the first story shall be maintained at the expense of all the owners pro rata, with the exception of the owner of the ground floor; the stairs from the first to the second story shall be preserved at the expense of all, except the owner of the ground floor and the owner of the first story; and so on successively. Article 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common, even though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the withholding of the consent by one or more of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford adequate relief. Article 492. For the administration and better enjoyment of the thing owned in common, the resolutions of the majority of the co-owners shall be binding. There shall be no majority unless the resolution is approved by the co-owners who represent the controlling interest in the object of the co-ownership. Should there be no majority, or should the resolution of the majority be seriously prejudicial to those interested in the property owned in common, the court, at the instance of an interested party, shall order such measures as it may deem proper, including the appointment of an administrator. Whenever a part of the thing belongs exclusively to one of the co-owners, and the remainder is owned in common, the preceding provision shall apply only to the part owned in common. Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the coowners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Article 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement. A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years. Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law. No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or coheirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. Article 495. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, the co-owners cannot demand a physical division of the thing owned in common, when to do so would render it unserviceable for the use for which it is intended. But the co-ownership may be terminated in accordance with article 498. Article 496. Partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. Partition shall be governed by the Rules of Court insofar as they are consistent with this Code. Article 497. The creditors or assignees of the co-owners may take part in the division of the thing owned in common and object to its being effected without their concurrence. But they cannot impugn any partition already executed, unless there has been fraud, or in case it was made notwithstanding a formal opposition presented to prevent it, without prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor to maintain its validity. Article 498. Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds distributed. 162 | P a g e -
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Article 499. The partition of a thing owned in common shall not prejudice third persons, who shall retain the rights of mortgage, servitude or any other real rights belonging to them before the division was made. Personal rights pertaining to third persons against the co-ownership shall also remain in force, notwithstanding the partition. Article 500. Upon partition, there shall be a mutual accounting for benefits received and reimbursements for expenses made. Likewise, each co-owner shall pay for damages caused by reason of his negligence or fraud. Article 501. Every co-owner shall, after partition, be liable for defects of title and quality of the portion assigned to each of the other co-owners. What constitutes ACP, FC 91 Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter. Memorize! (a) All property at time of marriage (b) Property acquired subsequently (c) Winnings from gambling, FC as of NCC 164 Article 164. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any kind of gambling, betting or game, whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser, and shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership. (d) Presumption of ACP, FC 93 of NCC 160 FC 93. Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the community, unless it is proved that it is one of those excluded therefrom. NCC 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. 3 Muller v Muller, G.R. NO. 149615, August 29, 2006
The facts are as follows: Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondents parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila. Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition 6 for separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution. Thus However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse during the marriage shall be excluded from the community property. The real property, therefore, inherited by petitioner in Germany is excluded from the absolute community of property of the herein spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of the sale of said real property as well as the personal properties purchased thereby, belong exclusively to the petitioner. However, the part of that inheritance used by the petitioner for acquiring the house and lot in this country cannot be recovered by the petitioner, its acquisition being a violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." The law will leave the parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice to a voluntary partition by the parties of the said real property. x x x xxxx As regards the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 of the Registry of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila, situated in Antipolo, Rizal and the improvements thereon, the Court shall not make any pronouncement on constitutional grounds. 7 Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision modifying the trial courts Decision. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also considered petitioners ownership over the property in trust for the respondent. As regards the house, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the lower court dated August 12, 1996 is hereby MODIFIED. Respondent Elena
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Buenaventura Muller is hereby ordered to REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the house situated in Atnipolo, Rizal, deducting therefrom the amount respondent spent for the preservation, maintenance and development of the aforesaid real property including the depreciation cost of the house or in the alternative to SELL the house and lot in the event respondent does not have the means to reimburse the petitioner out of her own money and from the proceeds thereof, reimburse the petitioner of the cost of the land and the house deducting the expenses for its maintenance and preservation spent by the respondent. Should there be profit, the same shall be divided in proportion to the equity each has over the property. The case is REMANDED to the lower court for reception of evidence as to the amount claimed by the respondents for the preservation and maintenance of the property. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HEREIN IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF THE AMOUNT USED TO PURCHASE THE LAND AS WELL AS THE COSTS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE, FOR IN SO RULING, IT INDIRECTLY ALLOWED AN ACT DONE WHICH OTHERWISE COULD NOT BE DIRECTLY x x x DONE, WITHOUT DOING VIOLENCE TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION THAT AN ALIEN IS PROHIBITED FROM ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTIES LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENTS CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH IS ACTUALLY A DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN OWNERSHIP OVER THE LOT IN QUESTION, CLOTHED UNDER THE GUISE OF CLAIMING REIMBURSEMENT. Petitioner contends that respondent, being an alien, is disqualified to own private lands in the Philippines; that respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition but circumvented the same; and that respondents purpose for filing an action for separation of property is to obtain exclusive possession, control and disposition of the Antipolo property. Respondent claims that he is not praying for transfer of ownership of the Antipolo property but merely reimbursement; that the funds paid by him for the said property were in consideration of his marriage to petitioner; that the funds were given to petitioner in trust; and that equity demands that respondent should be reimbursed of his personal funds. The issue for resolution is whether respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property. The petition has merit. Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. 9 The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. In the case of Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 10 the Court held: Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows: "Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. x x x xxxx If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellants words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor Generals Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question. Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. 11 He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. 12 His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained. 164 | P a g e -
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The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioners marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondents disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. 13 To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition. Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. 14 He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 15 Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition. Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondents part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law. As expressly held in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court: 16 Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have. As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out to militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired, or any part thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise. (Emphasis added) WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 26, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 ordering petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller to reimburse respondent Helmut Muller the amount of P528,000 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000 for the construction of the house in Antipolo City, and the Resolution dated August 13, 2001 denying reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862 terminating the regime of absolute community between the petitioner and respondent, decreeing a separation of property between them and ordering the partition of the personal properties located in the Philippines equally, is REINSTATED. 4Pacific Ace v Yanagisawa, G.R. No. 175303, April 11, 2012 FACTS: R (Japanese) and Evelyn married. Evelyn then bought a townhouse unit which was registered in her name. R filed a PDN against Evelyn on the ground of bigamy. During the pendency of the case, R filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Restraining Order against Evelyn and an Application for a Writ of a Preliminary Injunction to enjoin her from disposing or encumbering all of the properties registered in her name. Rs petition became moot coz Evelyn committed in open court that she will not dispose of the property during the pendency of the case. Evelyn obtained a loan from P (PAFIN) an dexecuted a REM (real estate mortgage) in favor of P over the townhouse unit. R filed for an annulment of the REM. MAKATI RTC DECISION: (at the time of the mortgage) dissolved the marriage between Rand Evelyn and ordered the liquidation of their properties. PQUE RTC DECISION:- a foreign national, cannot possibly own themortgaged property.- Without ownership, or any other law or contract binding the defendants to him, Eiji hasno cause of action that may be asserted against Evelyn and P. CA DECISION: annulled the REM executed byEvelyn in favor of PAFIN. ISSUE WON pque rtcs decision was improper RATIO YES. The issue of ownership and liquidation of properties acquired during the cohabitation of Eiji and Evelyn has been submitted for the resolution of the Makati RTC, and is pending appeal before the CA. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue operates as an
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insurmountable barrier to the subsequent assumption by the Paraaque RTC. .Jurisprudence holds that all acts done inviolation of a standing injunction order are voidable as to the party enjoined and third parties who are not in good faith. The party, in whose favor the injunction is issued, has a cause of action to seek the annulment of the offending actions Denied for lack of merit. 5 Beumer v Amores, GR 195670, December 3, 2012 The foregoing rulings dissolved the conjugal partnership of gains of Willem Beumer (petitioner) and Avelina Amores (respondent) and distributed the properties forming part of the said property regime. The Factual Antecedents Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 32, declared the nullity of their marriage in the Decision 5 dated November 10, 2000 on the basis of the formers psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code. Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership 6 dated December 14, 2000 praying for the distribution of the following described properties claimed to have been acquired during the subsistence of their marriage, to wit: By Purchase: 6 lots in Dumaguete In defense,8 respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth being that she used her own personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way of inheritance. 9 She submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and petitioner attesting to the fact that she purchased Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon using her own money.10 Accordingly, respondent sought the dismissal of the petition for dissolution as well as payment for attorneys fees and litigation expenses.11 During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit 12since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He also claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid. 13 For her part, respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of the lots came exclusively from her personal funds, in particular, her earnings from selling jewelry as well as products from Avon, Triumph and Tupperware. 14 She further asserted that after she filed for annulment of their marriage in 1996, petitioner transferred to their second house and brought along with him certain personal properties, consisting of drills, a welding machine, grinders, clamps, etc. She alleged that these tools and equipment have a total cost of P500,000.00.15 The RTC Ruling grants all parcels of land to respondent as her paraphernal property; All tools and equipment as petitioners exclusive properties 2 houses co-owned by parties It ruled that, regardless of the source of funds for the acquisition of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4, petitioner could not have acquired any right whatsoever over these properties as petitioner still attempted to acquire them notwithstanding his knowledge of the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of private lands.17 This was made evident by the sworn statements petitioner executed purporting to show that the subject parcels of land were purchased from the exclusive funds of his wife, the herein respondent. 18 Petitioners plea for reimbursement for the amount he had paid to purchase the foregoing properties on the basis of equity was likewise denied for not having come to court with clean hands. The CA Ruling Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA, contesting only the RTCs award of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 in favor of respondent. He insisted that the money used to purchase the foregoing properties came from his own capital funds and that they were registered in the name of his former wife only because of the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership. Thus, he prayed for reimbursement of one-half (1/2) of the value of what he had paid in the purchase of the said properties, waiving the other half in favor of his estranged ex-wife. 19 Upheld the decision of the RTC in toto. The CA stressed the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the constitutional prohibition for aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines."21 Hence, he cannot invoke equity to support his claim for reimbursement. The Ruling of the Court - The petition lacks merit. The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller23 the Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land24 enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which reads: Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited constitutional prohibition" 25 and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties in the latters name. 26 Clearly, petitioners actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioners claim for reimbursement.
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As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful. 27 In this case, petitioners statements regarding the real source of the funds used to purchase the subject parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to have previously executed a joint affidavit that respondents personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1,28 he likewise claimed that his personal disability funds were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any equitable refuge. In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. 29 Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all.30 Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, 31 petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.32 Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into. Neither can the Court grant petitioners claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. 33 As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution, to wit: Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads: Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. 1wphi1 The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff." 34 (Citations omitted) Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship. 35 Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony36 and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED. What is excluded from ACP, FC 92; FC 95 Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property: (1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the community property; (2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However, jewelry shall form part of the community property; (3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property. Art. 95. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling, whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the community but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the community property. 6 Abrenica v Abrenica, G.R. No. 180572, June 18, 2012 Topic: What is excluded from ACP Facts: Petitioner Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica was a partner of individual respondents, Attys. Danilo N. Tungol and Abelardo M. Tibayan, in the Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan (the firm). . Respondent filed a case against Petitioner to return partnership funds representing profits from the sale of a parcel of land and sought to recover from petitioner retainer fees that he received from two clients of the firm and the balance of the cash advance that he obtained. RTC affirmed the liability of petitioner. We note that petitioners were married on 28 May 1998. The cases filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on 6 May 1998 and 15 October 1998 were filed against petitioner Erlando only. It was with the filing of CA-G.R. SP No. 98679 on 24 April 2007 that Joena joined Erlando as a co-petitioner. On 24 May 2007, the 26 April 2007 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 98679 became final and executory. A Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was issued on 3January 2008 in favor of the law firm for the Petitioner. 13 September 2007, petitioner Erlando filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion[13]with Branch 226, alleging that the sheriff had levied on properties belonging to his children and petitioner Joena. She also insisted that she owned half of the two (2) motor vehicles as well as the house and lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 216818, which formed part of the absolute community of property. Thus, she sought their discharge and release and likewise the immediate remittance to her of half of the proceeds, if any. Issues: whether or not that petitioner Joenas right to due process was also violated when she was not made a party-in-interest to the
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proceedings even if her half of the absolute community of property was included in the execution of the judgment rendered by Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City and that she had the right to claim such. Held: We DENY petitioners claims. it appears from the records that petitioner Erlando was first married to a certain Ma. Aline Lovejoy Padua on 13 October 1983. They had three children: Patrik Erlando (born on 14 April 1985), Maria Monica Erline (born on 9 September 1986), and Patrik Randel (born on 12 April 1990). After the dissolution of the first marriage of Erlando, he and Joena got married on 28 May 1998. In her Affidavit, Joena alleged that she represented her stepchildren; that the levied personal properties in particular, a piano with a chair, computer equipment and a computer table were owned by the latter. We note that two of these stepchildren were already of legal age when Joena filed her Affidavit. As to Patrik Randel, parental authority over him belongs to his parents. Absent any special power of attorney authorizing Joena to represent Erlandos children, her claim cannot be sustained. Petitioner Joena also asserted that the two (2) motor vehicles purchased in 1992 and 1997, as well as the house and lot covered by TCT No. 216818 formed part of the absolute community regime. However, Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community property the property acquired before the marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of that property. Neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage. Charges upon ACP, FC 94 Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for: (1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support; (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; (4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs, upon the community property; (5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during marriage upon the separate property of either spouse used by the family; (6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional or vocational course, or other activity for self-improvement; (7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family; (8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; (9) Antenuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under paragraph (7) of this Article, the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the payment of which shall be considered as advances to be deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the community; and (10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless. If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, except those falling under paragraph (9), the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. (a) Family expenses cf. FC 100 (3), FC 121(5) and FC 94 (4), (5) Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that: (3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse; Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for: (4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs, upon the community property; (5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during marriage upon the separate property of either spouse used by the family; (b) Debts of spouses, Art. 94 (2) and (3) Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for: (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; (c) Subsidiary liabilities, Art. 94 (9) Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for: (9) Antenuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under paragraph (7) of this Article, the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred 168 | P a g e -
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by either spouse by reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the payment of which shall be considered as advances to be deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the community; 7 Buado vs. CA, G.R. No. 145222, April 24, 2009 Facts: Mr. and Mrs. Buado filed a civil case against Erlinda Nicol. On April 1987, the trial court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay damages to the petitioners. The personal properties of Erlinda were insufficient to pay the damages. The sheriff levied and auctioned the property of Erlinda. An auction sale was held with the petitioners as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Buado. After almost one year, the husband of Erlinda, Romulo Nicol, filed a complaint for the annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and deputy sheriff. He argued that there was no proper publication and posting for the auction sale. He also claimed that the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol amounted to P40,000 only. The spouses Buado obtained the P500,000 worth of property for only P51,685. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition of Romulo Nicol. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and held that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on the complaint filed by the respondent in this case. The petitioners filed a petition where they said that the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion for reversing the decision given by the RTC. Issue: Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda Nicol arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership. HELD: NO. Erlinda Nicols liability is not chargeable to the conjugal partnership. Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership. The Supreme Court does not agree to the contention of Mr. and Mrs. Buado. In Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court held that the car which was claimed by the third party complainant to be conjugal property was being levied upon to enforce a judgment for support filed by a third person, the third-party claim of the wife is proper since the obligation which is personal to the husband is chargeable not on the conjugal property but on his separate property. Hence, the filing of a separate action by Romulo Nicol was proper. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. (d) Sole obligations of a spouse, Art. 94 Art 94 see above (Number 8) Gambling losses, FC 95 Art. 95. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling, whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the community but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the community property. (f) Other charges, Art. 94 Art 94 see above (Number 8) Administration and enjoyment of ACP (note: there is no #9 in the syllabus) (a) Joint administration, FC 96; FC 90 Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. Art. 90. The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the absolute community of property between the spouses in all matters not provided for in this Chapter. 1 Dar v Legasto, G.R. No. 143016, August 30, 2000 FACTS: Petitioners are husband and wife but only one of them signs the petition for review on certiorari and mandamus. The contention of the petitioners is that the petition should be dismissed for violation of Rule on Certification. Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for failure to comply with the Rule on Certification of Non-Forum Shopping after finding that the petition "was signed only by Ronnie Dar, Randy Angeles, Joy Constantino, and Liberty Cruz, without authority attached thereto to sign for and in behalf of their co-petitioners." Since their respective spouses failed to sign the same. The private respondent filed a case of unlawful detainer against the spouses of each thus, their compliance is needed. ISSUE: Is the petition dismissible for violation of the Rule on Certification of Non-Forum Shopping requiring all petitioners to certify it under oath? This is the sole issue raised by petitioners Mr. and Mrs. Ronnie Dar, Mr. and Mrs. Randy Angeles, Mr. and Mrs. Joy
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Constantino, and Mr. and Mrs. Liberty Cruz. HELD: The court found merit in the petition. Revised Circular No. 28-91, dated February 8, 1994 applies to and governs the filing of petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and is intended to prevent the multiple filing of petitions or complaints involving the same issues in other tribunals or agencies as a form of forum shopping. Complementary thereto and for the same purpose, the following requirements, in addition to those in pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and existing circulars, shall be strictly complied with in the filing of complaints, petitions, applications or other initiatory pleadings in all courts and agencies other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and shall be subject to the same sanctions provided hereunder. 1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceedings is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such action or proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated, he must state the status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceedings has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn certification contemplated herein have been filed. The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and subject of this Circular are the original civil complaint, counter-claim, crossclaim, third (fourth, etc.) party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention, petition, or application wherein a party asserts his claim for relief. xxx With respect to the contents of the certification which the pleader may prepare, the rule of substantial compliance may be availed of. While this section requires that it be strictly complied with, it merely underscores its mandatory nature in that it cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded but it does not thereby prevent substantial compliance on this aspect of its provisions under justifiable circumstances.[5] Circular No. 28-91 was designed to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure - which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.[6] In the instant case, the Court of Appeals should have taken into consideration the fact that the petitioners were sued jointly, or as Mr. and Mrs. over a property in which they have a common interest. Such being the case, the signing of one of them in the certification substantially complies with the rule on certification of non-forum shopping. (b) Sole administration incapacity, FC 96 (2) no court order Art. 96. XXX In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. separation in fact FC 100 (3) with court Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that: (3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. abandonment, FC 101 with court order Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. pendency of legal separation proceeding, FC 61 with court order (note: No #4) Art. 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court. (c) Disposition and encumbrance, FC 96-98
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Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (206a) Art. 97. Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest in the community property. (n) Art. 98. Neither spouse may donate any community property without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the community property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress. 2 Matthews vs. Taylor, GR 164584, June 22, 2009 FACTS: Joselyn , a Filipina, married Benjamin, a British, in June 1988. During their marriage, they acquired a Boracay real property. The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. However, they had a falling out. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental ofP12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort. Claiming that the agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his (Benjamins) consent, Benjamin ( Joselyns husband) instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyns husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent. The Lower Court ruled in favor of Benjamin. The appellate court also ruled in favor of Benjamin. ISSUE: Is an Agreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino wife without the consent of her British husband valid? HELD: Petition is impressed with merits. The trial and appellate courts both focused on the property relations of petitioner and respondent in light of the Civil Code and Family Code provisions. They, however, failed to observe the applicable constitutional principle, Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the said constitutional provision, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of this constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. Our fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of the public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos. In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, SC held that Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect violation of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have. Effect of separation de facto, FC 100; 101; cf. FC 239 summary proceedings for court authority to dispose Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that: (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported; (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding; (3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall,
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upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. (178a) Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. Art. 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicial authorization for a transaction where the consent of the other spouse is required by law but such consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts. The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the transaction, and, if none, shall describe in detail the said transaction and state the reason why the required consent thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court. Effect of abandonment, FC 101, FC 72 damages, rescission/nullity of a contract FC 101 See above Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief. 13. Dissolution of ACP, FC 99, 102, 43 (2); FC 63(2), 104
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates: (1) Upon the death of either spouse; (2) When there is a decree of legal separation; (3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or (4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Article 134 to 138. Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply: (1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each spouse. (2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94. (3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them. (4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purpose of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. (5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51. (6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse; Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: 172 | P a g e -
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(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2); Art. 104. Whenever the liquidation of the community properties of two or more marriages contracted by the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of each community shall be determined upon such proof as may be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which community the existing properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different communities in proportion to the capital and duration of each. (a) Death, FC 103 cf. Rule 73 Sec. 12 ROC Art. 103. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the community property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the community property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six months period, no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the community property of the terminated marriage shall be void. Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. Rule 73 Section 2. Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage . When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either. 3 Heirs of Go v Servacio, GR 157537, Sept. 7, 2011 DOCTRINE: The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse withoutthe prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is not necessarily void if said portion hasnot yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At anyrate, the requirement of prior liquidation does not prejudice vested rights. FACTS: On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land (17,140 SQM) to Protacio B. Go, Jr. Twenty three years later, Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver , whereby heaffirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchasedthe two parcels of land (the property). In 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of the petitioners. On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go (joined by Ritos wife Dina B. Go) sold aportion of the property (5,560 SQM) to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio). On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heedtheir demand. They sued Servacio and Rito for the annulment of the sale of the property. PETITIONERS: Following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the property became conjugal property; andthat the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community propertybetween Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void. Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the property because he hadpurchased it with his own money. RTCs RULING: Affirmed the validity of the sale. o However, declared the property was the conjugal property and not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr., because there were three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr.,Rito, and Dina). oThe participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of the lateMarta. oUnder Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when the property was acquired, all propertyacquired by either spouse during the marriage was conjugal unless there was proof that theproperty thus acquired pertained exclusively to the husband or to the wife. ISSUE: Whether or not the sale by Protacio, Sr. to Servacio was void for being made without prior liquidation? NO RULING: Article 130 of the Family Code reads: Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugalpartnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of thedeceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnershipproperty either judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon thelapse of the six month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugalpartnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void. Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoingrequirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of thesubsequent marriage.
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Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code: Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugalpartnership of gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall beof supplementary application. The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already establishedbetween spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquiredin accordance with theCivil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n) The CPG established before and after the effectivity of theFamily Codeare governed by the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnershipmust be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void. However, the CPG must be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code. Upon Martasdeath in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175(1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following itsliquidation. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share. Hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely selland dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. The sale by Protacio, Sr. andRito as co-owners without the consent of the other coowners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Martas share. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari ; and AFFIRM the decision of the RegionalTrial Court. (b) Legal separation, FC 63(2); FC 66 Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: (2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2); Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences: (1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated at whatever stage; and (2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime. The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries. (c) Annulment and declaration of nullity, FC 50 in rel. to FC 43 (2) Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129. Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse; (d) Judicial separation of property, FC 134-138 Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient cause. (190a) Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: (1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; (2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee; (3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court; 174 | P a g e -
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(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101; (5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power; and (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property. (191a) Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court for the voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, and for the separation of their common properties. All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership of gains, as well as the personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in the petition and notified of the filing thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest. (191a) Art. 137. Once the separation of property has been decreed, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains shall be liquidated in conformity with this Code. During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall pay for the support of the spouses and their children. (192a) Art. 138. After dissolution of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership, the provisions on complete separation of property shall apply. 4 Ugalde v Ysasi, GR 130623, February 29, 2008
14. Effects of dissolution (a) Liquidation procedure, FC 102 Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply: (1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each spouse. (2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94. (3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them. (4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purpose of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. (5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51. (6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. 5 Quiao v Quiao, G. R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012 Facts: On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao filed a complaint for legal separation against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao which was granted. Respondent filed a motion for execution and thereby the court proceeded with the liquidation. The following matters cannot anymore be disturbed: (a) The finding that the petitioner is the offending spouse since he cohabited with a woman who is not his wife; (b) The trial court's grant of the petition for legal separation of respondent Rita; (c) The dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership; (d) The forfeiture of the petitioner's right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership; (e) The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children's custody;
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(f) The disqualification of the offending spouse from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession; (g) The revocation of provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse; (h) The holding that the property relation of the parties is conjugal partnership of gains and pursuant to Article 116 of the Family Code, all properties acquired during the marriage, whether acquired by one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved; (i) The finding that the spouses acquired their real and personal properties while they were living together; (j) The holding that the conjugal partnership shall be liable to matters included under Article 121 of the Family Code and the conjugal liabilities totaling P503,862.10 shall be charged to the income generated by these properties; (k) The fact that the trial court had no way of knowing whether the petitioner had separate properties which can satisfy his share for the support of the family; (l) The holding that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7); (m) The ruling that the remaining properties not subject to any encumbrance shall therefore be divided equally between the petitioner and the respondent without prejudice to the children's legitime; (n) The holding that the petitioner's share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children; and Issues/Held: 1. Is the dissolution and the consequent liquidation of the common properties of the husband and wife by virtue of the decree of legal separation governed by Article 129 of The Family Code?
Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case since the parties' property relation is governed by the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains. From the record, we can deduce that the petitioner and the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains. And under this property relation, the husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry. The husband and wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains. Since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code this Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law. Procedure: Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply: (1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse. (2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof. (3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership. (4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121. (5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them. (6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any. (7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code. (8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the partition in accordance with Article 51. (9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. 2. What is the meaning of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership for purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized under Article 63 Of The Family Code?
The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of the separate properties of the spouses and the products of their
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labor and industry. As to the definition of net profits, we cannot but refer to Article 102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly provides that for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code. 3. Can the Family Code of the Philippines be given retroactive effect for purposes of determining the net profits subject of forfeiture as a result of the decree of legal separation which will be impairing vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code?
Yes. The petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is written on stone. In Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, we define and explained vested right in the following manner: A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term vested right expresses the concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny. From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence. In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. The petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation case. (b) For cause other than death, FC 43 (2); FC 63(2); 147; 148 Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: (2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2); Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
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The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in both faith. (c) Termination due to death, FC 104 Art. 104. Whenever the liquidation of the community properties of two or more marriages contracted by the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of each community shall be determined upon such proof as may be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which community the existing properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different communities in proportion to the capital and duration of each. 6 Dino v Dino, GR 178044, January 19, 2011 Topic: Effects of dissolution Facts: Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. In 1998, they were married before the Mayor of Las Pias City. Petitioner eventually filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner in the US which was granted. Petitioner also learned that respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara. Dr. Tayag, a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was long-lasting and by nature and incurable. TC granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically incapacitated and ruled that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code. Petitioner questioned the dissolution of the absolute community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Held: Yes. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages does NOT apply to Article 147 of the Family Code. In a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void. For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present: 1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other; 2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void. The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. (Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.) Article 50 of the Family Code (as mentioned in Section 19(1) of the Rule) applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. It does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on coownership. 7 Yu v Reyes-Carpio, GR 189207, June 15, 2011 C. Conjugal partnership of gains 178 | P a g e -
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1 Quiao v Quiao, G. R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012 On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido) for the latter cohabited with a woman who is not his wife. RTC on October 10, 2005 rendered the following decision: WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the legal separation of plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and defendant-respondent Brigido B. Quiao pursuant to Article 55. As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bond shall not be severed. Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor children, namely, Kitchie, Lotis and Petchie, all surnamed Quiao shall remain under the custody of the plaintiff who is the innocent spouse. Further, except for the personal and real properties already foreclosed by the RCBC, all the remaining properties, namely: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte; coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte; corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte; coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur; a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City; a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de Bugabos, Butuan City; a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City; Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;
shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner] subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of [P]45,740.00. [Petitioners] (Brigidos) share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children. He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the sum of [P]19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses of [P]5,000.00[.] SO ORDERED. No MR from petitioners, but respondents filed for a Motion for Execution which the trial court granted. Writ was partially executed on July 6, 2006 in the following manner: (a) P22,870.00 as petitioner's share of the payment of the conjugal share; (b) P19,000.00 as attorney's fees; and (c) P5,000.00 as litigation expenses. Petitioner on July 7, 2006 (9 months after the promulgation of the Decision), filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term Net Profits Earned. RTC (Order#1): The phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts. The Order further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. Petitioner: MR. RTC issued another Order (Order#2): although the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory, it may still consider the Motion for Clarification because the petitioner simply wanted to clarify the meaning of net profit earned. Furthermore, the same Order held: "ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby ordered set aside. NET PROFIT EARNED, which is subject of forfeiture in favor of [the] parties' common children, is ordered to be computed in accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code. Petitioner: MR. prayed for the correction and reversal of the Order#2 RTC: changed its ruling again and granted the respondents' Motion for Reconsideration whereby the Order#2 was set aside and reinstated Order#1 Petitioner: Rule 45 to SC averring that the RTC was wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation. ISSUES: (1) Whether their property relation is governed by CPG (2) Whether Art. 102 (Liquidation of the Absolute Community Assets and Liabilities) should be applied RULING: (1) YES.
Petitioner and the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property 179 | P a g e -
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relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains. Under this property relation, the husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry. The husband and wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains. Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage. From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals. (2) NO. Since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code [t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law. 2 Orpiano vs Tomas, G.R. No. 178611, Jan. 14, 2013 Considerations of expediency cannot justify a resort to procedural shortcuts. The end does not justify the means; a meritorious case cannot overshadow the condition that the means employed to pursue it must be in keeping with the Rules. Facts: 1979: Decision by the defunct Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) QC: Estrella an absent/absentee spouse and granting Alejandro (husband) the authority to sell part of their conjugal lot (809.5sqm,QC). JDRC Decision was annotated on the back of TCT No. RT-23468. March 19, 1996: Alejandro sold the lot on installment basis to respondent spouses Antonio and Myrna Tomas for 12M. Very same day, a new title TCT No. N-152326 was issued in the name in their name despite not having paid in full, and they were given until December of same year to complete payment. October 28, 1996: Alejandro filed collection case-RTC QC: balance of 4M with damages. Pendency of case: Alejandro passed away. His heirs with Estrella were substituted. Estrella moved to amend the Complaint: rescission/annulment of sale and cancellation of title but was denied. She moved to be dropped as party plaintiff denied. June 11, 2005: Estrella filed annulment case-March 1996 sale and cancellation of TCT No. N-152326, with damages, against the Tomas spouses and the RD QC-impleaded as a nominal party. Her claim: declaration of her absence and accompanying authority to sell the lot were obtained through misrepresentation, fraud and deceit, + JDRC Decision was not published. Answer-Tomas spouses: dismissal-forum shopping RTC and CA: dismiss Estrellas Arguments: merely substituted, not privy to sale, on account of repeated denials, she was left with no other alternative but to institute the annulment case. The collection case does not further her interest-recover her conjugal share. SC: denied Estrella was not prompted by a desire to trifle with judicial processes, and was acting in good faith (protect her conjugal share) in initiating the annulment case, still the case should be dismissed based on forum shopping. "The absence of the consent of one (spouse to a sale) renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale." Estrella had the right to maintain the annulment case as a measure of protecting her conjugal share. There thus exists a just cause for her to be dropped as party plaintiff in the collection case so that she may institute and maintain the annulment case without violating the rule against forum shopping. Unless this is done, she stands to lose her share in the conjugal property. But the issue of whether the sale should be annulled is a different matter altogether. While Estrella correctly made use of the remedies available to her amending the Complaint and filing a motion to drop her as a party she committed a mistake in proceeding to file the annulment case directly without first questioning or addressing the propriety of these denials thru petition for certiorari 1. When CPG commences and applies (a) Marriages under FC, FC 107 cf. FC 88, FC 89 Art. 107. The rules provided in Articles 88 and 89 shall also apply to conjugal partnership of gains. Art. 88. The absolute community of property between spouses shall commence at the precise moment that the marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement of the community regime at any other time shall be void. Art. 89. No waiver of rights, shares and effects of the absolute community of property during the marriage can be made except in case of judicial separation of property. When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of property, or after the marriage has been dissolved or annulled, the same shall appear in a public instrument and shall be recorded as provided in Article 77. The creditors of the spouse who made such waiver may petition the court to rescind the waiver to the extent of the amount sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. (b) Marriages before FC, FC 105(2) of FC 256 Art. 105. XXX The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. 180 | P a g e -
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Art. 256. This Code shall take effect one year after the completion of its publication in a newspaper of general circulation, as certified by the Executive Secretary, Office of the President. Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven. (c) Suppletory rules, FC 108 cf. NCC 1767-1768 Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Article 1767. By the contract of partnership two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves. Two or more persons may also form a partnership for the exercise of a profession. Article 1768. The partnership has a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of each of the partners, even in case of failure to comply with the requirements of article 1772, first paragraph. 2. What is included in the CPG, FC Art. 106 Art. 106. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance, and, upon dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be divided equally between them, unless otherwise agreed in the marriage settlements. a. Presumption of CPG, FC 116 Art. 106. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance, and, upon dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be divided equally between them, unless otherwise agreed in the marriage settlements. 3 Titan v David, G.R. No. 169548, March 15, 2010 1. 2. Manuel and Martha were married in March 25, 1957. In 1970, spouses acquired a lot located at White Plains which was registered in the name of Martha David married to Manuel David. In 1976, spouses separated de facto and no longer communicated with each other. In March 1995, Manuel discovered that Martha had previously sold the property to Titan through a deed of sale. Manuel filed a complaint for annulment of contract and reconveyance against Titan. He alleged that the sale executed b y Martha in favor of titan was without his knowledge and consent and therefore void. Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and for value because it relied on the SPA signed by Manuel which authorized Martha to dispose of the property on behalf of the spouses. Manuel claimed that the SPA was spurious and the signature purporting to be his was a forgery. Hence Martha has no authority to sell it.
3. 4. 5.
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Issue: WoN the property is conjugal thus Martha doesnt have the authority to sell it without the consent of Manuel Held: YES The property is part of the spouses conjugal partnership. Article 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Manuel was not required to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. Rather, the presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. 23 Here, we find that Titan failed to overturn the presumption that the property, purchased during the spouses marriage, was part of the conjugal partnership. In the absence of Manuels consent, the Deed of Sale is void. Since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership, the sale to Titan required the consent of both
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spouses. Article 165 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership". Likewise, Article 172 of the Civil Code ordains that "(t)he wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husbands consent, except in cases provided by law". Similarly, Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written consent of the other spouse, otherwise, such disposition is void. The Special Power of Attorney purportedly signed by Manuel is spurious and void. Titan is not a buyer in good faith. Because at the face of the TCT it can be inferred that the said property is owned by Martha married to Manuel, thus it may deemed to be a conjugal property. 4 Imani vs. Metrobank, G.R. No. 187023, November 17, 2010. Envangeline signed a continuing suretyship agreement in favor of Metrobank with Cesar Dazo et. al as her co-sureties. As sureties, they bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever indebtedness CP Dazo Tannery Inc. (CPDTI) CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its loans. Metrobank filed a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties, including herein petitioner. Trial court ruled in favor of Metrobank. It also issued a writ of execution. The sheriff levied on a property registered in the name of Petitioner. Public auction was executed and the property was awarded to Metrobank. Metrobank filed a manifestation and motion praying that spouses Imani be directed to surrender the owners copy of TCT for cancellation. Petitioner opposed and filed a comment with urgent motion to cancel and nullify the levy on execution, the auction sale and certificate of salve over TCT. She argued that the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership as such it cannot be held answerable for the liabilities incurred by CPDTI to Metrobank. Issue: WoN the property is conjugal Held: NO Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.31 Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material. To support her assertion that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership, petitioner submitted the Affidavit35 of Crisanto Origen, attesting that petitioner and her husband were the vendees of the subject property, and the photocopies of the checks36 allegedly issued by Sina Imani as payment for the subject property. Unfortunately for petitioner, the said Affidavit can hardly be considered sufficient evidence to prove her claim that the property is conjugal. As correctly pointed out by Metrobank, the said Affidavit has no evidentiary weight because Crisanto Origen was not presented in the RTC to affirm the veracity of his Affidavit The fact that the land was registered in the name of Evangelina Dazo-Imani married to Sina Imani is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. Indubitably, petitioner utterly failed to substantiate her claim that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership. Thus, it cannot be rightfully said that the CA reversed the RTC ruling without valid basis. 5 Dewara v Lamela, GR 179010, April 11, 2011 Facts: Spouses Dewara were married before the enactment of the Family Code. Elenita worked in California while Eduardo stayed in Bacolod. While driving a private jeepney registered in the name of Elenita, Eduardo hit Ronnie. Ronnie filed a criminal case for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence against Eduardo. The lower court found Eduardo guilty of the charge and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment, and to pay civil indemnity. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the lower court and it became final and executory. The writ of execution on the civil liability was served on Eduardo, but it was returned unsatisfied because he had no property in his name. Ronnie requested the City Sheriff, respondent Alvero, to levy on a lot in the name of Elenita, Eduardos wife, to satisfy the judgment on the civil liability of Eduardo. The City Sheriff served a notice of embargo on the title of the lot and subsequently sold the lot in a public auction. In the execution sale, there were no interested buyers other than Ronnie. The City Sheriff issued a certificate of sale to spouses Ronnie and Gina Lamela to satisfy the civil liability in the decision against Eduardo. Ronnie then caused the consolidation of title in a Cadastral Proceeding before the RTC, which ordered the cancellation of the TCT in the name of Elenita and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of respondent spouses. The above incidents happened while Elenita was working in California. Elenita, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Ferdinand Magallanes, filed a case for annulment of sale and for damages against Spouses Lamela and ex-officio sheriff Alvero. Elenita claimed that the levy on execution of the subject lot was illegal because the said property was her paraphernal or exclusive property and could not be made to answer for the personal liability of her husband. Furthermore, as the registered owner of the property, she received no notice of the execution sale. On the other hand, the Spouses averred that the subject lot was the conjugal property of Elenita and Eduardo. They asserted that the property was acquired by Elenita during her marriage to Eduardo; that the property was acquired with the money of Eduardo because, at the time of the acquisition of the property, Elenita was a plain housewife; that the jeep involved in the accident was registered in the name of petitioner; and that Elenita did not interpose any objection pending the levy on execution of the property. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Elenita. The RTC declared that said property was paraphernal in nature. It arrived at this conclusion by tracing how Elenita acquired the subject property. Based on the documentary evidence submitted, Elenitas grandfather, Exequiel, originally owned the lot. Upon his death, his children Jesus, Elenitas father, Salud and Concepcion, inherited the property, and subsequently a new title on their favor was issued. Asto how Elenita acquired the lot, the RTC gave credence to the testimony of Elenita on the circumstances surrounding the sale of the property. First, it was sold to her by her father and her aunt so that the family would remain on the lot. Second, the minimal and inadequate consideration for the 1,440 sq m property was for the purpose of helping her expand her capital in her business at the time. Thus, the sale was essentially a donation and was therefore gratuitous in character. Having declared that the property was the paraphernal property of Elenita, the RTC ruled that the civil liability of Eduardo, which was personal to him, could not be charged to the exclusive property of his wife.
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On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA elucidated that the gross inadequacy of the price alone does not affect a contract of sale, except that it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract. The CA ruled that Elenita and Eduardo acquired the property by onerous title during their marriage through their common fund. Thus, it belonged to the conjugal partnership of gains and might be levied upon to answer for civil liabilities adjudged against Eduardo Issues: a. Whether the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo? b. Whether the property may be subject to levy and execution sale to answer for the civil liability adjudged against Eduardo in the criminal case for serious physical injuries, which judgment had already attained finality? Held: a. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this presumption. The separation-infact between the husband and the wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature. Moreover, the presumption of conjugal ownership applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal funds is not an essential requirement for the presumption to arise. There is no dispute that the subject property was acquired by spouses Elenita and Eduardo during their marriage. It is also undisputed that their marital relations are governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, since they were married before the enactment of the Family Code and they did not execute any prenuptial agreement as to their property relations. Thus, the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the property applies to the lot in question. The presumption that the property is conjugal property may be rebutted only by strong, clear, categorical, and convincing evidence, there must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it. Aside from the assertions of Elenita that the sale of the property by her father and her aunt was in the nature of a donation because of the alleged gross disparity between the actual value of the property and the monetary consideration for the sale, there is no other evidence that would convince this Court of the paraphernal character of the property. Elenita proffered no evidence of the market value or assessed value of the subject property in 1975. Elenita has not sufficiently proven that the prices involved in the sales in question were so inadequate for the Court to reach a conclusion that the transfers were in the nature of a donation rather than a sale. Furthermore, gross inadequacy of the price does not affect a contract of sale, except as it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract. b. However, even after having declared that Lot No. 234-C is the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo, it does not necessarily follow that it may automatically be levied upon in an execution to answer for debts, obligations, fines, or indemnities of one of the spouses. Before debts and obligations may be charged against the conjugal partnership, it must be shown that the same were contracted for, or the debts and obligations should have redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon the husband or the wife, as a rule, may not be charged to the partnership. However, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if the property should be insufficient, the fines and indemnities may be enforced upo nthe partnership assets only after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of the Civil Code have been covered. In this case, it is just and proper that Ronnie be compensated for the serious physical injuries he suffered. Even though the vehicle that hit Ronnie was registered in the name of Elenita, she was not made a party in the said criminal case. Thus, she may not be compelled to answer for Eduardos liability. Nevertheless, their conjugal partnership property may be held accountable for it since Eduardo has no property in his name. The payment of indemnity adjudged by the RTC of Bacolod City in Criminal Case in favor of Ronnie may be enforced against the partnership assets of spouses Elenita and Eduardo after the responsibilities enumerated under Article 161 of the Civil Code have been covered. Said enumeration should first be complied with before the conjugal partnership may be held to answer for the liability adjudged against Eduardo. b. What are included in CPG, FC 106, 117, 115, 118, 119, 120 Art. 106. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance, and, upon dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be divided equally between them, unless otherwise agreed in the marriage settlements. Art. 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties: (1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; (2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the spouses; (3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse; (4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the law awards to the finder or owner of the property where the treasure is found; (5) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or hunting; (6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in excess of the number of each kind brought to the marriage by either spouse; and (7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings from gambling or betting. However, losses therefrom shall be borne exclusively by the loser-spouse.
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Art. 115. Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities, usufructs and similar benefits shall be governed by the rules on gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be proper in each case. Art. 118. Property bought on installments paid partly from exclusive funds of either or both spouses and partly from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or buyers if full ownership was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal partnership if such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case, any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership. Art. 119. Whenever an amount or credit payable within a period of time belongs to one of the spouses, the sums which may be collected during the marriage in partial payments or by installments on the principal shall be the exclusive property of the spouse. However, interests falling due during the marriage on the principal shall belong to the conjugal partnership. Art. 120. The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses shall pertain to the conjugal partnership, or to the original owner-spouse, subject to the following rules: When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be vested upon the reimbursement, which shall be made at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. 6 Villanueva vs CA, 427 SCRA 439 Topic: What are included in CPG Facts: Plaintiff Eusebia is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas with five children. During their marriage, they acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandue City and Consolacion (22 properties). Nicolas is co-owner of a parcel of land in Mandaue which he inherited from his parents as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately 8 parcels of land in Mandaue City. The properties earn income to which Nicolas was only one to receive. In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with legitimate family and cohabited with Pacita with an illegitimate son. Pacita has no occupation, no properties of her own. In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke. Illegitimate child Procopio has been receiving the income of said properties. Witness Natividad Retuya went to Procopio to negotiate because at this time their father Nicolas was already senile. Plaintiff, then, complained to the Barangay Captain for reconciliation/mediation but no settlement was reached, hence, the said official issued a certification to file action. RTC judgment ruled in favor of respondents, the legitimate family. Applying the presumption in Art. 116, Eusebia presented solid evidence, petitioners failed to meet standard proof required to maintain their claim that the subject properties are paraphernal properties of Nicolas. During the appeal, Eusebia died and heirs were substituted. In 1996, Pacita and Nicolas got married. CA affirmed RTC decision Issue: WON subject properties are conjugal. Held: Petitioners claim that the subject properties are exclusive properties of Nicolas except for Lot No. 152, which they claim is Pacitas exclusive property. The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of Family Code. Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. The question of whether the subject properties were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia is a factual issue. The tax declarations covering the subject properties, along with the unrebutted testimony of Eusebias witnesses, establish this fact. Petitioners point out that the deed of sale, the transfer certificate of title and the tax declaration of Lot No. 152 are all in the name of Pacita. The totality of the evidence reveals that this was merely just one of the several schemes Nicolas employed to deprive Eusebia of their conjugal property. Tax declarations in the name of Nicolas alone are also not sufficient proof to overcome the presumption under Art. 116. Further, the cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even for a long period, does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. The marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia continued to exist regardless of the fact that Nicolas was already living with Pacita. Hence, all property acquired from the date of Nicolas and Eusebias marriage, until the date of Eusebias death, are still presumed conjugal.
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7 Mendoza v. Reyes 124 SCRA 154 Nature: Efren and Inocencia, Julia de Reyes vs.Ponciano Reyes and CA (1983) Reviewfor certiorari on the decision of CA Facts: Ponciano Reyes and Julia de Reyeswere married in 1915. They were ableto acquire two parcels of land in QC,plus buildings erected thereon fromAraneta Inc. sometime in Feb. 1947 oninstallment basis. They had to borrowmoney from the Rehabilitation FinanceCorporation (RFC) to pay theinstallments (2 joint loans of P12,000and P8,000 acquired on 1948 and1952 respectively).In the deed of sale, the vendee namedis JULIA de REYES, with marital consentfrom Ponciano. The transfercertificates in the Register of Deedswere also in her name. The spousesbuilt a house and camarin on the lotswhich were eventually leased to Efrenand Inocencia Mendoza (appellees)who transformed the camarin into amovie house.November 1958, the Reyes spouseshad to ask for an extension of 5 yearsfrom the Devt Bank of the Phil(successor of the RFC) for the paymentof the money they borrowed, aspayment for the outstanding balanceof the lots.On March 3, 1961, Julia sold the lots tothe Mendoza couple while Poncianowas in Pampanga, attending to hisfarm. The couple are not in good terms anymore. The sale was madewithout the consent of Ponciano Transfer certificates were issued toMendozas.Ponciano filed a case in the CFI for theannulment of the sale. The Mendozasand Julia allege that the lots wereparaphernal properties of Julia, and thepurchase was done in good faith. TheCFI ruled in favor of Julia and theMendozas. The Court of Appealsreversed the decision, declaring thesale null and void with respect to the share of Julia to the lots in question. Issues/Held/Ratio:
(1) Are the properties in questionconjugal or paraphernal?Court says conjugal. The Court appliedArt. 153 of the Civil Code (Art.117 of the FC par.1), ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property: (1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; The presumption found in Article 160 of the Civil Code must also be overcome by one who contends that the disputed property is paraphernal Article 160 provides: ART. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. declaring that theproperties are acquired by oneroustitle during the marriage. Records show that the funds came from loansobtained by the Reyes spouses fromthe Rehabilitation Finance Corporation . Although Julia was contendingthat the money came from her personal funds and from the donationsof her mother, various records showotherwise (Income Tax Returns declaring conjugal partnership), andshe did not deny the truth of thesestatements. (2) Petitioners are not allowed toinvoke estoppel, even if a previouscase of Ponciano had him declaring inhis special defenses that he and hiswife never had any kind of conjugalfunds, that they acted independentlyin business. Estoppel can only beinvoked between the person makingthe misrepresentation and the personto whom it was addressed. (3) Did the Mendozas buy the lands ingood faith? The Mendozas are aware of the natureof the property. The mortgagecontracts issued in the name of JuliaReyes married to Ponciano wereannotated in the transfer certificatesand the Mendozas are unquestionablycharged with notice of existence andcontents of said mortgages. Thepropertys nature is still conjugal evenif it was registered in the name of thewife. Petition DENIED. CA affirmed 1 Canete v PNB, April 2011 **Theres no such case as CANETE VS PNB in April 2011, but there is AGUETE vs PNB Laoag. So ito na lang ni-digest ko. Mej magkatunog naman ang AGUETE at CANETE. HAHA
JOE A. ROS and ESTRELLA AGUETE, Petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK - LAOAG BRANCH, Respondent. FACTS: Joe A. Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October 14, 1974 and as security for the loan, Ros executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land with all the improvements thereon described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T9646. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB, Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one (1) year without the property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB, Laoag Branch on August 10, 1978. Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete) has no knowledge of the loan obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property a complaint was filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the documents were forged and that the loan did 185 | P a g e -
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not redound to the benefit of the family. PNB prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action, and insists that it was plaintiffs-appellees own acts [of] omission/connivance that bar them from recovering the subject property on the ground of estoppel, laches, abandonment and prescription. RTC: Declared that Deed of REM was null and void as well as the subsequent foreclosure proceedings. Aguete did not sign the loan documents, nor did she appear before the Notary Public to acknowledge the execution of the loan documents, did not receive the loan proceeds from PNB, and was not aware of the loan until PNB notified her in 14 August 1978 that she and her family should vacate the mortgaged property because of the expiration of the redemption period. Under the Civil Code, the effective law at the time of the transaction, Ros could not encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without Aguetes consent. Aguete may, during their marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of the contract her husband entered into without her consent, especially in the present case where her consent is required. The trial court, however, ruled that its decision is without prejudice to the right of action of PNB to recover the amount of the loan and its interests from Ros. In a subsequent Order, trial court allowed petitioners to occupy the subject property with the condition that petitioners would voluntarily vacate the premises and waive recovery of improvements introduced should PNB prevail on appeal. CA: PNB appealed and CA granted its appeal. According to the CA, the trial court concluded forgery without adequate proof; thus it was improper for the trial court to rely solely on Aguetes testimony that her signatures on the loan documents were forged. The appellate court declared that Aguete affixed her signatures on the documents knowingly and with her full consent. Assuming arguendo that Aguete did not give her consent to Ros loan, the appellate court ruled that the conjugal partnership is still liable because the loan proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family. The records of the case reveal that the loan was used for the expansion of the familys business. Therefore, the debt obtained is chargeable against the conjugal partnership. ISSUES: (1) What are included in CPG? (2) Whether the Deed of REM is null and void (3) Whether the loan contracted by husband Ros PNB redounded to the benefit of his family RULING: (1) The spouses, being married in January of 1954 means that their property relation shall be governed by CPG. According to the Civil Code, Art. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property: (1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; (2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work or as salary of the spouses, or of either of them; (3) The fruits, rents or interest received or due during the marriage, coming from the common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse. Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership; (2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which constitute a charge upon property of either spouse or of the partnership; (3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either the husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the partnership; (4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property; (5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of both husband and wife, and of legitimate children of one of the spouses; (6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or other course. Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same. 186 | P a g e -
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Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage may demand the value of the property fraudulently alienated by the husband. (2) No. The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable. Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros encumbrance of the subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent. In the present case, we follow the conclusion of the appellate court and rule that Aguete gave her consent to Ros encumbrance of the subject property. (3) Yes. The application for loan shows that the loan would be used exclusively for additional working [capital] of buy & sell of garlic & virginia tobacco. In her testimony, Aguete confirmed that Ros engaged in such business, but claimed to be unaware whether it prospered. Aguete was also aware of loans contracted by Ros, but did not know where he wasted the money. Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term "x x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. 2 De La Pena v Avila, Feb. 2012 Facts: The suit concerns a 277 square m residential land, with improvements, situated in Marikina and previously registered in the name of petitioner Antonia R. Dela Pea, "married to Antegono A. Dela Pea".4 7 May 1996, Antonia obtained from Aguila a loan of 250K which, pursuant to the Promissory Note the former executed in favor of the latter, also executed in favor of Aguila a notarized Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the property, for the purpose of securing the payment of said loan obligation. 4 November 1997, Antonia executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of respondent Gemma Remilyn C. Avila, for 600K. Gemma caused the cancellation of the TCT and for the issuance new one, naming her as the owner of the subject realty.8 26 November 1997, Gemma also constituted a real estate mortgage over said parcel in favor of respondent FEBTC-BPI, to secure a loan facility with a credit limit of 1.2M 3 March 1998, Antonia filed with the RD of Marikina an Affidavit of Adverse Claim to the effect, among others, that she was the true and lawful owner of the property which had been titled in the name of Gemma; and, that the Deed of Absolute Sale Gemma utilized in procuring her title was simulated.11 In view of Gemmas failure to pay the principal as well as the accumulated interest and penalties on the loans she obtained, on the other hand, FEBTC-BPI caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted over the property. -FEBTC-BPI is the highest bidder and caused the same to be titled in its name. 18 May 1998, Antonia and her son, petitioner Alvin John B. Dela Pea, filed against Gemma the complaint for annulment of deed of sale (RTC Marikina), claiming that the subject realty was conjugal property. 25 September 1999, the Dela Peas filed a supplemental complaint, impleading FEBTC-BPI as additional defendant, alleging that FEBTC-BPI was in bad faith when it purchased the property. RTC: The subject property was conjugal in nature and that the Deed of Absolute Sale Antonia executed in favor of Gemma was void. CA: reversed -Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Gemma Avila and the subsequent sale on auction of the subject property to FEBTC are upheld as valid and binding. Issue: Whether the house and lot is a conjugal property of the spouses Antegono and Antonia Dela Pea? N Held: Pursuant to Article 160 CC, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership,30 proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Francisco vs. CA: Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must first prove said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.33 The Dela Peas did not even come close to proving that the subject property was acquired during the marriage. Beyond Antonias bare and uncorroborated assertion that the property was purchased when she was already married,34 the record is bereft of any evidence from which the actual date of acquisition of the realty can be ascertained. The presumption of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired,36 we find that the CA cannot be faulted for ruling that the realty in litigation was Antonias exclusive property. Not having established the time of acquisition of the property, the Dela Peas insist that the registration thereof in the name of "Antonia R. Dela Pea, of legal age, Filipino, married to Antegono A. Dela Pea" should have already sufficiently established its conjugal 187 | P a g e -
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nature. Ruiz vs. CA: the phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband is also a registered owner. Because it is likewise possible that the property was acquired by the wife while she was still single and registered only after her marriage, neither would registration thereof in said manner constitute proof that the same was acquired during the marriage and, for said reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature. "Since there is no showing as to when the property in question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the wife alone is determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said spouse."38 The Deed of Absolute Sale was valid and binding between Antonia and Gemma. 3. What is excluded from CPG, FC 109 Art. 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse: (1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own; (2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title; (3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by exchange with property belonging to only one of the spouses; and (4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband. 3 Laperal v. Katigbak, 10 SCRA 493 Facts: Appeal from decision of CFI of Manila declaring property to be the paraphernal property of defendant-appelle Evelina Kalwa. The appellants maintain that it should be considered as conjugal property Laperals sought for recovery of money evidenced by promissory notes made by Katigbak and for the recovery of jewelry that katigbak was supposed to sell. Nov 1, 1950 - TC ordered Katigbak to pay back the Laperals and return the jewelry. Dec 1950 Katigbak and Evelina Kalaw filed for judicial separation of property and separate administration which was granted. Feb 1, 1955 Laperals filed complaint that the separation of property should be annulled and should be deemed as conjugal property Dec 27, 1958: SC rendered judgment that while the conjugal property should be used to pay the debt of Katigbak, the paraphernal property of Kalaw shouldnt. TC: rendered judgment that Kalaws property was indeed paraphenral. ISSUE: WON property being contested is part of conjugal property HELD: NO Art 160 of CC- properties acquired during marriage are deemed conjugal property unless it is proven that it belongs exclusively to husband and wife o Shown through: (1) title is in name of wife alone (2) husband gave his marital consent to their being mortgaged by his wife (3) wife is financially able to buy proeprty In this case, proved that mother of Evelina bought the contested property for her, it was under Evelinas name, Ramon Katigbak issued a manifestation where he stated he had no interest in the property, husband could not have afforded to buy it. RESULT: land is paraphernal and thus cant be subject to the debts of Katigbak 4 Veloso v. Martinez, 28 Phil 255 Facts: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Plaintiff commenced an action to recover of the defendant the possession of a certain parcel of land together with the sum of P125 per month. Defendant answered and filed a counterclaim for services rendered by the deceased to the plaintiff and recovery of certain jewelry alleged to be in the possession in the plaintiff. The jewels in question before the possession of the same was given to the plaintiff, belonged to the defendant personally and that she had inherited the same from her mother. Defendant Lucia is the widow of Domingo Franco and after the death of her husband she was appointed as the adminsitratrix. A short time before the death of Domingo he borrowed from plaintiff money and gave as security the jewelry.
Issue: whether or not jewelry is conjugal property Held: NO 6. 7. It was contended that the jewelry was never delivered to Plaintiff. It was shown that the key to the box where the jewelry was kept remained with the deceased. Defendant now denies that she knew that her husband had pawned her jewels or that she promised to redeem the same by
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paying the amount due. 8. 9. Record shows that the jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife acquired from her mother. It is part of her paraphernal property. As such she exercised dominion over the same. She had the exclusive control and management of the same, until and unless she had delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, with the intent that the husband might administer it properly. (Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record that she had ever delivered the same to her husband, in any manner, or for any purpose.
5 Berciles v. GSIS,128 SCRA 53, cf. FC 115 Facts: Judge Pascual Berciles died of cardiac arrest. His retirement benefits, unpaid salary, retirement premiums and terminal leave and representation and transportation allowances are being contested in this case by two families. Iluminada Ponce Berciles and her four children Ilona, Ellery, England and Ione (lawful heirs) allege that they are the lawful legal heirs of the deceased. Iluminada presents as proof, evidence of her marriage with the deceased which entitled her and their legitimate children to a share in the said benefits. On the other hand, Flor Fuentebella and her four children Pascual Voltaire, Maria Luisa, Mercy and Rhoda (contending claimants) also claim a share in the benefits. The GSIS resolved to grant the benefits in the following proportion: 77/134 for Iluminada as surviving spouse;10/134 each for the legitimate children Ilona, Ellery, England and Ione;5/134 for Pascual Voltaire as acknowledged natural child;4/134 each for the illegitimate children Maria Luisa, Mercy and Rhoda. Both parties appealed. The lawful heirs contend that the GSIS ruling is erroneous, that they are the only legal heirs under the law. The contending claimants also appealed claiming that they should be the only ones entitled to the benefits Issue: Is the GSIS decision valid? Held: NO. The marriage between Iluminada and the deceased was sufficiently proved and ruled upon by this court, fully supported by appropriate evidence as certified by the civil registry therefore the four children begotten by said spouses during their marital union are all legitimate. They are entitled to their share in the benefits. The marriage between Flor and the deceased was not proved. She only presented a certification that their marriage records could not be found or located in the civil registry. As to Pascual Voltaire, his paternity cannot be sufficiently proved. His birth certificate was nots igned by either the father or mother and under the law, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, the putting of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and void. Pascual Voltaire therefore cannot be considered as an acknowledged natural child. Under the law, illegitimate children are entitled to support and such successional rights so long as there is admission or recognition of paternity. As a result, the illegitimate children of Flor cannot share in the benefits as the marriage between Flor and the deceased was not sufficiently proved and paternity was not established. The retirement benefits and the terminal leave pay, unpaid salary and allowances accruing to the deceased shall be distributed equally to the 5 heirs: Iluminada, Ilona, Ellery, England and Ione. As to the retirement premiums, the same is presumed conjugal, there being no proof that the premiums were paid from the exclusive funds of the deceased. One half belongs to the wife as her property in the conjugal partnership and the other half shall go to the estate of the deceased to be distributed to his legal heirs. Premiums are presumed conjugal without proof of payment though exclusive funds 6 Plata v. Yatco, 12 SCRA 718 Topic: What are included in CPG Facts: This case involves a decision of court finding the petitioner Plata in contempt of court for refusing to vacate certain property. Amailia Plata purchased land and sold it to Celso Saldana. But Celso resold it to her seven months after when she was already married to Gaudencio Begosa. Amalia mortgaged to Cesarea Villanueva the property in consideration of a loan of 3,000. Gaudencio also signed the deal. Amalia and Gaudencion failed to pay mortgage and the land was then sold to Cesarea and husband Gregorio. They then sued Gaudencio Begosa alone for illegal detainer which was granted. However, Amalia resisted all efforts ejecting her from the party since she is claiming that land was her own paraphernal property and not conjugal property. Issue: WON Amalia is bound by the detainer judgment against Gaudencio Begosa. Held: No. Applying the well known presumption that persons openly living together as husband and wife are legally married to each other, it is settled that Petitioner and Gaudencio are deemed to be legally married. Despite this, the respondents Villanueva could not ignore the paraphernal character of the property in question, which had been unquestionably acquired by Plata while still single, as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title. The subsequent conveyance to Celso Saldaa, and the reconveyance of her several months afterward of the same property, did not transform it from paraphernal to conjugal property, there being no proof that the money paid to Saldaa came from common or conjugal funds. The deed of mortgage in favor of respondents Villanueva actually recites that the petitioner was the owner of the tenement in question and so does the conveyance of it by Saldaa to her. It is true that Gaudencio Begosa signed the mortgage as a co-mortgagor; but by itself alone that circumstance would not suffice to convert the land into conjugal property, considering that it was paraphernal in origin. This is particularly the case where the addition of Begosa as co-mortgagor was clearly an after thought, the text of the deed showing that Plata was the sole mortgagor. Since the property was paraphernal, and the creditors and purchasers were aware of it, it is plain that Plata's possession, therefore, was not derived from Gaudencio Begosa. The illegal detainer judgment against the husband alone cannot bind nor affect the wife's possession of her paraphernal. Hence, as she was not made party defendant in the eviction suit, the petitioner-wife could validly ignore
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the judgment of eviction against her husband, and it was no contempt of court for her to do so, because the writ of execution was not lawful against her. 7 Francisco v CA, 1998 This petition for review on certiorari Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco (Eusebio) by his second marriage. Private respondents Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio Francisco are children of Eusebio by his first marriage. Petitioner alleges that since their marriage on February 10, 1962, she and Eusebio have acquired the following: (1) a sari-sari store, a residential house and lot, an apartment house, and a house and lot Petitioner further avers that these properties were administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer, thereby, rendering him unfit to administer them. Petitioner also claims that private respondents succeeded in convincing their father to sign a general power of attorney which authorized Conchita Evangelista to administer the house and lot together with the apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal. RTC Petition to declare the properties conjugal in nature and to declare her as administratrix DENIED; failed to adduce proof that the properties were acquired in the second marriage. CA Affirmed RTC in toto Petitioner raised the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court: ISSUE: WON the properties are exclusive properties of Eusebio. (NOTE: The issue had been resolved based on the NCC because vested rights cannot be impaired by the passing of the FC.) HELD: Yes, the properties are exclusive properties of Eusebio. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must first prove said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio. With respect to the land at Col. Cruz St., Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal, petitioner failed to refute the testimony of Eusebio that he inherited the same from his parents. Interestingly, petitioner even admitted that Eusebio brought into their marriage the said land, albeit in the concept of a possessor only as it was not yet registered in his name. Whether Eusebio succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to his second marriage is inconsequential. The property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of law, pursuant to Article 148 of the New Civil Code. Essentially, property already owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and brought to the marriage, is considered his or her separate property. Acquisitions by lucrative title refers to properties acquired gratuitously and include those acquired by either spouse during the marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation. Hence, even if it be assumed that Eusebios acquisition by succession of the land took place during his second marriage, the land would still be his exclusive property because it was acquired by him, during the marriage, by lucrative title. As regards the house, apartment and sari-sari store, private respondents aver that these properties were either constructed or established by their father during his first marriage. On the other hand, petitioner insists that the said assets belong to conjugal partnership. In support of her claim, petitioner relied on the building permits for the house and the apartment, with her as the applicant although in the name of Eusebio. She also invoked the business license for the sari-sari store issued in her name alone. It must be emphasized that the aforementioned documents in no way prove that the improvements were acquired during the second marriage. And the fact that one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the property is conjugal or not. Regarding the property at San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, private respondents assert that their father purchased it during the lifetime of their mother. In contrast, petitioner claims ownership over said property inasmuch as the title thereto is registered in the name of Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco. It must be stressed that the certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors her claim is inadequate. The fact that the land was registered in the name of Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco, is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts . It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase married to preceding Teresita Francisco is merely descriptive of the civil status of Eusebio Francisco Petition Denied.
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4. Administration of exclusive property (a) By the spouse-owner, FC 110 Art. 110. The spouses retain the ownership, possession, administration and enjoyment of their exclusive properties. Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the administration of his or her exclusive property to the other by means of a public instrument, which shall be recorded in the registry of property of the place the property is located. (b) By the other spouse, FC 110 2nd par; FC 142, 75, 227 FC 110 2nd par see above Art. 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to the other spouse: (1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other; (2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee; (3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; or (4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an accused in a criminal case. If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, conflict of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator. Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any other regime. In the absence of a marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community of property as established in this Code shall govern. Art. 227. If the parents entrust the management or administration of any of their properties to an unemancipated child, the net proceeds of such property shall belong to the owner. The child shall be given a reasonable monthly allowance in an amount not less than that which the owner would have paid if the administrator were a stranger, unless the owner, grants the entire proceeds to the child. In any case, the proceeds thus give in whole or in part shall not be charged to the child's legitime. 1 Veloso v. Martinez, supra FACTS: A short time before the death of Domingo Franco, he borrowed from the Veloso the sum of P4,500 and gave as security for the payment of said sum the jewelry which belonged to Martinez personally and that she had inherited the same from her mother. The money was borrowed on the 7th day of April, 1911, under promise to repay the same, with 12 per cent interest, on the 7th day of May, 1911. It is not clear whether or not the jewelry, at the time of the execution of said document was in fact delivered to the plaintiff. Lucia Martinez, is the widow of Domingo Franco, and after the death of her husband she was appointed administratrix of his estate. On the 1st day of July, 1911, Veloso commenced an action in the Court of First Instance to recover of the defendant the possession of a certain parcel of land particularly described in the second paragraph of the complaint, together with the sum of P125 per month, from the 1st day of June, 1911. Defendant: CFI counterclaim in the sum of P18,500, as attorneys fees for services rendered by the deceased, Domingo Franco, to the plaintiff; recovery of certain jewelry, of the value of P6,000, particularly described in the answer of the defendant, alleged to be in the possession of the plaintiff. counterclaim was withdrew plaintiff was entitled to recover the possession of the land in question, together with the sum of P100 for each month from the month of June, 1911, until the possession of the land was returned to him defendant was entitled to the possession of said jewelry, and ordered the plaintiff to return the same to her and in case of the plaintiffs failure to return said jewelry to the defendant, then and in that case, he shall pay to the defendant, for such failure, the sum of P6,000
ISSUE: Whether the jewelry is Martinezs paraphernal property RULING: It is not clear whether or not the jewelry, at the time of the execution of said document (Exhibit C), was in fact delivered to the plaintiff. Said exhibit states that the jewelry was contained in a box which remains closed after the jewels were shown to Mariano Veloso. The document further admits the key shall remain in possession of Domingo Franco. After the death of Domingo Franco it appears that said jewelry was found in the same box (caja) and that the key was in the possession of Martinez. It is very doubtful whether the plaintiff ever obtained the actual possession of the jewelry. However, Velosos possession of said jewelry seems to be admitted by the defendant in the present action. So far as the record shows the jewelry was in the same box where it was found at the time of the execution and delivery of said Exhibit C and that the defendant still has the key to said box. Plaintiff attempted to show that the jewels in question were pawned to him by Domingo Franco, with the full knowledge and consent of the defendant; and that after the death of Domingo Franco, the defendant promised to pay the amount for which the jewels were pawned. The defendant positively denies that she knew that her husband had pawned her jewels or that she promised to redeem the same by paying the amount due. No explanation is contained in the record why the jewels were placed in said box .
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The jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife, acquired from her mother, and in the absence of further proof, we must presume that they constituted a part of her paraphernal property. As such paraphernal property she exercised dominion over the same. (Article 1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive control and management of the same, until and unless she had delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, with the intent that the husband might administer it properly. (Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record that she had ever delivered the same to her husband, in any manner, or for any purpose. That being true, she could not be deprived of the same by any act of her husband, without her consent, and without compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code above cited. 5. Encumbrance/disposition of exclusive property FC 111-112, of FC 236, amended by RA 6809 Art. 111. A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive property, without the consent of the other spouse, and appear alone in court to litigate with regard to the same. Art. 112. The alienation of any exclusive property of a spouse administered by the other automatically terminates the administration over such property and the proceeds of the alienation shall be turned over to the owner-spouse. Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. (amended by RA 6809 act lowering age of majority) 2 Wong et al. v. IAC 200 SCRA 792 Facts: Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda. They had been most of the time living separately. The former stayed in Angeles City while the latter lived in Manila. During the marriage, Romarico bought parcel of land in Angeles City from his father, with money borrowed from an officemate. Meanwhile in Hongkong, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale. When Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in favor of Anita Chan a check, however, was dishonored for lack of funds. Hence, Katrina was charged with estafa. Trial court dismissed the case on the ground that Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil in nature. Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against Katrina and her husband Romarico Henson, an action for collection of a sum of money. After trial, the court promulgated decisions in favor of the Wongs. A writ of execution was thereafter issued, levied upon were four lots in Angeles all in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. Romarico filed an action for the annulment of the decision as well as the writ of execution, levy on execution and the auction. Romarico alleged that he was "not given his day in court" because he was not represented by counsel as Attys. Albino and Yumul appeared solely for Katrina. That he had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina as he did not authorize her to enter into such transactions; and that the properties levied on execution and sold at public auction by the sheriff were his capital properties. Issue: Whether the properties levied on execution are exclusive properties of Romarico? N Held: On the matter of ownership of the properties involved, however, the Court disagrees with the appellate court that the said properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. Having been acquired during the marriage, they are still presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership 26 even though Romarico and Katrina had been living separately. 27 The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. 28 While there is proof that Romarico acquired the properties with money he had borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear where he obtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then the money is part of the conjugal assets 29 and not exclusively his. Proof on this matter is of paramount importance considering that in the determination of the nature of a property acquired by a person during covertrue, the controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in the purchase. The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's indebtedness may not be paid for with them her obligation not having been shown by the petitioners to be one of the charges against the conjugal partnership. 30 In addition to the fact that her rights over the properties are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the consent of her husband and her authority to incur such indebtedness had not been alleged in the complaint and proven at the trial. 31 Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988), a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family or when she borrows money for the purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support of the family if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum; 32 when the administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts 33 or by the husband 34 and when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. 35 Having failed to establish that any of these circumstances occurred, the Wongs may not bind the conjugal assets to answer for Katrina's personal obligation to them. 6. If property bought by installments, FC Art. 118, 119 Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary: (1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over, (2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality; (3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent or parents; (4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent, if living with said parent and the latter's spouse, if any; and (5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. Art. 189. Adoption shall have the following effects: (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the 192 | P a g e -
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relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters; (2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and (3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives. 3 Jovellanos v CA, G.R. No. 100728 June 18, 1992 Facts: Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a a lease and conditional sale agreement over a house and lot. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three children, the petitioners. Leonor Dizon died consequently. Then Daniel married private respondent Annette with whom he begot two children. The daughter from the 1st marriage Mercy Jovellanos married Gil Martinez and at the behest of Daniel Jovellanos, they built a house on the back portion of the premises. With the lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife executed to Daniel Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter donated to herein petitioners all his rights, title and interests over the lot and bungalow thereon. In 1985, Daniel died. Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower court that the aforestated property was acquired by her deceased husband while their marriage was still subsisting and which forms part of the conjugal partnership of the second marriage. Petitioners contend that the property, were acquired by their parents during the existence of the first marriage under their lease and conditional sale agreement with Philamlife of September 2, 1955. Issue: WON the house and lot pertains to the second marriage? YES Held: The conditional sale agreement in said contract is, therefore, also in the nature of a contract to sell, as contradistinguished from a contract of sale. In a contract to sell or a conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of the property but upon full payment of the purchase price. Generally, ownership is transferred upon delivery, but even if delivered, the ownership may still be with the seller until full payment of the price is made, if there is stipulation to this effect. The stipulation is usually known as a pactum reservati dominii, or contractual reservation of title, and is common in sales on the installment plan. Compliance with the stipulated payments is a suspensive condition. The failure of which prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force. Daniel consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full payment of the said amount hence, although he had been in possession of the premises since September 2, 1955, it was only on January 8, 1975 that Philamlife executed the deed of absolute sale thereof in his favor. Daniel Jovellanos did not enjoy the full attributes of ownership until the execution of the deed of sale in his favor. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law, 19 and, under the contract, Daniel Jovellanos evidently did not possess or enjoy such rights of ownership. Upon the execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in Daniel Jovellanos. Since. as early as 1967, he was already married to Annette H. Jovellanos, this property necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said second wife. NB: But since it pertained to the second wife, she is still liable to pay the corresponding reimbursements to the petitioners who helped pay for the amortization of the house and lot. Remember Article 118 of the Family Code on property bought on installments, where ownership is vested during the marriage, such property shall belong to the conjugal partnership 4 Tarrosa vs. De Leon, GR 185063, July 23, 2009 On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon, then single, and the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a 191.30 square-meter lot situated in Fairview, Quezon City. Subsequently, on April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in a civil rite officiated by the Municipal Mayor of Zaragosa, Nueva Ecija. To this union were born Danilo and Vilma. Following the full payment of the cost price for the lot thus purchased, PHHC executed, on June 22, 1970, a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio. Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 173677 was issued on February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, "single." Subsequently, Bonifacio, for PhP 19,000, sold the subject lot to her sister, Lita, and husband Felix Rio Tarrosa (Tarrosas), petitioners herein. The conveying Deed of Sale dated January 12, 1974 (Deed of Sale) did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died. Three months later, the Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale. They secured the issuance in their names from the Quezon City Register of Deeds. Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit before the RTC in Quezon City. In their complaint, Anita and her children alleged, among other things, that fraud attended the execution of the Deed of Sale and that subsequent acts of Bonifacio would show that he was still the owner of the parcel of land. The Tarrosas, in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property inasmuch as he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC. As further alleged, they were not aware of the supposed marriage between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale. RTC ruled in favor of Anita and her children. CA held that the Tarrosas failed to overthrow the legal presumption that the parcel of land in dispute was conjugal. Issue: WON the property in question is part of the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita. Ruling: Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita contracted marriage, provides that
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all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. For the presumption to arise, it is not, as Tan v. Court of Appeals teaches, even necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the property is conjugal. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal. In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and covered by the PHHC-Bonifacio Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. It is well settled that a conditional sale is akin, if not equivalent, to a contract to sell. In both types of contract, the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendors obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, usually the full payment of the purchase price, so that if the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed. In other words, in a contract to sell ownership is retained by the seller and is not passed to the buyer until full payment of the price, unlike in a contract of sale where title passes upon delivery of the thing sold. It cannot be over-emphasized that the 1950 Civil Code is very explicit on the consequence of the husband alienating or encumbering any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. To a specific point, the sale of a conjugal piece of land by the husband, as administrator, must, as a rule, be with the wifes consent. Else, the sale is not valid. So it is that in several cases we ruled that the sale by the husband of property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife is void ab initio, absent any showing that the latter is incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or like causes. The nullity, as we have explained, proceeds from the fact that sale is in contravention of the mandatory requirements of Art. 166 of the Code. Since Art. 166 of the Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband may alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership, it follows that the acts or transactions executed against this mandatory provision are void except when the law itself authorized their validity. As a final consideration, the Court agrees with the CA that the sale of one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation of the partnership is void. Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into a title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement.26 The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution.27 Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs 7. Improvements on CPG property, FC 120 Art. 120. The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses shall pertain to the conjugal partnership, or to the original owner-spouse, subject to the following rules: When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be vested upon the reimbursement, which shall be made at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. 5 Munoz, Jr. v Ramirez, GR 156125, August 25, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent-spouses mortgaged a residential lot (which the wife inherited) to the GSIS to secure a housing loan (200k). Thereafter, they used the money loaned to construct a residential house on said lot. It is alleged that MUNOZ granted the spouses a 600k loan, which the latter used to pay the debt to GSIS. The balance of the loan (400k) will be delivered by MUNOS upon surrender of the title over the property and an affidavit of waiver of rights (over the property) to be executed by the husband. While the spouses were able to turn over the title, no affidavit was signed by the husband. Consequently, MUNOZ refused to give the 400k balance of the loan and since the spouses could no longer return the 200k (which was already paid to GSIS), MUNOZ kept the title over the property and subsequently, caused the issuance of a new one in his own name. The spouses then filed a case for the annulment of the purported sale of the property in favor of MUNOZ. The RTC ruled that the property was the wifes exclusive paraphernal property (since she inherited it from her father) and as such, the sale is valid even without the husbands consent. The CA reversed and ruled that while the property was originally exclusive paraphernal property of the wife, it became conjugal property when it was used as a collateral for a housing loan that was paid through conjugal funds. Hence, the sale is void. Issue: Is the property paraphernal or conjugal? Ruling: PARAPHERNAL. As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. In this case, clear evidence that the wife inherited the lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership. Consequently, the residential lot is the wifes exclusive paraphernal property (pursuant to Article 92 and 109 of FC). 194 | P a g e -
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It was error for the CA to apply Article 158 of the CC and the ruling on Calimlim-Canullas. True, respondents were married during the effectivity of the CC and thus its provisions should govern their property relations. With the enactment of the FC however, the provisions of the latter on conjugal partnership of gains superseded those of the CC. Thus, it is the FC that governs the present case and not the CC. And under Article 120 of the FC (which supersedes Article 158 of the CC), when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in the value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement; otherwise, the property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement for the cost of improvement. In this case, the husband only paid a small portion of the GSIS loan (60k). Thus, it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot is considerably more than the contribution paid by the husband. Thus, the property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of the wife at the time she contracted with Munoz; the written consent of the husband was not necessary. 8. Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122, 123 Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support; (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have benefited; (4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property; (5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse; (6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other activity for self-improvement; (7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family; (8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; and (9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to groundless. If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership. However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned. Art. 123. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance or in betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the conjugal partnership property. 6 Ayala vs CA, 286 SCRA 272 Topic: Charges upon and obligations of CPG Facts: Petitioner assails the CA decision affirming the RTC decision holding the Conjugal partnership of Ching not liable for the debts incurred. Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) takes a P50,300,000 loan from Ayala, Ching Executive VP in said company executes security agreements for the loan. PBM fails to pay the loan and Ayala sues them. CFI holds PBM and Ching jointly and severally liable to pay. Pending appeal CFI issues Writ of execution upon the putting up of a P8M bond. The sheriff poses a notice of sale on 3 of Chings conjugal properties. Ching files injunction with CFI arguing subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. CFI issues TRO on auction and sale. Ayala filed a petition for certiorari with the CA to which CA issues TRO on the CFI decision. Auction of the properties takes place and are sold to Ayala who are the only bidders. Certificate of sale is issued and the redemption period expires without being claimed by Ching. In the meantime while the CA decided that CFI decision with TRO be set aside, the Civil Case should push through. Ayala filed motion to dismiss the case for being moot and academic with the consummation of the sale which was denied by CFI. TC declares the sale on execution null and void. Petitioner appealed to CA. . 195 | P a g e -
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First Argument of Ayala: Ruling of the respondent court runs counter to the pronouncement of this Court in the case of Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin, that the husband as head of the family and as administrator of the conjugal partnership is presumed to have contracted obligations for the benefit of the family or the conjugal partnership. Second Argument of Ayala: Petitioners pointed out that there is no need to prove that actual benefit redounded to the benefit of the partnership; all that is necessary, they say, is that the transaction was entered into for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The wordings of Article 161 of the Civil Code is very clear: for the partnership to be held liable, the husband must have contracted the debt for the benefit of the partnership. There is a difference between the phrases: redounded to the benefit of or benefited from (on the one hand) and for the benefit of (on the other). The former require that actual benefit must have been realized; the latter requires only that the transaction should be one which normally would produce benefit to the partnership, regardless of whether or not actual benefit accrued. Issue: WON a surety agreement entered into by the husband in favor of his employer incurs civil liability on the conjugal partnership of the former. Held: (Important)On the first argument, the court had the occasion to draw the difference between the situation where husband contracted obligation for his own business that is for benefit of his family and where the husband merely acted as surety of loan contracted by another for the latter business. 1. If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, that contract falls within the term x x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
2.
On the Second Argument, the court didnt agree with petitioner that there is a difference between the terms redounded to the benefit of or benefited from on the one hand; and for the benefit of on the other. They mean one and the same thing. Article 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Article 121 (2) of the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both use the term for the benefit of. On the other hand, Article 122 of the Family Code provides that The payment of personal debts by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. As can be seen, the terms are used interchangeably. There is no merit to the argument of Ayala. The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. In the case at bar, respondent-appellant Ayala failed to prove that the debt was contracted by appellee-husband, for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains 7 Ching vs CA, 423 SCRA 356 FACTS: The Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan of P9,000,000 fromthe Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). By virtue of this loan, the PBMCI, through its Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note for the said amount promising to pay onDecember 22, 1978 at an interest rate of 14% per annum. As an added security for the said loan,Alfredo Ching, together with Emilio Taedo and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a continuing guarantywith the ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCIobligations owing to the ABC. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans. Hence, on August21, 1981, the ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminaryattachment against the PBMCI to collect the P12,612,972.88 exclusive of interests, penalties andother bank charges. Impleaded as co-defendants in the complaint were Alfredo Ching, EmilioTaedo and Chung Kiat Hua in their capacity as sureties of the PBMCI. Citing as one of the groundsfor the writ was the fraud defendants employed in incurring the obligations by representingthemselves as having the financial capacity to pay the loan when in fact they did not have suchcapacity. In the meantime, on July 26, 1983, the deputy sheriff of the trial court levied onattachment the 100,000 common shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching. OnNovember 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion toSet Aside the levy on attachment. She alleged inter alia that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied onby the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal fundsafter the Citycorp Investment Philippines was established in 1974. Furthermore, the indebtednesscovered by the continuing guaranty/comprehensive suretyship contract executed by petitionerAlfredo Ching for the account of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.She, likewise, alleged that being the wife of Alfredo Ching, she was a third-party claimant entitledto file a motion for the release of the properties. She attached therewith a copy of her marriagecontract with Alfredo Ching. The petitioner-spouses aver that the source of funds in the acquisition of the levied sharesof stocks is not the controlling factor when invoking the presumption of the conjugal nature ofstocks under Art. 160 and that such presumption subsists even if the property is registered only inthe name of one of the spouses, in this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching. According to the petitioners,the suretyship obligation was not contracted in the pursuit of the petitioner-husband's profession orbusiness. And where conjugal assets are attached in a collection suit on an obligation contracted bythe husband, the wife should exhaust her motion to quash in the main case and not file a separatesuit. Furthermore, the petitioners contend that under Art. 125 of the Family Code, the petitioner-husband's gratuitous suretyship is null and void ab initio, and that the share of one of the spouses inthe conjugal partnership remains inchoate until the dissolution and liquidation of the partnership.The trial court initially granted the lifting of the preliminary attachment but on appeal, thedecision was reversed, the appellate court holding that petitioner Encarnacion Ching was not aproper party to the action and that even if she possessed such right, her action was already barredby laches. The appellate court also ruled that the presumption under Art. 160 was inapplicable inthe present case, when petitioner-spouses failed to prove the source of the money used to acquirethe 196 | P a g e -
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shares of stock. Hence this present petition. ISSUES: 1.Do the 100,000 shares of stock in the name of Alfredo Ching belong to the conjugalpartnership? 2.Is the conjugal partnership liable for the payment of the liability? HELD: 1. YES. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired duringthe marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that itpertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wife. In Tan v. Court of Appeals, we held that it isnot even necessary to prove that the properties were acquired with funds of the partnership. Aslong as the properties were acquired by the parties during the marriage, they are presumed to beconjugal in nature. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were acquired does notappear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal. Thepresumption of the conjugal nature of the properties acquired during the marriage subsists in theabsence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome the same.In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 sharesof stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate booksin the name of the petitioner-husband when the said corporation was incorporated on May 14,1979. This was done during the subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. The shares ofstocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners. The privaterespondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with hisexclusive money. The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporatebooks of Citycorp Investment Philippines solely in the name of the petitioner-husband does notconstitute proof that the petitioner-husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same. 2. NO. For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to thehusband alone, there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. Certainly,to make a conjugal partnership responsible for a liability that should appertain alone to one of thespouses is to frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code to show the utmost concern for thesolidarity and well being of the family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power toassume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the conjugal partnership.In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitionerswas benefited by the petitioner-husband's act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyshipagreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan wasbetween the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumptioncan be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodationagreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. Theprivate respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugalpartnership. 1 Homeowners vs. Dailo, G.R. 153802, Mar.11, 2005 Facts: Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at Barangay San Francisco, San Pablo City from a certain Sandra Dalida. However, the deed of Absolute Sale was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife. On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the this, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of P300,000.00 from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner without the knowledge and consent of respondent. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner, through its vice-president, consolidated the ownership thereof by executing on June 6, 1996 an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale. On December 20, 1995, Marcelino Dailo Died. In one of her visits to the subject property, respondent learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Roldan Brion to clean its premises and that her car, Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises. Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted Civil Case No. SP-2222 (97) for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. Petitioner: Prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. RTC: in favor of Dailo Deed of REM was null and void. Reconvey property to Dailo CA: affirmed the trial courts finding the subject property was conjugal in nature, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the subject property acquired during the marriage of spouses Dailo belongs to their conjugal partnership declared as void the mortgage on the subject property because it was constituted without the knowledge and consent of respondent, in accordance with Article 124 of the Family Code Issues: Whether or not the mortgage constituted by the late Marcelino Dailo on the subject property as co-owner thereof is valid as to his undivided share Whether or not the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, the same having redounded to the benefit of the family Ruling: First, petitioner takes issue with the legal provision applicable to the factual milieu of this case. It contends that Article 124 of 197 | P a g e -
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the Family Code should be construed in relation to Article 493 of the Civil Code, which states: ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part: ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. . . . In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . . The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. There is no legal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Code as an exception to Article 124 of the Family Code. During his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, Deed of REM is void. On second issue, petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, "[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . ." For the subject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit. The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditorparty litigant claiming as such. Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation. 2 Ando v Campo, GR 184007, February 16, 2011 Facts: Petitioner Ando: president of Premier Allied and Contracting Services, Inc. (PACSI)-independent labor contractor. Respondents: pilers or haulers hired by PACSI-manually carry bags of sugar from the warehouse of Victorias Milling Company and load them on trucks June 1998: respondents were dismissed and they filed a case for illegal dismissal and money claims with NLRC (Bacolod) LA: in favor of respondents - PACSI and petitioner were directed to pay 422K (separation pay and attorneys fees) NLRC: petitioner failed to perfect his appeal because he did not pay the supersedeas bond. Affirmed the LAs decision Upon finality of the decision, respondents moved for its execution. To answer for the monetary award, NLRC Acting Sheriff Pasustento issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Personal Property over the property covered by TCT No. T-140167 in the name of "Paquito V. Ando x x x married to Erlinda S. Ando. Petitioner filed an action for prohibition and damages with prayer for the issuance of TRO to RTC Bacolod, claiming that the property belonged to him and his wife, not to the corporation, and, hence, could not be subject of the execution sale. Since it is the corporation that was the judgment debtor, execution should be made on the latters properties. RTC: denied TRO - no jurisdiction, but still decide the merits of the case CA: affirmed RTC - no jurisdiction over the case, and nullified all other pronouncements Petitioners argument: never sued in his personal capacity, but in his representative capacity as president of PACSI. There is no indication in the body of the Decision that he was solidarily liable with the corporation. He also concedes that the LAs decision has become final. Hence, he is not seeking to stop the execution of the judgment against the properties of PACSI- What he is seeking to be restrained, is not the Decision itself but the manner of its execution. There is also no evidence that the sheriff ever implemented the writ of execution against the properties of PACSI. The property levied has been constituted as a family home within the contemplation of the Family Code. SC: The petition is meritorious.-granted There is no question that the property belongs to petitioner and his wife (TCT), and not to the corporation. It can be said that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership, not to petitioner alone. Thus, the property belongs to a third party, i.e., the conjugal 198 | P a g e -
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partnership. At the very least, the Court can consider that petitioners wife is a third party within contemplation of the law. Thus, even if we consider petitioner as an agent of the corporation and, therefore, not a stranger to the case such that the provision on third-party claims will not apply to him, the property was registered not only in the name of petitioner but also of his wife. She stands to lose the property subject of execution without ever being a party to the case. This will be tantamount to deprivation of property without due process. The power of the NLRC, or the courts, to execute its judgment extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. A sheriff, therefore, has no authority to attach the property of any person except that of the judgment debtor. Likewise, there is no showing that the sheriff ever tried to execute on the properties of the corporation. While petitioner availed himself of the wrong remedy to vindicate his rights, nonetheless, justice demands that this Court look beyond his procedural missteps and grant the petition. 3 Security Bank vs. Mar Tiera Corp., G.R. No. 143382, Nov. 29, 2006 FACTS: Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company. Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit line agreement with respondent corporation. It was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and severally with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan. Respondent corporation was not able to pay all its debt balance as it suffered business reversals, eventually ceasing operations. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent corp and individual respondents. RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of respondent corporation and individual respondent Martinez including the conjugal house and lot of the spouses but it found that it did not redound to the benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez. Petitioner appealed to CA. It affirmed RTC decision. Petitioned to SC. ISSUE: WON the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party HELD: No. SC upheld the CA. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The court ruled in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia that, in acting as a guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party. In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that, if the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own business or profession, the transaction falls within the term obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. In other words, where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. In the case at bar, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the latters benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to discharge that burden 4 Ravina v Villa-Abrille, GR No. 160708, Oct. 16, 2009 Mary Ann (R) and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four children (R). spouses acquired a lot in Davao; Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely in his name T hrough their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan, the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedros lot. The house was finished in the early 1980s but the spouses continuously made improvements, including a poultry house and an annex. 1991, Pedro got a mistress; Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their movables to support the family and the studies of her children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to the petitioners (P). Pedro sold the house and the two lots without Mary Anns consent 1991, while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school, Pedro together with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting in connivance with petitioners began transferring all their belongings from the house to an apartment. When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from entering it. RTC ruled in favor of Mary Ann; CA affirmed RTC decision with modifications Issue(s): whether the property is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal property
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whether its sale by Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary Anns consent. Held: Sale was null and void Ruled in favor of Mary Ann Ratio Decidendi: There is no issue with regard to the lot which was an exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann. However, the 2nd land was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property , having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. if the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given 5 years from the date the contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case. Even assuming that petitioners believed in good faith that the subject property is the exclusive property of Pedro, they were apprised by Mary Anns lawyer of her objection to the sale and yet they still proceeded to purchase the property without Mary Anns written consent. Thus, at the time of sale, petitioners knew that Mary Ann has a right to or interest in the properties and yet they failed to obtain her conformity to the deed of sale . Hence, petitioners cannot now invoke the protection accorded to purchasers in good faith. petitioners cannot claim reimbursements for improvements they introduced after their good faith had ceased. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner made improvements and renovations on the house and lot at the time when the complaint against them was filed .
5Hernandez v Mingoa, G.R. No. 146548, Dec. 18, 2009 Facts: In 1958 Domingo was awarded a parcel of land with an area of 520.20 square meters as part of the governments housing program at the time. Title to the said property (TCT 107534) was issued in the name of Domingo and Sergia on May 23, 1966 after full payment for the property was received by the government housing authority then known as the PHHC. Even with the issuance of the title, neither Domingo or Sergia or their children took possession of the property. It was Atty. Mingoa and his children who took possession of said property in 1966 and are in actual physical possession of it up to the present. The owners duplicate copy of the title over the property given by the PHHC to Domingo was also in the possession of Atty. Mingoa who had made considerable improvements thereon including the residential house where his family presently resides. The realty taxes had been paid by Atty. Mingoa although in the name of Domingo, but all the official receipts of tax payments are kept by Atty. Mingoa. In April 1983, Domingo died and it was only after his burial that Sergia and her two children found out that in 1982, TCT 107534 was already cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No 2909121 was issued in the name of the eldest child of Atty. Mingoa who then started paying the taxes thereon. Upon diligent inquiry, Sergia and her children discovered that the cancellation of TCT 107534 in favor of TCT 2909121 was based on three sets of documents: (1) Irrevocable Special Power of Atty. dated February 14, 1963 executed by Domingo and Sergia in favor of Melanie (daughter of Atty. Mingoa) appointing the latter as their attorney-in-fact with express power to sign, execute and acknowledge any contract of disposition of said property; (2) a similar irrevocable power of attorney executed in favor of Atty. Mingoa together with a Deed of Absolute Sale wherein Melanie sold the property to Atty. Mingoa. It was by virtue of these documents that Atty. Mingoa subsequently transferred TCT No. 107534 which was in his possession, to his daughter in whose favor TCT No. 2909121 was issued. As it turned out, Domingo assigned his rights to the property to Respondents when he could no longer comply with the monthly installment. And Melanie in turn sold her rights to Atty. Mingoa who transferred the title to his daughter as he was already in possession of the TCT 107534 issued in name of his daughter. But Sergia did not know or consent to the same and that her signatures were forged especially the Special Power of Attorney in favor of Respondents where the forgery was so blatant as to be remarkably noticeable to the naked eye. But it was only on February 11, 1995, after consulting several lawyers, when Sergia and her children filed a complaint against Atty. Mingoa and his daughter as well as Respondents and the Register of Deeds seeking the annulment of the TCT and all its derivative titles and the re-conveyance of the property to them. They contended that Sergias lack of consent rendered the SPAs and the deeds of assignment and sale null and void or inexistent and actions for declaration of non-existence of a contract does not prescribe. Issue: Whether there was a valid alienation involving the subject property. Held: To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent.
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The consent of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. to the contract is undisputed, thus, the sale of his share in the conjugal property was valid. With regard to the consent of his wife, Sergia Hernandez, to the sale involving their conjugal property, the trial court found that it was lacking because said wifes signature on the SPA was falsified. Notably, even the CA observed that the forgery was so blatant as to be remarkably noticeable to the naked eye of an ordinary person. Having compared the questioned signature on the SPA with those of the documents bearing the sample standard signature of Sergia Hernandez, we affirm both lower courts' findings regarding the forgery. However, Sergias lack of consent to the sale did not render the transfer of her share invalid. It bears stressing that the subject matter herein involves conjugal property. Said property was awarded to Domingo Hernandez, Sr. in 1958. The assailed SPAs were executed in 1963 and 1964. Title in the name of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. covering the subject property was issued on May 23, 1966. The sale of the property to Melanie Mingoa and the issuance of a new title in her name happened in 1978. Since all these events occurred before the Family Code took effect in 1988, the provisions of the New Civil Code govern these transactions. Art. 165. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband. The plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the wifes consent, may be annulled by the wife. The alienation and/or encumbrance of conjugal property by the husband without the wifes consent is not null and void but merely voidable. Thus, the failure of Sergia Hernandez to file with the courts an action for annulment of the contract during the marriage and within ten (10) years from the transaction necessarily barred her from questioning the sale of the subject property to third persons. In sum, the rights and interests of the spouses Hernandez over the subject property were validly transferred to respondent Dolores Camisura. Since the sale of the conjugal property by Hernandez, Sr. was without the consent of his wife, Sergia, the same is voidable; thus, binding unless annulled. Considering that Sergia failed to exercise her right to ask for the annulment of the sale within the prescribed period, she is now barred from questioning the validity thereof. And more so, she is precluded from assailing the validity of the subsequent transfers from Camisura to Plaridel Mingoa and from the latter to Melanie Mingoa. Therefore, title to the subject property cannot anymore be reconveyed to the petitioners by reason of prescription and laches. 6 Fuentes v Roca, GR No. 178902, April 21, 2010 Topic: Charges upon and obligations of CPG Facts: On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter lot in Zambales from his mother. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners Fuentes spouses through the help of Atty. Plagata who would prepare the documents and requirements to complete the sale. In the agreement between Tarciano and Fuentes spouses there will be a Php 60,000 down payment and Php 140,000 will be paid upon the removal of Tarciano of certain structures on the land and after the consent of the estranged wife of Tarciano, Rosario, would be attained. Atty. Plagata thus went about to complete such tasks and claimed that he went to Manila to get the signature of Rosario but notarized the document at Zamboanga . The deed of sale was executed January 11, 1989. As time passed, Tarciano and Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses and possession and control over the lot. Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to annul the sale and reconvey the property on the ground that the sale was void since the consent of Rosario was not attained and that Rosarios signature was a mere forgery. The Fuentes spouses claim that the action has prescribed since an action to annul a sale on the ground of fraud is 4 years from discovery. The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses ruling that there was no forgery, that the testimony of Atty. Plagata who witnessed the signing of Rosario must be given weight, and that the action has already prescribed. On the other hand, the CA reversed the ruling of the CA stating that the action has not prescribed since the applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided that the sale of Conjugal Property without the consent of the other spouse is voidable and the action must be brought within 10 years. Given that the transaction was in 1989 and the action was brought in 1997 hence it was well within the prescriptive period. Issues: 1. Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed; and 2. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul that sale. Held: 1. The law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. The Family Code provisions were made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights. In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husbands sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouses written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void.
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Although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside, when any of its terms have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it. This action, according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe. 2. It is argued by the Spouses Fuentes that it is only the spouse, Rosario, who can file such a case to assail the validity of the sale but given that Rosario was already dead no one could bring the action anymore. The SC ruled that such position is wrong since as stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal. In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they should be entitled, among other things, to recover from Tarcianos heirs, being buyers in good faith. 7 Aguete v PNB, GR 170166, April 6, 2011 Complaint for annulment of Real Estate Mortgage against PNB FACTS: Joe Ros obtained a loan from PNB in the amount of P115,000 on 1974. As security for the loan, Ros obtained a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land. The loan remained outstanding upon maturity and an extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property was instituted by PNB. PNB won bought the lot, being the highest bidder and after a lapse of 1 year, the property not being redeemed, PNB registered the lot under its name. Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete) has no knowledge of the loan obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property a complaint was filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the documents were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family. In its answer, PNB prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action, and insists that it was plaintiffs-appellees own acts
1avvphi1
RTC In favor of petitioners CA reversed RTC ISSUE: WON Aguete gave her consent to the sale making the sale valid. HELD: Yes. Pertinent provisions: Art. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property: (1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; (2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work or as salary of the spouses, or of either of them; (3) The fruits, rents or interest received or due during the marriage, coming from the common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse. Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership; (2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which constitute a charge upon property of either spouse or of the partnership; (3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either the husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the partnership; (4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property; (5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of both husband and wife, and of legitimate children of one of the spouses; (6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or other course. Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same. Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage may demand the value of the property fraudulently alienated by the husband. The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable. Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros encumbrance of the subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent. In the present case, we follow the conclusion of the appellate court and rule that Aguete gave her consent to Ros encumbrance of the subject property. The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged before a notary public, hence they are public documents. Every instrument duly acknowledged and certified as provided by law may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. The execution of a document that has been ratified before a notary public cannot be disproved by the mere denial of the alleged signer. The application for loan shows that the loan would be used exclusively for additional working [capital] of buy & sell of garlic & virginia tobacco. In her testimony, Aguete confirmed that Ros engaged in such business, but claimed to be unaware whether it prospered. Aguete was also aware of loans contracted by Ros, but did not know where he wasted the money. Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his 202 | P a g e -
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exclusive and private debts. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. 9. Ownership, administration and enjoyment (a) Joint administration, FC 124 cf. FC 96, 142 Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. Art. 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to the other spouse: (1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other; (2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee; (3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; or (4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an accused in a criminal case. If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, conflict of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator. 1 Homeowners vs. Dailo, G.R. No. 153802, Mar. 11, 2005 Facts: Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at Barangay San Francisco, San Pablo City from a certain Sandra Dalida. However, the deed of Absolute Sale was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife. On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the this, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of P300,000.00 from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner without the knowledge and consent of respondent. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner, through its vice-president, consolidated the ownership thereof by executing on June 6, 1996 an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale. On December 20, 1995, Marcelino Dailo Died. In one of her visits to the subject property, respondent learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Roldan Brion to clean its premises and that her car, Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises. Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted Civil Case No. SP-2222 (97) for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. Petitioner: Prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. RTC: in favor of Dailo Deed of REM was null and void.
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Reconvey property to Dailo
CA: affirmed the trial courts finding the subject property was conjugal in nature, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the subject property acquired during the marriage of spouses Dailo belongs to their conjugal partnership declared as void the mortgage on the subject property because it was constituted without the knowledge and consent of respondent, in accordance with Article 124 of the Family Code Issues: Whether or not the mortgage constituted by the late Marcelino Dailo on the subject property as co-owner thereof is valid as to his undivided share Whether or not the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, the same having redounded to the benefit of the family Ruling: First, petitioner takes issue with the legal provision applicable to the factual milieu of this case. It contends that Article 124 of the Family Code should be construed in relation to Article 493 of the Civil Code, which states: ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part: ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. . . . In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . . The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. There is no legal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Code as an exception to Article 124 of the Family Code. During his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, Deed of REM is void. On second issue, petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, "[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . ." For the subject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit. The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditorparty litigant claiming as such. Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation. 2 Alinas vs Alinas, GR No. 158040, April 14, 2008 Facts: 1982: Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas (petitioners) separated, Rosario moved to Pagadian and Onesiforo to Manila. They left behind 2 lots (Lot 896-B-9-A with a bodega and Lot 896-B-9-B with petitioners' house) - subject of the petition. Petitioner Onesiforo and respondent Victor are brothers. Petitioners allege that they entrusted their properties to Victor and Elena (respondent spouses) with the agreement that any income from rentals of the properties should be remitted to SSS and to the Rural Bank of Oroquieta City, - to pay off petitioners' loans with said institutions. Onesiforo alleges that he left blank papers with his signature on them to facilitate the administration of said properties. 204 | P a g e -
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1993: petitioners discovered that their two lots were already titled in the name of respondent spouses. Petitioners filed with RTC-Ozamis: complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of their conjugal properties with damages against respondent spouses. RTC: Lot A with bodega respondent spousesowner; Lot B with house petitioner spouses-owner: plaintiff Onesiforo's sale to defendants spouses without the consent of his wife being null and void and defendant spouses' redemption thereof from the SSS not having conferred its ownership to them; Respondent spouses appealed to the CA. CA: Lot B Rosario (wife) share of one half-no force and effect SC: The sale of Lot B to respondent spouses is entirely null and void. Although petitioners were married before the enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, the sale in question occurred in 1989. Thus, their property relations are governed by Chapter IV on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code. Article 124 FC: Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. x x x In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. x x x (Underscoring and emphasis supplied) Guiang v. Court of Appeals: the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. x x x x x x By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. Thus, pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code and jurisprudence, the sale of petitioners' conjugal property made by petitioner Onesiforo alone is void in its entirety. It is true that in a number of cases, this Court abstained from applying the literal import of a particular provision of law if doing so would lead to unjust, unfair and absurd results. In the present case, the Court does not see how applying Article 124 FC would lead to injustice or absurdity. It should be noted that respondent spouses were well aware that Lot B is a conjugal property of petitioners. They also knew that the disposition being made by Onesiforo is without the consent of his wife, as they knew that petitioners had separated, and, the sale documents do not bear the signature of petitioner Rosario. The fact that Onesiforo had to execute two documents, namely: the Absolute Deed of Sale and a notarized Agreement (March 10, 1989), reveals that they had full knowledge of the severe infirmities of the sale. Heirs of Aguilar-Reyes v. Spouses Mijares: "a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith." Such being the case, no injustice is being foisted on respondent spouses as they risked transacting with Onesiforo alone despite their knowledge that the subject property is a conjugal property. However, in consonance with the salutary principle of non-enrichment at anothers expense, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners should reimburse respondent spouses the redemption price paid for Lot B (P111,110.09 with legal interest (6%) from the time of filing of the complaint). Prayer for offset or compensation: Art 1279 CC par 4: compensation or set-off is allowed only if the debts of both parties against each other is already liquidated and demandable. To liquidate means "to make the amount of indebtedness or an obligation clear and settled in the form of money." In the present case, no definite amounts for rentals nor for expenses for repairs on subject house has been determined. Thus, in the absence of evidence upon which to base the amount of rentals, no compensation or set-off can take place between petitioners and respondent spouses. 3 Docena vs. Lapesura, 355 SCRA 658 FACTS: Casiano Hombria, private respondent, filed a complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees, petitionerspouses, Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The spouses claimed ownership of the land based on the occupation since time immemorial. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in issuing orders and that of the sheriff in issuing the writ of demolition. CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the petition was filed beyond the 60-day period provided in the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and that the certification of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by only one of the petitioners. ISSUE: WON it is sufficient that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the petitioners. HELD: In view of the property involved which is a conjugal property, the petition questioning the writ of demolition thereof originated from an action for recovery brought against the spouses and is clearly intended for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and the wife as point out was in the province of Samar whereas the petition was prepared in Metro Manila, a rigid application of the rules on forum shopping that would disauthorize a husbands signing the certification in his behalf and that of his wife is too harsh. In the previous court rulings, certificate of non-forum shopping should be sign by all the petitioners in a case. However, in the case at bar, such certificate signed by Antonio Docena alone should be deemed to constitute substantial compliance with the rules. The two petitioners in this case are husband and wife and their residence is the subject property alleged to be a conjugal property. Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is required, joint management or administration does not require that the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases. Hence, petition is granted and the case is remanded to CA for further proceedings 4 Aggabao vs. Parulan, G.R. No. 165803, Sept. 1, 2010 FACTS: Subject of this case are 2 parcels of land located, BF Homes, Paraaque City and registered under TCT No. 633763 and TCT No. 633774 205 | P a g e -
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in the name of respondents Spouses Maria Elena A. Parulan (Ma. Elena) and Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr. (Dionisio), who have been estranged from one another. Real estate broker Marta K. Atanacio (Atanacio) offered the property to the petitioners, who initially did not show interest due to the rundown condition of the improvements, but Atanacios persistence prevailed. On February 2, 1991, they and Atanacio met with Ma. Elena at the site of the property thelatter showed to them the following documents: (a) the owners original copy of TCT No. 63376; (b) a certified true copy of TCT No. 63377; (c) three tax declarations; and (d) a copy of the SPA dated January 7, 1991 executed by Dionisio authorizing Ma. Elena to sell the property.On the same day, they paid P20,000.00 as earnest money, Ma. Elena then executed a handwritten Receipt of Earnest Money, and stipulated that: (a) they would pay an additional payment of P130,000.00 on February 4, 1991; (b) they would pay the balance of the bank loan of the respondents amounting to P650,000.00 on or before February 15, 1991; and (c) they would make the final payment of P700,000.00 once Ma. Elena turned over the property on March 31, 1991. On February 4, 1991, the petitioners went to the Office of the Register of Deeds and the Assessors Office to verify the TCTs in the company of Atanacio and her husband (also a licensed broker). There, they discovered that the lot under TCT No. 63376 had been encumbered to Banco Filipino in 1983 or 1984, but that the encumbrance had already been cancelled due to the full payment of the obligation. They noticed that the Banco Filipino loan had been effected through an SPA executed by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena. They found on TCT No. 63377 the annotation of an existing mortgage in favor of the Los Baos Rural Bank, also effected through an SPA executed by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena, coupled with a copy of a court order authorizing Ma. Elena to mortgage the lot to secure a loan of P500,000.00. The petitioners and Atanacio next inquired about the mortgage and the court order annotated on TCT No. 63377 at the Los Baos Rural Bank. There, they met with Atty. Noel Zarate, the banks legal counsel, who related that the bank had asked for the court order because the lot involved was conjugal property. Following their verification, the petitioners delivered P130,000.00 as additional down payment on February 4, 1991; and P650,000.00 to the Los Baos Rural Bank on February 12, 1991, which then released the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 63377 to them. On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final amount of P700,000.00 to Ma. Elena, who executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor.However, Ma. Elena did not turn over the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 63376, claiming that said copy was in the possession of a relative who was then in Hongkong. She assured them that the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 63376 would be turned over after a week. On March 19, 1991, TCT No. 63377 was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the petitioners. Ma. Elena did not turn over the duplicate owners copy of TCT No. 63376 as promised. In due time, the petitioners learned that the duplicate owners copy of TCT No. 63376 had been all along in the custody of Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, who appeared to hold an SPA executed by his brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell both lots. At Atanacios instance, the petitioners met on March 25, 1991 with Atty. Parulan, they were also accompanied by one Atty. Olandesca. They recalled that Atty. Parulan smugly demanded P800,000.00 in exchange for the duplicate owners copy of TCT No. 63376, because Atty. Parulan represented the current value of the property to be P1.5 million. As a counter-offer, however, they tendered P250,000.00, which Atty. Parulan declined, giving them only until April 5, 1991 to decide. Hearing nothing more from the petitioners, Atty. Parulan decided to call them on April 5, 1991, but they informed him that they had already fully paid to Ma. Elena. Thus, on April 15, 1991, Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan, commenced an action praying for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof.In turn, the petitioners filed on July 12, 1991 their own action for specific performance with damages against the respondents.Both cases were consolidated for trial and judgment in the RTC. RTC ruled in favour of Plaintiff Parulan and declared the sale covered by TCT 63376 and 63377 as null and void. RTC declared that the SPA in the hands of Ma. Elena was a forgery, based on its finding that Dionisio had been out of the country at the time of the execution of the SPA; that NBI Sr. Document Examiner Rhoda B. Flores had certified that the signature appearing on the SPA purporting to be that of Dionisio and the set of standard sample signatures of Dionisio had not been written by one and the same person;22 and that Record Officer III Eliseo O. Terenco and Clerk of Court Jesus P. Maningas of the Manila RTC had issued a certification to the effect that Atty. Alfred Datingaling, the Notary Public who had notarized the SPA, had not been included in the list of Notaries Public in Manila for the year 1990-1991. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.Hence, the instant petition. Issues 1) 2) Held: The petition has no merit. We sustain the CA. Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal properties made after the effectivity of the Family Code The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should apply to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio? whether or not they had diligently inquired into the authority of Ma. Elena to convey the property, not whether or not the TCT had been valid and authentic, as to which there was no doubt.
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the Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code. Article 124 of the Family Code provides: Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. The power of administration does not include acts of disposition or encumbrance, which are acts of strict ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed from an authority to administer, and vice versa, for the two powers may only be exercised by an agent by following the provisions on agency of the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878). Specifically, the apparent authority of Atty. Parulan, being a special agency, was limited to the sale of the property in question, and did not include or extend to the power to administer the property. The petitioners insistence that Atty. Parulans making of a counter-offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting ratified the sale merits no consideration. Under Article 124 of the Family Code, the transaction executed sans the written consent of Dionisio or the proper court order was void; hence, ratification did not occur, for a void contract could not be ratified. The void sale was a continuing offer from the petitioners and Ma. Elena that Dionisio had the option of accepting or rejecting before the offer was withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the petitioners. The last sentence of the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code makes this clear, stating that in the absence of the other spouses consent, the transaction should be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or upon authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. Due diligence required in verifying not only vendors title, but also agents authority to sell the property Article 124 of the Family Code categorically requires the consent of both spouses before the conjugal property may be disposed of by sale, mortgage, or other modes of disposition. In Bautista v. Silva,the Court erected a standard to determine the good faith of the buyers dealing with A seller who had title to and possession of the land but whose capacity to sell was restricted, in that the consent of the other spouse was required before the conveyance, declaring that in order to prove good faith in such a situation, the buyers must show that they inquired not only into the title of the seller but also into the sellers capacity to sell. Thus, the buyers of conjugal property must observe two kinds of requisite diligence, namely: (a) the diligence in verifying the validity of the title covering the property; and (b) the diligence in inquiring into the authority of the transacting spouse to sell conjugal property in behalf of the other spouse. It is true that a buyer of registered land needs only to show that he has relied on the face of the certificate of title to the property, for he is not required to explore beyond what the certificate indicates on its face.In this respect, the petitioners sufficiently proved that they had checked on the authenticity of TCT No. 63376 and TCT No. 63377 with the Office of the Register of Deeds in Pasay City as the custodian of the land records; and that they had also gone to the Los Baos Rural Bank to inquire about the mortgage annotated on TCT No. 63377. Thereby, the petitioners observed the requisite diligence in examining the validity of the TCTs concerned. Yet, it ought to be plain enough to the petitioners that the issue was whether or not they had diligently inquired into the authority of Ma. Elena to convey the property, not whether or not the TCT had been valid and authentic, as to which there was no doubt. Thus, we cannot side with them. Firstly, the petitioners knew fully well that the law demanded the written consent of Dionisio to the sale, but yet they did not present evidence to show that they had made inquiries into the circumstances behind the execution of the SPA purportedly executed by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena. Had they made the appropriate inquiries, and not simply accepted the SPA for what it represented on its face, they would have uncovered soon enough that the respondents had been estranged from each other and were under de facto separation, and that they probably held conflicting interests that would negate the existence of an agency between them. To lift this doubt, they must, of necessity, further inquire into the SPA of Ma. Elena. Indeed, an unquestioning reliance by the petitioners on Ma. Elenas SPA without first taking precautions to verify its authenticity was not a prudent buyers move. 40 They should have done everything within their means and power to ascertain whether the SPA had been genuine and authentic. If they did not investigate on the relations of the respondents vis--vis each other, they could have done other things towards the same end, like attempting to locate the notary public who had notarized the SPA, or checked with the RTC in Manila to confirm the authority of Notary Public Atty. Datingaling. It turned out that Atty. Datingaling was not authorized to act as a Notary Public for Manila during the period 1990-1991, which was a fact that they could easily discover with a modicum of zeal. Secondly, the final payment of P700,000.00 even without the owners duplicate copy of the TCT No. 63376 being handed to them by Ma. Elena indicated a revealing lack of precaution on the part of the petitioners. It is true that she promised to produce and deliver the 207 | P a g e -
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owners copy within a week because her relative having custody of it had gone to Hongkong, but their passivity in such an essential matter was puzzling light of their earlier alacrity in immediately and diligently validating the TCTs to the extent of inquiring at the Los Baos Rural Bank about the annotated mortgage. Yet, they could have rightly withheld the final payment of the balance. That they did not do so reflected their lack of due care in dealing with Ma. Elena. Lastly, another reason rendered the petitioners good faith incredible. They did not take immediate action against Ma. Elena upon discovering that the owners original copy of TCT No. 63376 was in the possession of Atty. Parulan, contrary to Elenas representation. Human experience would have impelled them to exert every effort to proceed against Ma. Elena, including demanding the return of the substantial amounts paid to her. But they seemed not to mind her inability to produce the TCT, and, instead, they contented themselves with meeting with Atty. Parulan to negotiate for the possible turnover of the TCT to them. (b) Sole administration (1) Incapacity, FC 124, 253 Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. Art. 253. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, XI, and XV of Book 1 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41, and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed. 5 Uy vs. CA, 346 SCRA 246 FACTS: This is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of CA and its resolutiondenying reconsideration reversing that of the RTC declaring void the specialproceedings instituted therein by petitioners to authorize petitioner Gilda Jardelezain view of the comatose condition of her husband, Ernesto Jardeleza Sr., withapproval of the court, to dispose of their conjugal property in favor of copetitioners,their daughter and son-in-law, for the ostensible purpose of financial need in thepersonal, business and medical expenses of her incapacitated husband March 25, 1991 Ernesto Jardeleza suffered a stroke which left him comatoseand incapable of motor and mental functions. June 6, 1991 Teodoro Jardeleza, Ernestos son, filed a petition forguardianship of his father. He averred that due to Ernestos currentcondition, he cannot competently administer his properties. In order toprevent the loss and wasteful expenditure of Jardelezas real and personalassets, there was a need for a court-appointed guardian to administer saidproperties. He prayed that the guardianship be issued in favor of the wifeand thatin the meantime, no property be negotiated, mortgaged oralienated to third persons June 13, 1991 The wife filed a petition declaring the incapacity of thehusband and assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugalproperties and prayed for authorization from the court to sell a parcel of land(lot no. 4291) due pay for medical expenses of the husband June 20, 1991 RTC rendered a decision in favor of the wifes petitionpursuant to Art. 124 FC; that the wife is the sole administrator due to thehusbands incapacity and authorize the sale of the lot in question to paymedical bills Son Teodoro opposed petition; assumption of sole administratorship andauthority to sell conjugal properties is essentially a petition for guardianshipof person and properties of Ernesto and as such it cannot be proceeded inaccordance with Art. 253 FC. It should follow the rules on special proceedingsset in ROC. Also, under NCC, Ernesto acquired vested rights as a conjugalpartner and such rights cannot be impaired or prejudiced without his consent. Teodoro filed motion for reconsideration on the following grounds:1.CPG has other assets to pay off financial obligations.2.Medical bills can be offset since Ernesto can pay on installment sincehe has stocks in the hospital3.Two of his attending physicians are his own sons who are not charginghim anything While motion for reconsideration was pending, the wife sold the said propertyto daughter (Glenda Uy) for P 8M. July 23, 1991, the wife filed an urgent ex-parte motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale December 19, 1991 RTC denied Teodoros motion for reconsideration andapproved the wifes motion for approval of the deed of 208 | P a g e -
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absolute sale citingthat Teodoro does not have the personality to oppose the petition since theproperty belongs to CPG and both spouses are still alive December 9, 1992 CA reversed RTC decision and ordered RTC to declaresale VOID. ISSUE: Due to the comatose condition of the husband, can the wife assume solepowers of administration over conjugal properties and dispose of a parcel of landwith the approval for the court? HELD: CA ruled that due to the condition of the husband, the rules on summaryproceedings in relation to Art. 124 FC are not applicable. What Art. 124 covers aresituations where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned theother, or the consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. SUCH RULES DO NOTAPPLY TO CASES WHERE THE NON-CONSENTING SPOUSE IS INCAPACITATED ORINCOMPETENT TO GIVE CONSENT. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicialguardianship under Rule 93 of 1964 ROC.Even if the rules of summary judicial proceedings under FC applied to the wifesadministrative powers, the wife who assumes the sole powers of administration hasthe same powers and duties as a guardian under the ROCA spouse who desires to sell a real property as such administrator of CPG mustobserve the procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicialguardians under Rule 95 ROC, not summary judicial proceedings under FCIn the present case, RTC did not comply with the procedures under ROC and therequirements of the summary judicial proceedings under FC: it did not serve noticeof the petition to the incapacitated spouse and it did not require him to show causewhy the petition should not be granted. (2) Separation in fact, FC 100 (3), 127(3) Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that: (3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. Art. 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of conjugal partnership, except that: (3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. (3) Abandonment, FC 101, 128 Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligation to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (4)Pendency of legal separation proceedings, FC 61 Art. 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court. 10. Disposition and encumbrance, FC 124-125; FC 97, 121, Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail,
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subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. Art. 125. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership property without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the conjugal partnership property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress. Art. 97. Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest in the community property. Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support; (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have benefited; (4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property; (5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse; (6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other activity for self-improvement; (7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family; (8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; and (9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to groundless. If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. 6 Cheeseman v. IAC 193 SCRA 93 Topic: Disposition and encumbrance Facts: Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on December 4, 1970 but have been separated since February 15, 1981. A Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights was executed by Armando Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered land and the house in favor of Criselda P. Cheesman, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Thomas Cheesman. Thomas Cheesman, although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife. Thereafterand again with the knowledge of Thomas Cheesman and also without any protest by himtax declarations for the property purchased were issued in the name only of Criselda Cheesman and she assumed exclusive management and administration of said property, leasing it to tenants. Criselda Cheesman sold the property to Estelita M. Padilla, without the knowledge or consent of Thomas Cheesman. Thomas Cheesman brought suit in the Court of First Instance against his wife, Criselda, and Estelita Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent. Pre-trial decided the action resulted in a judgment declaring void ab initio the sale executed by Criselda Cheesman in favor of Estelita M. Padilla, and ordering the delivery of the property to Thomas Cheesman as administrator of the conjugal partnership property. Criselda filed an answer alleging that the property sold was paraphernal, having purchased the property from her own money; that Thomas, an American was disqualified to have any interest or right of ownership in the land and; that Estelita was a buyer in good faith. RTC: Ruled in favor of Criselda. Cheeseman appealed. Issue: WON Mr. Cheeseman has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife. Held: Section 14, Art. XIV of 1973 Constitution provides that: save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatsoever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, he was knowingly violating the Constitution. As such, the sale to him was null and void. At any rate, Cheesman had and has no capacity to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit in direct controversion of the Constitutional prohibition.
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If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not in substantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have. Even if the wife did use conjugal funds to make the acquisition, his recovering and holding the property cannot be warranted as it is against the constitution. Consequently, Estelita is a purchaser in good faith since she knew that Thomas cannot intervene in the sale or disposition of the said property. 7 Frenzel vs. Catito, G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003 Facts: Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent. He is an electrical engineer by profession, but worked as a pilot with the New Guinea Airlines. He arrived in the Philippines in 1974, started engaging in business in the country; two years thereafter, he married Teresita Santos, a Filipino citizen. In 1981, Alfred and Teresita separated from bed and board without obtaining a divorce. In 1983, Alfred arrived in Sydney, Australia for a vacation. He went to Kings Cross, a night spot in Sydney, for a massage where he met Ederlina Catito, a Filipina and a native of Bajada, Davao City. Unknown to Alfred, she resided for a time in Germany and was married to Klaus Muller, a German national. She left Germany and tried her luck in Sydney, Australia, where she found employment as a masseuse in the Kings Cross nightclub. Alfred was so enamored with Ederlina that he persuaded her to stop working at Kings Cross, return to the Philippines, and engage in a wholesome business of her own. He also proposed that they meet in Manila, to which she assented. Alfred gave her money for her plane fare to the Philippines. Within two weeks of Ederlinas arrival in Manila, Alfred joined her. Alfred reiterated his proposal for Ederlina to stay in the Philippines and engage in business, even offering to finance her business venture. Ederlina was delighted at the idea and proposed to put up a beauty parlor. Alfred happily agreed. Alfred told Ederlina that he was married but that he was eager to divorce his wife in Australia. Alfred proposed marriage to Ederlina, but she replied that they should wait a little bit longer. Alfred went back to Papua New Guinea to resume his work as a pilot. Since Alfred knew that as an alien he was disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines, he agreed that only Ederlinas name would appear in the deed of sale as the buyer of the property, as well as in the title covering the same. After all, he was planning to marry Ederlina and he believed that after their marriage, the two of them would jointly own the property. When Ederlina left for Germany to visit Klaus, she had her father Narciso Catito and her two sisters occupy the property. Alfred decided to stay in the Philippines for good and live with Ederlina. He returned to Australia and sold his fiber glass pleasure boat to John Reid in 1984. He also sold his television and video business in Papua New Guinea. He had his personal properties shipped to the Philippines and stored at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. On July 28, 1984, while Alfred was in Papua New Guinea, he received a Letter dated December 7, 1983 from Klaus Muller who was then residing in Berlin, Germany. Klaus informed Alfred that he and Ederlina had been married on October 16, 1978 and had a blissful married life until Alfred intruded therein. Klaus stated that he knew of Alfred and Ederlinas amorous relationship, and discovered the same sometime in November 1983 when he arrived in Manila. He also begged Alfred to leave Ederlina alone and to return her to him, saying that Alfred could not possibly build his future on his (Klaus) misfortune. Alfred had occasion to talk to Sally MacCarron, a close friend of Ederlina. He inquired if there was any truth to Klaus statements and Sally confirmed that Klaus was married to Ederlina. When Alfred confronted Ederlina, she admitted that she and Klaus were, indeed, married. But she assured Alfred that she would divorce Klaus. Alfred was appeased. He agreed to continue the amorous relationship and wait for the outcome of Ederlinas petition for divorce. After all, he intended to marry her. He retained the services of Rechtsanwltin Banzhaf with offices in Berlin, as her counsel who informed her of the progress of the proceedings. Alfred paid for the services of the lawyer. Ederlina often wrote letters to her family informing them of her life with Alfred. In a Letter dated January 21, 1985, she wrote about how Alfred had financed the purchases of some real properties, the establishment of her beauty parlor business, and her petition to divorce Klaus. In the meantime, Ederlinas petition for divorce was denied because Klaus opposed the same. A second petition filed by her met the same fate. Klaus wanted half of all the properties owned by Ederlina in the Philippines before he would agree to a divorce. Worse, Klaus threatened to file a bigamy case against Ederlina. Alfred proposed the creation of a partnership to Ederlina, or as an alternative, the establishment of a corporation, with Ederlina owning 30% of the equity thereof. She initially agreed to put up a corporation and contacted Atty. Armando Dominguez to prepare the necessary documents. Ederlina changed her mind at the last minute when she was advised to insist on claiming ownership over the properties acquired by them during their coverture. Alfred and Ederlinas relationship started deteriorating. Ederlina had not been able to secure a divorce from Klaus. The latter could charge her for bigamy and could even involve Alfred, who himself was still married. To avoid complications, Alfred decided to live separately from Ederlina and cut off all contacts with her. In one of her letters to Alfred, Ederlina complained that he had ruined her life. She admitted that the money used for the purchase of the properties in Davao were his. She offered to convey the properties deeded to her by Atty. Mardoecheo Camporedondo and Rodolfo Morelos, asking Alfred to prepare her affidavit for the said purpose and send it to her for her signature. The last straw for Alfred came on September 2, 1985, when someone smashed the front and rear windshields of 211 | P a g e -
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Alfreds car and damaged the windows. Alfred thereafter executed an affidavit-complaint charging Ederlina and Sally MacCarron with malicious mischief. On October 15, 1985, Alfred wrote to Ederlinas father, complaining that Ederlina had taken all his life savings and because of this, he was virtually penniless. He further accused the Catito family of acquiring for themselves the properties he had purchased with his own money. He demanded the return of all the amounts that Ederlina and her family had stolen and turn over all the properties acquired by him and Ederlina during their coverture. Alfred filed a Complaint dated October 28, 1985, against Ederlina, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, for recovery of real and personal properties located in Quezon City and Manila. In his complaint, Alfred alleged, inter alia, that Ederlina, without his knowledge and consent, managed to transfer funds from their joint account in HSBC Hong Kong, to her own account with the same bank. Using the said funds, Ederlina was able to purchase the properties subject of the complaints. He also alleged that the beauty parlor in Ermita was established with his own funds, and that the Quezon City property was likewise acquired by him with his personal funds. Ederlina failed to file her answer and was declared in default. Alfred adduced his evidence ex-parte. Alfred prayed that after hearing, judgment be rendered in his favor. RTC In favor of Ederlina CA- Upheld RTC Issues: a) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying the rule of In Pari Delicto since both parties are not equally guilty but rather it was the respondent who employed fraud when she did not inform petitioner that she was already married? b) Whether the intention of the petitioner is not to own real properties in the Philippines but to sell them as public auction to be able to recover his money used in purchasing them? Ruling: Even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question were entered into by him as the real vendee, the said transactions are in violation of the Constitution; hence, are null and void ab initio. A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or property by knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his own moral turpitude may not maintain an action for his losses. To him who moves in deliberation and premeditation, the law is unyielding. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them. Under Article 1412 of the New Civil Code, the petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. Equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Where the wrong of one party equals that of the other, the defendant is in the stronger position ... it signifies that in such a situation, neither a court of equity nor a court of law will administer a remedy. The rule is expressed in the maxims: EX DOLO MALO NON ORITUR ACTIO and IN PARI DELICTO POTIOR EST CONDITIO DEFENDENTIS. Futile, too, is petitioners reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads: Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. The provision is expressed in the maxim: MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST (No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman vs. Johnson: The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. 1 Alinas vs. Alinas, G.R. No. 158040, April 14, 2008 FACTS: Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas (petitioners) separated sometime in 1982, with Rosario moving to Pagadian City and Onesiforo moving to Manila. They left behind two lots: one with a bodega standing on it (LOT A) and one with petitioners' house (LOT B). Petitioner Onesiforo and respondent Victor are brothers. Petitioners allege that they entrusted their properties to Victor and Elena Alinas (respondent spouses) with the agreement that any income from rentals of the properties should be remitted to the Social Security System (SSS) and to the Rural Bank of Oroquieta City (RBO), as such rentals were believed sufficient to pay off petitioners' loans with said institutions. LOT-A was mortgaged as security for the loan obtained from the RBO, while LOT-B with the house was mortgaged to the SSS. Onesiforo alleges that he left blank papers with his signature on them to facilitate the administration of said properties. In 1993, petitioners discovered that their two lots were already titled in the name of respondent spouses. 212 | P a g e -
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LOT-A -- extra-judicially foreclosed, TCT covering said property was issued in the name of RBO on November 13, 1987. On May 2, 1988, the duly authorized representative of RBO executed a Deed of Installment Sale of Bank's Acquired Assets conveying LOT-A to respondent spouses. RBO's TCT over LOT-A was then cancelled and on February 22, 1989. Another TCT covering said lot was issued in the name of respondent spouses. LOT-B -- foreclosed by the SSS. On November 17, 1986, the Ex-Officio City Sheriff of Ozamis City issued a Certificate of Sale over said property in favor of the SSS. However, pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney signed by Onesiforo in favor of Victor, dated March 10, 1989, the Victor was able to redeem, on the same date, LOT-B from the SSS for the sum of P111,110.09. On June 19, 1989, a Certificate of Redemption was issued by the SSS. Onesiforo's signature also appears in an Absolute Deed of Sale likewise dated March 10, 1989, selling LOT-B to respondent spouses. The records also show a notarized document dated March 10, 1989 and captioned Agreement whereby Onesiforo acknowledged that his brother Victor used his own money to redeem LOT-B from the SSS and, thus, Victor became the owner of said lot. In the same Agreement, Onesiforo waived whatever rights, claims, and interests he or his heirs, successors and assigns have or may have over the subject property. On March 15, 1993, by virtue of said documents, TCT covering LOT-B was issued in the name of respondent spouses. On June 25, 1993, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamis City a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of their conjugal properties with damages against respondent spouses. RTC: In favor of respondent spouses. Sale of the subject lots is valid. CA: LOT-A to respondent spouses, while Onesiforos sale of his wifes share in LOT-B has no force and effect Issue: Whether the sale of LOT-B (the one with petitioners house) is null and void RULING: Verily, the sale of LOT-B to respondent spouses is entirely null and void. Pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code and jurisprudence, the sale of petitioners' conjugal property made by petitioner Onesiforo alone is void in its entirety. The respondent spouses were well aware that LOT-B is a conjugal property of petitioners. They also knew that the disposition being made by Onesiforo is without the consent of his wife, as they knew that petitioners had separated, and, the sale documents do not bear the signature of petitioner Rosario. The fact that Onesiforo had to execute two documents, namely: the Absolute Deed of Sale dated March 10, 1989 and a notarized Agreement likewise dated March 10, 1989, reveals that they had full knowledge of the severe infirmities of the sale. As held in Heirs of Aguilar-Reyes v. Spouses Mijares, "a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith." Such being the case, no injustice is being foisted on respondent spouses as they risked transacting with Onesiforo alone despite their knowledge that the subject property is a conjugal property. In consonance with the salutary principle of non-enrichment at anothers expense, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners should reimburse respondent spouses the redemption price paid for LOT-B in the amount of P111,110.09 with legal interest from the time of filing of the complaint. Petitioners should reimburse respondent spouses the redemption price plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the complaint, and after the judgment becomes final and executory, the amount due shall earn 12% interest per annum until the obligation is satisfied. 2 Siochi v Gozon, G.R. No. 169900, March 18, 2010 Facts: This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land (TCT No. 5357), situated in Malabon and is registered in the name of "Alfredo Gozon, married to Elvira Gozon." 23 December 1991: Elvira filed with Cavite RTC a petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo. 2 January 1992: Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, which was then annotated on TCT No. 5357. 31 August 1993: while the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell involving the property (18M), 5M has been paid as earnest money, and on Sept 1993, Mario took possession of the property. 29 June 1994: Cavite RTC: decreeing the legal separation between petitioner and respondent. Petitioner Elvira is entitled to live separately from respondent Alfredo without dissolution of their marriage bond. The CPG of the spouses is hereby declared dissolved and liquidated. Being the offending spouse, respondent is deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is awarded to their child Winifred whose custody is awarded to petitioner. The parties are required to mutually support their child as her needs arises. As regards the property, it is deemed conjugal property. 22 August 1994: Alfredo executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favor of their daughter, Winifred . The RD of Malabon, Gil Tabije, cancelled TCT No. 5357 and issued TCT No. M-10508 in the name of Winifred, without annotating the Agreement and the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. M-10508. 26 October 1994: Alfredo, by virtue of SPA executed in his favor by Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. for 18M. IDRI paid Alfredo the full payment for the property. RD Malabon cancelled TCT No. M-10508 and issued TCT No. M-10976 to IDRI. Siochi filed with Malabon RTC a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. Malabon RTC decision: The Agreement to Buy and Sell between plaintiff and defendant Alfredo is hereby approved, excluding the property and rights of defendant Elvira to the undivided one-half share in the conjugal property subject of this case. Deed of Donation and Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of defendant IDRI-null and void Defendant Alfredo is hereby ordered to deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of plaintiff over his one-half undivided share in the subject property. Ordering defendant Elvira sit with plaintiff to agree on the selling price of her undivided one-half share in the subject property, thereafter, to execute and deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale over the same in favor of the plaintiff. CA: affirmed the Malabon RTCs decision with modification: The sale of the subject land by defendant Alfredo to plaintiff-appellant Siochi is declared null and void: a) The conveyance was done without the consent of defendant-appellee Elvira; b) Defendant Alfredos one-half () undivided share has been forfeited in favor of his daughter; 213 | P a g e -
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Defendant Alfredo shall return/deliver to plaintiff-appellant Siochi the amount of 5M; Defendants Alfredo, Winifred and Gil Tabije are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Siochi jointly and severally for damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses Defendants Alfredo and Winifred are hereby ordered to pay defendant-appellant IDRI jointly and severally for damages and atty fees. Defendant Winifred, whom the undivided one-half share of defendant Alfredo was awarded, is hereby given the option whether or not to dispose of her undivided share in the subject land. Only Mario and IDRI appealed. SC: The case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition of the property occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code. Art. 124 FC. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to the recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied) Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property. However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouses written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity. The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Siochi was without the written consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void. As regards Siochis contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elviras acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn. The one-half undivided share of Alfredo in the property was already forfeited (not Alfredos share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property) in favor of his daughter Winifred (Cavite RTC in the legal separation case). IDRI is not a buyer in good faith (had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances which should impel a reasonably cautious person to make further inquiries about the vendors title to the property). Besides, had IDRI been more prudent before buying the property, it would have discovered that Alfredos donation of the property to Winifred was without the consent of Elvira. Under Article 125 of the Family Code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse. Nevertheless, the 18M should be reimbursed. 3 Ravina v Abrille, GR 160708, Oct. 16, 2009 The respondent Mary Ann Villa Abrille is married to Pedro Villa Abrille. The spouses have four children. In 1982, the spouses purchased a parcel of land in Juna Subdivision, Matina, Davao city with an area of 555 square meter. The property is registered under their names. Adjacent to the said lot is a parcel of land owned and acquired by Pedro before the marriage. Mr. and Mrs. Villa Abrille built a house on Lot 7 (owned by both spouses) and Pedro s lot. They also made improvements such as poultry house and annex. In 1991, Pedro had illicit relations with another woman and neglected his family. As a result, Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their movables to support the family. Pedro sold the property (house and two lots) to Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravino without the consent of Mary Ann. While Mary Ann was out, Pedro and armed members of the CAFGU transferred the properties of the family from the house to an apartment. Respondents Mary Ann and her children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale, Specific Performance, Damages and Attorney s Fees with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Pedro and herein petitioners (the Ravinas) in the RTC of Davao City. During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with his own money. Petitioner Patrocinia Ravina testified that they bought the house and lot from Pedro, and that her husband, petitioner Wilfredo Ravina, examined the titles when they bought the property. The Trial Court ruled in favor of Mary Ann Villa Abrille (sale of share is valid, payment for damages). When the petitioners appealed, the CA modified the decision. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the property covered by TCT No. T-88674 is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal property. Whether its sale by Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary Anns consent. HELD: There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was an exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann. However, the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. The house built thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house. Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouse s inability, the authority of the court. The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property by the husband without the consent of the wife is null and void. Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case. Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of the deed. However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and lot and does not include the lot covered by TCT No. 214 | P a g e -
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T-26471, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely without Mary Ann s consent. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners are not buyers in good faith. The sale of the conjugal property was annulled while the sale of Pedros exclusive property was valid. When a contract is declared void, there must be a restoration of the subject of the said contract. 4 Fuentes v Roca, GR 178902, April 21, 2010 Tarciano T. Roca bought a titled lot in Canelar, Zamboanga from his mother. But Tarciano did not for the meantime have the registered title transferred to his name. On 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes. They arranged to meet at the office of Atty. Romulo D. Plagata whom they asked to prepare the documents of sale. They later signed an agreement to sell that Atty. Plagata prepared dated April 29, 1988, which agreement expressly stated that it was to take effect in six months. The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment of 60,000 php for the transfer of the lots title to him. And, within six months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca, to the sale. Upon Tarcianos compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of the lot and pay him an additional 140,000php and 160,000php, depending on whether or not he succeeded in demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the lot without any further formality and payment. The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the other requirements of the sale. According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of his trips to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent. As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata notarized Rosarios affidavit in Zamboanga. On January 11, 1989 Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses. They then paid him the additional 140,000php mentioned in their agreement. A new title was issued in the name of the spouses who immediately constructed a building on the lot. On January 28, 1990 Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine months afterwards. In 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses vefore the RTC of Zamboanga. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since Rosario did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the property be reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano. ISSUES: 1. 2. 3. HELD: 1. The Court agrees with the CA that Rosarios signature strokes on the affidavit appears heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her specimen signatures, on the other hand, are consistently of a lighter stroke and more fluid. The way the letters R and s were written is also remarkably different. The variance is obvious even to the untrained eye. Significantly, Rosarios specimen signatures were made at about the time that she signed the supposed affidavit of consent. They were, therefore, reliable standards for comparison. The Fuentes spouses presented no evidence that Rosario suffered from any illness or disease that accounted for the variance in her signature when she signed the affidavit of consent. Notably, Rosario had been living separately from Tarciano for 30 years since 1958. And she resided so far away in Manila. It would have been quite tempting for Tarciano to just forge her signature and avoid the risk that she would not get her consent to the sale or demand a stiff price for it. What is more, Atty. Plagata admittedly falsified the jurat of the affidavit of consent. That jurat declared that Rosario swore to the document and signed it in Zamboanga on January 11, 1989 when, as Atty. Plagata testified, she supposedly signed it about four months earlier at her residence in Paco, Manila on September 15, 1988. While a defective notarization will merely strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument, that falsified jurat, taken together with the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms such document as proof of Rosarios consent to the sale of the land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as proof of Rosarios consent does not matter. The sale is still void w/o an authentic consent. 2. Contray to the ruling of the CA, the law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the CC. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on Aug. 3, 1988. In contrast to the Art. 173 of the CC, Article 124 of the FC does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husbands sale of the real property. It simply provides that w/o the other spouses written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. Under the provisions of the CC governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside, when any of its terms have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it. This action, according to the Art 1410 of the CC does not prescribe. Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes in 1997 for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real property that WoN Rosarios signature on the document of consent to her husbands sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes was forged; WoN the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed; WoN only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul that sale.
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Tarciano sold w/o their mothers written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action. 3. The answer is no. As stated above, the sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained to the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Art. 429 of the CC, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal. In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they should be entitled, among other things, to recover from Tarcianos heirs, the Rocas, the 200,000 that they paid to him, with legal interest until fully paid, chargeable against his estate. 5 Aguete v PNB, GR 170166, April 6, 2011 6 Flores v Lindo, GR 183984, April 13, 2011 Topic: Disposition and encumbrance Facts: Edna Lindo obtained a loan from Arturo Flores amounting to Php 400,000.00 with monthly interest and surcharge in case of late payment. Edna executed a deed of real mortgage and promissory note to secure the said loan. Edna issued three checks as partial payments which were dishonored later for insufficiency of funds. This prompted petitioner to file a complaint for the foreclosure of mortgage with damages against the respondents. RTC branch 33 held that Flores was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of the mortgage because it found out that the Deed was executed by Edna without her husbands consent. Special Power of Attorney by Enrico was only constituted days after the Deed. However, it further ruled that petitioner Flores was not precluded from recovering the loan from Edna as he could file a personal action against her. Petitioner then filed a complaint for Sum of Money with damages against respondents. Respondents admitted their loan but in the tune of Php340,000.00 and prayed for dismissal on the grounds of improper venue, res judicata, and forum shopping. RTC Branch 42 denied the motion to dismiss. CA set aside decision of RTC Branch 42 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. CA ruled in general that the creditor may institute two alternative remedies: either a personal action for the collection of debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, but not both. Issue: WON petitioner can no longer file complaint for collection of sum of money on the ground that there was a case already filed which was dismissed due to the fact that Flores was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of the mortgage because it found out that the Deed was executed by Edna without her husbands consent. Held: No. The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover the debt. The mortgage-creditor has the option of either filing a personal action for collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. An election of the first bars recourse to the second, otherwise there would be multiplicity of suits in which the debtor would be tossed from one venue to another depending on the location of the mortgaged properties and the residence of the parties. The two remedies are alternative and each remedy is complete by itself. However there are circumstances in this case that the Court takes into consideration. Petitioner filed an action for foreclosure of mortgage. The RTC, Branch 33 ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure because the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed without Enricos consent. Said circumstances tend to support the claim of defendant Edna Lindo that her husband did not consent to the mortgage of their conjugal property and that the loan application was her personal decision. The real estate mortgage executed by petitioner Edna Lindo over their conjugal property is undoubtedly an act of strict dominion and must be consented to by her husband to be effective. Indeed, the real estate mortgage is this case was executed on October 31, 1995 and the subsequent special power of attorney dated November 4, 1995 cannot be made to retroact to validate the mortgage previously made by petitioner. The liability of Edna Lindo on the principal contract of the loan however subsists notwithstanding the illegality of the mortgage. Under the foregoing circumstances, what is lost is merely the right to foreclose the mortgage as a special remedy for satisfying or settling the indebtedness which is the principal obligation. In case of nullity, the mortgage deed remains as evidence or proof of a personal obligation of the debtor and the amount due to the creditor may be enforced in an ordinary action. The transaction still shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract. But, as noted by CA, petitioner allowed the decision of RTC Branch 33 to become final and executory without asking for an alternative relief. Nevertheless, the petitioner is not without remedy. The principle of unjust enrichment is applicable in this case considering that
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Edna admitted obtaining a loan from petitioners, and the same has not been fully paid without just cause. The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of another without just cause or consideration. Hence, Petitioner should be allowed to recover. 11. Effect of separation de facto, FC 127, FC 100 cf. FC 239 Art. 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of conjugal partnership, except that: (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported; (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding; (3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that: (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported; (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding; (3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. Art. 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicial authorization for a transaction where the consent of the other spouse is required by law but such consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts. The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the transaction, and, if none, shall describe in detail the said transaction and state the reason why the required consent thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court. 12. Effect of abandonment, FC 128 cf. FC 101 Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligation to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. 7 Partosa-Jo v. CA 216 SCRA 693 FACTS: The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent. The latter admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a complaint against the husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to an earlier action for support which was consolidated. RTC decision was a definite disposition of the complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property. Jose elevated the decision to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial court. The complaint on the separation of property was dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code. Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to be separated permanently. She even returned to him but the latter refused to accept her.
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ISSUE: WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of conjugal property. HELD: Yes. The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint on the ground that the separation of the parties was due to their agreement and not because of abandonment. The respondent court relied mainly on the testimony of the petitioner, who declared under oath that she left Dumaguete City, where she and Jo were living together because that was our agreement. It held that a agreement to live separately without just cause was void under Article 221 of the Civil Code and could not sustain any claim of abandonment by the aggrieved spouse. Under the Art. 128 of Family Code, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation on either of these grounds: 1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and 2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if she said spouse does not leave the other spouse. Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the meantime providing in the least for ones family although able to do so. There must be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. The private respondent had already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. the private respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property. Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article 135 of the Family Code, providing as follows: Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouse have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. 13. Dissolution of CPG, FC 126, 129 Art. 126. The conjugal partnership terminates: (1) Upon the death of either spouse; (2) When there is a decree of legal separation; (3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or (4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138 Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply: (1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse. (2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof. (3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership. (4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121. (5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them. (6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any. (7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code. (8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the partition in accordance with Article 51. (9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. 1 Tarrosa vs De Leon, GR 185063, July 23, 2009 FACTS: In 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon, then single, and the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a 191.30 square-meter lot situated in Fairview, Quezon City. Subsequently, on April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in a civil rite officiated by the Municipal Mayor of Zaragosa, Nueva 218 | P a g e -
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Ecija. To this union were born Danilo and Vilma. Following the full payment of the cost price for the lot thus purchased, PHHC executed, in 1970, a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio. A TCT covering the lot was issued in 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, "single." Subsequently, Bonifacio, for PhP 19,000, sold the subject lot to her sister, Lita, and husband Felix Rio Tarrosa (Tarrosas), petitioners herein. The conveying Deed of Sale dated January 12, 1974 (Deed of Sale) did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. Manila. On May 23, 1977, Bonifacio and Anita renewed their vows in a church wedding at St. John the Baptist Parish in San Juan, On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died. months later, the Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale and had TCT No. 173677 canceled. They secured the issuance in their names of TCT No. N-173911 from the Quezon City Register of Deeds. Getting wind of the cancellation of their fathers title and the issuance of TCT No. N-173911, Danilo and Vilma filed on May 19, 2003 a Notice of Adverse Claim before the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to protect their rights over the subject property. Very much later, Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit before the RTC in Quezon City. Petitioners: The lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property inasmuch as he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC. As further alleged, they were not aware of the supposed marriage between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale. RTC: The lot in question was the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita. Deed of Sale between Boni and Lita is void ab initio CA: Affirmed the RTC; CA held that the Tarrosas failed to overthrow the legal presumption that the parcel of land in dispute was conjugal ISSUE: Whether the subject lot is conjugal RULING: (1) YES. Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita contracted marriage, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. For the presumption to arise, it is not, as Tan v. Court of Appeals9 teaches, even necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the property is conjugal. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal.10 ON DISSOLUTION Interest in the Conjugal Partnership Is Merely Inchoate until Liquidation As a final consideration, the Court agrees with the CA that the sale of one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation of the partnership is void. Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into a title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement.26 The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution.27 Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.28 Therefore, even on the supposition that Bonifacio only sold his portion of the conjugal partnership, the sale is still theoretically void, for, as previously stated, the right of the husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. 2 Cabreza v Cabreza, GR 171260, September 11, 2009 Facts: Ceferino Cabreza, Jr. (respondent) filed with RTC Pasig a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Amparo Robles Cabreza (petitioner). January 3, 2001: RTC granted the petition (Art 36 FC) Further, the conjugal partnership is hereby dissolved and must be liquidated in accordance with Art. 129 of the Family Code, without prejudice to the prior rights of known and unknown creditors of the conjugal partnership. Said Decision is final and executory. March 7, 2003: respondent filed with the RTC a Motion for Execution (Re: Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership). Respondent sought to implement the order for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, which consisted solely in the real property located in Pasig City (TCT No. 17460). He moved that said property be sold and the proceeds be divided and distributed. -RTC granted respondents motion (TCT 17460 be sold); Petitioner filed Petition for Review -CA dismissed the petition; Petitioner filed Petition for Certiorari -SC denied (final and 219 | P a g e -
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executory). Division: a) 1/2 or 50% of the total proceeds shall be delivered to the common children of the petitioner and the respondent as their presumptive legitime; b) the other half or 50% of the proceeds shall be equally divided between the petitioner and the respondent. From the share of the respondent should be deducted the total amount of 1.5 which was earlier advanced by petitioner to respondent, but which was adjudged to be returned to the former by the latter pursuant to the Resolution of the CA (November 14, 1994) and reiterated in the final and executory Decision in this case by this Court. All of the foregoing are subject to the claim of creditors of the conjugal partnership or of the petitioner and respondent, if any. RTCs order: allow prospective buyers to inspect the property; approval of the deed of absolute sale, for the authorization for respondent to sign said deed in behalf of petitioner, and occupants to vacate the property. -Petitioner filed MR which was however denied; issuance of a writ of possession (10M-price of the property) to buyer BJD Holdings Corp. July 5, 2004/Sept 2 2004: a Notice to Vacate/Final Notice was served on petitioner. July 8, 2004: petitioner filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate, arguing that Article 129(9) of the New Civil Code provides that, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom majority of the children choose to remain. Hence, since the majority of the children, albeit of legal age, opted to stay with petitioner, she asserted that the family home should be given to her (she points out that there is another property). RTC CA and SC denied 3 related cases including herein petition: G.R. No. 162745, Amparo R. Cabreza v. Court of Appeals, et al., questioning the May 26, 2003 RTC Order granting respondents motion to sell the family home. Said petition was denied by this Court and an Entry of Judgment was issued on July 23, 2004. G.R. No. 171260, Amparo R. Cabreza v. Ceferino Cabreza et al., herein petition, questioning the writ of execution/possession and notice to vacate because they allegedly varied the terms of the dispositive portion of the January 3, 2001 judgment of the RTC. CA-GR. CV No. 86511, Amparo R. Cabreza v. Ceferino S. Cabreza, et al., questioning the Deed of Sale between respondent and BJD Holdings Corporation, allegedly because of petitioners lack of consent thereto. The petition was granted by the CA, which ordered for the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings. SC: petition must fail. -denied The order to sale the family home has long been final and executory. The order of possession, writ of possession and notice to vacate, which are now assailed by petitioner, were all implemented after the May 26, 2003 Order. Hence, petitioner should have already raised herein argument in its first petition, as the facts on which she anchors her argument were already operative then. She did not raise the same, and it would be unfair to allow her to raise said argument in this petition in the guise of questioning the subsequent implementing orders of the RTC. There is also no compelling reason for this Court to exercise its equity jurisdiction in the case at bar. -While there is no prohibition for private parties to file a petition on their own behalf, it necessarily follows that they take the risk of not having a lawyer who is wellversed in appellate practice. After her failed petition in the CA, petitioner already had the opportunity to rectify the situation by engaging the services of a lawyer when she filed her petition before this Court; yet for some reason, she chose not to do so. Thus, she has no one else to blame but herself. In her effort to salvage her petition, petitioner contends that the deed of sale between respondent and the BJD Holdings Corporation is not valid because of her lack of consent thereto. Such argument, however, deserves scant consideration, as petitioner herself manifested that there is a pending case involving the validity of the deed of sale pursuant to the CAs ruling. The same therefore cannot be the proper subject of herein petition. Anent petitioners allegation that there is another conjugal property other than that covered by TCT No. 17460, the same is a question of fact which should not be the proper subject of a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (RTC and CA already ruled that there was only 1 asset of the conjugal partnership that was the subject of partition between the spouses.) 3 Heirs of Go v Servacio, GR 157537, Sept. 7, 2011 4 Ugalde v Ysasi, GR 130623, February 29, 2008 Facts: On February 15, 1951, Jon de Ysasi and Lorea de Ugalde married in civil law and on March 1, 1951, married in church law. They had a child but they separated in April 1957. On June 2, 1961, they agreed to have their conjugal partnership dissolved as of April 15, 1957. The CFI approved this Amicable Settlement on June 6, 1961. However, on May 26, 1964, Jon married Victoria Eleanor Smith. Hence, on December 12, 1984, Lorea petitioned for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. Pending appeal in CA, a petition for Judicial Declaration of Nullity of their Marriage was filed and granted on May 31, 1995 for lack of a marriage license. The Certification of Nullity was issued on November 20, 1995. CA then decided affirmed RTC decision that no conjugal partnership exists and that the Amicable Settlement was valid; it added that their marriage was void, deciding without knowing about the earlier judgment on the nullity of their marriage. Issue as stated in the case: WON CA did not err in affirming RTC ruling that there is conjugal partnership and that the Amicable Settlement is valid and in adding that their marriage is void Held: HELD: The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order in Civil Case No. 4791 approving the parties' separation of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence, when the trial court decided Special Proceedings No. 3330, the conjugal partnership between petitioner and respondent was already dissolved. Petitioner alleges that the CFI had no authority to approve the Compromise Agreement because the case was for custody, and the creditors were not given notice by the parties, as also required under Article 191 of the Civil Code. Petitioner cannot repudiate the Compromise Agreement on this ground. A judgment upon a compromise agreement has all the force and effect of any other judgment,
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and conclusive only upon parties thereto and their privies, and not binding on third persons who are not parties to it. 17 The Amicable Settlement had become final as between petitioner and respondent when it was approved by the CFI on 6 June 1961. The CFI's approval of the Compromise Agreement on 6 June 1961 resulted in the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent on even date. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the result of the 21 November 1996 Decision and of the 2 September 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41121. 5 Dino v Dino, GR 178044, January 19, 2011 FACTS: January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Niullity of Marriagw against respondent citing psychological incapacity under article 36. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him. The trial court declared their marriage void ab initio. The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later altered it to A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code ISSUE: WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code HELD: The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court. For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present: 1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other; 2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on coownership. In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, [p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage. 6 Yu v Carpio, GR 189207, June 15, 2011 Topic: Dissolution of CPG Facts: Eric Yu filed petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Caroline Yu. Judge Cruz Suarez of the RTC issued an Order, stating that petitioners Partial Offer of Evidence would already be submitted for resolution after certain exhibits of petitioner have been marked. Caroline Yu moved to resolve petition for declaration of nullity first. Eric Yu argued that petition for declaration of nullity cannot be resolved without presentation of evidence and it must resolve both incidents such as the nullity and property simultaneously. RTC ruled that evidence first must be presented, before resolving petition for declaration of nullity. Thereafter, case was re-raffled to another branch of RTC Caroline Yu moved to resolve petition for declaration of nullity first which was opposed by Eric Yu. Petitioner averred that the incident on nullity of marriage, on the one hand, and the incidents on custody, support, and property relations, on the other, should both proceed and be simultaneously resolved. RTC (via Judge Reyes-Carpio) granted motion of Caroline Yu, on grounds that evidence is merely an ancillary issue. Yu filed a motion for 221 | P a g e -
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reconsideration which was denied by the court. Eric Yu filed petition for certiorari, on grounds that Reyes-Carpio committed grave abuse of discretion. Issue: Whether or not Reyes-Carpio committed grave abuse of discretion. Held: The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." Nowhere in the petition was it shown that the acts being alleged to have been exercised with grave abuse of discretion. It is very clear that what petitioner seeks to reconsider in the Courts Order is the procedure regarding the reception of evidence on the issues of property relations, custody and support. He opposes the fact that the main issue on declaration of nullity is submitted for decision when he has not yet presented evidence on the issues on property relations, custody and support. Considering that what he seeks to set aside is the procedural aspect of the instance case, i.e. the reception of evidence which is a matter of procedure, there is no question that it is A.M. 02-11-[10]-SC which should be followed and not the procedures provided in Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code. While it is true that the Family Code is a substantive law and rule of procedure cannot alter a substantive law, the provisions laid in Articles 50 and 51 relative to the liquidation and dissolution of properties are by nature procedural, thus there are no substantive rights which may be prejudiced or any vested rights that may be impaired. Lastly, it is the policy of the courts to give effect to both procedural and substantive laws, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Trial judges decision was not without basis. Secs. 19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations after the trial court renders a decision granting the petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the petition. Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations but merely deferred it, based on the existing rules issued by this Court, to a time when a decision granting the petition is already at hand and before a final decree is issued. Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly the family court, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children, and delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the petition. And following the pertinent provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code, contrary to what petitioner asserts. Petitioner asserts that the deferment of the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations would amount to an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment on the main issue. This argument does not hold water. The Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive evidence on the subject incidents after a judgment granting the petition but before the decree of nullity or annulment of marriage is issued. And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in issuing the assailed orders. 7 Quiao v Quiao, G. R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012 FACTS: On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). ito lang talaga yung facts about their lovelife.. RTC in favor of Petitioner, approved legal separation (No MR/MNT was filed however a motion for clarification was filed re: the meaning of net profits earned) In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October 10, 2005. The petitioner neither filed a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. On December 16, 2005, or after 67 days had lapsed, the trial court issued an order granting the respondent's motion for execution; and on February 10, 2006, or after 123 days had lapsed, the trial court issued a writ of execution. Finally, when the writ had already been partially executed, the petitioner, on July 7, 2006 or after 270 days had lapsed. For 270 days, the petitioner never raised a single issue until the decision had already been partially executed. Thus at the time the petitioner filed his motion for clarification, the trial courts decision has become final and executory.
For our convenience, the following matters cannot anymore be disturbed since the October 10, 2005 judgment has already become immutable and unalterable, to wit: (a) The finding that the petitioner is the offending spouse since he cohabited with a woman who is not his wife; (b) The trial court's grant of the petition for legal separation of respondent Rita; (c) The dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership; (d) The forfeiture of the petitioner's right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership; (e) The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children's custody; (f) The disqualification of the offending spouse from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession; (g) The revocation of provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse; (h) The holding that the property relation of the parties is conjugal partnership of gains and pursuant to Article 116 of the Family Code, all properties acquired during the marriage, whe ther acquired by one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved; (i) The finding that the spouses acquired their real and personal properties while they were living together; (j) The list of properties which Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) foreclosed; (k) The list of the remaining properties of the couple which must be dissolved and liquidated and the fact that respondent Rita was the one who took charge of the administration of these properties; (l) The holding that the conjugal partnership shall be liable to matters included under Article 121 of the Family Code and the conjugal liabilities totaling P503,862.10 shall be charged to the income generated by these properties; (m) The fact that the trial court had no way of knowing whether the petitioner had separate properties which can satisfy his share for 222 | P a g e -
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the support of the family; (n) The holding that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7); (o) The ruling that the remaining properties not subject to any encumbrance shall therefore be divided equally between the petitioner and the respondent without prejudice to the children's legitime; (p) The holding that the petitioner's share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children; and (q) The order to the petitioner to reimburse the respondents the sum of P19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses of P5,000.00. ISSUES: 1. WON the vested right of the husband over half of the common properties of the conjugal partnership was violated when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the Family Code? 2. What is the meaning of net profits and how is it computed / divided? HELD: 1. No. The petitioner (husband) is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: "All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife." A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. To be vested, a right must have become a titlelegal or equitableto the present or future enjoyment of property. In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the Decision dated October 10, 2005 was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as "net profits," pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process. 2. The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of the separate properties of the spouses and the products of their labor and industry.
The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of "net profits" earned by the conjugal partnership for purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized under Article 63 of the Family Code. He insists that since there is no other provision under the Family Code, which defines "net profits" earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation, then Article 102 of the Family Code applies. SC: First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable law as to the property relations between the parties and the applicable law as to the definition of "net profits." As earlier discussed, Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to the property relations of the parties. In other words, the computation and the succession of events will follow the provisions under Article 129 of the said Code. Moreover, as to the definition of "net profits," we cannot but refer to Article 102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly provides that for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits "shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution." Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code. Where lies the difference? As earlier shown, the difference lies in the processes used under the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and in the processes used under the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code. Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between the absolute community regime and the conjugal partnership regime. On Absolute Community Regime: When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned. Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an inventory is prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each; then the debts and obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the absolute community's assets and if the community's properties are insufficient, the separate properties of each of the couple will be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the separate properties will be delivered to each of them. The net remainder of the absolute community is its net assets, which shall be divided between the husband and the wife; and for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture, said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. 74 Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the "net profits" requires that we first find the market value of the properties at the time of the community's dissolution. From the totality of the market value of all the properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of the 223 | P a g e -
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absolute community and this result to the net assets or net remainder of the properties of the absolute community, from which we deduct the market value of the properties at the time of marriage, which then results to the net profits. Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant case, let us see what will happen if we apply Article 102: (a) According to the trial court's finding of facts, both husband and wife have no separate properties, thus, the remaining properties in the list above are all part of the absolute community. And its market value at the time of the dissolution of the absolute community constitutes the "market value at dissolution." (b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were legally separated, all the properties which remained will be liable for the debts and obligations of the community. Such debts and obligations will be subtracted from the "market value at dissolution." (c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid from the total assets of the absolute community constitutes the net remainder or net asset. And from such net asset/remainder of the petitioner and respondent's remaining properties, the market value at the time of marriage will be subtracted and the resulting totality constitutes the "net profits." (d) Since both husband and wife have no separate properties, and nothing would be returned to each of them, what will be divided equally between them is simply the "net profits." However, in the Decision dated October 10, 2005, the trial court forfeited the half-share of the petitioner in favor of his children. Thus, if we use Article 102 in the instant case (which should not be the case), nothing is left to the petitioner since both parties entered into their marriage without bringing with them any property. On Conjugal Partnership Regime: Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership Regime, we make it clear that Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies in the instant case for purposes only of defining "net profit ." As earlier explained, the definition of "net profits" in Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies to both the absolute community regime and conjugal partnership regime as provided for under Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code, relative to the provisions on Legal Separation. Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, "the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage." From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals. Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the Family Code, Article 129 of the same Code applies in the liquidation of the couple's properties in the event that the conjugal partnership of gains is dissolved, to wit: Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply: (1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse. (2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof. (3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership. (4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121. (5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them. (6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any. (7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code. (8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the partition in accordance with Article 51. (9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation of the properties of the spouses: (a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing the couple's conjugal properties and their separate properties.78 In the instant case, the trial court found that the couple has no separate properties when they married.79 Rather, the trial court identified the following conjugal properties, to wit: 1. 2. 3. 4. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte; coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte; corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte; coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
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5. 6. 7. 8.
a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City; a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de Bugabos, Butuan City; a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City; Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City.
(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership during the marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets of the conjugal partnership; and if the community is enriched at the expense of the separate properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such properties to their respective owners shall be made. (c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the spouses shall be paid from their respective separate properties. But if the conjugal partnership is not sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations, the spouses with their separate properties shall be solidarily liable. (d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband and of the wife shall be returned to each of them. 84 In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties, 85 there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs.However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor. In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances, the petitioner is not entitled to any property at all. Thus, we cannot but uphold the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the trial court. However, we must clarify, as we already did above, the Order dated January 8, 2007. D. Regime of separation of property (a) In the marriage settlements, FC 143-146 Art. 143. Should the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that their property relations during marriage shall be governed by the regime of separation of property, the provisions of this Chapter shall be suppletory. Art. 144. Separation of property may refer to present or future property or both. It may be total or partial. In the latter case, the property not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to the absolute community. Art. 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her own separate estate, without need of the consent of the other. To each spouse shall belong all earnings from his or her profession, business or industry and all fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received during the marriage from his or her separate property. Art. 146. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their income, or, in case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the current market value of their separate properties. The liabilities of the spouses to creditors for family expenses shall, however, be solidary. (b)When mandatory, FC 103 & FC 130 Art. 103. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the community property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the community property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six months period, no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the community property of the terminated marriage shall be void. Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. Art. 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void. Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. (c)Reconciliation in legal separation, FC 66(2) Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences: XXX 225 | P a g e -
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(2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime. (d) Judicial separation of property, 134 - 146 Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient cause. Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: (1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; (2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee; (3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court; (4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101; (5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power; and (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property. Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court for the voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, and for the separation of their common properties. All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership of gains, as well as the personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in the petition and notified of the filing thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest. Art. 137. Once the separation of property has been decreed, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains shall be liquidated in conformity with this Code. During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall pay for the support of the spouses and their children. Art. 138. After dissolution of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership, the provisions on complete separation of property shall apply. Art. 139. The petition for separation of property and the final judgment granting the same shall be recorded in the proper local civil registries and registries of property. Art. 140. The separation of property shall not prejudice the rights previously acquired by creditors. Art. 141. The spouses may, in the same proceedings where separation of property was decreed, file a motion in court for a decree reviving the property regime that existed between them before the separation of property in any of the following instances: (1) When the civil interdiction terminates; (2) When the absentee spouse reappears; (3) When the court, being satisfied that the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements will not again abuse that power, authorizes the resumption of said administration; (4) When the spouse who has left the conjugal home without a decree of legal separation resumes common life with the other; (5) When parental authority is judicially restored to the spouse previously deprived thereof; (6) When the spouses who have separated in fact for at least one year, reconcile and resume common life; or (7) When after voluntary dissolution of the absolute community of property or conjugal partnership has been judicially decreed upon the joint petition of the spouses, they agree to the revival of the former property regime. No voluntary separation of property may thereafter be granted. The revival of the former property regime shall be governed by Article 67. Art. 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to the other spouse: (1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other; (2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee; (3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; or (4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an accused in a criminal case. If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, conflict of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator. Chapter 6. Regime of Separation of Property
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Art. 143. Should the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that their property relations during marriage shall be governed by the regime of separation of property, the provisions of this Chapter shall be suppletory. (212a) Art. 144. Separation of property may refer to present or future property or both. It may be total or partial. In the latter case, the property not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to the absolute community. Art. 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her own separate estate, without need of the consent of the other. To each spouse shall belong all earnings from his or her profession, business or industry and all fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received during the marriage from his or her separate property. Art. 146. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their income, or, in case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the current market value of their separate properties. The liabilities of the spouses to creditors for family expenses shall, however, be solidary. 1 Ugalde v Ysasi, GR 130623, February 29, 2008 On 15 February 1951, Lorea de Ugalde (petitioner) and Jon de Ysasi (respondent) got married before Municipal Judge Remigio Pea of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. On 1 March 1951,4 Rev. Msgr. Flaviano Arriola solemnized their church wedding at the San Sebastian Cathedral in Bacolod City. Petitioner and respondent did not execute any ante-nuptial agreement. They had a son named Jon de Ysasi III. Petitioner and respondent separated sometime in April 1957.5 On 26 May 1964, respondent allegedly contracted another marriage with Victoria Eleanor Smith (Smith) before Judge Lucio M. Tanco of Pasay City. Petitioner further alleged that respondent and Smith had been acquiring and disposing of real and personal properties to her prejudice as the lawful wife. Petitioner alleged that she had been defrauded of rental income, profits, and fruits of their conjugal properties. On 12 December 1984, petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 48 (trial court). The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3330. In particular, petitioner asked for her conjugal share in respondent's inheritance as per the settlement of the estate of respondent's parents, Juan Ysasi6 and Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi, who died on 17 November 1975 and 25 February 1979, respectively.7 Petitioner also prayed for a monthly support of P5,000 to be deducted from her share in the conjugal partnership; the appointment of a receiver during the pendency of the litigation; the annulment of all contracts, agreements, and documents signed and ratified by respondent with third persons without her consent; and payment of appearance and attorney's fees. Respondent: He and petitioner entered into an agreement that their conjugal partnership of gains shall be deemed dissolved as of 15 April 1957. Pursuant to the agreement, they submitted an Amicable Settlement in Civil Case No. 4791 then pending before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (CFI). Petitioner has already obtained a divorce from him before the Supreme Court of Mexico. Petitioner then contracted a second marriage with Richard Galoway (Galoway). After Galoway's death, petitioner contracted a third marriage with Frank Scholey. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains on the grounds of estoppel, laches, and res judicata. The marriage between him and petitioner was void because it was executed without the benefit of a marriage license.
RTC: Dismissed the action for dissolution of CPG. The existence of a conjugal partnership of gains is predicated on a valid marriage. Their marriage was null and void, thus, no community of property was formed between them. The action was barred by res judicata. Petitioner and respondent entered into an amicable settlement in Civil Case No. 4791. The amicable settlement was approved by the CFI and petitioner may no longer repudiate it. There was no proof to show that during their union, petitioner and respondent acquired properties.
CA: Affirmed RTCs decision Compromise agreement is a valid contract between the parties. Since the compromise agreement was entered into freely, voluntarily, and with the full understanding of its consequences, it is conclusive and binding on the parties. the action was barred by laches since it was filed by petitioner 23 years from the time the CFI approved the additional amicable settlement in Civil Case No. 4791 respondent's right over the estate of his deceased parents was only inchoate and there was no evidence that petitioner and respondent acquired any property that could be considered conjugal
ISSUE: Whether there was already a dissolution of the CPG RULING: YES. Conjugal Partnership of Gains Dissolved in Civil Case No. 4791
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The finality of the 6 June 1961 CFI Order in Civil Case No. 4791 resulted in the dissolution of the petitioner and respondent's conjugal partnership of gains. Petitioner and respondent were married on 15 February 1951. The applicable law at the time of their marriage was Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code) which took effect on 30 August 1950.16 Pursuant to Article 119 of the Civil Code, the property regime of petitioner and respondent was conjugal partnership of gains. Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of property results in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains: Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates: (1) Upon the death of either spouse; (2) When there is a decree of legal separation; (3) When the marriage is annulled; (4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191. The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order in Civil Case No. 4791 approving the parties' separation of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence, when the trial court decided Special Proceedings No. 3330, the conjugal partnership between petitioner and respondent was already dissolved. A judgment upon a compromise agreement has all the force and effect of any other judgment, and conclusive only upon parties thereto and their privies, and not binding on third persons who are not parties to it.17 The Amicable Settlement had become final as between petitioner and respondent when it was approved by the CFI on 6 June 1961. The CFI's approval of the Compromise Agreement on 6 June 1961 resulted in the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent on even date. E. Property regime of unions without marriage 1. Unions under FC 147, 6, 35, 36, 53 Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer. In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the marriage certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party, which fact shall be attested by the solemnizing officer. Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians; (2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so; (3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter; (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41; (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and (6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53. 228 | P a g e -
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Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void. 2 Valdes v. QC RTC, G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996 Law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both parties in the contract. Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were 5 children. Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 FC, RTC QC. RTC: granted the petition (mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations) Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification on the portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." RTC made the following clarification: Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their "family home" and all their properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply. Disposition of the family dwelling: Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on ownership. The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since Article 102 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute community of property. MR - denied Issue: What law should govern? SC: CC co-ownership The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148 FC. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 CC: Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation. This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership. Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that (a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or her share in co-ownership property, without consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and (b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the marriage. When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed. In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in 229 | P a g e -
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authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 15 and 42, 16 of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between commonlaw spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses. 3 Carino vs. Carino, GR 132539, February 3, 2001 FACTS: SPO4 Santiago CArio married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cario also married respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cario became bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance. On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying that Nicdao be ordered to return to her at least onehalf of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For failing to file her answer, Nicdao was declared in default. Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and Cario. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee submitted that Carios marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the required marriage license. ISSUES: 1. 2. Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void; Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death benefits from government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage.
HELD: Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence therof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. It does not follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage; otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property Gonzales vs Gonzales, 478 SCRA 327 4 Dio v Dio, GR 178004, January 19, 2011 2. Unions under FC 148, 35, 37, 38, cf FC 50 in rel. to FC 43(2) Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions 230 | P a g e -
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and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in both faith. Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians; (2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so; (3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter; (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41; (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and (6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53. Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate: (1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and (2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy: (1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree; (2) Between step-parents and step-children; (3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law; (4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child; (5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child; (6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter; (7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter; (8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and (9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or his or her own spouse. Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129. Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse; 5 Belcodero v. CA 227 SCRA 303
6 Agapay vs Agapay, 276 SCRA 340 Topic: Unions under FC 148, 35, 37, 38, cf FC 50 in rel. to FC 43(2) Facts: Miguel Palang married Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol on July 16, 1949. A few months after the wedding, he left to work in Hawaii. As early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. He refused to live with private respondents, but stayed alone in a house in Pangasinan Miguel married with nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay Miguel and Erlinda, jointly purchased a parcel of rice land. Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in their names. Further, Erlinda allegedly purchased a house and lot and title was issued in her name. October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang.
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In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. Two years later, Miguel died. Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein private respondents, instituted the case at bar, an action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages of the house and lot together with the rice land. Issue: WON Erlinda owns the said lands. Held No. Carlina owns the said lands The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage, said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latters de facto separation. Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Petitioner was only around twenty years of age and considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that she contributed in the purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of the same. Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland in, there is no basis to justify her coownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and Carlina Palang. Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in favor of their daughter. The trial court erred in holding that the decision adopting their compromise agreement in effect partakes the nature of judicial confirmation of the separation of property between spouses and the termination of the conjugal partnership. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. 7 Tumlos vs. Sps. Fernandez, G.R. No. 137650, Apr 12, 2000 FACTS: Spouses Fernandez filed an action of ejectment against petitioner Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. In their complaint, the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through tolerance they had allowed the defendants-private respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last 7 years without the payment of any rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few months, Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was not complied with by the said defendants. They have demanded several times that the defendants vacate the premises, as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building. Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to the complaint. She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with Mario Fernandez. She then asked for the dismissal of the complaint. Upon appeal to the RTC, petitioner and the two other defendants alleged in their memorandum on appeal that Mario and petitioner had an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for around 10 years, and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is the co-owner of the property HELD: No. As correctly held by the CA, the applicable law is not Article 144 of the Civil Code, but Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman who are not incapacitated to marry each other or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void from the beginning. It does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife. It is clear that Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry petitioner because he was legally married to Lourdes Fernandez. Art. 148 needs actual contributions. Petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the subject property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with Respondent Mario Fernandez. Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of the property amounts to a contribution in its acquisition. Clearly, there is no basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership. The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondents. 1 Atienza vs.de Castro,G.R. No. 1695698, Nov. 29, 2006 FACTS:In 1983, Lupo Atienza, then the President and General Manager of Enrico Shipping Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation, hired the services of Yolanda U. De Castro as accountant for the two corporations. The relationship between Lupo and Yolanda became intimate. Despite Lupo being a married man, he and Yolanda eventually lived together in consortium beginning the later part of 1983. Out of their union, two children were born. After the birth of their second child, their relationship turned sour until they parted ways. On May 28, 1992, Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati City a complaint against Yolanda for the judicial partition between them of a parcel of land with improvements located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City.
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Petitioner: -
the subject property was acquired during his union with Yolanda as common-law husband and wife, hence the property is co-owned by them the property was acquired by Yolanda sometime in 1987 using his exclusive funds and that the title thereto was transferred by the seller in Yolandas name without his knowledge and consent that he did not interpose any objection thereto because at the time, their affair was still thriving. It was only after their separation and his receipt of information that Yolanda allowed her new live-in partner to live in the disputed property, when he demanded his share thereat as a co-owner.
Respondent: she acquired the same property for P2.6M using her exclusive funds, insisting that she bought it thru her own savings and earnings as a businesswoman
RTC: Decided in favor of Lupo. The contested property as owned in common by him and Yolanda and ordering its partition between the two in equal shares. CA: Reversed. Under the provisions of Article 148 of the Family Code, Yolandas claim of sole ownership is meritorious, as it has been substantiated by competent evidence. Lupo failed to overcome the burden of proving his allegation that the subject property was purchased by Yolanda thru his exclusive funds. ISSUE: Whether the lot in litigation is De Castros sole property RULING: YES. The parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other because petitioner was validly married to another woman at the time of his cohabitation with respondent. Their property regime shall be governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime , only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ... Proof of actual contribution is required. The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal. Although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. Petitioners claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not only did he fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In contrast to petitioners dismal failure to prove his cause, herein respondent was able to present preponderant evidence of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, the respondent sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase the property from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail. She presented her clientele and the promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She also presented her bank account statements and bank transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay the purchase price of the subject property. 2 Signey v SSS, GR No. 173582, Jan. 28, 2008 Who is entitled to the SSS benefits of a member who was survived not only by his legal wife, but also by two common-law wives with whom he had six children? Facts: Rodolfo Signey, Sr., a member of the SSS, died. In his members records, he designated Yolanda Signey (petitioner) as primary beneficiary and his four children with her as secondary beneficiaries. Petitioner, Gina and Editha filed a claim for death benefits with the public respondent SSS. Petitioner and Gina were common-law wives of the deceased and that Editha was the legal wife. SSS: denied the death benefit claim of petitioner. However, it recognized Ginalyn and Rodelyn, the minor children of the deceased with Gina, as the primary beneficiaries under the SSS Law. The marriage between petitioner and the deceased was null and void because of a prior subsisting marriage contracted between the deceased and Editha, as confirmed with the Local Civil Registry of Cebu City. Petitioner filed a petition with the SSC in which she attached a waiver of rights executed by Editha. SSC: affirmed the decision of the SSS; denied MR. CA: affirmed SSC; denied MR. Issues: Whether petitioners marriage with the deceased is valid? Whether petitioner has a superior legal right over the SSS benefits as against the illegitimate minor children of the deceased? Held: petition is denied. CA decision affirmed. SC is not a trier of facts: not disturb the findings of fact of the SSS which are supported by substantial evidence and affirmed by the SSC 233 | P a g e -
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and the CA. SSC found based on the SSS field investigation report that even if Editha was the legal wife, she was not qualified to the death benefits since she herself admitted that she was not dependent on her deceased husband for support inasmuch as she was cohabiting with a certain Aquilino Castillo. On Edithas waiver, the SSC held that considering that one of the requisites of a valid waiver is the existence of an actual right which could be renounced, petitioner in effect recognized that Editha had a right over the benefits of the deceased thereby enabling her to renounce said right in favor of petitioner and her children. The declaration by Editha that she was not married to the deceased is not only contrary to the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City which state that they were married on 29 October 1967 but also renders nugatory the waiver of right itself, for if she was not married to the deceased then she would have no rights that may be waived. 1. The existence of a prior subsisting marriage between the deceased and Editha is supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner, who has fully availed of her right to be heard, only relied on the waiver of Editha and failed to present any evidence to invalidate or otherwise controvert the confirmed marriage certificate registered under LCR Registry No. 2083 (21 November 1967). She did not even try to allege and prove any infirmity in the marriage between the deceased and Editha. 2. Better right over the SSS death benefits: Section 8(e) and (k) of R. A. No. 8282 is very clear. Hence, we need only apply the law. (if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation; plain meaning rule or verba legis; index animi sermo est-speech is the index of intention; Verba legis non est recedendum-from the words of a statute there should be no departure) Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. Since petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and because the deceased has no legitimate child, it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall be entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries. The SSS Law is clear that for a minor child to qualify as a "dependent," the only requirements are that he/she must be below 21 years of age, not married nor gainfully employed. In this case, the minor illegitimate children Ginalyn and Rodelyn were born on 13 April 1996 and 20 April 2000, respectively. Had the legitimate child of the deceased and Editha survived and qualified as a dependent under the SSS Law, Ginalyn and Rodelyn would have been entitled to a share equivalent to only 50% of the share of the said legitimate child. Since the legitimate child of the deceased predeceased him, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, as the only qualified primary beneficiaries of the deceased, are entitled to 100% of the benefits. 3 Borromeo vs Descallar, GR No. 159310, Feb. 24, 2009 Facts: Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in 1983. In 1984, he met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress at St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together. In the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 19851 and March 10, 19862 and A Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 covering the properties in Agro-Macro Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue City, Jambrich and respondent were referred to as the buyers. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the Register of Deeds, registration was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Thus they erased Jambrichs name from the document only retaining his signature in certain areas. Jambrich also formally adopted respondents two sons. April 1991, respondent found a new boyfriend while Jambrich began to live with another woman in Danao City. Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. In 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted to the latter for about P150,000.00. To pay the debt he sold his rights to the Agro-Macro properties to the petitioner. On July 26, 1991, when petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots have been transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject property has already been mortgaged. On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property before the Regional Trial Court, alleging that the deed of sale issued for the property in favor of the respondent do not reflect the true agreement of the parties, the latter having paid nothing for the said properties. Respondent denies the allegation citing that she had paid for the property solely and exclusively using the money from her copra business. RTC rules for the petitioner (Borromeo) citing the proofs presented on the earning capacity of Jambrich at the time the property was purchased over the supposed earnings of the respondent from her Copra business (which were markedly fictional since the respondent was still working as a waitress for P1000 a month at the time of the purchase of the properties. April 10, 2002 Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA sides w/ respondent citing: In the case at bar, the title of the subject property is not in the name of Jambrich but in the name of defendant-appellant. Thus, Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has no title thereto. Issue: WON Respondent has a right over the said property. Held: NO, it was proven in the RTC trial that the properties in question were in fact purchased from the exclusive funds of Wilhelm Jambrich who at the time of acquisition had sufficient income compared to the waitress wages of the respondent. As such the purchase of the property could clearly be attributed Janbrich and subsequently to the petitioner. Furthermore the vice of alienage plaguing the sale of the property to Jambrich was in fact cured by the transfer of the property to the petitioner who is a Filipino citizen citing the case United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian 4 Heirs of Maramag vs De Guzman, GR 181132, June 5, 2009 (HINDI KO MAHANAP YUNG RELATED NA DISCUSSION: FEELING KO DAHIL CONCUBINE SI EVA AT SA DONATION/BENEFICIARY SIYA) Facts: Petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto Maramag (Loreto), while respondents were Loretos illegitimate family. Loreto designated respondents as beneficiaries in his life insurance policies from Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (Insular) and Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife). 234 | P a g e -
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Petitioners insituted in the RTC a petition for revocation and/or reduction of insurance proceeds for being void and/or inofficious, with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction. Pursuant to the motion to dismiss incorporated in Insular and Grepalifes respective answers, the TC dismissed the complaint with respect to the illegitimate children, who are the the designated primary beneficiaries in the life insurance policies, for lack of cause action. However, trial court ruled that the action may proceed against the concubine, Insular Life, and Grepalife. Insular and Grepalife filed their respective motions for reconsideration, arguing, in the main, that the petition failed to state a cause of action against them. TC granted, and dismissed the case against them. In doing so, the TC court considered the allegations found in Insulars answer. 1 CA dismissed petitionersappeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action involved a pure question of law. Further, it found that due to petitioners failure to timely file a motion for reconsideration, the dismissal against Insular and Grepalife had already attained finality. ISSUE: W/N Eva can claim even though prohibited under the civil code against donation HELD: YES. Petition is DENIED. Any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy of the person who cannot make any donation to him If a concubine is made the beneficiary, it is believed that the insurance contract will still remain valid, but the indemnity must go to the legal heirs and not to the concubine, for evidently, what is prohibited under Art. 2012 is the naming of the improper beneficiary. SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the policy. GR: only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy. EX: situation where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured 5 Labayan v Samoy, GR 165427, March 21, 2011 XII. THE FAMILY, FC 149 15, NCC 2035 Art. 149. The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect. Art. 150. Family relations include those: (1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parents and children; (3) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or halfblood. Article 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil status of persons; (2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation; (4) Future support; (5) The jurisdiction of courts; (6) Future legitime. 6 Tribiana vs.Tribiana, G.R. No. 137359, Sept. 13, 2004 Topic: The Family Facts: This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent Lourdes Tribiana against her husband petitioner Edwin Tribiana. In her petition, respondent claims that petitioner left their conjugal home with their daughter and has since deprived her of lawful custody. Petioner moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the petition failed to allege that earnest efforts at a compromise were made before its filing as required by Article 151 of the family code. ( No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. ) Lourdes filed her opposition to Edwins motion to dismiss claiming that there were prior efforts at a compromise, which failed. Lourdes attached to her opposition a copy of the Certification to File Action from their Barangay. The RTC denied Edwins motion, hence this petition. Issue: WON the failure to indicate in her petition for habeas corpus that the parties exerted efforts to reach a compromise is a ground for the dismissal of said petition.
1
Specifically, the allegations that Loreto revoked the designation of the concubine in one policy and that Insular disqualified her as a beneficiary in the other policy such that the entire proceeds would be paid to the illegitimate children of Loreto with Eva pursuant to Section 53 of the Insurance Code.
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Held: It is true that the petition for habeas corpus filed by Lourdes failed to allege that she resorted to compromise proceedings before filing the petition. However, in her opposition to Edwins motion to dismiss, Lourdes attached a Barangay Certification to File Action. Edwin does not dispute the authenticity of the Barangay Certification and its contents. This effectively established that the parties tried to compromise but were unsuccessful in their efforts. However, Edwin would have the petition dismissed despite the existence of the Barangay Certification, which he does not even dispute. Evidently, Lourdes has complied with the condition precedent under Article 151 of the Family Code. A dismissal under Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is warranted only if there is a failure to comply with a condition precedent. Given that the alleged defect is a mere failure to allege compliance with a condition precedent, the proper solution is not an outright dismissal of the action, but an amendment under Section 1 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, the failure of a party to comply with condition precedent is not jurisdictional defect. In habeas corpus proceedings involving the welfare and custody of a child of tender years, the paramount concern is to resolve immediately the issue of who has legal custody. Technicalities should not stand in the way of giving such child full protection. In connection with the topic, families cant just file a complaint against each other unless earnest efforts to compromise were made. 7 Hiyas Savings vs. Acua, G.R. NO. 154132, August 31, 2006 FACTS Private Alfredo Moreno filed a complaint against Hiyas, his wife Remedios, the spouses Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage. He said that he did not secure any loan from the petitioner bank or execute any mortgage contract in its favor. He says that the petitioners were the only ones benefited by the mortgage and its not possible for him to have signed the contract because he was working abroad at the time it was entered into. Hiyas filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that no earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made because the parties involved here are family members. On the other hand, Moreno says that since three of the parties are not his family members, such compromise need not be made before the action is instituted. He also said that the defendants be declared in default for not filing an answer in time. RTC ruled in favor of Moreno and denied the order to dismiss. It said that when one of the parties to a case is not a family member, there is no need to show that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made. ISSUE: Is the RTC correct? YES. The petition did not go through the CA so it ignored the hierarchy of courts. On this note, the petition is already dismissed. But even if it were given due course, the RTC is still correct. In Magbaleta v Gonong, the rule was already laid down that when a stranger becomes party to a suit between family members, the law no longer requires that earnest efforts towards a compromise have to be made before the action can prosper. Article 151 applies only when the suit is exclusively among family members, and it may be invoked only be a party who is the same member of that family. Article 151 of the Family Code provides as follows: No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. Article 222 of the Civil Code from which Article 151 of the Family Code was taken, essentially contains the same provisions, to wit: No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035. Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the action can prosper. In the subsequent case of De Guzman, the case involved spouses and the alleged paramour of the wife. The Court ruled that due to the efforts exerted by the husband, through the Philippine Constabulary, to confront the wife, there was substantial compliance with the law, thereby implying that even in the presence of a party who is not a family member, the requirements that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been exerted must be complied with, pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code, now Article 151 of the Family Code. While De Guzman was decided after Magbaleta, the principle enunciated in the Magbaleta is the one that now prevails because it is reiterated in the subsequent cases of Gonzales v. Lopez, Esquivias v. Court of Appeals, Spouses Hontiveros v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Iloilo City, and the most recent case of Martinez v. Martinez. Thus, Article 151 of the Family Code applies to cover when the suit is exclusively between or among family members. The Court finds no cogent reason why the ruling in Magbaleta as well as in all of the aforementioned cases should not equally apply to suits involving husband and wife. RULING Petition dismissed XIII. FAMILY HOME, FC 152-162 [exclude FC 157, 161, 162] Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
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Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. Art. 156. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent. It may also be constituted by an unmarried head of a family on his or her own property. Nevertheless, property that is the subject of a conditional sale on installments where ownership is reserved by the vendor only to guarantee payment of the purchase price may be constituted as a family home. Art. 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of the three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law. In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption of this Code, the value most favorable for the constitution of a family home shall be the basis of evaluation. For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to include chartered cities and municipalities whose annual income at least equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are deemed to be rural areas. Art. 158. The family home may be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof with the written consent of the person constituting the same, the latter's spouse, and a majority of the beneficiaries of legal age. In case of conflict, the court shall decide. Art. 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. Art. 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply. At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor. Art. 161. For purposes of availing of the benefits of a family home as provided for in this Chapter, a person may constitute, or be the beneficiary of, only one family home. Art. 162. The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. 1 Patricio vs. Dario, G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006 The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during one's lifetime Facts: Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, Perla and their two sons, Marcelino Marc and Marcelino III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building built thereon situated at 91 Oxford corner Ermin Garcia Streets in Cubao, Quezon City, with an area of seven hundred fifty five (755) square meters, more or less. Marcelino Marc and Marcelino III , extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Accordingly, TCT No. RT-30731 (175992) was cancelled and TCT No. R-213963 was issued in the names of Perla, Marcelino III and Marcelino Marc.
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Perla and Marcelino Marc formally advised Marcelino III of their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Marcelino III refused to partition the property hence Perla and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court. RTC: ordered the partition of the subject property in the following manner: Perla G. Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. ordered the sale of the property by public auction wherein all parties concerned may put up their bids. In case of failure, the subject property should be distributed accordingly in the aforestated manner.
CA: Denied Marcelino IIIs appeal. Petitioner: MR. CA: Partially reconsidered. Dismissed the partition filed by Perla and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit The family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary (the son of Marcelino III named Marcelino IV) thereof, hence, heirs could not partition the property unless the court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise
Issue: Whether Marcelino IV is a minor beneficiary of Marcelino V. Dario, thus, the Family Home shall continue and shall not be partitioned RULING: (1) NO. Thus, the property shall be partitioned. The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during ones lifetime. It is the dwelling house where husband and wife, or by an unmarried head of a family, reside, including the land on which it is situated. It is constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family. The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by "any of its beneficiaries" must be actual. That which is "actual" is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or constructive. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the "beneficiaries" enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code, which may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code. Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term "descendants" contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus, private respondents minor son, who is also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the first requisite. As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino IV, also known as Ino, the son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite. However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on Marcelino IVs parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents. Marcelino IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother, but from his father. Thus, despite residing in the family 238 | P a g e -
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home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age. 2 Arriola v Arriola, GR 177703, January 28, 2008 Facts: Respondent John is the son of decedent Fidel with his first wife Victoria, while petitioner Anthony is the son of decedent Fidel with his second wife, petitioner Vilma. Respondent filed for judicial partition of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola against petitioners (RTCLas Pias). RTC: ordered partition -the decision became final. As the parties failed to agree on how to partition among them the land, respondent sought its sale through public auction, and petitioners acceded to it. But the sale had to be reset for petitioners refused to include in the auction the house standing on the subject land. Respondent filed with the RTC an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court. RTC denied; CA granted the Petition for Certiorari Issue: Whether the public auction should include the subject house? Held: The subject house is covered by the judgment of partition (the deceased owned the subject land, he also owned the subject house which is a mere accessory to the land-accession; petitioners themselves implicitly recognized the inclusion of the subject house in the partition of the subject land when they proposed in their letter of swapping-arrangement). However, that this ruling does not necessarily countenance the immediate and actual partition of the subject house by way of public auction in view of the suspensive proscription imposed under Article 159 of The Family Code. Based on record establish, the subject house is a family home within the contemplation of the provisions of The Family Code, particularly: Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (Emphasis supplied.) One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic constitution of the family home from the time of its occupation as a family residence, without need anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home not just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back. It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family Code, viz: Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor . This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. (Emphasis supplied.) The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit following the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the family home as the physical symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing the following restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs cannot extra-judicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein; and second, that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling reason has been alleged by the parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling reason to order the partition of the family home, either by physical segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or through auction sale as suggested by the parties. More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the family home regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if the family home has passed by succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home. Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the subject house and lot on which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at this time, even if it has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs, the parties herein. Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003. Thus, for 10 years from said date or until March 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home he constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when no compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and order the partition of the property. The house standing on the land is exempted from partition by public auction. 3 Modequillo v. Breva, 185 SCRA 766 FACTS: The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latters name. A motion to quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated. With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential house in the present case became a family home by operation of law under Article 153. ISSUE: WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home. HELD: The petitioners contention that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. 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family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC. The debt and liability which was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code. This does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the FC. As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land. Petition was dismissed. TAN V. TROCIO Facts: April 1971 when as Felicidad said, Galileo Trocio raped her which begot a son, Jewel o Didnt immediately tell the police since Trocio was thereatening to have her alien husband and to tell authrorities that she was violating the Anti-Dummy Law in operation of her vocational school Nov 1979 Felicidad filed case of disbarment against Atty. Trocio o Trocio denied allegation of rape, only testifying that he dealt her and her familys cases and said she was only doing this because he declined on her request to increase his fee so that she may get the extra. Feb 13 1986 since Trocio failed to attend the hearings etc, Provincial fiscal of Lanao Del Norte, on prima facie evidence presented, held Trocio administratively liable. ISSUE: WON Trocio should be disbarred for gross immoral conduct HELD: NO, there is lack of evidence After incident, she still asked him to be the lawyer for her cases such as a robbery case and her claim for indeminity when a fire burned down the school.The fear that her alien husband would be deported has actually been an absent fear since she said she lost contact of her husband on the night the tryst happened. Keeping her peace for 8 years could be construed as a condonation of his alleged immoral conduct. Testimony of household help that they heard her cries for help is negated by fact that she said it happened in school premises. How could the help have been there then? INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW IT WAS HIS SON: (1) unusual closeness as testified by her household help (2) pictures of Jewel and Trocio together = not enough ground to establish paternity Presumption is Jewel is the child of the alien husband since he was born on 1972 when husband and Felicidad were living together 4 Cabang vs Basay, GR No. 180587, March 20, 2009 Felix Odong was the registered owner of a parcel of land Lot 7777 in Zamboanga the OCT of which was issued in 1966. Odong and his heirs never occupied the land. In 1987, the respondents bought the property form the heirs of Felix but they also did not occupy the property. Petitioners Cabang were the awardees in a cadastral proceedings, they were awarded Lot 7778 but instead of occupying Lot 7778, petitioners occupied Lot 7777 because a big portion of Lot 7778 was used by the government as a public road. Respondents filed a complaint for recovery of the land against the petitioners. The case reached the SC and judgment was for the respondents. After the judgment became final, the records were remanded to the trial court for execution but the court denied the motion for execution on the ground that herein petitioners family home may not be subject to an order of execution. Upon petition filed by respondents, the CA reversed the order of the RTC. ISSUE: WoN the property subject of the controversy is their duly constituted family home and not subject to execution. HELD: SC ruled that while the family home is exempt from execution, for the exemption to apply, it must be constituted on property owned by the persons constituting it. It must be part of either the ACP or the CPG or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latters consent or on the property of the unmarried head of the family. In this case, the alleged family home of petitioners stood on a land owned by the respondents and the question of ownership had long been decided by the courts. Petitioners continued stay on the property is only by mere tolerance of the respondents. Thus, SC denied the petition and ordered the petitioner to vacate. Family home. A family home is generally exempt from execution, provided it was duly constituted as such. It is likewise a given that the family home must be constituted on property owned by the persons constituting it. As pointed out in Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc.: [T]he family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latters consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the family. In other words, the family home must be established on the properties of (a) the absolute community, or (b) the conjugal partnership, or (c) the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the other. It cannot be established on property held in co-ownership with third persons. However, it can be established partly on community property, or conjugal property and partly on the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the latter. If constituted by an unmarried head of a family, where there is no communal or conjugal property existing, it can be constituted only on his or her own property. Therein lies the fatal flaw in the postulate of petitioners. For all their arguments to the contrary, the stark and immutable fact is that the property on which their alleged family home stands is owned by respondents and the question of ownership had been long laid to rest with the finality of the appellate courts judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 55207. Thus, petitioners continued stay on the subject land is only by mere tolerance of respondents. Simeon Cabang, et al. vs. Mr. & Mrs. Guillermo Basay, G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009. 5 Ramos v Pangilinan, GR 185920, July 20, 2010 DOCTRINE:
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For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege and on both instances, the exemption must be proved. FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos), the patriarch of herein petitioners. The labor arbiter ordered Ramos and the company to pay the respondents back-wages, separation pay, 13th month pay & service incentive leave pay. The decision became final and executory so a writ of execution was issued which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos name situated in Pandacan. Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from execution to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution. Respondents argued that it is not the family home there being another one in Antipolo and that the Pandacan address is actually the business address. The motion was denied and the appeal was likewise denied by the NLRC. Ramos and the company appealed to the Court of Appeals during the pendency of which Ramos died and was substituted by herein petitioners. The appellate court, in denying petitioners appeal, held that the Pandacan property was not exempted from execution, for while Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence, it did not mean that the article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid HELD: YES. RATIO: The general rule is that the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases. For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable. If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242.. On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. In both instances, the claim for exemption must be proved. In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially constituted as the Ramos family home, the law protecting the family home cannot apply thereby making the levy upon the Pandacan property valid. 6 Equitable v OJ Mark, G.R. No. 165950, August 11, 2010 Topic: The Family Home Facts: Respondent-spouses Oscar and Evangeline Martinez obtained loans from petitioner Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. As security for the said amount, a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) was executed over a condominium unit in San Miguel Court, Valle Verde 5, Pasig City where the spouses are residing. Respondent Oscar Martinez signed the REM both as principal debtor and as President of the registered owner and third-party mortgagor, respondent OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. Respondent-spouses defaulted in the payment of their outstanding loan obligation. They offered to settle their indebtedness with the assignment to the Bank of a commercial lot of corresponding value and also requested for recomputation at a lower interest rate and condonation of penalties. While petitioners officers held a meeting with respondent Oscar Martinez, the latter however failed to submit the required documents. Respondents sought to enjoin the impending foreclosure sale alleging that the same was hasty, premature, unreasonable and unwarranted. Respondents imputed bad faith on the part of petitioner who did not officially inform them of the denial or disapproval of their proposal to settle the loan obligation by dacion via assignment of a commercial property. It was further averred that the subject property is being used and occupied by respondent-spouses as a family home which is exempt from forced sale or execution under
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Article 155 of the Family Code. Petitioner that the claim that respondents possess proprietary right over the mortgaged property subject of foreclosure is utterly baseless, for the following reasons: first, while the condominium unit is supposedly a family home, it is admittedly owned by respondent corporation and not by the conjugal partnership or absolute community of respondent-spouses; and second, even assuming that OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. is a family corporation, respondents stance contravenes the established rule that properties registered in the name of the corporation are owned by it as an entity separate and distinct from its members or stockholders Issue: Whether or not the respondents have shown a clear legal right to enjoin the foreclosure and public auction of the property since it was used as a family home? Held: No. The claim of exemption under Art. 153 of the Family Code, thereby raising issue on the mortgaged condominium unit being a family home and not corporate property, is entirely inconsistent with the clear contractual agreement of the REM. Assuming arguendo that the mortgaged condominium unit constitutes respondents family home, the same will not exempt it from foreclosure as Article 155 (3) of the same Code allows the execution or forced sale of a family home for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution. Respondents thus failed to show an ostensible right that needs protection of the injunctive writ. Clearly, the appellate court seriously erred in sustaining the trial courts orders granting respondents application for preliminary injunction. Respondent-spouses alleged proprietary right in the mortgaged condominium unit appears to be based merely on respondents averment that respondent OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. is a family corporation. However, there is neither allegation nor evidence to show prima facie that such purported right, whether as majority stockholder or creditor, was superior to that of petitioner as creditormortgagee. The rule requires that in order for a preliminary injunction to issue, the application should clearly allege facts and circumstances showing the existence of the requisites. It must be emphasized that an application for injunctive relief is construed strictly against the pleader. 7 De Mesa v Acero, Jan. 16, 2011 It is incumbent upon the debtor to invoke and prove that the subject property is his family home within the prescribed period, otherwise laches will set in. FACTS: Claudio D. Acero Jr., being the highest bidder, acquired the ownership of a parcel of land formerly owned by petitioners Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto S. De Mesa (Spouses De Mesa). The property was sold at a public auction after Spouses De Mesa failed to pay the loan they secured from Acero. Thereafter, respondents Acero and his wife Rufina (Spouses Acero) leased the subject property to its former owners who then defaulted in the payment of the rent. Unable to collect the rentals due, Spouses Acero filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) against Spouses De Mesa. The MTC ruled in Spouses Aceros favor. In their defense, Spouses De Mesa filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking to nullify TCT No. T-221755 (M) on the basis that the subject property is a family home which is exempt from execution under the Family Code, and thus, could have not been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying their unpaid loan. However, the RTC dismissed their complaint. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTCs Decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the family home is exempted from execution HELD: Petition DENIED. Indeed, the family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during ones lifetime. It is likewise without dispute that the family home, from the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, is generally exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases. However, this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the property as a family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter. For all intents and purposes, the negligence of Petitioners De Mesa or their omission to assert their right within a reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned, waived or declined to assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right, it is incumbent upon the De Mesa to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriffs duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family home. 1 Fortaleza v Lapitan, GR 178288, August 15, 2012 FACTS: Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza (spouses Fortaleza) obtained a loan from spouses Rolando and Amparo Lapitan (creditors) in the amount of P1.2 million subject to 34% interest per annum. As security, spouses Fortaleza executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over their residential house and lot situated in Barrio Anos, Municipality of Los Baos, Laguna (subject property). When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness including the interests and penalties, the creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage before the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Calamba City. The public auction sale was set on May 9, 2001. At the sale, the creditors son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona (spouses Lapitan) emerged as the highest bidders with the bid amount of P2.5 million. Then, they were issued a Certificate of Sale which was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba City and annotated at the back of TCT No. T-412512 under Entry No. 615683 on November 15, 2002. The one-year redemption period expired without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage. Thus, spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership on November 20, 2003 and caused the cancellation of TCT No. T-412512 and the registration of the subject property in their names under TCT No. T-53594510 on February 4, 2004. Despite the foregoing, the spouses 242 | P a g e -
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Fortaleza refused spouses Lapitans formal demand to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property. Spouses Lapitan (SL): filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of possession with the RTC as new registered owners of the subject property, they claimed that they were entitled to its possession Spouses Fortaleza (SF): questioned the validity of the real estate mortgage and the foreclosure sale the mortgage was void because the creditors bloated the principal amount by the imposition of exorbitant interest the foreclosure proceeding was invalid for non-compliance with the posting requirement RTC: Ordered the issuance of a writ of possession explaining that it is a ministerial duty of the court especially since the redemption period had expired and a new title had already been issued in the name of the spouses Lapitan. SF: MR, claiming that the subject property is their family home and is exempt from foreclosure sale RTC: Denied CA: Dismissed. stressed that any question regarding the regularity and validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of the writ of possession since the proceedings is ex parte and non-litigious until the foreclosure sale is annulled, the issuance of the writ of possession is ministerial.
ISSUE: Whether the subject property, being family home, is exempt from forced sale RULING: NO. As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. However, Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution." In this case, there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property which was even notarized by their original counsel of record. And assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before it was sold at the public auction. As elucidated in Honrado v. Court of Appeals: While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption. As this Court ruled in Gomez v. Gealone: Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which to claim the exemption, the rule is, nevertheless, wellsettled that the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself at the time of the levy or within a reasonable period thereafter. Certainly, reasonable time for purposes of the law on exemption does not mean a time after the expiration of the one-year period for a judgment debtor to redeem the property. The spouses Fortaleza neither filed an action nor made a formal offer to redeem the subject property accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment. It is also undisputed that they allowed the one-year period to lapse from the registration of the certificate of sale without redeeming the mortgage. For all intents and purposes, spouses Fortaleza have waived or abandoned their right of redemption XIV. PATERNITY AND FILIATION
A. Concept of paternity, filiation and legitimacy, FC 163 Art. 163. The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or illegitimate. 2 Arbolario v CA, G.R. No. 129163, April 22, 2003 Once a valid marriage is established, it is deemed to continue until proof that it has been legally ended is presented. Thus, the mere cohabitation of the husband with another woman will not give rise to a presumption of legitimacy in favor of the children born of the second union, until and unless there be convincing proof that the first marriage had been lawfully terminated; and the second, lawfully entered into. Facts: (+ = deceased, c = child) Spouses Anselmo Baloyo+ and Macaria Lirazan+ are the original owners of the controverted lot. They had 5 children: (1) Agueda Colinco+ - survived by her 2 c: Antonio+ and respondent Irene Colinco. Antonio predeceased his three daughters, herein respondents Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina. (2) Catalina Baloyo+ was married to Juan Arbolario. Their union was blessed with only one child, Purificacion, who, in 1985, died a spinster and without issue. Purificacions father, consorted with another woman by the name of Francisca Malvas. From this cohabitation was born the [petitioners], viz, Voltaire, Lucena, Fe, Exaltacion, and Carlos -all were born well before the year 1951. 243 | P a g e -
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(3) Eduardo Baloyo+ sold his entire interest in the lot to his sister, Agueda (1st child), by virtue of a notarized document acknowledged before Notary Public Deogracias Riego. (4) Gaudencia Baloyo+ conveyed her interest in the said lot in favor of her two nieces, Irene Colinco (1st c daughter) to (1/2) and Purificacion Arbolario (2nd c daughter) to the other half. (5) Julian Baloyo+ was married to a certain Margarita Palma and he died without any issue. 1951: notarized declaration of heirship was executed by and between Agueda, Catalina, Gaudencia, and their brothers Eduardo and Julian, who extrajudicially declared themselves to be the only heirs of the late spouses Anselmo and Macaria. Purificacion Arbolario was allowed to take possession of a portion of the disputed parcel until her death sometime in 1984 or 1985. Respondents Colinco believing themselves to be the only surviving heirs, executed a Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement (May 8, 1987). The Colincos filed for the recovery of the possession of a portion of the lot occupied by spouses Salhays since 1970. Salhays defense: lawful lessees of the late Purificacion and that they purchased the disputed lot from the deceased lessor. Before the case was heard and tried on the merits, Arbolarios and spouses Salhay filed for Cancellation of Title with Damages against the Colincos. They contend that the Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement was defective and thus voidable as they (Arbolarios-half-sister) were excluded therein. RTC Negros Occ: Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement - null and void CA: reversed Issue: Whether the Arbolarios are illegitimate children and not entitled to inherit from their half-sister Purificacion Arbolario? Y SC: 1. Illegitimacy of Petitioners -The 1951 Declaration reveals that the year of Catalinas death was intercalated; the document, being in Spanish, requires an official translation; and it consisted of only a paragraph of the whole document. -There is no solid basis that Juan Arbolarios marriage to Francisca Malvas was valid, supposedly because Catalina Baloyo was already dead when they were born. It does not follow that just because his first wife has died, a man is already conclusively married to the woman who bore his children. A marriage certificate or other generally accepted proof is necessary to establish the marriage as an undisputable fact. -Clear and substantial evidence is required to support the claim of petitioners that they were preterited from the 1951 Declaration of Heirship. The RTC Decision merely declared that they were half-brothers and half-sisters of Purificacion, while respondents were her cousins and nieces (collateral relatives). It made no pronouncement as to whether they were her legitimate or illegitimate siblings. Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must be judicially established. It stands to reason that children born within wedlock are legitimate. Petitioners, however, failed to prove the fact (or even the presumption) of marriage between their parents, Juan Arbolario and Francisca Malvas; hence, they cannot invoke a presumption of legitimacy in their favor. The CAs factual findings cannot be set aside, because they are supported by the evidence on record. As held by the appellate court, without proof that Catalina died in 1903, her marriage to Juan is presumed to have continued. Even where there is actual severance of the filial companionship between spouses, their marriage subsists, and either spouses cohabitation with any third party cannot be presumed to be between "husband and wife." 2. The portion of the disputed lot had ever been purchased by the Salhays no clear and reliable evidence 3. The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of co-owners, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and a right to enjoy the allotted estate without supervision or interference. Petitioners in this case were unable to establish any right to partition, because they had failed to establish that they were legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of the deceased Purificacion. Questions as to the determination of the heirs of a decedent, the proof of filiation, and the determination of the estate of a decedent and claims thereto should be brought up before the proper probate court or in special proceedings instituted for the purpose. Such issues cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for the recovery of ownership and possession. B. LEGITIMATE CHILDREN, FC 164 Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child 3 Tan v. Trocio, 191 SCRA 764 Facts: Pablo Aguas, SSS pensioner, died on December 8, 1996. His surviving spouse Rosanna Aguas filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits. In her claim, Rosanna indicated that Pablo was survived by his minor child Jeylnn. Her claim was approved on February 13, 1997. In April 1997, deceased sister, Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac contested Rosannas claim, saying that Rosanna abandoned the family abode about 6 years earlier and that she was living with another man. Leticia further alleged that Pablo did not have any children with Rosanna but Rosanna had several children with a certain Romeo dela Pena. SSS suspended the payment of the pension and conducted an investigation. The investigation confirmed that Pablo did not have any children with Rosanna and that Pablo was incapable of having children based on the certification of Dr. Manuel Macapinlac that Pablo was infertile. It was on this ground that the SSS denied Rosannas request to resume payment and ordered Rosanna to refund to SSS the Php10,350.00 death benefits already released to her and Jeylnn. When Rosanna filed a petition with the Social Security Commission, Janet H. Aguas also claiming to be a child of the deceased, joined Rosanna and Jeylnn as claimants. As proof, the petition included a photocopy of Jeylnn and Janets certificates of live birth. SSS denied their claims but decided to conduct hearings. During the hearings, the SSC found sufficient proof that Rosanna contracted marriage with Romeo dela Pena while still being married to Pablo; that Rosanna had a child with Romeo dela Pena while still married to Pablo (as evidenced by the baptismal certificate presented to the court for Jenelyn H. dela Pena showing that the showing that she was the child of Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo dela Pena)
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The SSC ruled that because of her adultery, Rosanna was no longer entitled to support from Pablo. As for Jeylnn, the SCC ruled that Jeylnn was not Pablos legitimate child, even if her birth certificate was signed by Pablo. The SSC deduced from the records that Jeylnn and Jenelyn was one and the same person. Janet on the other hand was only adopted by Pablo and Rosanna but with no legal papers. The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling based on the birth certificates of Janet and Jeylnn showing that they were children of the deceased. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners may be considered primary beneficiaries of the deceased for his SSS pension and therefore entitled to the SSS death benefits. Held: Only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension. Jeylnns claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate showing the signature of Pablo as her father authenticating that Jeylnn was born on October 29, 1991. Records show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4, 1977 which continued, as far as the records are concerned, until the death of Pablo on December 8, 1996. Based on the records, Jeylnn was born during the marriage of Rosanna and Pablo. Since Jeylnn was conceived or born during the marriage of the parents, she is considered legitimate. Petitioner Rosanna married Romeo dela Pena during her marriage to Pablo. A wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be dependent from support upon the husband Even if the records show that the spouses adopted Janet, there were no legal papers to prove it. She therefore does not qualify as a primary beneficiary Pictures of Jewel and Trocio showing allegedly their physical likeness to each otheris inconclusive evidence to prove paternity, and much less would it prove violation of Complainants person More importantly, Jewel Tan was born during the wedlock of Complainant and herhusband and the presumption should b in favor of legitimacy unless physical accessbetween the couple was impossible. From the evidence on hand, the presumptionhas not been overcome by adequate and convincing proof. In fact, Jewel wasregistered in his birth certificate as the legitimate child of the Felicidad and herhusband, Tan Le Pok 4 Angeles vs Maglaya, 469 SCRA 363 - Nov 20, 1939 when Aleli Maglaya was born - 1948 when deceased Francisco married Belen Angeles - 1988 when her mother Genoveva died - March 1998 when Aleli Maglaya filed in Rtv Caloocan petition to be made administratix of late Francisco Angeles estate since she is sole legitimate daughter of Francisco. This was contested by his wife Belen Angeles. - RTC: Aleli failed to prove filiation - CA: reversed decision and said that Aleli was indeed a legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva ISSUE: WON CA erred in declaring Aleli as a legitimate child HELD: YES - Law applied: FC 164 children conceived or born during the marriage of parents are legitimate - Aleli never showed any evidence of a marriage existing between Francisco and Genoveva. In fact, if they did marry, it would have rendered Franciscos marriage to Belen as bigamouse. However, Aleli herself recognized Belen as the surviving spouse in her petition for letters of administration o Without evidence of marriage, one cant presume Aleli to be legitimate child - CA erred in declaring that birth certificate indubitably establishes legitimacy o In order for legitimacy to be established, birth certificate must bear the signatures of BOTH mother and father. Only attending physicians signature was in the certificate. Thus it only showed the fact of birth of a child and not legitimacy - Papers and photogrpahs that show Francisco Angeles as her father is not sufficient enough to prove filiation. RESULT: at best, could only be declared a natural child and NOT a legitimate child. - SSS vs. Aguas ISSUE: WON Janet and Jeylynn are legitimate daughters of Pablo? HELD: Only Jeylynn is - Jeylynn proven by birth certificate where signature of Pablo is present and the fact that she was born on 1991 when marriage between Pablo and Rosana who were married on 1977 was still susbsisting o Pablo never once questioned legitimacy of Jeylynn o Presumption of legitimacy, conditions that husband may contest (398) - Janet birth certificate shown was only photocopy with no confirmation by civil register regarding her date of birth. Thus if one cant show that one is born during the marriage then cant be presumed legitimate Said that she was adopted but no papers to prove it and only legally adopted children are considered dependent children. Thus she cant be a beneficiary. 5 SSS vs. Aguas, G.R. 165546, Feb. 27, 2006 Facts: Pablo Aguas, SSS pensioner, died on December 8, 1996. His surviving spouse Rosanna Aguas filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits. In her claim, Rosanna indicated that Pablo was survived by his minor child Jeylnn. Her claim was approved on February 13, 1997. In April 1997, deceased sister, Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac contested Rosannas claim, saying that Rosanna abandoned the family abode about 6 years earlier and that she was living with another man. Leticia further alleged that Pablo did not have any children with 245 | P a g e -
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Rosanna but Rosanna had several children with a certain Romeo dela Pena. SSS suspended the payment of the pension and conducted an investigation. The investigation confirmed that Pablo did not have any children with Rosanna and that Pablo was incapable of having children based on the certification of Dr. Manuel Macapinlac that Pablo was infertile. It was on this ground that the SSS denied Rosannas request to resume payment and ordered Rosanna to refund to SSS the Php10,350.00 death benefits already released to her and Jeylnn. When Rosanna filed a petition with the Social Security Commission, Janet H. Aguas also claiming to be a child of the deceased, joined Rosanna and Jeylnn as claimants. As proof, the petition included a photocopy of Jeylnn and Janets certificates of live birth. SSS denied their claims but decided to conduct hearings. During the hearings, the SSC found sufficient proof that Rosanna contracted marriage with Romeo dela Pena while still being married to Pablo; that Rosanna had a child with Romeo dela Pena while still married to Pablo (as evidenced by the baptismal certificate presented to the court for Jenelyn H. dela Pena showing that the showing that she was the child of Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo dela Pena) The SSC ruled that because of her adultery, Rosanna was no longer entitled to support from Pablo. As for Jeylnn, the SCC ruled that Jeylnn was not Pablos legitimate child, even if her birth certificate was signed by Pablo. The SSC deduced from the records that Jeylnn and Jenelyn was one and the same person. Janet on the other hand was only adopted by Pablo and Rosanna but with no legal papers. The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling based on the birth certificates of Janet and Jeylnn showing that they were children of the deceased. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners may be considered primary beneficiaries of the deceased for his SSS pension and therefore entitled to the SSS death benefits. Held: Only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension. Jeylnns claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate showing the signature of Pablo as her father authenticating that Jeylnn was born on October 29, 1991. Records show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4, 1977 which continued, as far as the records are concerned, until the death of Pablo on December 8, 1996. Based on the records, Jeylnn was born during the marriage of Rosanna and Pablo. Since Jeylnn was conceived or born during the marriage of the parents, she is considered legitimate. Petitioner Rosanna married Romeo dela Pena during her marriage to Pablo. A wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be dependent from support upon the husband Even if the records show that the spouses adopted Janet, there were no legal papers to prove it. She therefore does not qualify as a primary beneficiary 6 Rivera vs Villanueva, GR No. 141501, July 21, 2006 Topic: Legitimate Children Facts: Petitioners are allegedly half-brothers, half-sis-in-law and children of a half-brother of deceased Pacita Gonzales. Respondents are allegedly siblings, full and half-blood of ROMUALDO; respondents are denominated as heirs of Romualdo Villanueva. Respondent Angelina is allegedly the daughter of Pacita and Romualdo. From 1927 until her death in 1980, Pacita cohabited with Romualdo without the benefit of marriage because the latter was married to Musngi who died in 1963. In the course of their cohabitation, they acquired several properties. Pacita died without leaving a will. Romualdo and respondent Angelina executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with sale of Pacitas estate. Petitioners filed a case for partition of Pacitas estate and annulment of titles. RTC found that: Pacita was never married to Romualdo and that respondent Angelina was her illegitimate child by Romualdo. CA affirmed it. Petitioners contend that the RTC and CA erred in finding that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' illegitimate daughter despite the RTC's ruling in another case, Special Proceedings No. SD-144. They argue that the trial court's decision in SD-144, to the effect that respondent Angelina was neither the adopted nor the illegitimate daughter of Gonzales, should have operated as res judicata on the matter of respondent Angelina's status. Issue: WON respondent Angelina was illegitimate daughter of Pacita. Held: No. First, res judicata would not attach since there are factors which militate against the existence of res judicata. Further, the trial court never actually acquired jurisdiction over respondent Angelina's person. She was not even a party there, given that Villanueva did not represent her interest when he opposed Epifanio Rivera's petition. Both the trial court and the CA ruled that respondent Angelina was the illegitimate daughter of the decedent, based solely on her birth certificate. According to the assailed decision, "the birth certificate clearly discloses that Pacita Gonzales was the mother of Angelina Villanueva while municipal treasurer Romualdo Villanueva was denominated therein as her father." A closer examination of the birth certificate reveals that respondent Angelina was listed as adopted by both Pacita and Romualdo. The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document. Thus, she cant inherit from Pacita. Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties. Following the logic of Benitez, respondent 246 | P a g e -
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Angelina and her co-defendants should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence. Lastly, Pacita was 44 years old, on the verge of menopause at the time of the alleged birth. Pacita had been living childless with Romualdo for 20 years. 7 Suntay v Suntay, GR 183053, October 10, 2012 (Settlement of Estate case) Decedent: Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay (Cristina) Died intestate on 4 June 1990 Survived by: (Emilio I, their only son died) Spouse Dr. Frederico Suntay 5 Grandchildren 3 legitiamate (lived with their mother following the separation of their parents) Including respondent Isabel 2 illegitimate (reared by their grandparents) Including Petitioner Emilio III Isabels parents along with her paternal grandparents were involved in domestic relations cases including paricide, their father was acquitted. In retaliation, their father filed a complaint for legal separation accusing his wife with infidelity. The TC declared their marriage null and void due to petitioners unsound mind (schizophrenia). Visitation rights were initially granted to the grandparents but was eventually stopped due to Isabels testimony that her grandparents cause axiety. More than 3 years after Cristinas death, Dr. Frederico adopted their 2 illegitimate grandchildren. 1995 Isabel filed with the RTC issuance of Letters of Administration over her grandmothers estate Frederico filed Motion to Dismiss Isabels petition for letters of administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabels parents marriage being declared null and void. (However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that Isabel and her siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of their legitimate grandmother, the decedent, Cristina so Frederico nominated Emilio III to administer decedents estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration be issued to Frederico. 2000 Frederico died 2001 letters of administration were issued to Emilio III CA revoked letters of administration given to Emilio III and appointed Isabel as administratrix SC- Appointed Emilio as co-administrator of Isabel In this motion, Isabel prays that she be appointed as sole administratrix due to the fact that Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild thus, has no interest in the estate to justify his appointment as administrator (among others). ISSUE: WON Emilio should be removed as co-administrator of Cristinas estate HELD: No. As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set aside the ruling of the appellate court. We decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristinas estate, giving weight to his interest in Federicos estate. In ruling for co-administration between Emilio III and Isabel, we considered that: 1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild; 2. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their marriage; 3. Cristinas properties, forming part of her estate, are still commingled with those of her husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership remains undetermined and unliquidated; and 4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of the latters estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, and not simply in representation of his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I. In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals Decision in favor of her sole administratorship based on her status as a legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks to administer. Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of the Civil Code must be followed. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to become a co-administrator thereof. We did not choose. Considering merely his demonstrable interest in the subject estate, we ruled that Emilio III should likewise administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina, as a co-administrator. In the context of this case, we have to make a choice and therefore, reconsider our decision of 16 June 2010. The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select. 1. Who are considered legitimate children A. LEGITIMATE PROPER, FC 164 please see above (a) Conceived during marriage cf. ROC Rule 131 Sec. 3(dd) FC Art. 168 ROC Rule 131 Section 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: (dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary: (1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even 247 | P a g e -
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though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. (2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. Art. 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary: (1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage; (2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. 1. valid marriage 2. terminated marriage under FC 42 in rel. to FC 43(1) Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate; 3. void marriages under FC 53, 36 Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void. Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227) 4. voidable marriages, FC 45 Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife; (2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or (6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. 1 Suntay v Suntay, GR 132524, Dec. 29, 1998 Facts: Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay were married in the Portuguese Colony of Macao on July 9, 1958. Out of this marriage, three children were born. After 4 years, the marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel filed a criminal case against her husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay. In retaliation, Emilio Aguinaldo filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging her, among others, with infidelity and praying for the custody and care of their children who were living with their mother. From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans Memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient was already out of the hospital he continued to be under observation and treatment. 248 | P a g e -
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It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong. Issues: Is there ground for annulment? Are the children borne within a valid marriage prior to annulment legitimate? Held: There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage: That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife. A voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that: Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. Note: Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate. (b) Born during marriage (c) Conceived by artificial insemination cf. NCC 40, FC 164 NCC 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child. 2. Proof of Filiation Of legitimate children, FC 172-173 Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. 2 Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 188, April 20, 1998 In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how may marriage and filiation be proven? Facts: Patricio Trinidad+ was the original owner of the parcels of land. He left the (4) land to his (3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff Arturio Trinidad (July 21, 1943) demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three (3) equal shares and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual share of his late father Inocentes, but the defendants refused. Petitioner Arturio filed a complaint 4 for partition and damages against Private Respondents Felix+ and Lourdes (CFI Aklan). TC: in favor of the petitioner: plaintiff is the legitimate son of Inocentes Trinidad, plaintiff is entitled to inherit the property left by his deceased father which is 1/3 of the 4 parcels of land subject matter of this case. CA: reversed Issues: 1. Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents' marriage and of his filiation? 2. Was petitioner's status as a legitimate child subject to collateral attack in the action for partition? 3. Was his claim time-barred under the rules on acquisitive prescription? Held: First and Second Issues: Evidence of and Collateral Attack on Filiation Petitioner's first burden is to prove that Inocentes and his mother (Felicidad) were validly married, and that he was born during the subsistence of their marriage. Pugeda vs. Trias: when the question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents. 19 249 | P a g e -
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In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification 20 from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioner's case. Although the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the marital union, petitioner's failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place. 21 In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren, who testified that she was present during the nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple deported themselves as husband and wife after the marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year old barangay captain of Tigayon and former board member of the local parent-teachers' association, used to visit Inocentes and Felicidad's house twice or thrice a week, as she lived only thirty meters away. 22 On July 21, 1943, Gerardo dropped by Inocentes' house when Felicidad gave birth to petitioner. She also attended petitioner's baptismal party held at the same house. 23 Her testimony constitutes evidence of common reputation respecting marriage. 24 It further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 25 Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate (Exhibit C) in which Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the child's father and mother. 26 On the other hand, filiation may be proven by the following: Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment. Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child. Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 27 Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification 28 that records relative to his birth were either destroyed during the last world war or burned when the old town hall was razed to the ground on June 17, 1956. To prove his filiation, he presented in evidence two family pictures, his baptismal certificate and Gerardo's testimony. The first family picture (Exhibit A) shows petitioner (Exhibit A-5) carrying his second daughter and his wife (Exhibit A-4) together with the late Felix Trinidad (Exhibit A-2) carrying petitioner's first daughter, and Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit A-1). Exhibit B is another picture showing Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit B-1) carrying petitioner's first child (Exhibit B-2). These pictures were taken before the case was instituted. Although they do not directly prove petitioner's filiation to Inocentes, they show that petitioner was accepted by the private respondents as Inocentes' legitimate son ante litem motam. Lourdes' denials of these pictures are hollow and evasive. While she admitted that Exhibit B shows her holding Clarita Trinidad, the petitioner's daughter, she demurred that she did so only because she was requested to carry the child before she was baptized. 29 When shown Exhibit A, she recognized her late brother but not petitioner, his wife and the couple's children slyly explaining that she could not clearly see because of an alleged eye defect. 30 Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of "the other means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws" to show pedigree, as this Court ruled in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals: 31 What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence of proof in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. [Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Phil. 1988 ed., p. 246] Concededly, because Gerardo was not shown to be a member of the Trinidad family by either consanguinity or affinity, 32 her testimony does not constitute family reputation regarding pedigree. Hence, it cannot, by itself, be used to establish petitioner's legitimacy. Be that as it may, the totality of petitioner's positive evidence clearly preponderates over private respondents' self-serving negations. Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes' surname (Trinidad) without objection from private respondents a presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes' legitimate child. 38 Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not permitted. 42 Rather than rely on this axiom, petitioner chose to present evidence of his filiation and of his parents' marriage. Hence, there is no more need to rule on the application of this doctrine to petitioner's cause. No Acquisitive Prescription Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the property in question by acquisitive prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of one benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former repudiates the co-ownership. 43 Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. 3 De Jesus vs. Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon, 366 SCRA 499 Facts: Aug 23, 1964 Danilo Jesus and Carolina Jesus were married. Their union produced two children, Jacqueline (March 1, 1979) and Jinky Jesus (July 6, 1982). June 7 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as his own illegitimate children with Carolina Aves de Jesus 12 March 1992 Juan Dizon died. Jacqueline and Jinky then filed an action to be part of the heirs of his estate as his illegitimate children in a notarized document. TC: ulitimately dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and for being improper since its not the proper forum to question their paternity and filiation. Thus the present case ISSUE: WON Jinky and Jacquelin are the illegitimate children of Juan Dizon HELD: NO. Presumption of law is that of legitimacy. Those who are born in wedlock without conclusive proof that there was physical impossibility for the parents to conceive the child are considered legitimate. Upon the expiration of periods found in FC 170 and 171, this presumption of civil status becomes fixed and unassailable. It is only when the legitimacy of the child has been disputed can paternity of the husband be rejected. While the recognition of illegitimacy by Dizon was made in accordance with the rules on recognizing illegitimacy, this does not negate the legitimacy they hold with Danilo Jesus. Petitoners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth also identify Danilo de Jesus as their father. Thus, before they can be recognized as illegitimate children, they must first 250 | P a g e -
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contest their status as legitimate children of Danilo Jesus 4 Ong vs. Diaz, December 17, 2007 Facts: Jinky was already married to a Japanese national when she met Rogelio. Despite this, they cohabitated and allegedly bore a child together in February 1998. Shortly thereafter, Rogelio abandoned Jinky and Joanne. Although the presumption was that Joanne was the legitimate child of Jinky and her Japanese husband because of their subsisting marriage, this was turned down by the RTC. It was established that Jinkys husband lived abroad and only visited the Philippines once a year. No evidence was also found that he visited 1 year preceding the birth of Joanne. RTC ruled that Joanne was the illegitimate child of Rogelio because he admitted paying for the hospital bills connected to her birth, picking up Jinky after giving birth. CA however, reversed this and remanded the case to make way for DNA analysis. Estate of Rogelio files for reconsideration alleging the death of Rogelio makes DNA testing no longer possible. Issue: Whether the death of Rogelio affected the possibility of a DNA test? Held: No. Petition denied. Ratio: Petitioner questions the appropriateness of the order by the Court of Appeals directing the remand of the case to the RTC for DNA testing given that petitioner has already died. Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the RTC for DNA analysis is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged impossibility of complying with the order of remand for purposes of DNA testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioners argument is without basis especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, thus: SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order . The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case; (b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any organic material originating from a persons body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones. Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing. And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. In People v. Umanito, citing Tecson v. Commission on Elections, this Court held: The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA 277] likewise reiterated the acceptance of DNA testing in our jurisdiction in this wise: "[i]n case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to ." It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether appellant is the father of AAAs child, which may be accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the fair and correct adjudication of the instant appeal. Under Section 4 of the Rules, the courts are authorized, after due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However, while this Court retains jurisdiction over the case at bar, capacitated as it is to receive and act on the matter in controversy, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not, in the course of daily routine, conduct hearings. Hence, it would be more appropriate that the
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case be remanded to the RTC for reception of evidence in appropriate hearings, with due notice to the parties. (Emphasis supplied.) As we have declared in the said case of Agustin v. Court of Appeals: x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity. 5 Lee v CA, GR No. 177861, July 13, 2010
6 Makati Shangrila v Harper, GR 189998, August 29, 2012 Topic: Proof of Filiation of legitimate children Facts: An incident of murder happened to Harper during his stay in Shangri-la. Respondents commenced this suit in the RTC to recover various damages from petitioner. Respondents, heirs of Harper, commenced this suit in the RTC to recover various damages from petitioner. RTC: found the petitioners liable for the death of Christian Harper, this Court orders the defendant to pay plaintiffs. CA: Affirmed. Manila Shangri-la points out that plaintiffs-appellees committed several mistakes as regards the above documentary exhibits, resultantly making them incompetent evidence, to wit, none of the plaintiffs-appellees or any of the witnesses who testified for the plaintiffs gave evidence that Ellen Johanne Harper and Jonathan Christopher Harper are the widow and son of the deceased Christian Fredrik Harper. Exhibit Q-1 is a translation of the Marriage Certificate of Ellen Johanne Harper and Christian Fredrik Harper, the original of which was not produced in court, much less, offered in evidence. Being a mere translation, it cannot be a competent evidence of the alleged fact that Ellen Johanne Harper is the widow of Christian Fredrik Harper, pursuant to the Best Evidence Rule. Even assuming that it is an original Marriage Certificate, it is not a public document that is admissible without the need of being identified or authenticated on the witness stand by a witness, as it appears to be a document issued by the Vicar of the Parish of Ullern and, hence, a private document. Also, Exhibit "R-1" is a translation of the supposed Probate Court Certificate, the original of which was not produced in court, much less, offered in evidence. Being a mere translation, it is an incompetent evidence of the alleged fact that plaintiffs-appellees are the heirs of Christian Fredrik Harper, pursuant to the Best Evidence Rule. Defendant-appellant further adds that the documents were not duly attested by the authorities as required under Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. Plaintiffs-appellees countered that the Marriage Certificate of Ellen Johanne Harper and Christian Fredrik Harper, was issued by the Office of the Vicar of Ullern with a statement that "this certificate is a transcript from the Register of Marriage of Ullern Church." The contents of the Marriage Certificate were translated by the Government of the Kingdom of Norway, through its authorized translator, into English and authenticated by the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, which in turn, was also authenticated by the Consul, Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in Stockholm, Sweden. The Birth Certificate of Jonathan Christopher Harper, was issued and signed by the Registrar of the Kingdom of Norway, as authenticated by the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, whose signature was also authenticated by the Consul, Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in Stockholm, Sweden. Exhibit "R-1", the Probate Court Certificate was also authenticated by the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, whose signature was also authenticated by the Consul, Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in Stockholm, Sweden. Issue: Whether or not the plaintiffs-appellees were able to prove with competent evidence the affirmative allegations in the complaint that they are the widow and son of Mr. Christian Harper. Held: Yes. The Revised Rules of Court provides that public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, the attested copy must be accompanied with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The documents in this case have been authenticated by the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs accompanied by an Authentication by the Consul, Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in Stockholm, Sweden. Also, Petitioner urges the Court to resolve the apparent conflict between the rulings in Heirs of Pedro Cabais v. Court of Appeals and in 252 | P a g e -
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Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals establishing filiation through a baptismal certificate. Petitioners urging is not warranted, since it is not applicable in this case. In the case, it argued that baptismal certificates did not prove the filiation of collateral relatives of the deceased. The Court said that altogether, the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted are competent and adequate proofs that private respondents are collateral heirs of Sampayo. Under Art. 172 of the Family Code, the filiation of legitimate children shall be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, in the absence of a record of birth or a parents admission of such legitimate filiation in a public or private document duly signed by the parent. Such other proof of ones filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. By analogy, this method of proving filiation may also be utilized in the instant case. The baptismal certificates presented in the said case are public documents. Parish priests continue to be the legal custodians of the parish records and are authorized to issue true copies, in the form of certificates, of the entries contained therein. Unlike Cabais and Conti cases, this case has respondents presenting several documents, like the birth certificates of Harper and respondent Jonathan Harper, the marriage certificate of Harper and Ellen Johanne Harper, and the probate court certificate, all of which were presumably regarded as public documents under the laws of Norway. Such documentary evidence sufficed to competently establish the relationship and filiation under the standards of our Rules of Court. 3. Rights of legitimate children, FC 173-174, NCC 364, 374, 376, NCC 888, NCC 979 Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right: (1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames; (2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support; and (3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other successional rights granted to them by the Civil Code. NCC 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. NCC374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion. NCC888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. NCC 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages. An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child. 4. Action to impugn legitimacy 7 Reyes vs. Mauricio, G.R. No. 175080, November 24, 2010 (annulment of kasunduan over a piece of land) Facts: Eugenio was the registered owner of a parcel of land. Librada (now deceased) and her alleged daughter Leonida filed a complaint before the DARAB for annulment of contract denominated as KASUNDUAN between Librada and Eugenio as parties. Respondents: They are the legal hiers of Godofredo who was the registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land; that from 1936 until his death in May 1994, Godofredo had been working on the subject land and introduced improvements consisting of fruit-bearing trees, seasonal crops, a residential house and other permanent improvements; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a document denominated as Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 to eject respondents from the subject property, and had the same notarized by Notary Public Ma. Sarah G. Nicolas in Pasig, Metro Manila; that Librada never appeared before the Notary Public; that Librada was illiterate and the contents of the Kasunduan were not read nor explained to her; that Eugenio took undue advantage of the weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other handicaps of Librada in the execution of the Kasunduan rendering it void for lack of consent; and that Eugenio had been employing all illegal means to eject respondents from the subject property. Respondents prayed for the declaration of nullity of the Kasunduan and for an order for Eugenio to maintain and place them in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject property. Petitioner: Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship existed between him and respondents. He clarified that Godofredos occupation of the subject premises was based on the formers mere tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio denied signing a tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any person to sign such an agreement. He maintained that Librada, accompanied by a relative, voluntarily affixed her signature to the Kasunduan and that she was fully aware of the contents of the document. Moreover, Librada received P50,000.00 from Eugenio on the same day of the execution of the Kasunduan. Eugenio also questioned the jurisdiction of the DARAB since the principal relief sought by respondents is the annulment of the contract, over which jurisdiction is vested on the regular courts. Eugenio also asserted that Leonida had no legal personality to file the present suit. As an incidental issue, Leonidas legal standing as a party was also assailed by Eugenio.1avvphi1 Eugenio submitted that the complaint was rendered moot with the death of Librada, Godofredos sole compulsory heir. Eugenio contended that Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a legal heir. ISSUE: WON the status of Leonila can be collaterally attacked in the same case. 253 | P a g e -
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HELD: No. It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.20 Well-known civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book "Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence," noted that the aforecited doctrine is rooted from the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. He explained thus: The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which provides: "The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void." This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy." This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.21 In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental,22 the Court stated that legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack.23 The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero,24 this Court reiterated that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedents estate.25 Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes,26 the Court declared that the legality of the adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be subject to collateral attack.27 Against these jurisprudential backdrop, we have to leave out the status of Leonida from the case for annulment of the "Kasunduan" that supposedly favors petitioners cause. Petition Denied 1 Republic v Magpayo, GR 189476, Feb. 2, 2011 FACTS: Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondents certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972. Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. The petition, docketed as SPP No. Q0863058, was entitled "IN RE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAMEOF JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG." In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage. Respondent also submitted his academic records from elementary up to college showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon Citys 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG." On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, respondent amended his petition by alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103] of the Rules of Court. The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31November 6, 2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008. And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte By Decision of January 8, 2009, the trial court granted respondents petition and directed the Civil Registrar ofMakati City to: 1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24 for "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES" [in herein respondents Certificate of live Birth]; 2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last Name of the [respondent] to "COSETENG"; 3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle Name of the [respondent]; and 4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for FATHER of the [respondent] (emphasis and underscoring supplied; capitalization in the original) The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009, hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court on pure question of law. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for change of name involving change of civil status should be made through appropriate adversarial proceedings. Whether or not the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it directed the deletion of the name of respondents father from his birth certificate. HELD: The petition is impressed with merit. (in favor of the Republic) 1. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
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*** Respondents reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however. The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mothers surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy. The change being sought in respondents petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondents supplication. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic categorically holds that "changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings . . ." ******** Since respondents desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It reads: SECTION 1. Who may file petition.Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. SEC. 3. Parties.When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) 2. Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected that of Makati in the present case, and "all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be made parties to the proceeding. As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto. Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. Aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case."A petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby." Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors." The first notice is that given to the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication). The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out 5. Grounds to impugn legitimacy, FC 166 Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds: (1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of: (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse; (2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or (3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence. (a) Physical impossibility of access 2 Andal v. Macaraig, 89 Phil 165 Facts: Mariano Andal, assisted by his mother Maria Dueas, as guardian ad litem, brought an action in the CIF of Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in Camarines Sur. The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueas and that Emiliano was the owner of the parcel of land in question having acquired it
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from his mother Eduvigis M by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the former. LC: in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring Mariano Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit the land in question; (b) declaring Mariano Andal owner of said land; and (c) ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit. Defendant took the case to this Court upon the plea that only question of law are involved. Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his house to help him work his farm. His sickness became worse, he became so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. Maria Dueas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father. Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife. Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his funeral. Maria Dueas gave birth to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal. Issue: Whether or not the child is considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano. Ruling: Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943, that boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he having been born within three hundred (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child. Is there any evidence to prove that it was physically impossible for Emiliano to have such access? Is the fact that Emiliano was sick of tuberculosis and was so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed sufficient to overcome this presumption? Manresa on this point says: Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include (1) absence during the initial period of conception, (2) impotence which is patent, continuing and incurable, and (3) imprisonment, unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations. Manresa, 492-500, Vol. I, cited by Dr. Arturo Tolentino in his book "Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, p.90)." There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during the initial period of conception, specially during the period comprised between August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942, which is included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child Mariano Andal. On the contrary, there is enough evidence to show that during that initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife were still living under the marital roof. Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the same house, and he and the wife were indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that does not preclude cohabitation between Emiliano and his wife. We admit that Emiliano was already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious that he could hardly move and get up from bed, his feet were swollen and his voice hoarse. But experience shows that this does not prevent carnal intercourse. There are cases where persons suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage because they are more inclined to sexual intercourse. As an author has said, "the reputation of the tuberculosis towards eroticism (sexual propensity) is probably dependent more upon confinement to bed than the consequences of the disease." (An Integrated Practice of Medicine, by Hyman, Vol. 3, p.2202). There is neither evidence to show that Emiliano was suffering from impotency, patent, continuous and incurable, nor was there evidence that he was imprisoned. The presumption of legitimacy under the Civil Code in favor of the child has not, therefore, been overcome. Section 68, par. (c) of Rule 123, of the Rules of Court: The issue of a wife cohabiting with the husband who is not impotent, is indisputably presumed to be legitimate, if not born within one hundred eighty days immediately succeeding the marriage, or after the expiration of three hundred days following its dissolution. We have already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living together, or at least had access one to the other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born within three (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts no other presumption can be drawn than that the issue is legitimate. We have also seen that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that it was physically or naturally impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse. And here there is no such proof. The fact that Maria Dueas has committed adultery can not also overcome this presumption (Tolentino's Commentaries on the Civil Code, Vol. I, p. 92). 3Concepcion vs. CA, G.R. No. 123450, Aug. 31, 2005 FACTS: Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent, were married in December 1989, and begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in December 1990. The husband filed on December 1991, a petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since the wife married a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom according to the husband was still alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC. Trial court ruled that the son was an illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to the wife while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Theresa argued that there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child. She further wanted to have the surname of the son changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use his mothers surname. After the requested oral argument, trial court reversed its ruling and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of Mario. Hence, the child was a legitimate child of Theresa and Mario. HELD: Considering that Theresas marriage with Gerardo was void ab initio, the latter never became the formers husband and never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of the child. Theresas contention was to have his son be declared as not the legitimate child of her and Mario but her illegitimate child with Gerardo. In this case, the mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, she is not permitted by law to question the sons legitimacy. Under Article 167 of the Family Code, the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Having the best interest of the child in mind, the presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the Court. As a legitimate child, the son shall have the right to bear the surnames of Mario and Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo cannot then impose his surname to be used by the child, since in the eyes of the law, the child is not related to him in any way (b) Biological or other scientific grounds, FC 170, 171 Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband
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or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded. If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier. Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases: (1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action; (2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or (3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. 4 Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Minor Joanne Jinky and Rogelio started out as friends but this friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19 February 1993 by Municipal Trial Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez. From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together at Fairlane Subdivision, and later at Capitol Garden, Tarlac City. From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and on 25 February 1998 was born at the Central Luzon Doctors Hospital, Tarlac City. Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor Joannes needs recognizing the child as his. In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child. Rogelio, despite Jinkys remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing and refusing to give support for the child and to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the heretofore adverted complaint. The RTC held that Rogelio Ong is the father of Joanne Rogelio died on 21 February 2005 so a Notice of Substitution was filed by said counsel praying that Rogelio be substituted in the case by the Estate of Rogelio On, which motion was accordingly granted by the Court of Appeals. CA ordered that the case be remanded for DNA Analysis to the trial court. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REMANDED THE CASE TO THE COURT A QUO FOR DNA ANALYSIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS NO LONGER FEASIBLE DUE TO THE DEATH OF ROGELIO G. ONG. HELD: The Supreme Courts Rule on DNA Evidence A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC became effective on October 15, 2007. The Court used the Rule in deciding the case of Estate Of Rogelio G. Ong versus Minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, Represented by Her Mother and Guardian, Jinky C. Diaz, G.R. No. 171713, promulgated on December 17, 2007. The Court observed: For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity. Agustin v. Court of Appeals Rogelios appeal to the Supreme Court; DNA analysis no longer feasible after death? Among other grounds, Ongs appeal (as represented by his Estate) to the Supreme Court sought to reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals by claiming that the CA erred when it remanded the case to the Tarlac City RTC for DNA analysis despite the fact that it is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio G. Ong. In his petition, the Estate of Rogelio Ong asked that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be modified, by setting aside the judgment remanding the case to the trial court for DNA testing analysis, by dismissing the complaint of minor Joanne for compulsory recognition, and by declaring the minor as the legitimate child of Jinky and Hasegawa Katsuo.
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Supreme Court ruling: Even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing In its decision, the Supreme Court discussed the Family Code provisions on filiation, presumption of legitimacy of a child (Article 167), basis for establishing legitimacy (Articles 172 and 175), among others. I have divided and numbered the pertinent portions of the Courts ruling for easier reading and comprehension: [1] As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor Joanne for purposes of support in favor of the said minor. But with the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father of the minor, through DNA testing. [2] DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a persons DNA profile can determine his identity. DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins. [3] Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the RTC for DNA analysis is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged impossibility of complying with the order of remand for purposes of DNA testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioners argument is without basis especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. From Section 4 Application for DNA Testing Order, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. As defined above, the term biological sample means any organic material originating from a persons body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones. Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing. 5 Diaz, G.R. No. 171713, Dec. 17, 2007 Jinky was already married to a Japanese national when shemet Rogelio. Despite this, they cohabitated and allegedlybore a child together in February 1998. Shortly thereafter,Rogelio abandoned Jinky and Joanne.Although the presumption was that Joanne was thelegitimate child of Jinky and her Japanese husband because of their subsisting marriage, this was turned down by the RTC. It was established that Jinkys husband lived abroad and only visited the Philippines once a year. No evidence was alsofound that he visited 1 year preceding the birth of Joanne.RTC ruled that Joanne was the illegitimate child of Rogeliobecause he admitted paying for the hospital bills connectedto her birth, picking up Jinky after giving birth. CA however,reversed this and remanded the case to make way for DNAanalysis. Estate of Rogelio files for reconsideration allegingthe death of Rogelio makes DNA testing no longer possible.Issue:Whether the death of Rogelio affected the possibility of aDNA test?Held:No. Petition denied.Ratio:Petitioner questions the appropriateness of the order by theCourt of Appeals directing the remand of the case to the RTCfor DNA testing given that petitioner has already died.Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the RTC forDNA analysis is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio.To our mind, the alleged impossibility of complying with theorder of remand for purposes of DNA testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioners argument is without basis especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence allows theconduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or uponapplication of any person who has a legal interest in thematter in litigation, thus: SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order . Theappropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has alegal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNAtesting. Such order shall issue after due hearing andnotice to the parties upon a showing of thefollowing:(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to thecase;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previouslysubjected to the type of DNA testing now requested;or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, butthe results may require confirmation for goodreasons;(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically validtechnique;(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential toproduce new information that is relevant to theproper resolution of the case; and(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which thecourt may consider as potentially affecting theaccuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of thepetitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNAtesting for as long as there exist appropriate biologicalsamples of his DNA.As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any organic material originating from a persons body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing.This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues,hairs and bones.Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biologicalsamples as enumerated above as may be available, may beused for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shownthe impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biologicalsample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNAtesting. In People v. Umanito, citingTecson v. Commission onElections, this Court held:The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission onElections[G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA277] likewise reiterated the acceptance of DNAtesting in our jurisdiction in this wise: "[i]n caseproof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely t 6 Lucas v Lucas, GR No. 190710, June 6, 2011 Topic: Biological or other scientific grounds Facts: Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial 258 | P a g e -
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Court. Jesse narrated his mothers account of her history with Jesus S. Lucas and attached several copies of his personal documents. Though Jesus was not summoned and was not served a copy of the petition, he nevertheless learned of it and obtained for himself a copy. He then filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting among others that the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him as respondent. Unbeknownst to Jesus on the day before he filed his Comment, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing. After learning of the RTCs order, Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesses father. Acting on Jesus Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba. This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration of his own which the RTC granted. A new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The CA ruled in favor of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case. Issue: Whether or not a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order. Held: In this case, the petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance. It satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which requires the complaint to contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains the following elements: (1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied upon by petitioner to establish his filiation to respondent. Thus, the denial of the motion for DNA testing should not be a reason for the dismissal of the petition since it is not a legal ground for the dismissal of cases. However, the issuance of the DNA order needs sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing. It should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing. Discussion of the case: Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie casethe first procedural aspect in a paternity caseis therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading. Section 4 of the Rule on DNA evidence. The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence. It seeks to ensure that the evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, and shall not be misused and/or abused and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice the public. Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states: The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established. Court order for blood testing equivalent to search under the Constitution. 259 | P a g e -
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In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a search, which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained; Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing. The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. (c.) FC 166(3) Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds: (3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence. 6. Effect of a mothers declaration, FC 167 Art. 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. 7. In subsequent marriages, FC 168, 169 Art. 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary: (1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage; (2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. Art. 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the termination of the marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy. 7 People v Quitoriano, January 20, 1997 (Rape case) FACTS: Private complainant AAA testified that in the evening of December 24, 1992, she was in the kitchen located at the back of their house in Barangay XXX, XXX, Marinduque. The kitchen is about three (3) arms length away from the main house. At about 9:00 in the evening, accused-appellant entered the kitchen, poked a knife on her neck, and dragged her to the bamboo bed ("papag") about onehalf arms length from the stove. Accused-appellant laid her down and removed her short pants and underwear. He then took off his pants and had sexual intercourse with her. Private complainant trembled because of fear. Thereafter, accused-appellant warned her not to tell anybody about the incident, or else, he would kill her. Private complainant kept the incident to herself. However, in June 1993, her aunt, BBB discovered that she was pregnant. Thus, private complainant was forced to tell her aunt and her parents about the sexual assault committed against her by accused-appellant on December 24, 1992. On August 2, 1993, private complainant filed a complaint for rape against accused-appellant. [2]Private complainant gave birth on October 31, 1993. [3] Accused-appellant interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that from 7:00 until 10:00 in the evening on December 24, 1992, he was at the house of Paulino Rioflorido in Barangay Pakaskasan, Torrijos, Marinduque. He was then having a drinking session with Reynaldo Rioflorido, the son of Paulino. At 10:00, they attended a party at the house of Jose Ampiloquio which was about 400 meters from the Rioflorido residence. The party ended at around 1:00 in the morning, after which, they proceeded to accused-appellant's house. TC Guilty ISSUE: WON the crime of rape was proved beyond reasonable doubt considering that AAA gave birth 10 months after the alleged crime. HELD: Yes. The fact that private complainant gave birth more than ten months after the alleged rape does not discredit her testimony. Dr. Honesto Marquez, a physician from the Marinduque Provincial Hospital, explained that the normal gestation period is 40 weeks or 280 days, but it can also extend beyond 40 weeks if the woman is having her first pregnancy. It is undisputed that the child delivered by private complainant on October 31, 1993 was her first. Hence, it is not impossible that the child was conceived in December, 1992, the date of the alleged rape.
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8. Presumptions, FC 170, 171 Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded. If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier. Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases: (1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action; (2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or (3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. 4. ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN 1. Who are considered illegitimate, FC 165 Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code. 1 Joanie Surposa Uy v Jose Ngo Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009 Facts: Petitioner filed for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent. She alleged in her complaint that respondent, who was then married, had an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa and that the respondent and Irene had two children namely, petitioner (Joanie) and her brother, Allan. Respondent attended at the birth of the latter instructed that petitioners birth certificate be filled out with the following names: ALFREDO F. SURPOSA as father and IRENEDUCAY as mother. Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of Irenes father, and Ducay was the maiden surname of Irenes mother. However, respondent Chua financially supported petitioner and Allan and even provided employment for her. He and Allan were introduced to each other and became known in the Chinese community as respondents illegitimate children. During petitioners wedding, respondent sent his brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) ashis representative and Respondents relatives even attended the baptism of petitioners daughter. Later, Respondent denied that he had an illicit relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was his daughter. Hearings then ensued and petitioner presented documentary evidence to prove her claim of illegitimate filiation. Petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation against respondent. And latter filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that the Decision dated 21 February 2000 barred by res judicata. A Compromise Agreement wasmade between the two parties prior where petitioner Joanie declares, admits and acknowledges that there is no blood relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and the respondent, in exchange the latter paid the Two Million Pesos each. The court ruled in favor of the respondent hence this appeal Issue: Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to judgments predicated upon a compromise agreement on cases enumerated in Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines; ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil status of persons; (2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation; (4) Future support; (5) The jurisdiction of courts; (6) Future legitime. Held: Res judicata is based upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely public policy and necessity, which makes it in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation and that the hardship of the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. The requisites must also concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) itmust be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. The court rules held that res judicata does not exist in this case. The compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, the Court pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on themerits. A contract must have requisites and no according to Article 2035 of the Civil Code, one of the requisites of such to be valid is that the compromise must not pertain to the Civil Status of a person and the issue of Future Support and Future Legitime. The agreement in this case is intended to settle the question of petitioners status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her rights to future support and future legitime 261 | P a g e -
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as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code as espoused in thecase of Advincula v. Advincula. It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations. Decision Reversed and Set Aside. 2. Rights of illegitimate children, FC 173, 172, 175-176 Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. 2 Montefalcon v Vasquez, GR No. 165016, June 17, 2008 Facts: 1999: Petitioner Dolores filed a Complaint for acknowledgment and support against respondent Ronnie (RTC Naga). - her son Laurence (born:1993) is the illegitimate child of Vasquez, evidenced by the certificate of live birth he signed as father. Petitioner Dolores and Vasquez are not legally married, and that Vasquez has his own family. Summons and alias summons (substituted service) were issued. TC: Vasquez in default; granted-illegitimate child CA: remand the case Issue: Whether Laurence is an illegitimate child and entitled to support? Y Held: Laurence is legally entitled to support from the respondent, and the amount of P5,000 monthly set by the trial court is neither excessive nor unreasonable. Article 175 FC mandates that illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Under Article 172, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) through record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final order; or (2) by admission of filiation in a public document or private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned; or in default of these two, by open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child or by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Laurence's record of birth is an authentic, relevant and admissible piece of evidence to prove paternity and filiation. Vasquez did not deny that Laurence is his child with Dolores. He signed as father in Laurence's certificate of live birth, a public document. He supplied the data entered in it. Thus, it is a competent evidence of filiation as he had a hand in its preparation. In fact, if the child had been recognized by any of the modes in the first paragraph of Article 172, there is no further need to file any action for acknowledgment because any of said modes is by itself a consummated act. As filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. Petitioners were able to prove that Laurence needs Vasquez's support and that Vasquez is capable of giving such support. Dolores testified that she spent around P200,000 for Laurence; she spends P8,000 a month for his schooling and their subsistence. She told the lower court Vasquez was earning US$535 monthly based on his January 10, 2000 contract of employment with Fathom Ship Management and his seafarer information sheet. That income, if converted at the prevailing rate, would be more than sufficient to cover the monthly support for Laurence. Under Article 195 (4) of the Family Code, a parent is obliged to support his illegitimate child. The amount is variable. There is no final judgment thereof as it shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may be 262 | P a g e -
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reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Under the premises, the award of P5,000 monthly support to Laurence is reasonable, and not excessive nor exorbitant. The substituted service was valid and justified because previous attempts were made by the sheriffs to serve the summons, but to no avail. Diligent efforts were evidently exerted in the conduct of the concerned sheriffs in the performance of their official duty. Also, the person who received the alias summons was of suitable age and discretion, then residing at Vasquez's dwelling. 3 Maramag vs De Guzman, GR 181132, June 5, 2009 FACTS: Loreto Maramag designated as beneficiary his concubine Eva de Guzman Maramag. Vicenta Maramag and Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie (heirs of Loreto Maramag) and his concubine Eva de Guzman Maramag, also suspected in the killing of Loreto and his illegitimate children are claiming for his insurance. Vicenta alleges that Eva is disqualified from claiming RTC: Granted - civil code does NOT apply CA: dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction for filing beyond reglementary period ISSUE: W/N Eva can claim even though prohibited under the civil code against donation HELD: YES. Petition is DENIED. Any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy of the person who cannot make any donation to him If a concubine is made the beneficiary, it is believed that the insurance contract will still remain valid, but the indemnity must go to the legal heirs and not to the concubine, for evidently, what is prohibited under Art. 2012 is the naming of the improper beneficiary. SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the policy. GR: only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy. EX: situation where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insure 4 De la Cruz vs Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009 FACTS: 1. For several months in 2005, petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Jenie got pregnant but 2 months before she gave birth, Dominique died. 2. When Jenie gave birth, she applied for registration of the childs birth, using Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the an unsigned autobiography of Dominique acknowledging paternity of the unborn child. 3. On November 11, 2005,[7] the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenies application for registration of the childs name because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child 4. Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint[9] for injunction/ registration of name against respondent before the RegionalTrial Court of Antipolo City. The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY CODE RULING: Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the childs paternity must be signed by the putative father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature. Petition is GRANTED. Special circumstances exist to hold that Dominiques Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law. Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the paramount consideration in resolving questions affecting him. 5 Uy v Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009
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6 Manungas v Loreto, GR 193161, August 22, 2011 Topic: Rights of illegitimate children Facts: Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They had no children. Instead, they adopted Samuel David Avila. Florentino Manungas died intestate, while Avila predeceased his adoptive mother. Avila was survived by his wife Sarah Abarte Vda. de Manungas. Thereafter, Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for Partition of Estate in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, of which she was the administratrix. There, she stated that there are no other legal and compulsory heirs of Florentino Manungas except for herself, Avila and a Ramon Manungas whom she acknowledged as the natural son of Florentino Manungas. Thereafter, a Decree of Final Distribution was issued in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas distributing the properties to Engracia Manungas and Ramon Manungas, the surviving heirs after Sarah renounced her rights. RTC appointed Parreo, the niece of Engracia Manungas, as the Judicial Guardian of the properties and person of her incompetent aunt. Engracia Manungas, through Parreo, then instituted a case against the spouses Diosdado Manungas and Milagros Pacifico for illegal detainer and damages with the MTC. In their answer, it was claimed that Diosdado is the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas. Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over the Estate of Engracia Manungas in his favor before the RTC. He alleged that he, being an illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas, is an heir of Engracia Manungas. The petition was opposed by Loreto and Parreo alleging that Diosdado was incompetent as an administrator of the Estate of Manungas claiming that he was not a Manungas, that he was not an heir of Engracia Manungas, he was not a creditor of Engracia Manungas or her estate and that he was in fact a debtor of the estate. RTC issued an Order appointing Parreo as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas. Thereafter, RTC issued an Order reversing itself and ordering the revocation of its earlier appointment of Parreo as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas while appointing Diosdado as the Special Administrator. CA reversed and reinstated Parreno. Issue: WON Diosdado, being an illegitimate child of Francisco, is entitled to be a special administrator of the estate of Engracia. Held: No. Although as a rule, the presence of illegitimate children precludes succession by collateral relatives to his estate, the fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does not mean that he is entitled or even qualified to become the special administrator of the Estate of Manungas. Diosdado Manungas, being the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas inherits the latters property by operation of law. However, he cannot be the special administrator of the Estate of Manungas. Such reasoning is a non sequitur. It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of administrator do not apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity. Given the duties of a special administrator as provided for by the law, it would, therefore, be prudent and reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to the heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person would not expose the estate to losses that would effectively diminish his or her share. While the court may use its discretion and depart from such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.. 7 Gotardo v Buling, GR 165166, August 15, 2012 (Petition to recognize and provide legal support) FACTS: Respondent Divina met Petitioner Rodulfo in a bank and eventually became sweethearts around January 1993. August 4, 1994 Respondent found out that she was pregnant. Petitioner was happy about it and proposed that they get married. The marriage did not push through because Petitioner backed-out. Respondent sued for breach of promise to marry which was then settled amicably. March 9, 1995 Respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze. Respondent sent petitioner a letter demanding him to give support and recognize their child but petitioner did not answer so respondent filed fer complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite. The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the imputed paternity, claiming that he first had sexual contact with the respondent in the first week of August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he was informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994. RTC during pendency of the cases and upon motion ordered support in the amount of 2,000.00 retroactive from March 1995. In its decision dismissed the case based on insufficiency of evidence based on the inconsistent testimonies of the Respondent as to when they had their first sexual contact i.e., "September 1993" in her direct testimony while "last week of January 1993" during her crosstestimony, and her reason for engaging in sexual contact even after she had refused the petitioners initial marriage proposal. Ordered to return to respondent the amount of support erroneously awarded. CA Reversed RTC ISSUE: WON Gliffze is the son of Petitioner entitling him to support.
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HELD: Yes. Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this case) or inheritance. In paternity cases, the burden of proof is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child." One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. We have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which [his] name has been entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court." The respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception. Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship. On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with the respondent, only that it occurred on a much later date than the respondent asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the respondent to have been three (3) months pregnant already in September 1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy. However, the petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary support.1wphi1 The petitioners denial cannot overcome the respondents clear and categorical assertions. Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support. 3. Proof of filiation, FC 175 Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. 1 Jison vs. CA, 286 SCRA 495 FACTS: Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against petitioner, Francisco Jison, for recognition as illegitimate child of the latter. The case was filed 20 years after her mothers death and when she was already 39 years of age. Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he impregnated Esperanza Amolar, Moninas mother. Monina alleged that since childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as the illegitimate child of petitioner by his acts and that of his family. It was likewise alleged that petitioner supported her and spent for her education such that she became a CPA and eventually a Central Bank Examiner. Monina was able to present total of 11 witnesses. ISSUE: Whether or not Monina should be declared as an illegitimate child of Francisco Jison. HELD: Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established. To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously. The following facts was established based on the testimonial evidences offered by Monina: 1. That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was employed by the former; 2. That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct. SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competence evidence as to the issue of paternity. Franciscos lack of participation in the preparation of baptismal certificates and school records render the documents showed as incompetent to prove paternity. With regard to the affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of age attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC was in the position that if Monina were truly not Franciscos illegitimate child, it would be unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation. Moninas evidence hurdles the high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish ones illegitimate filiation in relying upon the provision on open and continuous possession. Hence, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence. Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina filed her action well within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust. Petition was denied. 2 Rivero v CA, G.R. NO. 141273, May 17, 2005 Facts: August 27, 1996: Benedick Arevalo filed a Complaint against Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman, Benito Dy Chiao, Jr., and Benson Dy 265 | P a g e -
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Chiao (RTC Naga) for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their father, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., and for the administration and partition of his estate as he had died intestate (July 27, 1995). Since Benedick was a minor, his natural mother and guardian ad litem, Shirley Arevalo, filed the complaint on his behalf. Concepcion, Benito Sr.'s wife, was not impleaded as she had died (July 7, 1995). Mary Jane (spendthrift and drug addict), for herself, and purportedly in behalf of her brothers, denied the allegations that Shirley and her father had an amorous relationship and that Benedick was the illegitimate son of their father for want of knowledge or information; the allegation that they had recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of their father was, likewise, specifically denied. Benedick filed a Motion, praying that the court order a mental examination of the Dy Chiao brothers, and for the appointment of their sister as their guardian ad litem in the case. December 6, 1996: Plaintiff filed a "Compromise Agreement" (November 24, 1996), with the following signatories to the agreement: Shirley Arevalo, for the plaintiff and assisted by counsel, Atty. Simando; and Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman, assisted by counsel, Atty. Botor, purportedly for and in behalf of her brothers. Appended to the agreement was a photocopy of SPA, purportedly signed by the Dy Chiao brothers, who were then still confined in the hospital. TC: approved the agreement and rendered judgment: recognizes the plaintiff as the illegitimate son of her deceased father; settlement 6M December 17, 1996: Mary Jane, through Atty. Simando, (the counsel for Benedick), filed a petition with the RTC for the settlement of the estate of her father and for her appointment as administrator thereto. \ April 3, 1997: Benedick filed a Motion for Execution, on the allegation that the defendants had failed to comply with their obligations under the compromise agreement. =TC granted Dy Chiao brothers, represented by their uncle, Henry, filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO: not authorize their sister Mary Jane to execute any compromise agreement for and in their behalf. CA issued a status quo order, however, before the said order was served on Benedick, several lots had already been sold at public auction and the buyers had already remitted the money. Benson died intestate on June 25, 1997. CA: judgment in favor of Benito, Jr., granting the petition and nullifying the assailed decision and writ of execution issued by the RTC, including the sale at public auction of the property of the deceased. - filiation cannot be the subject of a compromise Issues: (1) whether or not Henry Dy Chiao had the authority to file the amended petition for Benito Dy Chiao, Jr.; (2) whether the decision of the RTC based on the compromise agreement is null and void for extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.; and (3) whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of Benedick Arevalo for recognition as the illegitimate son of the deceased Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., as well as the action for partition and distribution of the latter's estate. Held: 1. Henry had the authority to file the amended petition and sign the requisite certification on non-forum shopping when the CA admitted the amended petition and appointed him as guardian ad litem of his nephews. - by reason of his mental illness is enough. 2. The decision of the RTC based on the compromise agreement executed by Mary Jane is null and void. Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil status of persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the court to determine its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. A compromise is a contract whereby parties, making reciprocal concerns, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. 44 Like any other contract, it must comply with the requisite provisions in Article 1318 of the New Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation which is established. Like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order.45 Any compromise agreement which is contrary to law or public policy is null and void, and vests no rights and holds no obligation to any party. It produces no legal effect at all. 46 Considering all these, there can be no other conclusion than that the decision of the RTC on the basis of a compromise agreement where Benedick was recognized as the illegitimate child of Benito, Sr. is null and void. Article 1878 of the New Civil Code provides that an SPA is required for a compromise. Furthermore, the power of attorney should expressly mention the action for which it is drawn; as such, a compromise agreement executed by one in behalf of another, who is not duly authorized to do so by the principal, is void and has no legal effect, and the judgment based on such compromise agreement is null and void.47 The judgment may thus be impugned and its execution may be enjoined in any proceeding by the party against whom it is sought to be enforced.48 A compromise must be strictly construed and can include only those expressly or impliedly included therein.49 (compromise agreement was the handiwork of Atty. Simando) - the decision of the RTC is null and void, the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto and the subsequent sale at public auction of the properties belonging to the estate of Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. are null and void. 3. It is only Mary Jane who recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of her deceased father such recognition, however, is ineffectual, because under the law, the recognition must be made personally by the putative parent and not by any brother, sister or
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relative.52 3 Intestate Estate Delgado v Heirs of Rustia G.R. NO. 155733, January 27, 2006 FACTS: Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died without a will. The claimants of their estates may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and the de facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents. The Alleged Heirs of Josefa Delgado The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado. However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life. Before him was Ramon Osorio with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. The Marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. The Alleged Heirs of Guillermo Rustia Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children but they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan. During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. ISSUES: 1.Who are the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado? 2.Whether or not the grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado can inherit by right of representation? 3.Who are the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia? RULING: 1. The Lawful Heirs of Josefa Delgado
It was found out that Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, were her natural children. The above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado. However, the petitioners in this case are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other onehalf. 2. The Lawful Heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. She failed to present authentic proof of recognition. Together with Guillermina Rustia Rustia, they were held legal strangers to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, nieces and nephews. Therefore, the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half 267 | P a g e -
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shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. The trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgados estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates 4 Heirs of Gabatan vs CA, GR 150206, March 13, 2009 -A lot situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City and is declared for taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. -Pacana(respondent) alleged that she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited the same from her deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan Evero (Hermogena). Respondent further claimed that her mother, Hermogena, is the only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito. Respondent alleged that upon the death of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilos wife, Rita Gabatan, for administration. It was also claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded for the return of the land but to no avail. After Hermogenas death, respondent also did the same but petitioners refused to heed the numerous demands to surrender the subject property. According to respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died, petitioners Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado took possession of the disputed land despite respondents demands for them to vacate the same. -Petitioners, in their answer, denied that respondents mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan was survived by one brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners predecessor-ininterest), Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from Juan Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years and enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the whole world including respondent. Petitioners clarified that Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado have no interest in the subject land; the former is merely the husband of Teofilos daughter while the latter is just a caretaker. Petitioners added that a similar case was previously filed by respondent against Teofilos wife, Rita Vda. de Gabatan, on February 21, 1978, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840 but the case was dismissed on May 3, 1983 for lack of interest. Finally, petitioners contended that the complaint lacks or states no cause of action or, if there was any, the same has long prescribed and/or has been barred by laches. June 20, 1989, the complaint was amended wherein the heirs of Teofilo were individually named, to wit: Lolita Gabatan, Pompeyo Gabatan, Peregrino Gabatan, Reynaldo Gabatan, Nila Gabatan and Jesus Jabinis, Riorita Gabatan Tumal and Freira Gabatan. On July 30, 1990, petitioners filed an amended answer, additionally alleging that the disputed land was already covered by OCT No. P-3316 in the name of the heirs of Juan Gabatan represented by petitioner Riorita Gabatan (Teofilos daughter) The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent and such was affirmed by the CA. The CA even held that: The Deed of Absolute Sale on July 30, 1966 containing such declaration which was signed by Teofilo and the latters nearest relatives by consanguinity, is a tangible proof that they acknowledged Hermogenas status as the daughter of Juan Gabatan. ISSUE: WoN the respondent is the sole heir of Juan Gabatan; HELD: Gabatan. The Court finds insufficient and questionable the basis of the RTC in conferring upon respondent the status of sole heir of Juan
Under the Civil Code, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment. ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child. ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Here, two conflicting birth certificates of respondent were presented at the RTC. Respondent, during her direct testimony, presented and identified a purported certified true copy of her typewritten birth certificate which indicated that her mothers maiden name was Hermogena Clarito Gabatan. Petitioners, on the other hand, presented a certified true copy of respondents handwritten birth certificate which differed from the copy presented by respondent. Among the differences was respondents mothers full maiden name which was indicated as Hermogena Calarito in the handwritten birth certificate. The petitioners copy was given more credit. The Court held that to prove the relationship of respondents mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment. In the 268 | P a g e -
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absence of these, respondent should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Only in the absence of these two classes of evidence is the respondent allowed to present other proof admissible under the Rules of Court of her mothers relationship to Juan Gabatan. In the case at bar, the best evidence of Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan would have been the respodents mothers birth certificate. But such was never offered. The respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses and none of them had personal knowledge of the fact of the marriage of Juan Gabatan to Clarito and that Hermogena was their daughter. As for the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the court deemed it to be inadmissible. In the rules of Evidence a party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original instrument before it can present secondary evidence. Even the authentication of the said deed is defective since the one who authenticated it did not have any personal knowledge of the preparation of the alleged certified true copy. Even if we are to overlook the lack of proper authentication of Exhibit H and consider the same admissible, it still nonetheless would have only provided proof that a certain Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. Exhibit H does not show the filiation of respondent to either Hermogena Gabatan or Juan Gabatan. As discussed above, the only document that respondent produced to demonstrate her filiation to Hermogena Gabatan (respondents Exhibit A) was successfully put in doubt by contrary evidence presented by petitioners. All in all, the Court finds that respondent dismally failed to substantiate, with convincing, credible and independently verifiable proof, her assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property under litigation. Aggravating the weakness of her evidence were the circumstances that (a) she did not come to court with clean hands for she presented a tampered/altered, if not outright spurious, copy of her certificate of live birth and (b) she unreasonably delayed the prosecution of her own cause of action. If the Court cannot now affirm her claim, respondent has her own self to blame. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. 5 Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz , et al vs. Ronald Paul S. 1. For several months in 2005, petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Jenie got pregnant but 2 months before she gave birth, Dominique died. 2. When Jenie gave birth, she applied for registration of the childs birth, using Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the an unsigned autobiography of Dominique acknowledging paternity of the unborn child. 3. On November 11, 2005,[7] the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenies application for registration of the childs name because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child 4. Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint[9] for injunction/ registration of name against respondent before the RegionalTrial Court of Antipolo City. The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY CODE RULING: Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the childs paternity must be signed by the putative father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature. Petition is GRANTED. Special circumstances exist to hold that Dominiques Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law. Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the paramount consideration in resolving questions affecting him. 6 Dela Cruz vs. Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009 Topic: Proof of filiation Facts: For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of Dominiques parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel in Rizal. In 2005, Dominique died. After almost two months, , Jenie, who continued to live with 269 | P a g e -
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Dominiques parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz Aquino. Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the childs Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominiques father. Both affidavits attested, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled Autobiography which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent portions of which read: Aquino, Christian Dominique Autobiography: Im Christian Dominique Aquino, 19 years of age turning 20 this coming October 31, 2005. As of now I have my wife named Jenie dela Cruz. We met each other in our hometown. At first we became good friends, then we fell in love with each other, then we became good couples. And as of now she is pregnant and for that we live together in our house now. Thats all. By letter dated November 11, 2005, City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City Respondent, denied Jenies application for registration of the childs name. In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child (either through the back of Municipal Form No.102 Affidavit of acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father). Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against respondent before the Regional Trial Court. The complaint alleged that the denial of registration of the childs name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA No. 9255, which provides: Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Issue: Whether or not the unsigned handwritten statement of the deceased father of minor Christian Dela Cruz can be considered as a recognition of paternity in a private handwritten instrument within the contemplation of Article 176 of The Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, which entitles the said minor to use his fathers surname. Held: Petition granted. It is thus the policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children. The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor child's best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the childs paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the childs paternity must be signed by the putative father. That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not unduly expand the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners. First, Dominique died about two months prior to the childs birth. Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond tothe facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. Third, Jenies testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominiques father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child. These circumstances indicating Dominiques paternity of the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography that Jenie Dela Cruz is my wife as we fell in love with each other and now she is pregnant and for that welive together. In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor childs best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate 7 Lucas v Lucas, G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011 Facts: Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court. Jesse narrated his mothers account of her history with Jesus S. Lucas and attached several copies of his personal documents. Though Jesus was not summoned and was not served a copy of the petition, he nevertheless learned of it and obtained for himself a copy. He then filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting among others that the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him as respondent. Unbeknownst to Jesus on the day before he filed his Comment, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing. After learning of the RTCs order, Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesses father. Acting on Jesus Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba. This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration of his own which the RTC granted. A new hearing was scheduled where the RTC 270 | P a g e -
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held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The CA ruled in favor of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case. Issue: WON DNA can be used to prove paternity and filiation Held:Yes. The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the "prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence." It seeks "to ensure that the evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice the public." Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states: SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case; (b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established. In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or "good cause" for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a "search," which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.1avv The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing. 1 Gotardo v Buling, GR 165166, August 15, 2012 FACTS: Respondent Divina met Petitioner Rodulfo in a bank and eventually became sweethearts around January 1993. August 4, 1994 Respondent found out that she was pregnant. Petitioner was happy about it and proposed that they get married. The marriage did not push through because Petitioner backed-out. Respondent sued for breach of promise to marry which was then settled amicably. March 9, 1995 Respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze. Respondent sent petitioner a letter demanding him to give support and recognize their child but petitioner did not answer so respondent filed fer complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite. The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the imputed paternity, claiming that he first had sexual contact with the respondent in the first week of August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he was informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994. RTC during pendency of the cases and upon motion ordered support in the amount of 2,000.00 retroactive from March 1995. In its decision dismissed the case based on insufficiency of evidence based on the inconsistent testimonies of the Respondent as to when they had their first sexual contact i.e., "September 1993" in her direct testimony while "last week of January 1993" during her crosstestimony, and her reason for engaging in sexual contact even after she had refused the petitioners initial marriage proposal. Ordered to return to respondent the amount of support erroneously awarded. CA Reversed RTC ISSUE: WON Gliffze is the son of Petitioner entitling him to support. HELD: Yes. Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with 271 | P a g e -
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paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this case) or inheritance. In paternity cases, the burden of proof is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child." One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. We have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which [his] name has been entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court." The respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception. Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship. On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with the respondent, only that it occurred on a much later date than the respondent asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the respondent to have been three (3) months pregnant already in September 1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy. However, the petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary support.1wphi1 The petitioners denial cannot overcome the respondents clear and categorical assertions. Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support. 2 Perla v Baring, GR 172471, November 12, 2012 "An order for support must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence." Facts: Respondent Mirasol and her then minor son, Randy, filed a Complaint for support against Antonio. Allegation: Mirasol and Antonio lived together as common-law spouses for two years. As a result of said cohabitation, Randy was born on November 11, 1983. However, when Antonio landed a job as seaman, he abandoned them and failed to give any support to his son. Respondents thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to support Randy. Answer with Counterclaim: Antonio, who is now married and has a family of his own, denied having fathered Randy. Although he admitted to having known Mirasol, he averred that she never became his common-law wife nor was she treated as such. And since Mirasol had been intimidating and pestering him as early as 1992 with various suits by insisting that Randy is his son, Antonio sought moral and exemplary damages from respondents. RTC and CA: in favor of the plaintiff Randy Perla and ordering the Antonio to give a reasonable monthly support of 5K Issue: Whether the lower courts correctly ordered Antonio to support Randy? N SC: A high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for x x x support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. (certified true copies of Randys birth certificate and baptismal certificate both identifying Antonio as the father as good proofs of his filiation with Randy do not bear Antonios signature. ") Respondents failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio. The rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code which provide as follows: Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. xxxx Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. xxxx Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the father. However, said certificate has no probative value to establish Randys filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same. 60 It is settled that "a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate." 61 We also cannot lend credence to Mirasols claim that Antonio supplied certain information through Erlinda. Aside from Antonios denial in having any participation in the preparation of the document as well as the absence of his signature thereon, respondents did not present Erlinda to confirm that Antonio indeed supplied certain entries in Randys birth certificate. Besides, the several unexplained discrepancies in Antonios personal circumstances as reflected in the subject birth certificate are manifestations of Antonios non-participation in its preparation. Most important, it was Mirasol who signed as informant thereon which she confirmed on the witness stand. Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his illegitimate filiation. That during their first encounter in 1994 Randy called Antonio "Papa" and kissed his hand while Antonio hugged him and promised to support him; or that his Aunt Lelita treated him as a relative and was good to him during his one-week stay in her place, cannot be considered as indications of Randys open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172(1). "[T]o prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously." 62 Here, the single instance that Antonio allegedly hugged Randy and promised to support him cannot be considered as proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. To emphasize, "[t]he fathers conduct towards his son must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to exist." 63 Here, 272 | P a g e -
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except for that singular occasion in which they met, there are no other acts of Antonio treating Randy as his son. 64 Neither can Antonios paternity be deduced from how his sister Lelita treated Randy. To this Court, Lelitas actuations could have been done due to charity or some other reasons. Anent Randys baptismal certificate, we cannot agree with the CA that the same is a good proof of Antonios paternity of Randy. Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of participation of the supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this document incompetent to prove paternity.65 And "while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity. Thus, x x x baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same." 66 This Court cannot likewise agree with the RTCs conclusion that Antonio fathered Randy merely on the basis of his admission that he had sexual encounters with Mirasol. Neither does it agree with the CA that the inconsistencies in Antonios testimony with regard to the number of times he had sexual intercourse with Mirasol are good reasons to disregard his denials and uphold the respondents claims. It is well to stress that as plaintiff, Mirasol has the burden of proving her affirmative allegation that Antonio is the father of her son Randy.67 She must rely on the strength of her evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. 68 As Randy was born on November 11, 1983, it was incumbent upon Mirasol to prove that she had sexual intercourse with Antonio prior to the usual period of pregnancy or nine months before the birth of Randy. This crucial period therefore is during the early part of the first quarter of 1983. However, nothing from Mirasols testimony indicates that she had sexual intercourse with Antonio during that time. Antonios admission of sexual intercourse with Mirasol does not likewise by any means strengthen respondents theory that he fathered Randy. When Antonio testified as an adverse witness for the respondents, he stated that he had sexual intercourse with Mirasol in February and August of 1981. Later testifying as witness for his own behalf, he mentioned that he had a one night affair with Mirasol which happened in the month of September or October of 1981. Assuming that he indeed had sexual contact with Mirasol on the dates mentioned, still, none of these sexual congresses could have led to the conception of Randy who was born two years later in 1983. Respondents failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, the order for Antonio to support Randy has no basis. 4. Compulsory recognition, cf. RPC 345 Art. 345. Civil liability of persons guilty of crimes against chastity. Person guilty of rape, seduction or abduction, shall also be sentenced: 1. To indemnify the offended woman.chanrobles virtual law library 2. To acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing.chanrobles virtual law library 3. In every case to support the offspring.chanrobles virtual law library The adulterer and the concubine in the case provided for in Articles 333 and 334 may also be sentenced, in the same proceeding or in a separate civil proceeding, to indemnify for damages caused to the offended spouse. 3 People vs. Magtibay, G.R. No. 142985. Aug. 6, 2002 Facts: Rachel Recto went to the store to buy cigarette and ice when Magtibay pulled her hand and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her in a grassy place. She became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy. Magtibay claimed he was bedridden due to influenza but the RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. He was penalized with RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the victim Rachelle Recto of 50,000 without subsidiary imprisonment. Relevant Issue: WON the accused is ordered to provide support to the victim's child born out of the rape. Held: Yes. Concerning the acknowledgment and support of the offspring of rape, Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. Under the FC, the kid is considered an illegitimate child. Art. 176 of the FC vests parental authority upon the mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses parental authority over his children, no further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the child's status. Hence, accused should be ordered to indemnify and support the victim's child. Landingin vs. RP Facts: Diwata Landingin (us cit. of Filipino descent) filed for adoption on 2/4/2002 of the minors Elaine, Elma, and Eugene who are all nat. children of her brother Manuel and Amelia Ramos. Manuel died on May 19, 1990, the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos while their mother went to Italy, remarried and had two children (never communicated again). Diwata now supports said minors, together with help from other relatives. Maria passed away on November 23, 2000 and Diwata now therefore seeks to adopt said minors. Said minors have already given their written consent to adoption. She is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are already married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. Diwatas own children have also given their written consent already. Her brother Mariano Ramos who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors while in petitioners custody. Court ordered DSWD to conduct case study and submit report in time for the hearing. OSG also entered its appearance. Since her petition was unopposed, she presented ex-parte. Diwata testified in her behalf, presented Eliane Ramos, the eldest among the adoptees, to testify on the written consent that she and siblings exec. Also presented was the Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel Branitley.
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Pagbilao, the DSWD field officer assigned to the case, reported that minors are eligible for adoption because the mother has voluntarily consented to their adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata Landingin this is in view of her inability to provide the parental care, guidance and support they need (Affid of Consent by mother). Moreover, said minors have expressed the desire to be adopted through a joint Affidavit of consent. And lastly, the minors are present under the care of a temporary guardian who has also family to look after. Pagbilao interviewed the mother of the minors who went back to PI from Italy during the summer for a 3-week vacation. But Diwata was not able to present Pagbilao as witness offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Neither was she able to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the adoption. TC declared the minors freed from all legal obedience and maintenance from their natural parents and also declared to be children of Diwata. Moreover, TC ordered that from Dizon-Ramos, the surnames of the minors would now be Ramos-Landingin. OSG appealed CA saying that there was no consent from the biological mother. With this, CA reversed TC, saying that Diwata was not able to prove that the biological mother consented to the adoption nor was the affidavit of consent by Diwatas children be admissible since such was exec in Guam and not acknowledged before philippine Consular Office. Nor is she stable enough to support the children. Issue: 1)WON the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos 2)WON the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopters children sufficiently complies with the law 3)WON petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees. Held: 1)NO. The discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) requires the consent from biological parents. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. Written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. Amelia (mother) was said to be in PI, therefore it would not have been impossible to solicit Written Consent from her. That consent is no longer needed because of mothers abandonment is untenable. If mother had really abandoned, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such an abandonment More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children, and that the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given to an adopting parent. Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes precedence in adoption 2) NO. Section 2 of Act No. 2103 (pardon me if I would no longer expound on this point, this part deals more with technicalities of instruments I think e.g. including the intrinsic/extrinsic validity of such instruments What is important here is that no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the written consent of her legitimate children therefore said evidence is inadmissible 3) Primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents should also be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of the family. She only has a part-time job, and she is rather of age therefore financial stability is questionable. Even if she says that she has children to rely on, adopter must be the main breadwinne 4 People v Abella, G.R. No. 177295, January 6, 2010 Sometime in December 1999, the accused Marlon Abella, while armed with a knife and under the influence of liquor, entered the house of herein complainant [AAA] (real name of the victim was withheld by the court in its decision to protect her identity), and then and there have sexual intercourse with [AAA], a 38-year old woman of feeble mind (moderate mental retardation or intellectual quotient of a 7 to 8-year old child), against her will. During the pendency of the case, [AAA] gave birth to a child. Accused stated that [AAA] was coached to testify against him in furtherance of the hostility between their families. He claims that [AAA]s mental disability made he so subservient to her parents that she would believe everything that they tell her. The RTC convicted the accused of the crime of rape. The case was elevated to the CA which affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, the decision is under automatic review by this court. The RTC even directed the Accused to recognize [xxx] as his illegitimate daughter, and provide for her support as soon as his financial means permit. RELATED ISSUE:Whether or not Abella is the father of the daughter of AAA. Held: The Supreme Court held that: We also accord high respect to the ruling of the trial court, as well as to the appellate courts deference thereto, that the accused-appellant was the biological father of the two-year old daughter of AAA as a result of the rape incident and in view of their striking facial similarities and features. The order to acknowledge and support accused-appellants offspring is in accordance with Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code. CRIMINAL Issues: 1. Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused of the crime charged. 2. Whether or not the testimony of the victim is credible to convict the accused.
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3. Whether or not the denial of the accused was not given due credit by the court. Held: The high court in affirming the decision of the lower court and the CA stated the following: 1. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of rape is committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) through force, threat or intimidation; (2) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (3) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (4) when the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. In People v. Andaya, [25] it was held that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate with the mental age of a child below 12 years old constitutes statutory rape with or without the attendance of force, threat, or intimidation. 2. By well-entrenched jurisprudence, the issue of credibility of witnesses is a question best addressed to the province of the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts and [a]bsent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the trial courts assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the formers findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have affected the outcome of the case. 3. It has been stressed, moreover, that the bare denials and uncorroborated alibis of an accused cannot overcome the positive identification of the accused and straightforward recounting of the accuseds commission of a crime. In People v. Nieto, this Court held: It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him. The defense of alibi is likewise unavailing. Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Secondly, alibi is unacceptable when there is a positive identification of the accused by a credible witness. Lastly, in order that alibi might prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has been somewhere else during the commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it would have been impossible for him to be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime scene. 5. LEGITIMATED CHILDREN 1. Who may be legitimated, FC 177, RA 9858 Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. REPUBLIC ACT. NO. 9858 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE LEGITIMATION OF CHILDREN BORN TO PARENTS BELOW MARRYING AGE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS AMENDED Section 1. Article 177 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines", as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: "Art. 177. Children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, or were so disqualified only because either or both of them were below eighteen (18) years of age, may be legitimated." "Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation." 5 Abadilla vs Tabiliran, 249 SCRA 447 Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the formers brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption. A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption. Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptees biological mother. Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish
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in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption. 2. How legitimation takes place, FC 178, FC 180 Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a viodable marriage shall not affect the legitimation Art. 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child's birth. 3. Retroactivity and effects, FC 180-181 Art. 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child's birth. Art. 181. The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage shall benefit their descendants. 4. Action to impugn legitimation, FC 182 Art. 182. Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced in their rights, within five years from the time their cause of action accrues. 5. Rights of legitimated children, FC 179 Art. 179. Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children. 5. ADOPTED CHILDREN 6 Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250 Topic: Adopted Children Facts: On January 13, 1974, Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate in Pasay City .He was survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin daughters Nora L. De Leon and Irma Lazatin(respondents). A month after Mariano Lazatins death, Margarita de Asis commenced an intestate proceeding before the CFI of Pasay. On April 11, 1974 (2 months after the intestate proceeding), Margarita de Asis died. She left a holographic will, which was executed on 29 May 1970. It provided, among others, for: a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara (petitioners son). On June 3, 1974, the private respondents Norma and Irma filed a petition to probate the will of Margarita. Ramon Sta. Clara filed a motion in the probate court, claiming:1. that Margarita had executed a will subsequent to that submitted for probate 2.demanded its production3.prayed for the opening of the box On 22 November 1974 (7 months after Margaritas death), Renato Lazatin(petitioner) intervened for the first time as an admitted illegitimate child. On 22 August 1975, he also filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis, this time as an adopted child on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of Mariano, stating that Renato was an illegitimate child of Mariano who has later adopted by him. The affidavit was later modified to state that Renato was adopted by both Mariano and Margarita Renatos motion to intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita was denied by the lower court on the ground that the evidence presented tend to prove that he was a recognized natural child of Mariano, but not a legally adopted child of Margarita. He never presented a decree of adoption in his favor. Likewise, Renatos motion for reconsideration was denied by the court unless he presented some documentary evidence to prove his adoption Issue: W/N Renato Lazatin is Margarita De Asiss adopted child. Held: NO. Adoption is a juridical act. A proceeding in rem, which creates between two person a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance to the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out. Otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively proven by the person claiming its existence. An adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be established Renatos flow of evidence in the case below does not lead to any proof of judicial adoption. Petitioners proof do not show or tend to show that, at onetime or another, a specific court of competent jurisdiction rendered in an order approving his adoption by the spouses1.No judicial records of such adoption or copies thereof are presented or attempted to be presented2.Petitioner merely proceeds from a nebulous assumption that he was judicially adopted between the years 1928 and 19323.The particular court where the adoption was decreed or by whom the petition was heard is not even presented by Renato The certification of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila stating that its pre-war records were destroyed during the Liberation does not furnish any legal basis for a presumption of adoption in favor of petitioner. This is because there was no proof that petitioner was really adopted in Manila or that an adoption petition was filed in the CFI of Manila by the deceased spouses, where, after hearing, a judgment of approval was rendered by said Court Moreover, if there was really such adoption, Renato could have conveniently secured a copy of the newspaper publication of the adoption as required under Section 4, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, or a certification of the publishing house. The absence of proof of an order of adoption by the court, as provided by the statute, cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived with a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a child to establish such adoption. Even evidence of declaration of the deceased, made in his lifetime, that he intended to adopt a child as his heir, and that he had adopted him, and of the fact that the child resided with the deceased, as a member of his family, from infancy until he attained his majority, is not sufficient to establish the fact of adoption. Nor does the fact that the deceased spouses fed, clothed, educated, recognized and referred to one like petitioner as an adopted child, necessarily establish adoption of the child2 Secondary evidence presented by Renato is admissible where the records of adoption proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But before this may be done, Renato should first be able to establish that such records did exist. The order of proving the evidence should be:1.existence2.execution3.loss of the record 276 | P a g e -
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Renato failed to establish any proof of the existence of such records and also failed to prove its loss The declaration of pedigree made by Benjamin Lazatin, although hearsay,could be admitted on the principle that they are natural expressions of person who must know the truth. But, in proving an adoption, there is better proof available that should be produced the adoption papers. Also, Renatos claim that his adoption records are with Nora since it was supposedly in the safety deposit box cannot be accepted because:1.the fact of the real existence of the records have not been established2.Renato has no proof that such papers are with Nora3.the order of the court to produce the items in the safety deposit box could not be considered as a mode of discovery of production and inspection of the documents4.Nora already surrendered the contents of the box and no adoption papers of his were found 7 Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575 Facts: Child was born on Feb. 14, 1987 toparents who are common-law husbandand wife (Fajardo and Carreon).Parents offered child for adoption towifes sister and brother-in-law (theCervantes), spouses, who took careand custody of the child when she wasbarely 2 years old. Affidavit of Consentto the adoption was signed by Carreon.On March-April of the same year,adoptive parents received a letter fromthe natural parents demanding themto pay P150,000.00, otherwise, theywould get back their child. TheCervantes refused to accede to thedemand. On September, while theCervantes spouses were at work,Carreon took the child from theadoptive parents residence.Petitioners demanded the return of thechild but Carreon refused saying thatshe had no desire to give up the childand that she signed the affidavitwithout fully knowing what it meant.However, she sent word to thepetitioners stating that she would giveback the child if the amount requestedwas paid. Social worker of the adoptioncase testified that when she interviewCarreon, Carreon manifested herdesire to have the child adopted by theCervantes. Issue: WON custody of the child should revertback to natural mother. Held/Ratio: No. The paramount interest of the childwould not be met if custody weregranted to Fajardo (who is legallymarried to a woman other thanCarreon) and the latter. Hiscohabitation with Carreon will notaccord the minor that desirableatmosphere where she can grow anddevelop into an upright and moral-minded person. Besides, Carreon hasanother child through another man.For the child in question to grow upwith a sister whose father is not hertrue father, could affect the moraloutlook and values of the child inquestion. The minor has been legallyadopted by petitioners with the fullknowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption hasthe effect, among others, of dissolvingthe authority vested in natural parentsover the adopted child, except wherethe adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, inwhich case, parental authority over theadopted shall be exercised jointly byboth spouses. In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children,the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separatedfrom a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where the Court findscompelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of thechild concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as socialstanding of the contending parents.Conrado Fajardo's relationship with the Gina Carreon is a common-lawhusband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with Gina will not accord theminor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an uprightand moral-minded person. Gina Carreon had also previously given birth to anotherchild by another married man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years butwho eventually left her and vanished. For a minor to grow up with a sister whose"father" is not her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of saidminor. Upon the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to bemorally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor andgiving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not only jobless butalso maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her.Minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge andconsent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect of dissolving theauthority vested in natural parents over the adopted child. The adopting parentshave the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise parentalauthority and responsibility over him. R.A. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Law) ELIGIBILITY Section 7. Who May Adopt. The following may adopt: (a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee's parent; (b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, Further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the alien's qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following: (i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or (ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or 277 | P a g e -
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(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse; or (c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, However, that the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or (iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. Section 8. Who May Be Adopted. The following may be adopted: (a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been administratively or judicially declared available for adoption; (b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse; (c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status to that of legitimacy; (d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority; (e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or (f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died: Provided, That no proceedings shall be initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of said parent(s). Section 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption . After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required: (a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over; (b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child; (c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any; (d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter if living with said adopter and the latter's spouse, if any; and (e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. R.A. 8043 (Inter-Country Adoption Law) 1. Who may adopt Sec. 7, 8552 1 Michelle Lim, GR 168992, May 21, 2009 Facts On 23 June 1974, Petitioner Monina P. Lim married Primo Lim. They were childless. Subsequently, minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban. Being so eager to have a child of their own, Monina and Primo registered the children to make it appear that they were the childrens parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim. The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Primo died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario, an American citizen. Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael, who was already 25 years old and already married and 18 years and seven months, before the trial court. Michelle, together with her husband and Michael, gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent. Moninas husband Angel likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael. On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. On the ground that since petitioner having remarried, should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Issue: Whether or not petitioner Monina Lim, who has remarried, can singly adopt. Held: Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Angel Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial courts decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
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SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt: (a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptees parent; (b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following: (i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or (ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or (iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or (c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or (iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Angel Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. Effects of Adoption Petitioner contention that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority is untenable. It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus: Joint adoption of the husband and wife may not be dispensed. Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support and successional rights. Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no longer be possible because Angel Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court. We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Angel Olario is of no moment. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Angel Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory. 2 Republic v. Toledano, 233 SCRA 9 Facts: On February 21, 1990 Alvin Clouse, a natural born citizen of America and his wife Evelyn A Clause, Filipino at birth who later became a natural citizen of the United States petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala(younger brother). On June 20, 1990 the judge decree said Filipino minor be their child by adoption. Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner here, appealed that the lower court erred in granting the petition for adoption for the spouses are not qualified to adopt under the Philippine Law.
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Issue: Whether or not the spouses Alvin and Evelyn Clouse being an alien are disqualified to adopt under the Philippine law? Held: Yes. The spouse are disqualified to adopt the Filipino child Solomon. Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt: An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly the later. Alvin Clause is not qualified being a natural born citizen of the United States of America. On the other hand Evelyn Clouse may seem to be qualified on Article 184, however adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone for the Family Code requires that the husband and wife must jointly adopt as stated on Article 185. 2. Who may be adopted Sec. 8 3. Need for consent Sec. 9 3 Landingin vs. RP, G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006 Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the formers brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption. A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption. Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptees biological mother. Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption. 4. Effects of a decree of adoption, Secs. 13, 16, 17 and 18 Section 13. Decree of Adoption. If, after the publication of the order of hearing has been complied with, and no opposition has been interposed to the petition, and after consideration of the case studies, the qualifications of the adopter(s), trial custody report and the evidence submitted, the court is convinced that the petitioners are qualified to adopt, and that the adoption would redound to the best interest of the adoptee, a decree of adoption shall be entered which shall be effective as of the date the original petition was filed. This provision shall also apply in case the petitioner(s) dies before the issuance of the decree of adoption to protect the interest of the adoptee. The decree shall state the name by which the child is to be known. Section 16. Parental Authority. Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s). Section 17. Legitimacy. The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family. Section 18. Succession. In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern. 4 Tamargo v. CA, 209 SCRA 518 Adelberto Bundoc, a minor (10 yrs), shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident.
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Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings before the then CIF of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. Respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. Petitioners in their reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action. Issue WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual custody was lodged with the biological parents. Held This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents their parental authority which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. (U)nder the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control. We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child . Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed. Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being already before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 5 Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575 Facts: Child was born on Feb. 14, 1987 toparents who are common-law husbandand wife (Fajardo and Carreon).Parents offered child for adoption towifes sister and brother-in-law (theCervantes), spouses, who took careand custody of the child when she wasbarely 2 years old. Affidavit of Consentto the adoption was signed by Carreon.On March-April of the same year,adoptive parents received a letter fromthe natural parents demanding themto pay P150,000.00, otherwise, theywould get back their child. TheCervantes refused to accede to thedemand. On September, while theCervantes spouses were at work,Carreon took the child from theadoptive parents residence.Petitioners demanded the return of thechild but Carreon refused saying thatshe had no desire to give up the childand that she signed the affidavitwithout fully knowing what it meant.However, she sent word to thepetitioners stating that she would giveback the child if the amount requestedwas paid. Social worker of the adoptioncase testified that when she interviewCarreon, Carreon manifested herdesire to have the child adopted by theCervantes. Issue: WON custody of the child should revertback to natural mother. Held/Ratio: No. The paramount interest of the childwould not be met if custody weregranted to Fajardo (who is legallymarried to a woman other thanCarreon) and the latter. Hiscohabitation with Carreon will notaccord the minor that desirableatmosphere where she can grow anddevelop into an upright and moral-minded person. Besides, Carreon hasanother child through another man.For the child in question to grow upwith a sister whose father is not hertrue father, could affect the moraloutlook and values of the child inquestion. The minor has been legallyadopted by petitioners with the fullknowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption hasthe effect, among others, of dissolvingthe authority vested in natural parentsover the adopted child, except wherethe adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, inwhich case, parental authority over theadopted shall be exercised jointly byboth spouses. In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children,the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separatedfrom a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where the Court findscompelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of thechild concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as socialstanding of the contending parents.Conrado Fajardo's 281 | P a g e -
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relationship with the Gina Carreon is a common-lawhusband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with Gina will not accord theminor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an uprightand moral-minded person. Gina Carreon had also previously given birth to anotherchild by another married man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years butwho eventually left her and vanished. For a minor to grow up with a sister whose"father" is not her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of saidminor. Upon the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to bemorally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor andgiving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not only jobless butalso maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her.Minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge andconsent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect of dissolving theauthority vested in natural parents over the adopted child. The adopting parentshave the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise parentalauthority and responsibility over him. 6 Stephanie Garcia, 454 SCRA 541 Topic: Effects of a decree of adoption Facts: Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig his surname. The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the Family Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middlename. The lower court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name. Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father. Held: Law Is Silent As To The Use Of Middle Name As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176[11] of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle name a child may use. One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adapter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of Article V of RA 8557. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father. Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18[24], Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future. Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them Mama and Papa. Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy. Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind ,including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact ,it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father. In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that the adopted shall bear the surname of the adopters.[13] Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption Liberal Construction of Adoption Statutes In Favor Of Adoption It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.[25] The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration,[26] hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.[27] Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so. 5. Rescission of adoption, Sec. 19, 20 Section 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations. Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code. Section 20. Effects of Rescission. If the petition is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
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The court shall order the Civil Registrar to cancel the amended certificate of birth of the adoptee and restore his/her original birth certificate. Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but only as of the date of judgment of judicial rescission. Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected. All the foregoing effects of rescission of adoption shall be without prejudice to the penalties imposable under the Penal Code if the criminal acts are properly proven. 7 Lahom vs. Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003 Facts: Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom took in Isabelitas nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo since he was two years old, treating him as if he were their own child. It was only in 1971 that the spouses petitioned for adoption. a In 1972, this was granted and the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed his name to Jose Melvin Lahom. 1999: Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption: Jose Melvin refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, in utter disregard for the feelings of the spouses Before her husband died, he even wanted to revoke the adoption but was only stopped by Isabelita Diosdado further desired to give to charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future. Respondent failed to show concern for Petitioner and remained indifferent He does not act like a son, there is an uncomfortable relationship between the two the only motive to respondents adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of the spouses Lahom 1998: RA 8552 provided grounds committed by adopter for the rescission of adoption and also stated that Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter. However, adopter may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Art. 919 of the Civil Code. Respondent objects to motion RTC: dismissed the petition There is a lack of cause of action Said rights of petitioner to rescind should have been exercised within the period allowed by the Rules. Legal ground for the petition have been discovered and known to petitioner for more than 5 years, prior to the filing of the instant petition of December 1, 1999, hence the action had already prescribed. Issue: May the subject adoption, decreed on May 5, 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an adopted after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552? In the affirmative, has the adopters action prescribed? Held: The Petition was DISMISSED. SC begins with a brief background on the law: welfare of the adopted started becoming of paramount concern creation of written instruments that would protect and safeguard the rights of the adopted children adoption was impressed with social and moral responsibility and its underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted child R.A. 8552 secured these rights and privileges and affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child. The new law also withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption. It was also months after the effectivity of the R.A. No. 8552 that Isabelita filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. Therefore, her petition could no longer be pursued. Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the fiveyear bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a right, the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is a privilege that is governed by the states determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been exercised. XV. SUPPORT A. What comprises support, FC 194 Art. 194. Support compromises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work. B. Who are obliged to provide support, FC 195, 196, 199 Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article: (1) The spouses; (2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants; (3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; 283 | P a g e -
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(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and (5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood (291a) Art. 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise bound to support each other to the full extent set forth in Article 194, except only when the need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or negligence. Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided: (1) The spouse; (2) The descendants in the nearest degree; (3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and (4) The brothers and sisters. 1 Pelayo v. Lauron, 12 Phil 453 FACTS: Oct. 13, 1906, nighttime Arturo Pelayo, a physician based in Cebu, was called to the house of Marcelo Lauron & Juana Abella (defendants) in San Nicolas. Their daughter-in-law was about to give birth & they requested him to render medical assistance. Since it was a difficult birth, he had to perform a surgery to remove the fetus using forceps. He also removed the afterbirth. He finished all of these until the following morning. He visited the patient several times the following day. Just & equitable value for the services he rendered: P500.00. Without any good reason, defendants refused to pay said amount. Thus he filed a case praying for a judgment in his favor against defendants for the sum of P500.00 + costs along with other relief that may be deemed proper. The Defendants alleged that their daughter-in-law died in consequence of the childbirth. Also, that their son & daughter-in-law lived independently & her giving birth in their house was only accidental. They prayed that they be absolved. The CFI absolved the Defendants due to lack of sufficient evidence to establish right of action. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants are bound to pay the bill for the services Pelayo has rendered. HELD: NO. CFI judgment affirmed. Rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is among the mutual obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 & 143, CC) The party bound to give support should therefore be liable for all the expenses including the fees of the physician. Thus, it is the husbands obligation to pay Pelayo and not the defendants. The husband would still be liable even if his parents were the one who called & requested for Pelayos assistance. The defendants are not under any obligation to pay the fees claimed (An obligation according to CC Art. 1089 is created by law, contracts, quasi-contracts, & by illicit acts & omissions or by those in which any kind of fault/negligence occurs.). There was no contract between Pelayo & the defendants thus they cant be compelled to pay him. 2 Sanchez v. Zulueta, 68 Phil 110 Facts: Josefa Diego and Mario Sanchez (plaintiffs) are asking Feliciano Sanchez (defendant) that he be sentenced to pay them a monthly allowance for support. Plaintiffs alleges that they are the wife and child, respectively, of the defendant; that the latter, since 1932, refused and still refuses to support the plaintiffs; that the latter have no means of subsistence, while the defendant receives from the US Army a monthly pension of P174.20; that the defendant abandoned the plaintiffs without any justifiable cause and now refuses to allow them to live with him. Defendant alleges that the plaintiff Josefa abandoned the conjugal home without his knowledge or consent, because she committed adultery with Macario Sanchez, with whom she had, as a result of the illicit relations, a child which is the other plaintiff Mario. TC: ordered the defendant to pay a monthly allowance pendente lite of P50 CA: denied SC: the CA erred in not allowing the defendant to present his evidence for the purpose of determining whether it is sufficient prima facie to overcome the application. Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil., 285). Consequently, as to the child, it is also a defense that it is the fruit of such adulterous relations, for in that case, it would not be the child of the defendant and, hence, would not be entitled to support as such. But as this defense should be established, and not merely alleged, it would be unavailing if proof thereof is not permitted. It is not of course necessary to go fully into the merits of the case, it being sufficient the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered. Although mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application, nevertheless, the failure to accompany the opposition therewith did not justify the court in ignoring said opposition, just because of this omission, inasmuch as an opportunity to present evidence has been asked. It may be that the defendant could not get hold of affidavits in support of his opposition, but he may have on hand other evidence of greater weight. If the defendant has a valid defense which calls for proof, and he asks for an opportunity to present evidence, it is error to deny him this opportunity. The decision rendered by the Court Appeals is reversed, and it is ordered that the petitioner be given an opportunity to present evidence in support of his defense against the application for support pendente lite. 3 De Asis vs. CA, G.R. No. 127578, Feb. 15, 1999 Facts: October 14, 1988: Vircel D. Andres, mother and legal guardian of minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and support of Glen against Manuel de Asis o that Manuel is the father of Glen
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that Manuel refused/failed to provide for the maintenance of Glen despite repeated demands Contentions of Manuel: that Glen is not his child that he cannot be forced to support him then July 4, 1989: Manifestation of Vircel o that Manuel had made a judicial admission/declaration of his denial of paternity o that it seemed futile to continue the claim of support o o dismisses August 8, 1989: Action was dismissed o Both parties agreed to move for the dismissal of the case o Provided that Manuel will withdraw his counterclaim September 7, 1995: Complaint for maintenance and support against Manuel by Glen, represented by Vircel o Manuels motion to dismiss due to res judicata where the Manifestation of Vircel was, in effect, an admission of lack of filiation, which admission binds both parties o Manuels motion was denied because renunciation or waiver of future support is prohibited by law Issue/s: WON action for support is barred by Manifestation Held: NO 1. Manifestation of Vircel is void because the Right to support cannot be renounced or compromised o NCC 301: The right to receive support cannot be renounced, nor can it be transmitted to a third person. Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor. . . . o NCC 2035: Future support cannot be the subject of a compromise. compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: The civil status of persons; The validity of a marriage or legal separation; Any ground for legal separation Future support; The jurisdiction of courts; Future legitime. WHY: Because of the need of the recipient to maintain his existence o He is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. o It is to virtually allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden which is contrary to public policy o The right to life cannot be renounce; hence, support which is the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced. The manifestation amounted to a renunciation o It severed the filiation that gives Glen the right to claim support from his putative parent ; The agreement for the dismissal of the complaint is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced for violating the prohibition against any compromise of the right to support 2. Filiation of Glen must be judicially established and cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties NCC 297: Allowance for support is provisional because the amount may be increased or decreased depending upon the means of the giver and the needs of the recipient 4 Rondina v People, GR 179059, June 13, 2012 That on or about the 15th day of July 1998, RONDINA,raped "AAA" - a sixteen (16) year old lass, against her will. He then threatened her uttering "do not tell your mother or else I will kill you." "AAA" did not immediately tell anyone of her misfortune and just kept on crying. However, it came to the point where she could no longer keep silent so that a few months after the incident, "AAA" finally told her mother "BBB" that Victor raped her. When "BBB" had "AAA" examined by physicians, it was discovered that aside from having healed hymenal lacerations, "AAA" was more or less six months pregnant. Hence, Victor was charged with the crime of rape. During the pendency of the proceedings and after about nine months from the date of the alleged incident, "AAA" gave birth to a baby girl, "CCC," on May 1, 1999. The RTC, In resolving the case, the court held that Rondina is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, and to pay the offended party the sum of P75,000.00 as indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and costs; also to acknowledge the offspring [CCC] and to give her support. Victor filed a Notice of Appeal which was granted by the RTC and the case was subsequently transferred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition. The CA, however, found no compelling reason to depart from the RTCs ruling. Hence, Victor comes to this Court to seek a reversal of his conviction. Topic
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Support The lower courts did not err in convicting Victor of the crime of rape. All told, we hold that neither did the RTC err in finding Victor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape nor did the CA in affirming said conviction. As aptly declared by the appellate court, the prosecution has sufficiently established that Victor had carnal knowledge of "AAA" against her will and consent. We subscribe to the same. Damages awarded The CA was correct in reducing the award of civil indemnity from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00. "In cases of simple rape as in this case, civil indemnity of P50,000.00 is automatically awarded without need of pleading or proof." However, we note that the both the RTC and the CA failed to make an award for exemplary damages. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. "Exemplary damages are intended to serve as deterrent to serious wrongdoings, as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured, or as punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages can be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender." Here, Victor raped a minor, "AAA," with the use of a knife, threatened to kill her and her family if she tells them of her ordeal, and even got her pregnant. Victor should therefore pay AAA exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 in line with existing jurisprudence. Also, interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. Support of the offspring "CCC" The RTC ordered Victor to acknowledge "AAAs" offspring "CCC" and give her support. "Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three different kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to exercise parental authority over his children, no further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the childs status. Hence, [Victor] should only be ordered to indemnify and support the victims child." "The amount [and terms] of support shall be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 20171 of the Family Code." WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 24, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00185 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows: 1) Petitioner Victor Rondina is ordered to pay "AAA" P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. 2) Interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all the damages awarded in this case from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid. 3) Petitioner Victor Rondina is further ordered to give support to "AAAs" offspring, "CCC," in such amount and under such terms to be determined by the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City in a proper proceeding with support arrears to be reckoned from the finality of this Decision. SO ORDERED.
5 Gotardo v Buling, GR 165166, August 15, 2012 On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze.4 In his answer, the petitioner denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze.5 For the parties failure to amicably settle the dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings.6 Trial on the merits ensued. The respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness. Evidence for the respondent showed that she met the petitioner on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte branch where she had been hired as a casual employee, while the petitioner worked as accounting supervisor.7 The petitioner started courting the respondent in the third week of December 1992 and they became sweethearts in the last week of January 1993.8 The petitioner gave the respondent greeting cards on special occasions, such as on Valentines Day and her birthday; she reciprocated his love and took care of him when he was ill.9 Sometime in September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the respondent in the formers rented room in the 286 | P a g e -
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boarding house managed by Rodulfo, the respondents uncle, on Tomas Oppus St., Agbao, Maasin, Southern Leyte.10 The petitioner rented the room from March 1, 1993 to August 30, 1994.11 The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and became more frequent in June 1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, the respondent found out that she was pregnant.12 When told of the pregnancy, the petitioner was happy and made plans to marry the respondent.13 They in fact applied for a marriage license.14 The petitioner even inquired about the costs of a wedding reception and the bridal gown.15 Subsequently, however, the petitioner backed out of the wedding plans.16 The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte for damages against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry.17 Later, however, the petitioner and the respondent amicably settled the case.18 The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995.19 When the petitioner did not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on July 24, 1995 demanding recognition of and support for their child.20 When the petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite.21 The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the imputed paternity,22 claiming that he first had sexual contact with the respondent in the first week of August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he was informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994.23 During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondents motion,24 granted a P2,000.00 monthly child support, retroactive from March 1995.25 THE RTC RULING In its June 25, 2002 decision, the RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffzes filiation. It found the respondents testimony inconsistent on the question of when she had her first sexual contact with the petitioner, i.e., "September 1993" in her direct testimony while "last week of January 1993" during her cross-testimony, and her reason for engaging in sexual contact even after she had refused the petitioners initial marriage proposal. It ordered the respondent to return the amount of support pendente lite erroneously awarded, and to pay P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.26 The respondent appealed the RTC ruling to the CA.27 THE CA RULING In its March 5, 2004 decision, the CA departed from the RTC's appreciation of the respondents testimony, concluding that the latter merely made an honest mistake in her understanding of the questions of the petitioners counsel. It noted that the petitioner and the respondent had sexual relationship even before August 1994; that the respondent had only one boyfriend, the petitioner, from January 1993 to August 1994; and that the petitioners allegation that the respondent had previous relationships with other men remained unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set aside the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order granting a P2,000.00 monthly child support.28 When the CA denied29 the petitioners motion for reconsideration,30 the petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari. THE PETITION The petitioner argues that the CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTCs appreciation of the respondents testimony, and that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove paternity. THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT The respondent submits that the CA correctly explained that the inconsistency in the respondents testimony was due to an incorrect appreciation of the questions asked, and that the record is replete with evidence proving that the petitioner was her lover and that they had several intimate sexual encounters during their relationship, resulting in her pregnancy and Gliffzes birth on March 9, 1995. THE ISSUE The sole issue before us is whether the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the RTCs findings and ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son Gliffze. OUR RULING We do not find any reversible error in the CAs ruling. We have recognized that "[f]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this case) or inheritance. [In paternity cases, the burden of proof] is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child."31 One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.32 We have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which [his] name has been entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court."33 In Herrera v. Alba,34 we stressed that there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties have to 287 | P a g e -
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face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.35 We explained that a prima facie case exists if a woman declares supported by corroborative proof that she had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative father.36 We explained further that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative father are: (1) incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.37 In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception.38 Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship.391wphi1 On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with the respondent, only that it occurred on a much later date than the respondent asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the respondent to have been three (3) months pregnant already in September 1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy.40 However, the petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary support.1wphi1 The petitioners denial cannot overcome the respondents clear and categorical assertions. The petitioner, as the RTC did, made much of the variance between the respondents direct testimony regarding their first sexual contact as "sometime in September 1993" and her cross-testimony when she stated that their first sexual contact was "last week of January 1993," as follows: ATTY. GO CINCO: When did the defendant, according to you, start courting you? A Q A Q A Third week of December 1992. And you accepted him? Last week of January 1993. And by October you already had your sexual intercourse? Last week of January 1993.
COURT: What do you mean by accepting? A I accepted his offer of love.41
We find that the contradictions are for the most part more apparent than real, having resulted from the failure of the respondent to comprehend the question posed, but this misunderstanding was later corrected and satisfactorily explained. Indeed, when confronted for her contradictory statements, the respondent explained that that portion of the transcript of stenographic notes was incorrect and she had brought it to the attention of Atty. Josefino Go Cinco (her former counsel) but the latter took no action on the matter.42 Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and to anchor a conclusion based on these parts. "In ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered."43 Evidently, the totality of the respondent's testimony positively and convincingly shows that no real inconsistency exists. The respondent has consistently asserted that she started intimate sexual relations with the petitioner sometime in September 1993.44 Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.45 Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.46 Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient.47 It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.48 In this case, we sustain the award of P2,000.00 monthly child support, without prejudice to the filing of the proper motion in the RTC for the determination of any support in arrears, considering the needs of the child, Gliffze, during the pendency of this case. WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. The March 5, 2004 decision and the July 27, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 76326 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. 6 Perla v Baring, GR 172471, November 12, 2012 Topic: Who are obliged to provide support Facts: Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and her then minor son, Randy (collectively respondents), filed before the RTC a Complaint6 for support against Antonio. They alleged in said Complaint that Mirasol and Antonio lived together as common-law spouses for two years. As a result of said cohabitation, Randy was born on November 11, 1983. However, when Antonio landed a job as seaman, he abandoned them and failed to give any support to his son. Respondents thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to support Randy. She presented Randys Certificate of Live Birth17 and Baptismal Certificate18 indicating her and Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she and Antonio supplied the information in the said certificates. Randy claimed that he knew Antonio to be the husband of her mother and as his father. During their encounter, Randy called Antonio "Papa" and kissed his hand while the latter hugged him.26 When Randy asked him for support, Antonio promised that he would support him. , Aurora Ducay testified that she knew both Mirasol and Antonio as they were neighbors in Upper Bicutan, Taguig she knew of Mirasols and Antonios relationship because aside 288 | P a g e -
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from seeing Antonio frequenting the house of Mirasol, she asked Antonio about it. In his Answer with Counterclaim,7 Antonio, who is now married and has a family of his own, denied having fathered Randy. Although he admitted to having known Mirasol, he averred that she never became his common-law wife nor was she treated as such. After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision49 dated February 26, 2003 ordering Antonio to support Randy. the Court of Appeals upheld Randys illegitimate filiation based on the certified true copies of his birth certificate and of his baptismal certificate identifying Antonio as his father. According to the appellate court, while these documents do not bear the signature of Antonio, they are proofs that Antonio is the known, imputed and identified father of Randy Issue: whether the lower courts correctly ordered Antonio to support Randy Held: NO. Since respondents complaint for support is anchored on Randys alleged illegitimate filiation to Antonio, the lower courts should have first made a determination of the same. Respondents failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. xxxx Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the father. However, said certificate has no probative value to establish Randys filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same.60 It is settled that "a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate."61 We also cannot lend credence to Mirasols claim that Antonio supplied certain information through Erlinda. Aside from Antonios denial in having any participation in the preparation of the document as well as the absence of his signature thereon, respondents did not present Erlinda to confirm that Antonio indeed supplied certain entries in Randys birth certificate. Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his illegitimate filiation. "[T]o prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. To emphasize, "[t]he fathers conduct towards his son must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to exist."63 Here, except for that singular occasion in which they met, there are no other acts of Antonio treating Randy as his son. Anent Randys baptismal certificate, we cannot agree with the CA that the same is a good proof of Antonios paternity of Randy. Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of participation of the supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this document incompetent to prove paternity.65 Thus, x x x baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same."66 , Mirasol has the burden of proving her affirmative allegation that Antonio is the father of her son Randy. Mirasol to prove that she had sexual intercourse with Antonio prior to the usual period of pregnancy or nine months before the birth of Randy.. However, nothing from Mirasols testimony indicates that she had sexual intercourse with Antonio during that time. She merely testified that she last met with Antonio in 1983 but could not remember the particular month.69 Antonios admission of sexual intercourse with Mirasol does not likewise by any means strengthen respondents theory that he fathered Randy. When Antonio testified as an adverse witness for the respondents, he stated that he had sexual intercourse with Mirasol in February and August of 1981. Later testifying as witness for his own behalf, he mentioned that he had a one night affair with Mirasol which happened in the month of September or October of 1981. Assuming that he indeed had sexual contact with Mirasol on the dates mentioned, still, none of these sexual congresses could have led to the conception of Randy who was born two years later in 1983. All told, it is clear that respondents failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, the order for Antonio to support Randy has no basis. 7 Calderon vs Roxas, G.R. No. 185595, Jan. 09, 2013
FACTS: Petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private respondent Jose Antonio F. Roxas, were married on December 4, 1985 and their union produced four children. On January 16, 1998, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. On May 19, 1998, the trial court issued an Order granting petitioners application for support pendente lite. The Decision in said case declared that "the proceedings and orders issued by the trial court in the application for support pendente lite (and the main complaint for annulment of marriage) in the re-filed case, that is, in Civil Case No. 97-0608 were not rendered null and void by the omission of a statement in the certificate of non-forum shopping regarding the prior filing and dismissal without prejudice of Civil Case No. 97-0523 which involves the same parties." The assailed orders for support pendente lite were thus reinstated and the trial court resumed hearing the main case. The trial court issued an Order dated October 11, 2002 directing private respondent to give support in the amount of P42,292.50 per month starting April 1, 1999 pursuant to the May 19, 1998 Order. Petitioners motion for partial reconsideration of the March 7, 2005 Order was denied on May 4, 2005. On May 16, 2005, the trial court rendered its Decision in Civil Case No. 97-0608 decreeing thus: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring (sic):
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Declaring null and void the marriage between plaintiff Ma.Carmina C. Roxas and defendant Jose Antonio Roxas. Ordering the respondent Jose Antonio Roxas to provide support to the children in the amount of P30,000.00 a month, Petitioner emphasized that she is not appealing the Decision dated May 16, 2005 which had become final as no appeal there from had been brought by the parties or the City Prosecutor or the Solicitor General. Petitioner pointed out that her appeal is "from the RTC Order dated March 7, 2005, issued prior to the rendition of the decision in the main case", as well as the May 4, 2005 Order denying her motion for partial reconsideration. The CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that granting the appeal would disturb the RTC Decision of May 16, 2005 which had long become final and executory. The CA further noted that petitioner failed to avail of the proper remedy to question an interlocutory order. ISSUES: The core issue presented is whether the March 7, 2005 and May 4, 2005 Orders on the matter of support pendente lite are interlocutory or final. HELD: This Court has laid down the distinction between interlocutory and final orders, as follows: x x x A "final" judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes "final" or, to use the established and more distinctive term, "final and executory." Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Courts task of adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is "interlocutory" e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a "final" judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an "interlocutory" order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case. [Emphasis supplied] The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner's appeal was correctly dismissed by the CA. C. Source of support, FC 197-198, cf. FC 49, 70, 94, 121, 122 Art. 197. In case of legitimate ascendants; descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate; and brothers and sisters, whether legitimately or illegitimately related, only the separate property of the person obliged to give support shall be answerable provided that in case the obligor has no separate property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, if financially capable, shall advance the support, which shall be deducted from the share of the spouse obliged upon the liquidation of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership. Art. 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition, the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, specifying the terms of such order. Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties. Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for: (1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support;
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(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; (4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs, upon the community property; (5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during marriage upon the separate property of either spouse used by the family; (6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional or vocational course, or other activity for self-improvement; (7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family; (8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; (9) Antenuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under paragraph (7) of this Article, the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the payment of which shall be considered as advances to be deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the community; and (10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless. If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, except those falling under paragraph (9), the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support; (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have benefited; (4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property; (5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse; (6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other activity for self-improvement; (7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family; (8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; and (9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to groundless. If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership. However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned. 1Lerma v. CA, 61 SCRA 440 Petitioner: Teodoro Lerma Respondents: CA and Concepcion Diaz Nature of the case: Petition for review on certiorari of a resolution of CA FACTS: Lerma and Diaz married on May 19 1951. On August 22, 1969, petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the respondent and a certain Teodoro Ramirez. On Nov 18, 1969, respondent filed with the lower court a complaint against petitioner for legal separation and or separation of properties, custody of their children and support with an urgent petition for support pendent lite for her and their youngest son Gregory The respondents complaint for legal separation is based on two grounds: concubinage and attempt against her life. Petitioner filed
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his opposition to the respondents application for support: defense: adultery charge he had filed against respondent CFI: granted the respondents application for support pendent elite amended: amount from 2,250 to 1,820. Petitioner filed with CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the aforementioned ordersgrave abuse of discretion CA: issued a writ of preliminary injunction to stop Judge Luciano from enforcing said orders. Respondent court then set aside the assailed orders and granted the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence before the lower court. Respondent then moved to reconsider decision on the ground that petitioner had not asked that he be allowed to present evidence in the lower court. But Respondent court set aside the earlier decision, and dismissed the petition and is now the subject of instant proceeding for review (jan 20, 1971) Petitioner filed an urgent motion for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. The court resolved to issue a TRO effective immediately and until further orders from the Court- addressed to Judge Luciano and the representatives. Respondent filed opposition w/ a prayer for immediate lifting of the TRO issued ex parte: grounds of motion; a)an order granting support pendent elite, although interlocutory is immediately executory even if appealed unless enjoined b) dismissal of petition by CA rendered functus oficio the writ of preliminary injunction it had previously issued c)under Art 292 of the NCC: during the proceedings for legal sep or for annulment of marriage, the spouses and children shall be supported from the conjugal partnership propertysuch support is mandatory even if there be showing that the wife is guilty of adultery Note: CFI of Rizal decided the adultery case and found her guilty together with her co-accused, teodoro Ramirez, sentencing them to a term of imprisonmentsecond adultery case with Jose Gochangco ISSUE: Whether adultery is a good defense against the respondents claim for support pendente lite HELD: Resolution of respondent CA (jan 21, 1971) and the orders of the respondent court (JDRC) are all SET ASIDE and their enforcement enjoined, without prejudice to such judgment as may be rendered in the pending action for legal sep between the parties RATIO: 1) adultery is a good defense (Art 292) 2) it is suggested that while adultery may be a defense in an action for personal support. That is support of the wife by the husband from his own funds, it is not a defense when support is taken from the conjugal partnership property 3)during the pendency of the of the legal sep proceeding (support is taken from the conjugal partnership) it does not preclude the loss of such right in certain cases 4) the said article contemplates the pendency of the court action and inferentially at least a prima facie showing that action will prosper 5) ART 100 of CC: legal sep may be claimed only by innocent spouse. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal sep cannot be claimed by either of them 6) Probable failure of the respondents suit for legal sep can be foreseen since she is not an innocent spouse, having been convicted of adultery by the CFI 7) The right to separate support or maintenance even from the conjugal partnership property presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live separately 8)Art 104 of the CC: after the filing of petition for legal sep the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other 9)A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground for legal sep at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as within the intendment of the law granting separate support 10)Art 303: obligation to give support shall cease when the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to his disinheritance 11)Art 921: one act is when a spouse gave cause for legal separationthe loss of the substantive right to support in such situation is incompatible with any claim for support pendente lite 2 Reyes vs Ines-Luciano, 88 SCRA 803 Facts: The private petitioner, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court QC complaint (June 3, 1976) against her husband, Manuel J. C. Reyes, for legal separation on the ground that the defendant had attempted to kill plaintiff (2x) and asked for support pendente lite for her and her three children. The defendant, petitioner herein, opposed the application for support pendente lite on the ground that his wife had committed adultery with her physician. TC: granted plaintiff's prayer for alimony pendente lite in the amount of P5,000.00 a month, later reduced to P4,000.00 (children are in custody of the petitioner) CA: dismissed Issue: Whether she is entitled for support? Y Held:It is true that the adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support however, the alleged adultery of wife must be established by competent evidence. The allegation that the wife has committed adultery will not bar her from the right receive support pendente lite. Adultery is a good defense and if properly proved and sustained wig defeat the action. 7 In the instant case, petitioner did not present any evidence to prove the allegation that his wife, private respondent Celia Ilustre-Reyes, had committed adultery with any person. The petitioner has still the opportunity to adduce evidence on the alleged adultery of his wife when the action for legal separation is heard on the. It is to be noted however, that as pointed out by the respondents in their comment, the "private respondent was not asking support to be taken from petitioner's personal funds or wherewithal, but from the conjugal property which, was her documentary evidence ...". 8 It is, therefore, doubtful whether adultery will affect her right to alimony pendente lite. In Quintana vs. Lerma, 9 the action for support was based on the obligation of the husband to support his wife. In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite it is not necessary to go fully into the merits of the case, it being sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered. Mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application for support pendente lite. 13 It is enough the the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record. 14 The private respondent has submitted documents showing that the corporations controlled by the petitioner have entered into multimillion contracts in projects of the Ministry of Public Highways. Considering the high cost of living due to inflation and the financial ability of the petitioner as shown by the documents of record, We find that the amount of P4,000.00 a month granted by the respondent Judge as alimony pendente lite to the private respondent is not excessive. There is no showing that the respondent Judge has committed a grave abuse of discretion in granting said support. 292 | P a g e -
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D. Order of support, FC 199, 200, 204 Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided: (1) The spouse; (2) The descendants in the nearest degree; (3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and (4) The brothers and sisters. Art. 200. When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided between them in proportion to the resources of each. However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order only one of them to furnish the support provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share due from them. When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally obliged to give it, should the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the order established in the preceding article shall be followed, unless the concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a child subject to parental authority, in which case the child shall be preferred. Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. 3 Mangonon vs. CA, G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006 Facts: - 1975, Maria Belen Mangonon and Private Respondent Delgado married in 1975 - As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent, the marriage was annulled on 1975 - Within 7 months of the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rina and Rica. - Her second husband, Danny Mangonon raised her two twins as Private Respondent Delgado has already abandoned them. - 1994 Belen Mangonon filed for a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support in behalf of her minor children (Rica and Rina) - At the time of the petition, Rica and Rina are about to enter college in the USA. But despite their admission to the universities, they are financially incapable - Petitioner, who earns 1,200 dollars a month, could hardly give general support to the children, much less their required educational support. So they demanded support from Private Respondent. - Respondent Federico failed to sign the birth certificate, hence they need a judicial declaration in order to be legitimated. He said that their legitimacy should first be established before they could claim for support. - Moreover, Federico also said that he is also unable to give support. - Trial court resolved the case and awarded a MEASLY and MICROSCOPIC 5,000 pesos/child. - Petitioner was angered by this and filed the present petition. Issues: Since both the parties are unable to give support, can the grandfather (FRANCISCO) be the one to furnish support? Held: YES. First of all, the twins were able to prove their filiation, because Lolo Francisco wrote letters to them when they were young, and that he himself wrote the surname Delgado in the letters which just means that Lolo Francisco consented to it.On the issue of support, An eminent author on the subject explains that the obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related to the recipient. However, the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do so. Lolo Francisco said that Petitioner has the means to support the children, but this is BELIED by the fact that they obtained huge amounts of loans for them to even enroll at these US universities. Finally and I quote: There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their childrens college education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support should be borne by respondent Francisco. Under Article 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their parents. It bears stressing that respondent Francisco is the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel Commercial, Incorporated, which owns and manages twelve gasoline stations, substantial real estate, and is engaged in shipping, brokerage and freight forwarding. He is also the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel Shipping which does business with Hyundai of Korea. Apart from these, he also owns the Citadel Corporation which, in turn, owns real properties in different parts of the country. He is likewise the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Isla Communication Co. and he owns shares of stocks of Citadel Holdings. In addition, he owns real properties here and abroad.41 It having been established that respondent Francisco has the financial means to support his granddaughters education, he, in lieu of petitioner and respondent Federico, should be held liable for support pendente lite
D. Manner and time of payment, FC 200-208 Art. 200. When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided between them in proportion to the resources of each.
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However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order only one of them to furnish the support provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share due from them. When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally obliged to give it, should the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the order established in the preceding article shall be followed, unless the concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a child subject to parental authority, in which case the child shall be preferred. Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 195 and 196, shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced or increased proportionately, according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same. Art. 203. The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. Support pendente lite may be claimed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Payment shall be made within the first five days of each corresponding month or when the recipient dies, his heirs shall not be obliged to return what he has received in advance. Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (299a) Art. 205. The right to receive support under this Title as well as any money or property obtained as such support shall not be levied upon on attachment or execution. Art. 206. When, without the knowledge of the person obliged to give support, it is given by a stranger, the latter shall have a right to claim the same from the former, unless it appears that he gave it without intention of being reimbursed. Art. 207. When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. This Article shall particularly apply when the father or mother of a child under the age of majority unjustly refuses to support or fails to give support to the child when urgently needed. Art. 208. In case of contractual support or that given by will, the excess in amount beyond that required for legal support shall be subject to levy on attachment or execution. Furthermore, contractual support shall be subject to adjustment whenever modification is necessary due to changes of circumstances manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties. E. Renunciation and Termination, NCC 2035; FC 194 NCC 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil status of persons; (2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation; (4) Future support; (5) The jurisdiction of courts; (6) Future legitime. FC 194. Support compromises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work. G. Support pendente lite, FC 198 Art. 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition, the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, specifying the terms of such order. XVI. PARENTAL AUTHORITY & CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
Concept of parental authority, FC 209, 211 Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall include the
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caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental authority. 1 Medina vs. Makabali, 27 SCRA 502, March 28, 1969 FACTS: Feb. 4, 1961: Petitioner Zenaida Medina gave birth to Jospeh Casero in the Makabali Clinic, owned and operated by respondent Dra.Venancia Makabali. Zenaida left the child with Dra. Makabeli from birth, who took care and reared Joseph as her own son. The Court extracted a promise from Dra. Makabalito to allow the minor a free choice with whom to live with when he reaches 14yo Court held that it was for the childs best interest to be left with his foster mother Zenaida appealed ISSUES: Whether or not the writ to recognize the arrangement should be granted HELD: NO. When our law recognizes the right of parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that in all question on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare shall be paramount (NCC 363) For compelling reasons, even a child under 7may be ordered separated from the mother. The right of parents to the company and custody of the children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of parental duties to provide the children with adequate support, education, moral, intellectual and civic training and development (NCC 356) Zenaida proved remiss in these sacred duties. 2 Unson vs. Navarro, 101 SCRA 183, November 17, 1980 Petition for certiorari to have the order of respondent judge of December 28, 1979 ordering petitioner to produce the child, Maria Teresa Unson, his daughter barely eight years of age, with private respondent Edita N. Araneta and return her to the custody of the later, further obliging petitioner to "continue his support of said daughter by providing for her education and medical needs," allegedly issued without a "hearing" and the reception of testimony in violation of Section 6 of Rule 99. Facts: Petitioner Miguel Unson and private respondent Edita Araneta were married on April 19, 1971 1 and out of that marriage the child in question, Teresa, was born on December 1, 1971. However, on July 13, 1974 they executed an agreement (approve by the court) for the separation of their properties and to live separately, as they have in fact been living separately since June 1972. But there is no specific provision about the custody of the child because the husband and wife would have their own private arrangement in that respect. Issue: Who has better custody? (Unson) Held: It is axiomatic in Our jurisprudence that in controversies regarding the custody of minors the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents. Never has this Court diverted from that criterion. With this premise in view, the Court finds no difficulty in this case in seeing that it is in the best interest of the child Teresa to be freed from the obviously unwholesome, not to say immoral influence, that the situation in which private respondent has placed herself, as admitted by her, might create in the moral and social outlook of Teresa who is now in her formative and most impressionable stage in her life. The fact, that petitioner might have been tolerant about her stay with her mother in the past when she was still too young to distinguish between right and wrong and have her own correct impressions or notions about the unusual and peculiar relationship of her mother with her own uncle-in-law, the husband of her sister's mother, is hardly of any consequence now that she has reached a perilous stage in her life. No respectable father, properly concerned with the moral well-being of his child, specially a girl, can be expected to have a different attitude than petitioner's in this case. Under the circumstances thus shown in the record, the Court finds no alternative than to grant private respondent no more than visitorial rights over the child in question. Anyway, decisions even of this Supreme Court on the custody of minor children are always open to adjustment as the circumstances relevant to the matter may demand in the light of the inflexible criterion We have mentioned above. We deem it a grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge to have acted precipitably in issuing his order of December 28, 1979 here in question. As to the issue of jurisdiction, that is, whether or not, after the decision on separation of properties had become final, the matter of the custody of the child should be the subject of a separate proceeding under Rule 99. We are inclined to agree with respondents that, considering that in the decision on the separation of properties mention is made of support for the child, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, and since under Sec- tion 6 of Rule 99, the matter of the custody of children of separated spouses may be brought before the Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the respondent court had jurisdiction to decide the question of custody here. And as regards the petitioner's claim of denial of hearing and due process before the issuance by respondent judge of his order of December 28, 1979, We find that-petitioner was given sufficient time and opportunity to be heard, as, in fact, he filed his written opposition. With the facts in this case practically uncontroverted, We do not see the need for the calling of witnesses and the hearing of testimony in open court. Transfer of PA, FC 210 cf. FC 223-224, FC 234 Art. 210. Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the cases authorized by law. Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution exercising parental authority, may petition the proper court of the place where the child resides, for an order providing for disciplinary measures over the child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of his choice or appointed
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by the court, and a summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard. However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt such other measures as it may deem just and proper. Art. 224. The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the child for not more than thirty days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes duly accredited by the proper government agency. The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with the care of the child whenever committed but shall provide for his support. Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the court may terminate the commitment of the child whenever just and proper. Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of twenty-one years. Emancipation also takes place: (1) By the marriage of the minor; or (2) By the recording in the Civil Register of an agreement in a public instrument executed by the parent exercising parental authority and the minor at least eighteen years of age. Such emancipation shall be irrevocable. 3 Eslao vs CA, 266 SCRA 317 Facts: Maria Paz and Reynaldo Eslao were married on June 22, 1984 and after the marriage, they stayed with petitioner Teresita, the mother of the husband. Two children were born. Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of Maria's mom while Angelica stayed with her parents at Teresita's house. On August 6, 1990, Reynaldo died. Petitioner wanted to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but Teresita insisted on keeping the child with her in the meantime to assuage her grief due to her son's death. Maria later met James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese American who is an orthodontist and they decided to get married. She joined her new husband in SFO, USA and then later returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her kids and then bring them with her as her new husband is willing to adopt her kids. Teresita, however, refused to give her Angelica because she claims that Maria has already abandoned her. The lower court granted the custody of the minor Angelica to the mother, Maria Paz. CA affirmed this decision. Issue: WON custody of Angelica should be granted to Maria Paz Held: Yes. The child's welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. The mom is married to an Orthodontist who has a lucrative practice of his profession in SFO. In her grandmother's house, the rooms are rented to other persons. The foremost criterion is the physical and moral well being of the child taking into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parties. When the mom entrusted the custody of her minor child to the grandmother, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution which do not appear here Who exercises PA, FC 211-213 cf. FC 49, 102(6). 129 (9)and 63(2), Art. 176 Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental authority. Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply: (6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children.
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Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply: (9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: (2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2); Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.
4 Unson v. Navarro 101 SCRA 183

In Unson III vs. Navarro (101 SCRA 183 [1980]), we laid down the rule that "in all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents"
5 Espiritu & Layug v. CA, G.R. No. 115640 (1995)
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6 Santos Sr. v. C.A., G.R. No. 113054 (1995) Topic: Who exercises Parental Authority Facts: Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987. The wife went to the US and left the husband Leoel Santos and the child. The child has been in the care of his maternal grandparents. Father abducted the son and took him to his hometown. Grandparents file for custody of the child. After an ex parte hearing, trial court gave custody to the grandparents. Father appealed to the CA but CA affirmed the lower courts decision. Issue: WON the father is unfit and thus, substitute parental authority should be granted to grandparents. Held: Parental authority orpatria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the extent required by the latter' s needs. Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. 10 The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. 16 In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. 17 Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent. 18 The situation obtaining in the case at bench is one where the mother of the minor Santos, Jr., is working in the United States while the father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is present. Not only are they physically apart but are also emotionally separated. There has been no decree of legal separation and petitioner's attempt to obtain an annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of his wife has failed. 19 petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents. 22 The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide financial support for his minor son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-laws without permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to the child's custody. Since the father has not been shown to be an unsuitable or unfit parent, there is nothing barring him from custody. His use of deceit in taking the boy away from his grandparents isnt a ground to wrest custody from him. Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced(waiver of parental authority) except in cases authorized by law such as cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to orphans home. Only in cases of the parents death; absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent. 7 David vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 82, November 16, 1995 FACTS: Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a rich businessman. Private respondent is a married man and a father. However, despite this, Daisie and Ramon cohabited Out of this union, Christopher J., was born (on March 9, 1985). Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988. The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife. The children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family. In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed. But after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus. Respondents asserts: a. Law and jurisprudence wherein the question of custody of a minor child may be decided in a habeas corpus case contemplate a situation where the parents are married to each other but are separated b. respondent-appellant is financially well-off, he being a very rich businessman; whereas, petitioner-appellee depends upon her sisters and parents for support. In fact, he financially supported petitioner-appellee and her three minor children. It is, therefore, for the best interest of Christopher J that he should temporarily remain under the custody of respondent-appellant ISSUE: WON the writ of habeas corpus should be granted in demanding the return of the adopted child? HELD: Yes. Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." 3 In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC (reckoning time) , cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the 298 | P a g e -
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child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way `unfit to have custody of her child. Rebuttals of respondnets arguments On A. Rule 1021 1 (the rule on habeas corpus) makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child. Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." On B. Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own since they were born. Petitioner is a market vendor earning from P2,000 to P3,000 per month in 1993 when the RTC decision was rendered. She augments her income by working as secretary at the Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly income of P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her employer so that she can personally attend to her children. She works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up for time lost during the day. That she receives help from her parents and sister for the support of the three children is not a point against her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for every member of the family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it what it is. 1 Briones vs. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004 For review is the August 29, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00467, which affirmed with modification the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) January 21, 2004 Decision2 in Criminal Case No. 99-106, wherein accused-appellant Aida Marquez (Marquez), also known as Aida Pulido, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor as defined and penalized under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 18;3 was sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and was ordered to pay the offended party Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages. On December 28, 1998, Marquez was charged with Kidnapping under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 18, before the RTC, Branch 140 of Makati City.4 The Information reads in part as follows: That on or about the 6th day of September, 1998, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being entrusted with the custody of a minor, JUSTINE BERNADETTE C. MERANO, a three (3) month old baby girl, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously deliberately fail to restore the latter to her parent, CAROLINA CUNANAN y MERANO (sic).5 Marquez pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in her arraignment on October 10, 2002.6 Trial on the merits followed the termination of the pre-trial conference. According to the complainant, Carolina Cunanan Merano (Merano), she met Marquez at the beauty parlor where she was working as a beautician. Merano confessed to easily trusting Marquez because aside from her observation that Marquez was close to her employers, Marquez was also nice to her and her co-employees, and was always giving them food and tip.7 On September 6, 1998, after a trip to a beach in Laguna, Marquez allegedly borrowed Meranos then three-month old daughter Justine Bernadette C. Merano (Justine) to buy her some clothes, milk and food. Merano said she agreed because it was not unusual for Marquez to bring Justine some things whenever she came to the parlor. When Marquez failed to return Justine in the afternoon as promised, Merano went to her employers house to ask them for Marquezs address. However, Merano said that her employers just assured her that Justine will be returned to her soon.8 Merano averred that she searched for her daughter but her efforts were unsuccessful until she received a call from Marquez on November 11, 1998. During that call, Marquez allegedly told Merano that she will return Justine to Merano the following day and that she was not able to do so because her own son was sick and was confined at the hospital. Marquez also allegedly asked Merano for Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for the expenses that she incurred while Justine was with her.9 When the supposed return of Justine did not happen, Merano claimed that she went to Marquezs house, using the sketch that she got from her employers driver, but Marquez was not home. Upon talking to Marquezs maid, Merano learned that Justine was there for only a couple of days. Merano left a note for Marquez telling her that she will file a case against Marquez if Justine is not returned to her.10 Merano afterwards went to see then Mayor Alfredo Lim to ask for his help. Merano said that Mayor Lim referred her to Inspector Eleazar of San Pedro, Laguna, who assigned two police officers to accompany her to Marquezs house. When Merano did not find Justine in Marquezs house, she went back to Inspector Eleazar who told her to come back the following day to confront Marquez whom he will call. Merano came back the next day as instructed but Marquez did not show up.11 On November 17, 1998, Merano gave her sworn statement to the police and filed a complaint against Marquez. On February 11, 1999, Marquez allegedly called Merano up again to tell her to pick up her daughter at Modesto Castillos (Castillo) house in Tiaong, Quezon. The following day, Merano, accompanied by Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Diosdado Fernandez and SPO4 Rapal, went to the house of Castillo in Quezon. Merano claimed that Castillo told her that Marquez sold Justine to him and his wife and that they gave Marquez Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) supposedly for Merano who was asking for money. Castillo even gave Merano a photocopy of the handwritten "Kasunduan" dated May 17, 1998, wherein Merano purportedly gave Justine to the Castillo spouses.12 The Castillos asked Merano not to take Justine as they had grown to love her but Merano refused. However, she was still not able to take Justine home with her because the police advised her to go through the proper process as the Castillos might fight for their right to retain custody of 299 | P a g e -
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Justine.13 Merano then learned from Castillo that in an effort to legalize the adoption of Justine, the Castillos turned over custody of Justine to the Reception and Study Center for Children of the Department of Social Welfare and Development.14 To defend herself, Marquez proffered her own version of what had happened during her testimony.15 Marquez said that she had only formally met Merano on September 6, 1998 although she had known of her for some time already because Merano worked as a beautician at the beauty parlor of Marquezs financier in her real estate business. Marquez alleged that on that day, Merano offered Justine to her for adoption. Marquez told Merano that she was not interested but she could refer her to her friend Modesto Castillo (Castillo). That very same night, while Marquez was taking care of her son who was then confined at the Makati Medical Center, Merano allegedly proceeded to Marquezs house in Laguna and left Justine with Marquezs maid. The following day, while Marquez was at the hospital again, Castillo, accompanied by his mother, went to Marquezs house to pick up Justine. Since Marquez was out, she instructed her maid not to give Justine to Castillo for fear of possible problems. However, she still found Justine gone upon her return home that evening. Marquez allegedly learned of the encounter between the Castillos and Merano when a San Pedro police officer called Marquez to tell her that Merano, accompanied by two police officers, went to Castillos house to get Justine. This was confirmed by Castillo who also called Marquez and told her that Merano offered Justine to him for adoption.16 SPO2 Fernandez, one of the police officers who accompanied Merano to Castillos house in February 1999, was presented by the defense to prove that he was a witness to the execution of a document wherein Merano gave up her right to Justine to the Castillo spouses. Fernandez said that on February 12, 1999, he and SPO4 Rapal accompanied Merano to the house of Castillo where Justine was allegedly being kept. When they arrived at Castillos house, where they found baby Justine, Merano and Castillo talked and after sometime, they arrived at an agreement regarding Justines adoption. SPO2 Fernandez averred that he, Castillo, Merano and SPO4 Rapal left Castillos house to go to a lawyer near Castillos house. After the agreement was put into writing, they all signed the document, entitled "Kasunduan sa Pagtalikod sa Karapatan at Pagpapa-ampon sa Isang Anak,"17 with Castillo and Merano as parties to the agreement, and SPO2 Fernandez and SPO4 Rapal as witnesses. SPO2 Fernandez claimed that he was surprised that Merano gave up Justine for adoption when they supposedly went there to get Justine back.18 On January 21, 2004, the RTC found Marquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused AIDA MARQUEZ a.k.a. AIDA PULIDO, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act. No. 18 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. For the Civil aspect, accused is ordered to pay private complainant FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP50,000.00) for moral damage and TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP20,000.00) for exemplary damage. Costs against the accused.19 The RTC recounted in detail the factual antecedents of the case and made a comprehensive synopsis of the testimonies of all the witnesses presented. In finding for the prosecution, the RTC held that the testimony of the complainant mother, Merano, was enough to convict the accused Marquez because it was credible and was corroborated by documentary evidence.20 On intermediate appellate review, the Court of Appeals was faced with the lone assignment of error as follows: THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR WHEN THE LATTERS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.21 On August 29, 2007, the Court of Appeals found Marquezs appeal to be unmeritorious and affirmed the RTCs decision with modifications on the damages awarded, to wit: WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision, dated January 21 2004, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that nominal damages of P20,000.00 is hereby awarded in addition to the P50,000.00 moral damages, while the award for exemplary damages is accordingly deleted for lack of basis.22 The Court of Appeals, in affirming Marquezs conviction, relied on the satisfaction of the elements of the crime as charged. It said that the conflicting versions of the parties testimonies did not even matter as the fact remained that Marquez had, at the very least, constructive custody over Justine and she failed to return her when demanded to do so. The accused Marquez is now before us, still praying for a reversal of her conviction on the same arguments she submitted to the Court of Appeals.23 After a painstaking scrutiny of the entire records of this case, this Court finds no reason to reverse the courts below. Marquez argues that her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the elements constituting the crime of serious illegal detention or kidnapping are not present in this case.24
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The crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention falls under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, viz: Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: 1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. 2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority. 3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made. 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer. Marquez further contends that it is illogical for her to voluntarily divulge to Merano the whereabouts of Justine, even recommending the assistance of police officers, if she were indeed guilty of kidnapping. Accused is mistaken, if not misled, in her understanding and appreciation of the crime she was charged with and eventually convicted of. A reading of the charge in the information shows that the act imputed to Marquez was not the illegal detention of a person, but involves her deliberate failure to restore a minor baby girl to her parent after being entrusted with said babys custody. Contrary to Marquezs assertions, therefore, she was charged with violation of Article 270, and not Article 267, of the Revised Penal Code. The Revised Penal Code considers it a crime when a person who has been entrusted with the custody of a minor later on deliberately fails to return said minor to his parent or guardian. This may be found in Article 270, which reads: Art. 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who, being entrusted with the custody of a minor person, shall deliberately fail to restore the latter to his parents or guardians.25 This crime has two essential elements: 1. The offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and 2. The offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians.26 This Court, in elucidating on the elements of Article 270, stated that while one of the essential elements of this crime is that the offender was entrusted with the custody of the minor, what is actually being punished is not the kidnapping but the deliberate failure of that person to restore the minor to his parents or guardians.27 As the penalty for such an offense is so severe, the Court further explained what "deliberate" as used in Article 270 means: Indeed, the word deliberate as used in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code must imply something more than mere negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.28 (Emphasis ours.) It is clear from the records of the case that Marquez was entrusted with the custody of Justine. Whether this is due to Meranos version of Marquez borrowing Justine for the day, or due to Marquezs version that Merano left Justine at her house, it is undeniable that in both versions, Marquez agreed to the arrangement, i.e., to temporarily take custody of Justine. It does not matter, for the first element to be present, how long said custody lasted as it cannot be denied that Marquez was the one entrusted with the custody of the minor Justine. Thus, the first element of the crime is satisfied. As to the second element, neither party disputes that on September 6, 1998, the custody of Justine was transferred or entrusted to Marquez. Whether this lasted for months or only for a couple of days, the fact remains that Marquez had, at one point in time, physical and actual custody of Justine. Marquezs deliberate failure to return Justine, a minor at that time, when demanded to do so by the latters mother, shows that the second element is likewise undoubtedly present in this case. Marquezs insistence on Meranos alleged desire and intention to have Justine adopted cannot exonerate her because it has no bearing on her deliberate failure to return Justine to Merano. If it were true that Marquez merely facilitated Justines adoption, then there was no more need for Merano to contact Marquez and vice-versa, since Merano, as Marquez claimed, had direct access to Castillo. The evidence shows, however, that Merano desperately searched for a way to communicate with Marquez. As testified to by both Merano and Marquez, Marquez frequented the beauty parlor where Merano worked in, and yet, curiously, Marquez was nowhere to be found after September 6, 1998. It took Marquez more than two months before communicating with Merano again, after she supposedly 301 | P a g e -
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facilitated the adoption of Justine. If Marquez were indeed surprised to learn about the charges against her, she would have made every effort to clear her name when she found out that there was a standing warrant for her arrest. She would have immediately contacted either Merano or Castillo to confront them on why she was being implicated in their arrangement. Finally, even if it were true that Merano subsequently agreed to have Castillo adopt Justine, as evidenced by the "Kasunduan sa Pagtalikod sa Karapatan at Pagpapaampon sa Isang Anak," this would still not affect Marquezs liability as the crime of kidnapping and failure to return the minor had been fully consummated upon her deliberate failure to return Justine to Merano. Marquez avers that the prosecutions "evidence has fallen short of the quantum of proof required for conviction" and that it has "failed to establish [her] guilt with moral certainty."29 Marquez argues that her testimony was not only straightforward and consistent but also corroborated by a duly respected police officer. She insists that Meranos testimony should not be believed as the only reason Merano filed this charge was because she failed to get the money she demanded from Marquez.30 This Court is constrained to once again reiterate the time-honored maxim that the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the highest respect.31 In People v. Bondoc,32 a case also involving the accuseds failure to return a minor, we explained the rationale of this maxim: We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court. The issue involved in this appeal is one of credibility, and this Court has invariably ruled that the matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is best performed by the trial courts because they, unlike appellate courts, can weigh the testimony of witnesses in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial, except when circumstances of weight or influence were ignored or disregarded by them which does not obtain in the present case. Unless there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight that would have affected the result of the case, this Court will not disturb factual findings of the lower court. Having had the opportunity of observing the demeanor and behavior of witnesses while testifying, the trial court more than this Court is in a better position to gauge their credibility and properly appreciate the relative weight of the often conflicting evidence for both parties. When the issue is one of credibility, the trial court's findings are given great weight on appeal.33 (Emphases ours.) The RTC, in finding Merano credible, stated: Between the two conflicting allegations, the Court, after taking into account all the testimonies and evidences presented by the prosecution and the defense, finds for the prosecution. The lone testimony of the complainant inspired credibility and was corroborated by the documents, to wit, she is the mother of the child and she searched for her child when accused failed to return her baby, filed this complaint when she failed to get her child and she was able to recover the child from the DSWD at its Reception and Study Center for Children (RSCC) as evidenced by the Discharge Slip after accused informed her that the child was with Modesto Castillo. If indeed the complainant had given up or have sold her baby, she would not have exhausted all efforts possible to find her baby. Further, the child would not have been in RSCC but it would have been with Modesto Castillo as per the document allegedly executed by Complainant. The testimony of the complainant was straightforward and devoid of any substantial inconsistencies.34 The RTC found Marquezs defense of denial to be weak. It also outlined the inconsistencies in Marquezs testimonies which further destroyed her credibility. The manner of appreciating the defense of denial was discussed by this Court in this wise: As to the defense of denial, the same is inherently weak. Denial is a self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be given greater weight than that of the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters. Like alibi, denial is an inherently weak defense, which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any ill motive to testify against petitioner.35 Meranos credibility has been established by the trial court, to which the Court of Appeals agreed. This Court finds no reason to depart from these findings, especially since it was the trial court which had the opportunity to evaluate and assess the credibility of the witnesses presented before it. Both courts found Meranos testimony to be straightforward and consistent. Thus, Marquezs denial and inconsistent statements cannot prevail over Meranos positive and credible testimony. Anent Marquezs claim that SPO2 Fernandezs testimony corroborated hers, a perusal of the transcript of SPO2 Fernandezs testimony will reveal that its focus was mainly on how the agreement on Justines adoption came to be. The fact that SPO2 Fernandez may have corroborated Marquezs defense of adoption by testifying that he witnessed how Merano gave up her child for adoption to Castillo is irrelevant. As we have discussed above, the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor had been fully consummated way before the execution of the agreement in February 1999, the validity of which is not in issue before us now. Moreover, even if Merano had indeed given up Justine to Castillo on February 12, 1999, Meranos consent to have Justine adopted in 1999 has no impact on her demand to regain custody of Justine in 1998.1avvphi1 In People v. Bernardo,36 we held that the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code is clearly analogous to illegal and arbitrary detention or arrest, thereby justifying the award of moral damages.
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The award of nominal damages is also allowed under Article 2221 of the New Civil Code which states that: Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. It took Merano almost a year to legally recover her baby. Justine was only three months old when this whole debacle began. She was already nine months old when Merano saw her again. She spent her first birthday at the Reception and Study Center for Children of the Department of Social Welfare and Development.37 Evidently, Meranos right as a parent which was violated and invaded must be vindicated and recognized, thereby justifying the award of nominal damages. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 29, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR. HC No. 00467 finding Aida Marquez GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby AFFIRMED. No Costs. 2 Gualberto vs. Gualberto, G.R. No. 154994. June 28, 2005 When love is lost between spouses and the marriage inevitably results in separation, the bitterest tussle is often over the custody of their children. The Court is now tasked to settle the opposing claims of the parents for custody pendente lite of their child who is less than seven years of age. There being no sufficient proof of any compelling reason to separate the minor from his mother, custody should remain with her. Facts: 2 consolidated petitions. March 12, 2002: Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before RTC Paraaque a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn D. Pablo Gualberto, with an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4-year-old son, minor Rafaello, whom [Joycelyn] allegedly took away with her from the conjugal home and his school when [she] decided to abandon [Crisanto] RTC awarded custody pendente lite of the child to [Crisanto.] CA: child be turned over to Crisanto until the issue was resolved. Issue: Who has rightful custody? Held: Custody of a Minor Child Article 213 of the Family Code31 provides: "ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the court. The court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." This Court has held that when the parents are separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of their child.32 Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads: "Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure. "(Italics supplied) The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be separated from their mother finds its raison detre in the basic need of minor children for their mothers loving care. 33 In explaining the rationale for Article 363 of the Civil Code, the Code Commission stressed thus: "The general rule is recommended in order to avoid a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the good of the child: those cases must indeed be rare, if the mothers heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the (relative) divorce decree will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand the situation." (Report of the Code Commission, p. 12) A similar provision is embodied in Article 8 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603). 34 Article 17 of the same Code is even more explicit in providing for the childs custody under various circumstances, specifically in case the parents are separated. It clearly mandates that "no child under five years of age shall be separated from his mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to do so." The provision is reproduced in its entirety as follows: "Art. 17. Joint Parental Authority. The father and the mother shall exercise jointly just and reasonable parental authority and responsibility over their legitimate or adopted children. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. "In case of the absence or death of either parent, the present or surviving parent shall continue to exercise parental authority over such children, unless in case of the surviving parents remarriage, the court for justifiable reasons, appoints another person as guardian. "In case of separation of his parents, no child under five years of age shall be separated from his mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to do so." (Italics supplied) The above mandates reverberate in Articles 211, 212 and 213 of the Family Code. It is unmistakable from the language of these provisions that Article 21135 was derived from the first sentence of the aforequoted Article 17; Article 212, 36 from the second sentence; and Article 213,37 save for a few additions, from the third sentence. It should be noted that the Family Code has reverted to the Civil Code provision mandating that a child below seven years should not be separated from the mother. 38 Mandatory Character of Article 213 of the Family Code -shall Article 363 CC, Art 213 FC and Sec 6 R 99 RC The Best Interest of the Child a Primary Consideration The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that "[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration."45 The principle of "best interest of the child" pervades Philippine cases involving adoption, guardianship, support, personal status, minors in conflict with the law, and child custody. In these cases, it has long been recognized that in choosing the parent to whom custody is given, the welfare of the minors should always be the paramount consideration. 46 Courts are mandated to take into account all relevant 303 | P a g e -
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circumstances that would have a bearing on the childrens well-being and development. Aside from the material resources and the moral and social situations of each parent, other factors may also be considered to ascertain which one has the capability to attend to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children. 47 Among these factors are the previous care and devotion shown by each of the parents; their religious background, moral uprightness, home environment and time availability; as well as the childrens emotional and educational needs Tender-Age Presumption As pointed out earlier, there is express statutory recognition that, as a general rule, a mother is to be preferred in awarding custody of children under the age of seven. The caveat in Article 213 of the Family Code cannot be ignored, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise.48 The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mothers unfitness. The mother has been declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease.49 Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed been held that under certain circumstances, the mothers immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody.50 But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child. 51 To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental care. 52 Based on the jurisprudence, it is therefore not enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also demonstrate that she carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the childs proper moral development. Such a fact has not been shown here. There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the mothers alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result. Moreover, it is worthy to note that the trial court judge, Helen Bautista-Ricafort, ruled in her May 17, 2002 Order that she had found the "reason stated by [Crisanto] not to be compelling"56 as to suffice as a ground for separating the child from his mother. The judge made this conclusion after personally observing the two of them, both in the courtroom and in her chambers on April 16, 2002, and after a chance to talk to the boy and to observe him firsthand. This assessment, based on her unique opportunity to witness the childs behavior in the presence of each parent, should carry more weight than a mere reliance on the records. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the mothers custody. 3 Salientes vs Salientes, 500 SCRA 128 Facts: Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. Couple lived with parents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes. Respondent has problems w/ in-laws and suggests that they move to his own house. Petitioner refuses and troubles escalate w/ Respondent leaving the household. He was then prevented from seeing his son. Respondent files for habeas corpus w/c RTC grants. Petitioner appeals (motion for recon w/ RTC, certiorari w/ CA) and is denied by both the RTC and the CA.) Petitioner argues that under Article 213[7] of the Family Code, which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise and that there was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his own mother. As such they assert the said writ was void. Respondent argues that Article 213 of the Family Code applies only to the second part of his petition regarding the custody of his son. It does not address the first part, which pertains to his right as the father to see his son w/c is the primary reason for the petition for Habeas Corpus. Moreover he maintains that, under the law, he and petitioner Marie Antonette have shared custody and parental authority over their son (Art. 211). Issues: WON the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the petition for certiorari. Held: NO, the CA did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari because clearly the RTC was correct in issuing the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the instant case where the a lawful parent of the child had been denied the capacity to visit his child. In accordance w/ the arguments dwelling on Art 211 of the FC the SC ruled: Under Article 211[10] of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition.[11] Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him. As such the was correct in attesting to his joint custody and right to visitation of the child and filing the proper action to assert that right 4 People v Marquez, April 13, 2011 For review is the August 29, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00467, which affirmed with modification the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) January 21, 2004 Decision2 in Criminal Case No. 99-106, wherein accused-appellant Aida Marquez (Marquez), also known as Aida Pulido, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor as defined and penalized under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 18;3 was sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and was ordered to pay the offended party Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages.
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On December 28, 1998, Marquez was charged with Kidnapping under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 18, before the RTC, Branch 140 of Makati City.4 The Information reads in part as follows: That on or about the 6th day of September, 1998, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being entrusted with the custody of a minor, JUSTINE BERNADETTE C. MERANO, a three (3) month old baby girl, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously deliberately fail to restore the latter to her parent, CAROLINA CUNANAN y MERANO (sic).5 Marquez pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in her arraignment on October 10, 2002.6 Trial on the merits followed the termination of the pre-trial conference. According to the complainant, Carolina Cunanan Merano (Merano), she met Marquez at the beauty parlor where she was working as a beautician. Merano confessed to easily trusting Marquez because aside from her observation that Marquez was close to her employers, Marquez was also nice to her and her co-employees, and was always giving them food and tip.7 On September 6, 1998, after a trip to a beach in Laguna, Marquez allegedly borrowed Meranos then three-month old daughter Justine Bernadette C. Merano (Justine) to buy her some clothes, milk and food. Merano said she agreed because it was not unusual for Marquez to bring Justine some things whenever she came to the parlor. When Marquez failed to return Justine in the afternoon as promised, Merano went to her employers house to ask them for Marquezs address. However, Merano said that her employers just assured her that Justine will be returned to her soon.8 Merano averred that she searched for her daughter but her efforts were unsuccessful until she received a call from Marquez on November 11, 1998. During that call, Marquez allegedly told Merano that she will return Justine to Merano the following day and that she was not able to do so because her own son was sick and was confined at the hospital. Marquez also allegedly asked Merano for Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for the expenses that she incurred while Justine was with her.9 When the supposed return of Justine did not happen, Merano claimed that she went to Marquezs house, using the sketch that she got from her employers driver, but Marquez was not home. Upon talking to Marquezs maid, Merano learned that Justine was there for only a couple of days. Merano left a note for Marquez telling her that she will file a case against Marquez if Justine is not returned to her.10 Merano afterwards went to see then Mayor Alfredo Lim to ask for his help. Merano said that Mayor Lim referred her to Inspector Eleazar of San Pedro, Laguna, who assigned two police officers to accompany her to Marquezs house. When Merano did not find Justine in Marquezs house, she went back to Inspector Eleazar who told her to come back the following day to confront Marquez whom he will call. Merano came back the next day as instructed but Marquez did not show up.11 On November 17, 1998, Merano gave her sworn statement to the police and filed a complaint against Marquez. On February 11, 1999, Marquez allegedly called Merano up again to tell her to pick up her daughter at Modesto Castillos (Castillo) house in Tiaong, Quezon. The following day, Merano, accompanied by Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Diosdado Fernandez and SPO4 Rapal, went to the house of Castillo in Quezon. Merano claimed that Castillo told her that Marquez sold Justine to him and his wife and that they gave Marquez Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) supposedly for Merano who was asking for money. Castillo even gave Merano a photocopy of the handwritten "Kasunduan" dated May 17, 1998, wherein Merano purportedly gave Justine to the Castillo spouses.12 The Castillos asked Merano not to take Justine as they had grown to love her but Merano refused. However, she was still not able to take Justine home with her because the police advised her to go through the proper process as the Castillos might fight for their right to retain custody of Justine.13 Merano then learned from Castillo that in an effort to legalize the adoption of Justine, the Castillos turned over custody of Justine to the Reception and Study Center for Children of the Department of Social Welfare and Development.14 To defend herself, Marquez proffered her own version of what had happened during her testimony.15 Marquez said that she had only formally met Merano on September 6, 1998 although she had known of her for some time already because Merano worked as a beautician at the beauty parlor of Marquezs financier in her real estate business. Marquez alleged that on that day, Merano offered Justine to her for adoption. Marquez told Merano that she was not interested but she could refer her to her friend Modesto Castillo (Castillo). That very same night, while Marquez was taking care of her son who was then confined at the Makati Medical Center, Merano allegedly proceeded to Marquezs house in Laguna and left Justine with Marquezs maid. The following day, while Marquez was at the hospital again, Castillo, accompanied by his mother, went to Marquezs house to pick up Justine. Since Marquez was out, she instructed her maid not to give Justine to Castillo for fear of possible problems. However, she still found Justine gone upon her return home that evening. Marquez allegedly learned of the encounter between the Castillos and Merano when a San Pedro police officer called Marquez to tell her that Merano, accompanied by two police officers, went to Castillos house to get Justine. This was confirmed by Castillo who also called Marquez and told her that Merano offered Justine to him for adoption.16 SPO2 Fernandez, one of the police officers who accompanied Merano to Castillos house in February 1999, was presented by the defense to prove that he was a witness to the execution of a document wherein Merano gave up her right to Justine to the Castillo spouses. Fernandez said that on February 12, 1999, he and SPO4 Rapal accompanied Merano to the house of Castillo where Justine was allegedly being kept. When they arrived at Castillos house, where they found baby Justine, Merano and Castillo talked and after sometime, they arrived at an agreement regarding Justines adoption. SPO2 Fernandez averred that he, Castillo, Merano and SPO4 Rapal left Castillos house to go to a lawyer near Castillos house. After the agreement was put into writing, they all signed the document, entitled "Kasunduan sa Pagtalikod sa Karapatan at Pagpapa-ampon sa Isang Anak,"17 with Castillo and Merano as parties to the agreement, and SPO2 Fernandez and SPO4 Rapal as witnesses. SPO2 Fernandez claimed that he was surprised that Merano gave up Justine for adoption when they supposedly went there to get Justine back.18 On January 21, 2004, the RTC found Marquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused AIDA MARQUEZ a.k.a. AIDA PULIDO, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act. No. 18 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. For the Civil aspect, accused is ordered to pay private complainant FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP50,000.00) for moral damage and 305 | P a g e -
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TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP20,000.00) for exemplary damage. Costs against the accused.19 The RTC recounted in detail the factual antecedents of the case and made a comprehensive synopsis of the testimonies of all the witnesses presented. In finding for the prosecution, the RTC held that the testimony of the complainant mother, Merano, was enough to convict the accused Marquez because it was credible and was corroborated by documentary evidence.20 On intermediate appellate review, the Court of Appeals was faced with the lone assignment of error as follows: THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR WHEN THE LATTERS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.21 On August 29, 2007, the Court of Appeals found Marquezs appeal to be unmeritorious and affirmed the RTCs decision with modifications on the damages awarded, to wit: WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision, dated January 21 2004, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that nominal damages of P20,000.00 is hereby awarded in addition to the P50,000.00 moral damages, while the award for exemplary damages is accordingly deleted for lack of basis.22 The Court of Appeals, in affirming Marquezs conviction, relied on the satisfaction of the elements of the crime as charged. It said that the conflicting versions of the parties testimonies did not even matter as the fact remained that Marquez had, at the very least, constructive custody over Justine and she failed to return her when demanded to do so. The accused Marquez is now before us, still praying for a reversal of her conviction on the same arguments she submitted to the Court of Appeals.23 After a painstaking scrutiny of the entire records of this case, this Court finds no reason to reverse the courts below. Marquez argues that her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the elements constituting the crime of serious illegal detention or kidnapping are not present in this case.24 The crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention falls under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, viz: Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: 1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. 2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority. 3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made. 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer. Marquez further contends that it is illogical for her to voluntarily divulge to Merano the whereabouts of Justine, even recommending the assistance of police officers, if she were indeed guilty of kidnapping. Accused is mistaken, if not misled, in her understanding and appreciation of the crime she was charged with and eventually convicted of. A reading of the charge in the information shows that the act imputed to Marquez was not the illegal detention of a person, but involves her deliberate failure to restore a minor baby girl to her parent after being entrusted with said babys custody. Contrary to Marquezs assertions, therefore, she was charged with violation of Article 270, and not Article 267, of the Revised Penal Code. The Revised Penal Code considers it a crime when a person who has been entrusted with the custody of a minor later on deliberately fails to return said minor to his parent or guardian. This may be found in Article 270, which reads: Art. 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who, being entrusted with the custody of a minor person, shall deliberately fail to restore the latter to his parents or guardians.25 This crime has two essential elements: 1. The offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and 2. The offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians.26 This Court, in elucidating on the elements of Article 270, stated that while one of the essential elements of this crime is that the offender was entrusted with the custody of the minor, what is actually being punished is not the kidnapping but the deliberate failure of that person to restore the minor to his parents or guardians.27 As the penalty for such an offense is so severe, the Court further explained what "deliberate" as used in Article 270 means: 306 | P a g e -
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Indeed, the word deliberate as used in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code must imply something more than mere negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.28 (Emphasis ours.) It is clear from the records of the case that Marquez was entrusted with the custody of Justine. Whether this is due to Meranos version of Marquez borrowing Justine for the day, or due to Marquezs version that Merano left Justine at her house, it is undeniable that in both versions, Marquez agreed to the arrangement, i.e., to temporarily take custody of Justine. It does not matter, for the first element to be present, how long said custody lasted as it cannot be denied that Marquez was the one entrusted with the custody of the minor Justine. Thus, the first element of the crime is satisfied. As to the second element, neither party disputes that on September 6, 1998, the custody of Justine was transferred or entrusted to Marquez. Whether this lasted for months or only for a couple of days, the fact remains that Marquez had, at one point in time, physical and actual custody of Justine. Marquezs deliberate failure to return Justine, a minor at that time, when demanded to do so by the latters mother, shows that the second element is likewise undoubtedly present in this case. Marquezs insistence on Meranos alleged desire and intention to have Justine adopted cannot exonerate her because it has no bearing on her deliberate failure to return Justine to Merano. If it were true that Marquez merely facilitated Justines adoption, then there was no more need for Merano to contact Marquez and vice-versa, since Merano, as Marquez claimed, had direct access to Castillo. The evidence shows, however, that Merano desperately searched for a way to communicate with Marquez. As testified to by both Merano and Marquez, Marquez frequented the beauty parlor where Merano worked in, and yet, curiously, Marquez was nowhere to be found after September 6, 1998. It took Marquez more than two months before communicating with Merano again, after she supposedly facilitated the adoption of Justine. If Marquez were indeed surprised to learn about the charges against her, she would have made every effort to clear her name when she found out that there was a standing warrant for her arrest. She would have immediately contacted either Merano or Castillo to confront them on why she was being implicated in their arrangement. Finally, even if it were true that Merano subsequently agreed to have Castillo adopt Justine, as evidenced by the "Kasunduan sa Pagtalikod sa Karapatan at Pagpapaampon sa Isang Anak," this would still not affect Marquezs liability as the crime of kidnapping and failure to return the minor had been fully consummated upon her deliberate failure to return Justine to Merano. Marquez avers that the prosecutions "evidence has fallen short of the quantum of proof required for conviction" and that it has "failed to establish [her] guilt with moral certainty."29 Marquez argues that her testimony was not only straightforward and consistent but also corroborated by a duly respected police officer. She insists that Meranos testimony should not be believed as the only reason Merano filed this charge was because she failed to get the money she demanded from Marquez.30 This Court is constrained to once again reiterate the time-honored maxim that the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the highest respect.31 In People v. Bondoc,32 a case also involving the accuseds failure to return a minor, we explained the rationale of this maxim: We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court. The issue involved in this appeal is one of credibility, and this Court has invariably ruled that the matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is best performed by the trial courts because they, unlike appellate courts, can weigh the testimony of witnesses in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial, except when circumstances of weight or influence were ignored or disregarded by them which does not obtain in the present case. Unless there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight that would have affected the result of the case, this Court will not disturb factual findings of the lower court. Having had the opportunity of observing the demeanor and behavior of witnesses while testifying, the trial court more than this Court is in a better position to gauge their credibility and properly appreciate the relative weight of the often conflicting evidence for both parties. When the issue is one of credibility, the trial court's findings are given great weight on appeal.33 (Emphases ours.) The RTC, in finding Merano credible, stated: Between the two conflicting allegations, the Court, after taking into account all the testimonies and evidences presented by the prosecution and the defense, finds for the prosecution. The lone testimony of the complainant inspired credibility and was corroborated by the documents, to wit, she is the mother of the child and she searched for her child when accused failed to return her baby, filed this complaint when she failed to get her child and she was able to recover the child from the DSWD at its Reception and Study Center for Children (RSCC) as evidenced by the Discharge Slip after accused informed her that the child was with Modesto Castillo. If indeed the complainant had given up or have sold her baby, she would not have exhausted all efforts possible to find her baby. Further, the child would not have been in RSCC but it would have been with Modesto Castillo as per the document allegedly executed by Complainant. The testimony of the complainant was straightforward and devoid of any substantial inconsistencies.34 The RTC found Marquezs defense of denial to be weak. It also outlined the inconsistencies in Marquezs testimonies which further destroyed her credibility. The manner of appreciating the defense of denial was discussed by this Court in this wise: As to the defense of denial, the same is inherently weak. Denial is a self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be given greater weight than that of the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters. Like alibi, denial is an inherently weak defense, which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any ill motive to testify against petitioner.35 Meranos credibility has been established by the trial court, to which the Court of Appeals agreed. This Court finds no reason to depart from these findings, especially since it was the trial court which had the opportunity to evaluate and assess the credibility of the witnesses presented before it. Both courts found Meranos testimony to be straightforward and consistent. Thus, Marquezs denial and inconsistent statements cannot prevail over Meranos positive and credible testimony. 307 | P a g e -
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Anent Marquezs claim that SPO2 Fernandezs testimony corroborated hers, a perusal of the transcript of SPO2 Fernandezs testimony will reveal that its focus was mainly on how the agreement on Justines adoption came to be. The fact that SPO2 Fernandez may have corroborated Marquezs defense of adoption by testifying that he witnessed how Merano gave up her child for adoption to Castillo is irrelevant. As we have discussed above, the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor had been fully consummated way before the execution of the agreement in February 1999, the validity of which is not in issue before us now. Moreover, even if Merano had indeed given up Justine to Castillo on February 12, 1999, Meranos consent to have Justine adopted in 1999 has no impact on her demand to regain custody of Justine in 1998.1avvphi1 In People v. Bernardo,36 we held that the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code is clearly analogous to illegal and arbitrary detention or arrest, thereby justifying the award of moral damages. The award of nominal damages is also allowed under Article 2221 of the New Civil Code which states that: Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. It took Merano almost a year to legally recover her baby. Justine was only three months old when this whole debacle began. She was already nine months old when Merano saw her again. She spent her first birthday at the Reception and Study Center for Children of the Department of Social Welfare and Development.37 Evidently, Meranos right as a parent which was violated and invaded must be vindicated and recognized, thereby justifying the award of nominal damages. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 29, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR. HC No. 00467 finding Aida Marquez GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby AFFIRMED. No Costs. D. Substitute PA, FC 212-214, 216, FC 233 Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by the court, taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall exercise the authority. Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated: (1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214; (2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and (3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified. Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed. Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the parents. In no case shall the school administrator, teacher of individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. 5 Vancil vs Belmes, 358 SCRA 707 Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died on 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes. Bonifacia obtained a favorable court decision appointing her as legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent. On August 13, 1987, Helen submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian City. On June 27, 1988, Helen followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing. She also states that at the time the petition was filed, Bonifacia was a resident of Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen. On October 12, 1988, the trial court rejected and denied Helens motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing the RTC. Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the issue revolved around the 308 | P a g e -
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guardianship of Vincent. Issue: Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian? Held: Respondent Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner Bonifacia to be his guardian. Article 211 of the Family Code provides: "Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx." Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, Helen has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. "Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship." (Sagala-Eslao vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 317 [1997]) Bonifacia contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent. Bonifacias claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus: "Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx." In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals (242 SCRA 407 (1995), this Court ruled: "The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent." Bonifacia, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of Helen. Considering that Helen is very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, Bonifacia has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minors guardian, Helens unsuitability. Bonifacia, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that Helen is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia merely insists that Helen is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding. Even assuming that Helen is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still Bonifacia cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. She is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian. There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here. F. Special PA, FC 218-219, FC 233, cf. FC 221 in rel. to NCC 2180 Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable. The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the parents. In no case shall the school administrator, teacher of individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child.
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Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. NCC2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage 6 St. Marys vs. Carpitanos, G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002 Topic: Special Parental Authority Facts: from 13 to 20 February 1995, defendant-appellant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. TC: absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II, held parents and school liable-CA: school liable under A218 and 219, FC, finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them. Issue: WON the school under special parental authority on the students should be held liable as held by the CA Held: We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.[9] Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.[10] For the school to be liable, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must bethe legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury mus tbe a direct and natural sequence of events, unbrokenby intervening efficient causes. The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.-The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva.-Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded.-There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep, and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep.Liability for the accident, whether caused by thenegligence of the minor driver or mechanicaldetachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep ,must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondentVillanueva was an event over which petitioner St.Marys Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. 7 Child Learning Centre vs. Tagario, GR 150920, Nov. 25, 2005
Facts: In the afternoon of March 5, 1991, between 1 and 2 p.m., Timothy entered the boy's comfort room at the third floor of the Marymount building to answer the call of nature. He, however, found himself locked inside and unable to get out. Timothy started to panic and so he banged and kicked the door and yelled several times for help. When no help arrived he decided to open the window to call for help. In the process of opening the window, Timothy went right through and fell down three stories. Timothy was hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious multiple physical injuries.
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CLC further maintained that it had exercised the due care and diligence of a good father of a family to ensure the safety, well-being and convenience of its students. In its defense, CLC maintained that there was nothing defective about the locking mechanism of the door and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence. CLC further maintained that it had exercised the due care and diligence of a good father of a family to ensure the safety, well-being and convenience of its students. After trial, the court a quo found in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners CLC and Spouses Limon to pay. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in toto. Petitioners elevated the case to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, after their motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution of November 23, 2001. ISSUE: WON School failed to exercise diligence of a good father. HELD: The fact, however, that Timothy fell out through the window shows that the door could not be opened from the inside. That sufficiently points to the fact that something was wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant's negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. [11] Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their school toilets are at all times in working condition. The fact that a student had to go through the window, instead of the door, shows that something was wrong with the door. As to the absence of grills on the window, petitioners contend that there was no such requirement under the Building Code. Nevertheless, the fact is that such window, as petitioners themselves point out, was approximately 1.5 meters from the floor, so that it was within reach of a student who finds the regular exit, the door, not functioning. Petitioners, with the due diligence of a good father of the family, should have anticipated that a student, locked in the toilet by a non-working door, would attempt to use the window to call for help or even to get out. Considering all the circumstances, therefore, there is sufficient basis to sustain a finding of liability on petitioners' part. We, however, agree with petitioners that there was no basis to pierce CLC's separate corporate personality 1 Holy Spirit vs. Taguiam, GR 165565, July 14, 2008 Respondent Taguiam was the class adviser of a Grade 5 class of petitioner school. After obtaining permission from the principal, they were allowed to use the school swimming pool for their year-end activity. With this, respondent Taguiam distributed the parents/guardians permit forms to the students. The permit form of student Chiara Mae was unsigned. But because the mother personally brought her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit, Taguiam concluded that the mother allowed her to join. Before the activity started, respondent warned the pupils who did not know how to swim to avoid the deeper area. However, while the pupils were swimming, two of them sneaked out. Respondent went after them to verify where they were going. Unfortunately, while respondent was away, Chiara Mae drowned. When respondent returned, the maintenance man was already administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation on Chiara Mae. She was still alive when respondent rushed her to the General Malvar Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival. The petitioner school conducted a clarificatory hearing to which respondent attended and submitted her Affidavit of Explanation. A month later, petitioner school dismissed respondent on the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence. Issue: Whether or not respondents dismissal on the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence was valid Held: Yes. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, gross and habitual neglect of duties is a valid ground for an employer to terminate an employee. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or a failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances. The SC concluded that respondent had been grossly negligent. First, it is undisputed that Chiara Maes permit form was unsigned. Yet, respondent allowed her to join the activity because she assumed that Chiara Maes mother has allowed her to join it by personally bringing her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit. Second, it was respondents responsibility as Class Adviser to supervise her class in all activities sanctioned by the school. Thus, she should have coordinated with the school to ensure that proper safeguards, such as adequate first aid and sufficient adult personnel, were present during their activity. She should have been mindful of the fact that with the number of pupils involved, it would be impossible for her by herself alone to keep an eye on each one of them. Notably, respondents negligence, although gross, was not habitual. In view of the considerable resultant damage, however, the SC agreed that the cause is sufficient to dismiss respondent. Indeed, the sufficiency of the evidence as well as the resultant damage to the employer should be considered in the dismissal of the employee. In this case, the damage went as far as claiming the life of a child. 2 AquinasSchool v Inton, GR 184202, January 26, 2011 This case is about the private schools liability for the outside catechists act of shoving a student and kicking him on the legs when he 311 | P a g e -
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disobeyed her instruction to remain in his seat and not move around the classroom. Facts: 1998: respondent Jose Luis Inton was a grade 3 student at Aquinas School. Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion teacher who began teaching at that school only in June of that year, taught Jose Luis grade three religion class. July 14, 1998: Yamyamin was writing on the blackboard, Jose Luis left his assigned seat and went over to a classmate to play a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin noticed this and sent Jose Luis back to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis got up again and went over to the same classmate. This time, unable to tolerate the childs behavior, Yamyamin approached Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several times. She also pulled and shoved his head on the classmates seat. Finally, she told the child to stay where he was on that spot of the room and finish copying the notes on the blackboard while seated on the floor. As a result of the incident, respondents Jose and Victoria Inton filed an action for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis against Yamyamin and Aquinas (RTC Pasig). The Intons also filed a criminal action against Yamyamin for violation of RA 7610 to which she pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly. With regard to the action for damages, the Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees. -RTC dismissed Victorias personal claims but ruled in Jose Luis favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages of 25K, exemplary damages of 25K and attorneys fees of 10K plus the costs of suit. 1 Not satisfied, the Intons elevated the case (increase) to the CA. SC: The Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. Under the circumstances, it was quite evident that Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamins teaching methods. The Intons had not refuted the school directress testimony in this regard. Consequently, it was error for the CA to hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin. Of course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct towards the students by their religion teacher. Intons plea for an award of greater amounts of damages -no justification F. Effects of PA over the childs person, FC 220-222, FC 223-224 Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their unemancipated children on wards the following rights and duties: (1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means; (2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding; (3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship; (4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals; (5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests; (6) To demand from them respect and obedience; (7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and (8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians. Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. Art. 222. The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's property or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the child so requires. Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution exercising parental authority, may petition the proper court of the place where the child resides, for an order providing for disciplinary measures over the child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard. However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt such other measures as it may deem just and proper. Art. 224. The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the child for not more than thirty days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes duly accredited by the proper government agency. The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with the care of the child whenever committed but shall provide for his support. Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the court may terminate the commitment of the child whenever just and proper. 3 Cuadra v. Monfort, 35 SCRA 160 Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort were both classmates in Mabini Elementary School Bacolod City. In July 1962, their teacher assigned to weed the school premises. While they were doing so, MT Monfort found a headband and she jokingly shouted it as an earthworm and thereafter tossed it MT Cuadra who was hit in her eye. MT Cuadras eye got infected. She was brought to the hospital; her eyes were attempted to be surgically repaired but she nevertheless got blind in her right eye. MT Cuadras parents sued 312 | P a g e -
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Alfonso Monfort (MT Monforts dad) based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court ruled that Monfort should pay for actual damages (cost of hospitalization), moral damages and attorneys fees. ISSUE: Whether or not Monfort is liable under Article 2180. HELD: No. Article 2180 provides that the father, in case of his incapacity or death, the mother, is responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. In the case at bar there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the Alfonso Monfort could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the childs character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents. JUSTICE BARREDO Dissenting; MT Monfort is already 13 years old and should have known that by jokingly saying aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her, it was likely that something would happen to her friend, as in fact, she was hurt. There is nothing in the record that would indicate that he had properly advised his daughter to behave properly and not to play dangerous jokes on her classmate and playmates, he can be liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. There is nothing in the record to show that he had done anything at all to even try to minimize the damage caused upon by his child 4 Republic v Sagun, GR 187567, February 15, 2012 Accused-appellant Romy Sagun @ Pokpok assails the decision 1 dated April 23, 1993, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, 2 of Cabarroguis, Quirino, in Criminal Case No. 891, finding him guilty of the crime of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay private complainant the amount of P50,000.00 as damages without subsidiary imprisonment. On September 25, 1991, the Provincial Prosecutor, Anthony A. Fox, filed with the court a quo an information, 3 charging accusedappellant of the crime of rape, allegedly committed as follows: That on or about 12:00 o'clock midnight on November 5, 1990, in Barangay Bonifacio, Municipality of Diffun, Province of Quirino, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused ROMY SAGUN alias POKPOK, armed with a bolo, by means of force and intimidation and lewd design, did then and there there (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with MARITESS A. MARZO against her will. CONTRARY TO LAW. During arraignment on June 25, 1992, accused-appellant assisted by his counsel, 4 entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial of the case ensued. The evidence for the prosecution, culled from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, succinctly synthesized in the Appellee's Brief submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General, established the following facts: In the evening of November 5, 1990, Maritess Marzo, single and a third year high school student, was asleep in the room of her boarding house located at Bonifacio St., Diffun, Quirino (p. 2, tsn, July 9, 1992). Fronting said boarding house and separated by a road is the house of Romy Sagun where he and his family reside (p. 3, tsn, March 31, 1993). At about midnight of November 5, 1990, Maritess was awakened by sounds of footsteps approaching her. Maritess shouted but a man whom she recognized as Romy Sagun, her neighbor, poked his bolo at her head (p. 4, tsn, Aug. 11, 1992) and uttered, 'Do not shout or else I will kill you and tomorrow you will not be living any more' (p. 5, supra). Then, Sagun shifted his bolo to the neck of Maritess, who was lying on her side, and started removing her skirt and panty (pp. 7-8, supra). Sagun took off his pants and laid on top of Maritess (p. 10, supra); opened her legs and inserted his organ into Maritess' (p. 12, supra) and started gyrating for about five minutes. Maritess struggled and pushed Sagun but to no avail. Thereafter, Sagun stood up, put on his pants and left (p. 13, supra). Maritess felt that Sagun's male genital partly penetrated her's (p. 15, supra). After Sagun left, Maritess woke up her boardmates and informed them that somebody entered the boarding house but did not reveal that she was raped because of Sagun's death threat (p. 15, supra). The following morning, however, Maritess informed her landlord, Rudy Agsalud that Sagun entered her room and sexually abused her. Rudy Agsalud immediately reported the incident to the police authorities (p. 6, supra). On November 6, 1990 (p. 9, tsn, Aug. 17, 1992), Maritess submitted herself to a medical examination. Dr. Moises Lazaro, the examining physician, testifying on the results of his examination, pertinently declared as follows: QDoctor, you were saying that there was a partial penetration on the vagina. How many centimeters was the deep of the penetration? AAs I said from the opening to the hymen 1-1.5 cm. May be the tip of the penis penetrated the hymen but it did not break the
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hymen. Because we have to consider the circumstance whether there is resistance or force . . . (p.11, supra) 5 Accused-appellant denied having committed said crime. His counter statement of the facts as tersely summarized by the trial court, is as follows: He knows Maritess Marzo, the complainant. She was boarding in the house of Mercedes Agsalud sometime in November 1990. Student at the Quirino State College. Complainant's boarding house is about 45 meters from their house. In the evening of November 5, 1990, he was in their house with his wife and children. Before 9:00 o'clock of the same evening, he had a drinking spree with his nephew. After consuming two bottles of beer grande, he went to buy cigarette. On his way home, he noticed that the door of the boarding house of complainant was opened. She was reviewing. His nephew at that time was already asleep. He entered the boarding house of the complainant, sat down on the chair about four meters from her. Complainant inquired why he entered the house. Told complainant that he just came for a visit because she is a neighbor. Because he was drunk, complainant had to go upstairs. Complainant told him to leave the house or else she will report him to Mrs. Agsalud. With that warning, he went home. He denied the testimony of the complainant to the effect that he threatened her with a bolo, undressed her, removed her panty, mounted at her and had sexual intercourse with her. That there is no truth about the testimony of the complainant because nothing had happened to her. That he does not know why the complainant testified against him. On cross examination, witness testified that he went to the boarding house of the complainant on the alleged night of the incident after a drinking spree with his nephew. That it was only when he was already drunk that gave him the idea of going to the boarding house of the complainant. At that time, he entered the boarding house, complainant was reviewing, she was alone. He went near the complainant to talk to her being a neighbor. That he used to go to the boarding house. He was asking complainant why she was reviewing at that late hour of the night. He was seated near the door of the house while Maritess Marzo was reviewing in the sala of the house. That in the first floor of the house, there are no rooms while the second floor, it has rooms. That the drinking spree took place in his house. That after buying cigarette hed did not go home directly because he dropped by at the boarding house of the complainant. He talked with the complainant. After he was warned that she is going to report his coming in the house of Mrs. Agsalud, he left and that was the time he went home. He told complainant that he was visiting her being a neighbor and sensing that she was mad, he left. On clarificatory question of the court, accused testified that he knows that complainant was alone at that night, and that he entered the house to talk with her considering that she is a neighbor. He entered the boarding house of the complainant because he could not get his sleep that night. He just wanted to talk with the complainant. That he entered the boarding house of Maritess Marzo past 9:00 o'clock that evening. That he does not know of any reason why the complainant filed the case against him. Before November 5, 1990, he never visited Maritess Marzo because she used to go home in their barangay except on November 5, 1990. That he did not have any misunderstanding between Maritess Marzo and her parents before November 5, 1990 neither has he any misunderstanding before November 5, 1990 with Mrs. Agsalud. That he left Quirino sometime on November 9, 1990 in order to have a driving job in Tondo, Manila because his former employer Engr. Valido went abroad. That he came to know for the first time that he was charged for rape when his wife went to Manila before Christmas in 1990. 6 In its decision dated May 10, 1993, the trial court found the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged, and rendered judgment as follows: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the guilt of the accused of the crime charged has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA plus all the accessory penalties provided for by law and to indemnity the complainant Maritess Marzo the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost. The detention of the accused shall be fully credited in his favor. SO ORDERED. 7 Hence, this appeal from the lower court's decision. Significantly, accused-appellant makes only one assignment of error: THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND ERRED N GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND, ON THE BASIS THEREOF, IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED AGAINST HIM AND IN AWARDING DAMAGES AGAINST HIM. In his brief, accused-appellant contends that the trial court gravely erred in giving credence to the testimony of the complainant because it is tainted with inconsistencies and improbabilities. Drawing our attention to the medico-legal findings, he avers that the medical certificate issued by the physician who conducted the physical examination negates complainant's claim of carnal knowledge as her hymen remains intact. He likewise bewails the fact that complainant's acts and deeds the day after the alleged rape was committed are simply incredulous, as no rape victim could have easily recovered from the effects of such a traumatic experience. Thus, at the outset, it may be noted that accused-appellant places at issue the credibility of private complainant, upon whose testimony he was convicted. Once again, however, we have to stress that the matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is best performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses presented at the trial. The trial judge is thereby placed in a vantage position to discriminate finely between what is true and what is false 8 in the versions given by the witnesses of the opposing parties. Appellate courts will not disturb the findings on the credibility, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimony of witnesses, unless it be clearly shown that the trial court had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily certain facts and circumstances of significance in the case. 9 On this score, accusedappellant's plea that it was error to rely on the testimony of the complaining witness is less than persuasive. The crime of rape is essentially one committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, hence it is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced coitus. 10 As a result, conviction may be based justifiably on the plausible testimony of the private 314 | P a g e -
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complainant herself. In the present case, we find the trial court's reliance on the testimony of the complainant based on solid evidentiary grounds. She had no improper motive whatsoever, as admitted by accused-appellant himself, 11 to impute such a very serious offense to him. It is accepted doctrine, that in the absence of evidence of improper motive on the part of the victim to falsely testify against the accused, her testimony deserves credence. 12 The spontaneity of complainant's testimony could not be discredited by mere denials of accused-appellant. For an affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony, especially so when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. 13 Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of nonculpability to merit credence. 14 Furthermore, in the light of the complainant's positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime, the latter's defense of bare denial must necessarily fail, as her positive testimony overrides his negative testimony. 15 Note that accused-appellant's own version of a "friendly visit" he made to complainant in her boarding house on November 5, 1990, puts him squarely at the place and time of the alleged offense. As pointed out by the lower court, complainant testified in a direct and straightforward manner. She even demonstrated in court how she was raped by accused-appellant. Complainant cried when she testified; her tears added poignancy to verity born out of human nature and experience. 16 There was no grave abuse of discretion when the trial court considered the testimony of complainant worthy of full faith and credit, thus: . . . Complainant's detailed and straight forward narration and demonstration in court how she was abused and raped bear the earmarks of truth. There is no showing that she was ill motivated in filing the case against the accused. 17 Moreover, it is simply inconceivable that complaining witness, a 17-year-old lass 18 from a remote barrio in Rafael Palma, Diffun, Quirino, who was inexperienced with the ways of the world, would fabricate a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter submit herself to the indignity of a public trail or endure a lifetime of ridicule, if she had not, in fact, been a victim of rape and deeply motivated by a sincere desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished. As well said, when a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. As borne out by the evidence, complainant was forced to submit to appellant's bestial desires through violence and intimidation. 19 When appellant pointed his bolo at complainant's neck, while he was removing her skirt and underwear, there was indeed force and intimidation directly against her person. When he warned her not to shout unless she wanted to die, his evident intentions to harm her could not be disputed. Even when appellant put down the bolo to remove his pants, the threat and intimidation continued, since he could pick up the bolo anytime, to stab her. In any event, the significant consideration is that, the violence and intimidation were continuous as to engender fear for the safety of her life and limb. Intimidation is said to be addressed to the mind of the victim. It is subjective and its presence cannot be tested by any hard-and-fast rule, but must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the crime. 20 It may be of the moral kind, such as the fear caused by threatening a woman with a knife. 21 It is enough that it produces fear--fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial lust of the accused, something would happen to her at the moment or thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she reports the incident. 22 Intimidation would also explain why sometimes there are no traces of struggle which would indicate that the victim fought off her attacker. 23 Based on the record with the testimony of the complainant in the light of experience and common sense, we entertain no doubt that appellant employed such amount of intimidation and violence sufficient to consummate rape. Appellant admittedly had been drinking and the influence of alcohol on his conduct was undeniable. Moreover, according to the complainant, appellant is much stronger than her. The physical superiority of appellant would show not only when his body violently held down complainant's but also when her mind was subdued by his intimidating words and weapon at hand. Moreover, though a man lays no hand on a woman, yet if by an array of physical forces, he so overpowers her mind that she does not resist, or she ceases resistance through fear of greater harm, the consummation of the sexual act is recognized in jurisprudence as rape. 24 Physical resistance need not be established in rape, when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapist's embrace because of fear for life and personal safety. 25 Undoubtedly, in the present case, complainant could not have safely resisted accused-appellant's unchaste urge as the latter poked the bolo he was holding first at her head, then at her neck. Threats, intimidation, violence, fear and terror all combined to suppress the will to resist, kick, shout or struggle against the rapist. Thus, despite her lack of strong resistance or failure to shout in order to attract the attention of her boardmates, who were just sleeping a few meters away in another room, she could not be considered as giving consent to his attacker's bestial deed. Evidence shows that the appellant had undressed the complainant and forcibly taken off her underwear while he was holding a bolo aimed at her neck, before he took off his pants and had sex with her. The consummation of the offense of rape could not be any clearer. Moreover, settled is the rule that for rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character as to be irresistible. It is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. 26 Appellant would want to capitalize on the fact that there was no full or deep penetration of complainant's vagina to negate the finding that rape had been committed. But penetration of a woman's sex organ is not an element of the crime of rape. Penile invasion of and contact with the labia would suffice. Note that even the briefest of contacts under circumstances of force, intimidation, or unconsciousness is already rape in our jurisdiction. 27 In order to sustain a conviction for rape, penetration of the female genital organ by the male is not indispensable. Neither rupture nor laceration of any part of the woman's genitalia is required. Thus, the fact that the complainant's hymen is intact and there is no sign of laceration will not negate a finding that rape was committed. 28 In this case, what counts is the fact of contact with and penetration of the sexual organ, no matter how slight. 29 There was, therefore, on this point no error on the part of the trial court in concluding that indeed rape has been committed. 315 | P a g e -
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Accused-appellant likewise contends that complainant's acts and deeds after the assault was unnatural and not in accord with the ordinary experience of mankind, for a rape victim usually suffers trauma or even a nervous breakdown. But it has been repeatedly held by the Court, that different people react differently to emotional stress. There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident. The workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable. 30 As held in People v. Luzorata, 31 "this Court indeed has not laid down any rule on how a rape victim should behave immediately after she has been abused. This experience is relative and may be dealt with in any way by the victim depending on the circumstances, but her credibility should not be tainted with any modicum of doubt. Certain victims of rape might never be able to complain or file criminal charges against the rapist. They might bear the ignominy and pain of the offense in private, rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the rapist's making good the threat to kill or hurt the victims. 32 But the silence of the victim of rape, or her failure to disclose her state without loss of time to persons close to her and to report the matter promptly to the authorities, will not perforce warrant the conclusion that she was not sexually molested or that her charges against the accused are baseless, untrue and fabricated. Mere failure to report the incident immediately will not cast doubt on the credibility of the charge. Even if delay could not be attributed to death threats and intimidation made and exercised by the accused on the victim, 33 such failure in making a prompt report to the proper authorities does not destroy the truth per se of the complaint. Moreover, accused-appellant could not capitalize on the minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the complainant, even if they do exist. Such minor inconsistencies tend to bolster, rather than weaken, her credibility for they show that her testimony was not contrived nor rehearsed. Besides, errorless testimony could not be expected when complainant is recounting details of a harrowing experience. No matter how courageous she is, the act of filing a complaint and appearing in court would exact a heavy psychological and social toll on the victim who is usually twice victimized: by the rapist during the act of rape and by misguided elements of society which devalue the victim's worth. She would not be expected to possess total recall and complete composure on the witness stand. To conclude, we find the assigned error in this appeal utterly without basis. The conviction of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape is supported by the prosecution's evidence which could not be overthrown by the accused-appellant's selfserving denials. Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we note that the award of moral damages is in order. 34 They are awarded to victims of rape cases involving young girls between thirteen and nineteen years of age, taking into account the immeasurable havoc wrought on their youthful feminine psyche. 35 Such award is distinct from indemnity awarded to complainant for the injury that she suffers because of the offense committed on her person. In this case, both indemnity and moral damages are justifiably called for. WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the court a quo imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on accused-appellant is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is further ORDERED to pay the complainant indemnity in the amount of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos and moral damages also in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00). Costs against appellant. SO ORDERED. G. Filial privilege, FC 215 Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and grandparents, except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against the descendant or by one parent against the other. H. Effects of PA over the childs property, FC 225-227 RA 9231, Secs. 12-B and 12-C Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians. A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated. The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved. The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply. Art. 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the latter's support and education, unless the title or transfer provides otherwise. The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family. Art. 227. If the parents entrust the management or administration of any of their properties to an unemancipated child, the net proceeds of such property shall belong to the owner. The child shall be given a reasonable monthly allowance in an amount not less than that which the owner would have paid if the administrator were a 316 | P a g e -
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stranger, unless the owner, grants the entire proceeds to the child. In any case, the proceeds thus give in whole or in part shall not be charged to the child's legitime. Republic Act No. 9231 December 19, 2003 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR AND AFFORDING STRONGER PROTECTION FOR THE WORKING CHILD, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACTNO. 7610, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION ACT" Sec. 12-B. Ownership, Usage and Administration of the Working Child's Income. - The wages, salaries, earnings and other income of the working child shall belong to him/her in ownership and shall be set aside primarily for his/her support, education or skills acquisition and secondarily to the collective needs of the family: Provided, That not more than twenty percent (20%) of the child's income may be used for the collective needs of the family. "The income of the working child and/or the property acquired through the work of the child shall be administered by both parents. In the absence or incapacity of either of the parents, the other parent shall administer the same. In case both parents are absent or incapacitated, the order of preference on parental authority as provided for under the Family Code shall apply. "Sec. 12-C. Trust Fund to Preserve Part of the Working Child's Income. - The parent or legal guardian of a working child below eighteen (18) years of age shall set up a trust fund for at least thirty percent (30%) of the earnings of the child whose wages and salaries from work and other income amount to at least two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) annually, for which he/she shall render a semi-annual accounting of the fund to the Department of Labor and Employment, in compliance with the provisions of this Act. The child shall have full control over the trust fund upon reaching the age of majority. 5 Hebron vs. Loyola, G.R. No. 168960, July 5, 2010 Courts, not being omniscient, can only strive to determine what actually and truly transpired based on the evidence before it and the imperfect rules that were designed to assist in establishing the truth in disputed situations. Despite the difficulties in ascertaining the truth, the courts must ultimately decide. In civil cases, its decision must rest on preponderance of admissible evidence.This petition for review assails the February 22, 2005 Decision[1] and the July 7, 2005 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 64105. The CA partially granted the appeal before it and modified the June 22, 1999 Decision [3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite, Branch 20, which ordered the partition of two parcels of land among the seven sets of plaintiffs (respondents herein). Factual Antecedents This case originated from a suit for partition and damages concerning the two parcels of land denominated as Lot Nos. 730 and 879 of the Carmona cadastre. Lot No. 730, with an area of 17,688 square meters, was owned by Remigia Baylon who was married to Januario Loyola. Lot No. 879, with an area of 10,278 square meters was owned by Januario Loyola, the husband of Remigia Baylon. Januario and Remigia had seven children, namely Conrado, Jose, Benjamin, Candida, Soledad, Cristeta and Encarnacion, all surnamed Loyola. The administration of the said lots was entrusted to Encarnacion Loyola-Bautista. All the heirs of Januario and Remigia received their shares in the fruits of the subject properties during Encarnacions administration thereof. With the latters death on September 15, 1969, administration of the subject properties was assumed by her daughter, Amelia Bautista-Hebron, who, after some time, started withholding the shares of Candida and the heirs of Conrado. By the time partition of the said properties was formally demanded on November 4, 1990, Candida was the only one still living among the children of Januario and Remigia. The rest were survived and represented by their respective descendants and children, to wit: Conrado Loyola, by his children, Ruben Loyola, now substituted by his heirs, namely, Josefina, Edgardo, Evelyn, Marina, Aure, Corazon and Joven Francisco, all surnamed Loyola, and respondents Lorenzo Loyola, Candelaria Loyola, Flora Loyola, Nicardo Loyola, Teresita Loyola-Alonza, Vicente Loyola and Rosario Loyola-Lontoc; Jose Loyola, by his children, respondents Serafin Loyola, Bibiano Loyola, Roberto Loyola, Purita Loyola-Lebrudo and Estela Loyola; Benjamin Loyola, by his children, respondents Franco Loyola, Angelo Loyola, Rafael Loyola, Senen Loyola, Perla Loyola-Abad, Ma. Venus Loyola-Ronquillo, Armando Loyola as well as his daughter-in-law by his son, Eduardo Loyola, respondent Carmen Hermosa; Soledad Loyola, by her children, respondents Ester Danico, Eduardo Danico, Mercedita Danico, Honesto Danico, Emelita Danico and Dante Danico; Cristeta Loyola, by her children, respondents Efren Cabigan and Isidro Cabigan; and Encarnacion Loyola-Bautista, by her son, respondent Alfredo Bautista, by petitioner Amelia Bautista-Hebron, and by her daughter-in-law by her son, Alberto Bautista, respondent Felicidad Bautista, and the latters children, respondents Anjanet, Agnes, Ayren and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Bautista. For petitioners failure to heed their formal demand, respondents filed with the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, the complaint for partition and damages from which the instant suit stemmed. While manifesting her conformity to the partition demanded by her coheirs, petitioner claimed in her amended answer that Candida and the heirs of Conrado have already relinquished their shares in consideration of the financial support extended them by her mother, Encarnacion. In the pre-trial order, the trial court consequently limited the issue to be resolved to the veracity of the aforesaid waiver or assignment of shares claimed by petitioner. Trial on the merits then ensued. While conceding their receipt of financial assistance from Encarnacion, Candida and the heirs of Conrado maintained that adequate recompense had been effectively made when they worked without pay at the formers rice mill and household or, in the case of Carmelita Aguinaldo-Manabo, when she subsequently surrendered her earnings as a public school teacher to her said aunt. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court 317 | P a g e -
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On June 22, 1999, the trial court rendered a Decision granting the partition sought. The dispositive portion of the Decision states: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the partition of the following real properties, to wit: 1. The parcel of land known as Lot 730 of the Carmona Cadastre with an area of 17,688 sq. meters more of less; and 2. the parcel of land known as Lot 879 of the Carmona Cadastre with an area of 10,278 sq. meters, more of less among all the seven (7) sets of plaintiffs in seven (7) equal parts. In this regard, the parties are directed within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof to make the partition of the two (2) lots among themselves should they agree, and thereafter, to submit in Court their deed of partition for its confirmation. SO ORDERED.[4] Ruling of the Court of Appeals Petitioner, the defendant in the case before the RTC, appealed the Decision to the CA. The CA found the petitioner entitled to participate in the partition of the subject properties. It stated that petitioners inadvertent exclusion from the partition of the subject properties arose from the trial courts use of the phrase seven (7) sets of plaintiffs in the dispositive portion of the appealed Decision instead of the more accurate seven (7) sets of heirs. The CA however, like the trial court, found that petitioner was not able to prove the existence of the waiver or assignment of their shares by Candida and the heirs of Conrado. The dispositive portion of the Decision states: WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED and the appealed June 22, 1999 decision is, accordingly, MODIFIED to include appellants participation in the partition of the subject parcels as one of the heirs of Encarnacion Loyola-Bautista. The rest is AFFIRMED in toto.[5] The CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. Hence, petitioner elevated the case to us via the present petition for review. Issues Petitioner raises the following issues: I WHETHER X X X THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS SHIFTED TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AMELIA B. HEBRON AND THAT THE LATTER FAILED TO SUBSTANTIATE HER CLAIM WITH PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE. II WHETHER X X X THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT A SPOUSE PRESENT CANNOT RELINQUISH THE SHARES IN THE PARCELS OF LAND IF IT WILL DEPRIVE MINOR CHILDREN OF THEIR HEREDITARY RIGHTS. III WHETHER X X X THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT NO CONCRETE PROOF EVIDENCING THE SALE OR ASSIGNMENT OF SHARES OF CANDIDA LOYOLA-AGUINALDO AND CONRADO LOYOLA IN THE TWO PARCELS OF LAND IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS MOTHER, ENCARNACION LOYOLA-BAUTISTA, HAD BEEN PRESENTED BY PETITIONER DURING THE TRIAL DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF PAROL EVIDENCE BY WAY OF AN EXCEPTION TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. IV WHETHER X X X THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT CANDIDA LOYOLAAGUINALDO AND THE HEIRS OF CONRADO LOYOLA ARE BARRED BY ESTOPPEL IN ASSERTING THAT THEY ARE STILL ENTITLED TO SHARE IN THE QUESTIONED PARCELS OF LAND.[6] Petitioners Arguments Petitioner contends that she has no affirmative allegation to prove, hence, the burden of proof is on respondents and not on her. And if at all, she has proven that Candida and the heirs of Conrado have relinquished their respective shares. She further contends that ownership of inherited properties does not fall under Articles 321 and 323 of the Civil Code and thus, the properties inherited by the children of Conrado can be alienated by their mother, Victorina, in favor of petitioners mother. Petitioner also contends that her parol evidence proved the alleged executed agreement of waiver of shares in the two subject inherited properties in consideration of the educational and other financial support extended by Encarnacion to Candida and Conrados respective families. Finally, petitioner posits that Candida and the heirs of Conrado are estopped by laches from asserting their entitlement to shares in the subject properties. Respondents Arguments On the other hand, respondents argue that Candida and the heirs of Conrado have not relinquished their shares in the litigated properties. They insist that the alleged agreement of relinquishment of shares cannot be proved by parol evidence. They also contend that all the issues raised are factual in nature, and the findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive and thus, may not be the subject of review by the Supreme Court, absent any of the recognized exceptions to the said rule. Our Ruling The petition has no merit. Burden of Proof Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states: Section 1. Burden of Proof.- Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. (Emphasis supplied) From the above provision it is clear that the defendant, not only the plaintiff, also has a burden of proof. The plaintiffs have the duty to establish their claims. And, it is the defendants who have the duty to establish their defenses. Children of the deceased, like Candida and her siblings, are compulsory heirs who are entitled to a share in the properties of the deceased. Art. 980 of the Civil Code states: The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares. The heirs of Conrado are also heirs of Remigia and Januario, being the children of a child of Remigia and Januario; and as such are entitled to their shares in the estate of Remigia and Januario. [7] Petitioner has admitted in her answer that respondents are heirs of Remigia and Januario; [8] and that the two subject properties were left behind by Remigia and Januario.[9] An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof.[10] Hence, we find no error committed by the CA when it affirmed the ruling of the trial court that the burden was on petitioner to establish her affirmative defense of waiver or sale of the shares of Candida and the heirs of Conrado. The defense of petitioner is that Candida and the heirs of Conrado have waived or sold their shares in the subject properties. This alleged fact is denied by the respondents. Hence, this is the fact that is at issue and this alleged fact has to be proven by petitioner, who is the one who raised the said alleged fact. The burden of proof of the defense of waiver or sale is on petitioner. 318 | P a g e -
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Whether petitioner has been able to prove the said fact is undoubtedly a question of fact, not of law. It involves the weighing and calibration of the evidence presented. In the absence of any of the exceptions that call for the Court to do so, the Court will not disturb the factual findings of the RTC that were affirmed by the CA in the present case. Shares of Minor Children The minor children of Conrado inherited by representation in the properties of their grandparents Remigia and Januario. These children, not their mother Victorina, were the co-owners of the inherited properties. Victorina had no authority or had acted beyond her powers in conveying, if she did indeed convey, to the petitioners mother the undivided share of her minor children in the property involved in this case. The powers given to her by the laws as the natural guardian covers only matters of administration and cannot include the power of disposition. She should have first secured the permission of the court before she alienated that portion of the property in question belonging to her minor children.[11] In a number of cases, where the guardians, mothers or grandmothers, did not seek court approval of the sale of properties of their wards, minor children, the Court declared the sales void. [12] Although the CA inaccurately cited Articles 321 and 323 of the Civil Code, its conclusion that Victorina had no capacity to relinquish her childrens shares in the inherited properties was, nevertheless, correct. Evidence of Sale/Waiver of Shares in Real Properties On this factual issue too, we find no reason to disturb the finding of the CA affirming that of the RTC that petitioner failed to prove by preponderance of evidence her alleged fact of relinquishment, by sale or waiver, of the shares of Candida and the heirs of Conrado. Again, the court has no duty to delve into and weigh the pieces of evidence presented by the parties and passed upon by both the RTC and the CA with consistent conclusions on this matter and absent the other exceptions to the general rule. Nevertheless, we did so, but find no error in the findings of the RTC and the CA on this issue. The very sketchy and partly hearsay testimony of petitioner was resoundingly rebutted by the testimonies of the respondents. The hearsay letter of Soledad, self-serving entries of relinquishment in the notebook of accounts and tampered notebook of educational expenses hinting at a relinquishment of shares cannot be given weight. Moreover, these were refuted by the presentation of document embodying the notarized extrajudicial partition establishing no such relinquishment. The evidence does not preponderate in favor of petitioner. Absent a preponderance of evidence on the fact in issue of relinquishment of shares, then Candida and the heirs of Conrado, as admitted heirs of Remigia and Januario, are entitled to their shares in the two subject properties. Laches Laches is the failure of or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it or declined to assert it. [13] In the present case, the book of accounts, showing the record of receipts of some heirs of their shares, has repeated entries in Amelias handwriting that Candida and the heirs of Conrado are no longer entitled to shares in the fruits of the properties in litigation because they have sold or given their share in the said properties to Encarnacion. These entries only prove that Amelia no longer recognized the entitlement of Candida and the heirs of Conrado to their respective shares. It is relevant to note however that the entries in the book of accounts started only on July 17, 1986. Hence, there is definite proof of non-recognition by petitioner of Candida and the heirs of Conrados entitlement to shares in the subject properties starting only on July 17, 1986. Before this time, during the administration of the properties by Encarnacion Loyola-Bautista and some undetermined number of years after her death, Candida and the heirs of Conrado were proven to have been receiving their shares in the fruits of the subject properties. On record is the written demand letter for partition of the litigated properties signed by Candida and the heirs of Conrado dated November 4, 1990. The complaint for partition was subsequently filed on February 23, 1993. From July 17, 1986, to November 4, 1990 only 4 years have elapsed. Even from July 17, 1986 to February 23, 1993 just six years have passed. Considering that the parties are closely related to each other and considering also that the parties are many different heirs, some of whom reside outside the Philippines, the passage of six years before the respondents asked for partition through the court is not unreasonable. We find respondents not guilty of laches. WHEREFORE the petition for review is DENIED. The February 22, 2005 Decision and the July 7, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 64105 are AFFIRMED. 6 Neri v Heirs, GR 194366, October 10, 2012 Topic: Effects of Parental Authority over the childs property Facts: During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven children, two (2) from her first marriage with Gonzalo Illut (Gonzalo), namely: Eutropia and Victoria, and five (5) from her second marriage with Enrique Neri (Enrique), namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa. Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead properties. On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband, Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas, together with Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale8 on July 7, 1979, adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties, and thereafter, conveying them to the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy (spouses Uy)for a consideration of P 80,000.00. On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of saleof the said homestead properties against spouses Uy (later substituted by their heirs)before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.96-28, assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period. In their amended answer with counterclaim, the heirs of Uy countered that the sale took place beyond the 5-year prohibitory period from the issuance of the homestead patents. They also denied knowledge of Eutropia and Victorias exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject properties, and interposed further the defenses of prescription and laches. On October 25, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering, among others, the annulment of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC in its April 27, 2010 Decision and dismissed the complaint of the petitioners. Issue: WON the sale made by the father on the properties of the minor child is valid. Held: The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and 319 | P a g e -
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father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion. Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale, provide: ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance. ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of the childs property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules of Court. Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides: SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. When the property of the child under parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of the childs property, with the duties and obligations of guardians under these Rules, and shall file the petition required by Section 2 hereof. Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration.13 Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the wards property and even then only with courts prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.14 For good reasons, the court may, however, appoint another suitable persons. Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children without the proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority,15 is unenforceable in accordance with Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code. However , in their affidavit, they affirmed the validity of the sale, hence ratified on the part Rosa but not on the part of Douglas. 7 Lindain v. CA, 212 SCRA 725 FACTS: When the plaintiffs were still minors, they were already the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-63540 (Exh. D-1). On November 7, 1966, their mother, Dolores Luluquisin, then already a widow and acting as guardian of her minor children, sold the land for P2,000 under a Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land (Exh. 2) to the defendants spouses Apolonia Valiente and Federico Ila. The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Nueva Ecija. TCT No. NT-66311 was issued to the vendees, Apolonia Valiente and Federico Ila. The defendants admitted that the property in question was sold to them by the mother of the minors as evidenced by a Deed of Sale, the registered owners thereof being all minors, that the property could be sold without the written authority of the court, considering that its value was less than P2,000, they bought the property and had it registered in their names under Certificate of Title No. 66311 Plaintiffs contend, however, that the sale of the lot by their mother to the defendants is null and void because it was made without judicial authority and/or court approval. The defendants, on the other hand, contend that the sale was valid, as the value of the property was less than P2,000, and, considering the ages of plaintiffs now, the youngest being 31 years old at the time of the filing of the complaint, their right to rescind the contract which should have been exercised four (4) years after reaching the age of majority, has already prescribed. On May 25, 1989, the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City rendered a decision Declaring the Deed of Sale executed by the guardian Dolores Luluquisin in favor of the defendants spouses Apolonia Valiente and Federico Il, over the property of the minors covered by the TCT No. NT-66311 to be null and void; Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was reversed ISSUE: WON the property sold worth less than 2,000 owned by the minor children is valid. WON judicial approval was necessary for the sale of the minors' property by their mother HELD: A father or mother acting as legal administrator of the property of the child under parental authority cannot, therefore, dispose of the child's property without judicial authority if it is worth more than P2,000.00, notwithstanding the bond that he has filed for the protection of the child's property. But when the value of such property is less than P2,000.00, the permission of the court for its alienation or disposition may be dispensed with . The father or mother, as the case may be, is allowed by law to alienate or dispose of the same freely, subject only to the restrictions imposed by the scruples of conscience. (p. 64, Rollo.) Art. 320 of the New Civil Code, which was already in force when the assailed transaction occurred, provides: Art. 320.- The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance.
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Under the law, a parent, acting merely as the legal (as distinguished from judicial) administrator of the property of his/her minor children, does not have the power to dispose of, or alienate, the property of said children without judicial approval. The powers and duties of the widow as legal administrator of her minor children's property as provided in Rule 84 by the Rules of Court entitled, "General Powers and Duties of Executors and Administrators" are only powers of possession and management. Her power to sell, mortgage, encumber or otherwise dispose of the property of her minor children must proceed from the court, as provided in Rule 89 which requires court authority and approval. I. Suspension or termination of PA, FC 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, cf 193 cf. RA 6809 Art. 228. Parental authority terminates permanently: (1) Upon the death of the parents; (2) Upon the death of the child; or (3) Upon emancipation of the child. Art. 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority also terminates: (1) Upon adoption of the child; (2) Upon appointment of a general guardian; (3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the purpose; (4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of parental authority; or (5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person exercising parental authority. Art. 230. Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the parent or the person exercising the same of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The authority is automatically reinstated upon service of the penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of the offender. Art. 231. The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related case may also suspend parental authority if the parent or the person exercising the same: (1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty; (2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example; (3) Compels the child to beg; or (4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasciviousness. The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have resulted from culpable negligence of the parent or the person exercising parental authority. lawphi1.net If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child so demands, the court shall deprive the guilty party of parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be proper under the circumstances. The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental authority revived in a case filed for the purpose or in the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor has ceased and will not be repeated. Art. 232. If the person exercising parental authority has subjected the child or allowed him to be subjected to sexual abuse, such person shall be permanently deprived by the court of such authority.(RA 6809 Act lowering the age of majority) XV. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS, FC 356 363 XVI. SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, FC 238-252 Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules provided for in this Title shall apply as regards separation in fact between husband and wife, abandonment by one of the other, and incidents involving parental authority. Chapter 2. Separation in Fact Art. 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicial authorization for a transaction where the consent of the other spouse is required by law but such consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts. The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the transaction, and, if none, shall describe in detail the said transaction and state the reason why the required consent thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court. Art. 240. Claims for damages by either spouse, except costs of the proceedings, may be litigated only in a separate action. Art. 241. Jurisdiction over the petition shall, upon proof of notice to the other spouse, be exercised by the proper court authorized to hear family cases, if one exists, or in the regional trial court or its equivalent sitting in the place where either of the spouses resides. Art. 242. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the other spouse, whose consent to the transaction is required, of said petition, ordering said spouse to show cause why the petition should not be granted, on or before the date set in said notice for the initial conference. The notice shall be accompanied by a copy of the petition and shall be served at the last known address of the spouse concerned.
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Art. 243. A preliminary conference shall be conducted by the judge personally without the parties being assisted by counsel. After the initial conference, if the court deems it useful, the parties may be assisted by counsel at the succeeding conferences and hearings. Art. 244. In case of non-appearance of the spouse whose consent is sought, the court shall inquire into the reasons for his failure to appear, and shall require such appearance, if possible. Art. 245. If, despite all efforts, the attendance of the non-consenting spouse is not secured, the court may proceed ex parte and render judgment as the facts and circumstances may warrant. In any case, the judge shall endeavor to protect the interests of the non-appearing spouse. Art. 246. If the petition is not resolved at the initial conference, said petition shall be decided in a summary hearing on the basis of affidavits, documentary evidence or oral testimonies at the sound discretion of the court. If testimony is needed, the court shall specify the witnesses to be heard and the subject-matter of their testimonies, directing the parties to present said witnesses. Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. Art. 248. The petition for judicial authority to administer or encumber specific separate property of the abandoning spouse and to use the fruits or proceeds thereof for the support of the family shall also be governed by these rules. Chapter 3. Incidents Involving Parental Authority Art. 249. Petitions filed under Articles 223, 225 and 235 of this Code involving parental authority shall be verified.. Art. 250. Such petitions shall be verified and filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides. Art. 251. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individuals, entities or institutions exercising parental authority over the child. Art. 252. The rules in Chapter 2 hereof shall also govern summary proceedings under this Chapter insofar as they are applicable.
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Civil Law Review b22

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B. Absolute community of property (ACP) FC 88, 91, 92, 93 Section 1. General Provisions Art. 88.

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

Reconvey property to Dailo

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda

PLM College of Law Batch 2014 Review Atty. Katrina Legarda